



The International Association for Semiotic Studies
L'Association internationale de Sémiotique
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Internationale Vereinigung für Semiotik



NEW
BULGARIAN
UNIVERSITY



Southeast European Center
for Semiotic Studies

NEW SEMIOTICS


Between Tradition and Innovation

NEW SEMIOTICS

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12th WORLD CONGRESS OF SEMIOTICS

Sofia 2014 New Bulgarian University

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Editor in Chief

Kristian Bankov

Editors

Ivan Kasabov
Mony Almalech
Borislav Gueorguiev
George Tsonev
Reni Iankova
Dimitar Trendafilov
Ivo Iv. Velinov
Yagodina Manova
Boyka Batchvarova

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INTRODUCTION

The 12th World Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies “New Semiotics. Between Tradition and Innovation” took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, between 16 and 20 September 2014. It was the result of one year of intensive preparatory work, 5 days of semiotic performances by more than 500 semioticians from 61 countries, plus 1.5 years of “postproduction”. Semio2014 was a big congress: if we compare the programs and the abstract books with the 10th IASS Congress in A Coruna, Spain, there is still the same number of papers. It is a good tendency, considering the aggressive EU policies of cutting university budgets, privatization and labour market efficacy, where the humanities in particular have suffered. Indeed, this tendency had its negative impact on the 12th Congress in respect of a reduced presence of scholars from EU countries. Yet, fortunately, it was balanced by a positive tendency, as we witnessed more and more semioticians, coming from the “non-Western” world, with a particular boom of Brazilian scholars – more than 50 of them participating in Sofia. Certainly there were more participants also from China and the other countries from the Far East, compared to the previous congresses in Europe.

The impact of these trends on semiotic production is important and shapes the new face of semiotics. Just a quick view of the contents of the Proceedings is enough to note that semiotic inquiry combines tradition and innovation in an exemplary way. More traditional are the contributions in the theoretical area of semiotics, where 54 papers have been placed, covering classical topics such as Peirce, Saussure, text, sign, culture, nature, narrative, time, art, law, gender, etc. The new face of semiotics is revealed with the applied semiotics section (57 papers) and the section devoted to semiotics in interdisciplinary context (30 papers). There one can enjoy semiotic explorations of topics ranging from Elves to selfies, from Jean-Paul Gaultier to battered women,

from digital nomads to African folk dances, from the Harry Potter saga to schizophrenia, from heavy metal CD covers to the pet world, from manga and anime to narco-traffic, and the list continues. The innovation that is so characteristic of semiotics is reflected also in the large number of papers directly or indirectly dedicated to the internet and digital culture. In all these new openings for semiotic interest is obvious a reduction of the methodological rigor, typical for the first decades of publications of the proceedings. Another trend, also based on comparison with Proceedings from previous Congresses, is evinced in the higher number of papers in English in respect to the other three official languages of the IASS/AIS. Less than 20% of the papers in the current Proceedings are in French and Spanish and only one paper is in German.

The introduction to the general character of the contents of these Proceedings can stop here. Nothing more is necessary in presenting a rationale for this collection. But as generative semiotics teaches us, the most interesting things usually remain beneath the textual surface; they inhere in the process which creates the textual result.

The interesting procedural questions are as follows: “Why are the proceedings in online form?”, “Why does it take so long after the Congress to publish them?”, “How many of the participants in the Congress submitted their papers to the Proceedings?”, “Where are the plenary papers?”, “How was the evaluation process organized?”.

Many of the answers of these questions derive from the strategic choice of the organizers of the Congress to exploit the advantages of digital communication. Thus, Semio2014 became the first fully “digital” IASS congress (cf. Copley and Bankov 2016). That decision facilitated a kind of “crowd sourcing” from the early preparatory phase when only the general division of theoretical, applied, interdisciplinary and regional semiotics was offered. There was not a formal centralized scientific committee; the proposals for round tables were sanctioned by a debate through social media, generating a number of proposed papers. In this phase it became clear that the chairs of the proposed sessions were responsible, together with the organizing committee, for the quality and the pertinence of the papers, included in them. This networked approach helped us to create a program which was more representative of the state of the art in world semiotics, in contrast to a centralized approach in which, geographically and managerially, one overview of semiotics would be maintained. The same philosophy of “crowd sourcing” is transferred to the Proceedings project. Our internal editorial board carried out much work on the received papers; but the final decision on quality and inclusion was the responsibility of the roundtable chairpersons. Thus the editorial board of the present book includes virtually all 37 chairpersons of the represented roundtables!

And where are the plenary speakers? Actually the traditional plenary role, in which a conference is ‘led’ by ‘famous’ scholars, was not replayed in Semio2014. The Congress featured two Honorary Guest Speakers - Jaakko Hintikka and Solomon Marcus - who, since the Congress, have sadly passed away. We mark their passing and pay tribute to these revered scholars by opening these Proceedings with their papers. The major innovation in the Congress, however, was that we substituted the plenary speech format with the series of lectures under the banner, “Semiotics and Its Masters”. We did that not only for budgetary reasons, but also to avoid the limitation of having only 8-10 plenary speakers at most. About 40 distinguished semioticians from all possible continents (except Antarctica) were contacted and given the chance to present a speech under the aforementioned banner. Ultimately, 29 lectures from the series were included in the program. From the very beginning, those papers were planned to be published as a separate volume in order to maintain two records of the Congress: one record concerned with the breadth and innovation of semiotics represented in the Congress and one with slightly longer, thematic contributions which would be attractive to a commercial publisher and would provide a more digestible account of the ‘state of the art’ in semiotics at the time of Semio2014. The latter

project is in an advanced phase, within the Semiotics, Communication and Cognition [SCC] series of de Gruyter Mouton, and will be published later in 2016.

Let us be clear that the academic publishing landscape has started to resemble a minefield and that the Congress organizers and the IASS have been committed to finding publishing options which would best benefit the members in the long term. Already during the preparatory phase of the Congress, the organizers were subject to the “predatory open access publishing” phenomenon, an industry with elaborate tools that seeks to achieve its goals through aggressive approaches to conference organizers. So, after the online appearance of the first drafts of the program of the Congress, I was contacted by a dozen known and unknown publishers who were interested in publishing the proceedings. Some of these proposals were elaborated with concrete references to the Congress topics. What struck me in particular regarding their aggression, was that after the rejection of some of these proposals those same publishers started to contact the round table chairs. Thus I myself was contacted by the same publishers in my capacity of chair of one of the round tables, with reference to the contents of the concrete round table, having already rejected the publisher’s approach in my capacity as Congress organizer. I know that many other chairs received such proposals and I know that some of them have accepted them. Thus, we have “lost” certain number of papers from the general corpus of the Proceedings and there has been an undesirable division of our collective endeavour. Furthermore, most of the publishers involved in these activities are attracted to scholarly societies because they believe that they can demand excessive payments for publication.

I mention this issue in relation to the Proceedings because it bears closely on the plans of future IASS Congresses and the best representation of the membership. The IASS is committed to developing a unified publishing policy in respect of the Proceedings, its agreements with commercial publishing, its flagship journal, plus the growth of regional, local and specialized journals in semiotics. In respect of the latter, recent research by our colleagues from Tartu¹ reports that there are at least 53 regular periodical semiotic journals, and many others that are not regular enough to enter the list but which are active anyway. Some of these published round table papers from Semio2014, rendering the current Proceedings a little less than the fullest possible account of the Congress..

For the future, the IASS, in agreement with the next World Congress, organizer, Dario Martinelli, have taken the decision to start to publish the proceedings of each World Congress in a sustainable and independent way as a periodical edition. We choose to do it under the label of “IASS Publications”, with the collaboration of the publishing house of the host of future Congresses. In this way, if the IASS and the Congress organiser maintain the regularity of the publication, it will be possible to consolidate and obtain all necessary contemporary formal recognitions for the quality of the research of our international semiotics community such entering the SSCI listing, impact factor rating, etc. Thus, the IASS World Congress proceedings will be competitive within the semiotic community and, most of all, the IASS proceedings will not depend on “the mercy of predatory publishers”.²

In one way, the last couple of years have been pernicious to our semiotic community. Many distinguished figures passed away. The loss of Umberto Eco was particularly difficult because it meant that the last ‘giant’ of semiotics is gone. Umberto Eco was kind enough to give one of the last long interviews in his life on the occasion of the opening of the World Congress in Sofia, where all participants could watch the video. Here, below, I would like to include an extract from

¹ Kull, Kalevi and Maran, Timo. 2013. “Journals of semiotics in the world”. *Sign Systems Studies* 41(1), 2013, 140–145

² See Copley and Bankov, “Vistas for organized global semiotics” to appear in *Semiotica*, Autumn 2016.

this interview where our *Spiritus Rector* offers some interesting details about the organization of the first World Congress of the IASS/AIS and some observations on semiotics in general.

Last but not least, I would like to thank the team of the Southeast European Center for Semiotic Studies, all of whose members worked hard in order to make possible the publication of the Proceedings. Thousands of pages, hundreds of hours of reading, editing, contacting chairpersons and authors, uploading, etc. The members of the team are: Ivan Kasabov, Mony Almalech, Borislav Gueorguiev, George Tsonev, Reni Iankova, Dimitar Trendafilov, Ivo Iv. Velinov, Yagodina Manova and Andrey Batchvarov (RIP). But most of all I would like to thank *Boyka Batchvarova*, whose heroic efforts were decisive and were made in conditions of the terrible family loss.

AN INTERVIEW WITH UMBERTO ECO (1932-2016)

In occasion of the 12th World Congress of the International Semiotic Association (IASS/AIS)
17 July, 2014

Monte Cerignone, Molise, Italy

Link to the video of the interview (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixnN-a7Ei6E>)

Interview taken by Kristian Bankov

(La entrevista en español)

How did the first IASS/AIS congress start, in 1974?

The organisers were just me and my secretary.

The idea originated when the semiotic association in Paris was founded, there was a first, actually a second meeting in Warsaw, but it was soon after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

There was the meeting in Paris with Jakobson, Benveniste, Greimas... I think I'm only one... no, Kristeva and I are the only ones still alive among the participants of that meeting.

And there the idea that a conference ought to be done came up. Then there was a last meeting in Parma, because the publisher Franco Maria Ricci wanted to invite everyone... the last elections were held. Cesare Segre was elected president and I was elected as secretary – I had no desire to do it at all – but Jakobson insisted and said: “Go to the congress!”

Well this meeting was... the thing in Warsaw was in 1968 and then the meeting... the meeting was in 1971 or 1972, and we started looking for money for the congress. But we were soon disappointed. It was supposed to be an organisation from Genoa. But later, Genoa didn't do it, and so on...

Finally the Gemelli institute of Milan provided some funding, they gave us the hall, and there was some small private support. But it wasn't much. We had twenty million at that time to pay everything. Twenty million were nothing. Twenty million lire [ten thousand euros].

Just to pay for a journey from America required at least one million. We had to refund Jakobson, Sebeok, all these people. Finally we got it done. The only thing is, we didn't expect all those people to come.

Were there many participants?

We expected about 200-300 registrations... 800-900 persons arrived.

And very important people, whom I hadn't invited.

Lacan for example... We didn't think about inviting Lacan because he wasn't exactly a semiotician.

And the day before the opening we had a party in my home, where we met people we believed had died twenty years before: Buysens, David Efron (the one who studied gestuality).

We had written to them, and they came. And so there were all of them. All! I remember that my secretary was staring at them because she said: "It's been two years that I've been reading their names, just the names. Now I can see them here and discover that they are real, that they really exist." The event had been well organised, so that after the opening session various separate sessions started. And at some point I found myself sitting on the steps of a stair, having nothing to do because everybody was in the right place. Every session had its own director, I realised that everything was fine.

What is the 'added-value' of a world congress?

First, we actually had to figure out in what sense people were interested in semiotics. Paul Watzlawick, from the Palo Alto school, arrived there unannounced. He came there and at that point we realised that also that kind of research could have a semiotic side.

If you look indeed at the congress proceedings there are different sections, and it became clear that semiotics is not a discipline. Something I had always claimed, and still claim now, even more, although many of my colleagues disagree. I think semiotics should have become a university organisation, a faculty, rather than a discipline.

Let's think, for instance, about medicine. What do dietetics and oncology, phthisiology and gastroenterology have in common?... they are techniques and have one thing in common: the health of human body. Not only that: between different sections, between an oncologist and a dentist, there's an abyss, but also within the same specialisation there are different schools. I wrote this also in the preface of *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*: there's a general semiotics which, for me – not for many others – is still a philosophical discipline concerning the foundation of semiosis, of the sign. Well, I'm linked to Peirce... And then there are specific semiotics which can also be very different amongst each other. Although, at the beginning, during the structuralist phase, we thought we could find general categories which could work... Looking for articulations not just in language but also in cinema... We also acted naively... such as precisely when we thought we could find general categories... And this is not the case. Because the more semiotics distributes itself to different sectors, the more it discovers universes with their own rules. To dominate all these specialisations there should be what I call general

semiotics. That is exactly the one I practised myself. In the sense that, yes, at the beginning I dealt with cinema, visual arts, but then I let other people do it, specialised people, so that they could specialise in those things. I limited myself, especially in the last works, to general theoretical problems.

Nowadays, in my opinion, there are few people who are studying general theory, and several who practise, for instance, sociosemiotics, etc... which is good, but if we look at the programme of the semiotic congress in Berkeley in 1994, there were even some disciplines which studied such incredible topics as the afterlife. In that, I think, we had gone a bit overboard, but what I still believe is that what analytic philosophers called the 'linguistic turn' of our time, has actually been a 'semiotic turn'. All disciplines, not just humanities – but also genetics... the genetic code, DNA, etc. – significantly oriented themselves towards the semiotic problem. So that a conference took place in Lucca in 1981-82 where we had immunologists themselves willing to meet the semioticians in order to find points in common. A problem indeed occurred there. Where they thought they could see semiosis, I could only just see a stimulus-response.

At that time semiotics was quite fashionable. How did it develop later?

Yes it was, but there were other phenomena afterwards. While in Italy, and in Germany semiotics continued to develop, the French at some point, driven by reciprocal envy, began to say: "I'm not doing semiotics anymore...", "I'm doing psychoanalysis", as Kristeva used to say... Todorov has done history of culture and other wonderful stuff. And thus, what took, so to speak, the leadership of semiotics, was the Greimassian school. And that's it. At least in Paris. Then if you look at a peripheral university, you might come to know that there are people doing semiotics who are not necessarily Greimassian. But those who claim that there is one scientific semiotics are the Greimassians

In the United States there has been, so to speak, a clash with analytic philosophy... which, in itself could well be understood as an interesting form of semiotics. Especially if we look at its critics like Rorty. We have done many conferences together. But in America there are 'magic words'. 'Semiotics' didn't sell well. Later some universities like Brown started a PhD programme in semiotics, but at that point cultural studies had become fashionable. Remember that someone doing sociosemiotics is doing cultural studies. But they changed the name of the PhD programme and they called semiotics 'cultural studies'. There are *shibboleth* working there, passwords, so to speak, marketing words. And, therefore, America is a special case.

Did you know that the country with the largest number of participants is Brazil?!

But South America always kept going. Brazilians in particular were considerably involved. Brazilians were working on Peirce before the whole semiotic issue in Europe started. They were all Noigandres poets: Haroldo De Campos, Augusto De Campos, Décio Pignatari were studying Peirce in the fifties. Obviously they were wrong, because they used to study Max Bense's books, who never understood Peirce, but alas!

What would 'the semiotic tradition' be?

We shouldn't throw away tradition... there are some among my friends who have begun to say: "Let's not throw away Saussure". Let's not throw away those from whom we started. For a while semiotics seemed to be all structuralist, and it was like structuralism and semiotics were the same thing, and it was not true. At some point structuralism was thrown out of the window, but we were not meant to get rid of everything.

How do you see semiotic innovation?

‘Innovation,’ let’s try to understand. In the hard sciences there’s a huge sense of continuity: “I say something only basing myself on what the previous scientist said, and I expand, prove, disprove, etc.” Analytic philosophy has tried to reproduce this attitude of the hard sciences: “We have a very precise corpus, everyone produces a small article starting from a previous article by someone else...”

Typically in the humanities there’s the myth of ‘novelty at all costs.’ The French are the masters in this sense: “I can be noticed only if I say the contrary of what has been said before.” If that’s what we mean by ‘innovation,’ then the method is detrimental. To the point that it reverses the meaning of words. So that for example we can have Baudrillard calling ‘seduction’ what for other people is not seduction. An attempt to always be, as Maritain used to say, *Les chevalier de l’absolu...* That’s why I was talking about innovation and tradition. We don’t have to always pretend to say the contrary. Maybe it’s also a Hegelian vice. We negate what has been previously said, in order to go forward.

And innovation in a positive sense?

Part of my group tried to merge semiotics and cognitive sciences in the 1990s and 2000s, and so at the University of San Marino, founded by us... we’ve done about twenty very interesting conferences. They were attended by all the major scholars of cognitive sciences, and good relationships have developed. I think that while early semiotics was still the victim of a dogma affecting all philosophy – “We can’t talk about mind”, so either we talk about behaviour or about so-and-so... – with cognitive sciences we realised that we need to talk also about mind.

I always insist on recalling something: Adriano Olivetti, who was a great man, employed engineers in his company when necessary, because he needed them. However, if possible, he also employed people who majored in Greek philology, or philosophy. And then he would send them to the factory for six months in order to see what happened. But he knew that someone who had studied humanities had a mind more open to innovation.

What are you working on now?

I’ve always been of the idea, and I’ve always said, that after turning fifty one has to focus only on Elizabethan poets, whom one knows how to study. One should let young people deal with novelties instead.. It’s not that I’ve actually studied Elizabethan poets, but I have partially diverted to historical studies. I don’t know if you’ve seen the large volume on the history of medieval thought.

And now I am collecting all my semiotic writings. The outcome will be around three thousand pages. Now they are all in the hands of someone, who is only putting together a single bibliography, without modifying the texts. Just unifying and editing them. The result will be a two-volume set. Some sort of funeral offering to be placed into the pyramid for the dying pharaoh!

And then, you know, I have had a strange life line, interrupted in the middle as if I had died at fifty years old, but after continuing like this. And what happened in the middle of my life? I started writing novels. Therefore that’s a parallel life.

You took the another way, probably a more rewarding one...

Well, a more amusing one. Now there’s a new novel. It’s already written. It’s a grotesque representation of journalism. [...] It’s the story of a newspaper which might seem a bit Berlusconi, even though the story occurs in 1992, before Berlusconi entered politics.

What should we expect and what can we achieve by a congress?

The results of a congress can only emerge later. When we prepared the congress in 1974 we didn't expect there to be the high level of participation that there actually was. Perhaps it would have taken only a small mistake in communicating it, and only a hundred people would have come, and nobody would have ever talked about semiotics anymore. The result of a congress is not a final dogmatic document. A congress generates proceedings. And there you can find what is available. It all depends on the productivity and novelty of the proceedings.

What would you wish for the participants?

What would I wish for the participants? Preserve paper! Preserve paper! Do not only study online.

Because a big blackout will occur, everything will disappear and only your books will last!

ENTREVISTA A UMBERTO ECO (1932-2016)

Por Kristian Bankov

17 July, 2014

Monte Cerignone, Molise, Italia

Video (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ixnN-a7Ei6E>)

¿Cómo transcurrió el primer congreso de IASS/AIS en el año 1974?

Lo organicé yo con la ayuda de mi secretaria. La idea surgió cuando se fundó la Asociación de Semiótica en París, después tuvo lugar una primera, es decir una segunda reunión en Varsovia, pero eso fue inmediatamente después de la invasión en Checoslovaquia. En aquella reunión, que se organizó en París, participaron Jacobson, Benveniste, Greimas... me parece que soy el único ... No, creo que de los asistentes al primer encuentro somos Kristeva y yo los únicos que todavía quedamos vivos. Y fue allí donde surgió la propuesta de organizar un congreso. Más tarde tuvo una última reunión en Parma puesto que el editor Franco M^a Richi quiso invitar a todos ... y se realizó la última selección. Chesare Segre fue elegido Presidente y a mí me nombraron secretario – no me gusto para nada – pero Jacobson insistió y dijo: ¡Adelante el congreso!

De modo que, aquella primera reunión fue en 1968 en Varsovia, la segunda se realizó en 1971 ó 72 y nos pusimos a buscar dinero para el Congreso. Y vivimos grandes desilusiones.

Esperábamos recibir el dinero de una organización de Génova. Sin embargo, los de Génova no lo hicieron, etc., etc. Al fin el Instituto *Gemelli* de Milán nos proporcionaron una pequeña cantidad de dinero, nos concedieron una sala y pudimos contar con una donación privada. Pero no era suficiente. Entonces reunimos 20 millones para pagar todo. 20 millones no era nada. 20 millones de liras (10000 euro).

Solamente un billete de avión de América costaba un millón. Tuvimos que pagar el viaje de Jacobson, de Sebeok, de toda esta gente. Y lo logramos. Pero no pensamos en que llegaran todos.

¿Realmente hubo tantos participantes?

Nosotros pensábamos que se matricularan 200-300 personas, pero llegaron 800-900. Y llegaron personalidades de renombre que yo no había invitado. Como Lacan, por ejemplo ... No se me había ocurrido invitar a Lacan ya que él no es precisamente un semiólogo.

La víspera de la inauguración organicé una recepción en mi casa a la que acudieron personas que creíamos muertas desde hacía unos veinte años: Buysens o *David Efron, el mismo que ...* Buysens, *David Efron* – él que se había ocupado del estudio de la gesticulación. Les escribimos y ellos llegaron, ¡llegaron todos! Recuerdo que mi secretaria miraba con los ojos desenchajados y decía: “desde hace dos años que no hago más que leer nombres y ahora los veo aquí y ¡encuentro que son reales!” Y todo fue bien organizado, después de la apertura empezaron su trabajo las secciones diferentes. Y, de repente, me encontré sentado en el peldaño una escalera y ya no tenía qué hacer porque cada uno ocupaba su propio lugar. Cada sección tenía su presidente y me di cuenta de que todo estaba en orden.

¿Qué es lo que aporta un congreso internacional?

En primer lugar, nos interesaba qué rumbos toma el interés de la gente por la semiótica. Había llegado inesperado Paul Watzlawick, él de la escuela de Palo Alto. Estaba allí y nos dimos cuenta de que las investigaciones que él realiza también tienen que ver con la semiótica. En efecto, si se miran las Actas del Congreso, de verdad hay varias secciones y allá se esbozó hasta cierto grado lo que yo siempre he afirmado y sigo afirmando, mientras muchos de mis colegas no lo aceptan, y es que la semiótica no es precisamente una disciplina. Y si se compararía con una organización universitaria ella fuera un facultado. Demos el ejemplo de la medicina. ¿Qué es lo común entre la dietología y la oncología, o entre la fisiología y la gastroenterología? Son disciplinas unidas por un denominador común: la salud del cuerpo humano. Aún más: entre las secciones diferentes, entre un oncólogo y un dentista existe un abismo, pero también en los marcos de una especialidad hay escuelas diferentes. Esto lo he escrito en el prólogo de *Semiótica y filosofía del lenguaje*: existe una semiología común que para mí aún es una disciplina filosófica sobre el fundamento de la semiosis, del signo, pero para muchas otras personas no es así. Pues, es verdad que yo estoy relacionado con Peirce ... Y luego hay semióticas especializadas que pueden ser muy diferentes una de otra, aunque al principio, por ejemplo en la época del entusiasmo por el estructuralismo, se pensaba que se podían encontrar categorías comunes que funcionaran como tales... Se buscaban articulaciones no sólo en la lengua pero también, digamos, en el cine ... Admitimos incluso tantas cosas ingenuas... llevados precisamente por la idea de encontrar categorías comunes... Y no es así porque cuanto más se divide la semiótica entre los sectores diferentes tanto más se descubren universos con leyes propias. Todas estas ramas deberían ser dominadas por lo que yo llamo *semiótica común*. Que es lo que me ha ocupado a mí. Sí, en un principio me ocupaba del cine, de las artes visuales, Pero después dejé que de ello se ocupara la otra gente especializada en estas esferas específicas. Yo me limité -antes que nada en mis últimos trabajos- a los problemas teóricos generales. En mi opinión, creo que hoy en día, son pocas las personas que se ocupan de teoría general y son

muchas los que se ocupan de, no sé... de, digamos, sociosemiótica, etc. ...Lo que no está mal, pero si se observa el programa del congreso de semiótica en Berkeley, en 1994 fueron incluidas numerosas disciplinas que hasta llegaron a tratar la vida después de la muerte. Creo que fue una exageración, pero yo sigo considerando que lo que los filósofos analíticos llaman *linguistic turn*, de hecho es *semiotic turn*. Todas las disciplinas y no solamente las humanísticas – y pensad en la genética ... en el código genético, en ADN ... están muy orientadas hacia el problema de la semiosis. Entre otras cosas, entre 1981 y 1982 tuvimos un congreso en Luca, en que participaron inmunólogos que deseaban reunirse con los semióticos para encontrar puntos comunes. Y allí surgió un problema de verdad. Donde ellos pensaban ver la *semiosis*, para mí había nada más *stimulus response*.

