THE CONCEPT OF MODEL IN THOMAS A. SEBEOK’S SEMIOTICS
University of Toronto, Canada
marcel.danesi@utoronto.ca
Abstract
Especially in his later writings, Thomas Sebeok was striving to interconnect semiosis in species in emulation of his great intellectual predecessor, Jakob von Uexküll. In order to liberate semiotics as a discipline from the cultural-ideological orientation it had taken in the decades of the 1960s through to the late 1980s, the era that foregrounded post-structuralism in semiotic analysis, Sebeok brought back the concept of model as conceived by Uexküll and developed by the Tartu School. In my view, his goal was to eliminate jargon and abstruse solipsistic notions from postructuralist semiotics by expanding the paradigm to focus on the nature of semiosis as a model-based and model-generating faculty of the brain and, as consequence, to differentiate anthroposemiosis from zoosemiosis and phytosemiosis. This paper looks at modeling systems theory in the light of new technologies and the evolution of semiosis in the global village.
1. Introduction
The goal of semiotic theory is, essentially, been to figure out how human semiosis unfolds. The theoretical approaches of Ferdinand de Saussure (1916) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1938-1958) stand, to this day, as the main ones for carrying out any type of research on, or debate about, human semiosis. This state of affairs has really never been challenged, nor has the study of semiosis gone significantly beyond the human sphere until the late Thomas A. Sebeok started to formulate a new paradigm for semiotic theory, known as biosemiotics – a movement that continues to reshape the semiotic research agenda. Taking his inspiration from the great biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1909) – whose discovery by mainstream semioticians is due in large part to his efforts – Sebeok forged a point of contact between the scientific study of organisms – biology – and semiotics proper. Von Uexküll argued essentially that every species had different inward and outward realities, called respectively the Innenwelt and the Umwelt, hence the differential semiotic systems that emerge across species. The key to understanding the difference is in the anatomical structure of each species. Animals with widely divergent anatomies do not have access to the same kinds of experiences and perceptions. They access them according to their own biologically-unique constitution. The key to understanding semiosis is to look more closely at how the translation of the Umwelt into the Innenwelt leads to the different forms of knowledge (instinctual or intentional) that each species develops.
Epistemologically, the goal of semiotics is to figure out how the relation of form (X) to content or meaning (Y) takes place. The result of linking the two – X stands for Y – produces, of course, signs. What constitutes a sign? And in what ways are the signs used by humans comparable to or different from the signs or signals used by animals? Is a text or a code a sign, only larger? Starting in the 1960s (Sebeok 1963, 1968) argued that such questions were intrinsically intertwined. To show this, he elaborated a specific version of Modeling Systems Theory (MST), initially associated with the Tartu School (Sebeok 2001; Sebeok and Danesi 2000). The concept of model is, thus, crucial to understanding how semiosis can be studied across species. Semiosis is a concomitant of biological life, and the modeling (sign-making) strategies that it permits vary according to species (Sebeok 1972, 1990, 1991, 1994).
The purpose of this essay is to revisit Sebeok’s concept of model, since I believe that it can truly expand the scientific purview of semiotics. In a special 1999 issue of Semiotica, titled “Biosemiotics,” the biosemiotic movement took its initial cue (Nöth 2001). A basic distinction has since crystallized in the study of semiosis – instinctual versus intentional. Symptoms and many signals are instinctual responses to the world. Each species has its own set of such forms and many of these cut across species. On the other hand, intentionally-created sign forms, such as words, are not based on pure instinctual reactions. They involve a process of inventive creation that is grounded in small-scale reproductions of the world imprinted in sign forms. In effect, they are models of the world. While non-human species may have their own modeling systems, these do not parallel the modeling (reproductive) power of human semiosis.
