roberto.mastroianni@gmail.com

Abstract

The existential semiotics of Eero Tarasti proposes to explain which dynamics come into play in “states before signs are formed,” or in “existential situations,” in which mankind and the signs are positioned, before they crystallize into forms that can be analysed, classified and studied. This research project is presented as a: Epistemological choices; a new theory of the subject; a new aesthetic perspective and a new existentialism perspective.  This lectured presents a panoramic vision on the relationship between signs, existence and transcendence, which developed as a result of constant philosophizing to establish an “existential clarification” of semiotics. The theory of  Tarasti  selects existentialism as a philosophic koiné and does so by confronting the thinkers responsible for making it famous and identifiable (Kierkegaard, Sartre, Jaspers...) and proposes a semiotic point of view on: the existential condition of humankind”; the “existential states in which the subject and the signs are collocated before being ‘immersed’”;  the “relationship of the subject with ‘otherness’ and the world”; and the “ethical and political components of human existence.”  Existential semiotics can be considered a species of semiotic existentialism: a semiotic theory which examines the relationship between existence, possibility, the conditions of existence and semiotic processes. There are various existentialist forms, origins and structures, which can be divided into two broad categories: ontological existentialism (Heidegger, Maritain...) and anthropological existentialism (Sartre, Levinas....). The highest form of ontological existentialism is that which is rooted in the Heideggerian tradition, which stems from Sein und Zeit and which refers to the imperfect parallelism between two couples of concepts, such as “existential/existentiell” and “ontic/ontological.” For Heideggerism and post-Heideggerism, “existentialism is the theory of the various possible modes of being, considered abstractly as pure and neutral a priori, indistinct and indifferent to any kind of concrete distinction, even if by nature they also always represent concrete and distinct modes, which constitute the a priori foundation of the possibility of concrete, ontic decisions (existentiell). Every concrete relationship of the individual is existential [...] ... a concrete aspect of their being, conditioned and ontologically motivated [...] by the existentialism of being” (Pareyson, 1950: 219).  From this perspective, the concrete problems encountered by the individual in daily life would be “existentiell,” while the specific problems of reflecting upon, and serving, existence itself would be “existential.” Existential thought could thus only be carried out inside an existence. Its roots would therefore be profoundly “existentiell” (Heidegger, 1977 and Pareyson, 1950: 185). Tarasti thus chooses to make his own “extended version” of existentialism: a vision which has more in common with the French-style anthropological existentialism rooted in the teachings of Levinas (transcendence) and Sartre (the situation of humankind). The lectured proposes a philosophical, Semiotic and Anthropological vision on the relationship between “sign” and “existence” in relation to the “existential situation,” which precedes the formation of signs, the semiotic construction of the subject.

1. Existential semiotics

In recent years, Eero Tarasti has devoted a good deal of his intellectual energy to trying to outline “existential semiotics.” He does this in order to explain which dynamics come into play in “states before signs are formed,” or in “existential situations,” in which mankind and the signs are positioned, before they crystallize into forms that can be analyzed, classified and studied.

What binds the various versions and the author’s research together is the relationship between signs, subjects and transcendence, which developed as a result of constant philosophizing to establish an “existential clarification” of semiotics. In his efforts to produce a new semiotic theory, Tarasti’s choice of field is sound. He selects existentialism as a philosophic koiné and does so by confronting the thinkers responsible for making it famous and identifiable (Kierkegaard, Sartre, Jaspers...). The author could therefore seem to be renouncing his own semiotic vocation in order to devote himself to a broader form of philosophic research. This is in part true, but only in part, as this work can be fully incorporated into philosophic contemplations of the status of signs and language and the philosophic tradition of story-telling without seeking to abandon, however, the “sign doctrine,” which is a form of linguistic philosophy.