En aquellos tiempos la semiótica estaba muy de moda. ¿Cómo se desarrolló después?

Sí, pero después ocurrieron otras cosas: aquí es mientras en Italia o en Alemania la semiótica continuaba desarrollarse, llegó un momento en que los franceses, cada uno celoso de lo que hacía el otro, manifestaron: “Ya no me ocupo de semiótica... me ocupo de psicoanálisis”, declaró Krasteva; Todorov empezó ocuparse de la historia cultural y de otras cosas realmente estupendas. Y la que tomó la dirección de la semiótica, fue la escuela de Greimas. Y punto final, no se habló más. Por lo menos en París. Luego, si uno iba a ver las universidades periféricas, se daba cuenta de que había quienes se ocupaban de la semiótica sin necesariamente pertenecer a la escuela de Greimas. Pero los que pretenden que existe una sola semiótica científica son los seguidores de Greimas.

En cambio, en los Estados Unidos, pues, se dio un choque con la filosofía analítica la cual, fíjense en sumo grado se puede ver como una forma interesante de la semiótica. Sobre todo, si seguimos sus críticos como, por ejemplo, Rorty ... ¡Hemos participado juntos en tantos congresos! Pero en América hay palabras mágicas. „Semiótica“ no se encuentra entre ellas pero se vende bien. Algunas universidades como Brown University, crearon doctorados en semiótica, pero entonces se pusieron de moda los *cultural studies*. Tened presente que quien estudia socio-semiótica, estudia *cultural studies*, pero cambiaron el nombre del doctorado y le pusieron *cultural studies*. En los Estados Unidos deslizan hacia las consignas, quiero decir, a las comerciales. Pero los Estados Unidos es un caso aparte.

¿Sabía usted que el mayor número de participantes viene de Brasil?

Sí, América Latina en general y los brasileños en particular se han ocupado muchísimo de semiótica. Los brasileños estudiaban a Peirce antes de que el interés por la semiótica apareciera en Europa. Todos los poetas del grupo de *Noigandre*: Aroldo De Campos, Augusto De Campos, Decio Piñatari durante de los años cincuenta estudiaron Peirce. Por supuesto, Cometían un error porque lo estudiaban en los libros de Max Bense quien nunca entendió a Peirce, pero no importa...

¿En qué consiste la tradición semiótica?

Consiste en que no se descarte nada ... uno de mis amigos insistía: „Que no echemos a Saussure!“. No arrojamos a los de quienes marchamos. En un momento la semiótica parecía toda estructural, y parecía que el estructuralismo y la semiótica eran la misma cosa, pero no es así. Hubo un tiempo en el que el estructuralismo fue negado, pero no hay que negarlo todo.

¿Cómo ve Ud. la innovación semiótica?

La innovación... aclaremos de que se trata. Mientras en las ciencias naturales la continuidad tiene gran importancia yo digo sólo lo que ha dicho algún científico anterior a mí y sobre

esta base edifico, aduzco pruebas, refuto, etc, la filosofía analítica, por ejemplo, ensayó imitar las ciencias naturales; existe un corpus muy puntual, cada uno escribe un artículo pequeño marchando del artículo de alguien adelantado. En las ciencias humanísticas existe el mito de la novedad a toda costa. Y los franceses son auténticos maestros en este sentido. Repararán en mí sólo si digo lo contrario de lo que ya se ha dicho antes. Si la innovación es esto, entonces ella es un proceso perjudicial. Ellos incluso cambiaban el sentido de las palabras. No sé, Baudrillard que llama seducción (seduction) lo que para otros no es seducción. Lo de ellos no es más que un intento de estar siempre *Les chevaliers de l'absolu*, como decía Maritain. Pues no, por eso acabo de decir tradición e innovación. No hace falta simular a toda costa que se dice lo contrario. esto puede tratarse incluso de un vicio hegeliano. Se niega lo que fue para seguir adelante.

¿Y la innovación en el sentido positivo?

En los años noventa y en dos mil una parte del grupo en que trabajo trató unir la semiótica a las ciencias cognitivas y en la Universidad de San Marino, fundada por nosotros, organizaron unas veinte conferencias muy interesadas, a las que asistieron todos los grandes científicos en la esfera de las ciencias cognitivas y establecimos contactos muy fructíferos. Creo que en un principio la semiótica fue víctima de un dogma que pesaba sobre toda la filosofía – „ es imposible hablar sobre la mente“... – o se habla del tratamiento o se habla no sé de qué pero no de la mente. Después de las ciencias cognitivas se llegó a la conclusión de que habría que hablar sobre la mente. Yo recuerdo algo con insistencia: Adriano Olivetti, que era un gran hombre, empleaba ingenieros en su fábrica de ordenadores siempre que los necesitaba. Prefería, sin embargo a titulados en Filología griega o en Filosofía y los enviaba a la fábrica, a ver qué pasaba. Sabía que los que habían estudiado Humanidades eran más abiertos a la innovación. Pero prefería si era posible unas personas que tenían diploma de filología griega o filosofía y así les mandaba a la fábrica, para ver que pasará. Pero sabía que quien ha estudiado ciencias humanitarias pertenece un mente abierto hacia las innovaciones.

¿ En qué trabaja Ud. ahora?

Siempre he creído y lo he dicho, que después de cumplir cincuenta años, uno ha de ocuparse únicamente de los poetas isabelinos. (rie). Las novedades hay que dejarlas a los jóvenes. Y él sabe cómo se estudian a los poetas isabelinos. No es que yo estudie, a los poetas isabelinos, pero me he apartado un poco y me ocupo de investigaciones históricas. No sé si habéis visto el gran volumen dedicado a la historia del pensamiento medieval. Actualmente hago una recopilación de mis escritos semióticos. Serán aproximadamente tres mil páginas. Ahora mismo todos ellos están en las manos de un hombre quien tiene la tarea de igualar la bibliografía. Pero sin tocar los textos apartados. Tiene que compaginarlos, ponerlos en orden. Se publicarán en dos volúmenes con idéntico diseño. Algo semejante de un regalo funeral predestinado a ser depositado en la pirámide, junto con el faraón muerto. (ríe)

Y luego sabéis que la línea de mi vida es rara (muestra su palma), se interrumpe en la mitad, es decir que debería morir a mis cincuenta años, pero después continúa. Y así ocurrió: en la mitad de mi vida empecé a escribir novelas. O sea, existe una vida lateral.

Ha emprendido Ud. un viaje diferente, puede que sea más satisfactorio...


Sí, por lo menos más divertido. Ahora tengo una novela nueva. Ya escrita. Una presentación grotesca del periodismo. (...) La historia de un periódico que se parece un poco al de Berlusconi, aunque el argumento se desarrolla en 1992, antes de que Berlusconi entrara en la política.

¿Qué podemos esperar, qué resultará de los congresos?


Cómo ha resultado un congreso se entiende sólo después. Cuando preparamos el congreso de 1974 no esperamos que tuviera la divulgación que tuvo. Era posible que se diera una mínima falta de comunicación para que llegaran tan sólo 100 personas y que nadie volviera a hablar de semiótica. Lo que pasa después del congreso es que no se elabora ningún documento dogmático. Sí se prepara la publicación de las Actas y en las ellas se puede encontrar lo que hay. Depende de la riqueza y las novedades que contienen las

¿Qué les desearía Ud. a los participantes?

¿Qué desearles a los semióticos? Que defiendan el uso del papel. Defended el papel, no aprendáis únicamente *online*! Porque llegará el gran *blackout*, todo desaparecerá y sólo vuestros libros permanecerán (ríe).



**HONORARY
GUEST
SPEAKERS**



Jaakko Hintikka (1929-2015)

Prof. Jaakko Hintikka is known as the main architect of game-theoretical semantics and of the interrogative approach to inquiry, and also as one of the architects of distributive normal forms, possible-worlds semantics, tree methods, infinitely deep logics, and the present-day theory of inductive generalization. He has authored or co-authored over 30 books and monographs that have appeared in nine languages. Five volumes of his Selected Papers (Kluwer Academic) appeared in 1996-2003. Jaakko Hintikka has edited or co-edited 17 volumes and authored or co-authored over 300 scholarly papers. A comprehensive examination of his thought appeared in 2006 as the volume *The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka* in the series *Library of Living Philosophers*.

Solomon Marcus (1925-2016)

Solomon Marcus is a Romanian mathematician, member of the Mathematical Section of the Romanian Academy and Emeritus Professor of the University of Bucharest's Faculty of Mathematics. His main research is in the fields of mathematical analysis, mathematical and computational linguistics and computer science, but he also published numerous papers on various cultural topics: poetics, linguistics, semiotics, philosophy and history of science and education. He is recognized as one of the initiators of mathematical linguistics and of mathematical poetics, and has been a member of the editorial board of tens of international scientific journals covering all his domains of interest.

LANGUAGE-GAMES AS A FOCAL NOTION IN LANGUAGE THEORY

Jaakko Hintikka

Abstract

Wittgenstein introduced the language game idea to emphasize that language use is a rule-governed activity. But how do rules govern our linguistic behavior? After a long search, Wittgenstein decided in May 1941 that the meaning relations are constituted of entire language-games that are primary in relation to their rules. A language game is not defined by its rules. To understand the rules one has to master the game.

An application of the mathematical theory of games to language-games led to game-theoretical semantics, which is the true conceptual basis of logic and mathematics. It has prompted important new developments in logic and in the foundations of mathematics, including more relaxed concept of probability. In the light of game-theoretical semantics, the logic that Frege formulated and that was canonized as traditional first-order logic is flawed in the sense of being too poor conceptually. This flaw is being corrected by the development of independence-friendly logic and its extensions.

Game-theoretical semantics can also help to integrate syntax and semantics. Rules for a move in a semantical game (language game) typically involve both an action on the part of a “player” and also a syntactical transformation rule to indicate what the next move will be like. Those transformations are all the syntax that is needed in an overall language theory. They are but an aspect of the semantical game rules.

In these days, if I mention language-games, the first association of my audience is likely to be Wittgenstein. But what did Ludwig think about language-games? One reason why it is fascinating to study Wittgenstein’s thought is that his notebooks, his philosophical diaries enable us to

follow the dynamics of his development, almost re-living his line of thought. So let us fly our time-machine to the late May 1941. What we find is Wittgenstein in an agonizing crisis. Usually he writes only a couple of sentences daily in his diary. Now he writes in the three days (May 23–26) something like fifteen pages. He writes a sentence, strikes it over, tries to write a better one, corrects it or offers an alternative formulation and so on.

But what is he so excited about? Bertrand Russell once asked Wittgenstein whether he was thinking about logic or about his sins. Wittgenstein replied: “Both”. In those May days (may-days?) he would not have given either answer. But he could have said “meaning” or “meaning and language-games”. Wittgenstein was struggling with one of the main problems of all language theory. What are the meaning relations that enable us not only to understand a name or a sentence but to use language in our transactions with reality? How are the expressions of our language connected with the world?


In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein had defended an answer that in its simplest form amounts to saying: by picturing. Propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs and names represent objects by sharing the same logical form. By 1929 he nevertheless had given up this idea of language as a mirror of a (possible) world and replaced it by a vision of language as a rule-governed human activity (or, rather, a complex of such activities). This puts the main theoretical onus on the notion of rule. But what is a rule? Wittgenstein rejected in October 1929 phenomenological languages as our actual basis language in favor of physicalistic language. Hence rules must operate through their actual symbolic expressions, written instructions, formulas, samples and suchlike. But how can such external objects in Wittgenstein’s vivid words “dead” objects guide my decisions? His problem was not how to follow a rule, but how a rule can guide my actions. This is not a problem about us humans only. How does a rule, for instance a blueprint guide a machine? Wittgenstein did not ask: does a computer think? but: does a computer compute?

Wittgenstein pondered on such questions from 1933 on. In May 1941 he realized that he was not making any real progress. We do not need rules as an explanatory notion, he came to think. We can understand and describe exhaustively a person’s actions and other behavior without referring to rules as separate entities. On the contrary, we can understand the rules one is following only by reference to the complex of interrelated activities that it is a part of, “Language-games” is but a label to those activities. Thus Wittgenstein’s conceptual priorities switched. He came to believe that in the last analysis one cannot define a game by its rules. One can understand a rule only via the game that it is an aspect of. Rules became conceptually secondary in relation to their language games.

This, then is Wittgenstein’s (perhaps we should say, the third Wittgenstein’s) answer to the question of what the links are that connects language with reality: The links are language-games. This already is enough to make them a focal notion in the study of language.

This may be a truth and nothing but the truth, but it is not the whole truth about language or about language-games. Wittgenstein’s own account of language-games is unsatisfactory, or at least incomplete and impressionistic. One source of dissatisfaction with it is that Wittgenstein does not ever give fully worked-out large-scale examples of intrinsically interesting language games. In particular, he does not explain what the language-games are that lend our logical and mathematical words their meaning, in spite of having himself used logic and mathematics as testing-grounds of rule-following. But Wittgenstein aside what are the language games like give logic and mathematics their meaning? Remarkably Wittgenstein need not have construct such games himself. He may have been the first one to use the term “language-game”, but highly interesting language-games had been examined by an earlier thinker. As Risto Hilpinen was the first one to point out, the real inventor of language games was no other than one of the fathers of semiotics, Charles Sanders Peirce.

The games he was particularly interested in were precisely the ones that are involved (“played”) in logic and in its uses in mathematics. One can get an idea of what they are from the so-called epsilon delta technique of calculus texts. For instance, the definition of the continuity of a function $f(x)$ at x might be read: Given any ε , however small, one can find δ_0 such that $\|f(x+\delta)-f(x)\|<\varepsilon$ as soon as $\delta<\delta_0$. Here the locution “one can find” does precisely the same job as the existential quantifier ($\exists\delta$) and the force of a “given” is that of a universal one. In general, the logical home of one basic logical notions, quantifiers, “every” and “there exists” (“some”) are the language-games of seeking and finding. Intuitively, in the associated picture we can find an arbitrarily small δ no matter what ε is given. As an illustration, you can contemplate the following figure that displays the epsilon-delta definition of derivative.



$c = \text{derivate of } f(x) \text{ at } x$

What is going on is that you can make ε small as you wish by pushing $x+\delta$ close enough to x .

Several questions arise here. Are we really talking here of genuine games? Can a linguist or semiotician actually recognize such a game when it is being played? As an answer, imagine watching a bunch of children moving around. Surely from their behavior you can find out that they are playing hide-and-seek.

Perhaps you still feel like asking, as the late Erik Stenius once asked me: How can the ideas of seeking and finding help to constitute our notion of existence, codified in the existential quantifier? I replied: Erik, in your native Swedish language, how do you express existence? You say, “det finns”, literally “one can find”. And Swedish is not the only language to do essentially the same.

I will not try to examine in detail how Peirce used this language-game idea. It was for Peirce originally a semiotic rather than logical idea. Even though there are several important connections between the game idea and Peirce’s different treatments of logic, he never quite integrated it with the rest of his logical theory, certainly not into a formal system of the same rigid structure as Frege’s contemporary logic.

Why not? One of the first ideas that occurred to me when I internalized Wittgenstein’s notion of language-game was: this opens vast theoretical opportunities. Wittgenstein’s contrary view notwithstanding, “games” are not so called by mere family resemblance. There exists an explicit, fully developed mathematical theory of games, launched by John von Neumann, Borel, and Morgenstern. We can now use it in language theory, perhaps more its concepts than its results. Language-games can be thought of literally as games in the sense of von Neumann’s mathematical theory of games. The outcome is the fundamental semantical theory of logic known as game-theoretical semantics. Even though it is not generally used yet, it is superior to the usual Tarski-type semantics. The truth of a sentence S can be defined in it by a reference to the associ-

ated game $G(S)$ of attempted verification. But truth does not mean a verifier's winning a play of $G(S)$. It means the existence of a (sure-win) strategy to the verifier.

So why did Peirce not develop an explicit game-theoretical semantics? An answer, or at least an important part of an answer, lies in the very nature of game theory. "Game-theory" can even be claimed to be misnamed. It applies to activities we do not call games ("games against nature"). The intended "games" are not all competitive, either. The key notion of this theory is not "game" but "strategy". It could more accurately be called strategy theory rather than game theory. And strategies can be strategies of cooperation rather than strategies in a conflict situation.

Game theory was born, I am tempted to say, at the moment von Neumann (or was it Borel?) introduced the general notion of strategy. Unfortunately, that happened after Peirce, who therefore could not avail the notion of strategy. This deprived him of the main concept needed to regiment the use of the game idea. This is seen particularly clearly in the games that serve as the semantical basis of logic. They are stereotypical real or fictional attempts to find a fragment of the world in which a sentence S is true. As was pointed out, the idea of language game enables us to define explicitly the crucial semantical concept of truth. This is not possible to do to one's own language if we are using the common Tarski-type semantics, as Tarski's famous impossibility result suggests. This impossibility result, though applicable to the kind of language Tarski used, does not concern suitably richer languages. Tarski's famous theorem accordingly has little philosophical or semiotic interest.

There are plenty other opportunities opened up by various applications of game-theoretical semantics. One of the first questions that a game theorist would ask about semantical games is: Are they games of perfect information or not? In other words, does a player making a move always know what earlier moves have been made? At first sight, informationally imperfect games might seem to be impossible or at least unrealistic. They are nevertheless instantiated by card games like bridge in which a player does not know other player's hands. Such games can be handled conceptually as interpreting a "player" as a team like partners at bridge that not share their information. They do not know what cards their partner has.

What about the games that are the semantical home of logic and mathematics? It turns out that Frege's logic involves a tacit assumption of perfect information. This assumption has turned out to be a vicious mistake. Language-games with imperfect information might seem to be exotic animals, but in reality you can find them all over the place. For instance, in the mathematical example about continuity, δ is obviously chosen knowing ϵ . But is it chosen knowing x or not? In the usual notion of continuity, a dependence of δ on x and not only ϵ is assumed. But if we do not assume it, we obtain a different notion called uniform continuity. Such uniformity concept play an important role in mathematics.

Frege's tacit assumption of perfect information imposed a heavy restriction on what his logic can do. Later logicians followed his example, with the result that for more than a century logicians used unnecessarily weak logic. In this respect, Peirce was far ahead of Frege. Not only was he aware of the nature of uniformity concepts and even occasionally corrected professional mathematicians when they made a mistake. This makes a big difference to how we look upon the entire history of modern logic. Usually Frege is considered as the architect of the basic part of our contemporary logic referred to as quantification theory or first-order logic. While Peirce is relegated to the role of a slightly later co-discoverer, in reality, what Peirce had in mind was a far richer logic than what Frege and following him practically all other logicians have been using for more than hundred years. Only in the nineteen-nineties was the flaw in Frege's and his followers' logic pointed out and partly corrected in what is misleadingly labelled independence-friendly (IF) logic.

The notion of language-game is thus operative in putting several main issues to a new light.

One more such potential change of approach still remains to be pointed out. It concerns the relation of syntax and semantics. The two are in our day and age usually considered as separate studies. Here semioticians are doing better than linguists or analytical philosophers of language. For one thing, there is the famous Chomskian thesis of the autonomy of syntax. Generative grammarians maintain that one can construct a complete syntax for a (natural) language without appealing to semantical considerations.

This may in fact be a reasonable approximation to syntax, even though there are no general theoretical reasons for such a complete autonomy. I once offered a small concrete example of syntactical regularities in English that have only a semantical explanation. The example was the distribution of the English quantifier word “any”. Even though this is only a miniscule and undoubtedly exceptional detail in the overall English syntax, the issue was felt to be so significant that Noam Chomsky himself paid me the enormous tribute of criticizing my note in public. (He does not bother to criticize unclear or unimportant ideas.)

Even if Chomsky were right, the relation of semantics to syntax would be a major problem. The history of Chomsky’s own views illustrate the issues. At an early stage of his views, the possibility of generating syntactically a sentence in two different ways was supposed to explain its ambiguity, as in example like

(1) *Visiting relatives can be boring.*

Later, the hypothesis of deep structure was proposed. It was proposed, not so much by Chomsky himself as by some of his associates that the syntactical generation of a sentence happens in two stages. First, phrase structure rules generate the so-called deep structure. This deep structure is then subjected to various transformations in the technical syntactical sense. The crucial assumption is that the semantic interpretation of the sentence operates on the deep structure. Transformations were assumed not to affect meaning.

This deep structure theory soon proved inadequate. In the light of hindsight, linguists ought to have realized that the deep structure could match the logical form of sentences and that transformations like the passive transformation could change meaning. For instance, the sentences

(2) *Someone can beat anyone.*

(3) *Anyone can be beaten by someone.*

do not mean the same.

Later, generative grammarians gave up the deep structure idea and rehearsed other linguistic structures for the role of a logical or semantical structure.

At one point, Chomsky thought that the logical forms of natural-language sentences might be captured by the formulas of first-order logic. This is a mistake. In its usual formalization, first-order logic operates with quantifiers with variables bound to them. In contrast, natural languages (and some logical languages) operate with choice terms. There is a certain irony here. Choice terms were called denoting phrases by Bertrand Russell who sought to dispense them by reducing them to a quantifiers notation.

Game-theoretical semantics offers a solution to the problem of semantical structure. The fact admittedly is that the semantical meaning of a sentence (its interpretation) has to be gathered from syntactical clues. Wittgenstein once wrote: “If you ask me how you can understand what I say, when all that you have are my symbols, then I ask you, how can I understand what I say, when all that I have are my symbols”. In a semantical game, the next move is determined by the sentence that the players are considering at the time of the move. For instance, if the sentence

governing a move is $(\exists \xi)A(\xi)$, then the verifier must try to choose an individual b that satisfies $A(b)$. The newly introduced $A(b)$ is then sentence governing the next move. But that sentence $A(b)$ is not the initial sentence of the game. It is the sentence considered in the game at the time, and that sentence changes at each move syntactically and not only semantically. In our example it changes from $(\exists \xi)A(x)$ to $A(b)$. Rules for moves in a semantical game must accordingly have a syntactical component, rules for forming the new sentence to be considered at the next move.

Those rules move from compound sentences to simpler ones, the end-points being atomic sentences or their negations. If these rules are inverted so as to operate from the simpler to the more complicated and newly introduced constants are replaced by variables, they become rules for constructing the earlier sentences from later ones. Such rules can now be taken the rules of a generative grammar of the language in question. This grammar would be all that a language user needs to know in order to construct or to understand a sentence. More specifically, the whole syntax of the language or language fragment in question is captured by the syntactical part of those inverted game rules. This integrates syntax and semantics completely. Among other things, it shows what the syntactical clues are that direct a language user's semantical choices.