2. Models and forms
As used commonly, the term model exemplifies, actually, many of the aspects of Sebeok’s definition, given that it is used as a synonym for theory (Black 1962) or to indicate an analogy (a set of billiards balls in casual movement can be employed as a model for gas molecule movement). The term has also been used to define an exemplary paradigm to be followed (Da Vinci’s “Vitruvian Man” constitutes a model of the perfect proportions of the human body), or one to be discarded (the marketplace model of production is harmful to the environment). In each case, however, the term implies some formal structure as a point-of-reference. The term was used by logician Alfred Tarski (1933) as referring to a representation of a mathematical or logical pattern. Even an equation such as the Pythagorean one, c2 = a2 + b2, is a model of, initially, the relation of the sides of a right triangle. It also became a model for testing relations among numbers, known as Pythagorean triples.
Models possess what can be called a “4-E representational structure” – economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and ergonomics. A model, such as a blueprint for a building, is a small-scale version of the building to be constructed. In this sense, it is economical, compressing information into its specific form. The form is thus the specific way in which the architectural process is modeled. The principle of economy implies the related subprinciples of efficiency and effectiveness. A model allows us to “compact” information in a formal way and thus constitutes an efficient means of encoding that information in an effective fashion. As such, the more economical and compacted the model, the more effective it is in representing something. The fourth subprinciple in the 4-E paradigm is that of ergonomics – a term coming out of psychology and sociology in relation to the design of workplaces so that they may provide optimum safety and comfort and thus enhance productivity rates. This notion has been extended to the study of biological systems and to the study of language. It was introduced in 1857 by Woiciech Jastrzębowski and then again in 1949 by British psychologist Hywel Murrell. The basic premise of ergonomics is that the design of things tends towards maximum efficiency. Models are ergonomic if they can be applied back on to the world to see what they yield in terms of maximally utilizing the relevant information. In the biological realm, the human body is designed to seek maximum efficiency in locomotion and rate of motion. It is an ergonomic structure. From our biological needs, we are seemingly impelled to design our own products and artifacts ergonomically – from door handles to the design of chairs for maximum comfort. In sum, a model is effective because it demonstrates these 4-E principles of human representation and communication. In other words, it is our cognitive strategy for recording information economically and then using it efficiently, effectively, and ergonomically.
2.1. Types of models and forms
Semiotics emerged as the study of physical symptoms, when Hippocrates identified the need to understand bodily “marks” (semeion) as a something (X) standing for something else (Y). The semeion is, thus, the body’s natural form indicating some physical aberration, and the objective of medicine is to model this aberration in order to create an efficient and effective diagnostic strategy of how to tackle it. Starting from this historical point, Sebeok then delineated his concept of model as a species-specific ability to produce forms (such as symptoms) to stand for referents (such as bodily processes) that have some relevance to species continuity. The goal of the semiotician is to understand how these model the relevant referents. The use of the term form rather than sign or symptom allows the semiotician to integrate various phenomena that would otherwise have to be assigned to separate categories, even though they may share certain signifying phenomena in common. Thus, a word is form modeling reality in a specific way, but so too is a text, which also models reality, but in a different way. In the human species, forms may be purely imaginary, in which case they are equivalent to mental images, or they may be externalized – that is, given material form – in which case they are representations. The work on sign theory can now be reformulated in terms of four main form types: (1) signs (words, gestures, and so on); (2) texts (stories, theories, and so on); (3) codes (language, music, and so on); and (4) figural assemblages (metaphors, metonyms, and so on). While there have been attempts to integrate these seemingly different signifying phenomena into one overall paradigm of semiosis, they have been, at best, scattered ones, before Sebeok. Given the notion of model and form in Sebeok, these can now be categorized as interrelated, since they are all designed to model something in terms of the X stands for Y relation. A model can now be defined as the overall relation X stands for Y itself and a form as the X component of that relation, since it is something that has been imagined or made externally (through some physical medium) to stand for Y.
Model-making typifies all aspects of human intellectual and social life. Miniature models, blueprints, maps, scientific diagrams, and the like are so common that one hardly ever takes notice of the fact that they are strategies of compressed information. The intriguing question that this reformulation of basic sign theory invariably raises is the following one: What is the function of modeling in life? This question begs, in turn, a whole series of related ones: How is human modeling similar to, or different from, modeling systems in other species? What is the relation between modeling and knowing?