Tarasti’s theoretical challenge is, therefore, to produce a new “general theory of semiotics,” that will be able to correlate existential issues, by questioning how signs and their meanings are established. These issues include: “the existential condition of humankind,” the “existential states in which the subject and the signs are collocated before being ‘immersed;’” the “relationship of the subject with ‘otherness’ and the world,” and the “ethical and political components of human existence.”

For Tarasti, “reality is made up of energy fields governed by specific laws,” of which both the subject and the signs are parts. These are the “situations in which the sign is manifested, given that it is always in relation to a specific, existential situation” (Tarasti, 2009). This perspective expresses a preference for a vision of existence indebted to anthropological readings of existentialism, which are widespread in the French sphere (Levinas, 1998). It rejects post-Heideggerian ontology, presenting existential semiotics as an advanced, but still incomplete, attempt to correlate a possible semiotic reading of the existential condition of humankind in the world, its ethical dimension and the emersion of sign systems, which give meaning to the anthroposphere, and their temporal and spatial dimensions.

2. Semiotic Existentialism: ontological existentialism or anthropological existentialism?

Existential semiotics selects existentialism like Koiné. Tarasti refers to existentialist writers. He uses the same vocabulary and discusses issues which are both existentialist and existentiell.

At this point, it is fundamental to understand the type of existentialism Tarasti chooses and which he correlates to semiotic traditions. He does so after developing a “general theory of purpose and meaning” that can correlate “existential states of being” to those which precede the appearance of signs and systems of meaning.

From this point of view, existential semiotics are like a “third generation of semiotics” that seeks to surpass both ‘classical semiotics’” (Peirce, Greimas, Sebeok..) and “second generation” semiotics (Eco, Barthes, Kristeva …).

“First generation semiotics” put forward general theories of purpose and meaning, which served as a backdrop to semiotics of the “second generation,” which sought to elaborate operative semiotic theories, making less complete reference to the texts, sign systems and meanings. “Third generation semiotics” discusses the problem of formulating a new semiotic theory that can correlate the emersion of signs with the nature of the subject, temporality and human spatiality.

Existential semiotics can be considered a species of semiotic existentialism: a semiotic theory which examines the relationship between existence, possibility, the conditions of existence and semiotic processes. It is thus necessary to identify the forms and characters of the existentialist calling of Tarasti’s semiotics.

There are various existentialist forms, origins and structures, which can be divided into two broad categories: ontological existentialism (Heidegger, Maritain...) and anthropological existentialism (Sartre, Levinas....).

The highest form of ontological existentialism is that which is rooted in the Heideggerian tradition, which stems from Sein und Zeit and which refers to the imperfect parallelism between two couples of concepts, such as “existential/existentiell” and “ontic/ontological”. For Heideggerism and post-Heideggerism, “existentialism is the theory of the various possible modes of being, considered abstractly as pure and neutral a priori, indistinct and indifferent to any kind of concrete distinction, even if by nature they also always represent concrete and distinct modes, which constitute the a priori foundation of the possibility of concrete, ontic decisions (existentiell). Every concrete relationship of the individual is existential [...] ... a concrete aspect of their being, conditioned and ontologically motivated [...] by the existentialism of being” (Pareyson, 1950: 219). From this perspective, the concrete problems encountered by the individual in daily life would be “existentiell,” while the specific problems of reflecting upon, and serving, existence itself would be “existential.” Existential thought could thus only be carried out inside an existence. Its roots would therefore be profoundly “existentiell”. (Heidegger, 1977 and Pareyson, 1950: 185). Existential semiotics does not make this distinction itself. Instead, it tends to merge with the broader “existential condition.” As he does not discuss this distinction openly, Tarasti finds himself handling the notion of the “existential condition” imprecisely, in our opinion, not putting forward a “rigid definition” of it. Instead, a “broad version” is loyal to the post-Sartrian slogan (“existence precedes the essence”) in which existentialism, as a cultural movement, has long been recognized.

Tarasti thus chooses to make his own “extended version” of existentialism: a vision which has more in common with the French-style anthropological existentialism rooted in the teachings of Levinas (transcendence) and Sartre (the situation of humankind).