For instance a semantical game might start with the sentence

(4) *Tom is not the only man who loves his wife.*

As you can see, this is ambiguous. The ambiguity is brought out by the negation of (4)

(5) *Tom is the only man who loves his wife.*

(Negation rule changes the respective roles of the verifier and the falsifier.)

(6) *Tom loves his wife, while no one else does it.*

(Game rule paraphrasing (5).)

(7) *Tom loves his wife.*

(Conjunction rule from (6).)

(8) *No one else loves his wife.*

(Same conjunction rule. Both outcomes of this rule will be considered in what follows.)

(9) *Someone else loves his wife.*

(Negation rule applied to (8).)

(10) *Dick is not Tom, and Dick loves his wife.*

(Existential instantiation. Intuitively, the verifier finds Dick.) From (10) the game may move to either of the following:

(11) *Dick is not Tom, and Dick loves Dick's wife.*

(12) *Dick is not Tom and Dick loves Tom's wife.*

(These are obtained by a game rule for dealing with (i.e. interpreting) personal pronouns.)

If we replace “Dick” by a variable, the reverse of either sequence from (12) or (11) back to (4) might be part of a syntactical production of (4), not unlike Chomsky’s two ways of generating (1).

This is an illustration of how rules for semantical games can operate both as rule for syntactical generation and as rules of semantical interpretation.

Such a unification of syntax and semantics offers several further advantages for linguistic theory formation. An interesting advantage is that we do not now have to locate the features that prompt the application of a game rule in the initial sentence, but only the sentence that is being considered at the time of the application of the game rule in question. For instance, we do not have to have a rule telling how to introduce the second individual constant by looking only at (4). This applies also for instance to syntactical rules like rules for reflexive pronouns. The use anaphoric pronoun like “myself” is obligatory when it occurs in the same clause as its head, however that clause need not occur in the initial sentence, but in the sentence considered by the players at the stage at which a rule is applied. For instance a semantical game might lead the players from

(13) *I saw a snake near me.*

to

(14) *I saw a snake on the lawn, and the lawn was near me.*

Why is “myself” not obligatory in (13)? Because the first-person pronoun needs to be “interpreted” only in (14), not yet in the initial sentence (13).

A general advantage is that the integrated theory vindicates Chomsky’s ingenious early idea that a sentence derivably syntactically in two different way may for that very reason be semantically ambiguous. (See e.g. (8) above.)

Even more generally, we can see that anaphora is not a matter of coreference, but of the dependence of semantical rule application on each other. This is illustrated by a plethora of examples

(15) *There is nobody there, for he would have had to climb over the barbed-wire fence.*

(16) *I drive a Volvo. They are safe cars.*

(17) *A couple was sitting on the bench. Suddenly she got up.*

In none of these examples is the anaphoric pronoun in any natural sense coreferential with its head. Instead, the semantical interpretation of the anaphoric pronoun depends on that of its head. (Would one utter (17) on the proverbial isle of Lesbos?)

So far I have examined primarily such language-games as can be illustrated by means of games of seeking and finding. There are nevertheless other game-like activities including in-

volving language that can also be called language games. Formal deduction can be considered as such a game. An important case in point are games of questions and answers. Such games are especially useful in epistemology. Indeed, any new item of information that enters into one's reasoning can be thought of as an answer to an explicit or implicit question.

In epistemology, the nature of game theory as a strategy theory becomes crucial. In philosophical epistemology the main attention has been devoted to the evaluation of information that we already have, at the expense of the study of the ways of finding new truths. A study of the strategies of questioning is the best way of correcting this bias. The questioning games offer too large an embarrassment of riches to be discussed in detail here.

Leibniz once wrote that human nature reveals itself in games. Perhaps we can say that the nature of language is best revealed in games. I suspect that Peirce might have agreed with me.

Postscript: In order to avoid misunderstanding, I want to make it clear that game-theoretical semantics and IF logic are established branches of logical studies, but that the interpretation of syntax and semantics envisaged toward the end of this paper is at the present time only a project.

Literature

Many of the topics dealt with in this lecture are examined in my earlier work, including the following books:

HINTIKKA, K.J.J., 1985, *Anaphora and Definite Descriptions (with Jack Kulas)*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht

HINTIKKA, K.J.J., 1991, *On the Methodology of Linguistics (with Gabriel Sandu)*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

HINTIKKA, K.J.J., 1998, *Paradigms for Language Theory*, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht

HINTIKKA, K.J.J., 2007, *Socratic Epistemology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

HIDDEN SIGNS. THE LITERARY FACE OF THE NON-LITERARY TEXTS

Solomon Marcus
Romanian Academy & University of Bucharest
solomarcus@gmail.com

Abstract

There is a quasi-general agreement about the legitimacy and the high interest to read as literary works the Bible, Plato's Dialogues, Herodotus' Histories and many other religious, philosophical or historical works. Is there a similar legitimacy to consider the literary dimension of human creativity in fields like exact sciences, natural and engineering sciences, information sciences, linguistics, medical sciences, economics, sociology, psychology, juridical sciences etc.?

We bring some arguments in favor of an affirmative answer to this delicate question.

Literature, with Homer, and Mathematics, with Thales and Pythagoras, are daughters of the Ancient Myths, from which they inherited some of their basic features: the symbolic function; the need of a fictional universe; the holographic capacity to give to the local, the individual, the instantaneous the capacity to account for the global, the general, the eternal respectively; the need of paradox and of metaphor etc. During about two thousand years, science and culture were a mixture of mythical elements, literature, science and philosophy. Archimedes, some of the Catholic theologians of the Middle Age, Spinoza, Newton, until important authors of the 20th century in fields such as physics, biology or linguistics followed the axiomatic deductive type of presentation proposed by Euclid's Elements. Lucretius, Copernicus, Galilei, Kepler, in their famous works, are both important scholars and writers and the same is true for Augustine and for Aquinas. Italo Calvino gave a very deep argument for the high literary dimension of Galileo Galilei's writings and his debate with Carlo Cassola whether science and literature have

to say something each other deserves great attention. Calvino, a real European Borges, is in contrast with Roland Barthes' claim of a radical opposition between science and literature.

One can distinguish, in the last three thousand years of the cultural history of mankind, two lines of development. One of them was trying to organize the human knowledge and creativity in *disciplines* looking desperately for their *identity*, each of them aiming to become *a world in itself*. The other line of development made as its main object of inquiry the need of different aspects of nature and culture to be *together*, to *interact*, and to develop their *metabolism*, in absence of which you cannot understand them in their real nature.

1. To get order, we have to pay a price

The need to introduce some *order* in human knowledge and creativity, when their complexity was increasing, lead to the *segmentation in disciplines*; but this is obtained at the expense of the *nature of things*, because *reality, life phenomena and processes either ignore disciplines or go across them*. In order to bridge this gap, an alternative line of development directed its focus towards transgression of the disciplinary borders.

2. The great failure

As a matter of fact, these two lines of evolution are complementary, they need each other, but it happened that their synergetic capacity was not enough strong and the former line of development obtained the victory at the expense of the latter, in the way cultural institutions and systems of education were conceived. The second line remained rather hidden and now we try to recuperate, to bridge this gap.

The literature is one of the victims of this situation. To the need to develop a therapy of this illness, we devote our work.

3. A quasi general agreement

There is a quasi general agreement about the legitimacy and the high interest to read the *Bible* as literature or to read *Plato=s Dialogues* as literature or to consider Herodotus=*Histories* a literary work. We believe that this capacity of literature to be solidary with / inseparable from other types of human creativity and to interact with them is just its strong point. The problem begins to become more difficult and controversial as soon as we refer to the possible literature hidden in works belonging to exact sciences, natural sciences, information sciences, engineering sciences, economics, to some other social sciences. In this respect, some preliminary clarifications are necessary, because we have to face a lot of prejudices. The topic we are considering is of a high complexity.

4. Daughters of the ancient myths

In the Greek tradition of the Western World, Literature (beginning with Homer) and Mathematics (beginning with Thales and Pythagoras) are both daughters of the ancient myths, from which they inherited some of their basic features.

Need of a presence accounting for an absence. We refer first to the symbolic function, essential in myths, in poetry and in mathematics. More generally, sign processes of all kinds, iconic, indexical or symbolic, are essential.

Need of a fictional universe. Then, all these fields need to place their action into a fictional universe. Points, as things having no part, and lines, as things having no thickness, are the starting fictional characters in Euclid's *Elements*; equally fictional are the characters of the tragedies of Sophocles. In both cases, a fictional scenario is developed. The fiction is the price to be paid in order to get some rigour, be it logical or artistic.

The holographic capacity. Myths, poetry and mathematics need a *holographic capacity*, i.e., a capacity of some local, individual aspects to account for the global, the collective ones; of some

instantaneous aspects, to account for the eternity. In all myths, irrespective the traditions to which they belong, *anthropos* and *cosmos* are in interaction, the former is accounting, in some respects, for the latter. In poetry as well as in mathematics, the finite, the individual, are accounting for the infinity, the global, the total. The beginning of *To See a World ...* by William Blake is a magnificent illustration of this principle:

*To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.*

In mathematics, a lot of theorems account for the possibility of the finite to account for the infinity or for the small finite to account for the large finite. The so-called *analytic functions* are completely determined in the whole complex plane by their behaviour in the neighbourhood of a point.

Transgressing classical logic. Myths, literature and mathematics need to transgress the logic governed by the principles of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle, i.e., the logic of our sensorial, empirical, intuitive perception of the world, and to replace it by a logic in conflict with this perception. During the 20-th century, a lot of so-called *non-classical logics* were introduced and this fact is strongly connected with another one: the *paradox*, considered at the beginning of the 20-th century a pathological, marginal phenomenon, became, with the evolution of logic, physics, biology, computer science and many other fields, a normal, central phenomenon, just as it is in ancient myths and in modern visual arts, music and literature.

A special kind of temporality. We know now that there is a strong parallelism between myths, quantum physics and art, each of them having a tendency towards a temporality that could be the cancellation of the past-present-future distinction, to be replaced by a continuum present; and the same type of temporality seems to prevail in the perception of a new born baby.

Metaphor at home in mathematics. *Metaphor* is another thing which is essential in myths, in literature and in mathematics. If for metaphor in myths and in literature things are very clear, an explanation is necessary for metaphor in mathematics. We have in view the *cognitive metaphor*, as a basic ingredient of the research process, for instance in the building of new concepts and in exploring new possible theorems. In (Marcus 2012), I described the way cognitive self-referential metaphors (i.e., metaphors that refer not to a pre-existing entity, but to an entity emerging just under the action of the metaphorical process) are involved in the building of the conceptual status of integers, of rational numbers and of real numbers. On the other hand, it was proved (Lakoff B Nunez 2000) that with respect to the brain mechanisms involved in the creative process; mathematics is essentially of a metaphorical nature. A similar conclusion is suggested by (Manin 2007).

5. A cocktail of myths, science, and literature

During about two thousand years, science and culture were a cocktail of mythical elements, literature, science and philosophy (see, for more, Bochner 1966). Plato's *Dialogues*, Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, the works by Augustin, Aquinas, Copernicus, Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler are in this situation. In (Frankfort et al 1946) it is analyzed the importance of bringing together math, poetry and philosophy in Plato's and Aristotle's works.

Poetry, natural sciences and philosophy are at home in Lucretius' poem.

A contemporary reader could not believe that in a work, where a lot of interesting scientific facts are pointed out (for instance, he argues in this work that all unequal weights would fall with the same finite speed in a vacuum) and ideas of a natural philosophy are developed, the literary

beauty is the dominant note, as in the beginning of this poem:

Mother of Rome, delight of Gods and men,
 Dear Venus that beneath the gliding stars
 Makest to teem the many-voyaged main
 And fruitful lands - for all of living things
 Through thee alone are evermore conceived,
 Through thee are risen to visit the great sun-
 Before thee, Goddess, and thy coming on,
 Flee stormy wind and massy cloud away,
 For thee the daedal Earth bears scented flowers,
 For thee waters of the unvexed deep
 Smile, and the hollows of the serene sky
 Glow with diffused radiance for thee!
Lucretius - On the Nature of Things (Written 50 B.C.E.)
Translated by William Ellery Leonard

A term of reference: Euclid's Elements. Indeed, for almost 2000 years, many of the most important cultural works be they scientific, theological or philosophical, such as those of Archimedes, Augustin, Aquinas, Spinoza, Newton followed in their presentation the architecture of Euclid's *Elements*.

The poetic dimension of the father of heliocentrism. We refer to Nicolaus Copernicus' 1543 *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* [On the revolution of the celestial spheres].

Here are some quotations (English translation from 1926 by F.E. Bras).

That the Earth went round the Sun
 and not vice versa, as had been thought

For when a ship is floating calmly along,
 The sailors see its motion
 Mirrored in everything outside,
 While on the other hand
 They suppose that they are stationary,
 Together with everything on board,
 In the same way, the motion of the Earth
 Can unquestionably produce
 The impression that the entire Universe
 Is rotating.
(Ship, Earth, Motion)

For I am not so enamored
 Of my own opinions
 That I disregard
 What others may think of them.
 I am aware that
 A philosopher's ideas
 Are not subject
 To the judgement of ordinary persons.

Because is his endeavour
 To seek the truth in all things
 To the extent permitted
 To human reason by God.
 Yet I hold that
 Completely erroneous views
 Should be shunned.
 Those who know
 That the consensus of many centuries
 Had sanctioned the conception
 That the Earth remains at rest
 In the middle of the Heaven
 As its centre would.
 I reflected, regard it as insane pronouncement
 If I made the opposite assertion
 That the Earth moves.
 (*Opinion, Reason, Earth, Heaven*)

Finally we shall place
 The Sun itself at the centre of the Universe.
 All this is suggested
 By the systematic procession of events
 And the harmony of the whole Universe,
 If only we face the facts,
 As they say,
 AWith both eyes open.
 (*Sun, Universe*)

6. Galileo, secondo Calvino [Galileo according to Calvino]

In a first step, Anna Maria Ortese is addressing Italo Calvino:

È il 24 dicembre 1967. Da una decina di anni sonde e satelliti artificiali solcano lo spazio fuori dalla Terra. Italo Calvino ha appena pubblicato *Ti con zero*. E Anna Maria Ortese sulle pagine del *Corriere della Sera* gli scrive una lettera, datata 24 dicembre 1967.

*'Caro Calvino,
 non c'è volta che sentendo parlare di lanci spaziali, di conquiste dello spazio, ecc., io non provi
 tristezza e fastidio; e nella tristezza c'è del timore, nel fastidio dell'irritazione, forse sgomento e an-
 sia. Mi domando perché'*

La scrittrice, autrice di un acuto e indimenticabile *Il mare non bagna Napoli* con cui ha vinto il Premio Viareggio, è angosciata dal nuovo mondo tecnologico, che trova una clamorosa rappresentazione nei razzi che sfrecciano nello spazio.

In a second step, Calvino to Ortese:

La risposta, immediata, di Italo Calvino viene pubblicata quello stesso giorno sulle pagine del medesimo giornale e giunge forse inaspettata ad Anna Maria Ortese. Certo contiene un'impegnativa serie di giudizi su Galileo Galilei, su Giacomo Leopardi e sull'influenza del primo sul secondo.

'Cara Anna Maria Ortese,

guardare il cielo stellato per consolarci delle brutture terrestri? Ma non le sembra una soluzione troppo comoda? Se si volesse portare il suo discorso alle estreme conseguenze, si finirebbe per dire: continui pure la terra ad andare di male in peggio, tanto io guardo il firmamento e ritrovo il mio equilibrio e la mia pace interiore. Non le pare di "strumentalizzarlo" malamente, questo cielo?

Io non voglio però esortarla all'entusiasmo per le magnifiche sorti cosmonautiche dell'umanità: me ne guardo bene. Le notizie di nuovi lanci spaziali sono episodi d'una lotta di supremazia terrestre e come tali interessano solo la storia dei modi sbagliati con cui ancora i governi e gli stati maggiori pretendono di decidere le sorti del mondo passando sopra la testa dei popoli.

7. Galileo, il più grande scrittore italiana in prosa [Galileo, the greatest Italian writer in prose]

[...] **Chi ama la luna davvero non si accontenta di contemplarla come un'immagine** convenzionale, vuole entrare in un rapporto più stretto con lei, vuole vedere di più nella luna, vuole che la luna dica di più. Il più grande scrittore della letteratura italiana di ogni secolo, Galileo, appena si mette a parlare della luna innalza la sua prosa ad un grado di precisione e di evidenza ed insieme di rarefazione lirica prodigiose. E la lingua di Galileo fu uno dei modelli della lingua di Leopardi, gran poeta lunare...

Per Calvino, dunque, Galileo non è solo un grande scienziato e un grande filosofo. È anche un grande scrittore. Anzi, il più grande scrittore della letteratura italiana.

Cassola to Calvino

Carlo Cassola è tra i primi a reagire alla provocazione di Calvino. Non passa una settimana che il Corriere della Sera pubblica (31 dicembre 1967) un articolo molto duro a firma dello scrittore romano: *Domenica scorsa, su questo giornale Italo Calvino ha affermato che Galilei è il più grande scrittore italiano di ogni secolo. Io credevo che Galilei fosse il più grande scienziato, ma che la palma di massimo scrittore spettasse a Dante+.

Non si tratta di un'improbabile gara a chi meriti la palma del migliore scrittore. Ma dei fondamenti stessi della letteratura e della cultura. Mentirei – scrive Cassola – se dicessi che l'affermazione di Calvino mi ha scandalizzato. Lo spirito di dimissioni di molti miei colleghi è giunto a un punto tale che non mi scandalizzo più di niente. L'augurio che rivolgo loro è di liberarsi del complesso di inferiorità nei confronti della cultura scientifica e della tecnologia. E se no, che cambino mestiere.

8. Scienza e letteratura hanno nulla da dire l'una all'altra [Science and literature have nothing to say each other]

Carlo Cassola, dunque, pone due temi. Il primo è un assoluto: scienza e letteratura sono dimensioni comunicanti. Hanno nulla da dire l'una all'altra. Irrimediabilmente: Galileo è uno scienziato, dunque non è uno scrittore. Il secondo tema è più contingente: gli scrittori italiani son subalterni alla cultura umanistica. Una tesi che ha una versione speculare negli ambienti scientifici, secondo cui in Italia sarebbe egemone una cultura umanistica di impronta crociana e gentiliana che impedisce alla cultura scientifica di diffondersi nel paese sia tra le grandi masse, sia tra le classi dirigenti.

Calvino to Cassola

Calvino risponde a Cassola qualche settimana dopo, con intervento su L'Approdo letterario. In primo luogo:

Maggior nutrimento in Galileo

Intendevo dire scrittore di prosa; e allora lì la questione si pone tra Machiavelli e Galileo, e anch'io sono nell'imbarazzo perché amo molto pure Machiavelli. Quel che posso dire è che nella direzione in cui lavoro adesso, *trovo maggior nutrimento in Galileo, come precisione di linguaggio, come immaginazione scientifico-poetica, come costruzione di congetture.*

9. From Dante to Galileo

Infatti:

Galileo usa il linguaggio non come uno strumento neutro, ma con una coscienza letteraria, con una continua partecipazione espressiva, immaginativa, addirittura lirica.

Una coscienza letteraria che Galileo raggiunge soprattutto quando parla della Luna.
Leggendo Galileo mi piace cercare i passi in cui parla della Luna: è la prima volta che la Luna diventa per gli uomini un oggetto reale, che viene descritta minutamente come cosa tangibile, eppure appena la Luna compare, nel linguaggio di Galileo si sente una specie di rarefazione, di levitazione: ci si innalza in un'incantata sospensione.

Tutto questo giustifica il giudizio su Galileo scrittore. In particolare sul Galileo scrive della Luna dopo averla osservata, nell'autunno 1609, col nuovo occhiale.

Tuttavia Galileo non rappresenta una singolarità nella letteratura italiana. Al contrario ne incarna la più intima vocazione. E la dimostrazione l'abbiamo proprio partendo da Dante. Cosa fa il poeta fiorentino, sostiene l'autore di *Ti con zero*, se non realizzare con un'opera enciclopedica e cosmologica una mappa del mondo e dello scibile e costruire, attraverso la parola letteraria, un'immagine dell'universo?

Non c'è dunque davvero nessuno scandalo nell'accostare Galileo a Dante.

L'opera letteraria come mapa del mondo

Perché

Questa è una vocazione profonda della letteratura italiana che passa da Dante a Galileo: l'opera letteraria come mappa del mondo e dello scibile, lo scrivere mosso da una spinta conoscitiva che è ora teologica ora speculativa ora stregonesca ora enciclopedica ora di filosofia naturale ora di osservazione trasfigurante e visionaria.

La scienza e la filosofia naturale sono, dunque, la vocazione profonda della letteratura italiana. Una vocazione profonda, che coinvolge altri grandi autori – da Ariosto a Leopardi, entrambi *gran poeti lunari+. E che deve essere riscoperta, se vogliamo rinnovare la grandezza passata della nostra letteratura.

[Here is a free presentation in English of the controversy among Calvino, Cortese and Casolla:

In Italy's past century, a famous controversy about literary creativity took place among the writer Italo Calvino, on the one hand, and the writers Ana Maria Ortese and Carlo Casolla, on the other hand. In a letter published in *Corriere della Sera*, December 24, 1967, Ortese expresses her admiration but also her anxiety with respect to the new technological world, noisily represented by the cosmic space rockets. Calvino answers the same day, but referring to Galileo Galilei, to Giacomo Leopardi and to the influence of the former about the latter. "Dear Ana Maria Ortese, to look at the celestial stars as consolation for the life's brutalities, don't you think it is a too handy solution? You should conclude: the planet Earth may continue from bad to worse, but this fact will not stop me to contemplate the celestial stars and to find in this my stability and my interior peace". I don't want to join you in your enthusiasm for

the magnificent accomplishments of the cosmic flights. They are episodes of the fight for the terrestrial supremacy and they tell us how the governments of the big powers of the world want to decide the fate of the world, beyond the interests of the people [...]. Who loves the Moon, should not contemplate it as a conventional image; he should want to realize a direct relation with the Moon, to listen to its voice. The greatest Italian writer of all centuries, Galilei, when he refers to the Moon, he is raising his prose at an extraordinary degree of precision and of lyrical intensity. Galilei's language became a model for Leopardi, great selenic poet".

So, for Calvino Galilei is not only a great scientist and philosopher, he is also a great writer. Moreover, he is the greatest Italia writer. A few days later, at December 31, 1967, Carlo Casolla has a very hard reaction to Calvino's claim: "It is not Dante the greatest Italian writer, it is Galilei. Such a claim disturbs just the foundations of our literature and of our culture. But for me Calvino's claim is no longer scandalous. I observe to my colleagues a state of resignation, so nothing can be scandalous. I wish them to get rid of any complex of inferiority with respect to the scientific and technological culture. Otherwise, they should change their profession". So, Casolla claims that *no communication could exist between science and literature; they have nothing to say each other. As a derived statement, Casolla infers that Italian writers are subordinated to humanities, to a culture influenced by Croce and by Gentile.*

"Galilei, a strong literary consciousness" A few weeks later, Calvino retorts to Casolla. He says that Galilei is the first Italian writer in prose, in the same line with Machiavelli, while Dante is in poetry, and he adds: "Galilei's excellence can be seen in both language's precision and poetic imagination. For Galilei, language is not a neutral tool; he is using language with a strong literary consciousness, with a continuous expressive, imaginative and lyrical participation. Reading Galilei, I like to look for those places where he refers to the Moon; it is for the first time when the Moon becomes for humans a real object, something tangible. I feel in Galilei's language a kind of rarefaction, of charming floating. All these facts motivate to include Galilei among writers". Calvino refers to the moment, in Fall 1609, when Galilei observed the Moon with a new telescope. "Galilei is not singular in Italian literature. Dante himself realized an encyclopedic and cosmological work, by his literature. So, nothing surprising in placing Galilei near Dante. *Science and philosophy of nature are the deep feature of Italian literature, involving great authors, such as Ariosto and Leopardi, all of them great selenic poets*".