To start answering such questions, Sebeok first provided a generic typology of forms that allow use to distinguish the anthroposemiotic from the zoosemiotic ones (Sebeok 1994):
• Vocal/Nonvocal forms: These are the signals and messages can be transmitted vocally or nonvocally. Bird communication, for instance, is vocal; bee-dancing is nonvocal.
• Verbal/Nonverbal forms: These are linguistic forms such as words, sentences, and so on that are unique to the human species. All other communication systems in Nature are nonverbal. Language is verbal, but not necessarily vocal (for example, it can be communicated also by means of alphabet characters, gestures, and so on).
• Witting/Unwitting forms: Unwitting or unconditioned forms (for example, the signals sent out by pupil responses) are essentially signals; words, many gestures are witting, showing purposeful and intentional behavior. But they can also be used as substitutes for signals.
• Formation/Dissolution: Modeling systems are formed in the organism by exposure to appropriate input in context and are subject to change or even dissolution over time. In all species, other than the human, forms are produced primarily through the biological channel; only human beings have the ability to create forms both through the biological channel and through the cultural one.
As Sebeok argued, it is above all else necessary to distinguish between forms as they occur in Nature or in culture. A symptom is an example of an externalized natural form, that is, a form produced by Nature. Words and symbols, on the other hand, are examples of externalized artificial forms, that is, forms made intentionally by human beings to represent something. Forms stand for something intentionally, and are thus produced by specific kinds of modeling processes. There four general types of forms (Sebeok and Danesi 2000): singularized, composite, cohesive, and connective. These serve many functions in human life. They allow people to model patterns in things; they act as predictive guides or plans for taking actions; they serve as exemplars of specific kinds of phenomena; and the list could go on and on. Thy will be discussed separately below.
The ability to produce and understand what models are is an innate semiosic faculty. When an infant comes into contact with a new object, his or her immediate reaction is to explore it with the senses, that is, to handle it, taste it, smell it, listen to any sounds it might make, and visually observe its features. This exploratory phase of human understanding constitutes a sensory modeling stage. The resulting internal model (mental image) allows the infant to recognize the same object subsequently without having, each time, to explore it over again with his or her sensory system (although the infant often will examine its physical qualities for various other reasons). Now, as the infant grows, he or she starts to engage more and more in modeling behavior that replaces this sensory phase. For instance, he or she starts pointing to the object and/or imitating the sounds it makes, rather than just handling it, tasting it, and so on. These are the child’s first attempts at modeling the world in non instinctual-sensory terms (Morris 1938, 1946). Thereafter, the child’s repertoire of modeling activities increases dramatically, as he or she learns more and more how to refer to the world through the modeling resources to which he or she is exposed in cultural context.
The types of forms discussed above are the end-results of three different, but interrelated, modeling systems, corresponding grosso modo to what Charles Peirce called firstness, secondness, and thirdness. The child’s earliest strategy for knowing an object with his or her senses is, in fact, a firstness strategy. The modeling system that translates firstness sensory forms into models is the primary modeling system (PMS). The PMS can be defined as the instinctive ability to model the sensory or perceptual properties of referents. Needless to say, Peirce referred to this process as iconicity. The child’s subsequent attempts to refer to the object through vocal imitation and/or manual indication constitute a secondness knowing strategy. The modeling system that guides these attempts is the secondary modeling system (SMS). The SMS can be defined as the capacity to refer to objects with extended primary forms and with indexical (indicational) forms. Finally, in learning to use a culture-specific name to refer to an object, the child is engaging in a thirdness form of knowing. His or her ability to do so is dependent upon the tertiary modeling system (TMS), which can be defined as the capacity to acquire and utilize the symbolic resources of culture-specific abstract systems of representation.
2.2. Structural features
The notions inherent in the foregoing discussion can be summarized in terms of six basic principles of semiosis:
1. Representation is the end-result of producing forms of various types to model referents (the modeling principle).
2. Knowledge is indistinguishable from the forms used to encode referents (the representational principle).
3. Modeling unfolds on three levels or dimensions, called primary, secondary, and tertiary (the dimensionality principle).