3. The Subject, Otherness and the Existential Condition

The subject is one of the central themes of Tarasti’s theories. It is analysed in relation to the existential condition which characterizes it, the construction of identity and the otherness, to which transcendence always tends guide the subject.

From this perspective, the relationship between “sign” and “subject” is analysed in relation to the “existential situation,” which precedes the formation of signs, the semiotic construction of the subject,” otherness and the world. From this point of view, the subject and the semiotic process are both part of an existential situation which defies the logic of the “equal exchange of pieces of information” and which embraces a more dynamic, open form of semiosis, in which the “subject and the “world” are subjected to constant construction and deconstruction processes.

From this point of view, “existential semiotics” resembles the “interpretive semiotics” of Pierce. It recognizes the subject as a chain of signs and interpretations and the production process as an open semiotic process (infinite semiosis). At the same time, this new semiotic theory distances itself from that of Peirce, in terms of its existential, ethical and political interest and its intuitive, informal character.

From this perspective, the sign, the formation of meaning, the construction of the subject and of the method are inserted into a dynamic process which produces identity in relation to otherness. The otherness is a fundamental element of Tarasti’s theory: the “subject” is formed in relation to “otherness” in a type of open, interpretive semiotic process, which displaces the centre of semiotic activity in dialogue between inter-related subjects. The code of this relationship is determined by the existential situation, so it becomes important to understand these states in which signs emerge and codes are formalized. Attention to the spaces in discourse (spaces produced by semiotic practices referred to as discourses) makes existential semiotics a semiotics of communication, which focuses upon the anthropological, existential spatiality produced by meaning processes.

This type of semiotics thus refuses the idea that “communication” is an “equal exchange of pieces of information.” It refuses the “engineering-style model of communication” (issuer, recipient, message, code, channel), instead opting for an “idea of “communicative community”-style communication (language/spatiality/united by communications and speakers who produce a community).

Tarasti refers to the space of discourse/dialogue in the semiotic process as the semiotic construction of the subject, the world and otherness – the “existential condition.” He thereby attributes an ulterior meaning to Sartre’s concept of the “existential situation.”

For the author, the “existential condition” represents the totality of “conditions which precede the formation of signs; the so-called pre-signs” (Tarasti, 2009: 22).

From this perspective, the sign “always appears in relation to a given situation [...] I mean, the situation in which the sign shows itself as its determined, concrete, spatial-temporal position.” In addition, “the sign can be placed in any type of existential relationship with the situation itself. It can negate or affirm it” (Tarasti, 2009: 23). This layout is wedded to an anthropological vision of existentialism, a French-style vision which refers back to Sartre and Levinas.

The “in-situation” sign (as in Sartre) and this “situation” assume a socio-historic and, in some respects, a political tone...Transcendence (as in Levinas) is crucial to constructing the subject, otherness, the world and human relationships. This set-up (as in Levinas) has strong ethical components and recognises the central element of the anthropological dimension in the dialogue.

The rejection of Heidegger’s ontological existentialism thus opts in favour of the application of a French matrix, of anthropological existentialism.

But the refusal of Heideggerism and of his results does not end here. It is not limited to the rejection of a “strict definition” of the term “existential.” In fact, according to Tarasti, the term Dasein has been given a “broader” meaning. It has stopped meaning the condition of an individual being flung (the Dasein/to be Heideggerian here) into the world and has become the term with which an “existential phase” is designated, with the socio-historic characteristics from which signs extensively emerge.

From this point of view, transcendence is the desire to surpass realist acceptance of the world as it is and to move towards a political, ethical and planned reality of subjectivity in semiotic relations with the world.

4. Existential Semiotics or Existential Hermeneutics

A structure (such as Tarasti’s), which recognises the relationship between the subject, otherness, the signs and transcendence, as based upon language/dialogue/discourse and the refusal to realistically accept reality, is like many philosophic, hermeneutic and dialogic structures (such as hermeneutic philosophy, the dialogism of Bakhtin, the thinking of Buber and Gadamer...).