10. Calvino, the European Borges

Indeed, Calvino's ideas concerning the science-literature interaction are deeply involved in the creation of Luis Jorge Borges. Only one reference may be sufficient in this respect: the book by William Goldbloom Bloch (Bloch 2008).

11. Johannes Kepler, the triumph of a total vision

By his *Astronomia Nova* (1609) and mainly by his *Harmonices Mundi* (1619), Kepler is the highest expression and chronologically the last one in bridging successfully religious arguments and reasoning, astrology and astronomy, Pythagorean ideas and mathematics of planetary motion, Plato's five types of regular solids and the celestial music of spheres, all of them in a cosmic poetic perspective. His self-authored poetic epitaph survived the times:

*Mensus eram, nunc terrae metor umbras
Mens coelestis erat, corporis umbra iacet
[I measured the skies, now the shadows I measure
Sky bound was the mind, Earth bound, the body rests].*

12. Steps in the separation between literature and mathematics

The invention of an artificial component of mathematical language, with Galilei, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, favoured the rupture, the opposition between poetry and mathematics. The natural language component of the scientific language became more and more marginalized: less and less words, more and more symbolic representations, formulas, equations. This trend reached in the 20th century its highest moment, not only in research, but also in university and high school teaching. The contrast to literature increased tremendously.

13. Another source of rupture: the elimination of the narrative dimension

During the period from the 17th to the 19th century, the evolution of mathematics was from the accent on meaning and intuitive aspects, favouring the narrative dimension, towards the accent on syntax, correctness and formal rigor. Compare, in this respect, the face of *Calculus* with Newton, Leibniz and Euler with the same field with Cauchy, Weierstrass and Riemann. *Rigor at the expense of meaning*, in terms proposed by René Thom. This trend was another source of opposition between poetry and mathematics, but it is strongly connected to the previous trend. Because the natural language component of mathematics became more and more marginalized, it was less and less place for intuition, for dynamic aspects, for narrativity, i.e., less and less possibility for mathematics to show its literary, poetic face.

14. Maxwell: the exception

There were some remarkable exceptions, one of them being the *Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism* by James Clark Maxwell (1873), which has both the status of a scientific and of a literary work. See, for more, (Simpson 2005). In the review by Brian Hayes (Hayes 2013) of this book, Hayes writes: AIn mathematics and the sciences, style and substance seem to be orthogonal variables B but on this point Thomas K. Simpson disagrees. Speaking of scientific works generally and with particular reference to James Clark Maxwell's *Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism*, Simpson writes: AIt seems to be generally assumed that the literary and the scientific aspects of the work will factor, so to speak, and remain separable.

15. A big change of paradigm

Towards the end of the 19th century, when we move from the dominance of the Galileo-Newtonian paradigm, based on the assumption of a sharp distinction between Subject and Object (the *objectivity* of science, of mathematics by excellence, was in clear opposition with the subjectivity of poetry) and the incapacity of the former to have a significant influence on the behaviour of the latter, to a new period, when all the components of the Galileo-Newtonian scenario (observation, hypothesis, experiment, induction, generalization, laws, experimental tests etc) get in crisis, because *the assumption of a clear separation between Subject and Object, the universal determinism and the experimental testing no longer work*. We have instead the increasing role of cognitive models and of cognitive metaphors, conceived as hypothetical explanatory scenarios characterized by internal conflictual situations, so any cognitive model or metaphor needs to be improved and the cognitive process never ends.

16. Barthes and Calvino

During three centuries, from the 17th to the 19th century, but still persisting in the 20th century, the dominant idea was that of a strong opposition between science and art, between mathematics and poetry, culminating in the vision of the French writer Roland Barthes, for whom in a poetic text the language is like a black window, it is self-referential, while in a scientific text the language is a neutral tool, exterior to him, like a transparent window. (Barthes 1967–1968)

But we are inclined to favour Italo Calvino's attitude (1982; 1986), according to which *a work may be at the same time great both as science and as literature* (Italo Calvino 1986).

17. Science and literature as complementary aspects of the same text

Calvino's example, as we have seen, is the work of Galileo Galilei, but he goes much beyond it with his analysis. My belief is that mathematics, science in general, has a chance to acquire a literary dimension as soon as it is presented in the making and in their progress, with all human and social aspects of the fight with the unknown, with all failures and mistakes in the process.

We mention some contemporary examples which are significant in this respect:

1. The way Donald Knuth (Knuth 1974) supplemented with a novelette John H. Conway's surreal numbers;
2. The story told by the Fields Medallist in mathematics Cedric Villani (Villani 2012), about his human fight to solve a mathematical problem;
3. The book by Bogdan Suceava (Suceava 2012) transforming his mathematical adventure into a literary story;
4. Our literary analysis of the mathematical texts published by the poet Ion Barbu under the name Dan Barbilian (Marcus 2013b).
5. The literary face of Economics is one of the main concerns in the works of Donald N McCloskey (McCloskey 1984) and Deirdre N. McCloskey (McCloskey 1994), (McCloskey 1998) (see mainly Chapter 2, *The literary character of Economic Sciences*, and Chapter 3, *Figures of Economic Speeches*).

In this respect, we took advantage of the concept of *diction (articulation) of the ideas* introduced and analyzed by Professor Mircea Martin for the field of literary criticism (Martin 2010), but whose validity and relevance seem to be more general. A lot of other examples could be mentioned in this respect.

18. Wonder and surprise

The science of the 20th century shows an increasing degree of surprise, more and more scientific results are in *sharp conflict with our sensorial, intuitive and intellectual expectations*. Scientific and technological imagination came as a shock, increasing the state of wonder in contemplating what happens in the new discovered worlds of the infinitely large and of the infinitely small; in the new discovered worlds of the Internet.

19. Invention and discovery: from asymmetry to symmetry

Until the 19th century, it was a general agreement to place science under the sign of discovery and art and literature under the sign of invention. Beginning with the 20th century, we have to accept that both invention and discovery are essential in both science and art.

20. The theatrical dimension


The emergence of the *conflictual* aspects in cognitive modelling and in cognitive metaphors, the need of imagination of more and more explanatory *scenarios* increased the theatrical-spectacular nature of human creativity in both science and literature (Marcus 2013a). Almost no significant event in the field of science and technology remained out of the attention of artists and writers. *Human need and fight to know, to understand the world, the life are by no means less interesting for art and literature than the man-woman relation.*

21. To conclude


The second, hidden line of evolution of the human knowledge and creativity is, in some respect, more demanding, more exigent, than the first one, because it requires the understanding of different, heterogeneous disciplines, while we were trained to pay attention to one discipline, with respect to which we will define our profession. This is the challenge we have to face. Is literature living in a mixed environment inferior to the usual one? Two lines of evolution lead to two kinds of literature and we have to learn and to train to pay equal attention to both of them.

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THEORETICAL SEMIOTICS



Biosemiotic ethics

Chairman:

Morten Tønnessen (mortentoennesen@gmail.com)
University of Stavanger, Norway

Cultural Semiotics

Chairmen:

Mohammed Bernoussi (barnoussim@ymail.com)

Université de Meknès, Morocco

Massimo Leone (massimo.leone@unito.it)

University of Turin, Italy

Anna Maria Lorusso (annamaria.lorusso@unibo.it)

University of Bologna, Italy

Ethnosemiotics: Approach to Tradition and Culture

Chairman:

Vilmos Voigt (voigtbudapest@gmail.com)

Models, signs, values and dialogue

Chairmen:

Susan Petrilli (susan.petrilli@gmail.com)

University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy

Augusto Ponzio (augustoponzio@libero.it)

University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy

Giorgio Borrelli (giorgiorborrelli83@yahoo.it)

University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy

The images of the time / Les images du temps

Chairmen:

Antonio Roberto Chiachiri Filho (prof.arcf@uol.com.br)

Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil

Rodrigo Antunes Moraes (digo.morais@gmail.com)

Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil

Semiotic Paradoxes: Antinomies And Ironies In Transmodern World

Chairman:

Farouk Seif (fseif@antioch.edu)

Antioch University Seattle, USA

Visual Semiotics

Chairman:

Gregory Paschalidis (paschagr@jour.auth.gr)

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

Cognitive Semiotics

Chairmen:

Frederik Stjernfelt (stjern@hum.ku.dk)

University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

Jordan Zlatev (jordan.zlatev@ling.lu.se)

Lund University, Sweden

Peer Bundgaard (sempb@dac.au.dk)

Aarhus University, Denmark

Edusemiotics

Chairman:

Inna Semetsky (irs5@caa.columbia.edu)

Columbia University, USA

Existential semiotics

Chairmen:

Eero Tarasti (eero.tarasti@helsinki.fi)

Helsinki University, Finland

Zdzisław Wąsik (zdzis.wasik@gmail.com)

Philological School of Higher Education in Wrocław, Poland

Social construction or universal cultural conceptions? An epistemological rift

Chairman:

Rea Walldén (rwallden@yahoo.com)

Athens School of Fine Arts, Greece

BIOSEMIOTIC ETHICS

A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO THE PET WORLD

Panagiotis Xouplidis
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
pxouplid@itl.auth.gr

Abstract

The Oxford English Dictionary defines pet as “any animal domesticated or tamed kept as a favorite or treated with indulgence.”

In modern Western societies pets are everywhere. In modern cities there are millions of pet dogs, cats, birds, fish, rabbits, snakes, and monkeys while modern economy includes a vast service industry that provides veterinary care, food, breeding, and assorted accessories. Looking through the historical evolution of mankind it becomes obvious that without the possession of the domesticated animals, man would have continued to be a savage; and that without the help of them, no considerable progress in civilization could have been achieved. This became possible through artificial selection, which is the selection of advantageous natural variation for human ends and it is the mechanism by which most domestic species evolved. A fact to be considered is, as Paul Shepard affirms, that: “Pets are not part of human evolution or the biological context out of which our ecology comes. They are civilized paraphernalia whose characteristic combination and accommodation is tangled in ambiguous tyranny. Although looked upon with affection, even modern pets are property that is bought, sold, put down and neutered.”

Pets are commodities that many people use, like other consumer goods, as a means of constructing identities, although they are also considered members of families and serve as companions providing considerable emotional attachments and satisfactions. It is likely that because of the social and economic conditions many middle-class people make substantial emotional

investments in their relationships with animal companions. The case is that humans not only attribute various mental states to one another but there is an irresistible primate tendency to generalize these attributions to pets and other animals. On one side, anthropomorphic thinking enables animal companions' social behavior to be construed in human terms. On the other side, anthropomorphism constitutes an evolutionary selection pressure which has defined the appearance, anatomy, and behavior of companion animal species.

The fact that pets occupy by default an equally great human need for non-human others in the contemporary urban American household is both obvious and perplexing. Americans spend over \$5 billion annually feeding dogs and cats alone, while only \$3 billion is spent on baby food (Beck, 1983; Pet Food Institute, 1986).

During the past three decades, the subject of relations between people and other animals has become a respectable area of research: "anthrozoology" crosses a wide variety of academic disciplines, including anthropology, art and literature, education, ethology, history, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and human and veterinary medicine. In convergence to this research field the paper is going to discuss two emergent themes from the Sociosemiotic perspective:

Harry Truman once said: "If you want a friend in Washington, get a dog¹."

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Pets are commodities that many people use, like other consumer goods, as a means of constructing identities, although they are also considered members of families and serve as companions providing considerable emotional attachments and satisfactions. It is likely that because of the social and economic conditions many middle-class people make substantial emotional investments in their relationships with animal companions. The case is that humans not only attribute various mental states to one another but there is an irresistible primate tendency to generalize these attributions to pets and other animals. On one side, anthropomorphic thinking enables animal companions' social behavior to be construed in human terms. On the other side, anthropomorphism constitutes an evolutionary selection pressure which has defined the appearance, anatomy, and behavior of companion animal species.

The research is discussing mainly the U.S pet-keeping culture for methodological reasons, firstly because it's a phenomenon that is related to modern U.S society; secondly there are many scientific studies related to various aspects of pet-keeping in this country; and thirdly, there are statistical data from different institutions related to pet ownership and the social, personal and economic dimensions of this practice. As it will be shown in the process this paper will focus mainly on dogs and cats, as they constitute the vast majority of pets in the modern U.S. Addi-

¹ 50 famous quotes about dogs. (2014) <http://dogtime.com/25-famous-quotes-about-dogs.html>

tionally, the bibliography examined is almost exclusively based on case study results relying on answers provided by pet owners whose pet is usually a dog or a cat. The paper constitutes an overview and it is divided in two parts: the study of the meaning(s) and the function(s) of companion animals in modern U.S society.

1. Companion animals' mediation between nature and culture

1.1. The human/pet relationship: The sign of the pet

What kind of meaning is connected to *the pet world*² and by what kind of mechanisms?

For Gottdiener and Lagopoulos (1986: 2–3):

Semiotic studies sign relating to the recognition of the social and natural environment of an individual and of his/her internal world.[...]The universe of signs includes: the non-physiological part of perception; conception; scientific modes of discourse; and the value systems, or the socially constituted world views of social subjects, which are in function of social interaction. [...] Material objects are vehicles of signification, so that the symbolic act always involves some physical object as well as the discourse on it.

Gottdiener and Lagopoulos (1986: 8) also indicate that: “Conceptual stimuli in the environment play a more fundamental role as physical forms are assigned certain significations.” In this case the material objects or physical objects are companion animals (or pets) which act as stimuli as they have become symbols. Every companion animal (or pet) is transformed, at the level of denotation, into a signified of his own function, as well as of another function which is symbolic, it signifies on a second level also, that of connotation. Connotative codes are social products produced by groups and classes involved in practices related to companion animals.

The present socio-semiotic approach is a materialist inquiry into the role of the ideology related to companion animals in everyday life seeking to account for the articulation between semiotic and non-semiotic social processes in the ideological production and conception of companion animals. The organization of companion animals handling is a social product and the production of companion animals is governed by social processes characteristic of social formations that involve non-semiotic as well as semiotic processes, because social practices mold and interpret companion animals according to codified ideology. Thus, a socio-semiotic analysis at the level of production of companion animals, involves identifying the role of connotative and denotative codes of mediation of companion animals productions. It becomes clear that the pet world is the end result of the intersection between non-semiotic and semiotic processes, which are mediated through companion animal ideologies and it can be approached by an inquiry of the semiotic conception of companion animals by the socially stratified groups of synchronic users. A socio-semiotic analysis of the pet world therefore consists of a series of combined aspects of study related to the decomposition of companion animal or pet sign according to the model of Hjelmslev, in an attempt to identify explicitly the social languages of ideological systems and the non-semiotic environment (Gottdiener and Lagopoulos 1986: 16–17).

From this methodological approach a socio-semiotic analysis of a pet sign system should be constituted by cultural research to document the *form and substance of content*:

Substance: attention will be given to historically and culturally established signification related to companion animals, in other words the evolution of pet-keeping in western societies.

² Reference to Paul Sheppard's article (2003) with the same title.

Form: considerably case study research is necessary to document the codified ideology structuring the signifiers of companion animals. At this point it has to be mentioned that to establish the codes the research used a corpus of published texts from various disciplines – anthropology, sociology, psychology, cultural, consumer, medical and veterinary studies – examining the discourse of pet owners as appeared in studies and surveys. This task at this point it cannot be considered exhaustive.

On the other hand, observational data should be collected on *both the substance and form of the expression*:

Substance: description of material companion animal fauna invested by signification should be obtained, in this case of cats and dogs, which serve as companion animals.

Form: attention should be given to the specific companion animal elements which are the vehicles of signification, physical appearance, breed, species, etc.

The conception of companion animals is filtered through and finally shaped by a cultural grid. This grid is composed of a set of semantic components, each one of which is a specific manner of approaching and apprehending companion animals. The semantic components of this grid used to apprehend companion animals, constitute a semantic code. The codes which belong to the same general semantic field constitute a code set.

The research has indicated 10 codes grouped in 5 code sets:

Economic codes

The code of pet-care is used to make reference to expenditure animal keeping costs.

Social codes

The code of social support is used to make reference to the subject's sense of receiving certain types of social support from his pet.

The code of social status is used to make reference to the connection of the owner's pet with social status.

The code of property is used to make reference to legal or pet-welfare aspects of pet-keeping.

The code of control is used to make reference to behavioral aspects of the pet owned, as perceived by the owner.

Functional codes

The code of companion animals (pet-code) is used to make reference to the function of pets to serve as company to their owner.

Personal codes

The aesthetic code is used to make reference to physical appearance of the pet animal related to owner's aesthetic preferences.

The experiential code is used to make reference to experiences related to the interaction with the pet animal

The code of pet anthropomorphism is used to make reference to the pet animal, as bearer of human characteristics, as a person.

Taxonomic codes

Taxonomic species code is used to make reference to the species of the pet animal, in this case a cat or a dog.

1.2. Non-semiotic material practices related to companion animals: The evolution of pet-keeping

There are no pets in nature; an animal only becomes a pet by the human owner's choice. Thus, a "pet" is an artificial category of human conception. The *Oxford English Dictionary* records the earliest use in reference to a pet animal in 1539 (Walker-Meikle 2012: 2).

Pet-keeping appears to be a remarkable relationship between humans and animals, for the pet is often allowed into personal spaces, lives in physical proximity with its owner, often en-

joys of luxury food and it is decorated with special accessories, while nothing is asked but to provide companionship. Pet-keeping as a practice was established in the middle Ages. In the nineteenth century pet-keeping reveals a system of control related to the arrangement of the imaginary in ordinary life adapted to the bourgeois expectations of self. As Sheppard (2003: 512) discusses: “Domestic animals were “created” by humans by empirical genetic engineering over the past ten thousand years. [...] They and all captive animals are like organ transplants: healthy for us but cut out of their own organic fabric. [...] Pets, being our own creations, do not replace that wild universe.”

The modern pet dog constitutes a clear example: the eating habits, the walking time, the sleeping place and the grooming of the animal are totally under human control. Its health and its wellbeing through veterinary care depend entirely on the owner, as well. Pet dogs are provided with human names, clothing, grooming and health care to a level that owners start to see them as quasi-human, as members of the family in the modern domestic environment. The modern pet dogs don't have wild origins; they have always been tamed animals for being a product of breeding. In modern society a companion animal often constitutes an impulse item as the number of animal images accessible to viewers across the world beyond boundaries of language and culture through mass media and advertizing has drawn attention and reshaped our conception of animals.

1.3. The semiotic perspective of pet-keeping.

1.3.1. The key aspect of pet-keeping culture: Pet anthropomorphism

Humans use animals to symbolize and dramatize aspects of their social experience and individual fantasies, because they can simplify the narrative to produce effective allegorical meaning. In the mass media culture globalized community of today photography, film, television and Internet only have transformed the way they are told.

For Asquith (1984: 138), anthropomorphism in the context of animal behavior means: “the ascription of human mental experiences to animals”. Normally an animal, with certain physical and behavioral characteristics, must be singled out as a promising prospect for anthropomorphism. The distinctive mark of the animal is self-locomotion; they are not just one symbol system out of many, for Daston and Mitman (2005: 13): “they are symbols with a life on their own.”

As Serpell (2005: 123) suggests: “anthropomorphism appears to have its roots in the human capacity for so-called reflexive consciousness, which is the ability to use self-knowledge to understand and anticipate the behavior of others.” Thus, for Michell (2005: 102): “anthropomorphism involves claims the centrality of human concepts and abilities to classify behaviors across ontological categories.”

In the semiotic perspective of gestural communication Greimas (1987: 31–34) indicates:

Since the human body, as signifier, is treated as configuration is normal to expect that its mobility will be considered as mainly creating positional gaps and this polarization of movements will end up in the parallel categorization of contents. In addition to the fact that on the plane of content this valorizes what are commonly called *attitudes*, at the expense of gestures, we have also accounted for the semiosis that characterizes communicative gestuality. This consists in establishing a correlation between a phemic category belonging to the plane of expression and a semic category at the plane of content.[...] The acknowledgement that the correlation between the categories of expression and those of content remains constant within a given cultural context enables us to set out our observations on communicative gestuality by starting from considerations regarding content, and not, as would normally be the case for any other semiotic text, from the plane of expression.

For Greimas (1987: 38): “The presence of the animal world and the narrative sequences of taming make it possible to interpret this form of mythical gestuality, as an archaic universe still surviving in modern times”. In this case the research is focusing on the gestural programs of pet keeping investigating the semiotic models and structures responsible for the attribution of meaning to certain pet animal behavior while interacting with their owners. Greimas (1987: 45) concludes that: “Considered from the point of view of cultural projects, the different gestural programs seem to be closed discourses whose content analysis can explicate only a particular type of narrative structure. They can be represented as models of a practical or mythical knowing-how-to-do whose organization could account for a certain mode of existence of so-called economic and cultural structures.”

Thus, the conception of the gestural communication of pet animals perceived by humans indicates a semiotic model, an anthropomorphic code that could be named, code of pet anthropomorphism. This code seems to be the result behind the interpretation of the behavior of the pet animal and its taming in cultural terms by a semiotic process. From the socio-semiotic point of view, anthropomorphic codes in the conception of companion animals are specific, scientifically accessible claims of similarity between humans and nonhumans. Thus, there must be substantiated by evidence that there are similar structures responsible for generating meaning. To this hypothesis further specifically focused socio-semiotic case study is required.

Most authorities now agree that pets are serving as a form of social support. Cobb (Serpell 2005: 125) defined social support as “information leading the subject to believe that he is cared for and loved, esteemed, and a member of a network of mutual obligations.” Thus, the socially supportive potential of pets encoded in the social support code in the discourse of pet owners should therefore underlie on the ability of the animal to produce meaning by behaving in ways that make their owners conceive that the animal demonstrates care, love, high esteem towards them and depends on them for care and protection. It becomes apparent that the human-pet relationship serves primarily for the transfer or exchange of social meaning between people and animals than a rather economic or utilitarian function.

As Serpell (2005: 127) comments:

Bonas's study (Bonas, McNicholas and Collis 2000: 209–236) clearly suggests that her subjects had no difficulty describing and evaluating their nonhuman companions using precisely the same relational parameters as those developed and used to describe relations with humans. By implication, then, these people must have interpreted and evaluated the various behavioral signals of social support they received from their pets as if they were coming from fellow human beings.

This leads to the conclusion that the anthropomorphic code is closely related to the experiential code of pet owners practicing pet-keeping in modern world and to the social support code from the same individuals as a result of the interaction with their pets. For Hirschman (1994: 626), as the urban household is primarily intended as a human habitat, pet animals are permitted within it to the extent that they conform to behavioral practices and respect boundaries regarded from the owner as positive and acceptable. This is encoded in the control code that is used to make reference to the conception of the behavioral aspect of the animal's presence in human habitat.

For Albert and Bulcroft (1988: 544) pets are an economic paradox because they do not do useful work, and they cost substantial amounts of money and time from their owners. The code

of pet-care is used to make reference to economic and other type of cost – time for example – required from the pet owner as responsibility related to the animal.

Regarding the functional code of companion animals (pet code), Hirschman (1994: 620) asserts that:

[...] the majority of animals act as companions to their human owners.[...] Animals may act as friends and partners to their owners. They may serve as children or as child substitutes for childless couples. Finally, animals may act as extensions of the consumer's self, case in which the owner projects his or her own personality onto the animal and absorbs the animal's nature into himself or herself.

Albert and Bulcroft (1987) confirm that *pet attachment*³ is highest among single, divorced, widowed, and remarried people as well as among childless couples, newlyweds, and empty-nesters, while pet anthropomorphism is high among single, divorced, remarried people and childless couples. Albert and Bulcroft (1988: 550) also affirm that pets tend to be viewed as family members by people who live in the city and pet ownership, the roles and functions of pets vary over the life cycle and by family type.