4. Complex (abstract) forms are derivatives of simpler (more concrete) ones (the extensionality principle).
5. Codels and their referential domains are interconnected to each other (the interconnectedness principle).
6. All models and their forms display the same pattern of structural properties (the structuralist principle).
The representational principle implies simply that in order for something to be known and remembered, it must be assigned some form. The modeling principle asserts that modeling is the activity that underlies representation. The dimensionality principle maintains that there are three dimensions or systems involved in modeling – primary, secondary, and tertiary. The extensionality principle posits that abstract forms are derivatives of more concrete, sense-based forms. The interconnectedness principle asserts that a specific form is interconnected to other forms (words to gestures, diagrams to metaphors, and so on). The structuralist principle claims that certain elemental structural properties characterize all forms. These are: paradigmaticity, syntagmaticity, analogy, synchronicity, diachronicity, and signification.
Paradigmaticity is a minimal differentiation property. To speakers of English, the two words pin and bin are recognized s different signs or forms by a perceptible auditory difference in their initial sounds. This differentiation feature is known in linguistics, of course, as phonemic opposition. Similarly, in classical Western music, a major chord is perceivable as distinct from a minor one in the same key by virtue of a half tone difference in the middle tone of the chord. As such examples show, paradigmaticity is definable as the property of forms whereby some minimal feature is sufficient to keep them differentiated from all other forms of the same kind. Syntagmaticity is a combinatory property of forms. Forms such as tpin, tpill, tpit, and tpeak, for instance, would not be legitimate words in English because the initial sequence [tp] + [vowel] is not characteristic of English word-formation, whereas words beginning with [sp] + [vowel] would: spin, spill, spit, speak. This combinatory feature of words is called, of course, syllable structure. Similarly, a major chord is recognizable as such only if the three tones are combined in a specific way: [tonic] + [median] + [dominant]. Syntagmaticity is definable as the property whereby the components of a form are combinable in some specifiable way.
Analogy is an equivalence property, by which one type of form can be replaced by another that is perceived as being comparable to it. The English word cat is analogous to the Spanish word gato; European playing cards can replace American cards if an analogy is made between European and American suits; Roman numerals can replace Hindu-Arabic numerals through simple conversion; and so on. Synchronicity refers to the fact that forms are constructed at a given point in time for some particular purpose or function; and diachronicity to the fact that they undergo change over time. The change is not random, but rather, governed by both structural tendencies characterizing the code to which forms belong and external contextual (social, situational, and so on) influences. Finally, signification refers to the relation that is established between a form and its meaning. It is, more strictly, the relation that holds between the physical make-up of the form itself, the signifier, and the referent or referential domain to which it calls attention, namely the signified, to use Saussurean (1916) terminology.
Of course, these are all well-known notions within semiotics. But Sebeok’s reworking of the notions in the context of his concept of modeling gives them a much more scientific rigor, showing how they underlie the structural formation of models. The key concept in semiotics has, in fact, always been that no single form can bear meaning unless it enters into systematic connections with other forms. The method of inquiry implicit in Sebeok’s semiotics is thus different from the traditional linguistic-philosophical approach basically in seeing how sign forms and signifying processes constitute interrelated modeling phenomena.
3. Form types
As mentioned, Sebeok and Danesi (2001) identified four main types of forms resulting from specific types of modeling processes and needs. These are called singularized, composite, cohesive, and connective. In effect, these are inclusive of the many various and scattered signifying phenomena in the relevant literature, from individual words to metaphorical utterances, allowing for a classification and explication under the same phenomenological and epistemological rubric – modeling.
3.1. Singularized forms
In traditional semiotic theory singularized forms are called signs. In Sebeok’s framework, a singularized form can be defined, more precisely, as a form that has been made specifically to represent a singular (unitary) referent or referential domain. Singularized forms can be verbal or nonverbal. The English word cat, or the equivalent Spanish word gato, for example, are verbal singularized forms standing for the referent (carnivorous mammal with a tail, whiskers, and retractile claws); a drawing of a house cat is its nonverbal (visual) equivalent.