Tarasti’s work is ambitious and very interesting, perhaps precisely because it creates short-circuits between philosophy and semiotics, which find more fertile ground on which to express themselves in the triad of subject, sign and transcendence.

This perspective should be more explicit in Tarasti’s theories. Let us hope it becomes so in a subsequent phase. The author should make the value of dialogue/discourse more explicit in the semiotic theory he is developing.

Tarasti, like Gadamer, Arendt et alia considers language to be distinct from contemporary semiotics (Volli, 2002 and Volli, 2007). He recognizes it as “in-between” the people who speak it. For this reason, the “existential space,” or the “existential situation which precedes the establishment of signs,” is essentially a spatiality in dialogue/discourse.

This perspective would benefit from being developed until extreme philosophic consequences are reached, but Tarasti is not doing this for the time being. If he were to expand his research to cover the relationship between language, existence, otherness and transcendence, contemporary Hermaneutic philosophy (Gadamer) would be fused with ontological existentialism (Heidegger) and it is not clear why this is not being done.

In Tarasti’s mind, transcendence is an unshakable need for the otherness of the subject. This theory owes much to the theories of Levinas. This concession creates a checkmate situation for a theory of meaning that is too easy. It is based upon an “equal exchange of information,” and is evolving into a more complex theory of communication. But Tarasti stops here and does not examine the “existential situation” to an adequate degree, if doing so means embracing ontological existentialism. He should recognise (as Heidegger says): that the Dasein is positioned on a linguistic axis; that language is the “opening” through which humankind and the world end up being positioned; that transcendence is an element of existence; and that being (from the Latin term ex-sistere, to be outside) is an ontological aspect of humankind. In this way, existential semiotics might embrace Post-Heideggerian contemporary thought and intense dialogism.

Tarasti’s theory on dialogue/discourse much resembles Bakhtin’s theory of polyphony and is very similar to existential hermaneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer...).

For this reason, the author’s refusal of Heidegger’s thoughts is difficult to understand. Heidegger’s theory on Dasein is, in fact, based on a notion of being thrown away, which characterises existence like ex-sistere (to be outside and to go beyond reality towards possibility). This idea of transcendence, together with the centrality of dialogue/discourse could become the presupposed theory of semiotics, which specializes in otherness, the subject and existence. In this way, semiotics, which seeks to correlate the existential situations that precede the formation of meaning and signs, can find an ally, and not an enemy, in philosophic hermaneutics. This is because Heidegger’s being always exists in a situation and location. He or she is not a transcendental subject, but the “human being who has been disposed of” (Geworfenheith), a finished, concrete being, who is historically situated, a single, complete existence which corresponds to a certain emotional state and collection of prejudices.

In addition, all the Heideggerian speculation on whether the charter of the sign is “usable” might open up a semiotics that is attentive to the ethical implications of the human condition and to its relationship with otherness, which cannot be reduced to a field of research like an “existential project” that “makes sense” within an ontological opening, made up of language and signs.

This new theory of semiotics with its fruitful intuitions could be strengthened by a more careful investigation of the "worldiness of the world", which is a "character of the very being" that is constituted through the usability of things and their meaning in our lives. This is because, in the world, mankind (which Tarasti refers to as “the subject”) always organizes itself in relation to its options, inserting them into projects and assuming them as instruments. The character of “postponement” (aliquid pro aliquod) of the sign (§17 in Sein und Zeit), as a built-in, non-accidental nature, will perhaps be researched in greater depth and thus strengthen the Bakhtinian dialogism of existential semiotics.

For Tarasti, this will probably be the fertile path that will lead to further innovative thinking and which will better reconcile certain perspectives of existential semiotics with post-Heideggerian and post-Gadamerian philosophic hermeneutics.

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