1.3.2. A striking issue: The pet personality

The Oxford English Dictionary on-line defines the word *pet*:

1. (Noun): A domestic or tamed animal or bird kept for companionship or pleasure,
2. (Verb): Stroke or pat (an animal) affectionately⁴.

It is estimated that the total number of pets owned in the U.S is that of 396 from which the cat population is of 95.6 millions (24%) and the dog population is of 83.3 millions (21%)⁵. Apparently becomes reasonable to believe that the cat and the dog are the protagonists of the pet world in the U.S.

The domestic dog (*Canis Lupus Familiaris*) is a member of the *Canidae* family of the mammalian order *Carnivora*.

The domestic cat (*Felis Catus*) is a member of the *Felidae* family of the mammalian order *Carnivora*.

The human ability to attribute meaning to certain animal behavior and physical appearance, especially in the case of pets, conditions our conception at a connotative level. In this way certain animal elements, which are the vehicles of signification, tend to generate semantic structures, which constitute aesthetic and control codes in pet discourse, which are culturally regulated. The relation of these codes with the code of pet anthropomorphism, as described previously, constitutes the concept of the so-called *pet personality*. At the level of material processes related to the production of pets, anthropomorphic selection in favor of physical and behavioral traits that facilitate the attribution of human mental states to animals has significant impact on the anatomy, the physical appearance and the behavior of pets. Results of a study (Fratkin and Baker 2013) indicated that people attribute different personality characteristics to dogs based solely on physical characteristics (coat color and ear shape) and that there is some evidence (Delgado, Munera & Reevy 2012) that human perception of coat color is an indicator of domestic cat per-

³ Albert and Bulcroft (1987: 547) define pet attachment as an underlying dimension of people's feeling toward their pets that nine of the items used in the survey assessed and it was revealed by factor analysis and inter-item correlations of the data.

⁴ Oxford Diccionario (2014). [online]. <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/pet> (last accessed: 24 June 2014)

⁵ Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics. (2014).

http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp (last accessed: 25 June 2014)

sonality.

The combined aspects of the studies revised indicate a close relationship between the aesthetic and the control code with the experiential and social support codes that reveal the dimensions of the encounters with an animal that fulfills the companion animal owner's expectations and produces positive feelings. The anthropomorphic code seems to be the core code in the structure of this code system, fact that is also reflected in the content of the surveys questions. As a general overview the results for the average middle class urban pet owner of a dog or a cat can be summarized in this scheme of codes:

The pet code system	
Not pet VS pet	Companion animal code
Negative VS positive	Aesthetic code
Not controlled VS controlled	Control code
Not anthropomorphic VS anthropomorphic	Code of pet anthropomorphism
Negative VS positive	Experiential code
Negative VS positive	Code of social support

In this scheme the positive poles of the binary relationships underlying in the codes used by pet owners in pet related oral discourse respond to the concept of the pet in modern society. Regarding the code of pet-care, low importance is given to costs and expenditures from the pet owners, thus it does not appear playing a significant role. The code of social status is related to breeds and other types of pet functions, as pet contests and breeding activities, as well as it concerns upper class pet owners, thus at this point its appearance does not play an important role, requiring specific focused research to detect the structure of the system describing these phenomenons.

2. The commodification of animals in market industry: The case of the pet culture⁶ in the U.S

Statistical data provided by American Pet Products Association (APPA) indicate that 140 million U.S. households own a pet and APPA estimates pet spending will reach \$55.72 billion this year⁷. Pets in modern U.S. society seem to be no longer a part of wild nature. They are a middle class commodity⁸ that everyone wants and they are humanized to the point that they have the same food, clothes and beds as humans. As Mullin (1999: 215–216) affirms, pets are used like consumer goods, as a means of constructing identities although they serve as companions providing considerable emotional attachments and satisfactions and are also often considered members of families. Companion animals as facilitators of social interactions increase self-defining situations, as the self is a social construction built on the information derived from a person's social relationships. However, the connection between companion animals and the owner's self concept is direct, involving a material practice at the non-semiotic level, and mediated at the semiotic level of connotation, involving the code system for generating meaning previously

⁶ Reference to the article(Goudreau 2009) with the same title.

⁷ Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics. (2014).

http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp(last accessed: 25 June 2014)

⁸ Reference to the term introduced by Marx (1976: 125): "The commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind. The nature of these needs, whether they arise, for example, from the stomach, or the imagination, makes no difference."

discussed. Thus, for Sanders (1990): “owners usually define their pets as “persons” with whom they share lasting, intimate, and emotionally involving relationships”.

In the consumer society the companion animal function fulfils itself in the precision of its relationship to the real world and to human needs, while transcending its main function in the direction of a secondary level within the universal system of signs. From this semiotic process the companion animal nature results dominated, as the semiotic system is constantly converting it into culture. Thus, the pet being the object merely of needs and of the satisfaction of needs has become an object of consumption external to the relationship that it signifies. By this process the relationship is no longer directly experienced it is transformed into a sign and thus consumed. In this system the signified is the void of this relationship, the relationship that is lacking. Pets constitute the signs of the absence of nature in modern life; while at the same time constitute connotations of the absence of relationships in the consumer society. Pets are used for the development and definition of consumer’s sense of self in an attempt to overcome the sense of self-emptiness by creating a shared meaningful relationship.

A research (Gosling, Carson & Potter 2010) published in the journal *Anthrozoös* presents scientific evidence that there are personality differences between “cat people” and “dog people”, revealing “a widely held cultural belief that the pet species – dog or cat – with which a person has the strongest affinity says something about the individual’s personality”.

As a customized animated commodity in consumer culture, the pet provides to the consumer comfort, protection, love, health, companionship, and a self definition which can be bought, sold, or traded. A clear example from a modern society, with a lot of similarities with the U.S society, is given in a published study((King, Marston and Bennett 2009) regarding the ideal Australian pet dog, where the researchers indented to identify what constitutes an ideal dog in the present day based on a number of behavioral and physical characteristics. The results indicated that for Australian people is important that the companion dog is being medium sized, short haired, de-sexed, safe with children, fully housetrained, friendly, obedient and healthy; to come when called, not to escape from their property, to enjoy being petted and to display affection to their owners. It becomes clear from the results of this study that the closer model to the ideal Australian pet dog is a fully controlled robot-dog.

Many unexplored aspects of the ideology of pet-keeping in any modern culture may be accessible via socio-semiotic analysis. There is a tremendous amount of texts devoted to pets to be utilized within a consumer behavior context, while Internet, television and print advertisements present a variety of pet-related products which encode cultural beliefs about the meaning of pets and promote norms related to their care. Pets appear regularly in motion pictures, television programs, and, especially, in children’s animation programs. A systematic socio-semiotic analysis of these texts would reveal important cultural concepts related to companion animals in the modern world.

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CULTURAL SEMIOTICS

SEMIOTIK DER KULTUR ALS ÜBERSETZUNG VON SCHRIFTZEICHEN BEI YOKO TAWADA

Aglaia Blioumi
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
baglaia@hotmail.com

Abstract

Literary essays are not just objectification of real cultural artifacts, but also performances of culture. But how does culture become literarily organized on the levels of expression and contents? What happens when a topic becomes the meeting of foreign and own culture? Striking examples of such cultural overlaps are the literary essays of the Japanese German author Yoko Tawada. The previous article investigates how, for Tawada, elements of Japanese culture are translated for the German reader through the rendering of Japanese ideograms; how commonalities and differences are expressed literarily through the function of the alphabet and the ideograms. My thesis thereby is that Tawadas constant desemanticizing is set in the writing in order to avoid a static concept of culture.

Literarische Texte sind nicht nur Objektivationen realer kultureller Artefakte, sondern performieren auch Kultur. Wie wird jedoch Kultur auf der Ausdrucks- und der inhaltlichen Ebene literarisch dargeboten? Was passiert, wenn das Thema der Literatur die Begegnung der fremden mit der eigenen Kultur ist? Ein eklatantes Beispiel für solch kulturelle Überlappungen sind die literarischen Essays der deutschsprachigen Autorin japanischer Herkunft Yoko Tawada, da in ihren Schriften das „Fremde“ und das „Eigene“ zum Gegenstand ihres Schreibens wird.

Die Problematisierung des „Fremden“ und des „Eigenen“ wird nicht nur auf der konnotativen Ebene, sondern auch auf der denotativen Ebene konfiguriert. Daher werde ich im Folgen-

den untersuchen, wie bei Tawada Elemente der japanischen Kultur für den deutschen Leser durch die Wiedergabe der japanischen Ideogramme „übersetzt“, wie Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede durch die Funktion des Alphabets und der Ideogramme literarisiert werden. Schließlich, wie die Funktion des den Texten inhärenten semiotischen Systems zu beschreiben ist. Meine These ist dabei, dass durch die Wiedergabe der japanischen Ideogramme und die kulturellen Übersetzungen der Wörter, Desemantisierungsprozesse in Gang gesetzt werden, um einen statischen Kulturbegriff zu unterlaufen.

1. Hommage an Paul Celan

Im Essay *Die Krone aus Gras. Zu Paul Celans ‚Niemandrose‘* (Tawada 2007: 63-84) versucht Tawada den Zugang des Dichters Paul Celan zum Japanischen zu beschreiben. Bereits in Japan und ohne der deutschen Sprache mächtig zu sein, war sie von den japanischen Übersetzungen des Dichters beeindruckt. In ihrem bekannten Essayband *Talisman* behauptet die Protagonistin, dass es nicht genüge zu behaupten, dass Celans Gedichte übersetzbar sind, sondern, dass sie „ins Japanische hineinblicken“ (Talisman, 121). Daher unternimmt sie in ihrem Essay *Die Krone aus Gras* eine Art literarische Übersetzung, die Celans Gedicht *Zweihäusig, Ewiger* interpretiert. Ihre Profession als Übersetzerin führt sie dazu, im Wort des Gedichtes „Bettstatt“ zweimal den Signifikant des „Doppel-T“ zu registrieren. Beim Übersetzen ins Japanische erkennt sie, dass ihr dieses Wort deswegen optisch aufgefallen war, weil im japanischen Wort für Rose 薔薇 „bara“ ebenso zweimal das „Doppel-T“ steht. Die Protagonistin erklärt, dass das Wort aus zwei Ideogrammen besteht und jedes von ihnen im obersten Teil dasselbe Radikal hat, das wie ein Doppel-T aussieht (Die Krone aus Gras 2007: 66).

In Bezug auf die Schreibintention Tawadas ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass japanische Grapheme in einem deutschen Text beiden Sprachen und Kulturen näher rücken, sodass dem Mythos „Japan als die absolute Fremde“ entgegensteuert wird. Dieses Näherrücken im Übersetzen der japanischen Schrift ins vertraute Alphabet des Lesers überwindet das Fremdartige der Schrift. Grenzziehungen werden kulturell aufgelockert, da die Trias „Sprache – Schrift – japanische Kultur“, die als abgeschlossener Kulturkreis im europäischen Bewusstsein eingegangen ist und die absolute Fremde konstruiert hat, aufgelockert wird (Schaffers: 299-301). Nicht zufällig erörtert Tawada in Bezug auf Grenzen, dass während in Celans Gedicht *Chymisch* die Alchemie durch die Vermischung von Mineralien ein Wunder versucht, in *Die Krone aus Gras* durch Grenzüberschreitung quasi eine andere Art von Wunder vollbracht wird:

Ein Stein, der im Bereich der Mineralogie bleibt, kann nicht blühen. Aber wenn er in die Botanik eintritt, kann er sich auftun wie eine Rose. (64)

An anderer Stelle erörtert Tawada, dass Michel Foucault die Botanik des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts als den Versuch charakterisiert, die betrachteten Dinge durch ihre geometrische Form in die Nähe der Wörter zu rücken (Tawada 2007: 65). All diese Ausführungen münden schließlich darin, dass die Botanik in die Richtung der Symbolik der Poesie gerückt wird, da durch sie Grenzen aufgehoben werden und sogar ein Stein verlebendigt wird. Semiotisch kann hinter der Substitutionsmetapher folgende Homologie (Johansen 2003, 3-4: 315-329) konstatiert werden:

Botanik :: Stein
Rose :: Leben

Offensichtlich wird im Zuge dieser Metapher auf eine Opposition – die semantisch unpassenden Prädikate „Stein“ und „Leben“ – durch den Kontextwechsel der Fiktion, die eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen Quelle (Stein) und Ziel (Leben) herstellt, verwiesen (Sonesson 2003, 1-2: 25-37)¹. Die Funktion der Fiktion besteht schließlich darin, durch Abstraktion gemeinsame Eigenschaften herzustellen (Rozik 2003, 1-2: 93-107)².

Dieser bewegliche Umgang mit Grenzen wird an anderer Stelle des Essays auf den Akt der Übersetzung übertragen, was schließlich im Überschreiten von Kulturgrenzen mündet. Dabei wird das Beispiel mit dem „Doppel-T“ entsprechend im Wort „Bettstatt“ und dem Ideogramm (bara) auf den Punkt gebracht:

Man kann meistens die Formen, die man im Schriftbild eines Gedichtes entdeckt hat, nicht übersetzen. [...] In der Übersetzung blüht nicht immer an derselben Stelle dieselbe Rose wie im Original. Aber sie blüht. Sie blüht manchmal an einer unerwarteten Stelle und macht auf eine Form aufmerksam, die sonst weiter unter der Rose stehen würde (69).

Mit anderen Worten wird die Übersetzung zu einem third space (Bhabha 2000: 57)³, der sprachliche und kulturelle Metamorphosen hervorbringt, durchgeführt. Übersetzungen werden somit zu kulturellen Knotenpunkten. Die Gemeinsamkeit des obigen Beispiels besteht darin, dass über die Übersetzung der japanischen Schriftzeichen und die Wiederholung des Sinns von „Rose“ eine auffallende, morphologische Symmetrie („Doppel-T“) sowohl im Alphabet also auch in den japanischen Schriftzeichen hergestellt wird, die im Zuge der Übersetzung zu einem flexiblen Umgang mit Äquivalenzen führt. Das bedeutet, dass zwar eine Sprache und Kultur nicht 1:1, also der eine Primärcode in einen anderen übersetzt werden kann, aber im Kontextwechsel ein kommunikativer, kulturübergreifender Gewinn gesehen wird. Ähnlich wie im alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch die Kreation neuer Zeichen darauf beruht, dass wenn einmal über ein gemeinsames sprachliches Zeichensystem verfügt wird, es recht einfach ist, ständig neue Konventionen festzulegen, z. B. durch Sinnzuweisungen neu erfundener Wörter (Adamzig 2004: 22), so macht hier die Ich-Erzählerin darauf aufmerksam, dass sie durch die Übersetzung eines fiktionalen Textes neue kulturelle Bedeutungen zum Vorschein bringt.

Ähnlich verhält es sich auch im nächsten Absatz:

„Es ist Gras darüber gewachsen“: Das ist ein verbreitetes Bild für die Vergessenheit. Unter dem Boden, der mit Gras bedeckt ist, liegen die Toten. Das Ideogramm, das „begraben“ bedeutet 葬, enthält auch das Radikal „die Krone aus Gras“.

Die „Krone aus Gras“ ist also ein Radikal, das im Japanischen „Gräser-Typen“ zum Ausdruck bringt, es ist sogar auf der Inhaltsebene fast identisch mit dem deutschen Spruch, was durch die Übersetzung offenkundig wird. Die Similarität, die dadurch gestiftet wird, untergräbt den Mythos der „absoluten Fremde Japans“ und enthüllt überraschenderweise Gemeinsamkeiten, dort wo sie niemals vermutet worden wären, nämlich in der Gegenüberstellung der Schriftzeichen.

¹ Ähnliche Beispiele solcher Metaphern siehe Sonesson, (2003).

² Für den Aspekt der Konvention und der Abstraktion siehe Rozik, (2003).

³ The third space ist als ein symbolischer Raum zu verstehen, als eine Kontaktzone, wo die selben Zeichen „neu belegt, übersetzt, rehistorisiert und gelesen werden können“. Bhabha, 2000.

Im Grunde genommen ist die Protagonistin auf stetiger Spurensuche im Sinne Derridas (1976, 32)⁴, denn erst durch das Spiel der Differenzen, die im obigen Beispiel auch kulturell bedingt sind, – „Es ist Gras darüber gewachsen“ ist ein deutscher Ausdruck, und das Radikal ist eben japanisch – werden Grapheme als Spuren aufgefasst, die wiederum gegenseitige Spuren aufweisen. Darüber hinaus ist offensichtlich, dass die Zuweisung des Signifikanten auf das Signifikat völlig aufgelöst wird. Es wird ausschließlich auf der visuellen Ebene der Schrift fokussiert, nämlich das abgebildete „Doppel-T“ sowohl im Alphabet als auch im japanischen ikonographischen Schreibstil ist dafür verantwortlich, dass etwaige Assoziationen bzw. Verschiebungen und Verweise zu interkulturellen Gemeinsamkeiten führen.

In Bezug auf die Sprachreflexionen Tawadas scheint sie Belege für frühere Auffassungen zu liefern. In ihren Poetik-Vorlesungen (Tawada 1998, 30) heißt es, dass der Buchstabe etwas Rätselhaftes habe, „weil er kein Zeichen ist, das für ein Signifikat steht. Er ist weder ein Abbild noch ein Piktogramm.“ Er ist aber ein Graphem, mit dem hier experimentiert wird, sein jeweiliges Signifikat erfährt er über die Zuordnung zu anderen sowohl alphabetischen als auch ideogramatischen Signifikanten.

Die Suche nach solchen Spuren auf visueller Ebene vergegenwärtigt Gemeinsamkeiten, die schließlich nicht nur den Mythos der „absoluten Fremde“ untergraben, sondern statische Kulturbegriffe, die Kulturen als abgeschlossene Kreise betrachten, als obsolet erklären. Die Tatsache, dass Tawada dies auf der Grundlage der Übersetzung japanischer Schriftzeichen exemplifiziert, stellt den besonderen ästhetischen Reiz ihres Schreibens dar.

Man sollte jedoch nicht vergessen, dass es sich um literarische Essays handelt, was bedeutet, dass es sich um ein Schreiben handelt, das aus dem Wechselspiel zwischen Fiktion und Wirklichkeit hervorgerufen wird. Konkret geht es bei Tawada um eine metasprachliche Wirklichkeit, da sie in den Essays die Gedichte Paul Celans zu interpretieren versucht:

Übrigens ist „Konjugation“ gleichzeitig ein biologischer und ein linguistischer Begriff. *Ich grabe, du gräbst, und es gräbt auch der Wurm, und das Singende dort sagt: Sie graben.*⁵ Die Konjugation ist hier keine trockene Aufgabe für Sprachschüler, sondern eine musikalische Methode der Dichtung. Sie bringt wie in der Musik die Wiederholung mit Variationen hervor (Die Krone aus Gras:75).

Es ist offensichtlich, dass hier die metasprachliche Funktion die poetische verdrängt. Die Wiederholung, von der die Rede ist, bestätigt, dass das *Prinzip der Äquivalenz*, das durch die Similarität der Konjugation „und“ hervorgebracht wird, ein poetisch wirksames Mittel ist. Im Wortlaut Roman Jakobsons würde das heißen, dass das „und“ ein eigentümliches grammatisches Kennzeichen ausmacht, das als *vertikale Similarität* (Jakobson 1979: 254) bezeichnet werden kann, da seine Wirkung auf der syntagmatischen Ebene zu registrieren ist. Essayistisches Interpretieren funktioniert ähnlich wie bei der Beseitigung von Kommunikationsproblemen, denn „nur durch explizites Verbalisieren kann über den kognitiven Bereich der emotive Inhalt vermittelt werden“ (Batsalia 1997:91). Dass jedoch die Sphären der Metakommunikation und der Poesie nicht an allen Stellen so deutlich voneinander getrennt sind, wurde am Beispiel mit der „Rose“ und des „Steins“ gezeigt, das metaphorisch ausgedrückt wurde. Insofern besteht der

⁴ Nach Derrida ist die „Spur“ das Simulacrum eines Anwesens, das sich ständig auflöst und verschiebt. Vgl. Derrida, 1976.

⁵ Tawada bezieht sich hierbei auf die Ausgabe: Allemann, Beda/Reichert, Stefan (Hrsg.): Celan, Paul: Gesammelte Werke in fünf Bänden. Bd. 1, Frankfurt a.M. 1983, 211.

besondere ästhetische Reiz im Schreiben Tawadas metaphorisch in der *Äquivalenz der Funktionen*, da sich sowohl die poetische als auch die metasprachliche Funktion gegenseitig durchdringen. Die *ästhetische Übersetzung der Schriftzeichen* ist dabei ein besonderes Spezifikum ihres Schreibens, das die literarische Qualität unterstreicht.

2. Übersetzung der einen Kultur in eine andere?

Wie übersetzt man eine Kultur? Können *Mentefakte*⁶ (Posner 2003: 49) 1:1 übersetzt werden? Wie funktioniert ein Äquivalent zwischen zwei kulturellen Primärkodes? Bei Tawada geschieht dies über die literarische Übersetzung der Schriftzeichen hinaus und das explizite Verbalisieren des kognitiven Bereichs, zusätzlich durch die Übersetzung von Aspekten des kognitiven Bereichs, die mit den denotativen Inhalten japanischer ins Alphabet transkribierter Wörter korrelieren. Im Essay *Baumkuchen* meint zum Beispiel der Ich-Erzähler:

Die Fremdwörter aus dem Deutschen, die auch heute noch sehr häufig im Alltag verwendet werden, haben jedoch wenig mit Musik, Philosophie oder Literatur zu tun. Das Wort „Arbeit“ zum Beispiel, das manchmal abgekürzt „Bait“ ausgesprochen wird, bedeutet Stundenjob. Japanische Studenten bezeichnen das, was deutsche Studenten „Job“ nennen, als „Arbeit“ (122).

Die metasprachlichen Eingriffe Tawadas gelten dem Explizieren des Fremdwortes „Bait“. Dies ist zum einen ein eklatantes Beispiel dafür, dass sowohl denotative als auch konnotative Bedeutungen durch (kulturelle) Konventionen festgelegt sind⁷, zum anderen können *Mentefakte* nicht 1:1 übersetzt werden, auch nicht bei der Übernahme von Fremdwörtern. Dies entspricht Tawadas Sprachreflexionen nach denen Übersetzungen *Metamorphosen*⁸ sind, daher performiert die deutsche Bedeutung von „Job“ als Geldverdienen bzw. vorübergehende Beschäftigung⁹, ihre theoretischen Sprachreflexionen zur Übersetzung, indem die unterschiedlichen affektive Inhalte des Signifikats „Arbeit“ vorgeführt werden.

Die literarische Übersetzungsarbeit Tawadas besteht in erster Linie darin, die Korrelation des Begriffs zwischen sozialem Umfeld und *Ist-Zustand*, demzufolge die Korrelation des sozialen Umfelds und des kognitiven, assoziativen und emotiven Bereichs zu verbalisieren, um dadurch kulturelle Unterschiede evident zu machen. Interessanterweise belegt Batsalia (1997: 54) aus linguistischer Sicht, dass das letztendlich realisierte Lautzeichen jenes Sprechers der Korrelation des sozialen Umfelds mit dem kognitiven, assoziativen und emotiven Bereich entspringt. Die Tatsache aber, dass hier dieser *Ist-Zustand* metasprachlich über die Fiktion beschrieben wird, unterminiert dann doch die Zusammenhänge. Dem deutschen Leser des Essays wird bewusst, dass eigenkulturelle Elemente des Zusammenhangs zwischen sozialem Umfeld und Kognition, Assoziation bzw. Emotion in anderen Kulturen beweglich transferiert werden können, auch wenn es sich um die Übernahme desselben Signifikanten handelt. Man könnte metaphorisch behaupten, dass eine *kulturelle nicht-Äquivalenz* angestrebt wird.