Singularized forms include gestures, bodily postures, facial expressions, tones of voice, visual forms (such as drawn figures), words, intonation patterns, and graphic forms (alphabetic, ideographic, and so on). Singularized modeling is a general strategy for giving the perception of single objects, unitary events, individual feelings, and so on a specific form (Sebeok 1994). These are, in effect, “recognition-enhancing forms,” which allow for the detection of relevant incoming sensory information in a structure-making fashion. Clearly, they economize on the referential domain by translating it into a discernible model of that domain. Throughout the history of semiotics, there have been several attempts to identify and classify these forms. Among these, Peirce’s typology with sixty-six varieties is surely the most comprehensive, far-reaching, and sophisticated of all such attempts. In the verbal domain, one can also mention Roman Jakobson’s (1970) classificatory system, which has shed considerable light on the minutiae of verbal modeling. Ignoring the minutiae for the sake of simplicity, six general categories of singularized forms can be extrapolated from the relevant literature. These are: the symptom, the signal, the icon, the index, the symbol, and the name.
A symptom is a natural singularized sign, recognizable by virtue of the fact that its form is related to its referent inside the body’s morphology. It is a manifestation of some altered physical (histological, cytological, and so on) process, ranging from a painful sensation (such as headache or backache), to a visible condition (such as a swelling or a rash), or change in body temperature. A group of symptoms that collectively characterize a disease or disorder is called a syndrome. A syndrome is, therefore, a composite form (see below). It is a peculiarity of symptoms that their meanings are generally different for the patient (subjective symptoms) than they are typically for the physician (objective symptoms).
The signal is a singularized form that naturally or conventionally (artificially) triggers some reaction on the part of a receiver. Carpenter (1969: 44), a prominent researcher of animal behavior, defined a signal as “a condensed stimulus event, a part of a longer whole, which may arouse extended actions.” All animals are endowed with the capacity to use and respond to species-specific signals for survival. Birds, for instance, are born with the instinctive capacity to produce a particular type of coo, and no amount of exposure to the songs of other species, or the absence of their own, has any effect on their cooing forms. A bird reared in isolation, in fact, will sing a very simple outline of the sort of coo that would develop naturally in that bird born in the wild. This does not mean, however, that animal signaling is not subject to environmental or adaptation factors. Many bird species have also developed regional cooing “dialects” by apparently imitating each other. A large portion of communication among humans also unfolds largely in the form of unwitting bodily signaling. Humans are capable as well of deploying witting signals for some psychosocial purpose – for example, nodding, winking, glancing, looking, nudging, kicking, head tilting. As the linguist Karl Bühler (1934: 28) aptly observed, such signals act like social regulators, eliciting or inhibiting some action or reaction. Artificial, mechanical, or electronic signaling systems have also been created for conventional social purposes. The list of such systems is extensive, and includes smoke signals, semaphores, telegraph signals, warning lights, flares, alarms, sirens, bleepers, buzzers, knocking, bells, and so on.
An iconic singularized form results when the modeling process employed in its creation involves some form of simulation. It is a primary singularized form that displays a perceptible resemblance between the form and its referent. Roman numerals are iconic singularized forms because they imitate their referents in a visual way (one stroke = one unit, two strokes = two units, three strokes = three units); onomatopoeic words (boom, zap, whack, and so on) are also singularized iconic forms because they constitute attempts to portray their referents in an acoustic way; and the list could go on and on. There are manifestations of iconicity in zoosemiotic behavior as well, involving virtually all types of sensory channels – chemical, auditory, visual, and so on. An elegant (if sometimes disputed) example of a complex form of signaling behavior that evolved, as it were, to function as a visual iconic form is graphically described by Kloft (1959). Kloft suggested that the hind end of an aphid’s abdomen, and the kicking of its hind legs, constituted, for an ant worker, an iconic signifier, standing for the head of another ant together with its antennae movement. The ant can purportedly identify the likeness (the near end of the aphid) with its meaning (the front end of an ant), and act on this information, that is, treat the aphid in the manner of an effigy, which is a visual icon.