Zweifelsohne klingen hier Elemente jener postkolonialen Theorie der *Mehrfachkodierungen* (Suppanz 2003: 27) an, nach der die Abhängigkeit der Zuschreibungen vom jeweiligen Kontext determiniert wird. *Kultur* ist danach dynamisch aufzufassen, indem binnengesellschaftli-

⁶ Als Mentefakte sind die mentalen Kulturen jeder Gesellschaft zu verstehen, die das Verhalten der Individuen in einer Gesellschaft bestimmen.

⁷ Aus linguistischer Sicht siehe Batsalia 1997, 52.

⁸ In Tawadas Essay *Das Tor des Übersetzers oder Celan liest japanisch* aus dem früheren Band *Talisman* heißt es: „Die Übersetzung ist nicht Abbild des Originals, sondern in ihr bekommt eine Bedeutung des Originals einen neuen Körper“ (139).

⁹ Nach Wahrig drückt das Lema „Job“ eine vorübergehende Beschäftigung, Stellung, Gelegenheit zum Geldverdienen aus, siehe: Wahrig. Deutsches Wörterbuch, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 61997.

che und transnationale Aspekte berücksichtigt werden. Als binnengesellschaftlich ist das soziale Umfeld zu bezeichnen und als transnational Austauschprozesse und Transfers – wie eben jener Fremdwörter – innerhalb verschiedener Netzwerke, die wiederum die Reduktion der *Kultur* auf „Nationalkultur“ und territoriale Grenzen unterlaufen. Der *kulturellen nicht-Äquivalenz* Tawada liegt demzufolge ein dynamischer Kulturbegriff zugrunde.

Diese subversive Haltung gegenüber dem *Ist-Zustand* geht an anderen Stellen des Essays bis auf die Lautebene.

Das deutsche Wort, das meiner Meinung nach in Japan am häufigsten in den Mund genommen wird, ist „Baumkuchen“. [...] Vielleicht liegt es an dem Vokal „i“, warum die Lakritzen, [...] nicht in Japan eingewandert sind. Bei ihnen ist nämlich der Vokal „i“ zu stark präsent. Dagegen haben die japanischen Süßigkeiten immer ein „a“ oder ein „o“ in ihren Namen wie Monaka, Anko, Amanatoo oder Yookan. (123)

Die Analyse des affektiven Bereichs zielt darauf ab, die affektive Wirkung von Phonemen als ausschlaggebend für die Rezeption eines Artefakts in einer anderen Kultur darzustellen. Sinnkonstruktionen sind viel wichtiger als Artefakte selbst, was wiederum darauf hinweist, dass die Adaption eines fremden Artefakts auf vertraute Lautzeichen zurückzuführen ist, und dass es schließlich die Zeichen sind, die kulturelle Konventionen konstruieren, die wiederum von den jeweiligen Umkodierungen der Zeichen abhängig sind.

Semiotisch gesprochen untergräbt Tawada die *Autonomiethese*, der zufolge Grapheme (Buchstaben) noch keine Zeichen sind, da sie nichts bedeuten. Durch ihr literarisches Schaffen liefert sie eher Beispiele für die *heteronome* Auffassung der Schrift, da sie belegt, dass jedes einzelne Graphem das Zeichen eines Phonems ist. Indem das Graphem auf andere lautliche Elemente der Sprache verweist, übernimmt es die Funktion eines sekundären Zeichens und ist sprachliches Metazeichen (Nöth 2000: 361). In der Fiktion Tawadas ist es ein Meta-Metazeichen, von dem behauptet wird, dass es entschieden die Sinnkonstruktion mitbestimmt. Im Grunde genommen, bedient sich Tawada erneut Derridas *Spuren-Begriff*. Aufschlussreich ist dabei, dass sie im Essay *Sprachpolizei und Sprachpolyglotte*, in dem es wieder um das Spiel der Buchstaben geht, zum dem Schluss kommt, dass die Ich-Erzählerin von der Lust ergriffen ist, die Buchstaben durcheinanderzubringen, „um dem Spielplatz Wörterbuch seine poetische Ausstrahlung zurückzugeben“ (Tawada 2007: 37). Die praktizierte Polysemie gilt infolge dessen dem Spiel der Buchstaben, deswegen werden im Essay *Baumkuchen* keine Übersetzungen der Schriftzeichen vorgenommen, sondern es werden japanische Wörter gleich ins Alphabet transkribiert. Folglich erreicht ihr Schreiben die Qualität eines poetischen Wörterbuchs, was als Unikum die Qualität ihrer Schreibweise ausmacht und die kulturvermittelnde Funktion ihrer Schriften exemplifiziert, da es sich schließlich um ein poetisches deutsch-japanisches Wörterbuch handelt. Seine Inhalte sind jedoch nicht statisch, sondern müssen auf der Basis der Fiktion ständig hergestellt werden, da in einem Wörterbuch das eine Wort ständig auf das andere Verweist, was zu ständigen Sinnzuweisungen führt (Kimmerle 2000: 36)¹⁰.

Fazit: Tawadas Essays performieren einen dynamischen Kulturbegriff. Durch kulturelle Übersetzungen wird ein flexibler Umgang mit Differenzen postuliert, da diese je nach Situation

¹⁰ In diesem Sinn ist der Hinweis von Kimmerle in Bezug auf die Auffassung der Schrift als lesbare Spur zu verstehen, dass nämlich die Bedeutung der Spur bei Derrida darauf hinausläuft, dass sich Bedeutung ständig verändert und in stetigen Verweisungszusammenhängen erfasst werden muss.

kontextabhängig gesichtet werden. Im Grunde genommen liegt Tawadas Schriften folgendes semiotisches System zugrunde:

Primärkode → Interpretationen → sekundäres Bedeutungssystem →
Tawadische Poesie = Ästhetische Übersetzung der Schriftzeichen + kulturelle
Übersetzungen → kommunikative Funktion als Kulturvermittlung

Auf der Basis der Primärkodes ihrer deutschsprachigen Essays erfolgen Interpretationen auf metasprachlicher Ebene. Dieses sekundäre Bedeutungssystem drückt die Tawadische Poesie aus, die aus der ästhetischen Übersetzung der Schriftzeichen und überhaupt aus kulturellen Übersetzungen besteht. Die Funktion, die der Poesie Tawadas zugrunde liegt, ist im Grunde genommen eine kommunikative Funktion, da in Bezug auf deutschsprachige Leser Kulturvermittlung intendiert wird. Die Tatsache jedoch, dass sie ihr Schreiben als poetisches Wörterbuch strukturiert und kulturelle Übersetzungen sogar auf der Schriftebene versucht, zeugt zweifelsohne von einer regen Experimentierlust und der Originalität ihres Schreibens.

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LE ROLE DES NORMES DANS LE CADRE D'UNE SEMIOTIQUE DE LA CULTURE

Anna Maria Lorusso
University of Bologna, Italy
(annamaria.lorusso@unibo.it)

Abstract

Je voudrais concentrer mon attention sur quelques points qui sont à mon avis cruciaux pour encadrer le travail de la sémiotique de la culture, en essayant de définir ce que lui est propre et qui fait la différence par rapport à d'autres approches (par exemple, la socio-sémiotique, une sémiotique tout simplement narrative, ou bien toutes les sémiotiques caractérisées par un champ-objet précis: la sémio de l'art, de la littérature, du cinéma etc...).

J'y tiens à préciser tout de suite la thèse centrale de ma brève contribution : à savoir, que la spécificité de la sémiotique de la culture doit se situer au niveau des normes: pas au niveau de la langue et pas au niveau des actes de parole, mais bien à celui des normes.

Je crois que trop souvent notre activité sémiotique a été une sémiotique de la langue ou bien une sémiotique de la parole (ou a eu tendance à se penser en tant que telle). On peut voir un intérêt pour la langue dans les travaux de Propp d'où Greimas a tiré son schéma narratif (universel!), dans le travail de Barthes sur la mode, dans les travaux linguistiques de Saussure ou d'Hjelmslev...

Pas moins nombreux les exemples de sémiotiques de la parole: toutes les analyses, souvent magnifiques, d'oeuvres d'art, d'oeuvres littéraires (*Deux amis* de Maupassant par Greimas, *Sylvie* de Gérard de Nerval par Eco), des films...

Un travail encore à faire, ou à développer, serait le questionnement du passage de l'un à l'autre niveau, c'est à dire le questionnement du passage des actes de parole aux systèmes de la langue.

Comment ça se passe? Quelles sont la relation, la direction et la dialectique entre parole et système?

Dans mon travail j'ai de plus en plus l'impression qu'un des points essentiels, pour la sémiotique de la culture, soit précisément ce passage, et que ce passage ne soit rien de plus que le procès de normalisation et de standardisation que le sens subit.

Il s'agit évidemment d'un passage qui a à voir avec de nombreux aspects cruciaux de la réflexion sémiotique:

- le rapport type/token (le problème étant de savoir comment on passe des token au type)
- le rapport processus / systèmes
- le rapport histoire / structure

Je pense à la sémiotique de la culture comme à une sémiotique des normes parce qu'elle trouve son plan de pertinentisation dans les modèles, les standards, les habitudes qui uniformisent les actes de parole et les rendent en quelque manière systématiques, cohérents, ordonnés, structurés. C'est à dire: elle concentre son attention sur les régularités qu'on peut retrouver parmi les milliers de tokens d'une communauté, ce qu'il y a de récurrent dans les procès d'un champ donné, ce qui modifie les structures d'une culture à travers l'histoire.

Je viens d'utiliser des mots différents – normes, modèles, standard, habitudes (d'après Peirce ou Bourdieu, je pourrais dire aussi habitus) – pour définir ce niveau intermédiaire entre langue et parole. Tous ces mots, bien que afférents à des théories et traditions différentes, se situent au même plan, un plan que Saussure n'a pas beaucoup questionné mais qui était déjà assez clair à Louis Hjelmslev, qui dans *Langue et parole* (Hjelmslev 1943b : 89) nous rappelle que l'objet de la sémiotique est le plan de l'exécution et que c'est à ce niveau qu'on peut repérer des normes:

La théorie de l'exécution [...] a pour objet ce que nous avons appelé jusqu'ici la norme, l'usage et l'acte. Norme, usage et acte sont d'autre part intimement liés ensemble et se ramènent naturellement à ne constituer qu'un seul objet véritable: l'usage par rapport auquel la norme est une abstraction et l'acte une concrétisation.

Et encore, dans :

La parole se définit comme l'ensemble des relations inter-stratiques effectivement exécutées.

L'usage, à son tour, est évidemment ce qu'il y a de stabilisé dans la parole.

[...] A la différence de l'usage, la norme doit être l'ensemble des relations inter-stratiques admises.

Le schéma sémiotique (et linguistique) par contre est en dehors de cet ordre d'idées. (Hjelmslev cit. : 76)

Les normes, donc, selon Hjelmslev, ne sont pas des règles abstraites, ne sont pas les éléments d'une grammaire, mais « l'ensemble des relations inter-stratiques admises » – ce qu'une culture inclut dans son espace comme légitime, ce qui – on pourrait dire avec Lotman – une culture « laisse passer ». Il s'agit de quelque chose qui va au-delà des actes de parole et qui est bien plus ample. Hjelmslev pose une différence importante entre les usages (ce qui est stabilisé) et les

normes (les relations admises). Les normes représentent l'espace du possible, du permis, du tolérable, tandis que les usages sont simplement ce qui se passe, dans ce champ du possible (du possible pour une culture donnée, pas pour les êtres humains en général).

Je crois que cette réflexion nous invite à revenir à certaines théories sémiotiques qui nous offrent des outils pour mieux problématiser la question des normes, et que donc je considère fondamentales pour une étude sémiotique de la culture : je pense notamment à la théorie de la culture de Lotman, à la théorie archéologique de Foucault et à la théorie de l'encyclopédie de Eco avec son héritage peircien. Par conséquent, je vais proposer un petit chemin sémiotique. Mon but est de reprendre quelques uns des piliers théoriques qui peuvent donner une base solide à une réflexion sémiotique sur les normes.

La théorie de Lotman a conçu la sémiosphère comme un grand mécanisme de structuration. Je cite de Lotman-Uspensky, *Sur le mécanisme sémiotique de la culture* : « Le travail fondamental de la culture est organiser structurellement le monde qui entoure l'homme. La culture est un générateur de structuralité ». En plus, la réflexion lotmanienne sur la traduction se présente en tant que réflexion sur le travail de inclusion et adéquation que la culture fait, c'est-à-dire sur le filtrage qu'elle opère pour établir ce qui peut être admis à l'intérieur de son espace. Pour ordonner structurellement l'information, la culture utilise des *dispositifs stéréotypant* qui permettent l'uniformisation et la comparabilité entre diverses formes et expressions hétérogènes de la culture. Parmi ces dispositifs il y a le langage, l'art, la littérature, le folklore, les religions etc., c'est-à-dire des domaines sémiotiques qui offrent aux sujets humains des *modèles*. Lotman parle de systèmes modélisant primaires (les langues naturelles et l'espace) et de systèmes modélisant secondaires (tous les autres domaines que j'ai mentionné).

Grâce à ces systèmes de modélisation, ce travail de structuration n'est pas un travail d'imposition abstraite mais bien un filtrage concret que la culture fait avec nous, au-delà de nous et à travers nous. On peut penser aux grands choix des institutions (la censure ou la « *damnatio memoriae* ») mais aussi aux pratiques quotidiennes et diffusées à travers lesquelles nous définissons par exemple les régimes de visibilité (le voile, l'ostension du visage et des autres parties du corps), les régimes de dicibilité (pensons à la question du « *politically correct* » : peut-on dire handicapé, nègre, etc.), les régimes de sensibilité (il est évident que chaque culture et chaque époque a des passions privilégiées et des passions marginalisées : aujourd'hui par exemple est privilégiée l'indignation et plus marginalisé la modestie, peut-être qu'aux États-Unis est plus valorisée que en Italie l'estime de soi etc.). Il y a des moments où le problème de l'admissibilité ou inadmissibilité devient dramatique : les homicides liés aux caricatures de Charlie Hebdo nous parlent de violence, mais nous parlent aussi du fait que (pour une certaine culture, qui est une partie de la culture islamique) certaines choses ne sont pas dicibles, ne sont pas admissibles, pour des communautés données.

Je crois que Lotman – avec sa réflexion sur les mécanismes de traduction en tant que dispositifs stéréotypant, avec la centralité qu'il donne à la catégorie de modèle, avec l'idée de structuration et pas de structure – peut nous aider de manière décisive dans le questionnement des procès de normalisation du sens. Structuration signifie organisation, et organisation implique le rejet de tout ce qui est insuffisant, inutile, exceptionnel, et implique donc un processus de normalisation.

Dans notre réflexion sur le rapport entre sémiotique de la culture et niveau des normes, une autre référence fondamentale est représentée par Michel Foucault et par sa théorie de l'archive et des formations discursives. Il s'agit d'une théorie précieuse parce qu'elle nous permet de nous concentrer sur la nature contraignante de la régularité et sur la taille super-individuelle des normes. La sémiotique, à mon sens, n'a pas pensé suffisamment son rapport avec la théorie de Foucault.

A mon avis le concept de « formation discursive » nous aide à passer d'une réflexion sur les textes singuliers (en tant que tels, actes de parole) à une réflexion, de toute façon textuelle, qui est transversale à plusieurs manifestations discursives, une réflexion qui porte sur les règles qui permettent aux textes de se produire et se donner. Il est beaucoup plus utile, par exemple, de la catégorie de praxis énonciative, que la sémiotique a proposé (cfr. Bertrand 2000) pour exprimer la stratification du sens.

Foucault écrit dans *L'archéologie du savoir* :

Dans le cas où, entre les objets, les types d'énonciation, les concepts, les choix thématiques, on pourrait définir une régularité (un ordre, des corrélations, des positions et des fonctionnements, des transformations) on dira, par convention, qu'on a affaire à une *formation discursive* [...] On appellera *règles de formation* les conditions auxquelles sont soumis les éléments de cette répartition (objets, modalité d'énonciation, concepts, choix thématiques). Les règles de formation sont donc des conditions d'existence (mais aussi de coexistence, de maintien, de modification et de disparition) dans une répartition discursive donnée. (Foucault 1969 : 53)

Ainsi, nous voyons que avec Foucault le champ d'attention de l'analyste se rétrécit: l'analyse se concentre sur les formes du discours dans la mesure où celles-ci expriment des règles qui finalement représentent leur condition de possibilité. Dans les discours on se focalise donc sur tout ce qui a une force de modélisation, ce qui détermine le champ du dicible et de l'exprimable.

Comme on le sait, l'ensemble de ces règles de formation est à la base du savoir archéologique. Quand Foucault parle d'étude archéologique, il n'entend pas une étude tout simplement diachronique, mais l'étude des archives des cultures, c'est à dire des *séries de règles* qui régularisent l'apparition des énoncés.

L'idée fondamentale est que les règles se stratifient au cours de longues périodes (pas forcément de manière continue; le plus souvent, en effet, avec des sauts) et qu'elles forment des palimpsestes qu'il s'agit de retracer.

Objectif de l'analyste doit être de mettre à jour l'ensemble des conditions – les règles – qui régissent, à un moment donné et dans une société donnée, l'émergence des actes de parole, leur conservation dans le temps, les liens qu'il y a entre eux. Dans la culture, à travers la multiplicité et la « dispersion » (pour emprunter un mot foucauldien) des actes de parole, on peut suivre les parcours qui structurent des règles, des parcours conditionneurs, qui vont générer des séries de phénomènes homogènes.

Je vais appeler archives non tous les textes qui ont été préservés par une civilisation ou l'ensemble des pistes qui serait sauvé par sa chute, mais le jeu des règles qui déterminent une culture dans l'apparition ou la disparition des énoncés, leur persistance et leur extinction, leur existence paradoxale en tant que événements et choses. (Foucault 1968 : 47)

L'archive pour Foucault n'est donc pas un dépôt, mais l'ensemble (jamais totalisable, jamais exhaustive et épuisable) des règles, c'est-à-dire des conditions qui rendent possible l'apparition de certaines formes de culture et qui, en même temps, rendent impossible l'apparition d'autres phénomènes. L'analyse archéologique doit analyser les formes de persistance, mais non la persis-

tance volontaire et consciente, plutôt ce qui est gardé de manière sovra-personnelle à travers les médias, les techniques matérielles, les institutions, les pratiques, les comportements quotidiens...

Umberto Eco a parlé à ce propos de « filtrage de l'encyclopédie », pour mettre en évidence la fonction fondamentale de « barrière » qui possède l'encyclopédie. Dans un contexte donné, il y a des éléments littéralement impensables, non à cause d'interdictions explicites, mais en raison de « cadres sociaux » qui ne permettent pas qu'on pense ou qu'on conceptualise certains énoncés. Par conséquent, ces énoncés tout simplement n'existent pas ; ils ne sont pas donnés, bien qu'ils ne soient pas interdits de manière explicite. La consonance avec Foucault est complète.

Les codes fondamentaux d'une culture – ceux qui régissent son langage, ses schémas perceptifs, ses échanges, ses techniques, ses valeurs, la hiérarchie de ses pratiques – fixent d'entrée de jeu pour chaque homme les ordres empiriques auxquels il aura affaire et dans lesquels il se retrouvera. (Foucault 1966 : 11)

Tout ça a évidemment beaucoup à voir avec les deux derniers auteurs que je voudrais mentionner : Umberto Eco et C.S. Peirce. Je les considère fondamentales pour définir le cadre théorique d'une sémiotique de la culture capable d'étudier les normes.

Pourquoi Eco ?

Eco, à partir de son *Trattato di semiotica generale* (Eco 1975), conçoit la sémiotique en tant que « logique de la culture ». Elle est donc un savoir qui vise à définir la *structuration* du sens, la manière dont la sémosis trouve une organisation en suivant des logiques et en exposant des régularités.

La logique qui est à la base de cette structuration - et donc de la sémiotique et de la culture - est une logique *encyclopédique*. L'encyclopédie est l'ensemble de toutes les interprétations enregistrées dans une culture ; en tant que telle, elle comprend les activités d'interprétation des individus et des collectivités et expose la connaissance moyenne d'un certain « état de culture », c'est-à-dire d'une culture donnée à un moment donné.

Eco propose donc une idée *encyclopédique* du sens. Il ne pense pas en termes de langue abstraite mais en termes d'un système de relations toujours en évolution, au fur et à mesure qu'on utilise les langages. Le lien entre encyclopédie et plan des actions ou actes de paroles est constitutif : l'encyclopédie se fait au cours des jours et des années et elle a toujours affaire à des *substances* sémiotiques (pas des formes). Elle est faite par des actes réalisés qui dans le temps trouvent une stratification, construisent des relations réciproques, sont répétés et de cette manière assument une régularité ou, au contraire, un caractère d'exceptionnalité. Ils font partie de l'encyclopédie : les significations qu'on donne aux mots, la façon dont nous interprétons les rites, les textes que dans une culture sont produits, les réactions habituelles à certains stimuli, les images qu'on laisse circuler, les symboles qui expriment certaines valeurs, etc.

Tout au long de cette production, grâce à la force de ses répétitions et de sa régularité, l'encyclopédie devient conditionnante ; les actes de parole en effet ne sont pas tout à fait libres : ils sont conditionnés par les parcours encyclopédiques précédents, et le conditionnement est de nature « statistique » (les parcours les plus fréquentes étant ceux qui conditionnent le plus les actions successives).

L'encyclopédie ouvre donc des possibilités mais rend minoritaires des parcours. Elle joue le rôle d'un réseau de possibilités et donc de conditions.

En vertu des toutes ces caractéristiques, je crois qu'elle soit une modélisation de ce que, au début, j'ai appelé le « plan des normes ». L'encyclopédie de Eco est l'ensemble des normes (ou des

relations admises, comme dit Hjelmslev) dans une culture. Elle est bien plus large de l'ensemble des actes de parole effectivement réalisés, mais elle n'a pas l'abstraction d'une langue et de sa grammaire : *elle est faite d'occurrences, de tokens* : ses nœuds sont les unités culturelles, à savoir des unités qui – pour Eco – sont réalisés, publiques et de nature communicative.

Cette théorie de Umberto Eco n'est pas sans rappeler la théorie de Peirce et sa catégorie de habitus.

Dans la perspective de Peirce, le sens – qui est toujours soumis à une chaîne interprétative – tend à se stabiliser en tant que « interprétant logique final ». Il y a donc des phases dans la sémiotisation qui, bien qu'elle ne soit jamais complète ou définitive, toutefois temporairement s'arrête. La chaîne des interprétations, toujours relancée par de nouveaux actes sémiotiques, pour quelques instants (pour quelques sujets, dans quelques phases historiques) s'arrête parce que la communauté reconnaît une « vérité », une forme de suffisance et justesse d'une interprétation donnée.

Ces stabilisations (les habitus) conditionnent les interprétations successives, ou, pour mieux dire, les actions successives : elles vont conditionner la manière d'agir et de réagir des sujets. Les habitus jouent donc un rôle de médiateurs entre le monde interne (mental et cognitif) et le monde externe (perceptif et pragmatique). Ils représentent des régularités qui deviennent des dispositions à agir d'une certaine manière. La force des habitus interprétatifs est en quelque manière pragmatique : elle ne reste pas dans l'abstraction des interprétations théoriques, mais conditionne concrètement le monde des actions.

l'identité d'un habitus dépend de la façon dont il peut nous conduire à agir, non seulement dans les circonstances où il est généralement donné, mais dans les circonstances où il pourrait potentiellement se donner, indépendamment de sa probabilité. Ce qui est un habitus dépend de quand et comment il nous pousse à l'action. [...] Il n'y a pas de distinction de sens plus subtile que celle qui consiste à une différence dans la pratique. (C.P. 5.400, notre traduction)

Cette théorie est liée à notre réflexion parce qu'elle nous conduit à réfléchir (d'un point de vue différent de celui de Lotman, par exemple) sur la dialectique de stabilisation et subversion, prévisibilité et changement qui traverse et caractérise toute la vie sémiotique. Il s'agit là d'un point central de la dynamique du sens ; c'est le point où théorie et pratique se rencontrent, où la sémiosis et l'action se croisent et le sens se fait *modèle d'action*, de prévisibilité, de partage, d'appartenance. Comme je l'ai dit, c'est la communauté qui définit les interprétants logiques finaux : il n'y a pas de normes, ni d'habitus abstraits et universaux, parce qu'ils dérivent toujours d'un partage et qu'ils sont toujours relatifs à un groupe donné qui les met en pratique.