An indexical singularized form results when the focus of the modeling strategy is the location of a referent in space, time, or in relation to some other referent. In one of his most memorable illustrative examples, Peirce referred to the footprint that Robinson Crusoe – the character created by British novelist Daniel Defoe in his 1719 novel of the same name – found in the sand, which was interpreted by Crusoe as an index of some creature. A vast map of such indexical marks is imprinted onto substances by animals of all sorts (Ennion and Tinbergen 1967: 5). Singularized indexical forms do not resemble their referents, like icons do; rather, they indicate or show where they are in relational terms. The most typical manifestation of indexicality is the pointing index finger, which humans the world over use instinctively to point out and locate things, people, and events in the world. Many words, are substitutes for such concrete indexicality: for example, here, there, up, down, and so on.
A singularized form is symbolic when the modeling process employed in its creation is constrained by cultural or historical factors. Any formal feature or element – an object, a sound, a figure, and so on – can be used symbolically. For example, a cross figure can stand for the concept “Christianity;” a V-sign made with the index and middle fingers can stand for the concept “peace;” the color white can stand for “cleanliness,” “purity,” “innocence,” and the list could go on and on. The ability to model the world symbolically is evidence that human consciousness is not only attentive to sensible properties (resulting in iconic modeling activities), and to spatiotemporal and relational patterns (resulting in indexical modeling activities), but also to all kinds of referents (actual and potential) in and of themselves.
Finally, a name is a singularized form that identifies a human being (Alexander, Sarah, Charlotte) or, by connotative extension, an animal, an object (such as a commercial product, a boat), an animal (such as a horse, a pet), or event (such as a hurricane). A name has both indexical and symbolic properties: it is partly an indexical form because it identifies a person and, usually, points to his or her ethnic origin; it is partly a symbolic form because, like any word, it is a product of conventionalized representational practices. It is thus an indexical model of ethnicity and origins, which is imprinted in the phonology and morphology of the form itself.
3.2. Composite forms
Now, a description of the cat referent above as a popular household pet that is useful for killing mice and rats constitutes, clearly, a different kind of form. This is known traditionally as a text. A text can be defined, more specifically, as a composite form; that is, as a form that has been made to represent various aspects of a referent or referential domain in a composite (combinatory) manner. A singularized form models something that can be identified as consisting of unitary structure; a composite form, on the other hand, has been made to model something by means of combinations of elements or forms to represent something that has compositional structure. Sentences, drawings, narratives, theories, conversations, and so on are all examples of composite forms. These are constructed in such a way (paradigmatically, syntagmactically, and so on) so that fit together structurally, but which are, as a whole, different from any of their constituent forms taken individually. A novel, for instance, is made up of words following one after the other. But conceptually it is not just the sum of the meanings of the words; rather, a novel constitutes a composite form that generates its own interpretation(s). Drawings, theories, and other composite forms are interpreted in this fashion. For instance, when asked what the theory of relativity is all about, people will typically couch their answer as follows: “It explains how time and space are interrelated.” One can, of course, relate the signifying parts to each other in an interpretive discussion of the text. This is, in fact, what people do when they discuss a novel’s meaning by referring to parts of the novel, to its plot, to its characters, and so on. But in all such discussions, the parts are related to the overall referent extracted from it, rather than seen as separate from it.