Normes, habitus, parcours interprétatifs réguliers (à la Eco) sont donc au même temps :

- sociaux
- réguliers
- variables
- dépendent des exécutions discursives

Ils sont généraux, supra-individuels et pourtant historiques, en transformation continue. Ils définissent et réglementent les arènes discursives, et régissent la formation des énoncés indivi-

duels (pour revenir aux catégories foucauldienne).

Mon idée est que ce niveau des normes et des habitudes est le plus spécifique pour notre étude car c'est à ce niveau que certaines dimensions fondamentales de la culture se manifestent: la dimension *super-individuelle* (ce qui a une signification culturelle est ce qui représente une dimension partagée collectivement), la *dimension historique-évolutive* (usages et normes expriment la stratification interprétative et sémiotique, entre persistance, négociation et reformulation), la dimension *normalisante* (la culture, en dépit de son hétérogénéité interne, a une tendance intrinsèque à l'auto-organisation, à la régularité, à la création de zones d'homogénéité).

Cela ouvre un champ très riche pour la sémiotique de la culture. Le monde des normes, avec leurs interprétations locales, leurs exceptions, leur évolution, leur histoire, non seulement définit un niveau crucial de la culture qui est celui des systèmes qui définissent les politiques de la vérité et du pouvoir d'une certaine culture; mais implicitement ce niveau des normes exprime des formes spécifiques de valorisation et axsiologisation qui constituent les communautés. Partager des habitus signifie faire partie d'une même communauté, une communauté qui n'est ethnique, ni nationale, ni familiale, mais sémiotique, culturelle, archéologique (au sens foucauldienne) et que, en tant que telle, constitue l'objet d'étude propre à la sémiotique de la culture.

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EL MOTIVO DEL AGUA Y LA DIMENSIÓN MÍTICA EN EL FILM DOCUMENTAL SIGO SIENDO KACHKANIRAQMI (JAVIER CORCUERA 2013)*

Celia Rubina Vargas
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
cirubina@pucp.edu.pe

Abstract

Le but principal de notre étude c'est décrire le parcours de la figure de l'eau dans un film documentaire contemporain dans le cadre de notre réflexion sur la tradition orale péruvienne. Le film *Sigo siendo-Kachkaniraqmi* (Javier Corcuera, 2013) est une mosaïque de la diversité musicale et culturelle qui existe au Pérou actuel. Alors, on se pose des questions telles que, pour quoi cette récurrence de la figure de l'eau dans un film sur la musique populaire ? Comment est-ce qu'une forme discursive comme celle du documentaire audiovisuel fait place à la dimension mythique des chansons ancestrales ? Nous voudrions établir des rapports de la similitude et de la différence parmi les rites et les chants de deux cultures natives qui sont mis en évidence dans le film: la culture shipibo-conibo (de la région amazonienne) et la culture quechua (de la région andine). L'eau se présente dans les rituels très différents comme le baptême d'une danseuse traditionnelle au pied d'une cascade, aussi bien que le nettoyage collectif d'un canal d'irrigation et encore, le voyage solitaire et mythique de la femme-Anaconda dans une pirogue sur un immense fleuve amazonien.

* Una versión previa de este estudio ha sido publicada en la página del XII Congreso Latinoamericano de Investigadores de la Comunicación ALAIC 2014, bajo el título: "El motivo del "agua" en dos cantos tradicionales de dos lenguas ancestrales peruanas, el shipibo-conibo y el quechua. Análisis semiótico de la dimensión mítica en el documental *Sigo siendo (Kachkaniraqmi)* de Javier Corcuera", el día 7 de agosto del 2014, en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. <http://congreso.pucp.edu.pe/alaic2014/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/vGT14-CELIA-RUBINA-VARGAS.pdf>

L'étude des mythes et récits populaires péruviens est depuis un certain temps au centre de notre intérêt (Rubina, 1999, 2008, 2012). Notre point de vue est celui de la sémiotique discursive, et plus particulièrement nous sommes intéressés dans la problématique des motifs ethno littéraires, c'est-à-dire, des micro-récits récurrents qui peuvent migrer d'un récit mythique vers un autre, d'un univers culturel vers un autre univers culturel, mais aussi entre les objets de nature très différente (Greimas 1985, Courtés 1986, 1995). Pour aborder l'étude de la tradition orale andine et la tradition orale amazonienne, notre référence la plus directe se trouve dans les travaux de Ballón-Aguirre (2006). Pour l'étude des motifs en ethno littérature on fait la distinction parmi le motif narratif et le motif sémantique. Dans cet essai nous allons travailler davantage sur le motif sémantique étant donné que la figure de l'eau n'est pas rattachée d'une façon permanente à une seule structure narrative mais elle peut accomplir divers rôles. Une analyse sémio-linguistique est privilégiée pour établir le rapport entre les récits mythiques et les chants ancestraux.

Desde la perspectiva de la semiótica discursiva y del estudio de los motivos (Greimas 1985, Courtés 1986, 1995, Ballón Aguirre 2006), el objetivo de este estudio es determinar la organización semántica del motivo del "agua" en relación a la cultura shipibo-conibo y la cultura quechua sureña que aparecen en el film peruano *Sigo siendo Kachkaniraqmi* (Javier Corcuera, 2013). Es notable que en un documental sobre la diversidad de la música popular peruana, la figura del agua aparezca con tanta recurrencia, como un hilo conductor tanto verbal como visual. De las variadas manifestaciones del agua en el filme, nos limitamos al estudio de tres secuencias que ponen de relieve la dimensión mítica del agua a través de prácticas sociales tradicionales como son el canto ritual shipibo, el bautizo de una danzante de tijeras y la limpieza de un canal. El estudio semántico busca mostrar los aspectos coincidentes de dos culturas ancestrales peruanas: la cultura quechua de la región andina y la cultura shipibo-conibo de la región amazónica.

1. El documental musical: un recorrido geográfico y humano

El destacado cineasta peruano Javier Corcuera realiza en *Sigo siendo Kachkaniraqmi* (2013) un proyecto filmico que plantea un recorrido por lugares y gentes del Perú a través de la música. Ésta se expresa básicamente en las canciones populares y por lo tanto, las voces de los intérpretes nos conducen a lo largo del film. A nivel musical, la interpretación de instrumentos cobra una especial importancia, en particular los instrumentos de cuerda como el violín, el arpa, la guitarra y el charango para el caso andino. De modo deliberado, el filme se aleja de los lugares comunes por ello no se muestran las consabidas queñas, ni zamponas¹; en cambio sí, otros instrumentos de viento como el wakrapuku (trompeta andina hecha con cuernos de toro).

El documental como el *road-movie* hace un recorrido geográfico por distintas regiones del Perú. Se inicia en el corazón de la amazonía peruana, en la región de Pucallpa cerca de Yarinacocha, con el testimonio de Amelia Panduro, heredera del saber de los chamanes de la cultura shipibo-conibo. Con ella recorreremos una parte del bosque amazónico, surcamos el río Ucayali que aparece ante nuestros ojos como una extensión acuática inconmensurable. Pero hay un viaje que se presenta de modo más explícito y que consolida una narrativa específica, es el viaje del violinista Máximo Damián que parte desde Lima, su lugar de residencia, hacia Ishua su pueblo natal en Ayacucho, en el sur andino peruano. Es un viaje de retorno a los orígenes de la música, a los lugares donde escuchó y aprendió a tocar violín, es como un rito anual regresar a su pueblo por la celebración de la Fiesta del Agua.

De regreso sobre la costa y de la mano de otros músicos, recorreremos diferentes espacios de la ciudad de Lima. De los muelles, la orilla del mar, calles concurridas, el tráfico de las avenidas, llegamos a los lugares donde se hace música: bares, peñas y quintas o callejones, las modestas ca-

¹ Tampoco está presente el más famoso cliché de la peruanidad musical: El cóndor pasa de D. A. Robles.

sas de los maestros de la música. Nuevos instrumentos de cuerda y de percusión hacen vibrar la variada música criolla: el contrabajo, la guitarra, el bongó, el cajón, la cajita, la quijada de burro. Lima aparece justificadamente como el punto de encuentro de la migración interna en el Perú. Por eso este documental es también un recorrido humano por los esfuerzos de los músicos en seguir haciendo música aún lejos de sus lugares de origen.

1.1. La diversidad musical como una la imagen de la peruanidad

En el film, la identidad nacional no busca definirse ni por un género musical ni por un tema en particular, no se postula una canción como un himno o como un ícono nacional². En cambio, sí se subraya la pluralidad de las expresiones musicales peruanas, la diversidad de ritmos, melodías, lenguas en las que se canta y se baila.

Recordemos que el documental por oposición a la ficción es un género fílmico que está ligado a la realidad, pero no tanto porque presente directamente realidades y vivencias de una determinada comunidad, sino porque crea ese efecto de sentido. En *Sigo siendo Kachkaniraqmi* la impresión de realidad comienza por el hecho de que los personajes hablan en su lengua materna. En un país como el Perú donde, a pesar de su multiculturalidad y plurilingüismo, las lenguas ancestrales viven una situación de discriminación frente a la hegemonía absoluta del castellano, es notable que en buena parte de este filme se escuche hablar en shipibo-conibo y en quechua.

La idea de peruanidad que postula el film se refleja en el título *Sigo siendo Kachkaniraqmi*. Precisemos el significado de esta expresión quechua de la que habló José María Arguedas (Pini-lla 2004, 7). A la raíz verbal ka- (verbo ser) le siguen los siguientes sufijos: -chka (sufijo durativo que indica un proceso que se prolonga en el tiempo), -ni (sufijo de primera persona singular), -raq (sufijo continuativo que expresa la continuidad de un estado pero también un contraste) y -mi (sufijo reportativo de primera mano por el cual el hablante confirma que tiene conocimiento directo de aquello que enuncia)³. Por lo tanto, la enérgica expresión de vitalidad y persistencia “*Kachkaniraqmi*” podría entenderse como la afirmación de que a pesar de todo “sigo siendo” o “sigo existiendo” (con mi música, en mi lengua).

1.2. Dimensión mítica y prácticas rituales

Cuando hablamos de lo mítico pensamos por lo general en un relato tradicional en un “mito”, particularmente, en aquellos relatos cuyos protagonistas son los seres sagrados propios de una comunidad y la realización de hechos portentosos. La semiótica discursiva ha comprendido que lo mítico trasciende el relato etnoliterario y tomando como base los estudios de Lévi-Strauss opone lo pragmático de una lectura horizontal a lo mítico de una lectura vertical, paradigmática que “permite reconocer por su recurrencia en el texto de superficie, una organización de contenidos que puede formularse como la correlación de dos categorías binarias de semas contradictorios o contrarios” (Greimas & Courtés 1982:261). Bajo esta perspectiva, lo mítico encuentra en las estructuras sintácticas y semánticas profundas su carácter esencial y al mismo tiempo, deja de ser específico pues ya no se restringe a un solo tipo de discurso.

Las culturas ancestrales peruanas como la quechua y la shipibo-conibo mantienen vigentes sus tradiciones orales, tanto a nivel de relatos míticos como de cuentos populares. Ni mitos, ni cuentos, ni leyendas han sido objeto de la filmación en la película *Sigo siendo Kachkaniraqmi*. Sin embargo, no podemos decir que la tradición oral no esté presente en la película. Por una parte, la tradición etnoliteraria ancestral se manifiesta también a través de los cantos en lengua

² Aunque nos parece muy sugerente la propuesta de Andacht (2012) para las canciones uruguayas del documental analizado en su estudio, no hemos encontrado algo similar para el caso peruano en nuestro documental.

³ Sobre los sufijos y la morfología quechua ver Cerrón-Palomino (1987, 132-151; 1994, 85-142).

nativa, más aún cuando estos están ligados a una práctica ritual que se relaciona con una visión trascendental del universo. Esto lo explicitaremos con el análisis de las tres secuencias elegidas: el canto shipibo no se puede entender fuera de la concepción de las fuerzas que habitan los ríos de la selva; el bautizo de la danzante de tijeras exige el concurso de los Apus o divinidades de la montaña; la limpieza del canal hace que el agua sea considerada no solo como un recurso necesario para la agricultura, sino que el agua es tratada como una persona.

En relación a las prácticas rituales recordemos que al igual que las rutinas “encarnan una idea de significado basado en la repetición, en la imposibilidad de cambio o de elección, y en la naturalidad de las acciones” (Leone 2012:72). En efecto, los oficiantes del bautizo de la mujer danzante de tijeras repiten los gestos que muchos otros hicieron antes que ellos sin cuestionarlos: beben un trago, sumergen las tijeras en el agua, se arrodillan. Sin embargo, en el filme se evidencia que todos ellos tienen plena conciencia del por qué hacen una peregrinación dificultosa hasta el pie de la montaña donde cae una cascada, no podrían hacerlo en otro lugar pues es allí donde evocan a sus ancestros y a los dioses de las montañas.

2. El “agua” como un motivo semántico

En este documental sobre la música peruana aparece de manera reiterada la figura del “agua” a través de diversas figuras del universo acuático. Recordemos que el estudio de los motivos tiene una larga tradición en las artes plásticas y las tradiciones orales, por ello desde el punto de vista semiótico, Courtés (1995) ha subrayado la naturaleza semántica y el carácter migratorio del motivo:

En todos los casos se trata de una determinada forma semántico-sintáctica, identificable así en campos variables. Cualquiera que sea su soporte de base (lingüístico, auditivo, visual, gestual, espacial, etcétera), a primera vista se caracteriza por la reiteración, la reanudación (en forma ora idéntica ora, dado el caso, comparable con ligeras variaciones por lo menos aproximadas) tanto en el interior de un mismo objeto (por ejemplo, el motivo de un friso o el de un paso de danza) como en objetos de naturaleza análoga (los capiteles de un antiguo claustro) e incluso totalmente diferentes (entre otros casos, en arquitectura urbana). (38)

Los motivos en etnoliteratura pueden estudiarse a partir de dos formas recurrentes. Por una parte, con el “motivo narrativo” podemos identificar un núcleo narrativo estable susceptible de aparecer como un micro-relato al interior de diferentes relatos. Esta es la línea que ha privilegiado E. Ballón-Aguirre (2006, vol.1, 279–413, vol. 2). Por otra parte, el “motivo semántico” se caracteriza por un conjunto de figuras que aparecen reiteradamente en los relatos pero de una manera más libre, es decir, el elemento figurativo recurrente no se encuentra necesariamente ligado a una estructura narrativa única (Courtés, 1995, 49–53).

Según las distinciones expuestas, consideramos la figura del “agua” en la película *Sigo siendo*, como un motivo semántico aunque no siempre cumple una misma función. En algunos casos, el “agua” está asociada a la espacialidad, es el lugar donde se desarrollan las acciones (la “catarata” de Andamarca es el lugar donde se bautiza a la danzante de tijeras Palomita), en otros casos, el “agua” cumple una función actancial, puede ser Sujeto de estado (el violinista Andrés “Chimango” Lares dedica sus temas musicales a las “olas del mar”). Asimismo, el “agua” puede cumplir un rol protagónico, en tanto Sujeto humanizado u Objeto valorizado como lo precisaremos en el análisis de los cantos shipibo y quechua.

Cabe señalar que la denominación léxica del motivo a partir del lexema “agua” cumple una función genérica que incluye denominaciones específicas tales como: “lluvia”, “río”, “laguna”, “cocha”, “cataratas”, “acequia”, “olas”, “mar” entre otras que se enuncian en la película de manera visual y/o verbal.

2.1. El “agua” en el canto shipibo

La intervención de Amelia Panduro, mujer de la comunidad shipibo-conibo⁴ es doble tanto a nivel testimonial como a través de su canto. El filme se abre y se cierra con sus palabras, su voz y su imagen. La palabra hablada y la palabra cantada están íntimamente ligadas, se complementan y establecen una correspondencia que permite su mutua inteligibilidad.

El canto de Amelia es un ícaro o canto ritual shipibo que se inicia con las siguientes palabras: “Viajando, voy viajando/conectando con el agua/conectando, conectando” (1–3)⁵. Mientras escuchamos su canto, vemos a la mujer shipiba subir a su canoa, avanzar remando hasta desembocar en el gran río Ucayali que tiene la apariencia de una amplia laguna. Las primeras líneas del canto muestran la relación del “yo” del enunciado con la figura del “agua” que nos hacen pensar en una correspondencia entre la figuras visuales y las figuras léxicas, la mujer entra en conjunción con el “agua” a través de la navegación. Sin embargo en los versos siguientes la correspondencia visual-verbal se sostiene solo en parte: “Así, así, así, voy andando/ En mi barco, en este barco/ Mi barco de piedra” (4–6). La acción de la mujer remando está subrayada por las formas verbales durativas (“viajando”, “conectando”, “andando”) pero la “canoa” que vemos en el film es evidentemente de madera y no de “piedra”. El viaje emprendido no es un viaje cotidiano: “Retorno... yo, la mujer/ Viajando por la profundidad del agua/ En la anaconda/ Desde dentro del río” (10–13). La “canoa” del film se desliza sobre la /superficie/ de las aguas mientras que el “barco” del canto se adentra en las /profundidades/ del río. De esta manera se marca la espacialidad, el viaje es “desde dentro del río” (13), “por el fondo del agua” (17). Se trata entonces de un viaje mítico y la mención a la “anaconda” nos confirma la dimensión mítica del canto.

Recordemos la importancia de la anaconda en la tradición oral shipibo-conibo. En el mito de creación del universo el Padre Sol delega el cuidado de su creación a cuatro divinidades principales:

Kaná (Rayo), **Ino** (Jaguar), **Ronin** (Anaconda), **Xono** (Lupuna) son los guardianes del universo. Rayo es el dueño del cielo, Jaguar ejerce su dominio sobre los animales salvajes en las profundidades de la selva, **Ronin**, el gran anaconda, es el guardián de las aguas. Él es quien ha dibujado sobre la tierra el curso de nuestros ríos. Deslizándose por el suelo ha formado sus cauces. El vela por los lagos y los ríos. **Xono** es el Gran Dueño de la lluvia y de los árboles. Es también un poderoso brujo. **Varokan**, el volcán, controla el espacio subterráneo. Y también hay una multitud de espíritus, los **yoshin**, que vigilan el mundo. Todo aquello ha sido ordenado por Sol. (Bertrand-Ricoveri, 2010:46)

Queda claro que la Anaconda (“Ronin” en lengua shipiba) es la divinidad tutelar de las aguas. El nombre shipibo de Amelia Panduro es Ronin Wano Ainbo⁶, su relación de identidad con la

⁴ La lengua shipibo-conibo forma parte de la familia etno-lingüística Pano. La ubicación geográfica actual de los shipibos se despliega a lo largo de las márgenes del río Ucayali, en la zona centro-oriental de la Amazonía peruana.

⁵ Por razones de espacio no presentamos la transcripción integral de los cantos estudiados. Nos limitamos a poner la enumeración -entre paréntesis- de los versos de cada canto en nuestras citas.

⁶ El nombre shipibo-conibo de la cantante amazónica aparece en los créditos del film. También en la página oficial de la

Anaconda está marcada desde su nombre. En el canto, esta relación de identidad se encuentra desplazada: “Yo, la mujer/ La mujer encantada de la anaconda/ Y así les canto yo/ Yo la que viaja por el fondo del agua” (14-17). La “mujer” del canto viaja a las profundidades de las aguas del “río”, este “yo” femenino comparte en tanto “mujer encantada”, el carácter sagrado de la anaconda y su desplazamiento por las profundidades del “río” tiene un propósito: “Estuve con los guardianes del agua/ Con los guardianes llegando a acuerdos/ Llegando a acuerdos/ Así, abrazando acuerdos/ Estuve en el corazón/ En el corazón de la anaconda estuve” (19-24). Entonces aunque la identidad de la mujer del canto se aproxime a la de la Anaconda, no se trata de una fusión de identidades. Es necesario que el “yo” de la “mujer encantada” mantenga su independencia para erigirse en un sujeto capaz de llegar a establecer un acuerdo con la divinidad⁷.

El canto no explícita el carácter de esos acuerdos, pero la propuesta filmica asocia el canto y el testimonio de Amelia que lo precede: “Yo tengo un diálogo con el agua para que ella me dé su fuerza./ Ella nos da la fuerza de su profundidad para tener la energía de su cuerpo” (1-2). Aquí también se establece una relación de conjunción entre el “yo” y el “agua” a través de la figura del diálogo y del don: el agua otorga el /poder-hacer/ a la mujer dándole “fuerza” y “energía”.

Durante esta parte del testimonio, las imágenes que vemos no son todavía las del “río” sino las de un “árbol” gigantesco, la lupuna (*ceiba pentadra bombácea*) del que dice: “El río tenía inmensos árboles. A las orillas se veía árboles grandes como éste,/ como la Lupuna. Antes de ir a otro lugar, las ancianas le pedían permiso a la Lupuna./ Y la Xoná vive a orillas del río (...)” (3-5). La mención a esta otra divinidad tutelar, Xoná, el dios de la lluvia y de los árboles, permite ver la asociación entre la figuras del agua como “río”, “laguna” y “lluvia” con las figuras del mundo vegetal, como la “lupuna”. El universo acuático está entonces doblemente relacionado con el universo vegetal: en el plano pragmático de la naturaleza representada visualmente en el filme y en el plano mítico presentado en el canto.

El carácter ecológico de los acuerdos entre la naturaleza y los hombres se explicita cuando Amelia refiriéndose a los árboles dice: “Nuestros antiguos los respetaban “El agua se va a secar. ¿Cómo vamos a detenerlo?” decían los abuelos” (6). Esta preocupación por el agua está claramente expresada en su testimonio y en el canto, una conciencia ecológica que proviene de la relación de la cultura shipibo-conibo con la naturaleza por ello forma parte del saber de los ancestros. La amenaza con respecto al agua, es el riesgo de sufrir escasez o contaminación que afectaría profundamente la vida de comunidades cuya subsistencia depende de la pesca, la agricultura y la comunicación fluvial.

2.2. Canto shipibo-conibo para las imágenes del ritual quechua

La última estrofa del canto shipibo-conibo se escucha en la cuarta escena del film: la voz de Amelia Panduro cantando se escucha en off, ya no está asociada al paisaje selvático sino a las alturas serranas. Las imágenes corresponden al peregrinaje de la comitiva que se alista a cumplir un acto ritual –la bendición y el bautizo de una mujer danzante de tijeras, Palomita- al pie de las “cataratas” de Andamarca. Al plano general de un camino serpenteante entre montañas, le sigue un contrapicado que nos muestra el curso sinuoso de un río andino, finaliza con una sucesión de planos de detalle que muestran las patas de la recua y los pies de los músicos, por el camino empedrado del río. Este acoplamiento sonoro y visual entre dos culturas tan distintas como la shipibo conibo y la quechua podría pasar desapercibido para quien no maneja ninguna de las

película, varias consultas entre marzo y octubre del 2014; <http://sigosiendo.pe/>

⁷ En relación a la “mujer encantada” Danny Chávez nos señala que es necesario entender que la mujer “encantada” es una mujer protegida por la anaconda. Moviéndose en el espacio acuático, la mujer necesita la protección de los espíritus del agua. Agradecemos a Danny Chávez -heredera de la cultura shipibo-conibo- por compartir sus conocimientos. Comunicación personal, entre julio y septiembre del 2014.

dos lenguas ancestrales.