There are as many types of composite forms as there are singularized ones. For example, syndromes are, as mentioned, composite forms which collectively indicate or characterize a disease, a psychological disorder, or some other abnormal condition. An example of an iconic composite form is an imitative drawing of a scene or a portrait of someone. An indexical composite form, such as a topographical map, is one that is constructed to refer to spatial or temporal phenomena in an integrative relational way. A symbolic composite form, such as a mathematical formula, is a text that is made with the symbolic resources of mathematics. Finally, a composite name consists of several identifiers (for example, given name + surname) providing various kinds of culture-specific information – that is, where the person is from, what his or her parentage is, and so on. Composite modeling is not a specific capacity of human semiosis. It is found in other species. One well-known example is the honeybee dance. Worker honeybees returning to the hive from foraging trips inform the other bees in the hive about the direction, distance, and quality of the food with amazing accuracy through movement sequences which biologists call a “dance,” in obvious analogy to human dancing. The remarkable thing about the dance is that it appears to share with human representation the feature of displacement, that is, of conveying information in the absence of the referential domain to which it calls attention.
3.3. Cohesive forms
Classifying a cat in the same category as a tiger, lion, jaguar, leopard, cheetah, and so on exemplifies a third type of modeling strategy – namely, the tendency to codify types of forms in some cohesive fashion. A code can be defined as a system that allows for the representation of referents perceived to share common traits. Codes consist of interrelated forms, making up a cohesive whole, which can be deployed to model types of phenomena in specific ways (for example, mammals of a certain type).
A cohesive modeling system provides particular types of forms (singularized and composite) that can be used in various ways and for diverse representational purposes. It can be compared to a computer program or to a common recipe. The former consists of a set of instructions that the computer can recognize and execute converting information from one form into another; the latter of a set of directions for preparing something to eat or drink by combining various ingredients. A language code, for instance, provides a set of phonetic, grammatical, and lexical “instructions” that the producers and interpreters of words and verbal texts can recognize and convert into messages. Generally speaking, for some particular representational need there is an optimum code or set of codes that can be deployed. For example, the composer of an operatic text will need to deploy at least three code-making sources in the construction of his or her text: the musical code, the verbal code, and the theater code (all in place at the time of the composition).
There are as many types of cohesive modeling systems as there are signs or texts. For example, the body’s immune system is a natural code consisting of interacting organs, tissues, cells, and cell products such as antibodies which not only neutralize potentially pathogenic organisms or substances, but also allow one to become aware of the difference between Self and “non-Self” (the external world). It is the code that undergirds the symptomatology of diseases. An example of a simple mechanical (artificial) signaling code is the common traffic light system: a red light, green light, or yellow light inform a driver or pedestrian to stop, move forward, or slow down respectively. The Roman numeral system is an example of an artificial code fashioned in part iconically. An example of an indexical code is the system of street signs used typically to regulate and guide traffic. These signs provide information, among other things, about the distance of certain places from specific locations, about the direction one is traveling in, and so on. An example of a simple symbolic code is the Morse code. This allowed people in the not-too-distant past to make verbal texts with dots and dashes (a dash is equal to three dots in duration) which were transmitted by a flash lamp, telegraph key, or other device. A letter or a number was represented (conventionally) by a combination of dashes and dots.
3.4 Connective forms
Finally, the use of the word cat in an expression like “Alexander is a cool cat” is the result of a modeling strategy known traditionally as figurative or figural. It constitutes a connective form resulting from the linkage of different types of referents (or referential domains) – a human referent with a feline referent. Much has been written recently on connective forms (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Gibbs 1994; Goatley 1997; Danesi 2001). Suffice it to say here that they exemplify what Peirce called an abductive force in the making of new information or in the repackaging of already-known information.
In essence, connective forms result when abstract concepts are represented in terms of concrete ones. The conceptual metaphor thinking is seeing, for example, is a connective form because it delivers the abstract concept of thinking in terms of forms associated with the concrete concept of seeing:
1. He does not see what possible use those ideas might have.
2. My brother can’t quite visualize what that new idea is all about.
3. Just look at the professor’s new theory; it is really something!
4. I view his theory differently from you.
These are primary connective models, that is, they connect an abstract concept such as ideas directly with a concrete referent (seeing). This can be called the primary “layer” of connectivity. Once it has been formed in a language’s conceptual reservoir, then the primary layer becomes itself a new productive source domain for creating a higher (= more abstract) layer of concepts. This has been called the layering principle elsewhere (Danesi 2001). The models resulting from further abstract linkages are indexical, that is, they point to previous layers. Thus, for example, in utterances such as the following the abstract domain of thinking is rendered by domains that are themselves conceptual metaphors: namely, upward motion and scanning motion. These are examples of secondary connective models:
5. When did he think up that idea?
6. We thought over carefully your ideas.
7. She should think over the whole problem before attempting to solve it.
The third connective layer (more abstract) produces highly symbolic thinking. For example, a rose is used as a symbol for love in Western culture because its physical features – rose = sweet smell, red color, plant – also constitute metaphorical domains for love: namely, love is a sweet smell, love is a red color, and love is a plant. This is how the symbol rose can stand for love. It is an example, therefore, of a tertiary connective model. A connective form may also be the product of metonymic reasoning (among other figural assemblages). Metonymy entails the use of an entity to refer to another that is related to it. A metonymic connective form results when part of a domain starts being used to represent the whole domain (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35-40):
10. She likes to read Dostoyevski (= the writings of Dostoyevski).
11. He’s in dance (= the dancing profession).
12. My mom frowns on blue jeans (= the wearing of blue jeans).
13. Only new wheels will satisfy him (= car).
Each one of these constitutes an externalization of a metonymically-derived connective form – (10) is an instantiation of the author is his or her work, (11) of an activity of a profession is the profession, (11) of a clothing item is a lifestyle, and (12) of a part of an object is the entire object. Note that a connective form can also be realized as a material object (a rose), as a ritual (kissing), and so on. In other words it allows the semiotician to connect conceptual, symbolic, material, verbal, and nonverbal aspects of culture, communication, and representation.
4. Concluding remarks
Sebeok’s notion of model is a truly insightful one, since it allows us to link all forms of meaning, from a word to a text and a classificatory code under the same semiotic rubric. A word is a model of something; a text also models something, but in a different way (through composition). Each form thus provides a clue as to the nature of the referent or referential domain that it encodes. This means that there is a distinction among semiosis, modeling, and representation: semiosis is the neurobiological capacity to produce forms (signs, texts, and so on), modeling is the channeling of the semiosic capacity towards a representation of some referent (the actual act of creating a form). And representation is the strategy of actually realized a form. Modeling reveals how the brain carries out its work of transforming sensory input into internal forms of thinking and external forms of representation: a specific external model is thus a “cognitive trace” to the form a concept assumes in the mind, and since concepts depend on how they are modeled it has been argued throughout this book that the form that knowledge takes depends on the type of modeling used.
Sebeok’s system would thus take systematically the various facets of traditional semiotic analysis and connect them in an integrative fashion. Once the nature of the modeling process has been ascertained, then its forms and functions can be deduced or inferred from observation of the semiosic behavior involved. As Sebeok showed throughout his illustrious career, the relatively simple, nonverbal models that animals produce are natural forms that must fit “reality” sufficiently to secure the survival and sanity of the members of a species in their ecological niche. In human beings, the modeling instinct is so pervasive and powerful that it often becomes very sophisticated indeed in the adult life of some individuals, as borne out by Einstein’s testimonial, or by what we know about Mozart’s or Picasso’s ability to model intricate auditory or visual referents in their heads in anticipation of transcribing them onto paper or canvas. Models make it possible for humans not only to represent immediate reality, but also to frame an indefinite number of possible worlds.
There are many questions that Sebeok’s theory raises for semiotics. I would like to conclude by claiming that I believe that it is headed in the right direction and that the questions can be tackled along the way. The attractive aspect of the theory is that it allows us to use a standard terminology for studying semiosis across species, which in turn, allows us to establish a taxonomy of notions, principles, and procedures for understanding the uniqueness of human semiosis. The result will be, in my estimation, a rigorous program for studying human cognition as a capacity that transforms sensory-based and affectively-motivated responses into a world of mental models, and then to reconstruct that world through them whenever we want. As Kalevi Kull (2001: 94) has aptly put it, it is very likely that the Sebeokian notion of model will produce a “better understanding of life itself.”
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