Los últimos versos del canto shipibo-conibo dicen: “Voy viajando, voy viajando, voy viajando/ Al último rincón del río/ Si a ese lugar voy/ Al corazón, adentro del agua./ Naciendo, naciendo” (25–29). Estos versos adquieren una doble significación. Por una parte se refieren a la travesía de la “mujer encantada de la Anaconda” que está llegando a su destino para lograr un acuerdo con los guardianes del “agua”. Se mantiene la isotopía de lo acuático (“río”, “laguna”) frente a la inminencia del nuevo pacto entre el hombre y la naturaleza. Por otra parte, las palabras del canto shipibo se ajustan bien al ritual andino del bautizo de Palomita: el camino del “río” los lleva “viajando”, “viajando” al “corazón” de la caída de “agua” donde se oficiará la ceremonia de bendición de las tijeras gracias a la cual asistimos al “nacimiento” de Palomita como danzante de tijeras. La dimensión mítica del ritual que sigue a continuación se reconoce en los gestos: Palomita de rodillas sumerge las tijeras en el agua, todos beben un trago; y también en las invocaciones a la divinidad de la montaña, al “Huamani”, del oficiante maestro danzante de tijeras, Florián Cesáreo Ramos, y la evocación a los ancestros, prestigiosos danzantes de tijeras. La asociación de las dos narrativas a través de la música de la una y la imagen de la otra genera un nuevo sentido y logra un abrazo entre las dos culturas ancestrales, entre lo amazónico y lo andino.

2.3. El “agua” en el canto quechua

El harawi o canto tradicional quechua interpretado por Cristina Pusac, anciana mujer del pueblo de Cabana tiene lugar en la sexta escena del filme. En el marco de la Fiesta del Agua, la faena comunal de la limpieza de la acequia ocupa un lugar preponderante. Aunque *Sigo siendo* no es un documental etnográfico, muestra la secuencia de los gestos de la limpieza del canal: mujeres con flores de retama a sus espaldas, la autoridad comunal llamando a todos a participar, hombres armados de picos y palas retirando el barro y las piedras del lecho de la acequia, mujeres de polleras bordadas recogen las piedras pequeñas. En un recodo del paso de la acequia, Cristina Pusac rodeada de sus comadres inicia su canto: un harawi del “agua”. Cada tres o cuatro versos, las mujeres hacen el coro con una enérgica exclamación de alegría, característica en los cantos serranos.

El motivo del “agua” está claramente marcado desde el inicio del canto quechua: “Mi árbol sagrado, durazno mío,/ Para qué estás parado al borde de la acequia/ Qué estás creciendo al borde de la acequia/ Mi árbol sagrado, manzano mío,/ Anda llamando a tu agua/ Para que tomes el agüita” (1–6). Las figuras más importantes del universo acuático son aquí la “acequia” (“yarqha”) y el “agua” (“yaku”) que ésta contiene. El motivo del “agua” también está ligado al universo vegetal. La contigüidad de los árboles de “durazno” y del “manzano” con respecto a la “acequia” está fundamentada sobre la función que el “agua” cumple para ellos: necesitan el agua para “beber” y “crecer”. El “yo” del enunciado establece una relación de posesión con los “árboles” (reiteración del sufijo posesivo quechua -y). El árbol (“mallqui”) juega una doble dimensión de /sacralidad/ (es “sagrado”) y de /humanidad/ (“bebe el agua”, “llama al agua”). El universo animal está también presente en la figura del “picaflor” (“qinti”): “El picaflor que mandé/ De huerta en huerta está buscando flores/ Mandé al picaflor/ Voy a beber con mi compadre” le he dicho” (7–10). El “picaflor” indica la isotopía de la bebida tanto del pájaro que bebe de las “flores” como de la bebida celebratoria entre “compadres”.

El abastecimiento del “agua de riego” a través de las “acequias” no está de por sí asegurado para la comunidad. La cuarta estrofa del canto dice: “¿Qué dirá ahora tu corazón/ En el cerro de mi Cabana?/ Acaso agua ya está llegando?” (11–13). La renovación del “agua” depende de la faena del trabajo comunal y de una fiesta religiosa, la /sacralidad/ del rito está marcada en el canto.

Para esclarecer los sentidos que señalamos, recurrimos a otra fuente de tradición oral. En el

capítulo 7 del *Manuscrito de Huarochiri*⁸ – texto fundacional de la mítica andina – se describe los rituales en honor a Chuquisuso, deidad femenina que custodia el canal de Coccochalla. Como parte del ritual de la limpieza del canal se narra que una mujer haciendo las veces de Chuquisuso traía chicha en un gran recipiente y lo distribuía entre los presentes diciendo “He aquí la chicha de nuestra madre” (Taylor, 7:11). Es claro que quien provee el “agua” es la divinidad femenina, Chuquisuso.

La limpieza de la acequia forma parte de la Fiesta del agua donde todo el pueblo participa saliendo a las calles para reventar petardos, beber, bailar en grupo, cantar. El abastecimiento del agua se asegura no solo con el trabajo de limpieza de la “acequia” sino también con el cuidado del “agua”. En el canto quechua aparece claramente una conciencia ecológica con respecto al agua: “Esta agua hay que cuidarla bonito/ Hay que acariciarla bonito” (14–15). Hay una /humanización/ del “agua” que debe ser tratada como una persona a la que hay que “darle cariño”, o como decimos en el castellano andino, “cariñarla”.

La llegada del agua es el momento de mayor exaltación en esta secuencia de la película. A los gritos de “¡Yaku! ¡Yaku!” les sigue la estrofa que rinde homenaje a los ancestros en la figura de los padres: “Aquí está papá/ Aquí está mamá/ Has conseguido que nos alegremos” (23–25). Lo más resaltante en el plano visual es el predominio del ángulo de toma contrapicado para resaltar la expectativa de los campesinos frente a la llegada del “agua”. Vemos el lecho seco de la “acequia” ir llenándose de “agua” a medida que ésta cae. Enunciativamente la dirección de /arriba/ hacia /abajo/ crea la ilusión del “agua” que llega hasta nosotros, los espectadores.

Presentamos a continuación presentamos el cuadro que resume la organización semántica del motivo del “agua” en las tres secuencias del corpus según los distintos niveles de análisis estudiados.

Cuadro 1: Organización semántica del motivo del agua.

ASPECTOS SINTÁCTICO- SEMÁNTICOS	CULTURAS ANCESTRALES		
	SHIPIBO-CONIBO	QUECHUA SUREÑA	
FIGURAS DEL UNIVERSO ACUÁTICO	"cocha", "río", "laguna" Ucayali	"río", "catarata" Andamarca	"acequia" Cabana
FIGURAS DEL UNIVERSO VEGETAL	árbol de "lupuna"	"arbusos", musgo"	árbol de "manzano" árbol de "durazno"
DIVINIDAD/ANCESTROS	"Xoná" "abuelos" "Ronin"	"Huamaní" "abuelos Ramos"	"Mamay" "Papay"
ACCIÓN RITUAL	Acuerdos sobre el "agua"	Bautizo de "Palomita"	Limpieza de la acequia
SUJETOS DE LA ACCIÓN RITUAL	"Ronin" (Anaconda), la mujer encantada"	"Chuspicha" (sujeto del hacer) "Palomita" (sujeto de estado)	"Yaku" (Agua) Comuneros de Cabana
TEMÁTICA EUFÓRICA	/existencial/ /colectivo/	/fundacional/ /individual/	/existencial/ /colectivo/
TEMÁTICA DISFÓRICA	/escasez/ /contaminación/	/transgresión/ (danzar sin bendición)	/escasez/ /obstrucción/
ESPACIALIDAD	/verticalidad/ viaje de la /superficie/ hacia la /profundidad/ del río	/verticalidad/ "caída de agua" de /arriba/ hacia /abajo/ lugar del bautizo	/verticalidad/ el "agua" llega desde la /alto/ de la "acequia" hacia /abajo/

⁸ Documento excepcional de inicios del siglo XVII, fue escrito íntegramente en quechua. Seguimos el trabajo filológico de su más importante estudioso y traductor, G. Taylor (1999).

3. No cantamos por cantar

Los cantos ancestrales de ambas culturas estudiadas, la shipibo-conibo y la quechua sureña, ayudan a preservar la dimensión mítica de la figura del “agua”. El motivo del “agua” no solo es importante por su presencia reiterada sino por lo que significa para los habitantes de las comunidades a los que provee de fuerza, vida y energía. Pero su modo de hacerlo es siempre contractual, requiere de un “diálogo” entre los pobladores y las fuentes de agua, busca llegar a “acuerdos”. De una manera humanizada, al “agua” hay que tratarla “bonito”, con “cariño”.

Con su testimonio, Amelia Panduro hace explícitas las razones por las que canta. Ella responde cabalmente la pregunta implícita en el film ¿Por qué cantas?: “Con la fuerza de mi inspiración, canto para el agua y para la tierra, para la naturaleza que da fuerza a este mundo. Cuando me inspiro, canto” (7-8). En estas palabras expresa tanto el /poder-cantar/ como el /querer-cantar/. El canto se ofrece a los bienes de la naturaleza. Es la existencia de la colectividad la que está en juego. La modalidad del /saber-cantar/es fundamental: “Desde muy niña aprendí a cantar y ahora que soy anciana tengo más conocimiento y me nace, por eso canto” (12). El saber adquirido en la infancia se acrecienta con los años pero es necesario que no quede en uno mismo y es por eso que el /saber-cantar/ está asociado al /deber-cantar/: “Y debo compartirlo con todos, compartirlo para que los jóvenes me escuchen” (8). Entonces el canto es un objeto de saber que debe transmitirse, la modalidad modalizada se presenta como un /deber-hacer-saber-cantar/ a los más jóvenes, en caso contrario, corre el riesgo de perderse irremediamente con el fin de la existencia individual: “Si mis nietos aprendieron, mi canto se quedará en esta vida. Si nadie aprendió, cuando descansa será como llevar mis cosas amontonadas” (13-14).

Las palabras de Amelia Panduro cierran el filme: “Los pájaros hablan diferentes idiomas, cuando cantan unos son melancólicos, otros son alegres. Si ustedes no entienden, si no comprenden, piensan que cantan por cantar” (15). El mundo sonoro de las aves es equiparado al mundo sonoro de los humanos, la diversidad de los unos y los otros es perfectamente comprendida en la gran sabiduría de la mujer shipiba. A nivel enunciativo ese “nosotros” de la comunidad shipibo-conibo que conoce la naturaleza, la escucha y aprende de ella, termina cuestionando a ese “ustedes” interlocutor-espectador en su capacidad de apreciar las correspondencias entre la naturaleza y el hombre, y comprender las razones de su canto.

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ABDUCTION AS THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND BIOLOGY

Drude von der Fehr
University of Oslo, Norway
d.v.d.fehr@ilos.uio.no

Abstract

In the forthcoming book *The Live Body*, which I am currently editing, I present the cooperation between different aesthetic fields (literature, music, theatre) and biology as a field of possibility. The cooperation makes ab–duction happen as an event forming the meaning of the book. According to Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* A concept cannot be understood unless the problem is solved. This means that concepts gain meaning in retrospect and so does the book. Only by being used and rethought in different practical and theoretical contexts the book gains a definite meaning. The field of possibility works as a creative hypothesis. The hypothesis is that the body knows. But what does it know, and how do we know that it knows? We seem to think in this book, that what the body knows is in line with the hypothetical and uncertain quality of the abductive inference. The Norwegian literature researcher Elisabeth Løvlie, in her chapter “I know something that I do not know” (“Jeg vet noe jeg ikke vet”), draws in the newborn infant’s so-called amodal perception, a form of knowledge that is immediate and incomprehensible. According to her, new experimental science makes it clear that the body possesses this special kind of knowledge which does not rely on reflection. An infant has an immediate experiential and developmental relationship to its environment. This type of knowledge has long been a prerequisite for aesthetic and literary thinking and has been

something which attempts have been made to attain, among others by emphasizing the aesthetic experience. The Danish biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer's claim, namely that we have a biological, physical cognitive ability to anticipate the consequences of choices, and that even the simplest of organisms has it, is most important in understanding what the body knows – Charles Peirce's understanding of realism is important in this connection, because a semiotically realistic perception of man and of the universe relies on something that is hypothetical, potential and possible (or more likely abductive) rather than actual.

That which I aim to expound in this book, is a creative and strategic space which includes sufficient knowledge to make it possible to jump ahead and give the initial hypothesis – namely that the body knows – credibility and the possibility to exist in this world. As biological organism we have a “knowledge” which art struggles to express aesthetically and performatively. And this “knowledge” is real, semiotically speaking. What I want to argue for in this paper is that abduction is a starting point for expanding a hypothesis into a space for thought that has its basis in strategic principles. By virtue of having determination, the field of possibility is guided by a final causality, or in other words, a pragmatic meaning.

This paper is based on my introductory chapter in a book that I have initiated and edited, and which is now under publication. The book *Den levende kroppen. Mot en ny forståelse av menneske og natur. [The Live Body. Towards a New Understanding of Man and Nature]*¹ is an interdisciplinary cooperation between different aesthetic disciplines; literary, theater and musical studies; biosemiotics, epigenetics; philosophy; and theology. In the book I focus on the possibility of a creative meeting between aesthetics and biology. In order to do so, I argue for the establishment of a *field of possibility*, that is to say a place where disciplinary diversity can express itself.² What makes this possible is a focus on a specific concept. For the idea that a concept can form the basis for a creative field, evidence can be found in Gilles Deleuze's theory that concepts are aspects of reality. Concepts are living and creative and bring something new into the world. *Abduction* is such a concept. It is both a concept *regarding* creative thinking, and *in itself* creative. In their description of what a concept is, Deleuze and Guattari argue in *Hvad er filosofi? [Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? 1991]*, that a concept refers back to a problem, to problems without which it would have no meaning, and which can even be isolated and understood as their solution reveals itself (1996: 36). We hear the similarity here between the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari and Peirce's maxime of pragmatism.³

So what is abduction? It is a form of inference that forms part of Charles Peirce's logic. Abductive inference is in the following form:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true (CP 5. 189)

Abduction as a concept brings the participants together in a fellowship. The biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer states in his chapter *Viden og kropp [Knowledge and body]*, that an abduction comes to act as a premise for a common assumption, namely that the world is fundamentally made of the same stuff as our own body. Hoffmeyer, furthermore, in his chapter argues that projecting our own physical experience of causality onto a non-causal world, and actually gaining a

¹ The book is written in Danish and Norwegian because of our ambition to reach out to a broader public than the customary academic one. Because the book is under publication there is no reference to page numbers.

² The term *field of possibility* is taken from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari *Hvad er filosofi?*, see the Introduction by the editors of the Danish translation (København 1996: Gyldendal).

³ See Peirce's "The Maxim of Pragmatism": "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have: then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object." (*The Essential Peirce* 1998b: 135)

credible knowledge of it, makes it possible to abductively join a world which is made of fundamentally the same stuff as oneself. According to him, causality results from physically anchored experiences gained through our lives, going back to our first actions as an infant; it does not result from an a priori. The Norwegian literature researcher Elisabeth Løvlie, in her chapter *Jeg vet noe jeg ikke vet* [*I know something that I do not know*], draws in the newborn infant's so-called *amodal perception*, a form of knowledge that is immediate and incomprehensible. She maintains that new experimental science makes it ever more clear that the body possesses this special kind of knowledge which does not rely on reflection. An infant has an immediate experiential and developmental relationship to its environment. These experiences are based on effects and causality, and thereby on learning.

This type of knowledge has long been a prerequisite for aesthetic and literary thinking and has been something which attempts have been made to attain, among others by emphasizing the aesthetic experience. The work that the Danish historian of ideas and philosopher Dorthe Jørgensen did on Gottlieb Baumgarten's sensitive aesthetics of the 1750s in *Den skønne tænkning* [*The Beautiful Thinking*]⁴ (2014) has increased our reflection on the epistemological meaning of the art forms. In this project, we have therefore seen the field of possibility as a space where the body's abductive, prelogical guesswork can encounter the sensitive aesthetics of Baumgarten. The ability to have sensitive imaginations is a bodily capacity, but it is not only a matter of sensations, but also emotions, perceptual judgments and anticipations.

We propose, in other words, a similarity – or rather, a common ground – between abduction and aesthetics as it is conceptualized by Baumgarten and formulated in the chapters on esthetical phenomenon in this book. Our field of possibility is where hypothesis are born. The assertion of the existence of a common ground between what, we could view as a biological logic and aesthetics, functions as a legitimation of our elaboration of an interdisciplinary field.

1. Abduction is Real

But if we acknowledge the existence of something prelinguistic or presemiotic, we can at least attempt to form concepts that can limit the determinism in the world of ideas that we inhabit as creatures of language and symbolism. In the arts, it has always been accepted that a reality exists before we have formed our ideas about it. This is why the humanistic-aesthetic contributions to this book play an important role in the development of concepts. After all, aesthetes have strived to say that which cannot be said, that which concerns physical effects, feelings, interactions and causality. Perhaps the aesthetic disciplines are better than other disciplines in capturing the living aspects of language? Considering the great discoveries that are being made in biology and related fields of exact science, I believe it is only natural that humanists and biologists will eventually meet in the field of activity, in abduction's field of possibility.

Clearly, Hoffmeyer's chapter also functions on another fundamental and related premise, namely that in this book we base ourselves on an epistemological and semiotic realism in Peirce's sense of the word. This realism implies a break with Kant because every organism is in a perpetual causal, and therefore realistic, relationship to its environment.

Realism is based in something which comes before the sign, for instance in the immediate interaction that an infant has with its environment. Frederik Stjernfelt, in his *Diagrammatology*, emphasizes something of great interest within our context, namely that Peirce, who considered all mental and physical processes to be sign processes, maintains a realism which implies that something fundamental and real must exist before the sign. In line with Husserl's views, that which exists before the sign must be based on a *metaphysics of presence*. Peirce offers a *present instant*, something which has not yet been mediated through the sign. Peirce's term for this pre-

⁴ Aarhus 2014: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.

mediated something is icon. An icon is not a complete sign. It has the capacity to communicate various aspects of experience in the present moment (Stjernfelt 2007: 29). The index, which is the existential, experiential sign, always incorporates an icon.

Not only is it important, in relation to Peirce's realism that something exists before the sign process begins, but we must also acknowledge that the icon, because it is not a fully realized sign, stands for something that is not realized but only a possibility. The icon is an aspect of an actualization of reality, but exists in itself only as something possible, something that can come to be. A semiotically realistic perception of man and of the universe therefore relies on something (existing in the perceptive process) that is hypothetical, potential and possible (or more likely abductive) rather than actual.

If we assume it to be true that we have a biological ability to anticipate the consequences of choices, as Hoffmeyer argues even the simplest of organisms has, then we should be able to state that the possible is an important factor in this ability to recognize. And we can then argue that the possible is as real as the actual; it just has not yet been realized at an indexical level as an actual experience.

Also playing an important role in Peirce's realism is that the iconic sign, which exists as something potential, as something not yet realized in this world or actualized as an idea, also carries a possible generality (Stjernfelt 2007: 29). The fact that something exists that is not related to the actualization or mediation (we could also say symbolization) may, in Peirce's understanding of what is real, his realism, also include the general and thereby universal, as we have heard.

2. When the Possible is Real, are Concepts also Real?

Peirce's realism includes the idea that universals exist and are real. They are found in legitimate forms such as tendencies, dispositions, and patterns, and these can exist not just as actually existing but also as possibilities. Universals are products of consciousness, but are based in the possible (Stjernfelt 2007: 35). Because the presemiotic exists as a possibility that leads to actualization and conscious thought, we can safely speak of a form of precognitive *knowledge*, and we can also place concepts in this category. Concepts are legitimate and therefore possibilities, as Deleuze also stated. They actually exist in this world, even if we cannot observe or measure them. They are as invisible as consciousness is, but we would not deny that there is such a thing as consciousness, would we? Stjernfelt connects Peirce's idea of realism to the idea that the universal "is through and through a product of the mind, but this creation has in certain cases a basis – a condition of possibility" (Stjernfelt 2007: 35).

This ability to be possible or virtual is what is articulated by poetic expression indirectly and in spite of the medium being verbal.

3. Abduction and Perceptual Judgments

In his book *Kant and the Platypus. Essays on language and cognition*, Umberto Eco states that, to Peirce, perceptual judgment was the starting point for all critical and controlled thought. He saw perception as a process ending in perceptual judgment. But the process begins with what Peirce called the percept. The percept is not yet a perception; it is a first stimulus that is "an index of the fact that there is something to perceive" (Eco 1997: 114). The percept is somewhere between icon and index. Something appears, but this something is still unclear and does not require any sense: "It is pure individuality, in itself *dumb* (1997: 114). Already in the perceptual judgment, primary iconism shades off into a generic equality (...)" (Eco 1997: 115). The moment we get an impression, its singularity – its characteristic of being a unique event – has changed into something universal. In Peirce's terms, we have reached thirdness, that is to say, the sign as well as its rationality and interpretation.

So, perception ends with perceptual judgment, and Peirce argues that "... abductive infer-

ences shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them” (*The Essential Peirce* 1998a: 227). The perceptual judgments can therefore be considered extreme cases of abductive inference “in being absolutely beyond criticism” (1998a: 227). In other words, behind abduction, as hypothesis-generating inference, there is something that is considered to be absolutely certain. And that which is absolutely certain does not belong to our cognitive level of consciousness, but to something precognitive. This is how Stjernfelt puts it: “the inferences at stake in perceptual judgments are of a peculiar type – they take place without any control and are immediately given without any possibility of doubt” (2007: 332). Hoffmeyer introduces the concept of perceptual semiotics in his chapter. An example of perceptual semiotics is an impression on the retina resulting in a coordination of the brain between perception and memory. This may be the cause of a physical feeling of certainty “that can make us ‘believe’ with a surprising certainty, without any involvement of consciousness”. Here, Hoffmeyer in his chapter provides a biological explanation for the perceptual judgments’ physical sense of certainty. The perceptual judgments are perceived as belief.

In reference to Peirce, Umberto Eco calls that which precedes cognition, and is a prerequisite for abduction, primary iconicity. The very first, that which sets the perceptual process in motion and which, following the perceptual judgment, leads to semiosis or the process of interpretation, does not exist as an object or a phenomenon, as we have seen. In some ways, it does not exist at all. Nonetheless, this is the prerequisite for everything that follows. Peirce considered this primary iconicity to be pure qualia (quality) and pure possibility (Eco 1997:100–101).

The biosemiotician Kalevi Kull in the article “Where we are now in discovering the basic mechanism of meaning-making” refers to Umberto Eco’s concept of primary iconicity and indexicality in *Kant and the Platypus*, stating that Eco has demonstrated that the icon is a sign that not only reflects similarity, but also actively acts in a similar way (2012: 16). The prerequisite for all abductive activity therefore is that something appears, and that something, which does not have any substantial or phenomenal existence, nevertheless has an influence, and we could call this a performative ability. Something is done in a similar way (in our perception).

This agrees well with the emphasis that Kull places on the ability of primary iconicity to create similarity: possible similarities are realized as similarity through the index. It is here that abduction has a function. Something has actually become similar, at least in a hypothetical sense.

4. Qualitative Possibility, Consciousness and Experience

Can that which only exists as a qualitative possibility play a decisive role in human existence? In his two chapters in our book, one on the reality of the phenomenology of the body and one on the cybersemiotic component in the semiotic paradigm⁵, the Danish biosemiotician and philosopher of science Søren Brier states that abduction is tied to the creative part of the human ability to know. Fascinatingly, the creative element is tied to the possible rather than the actual – to that which we are able to categorize or about which we are able to theorize. Hoffmeyer’s book from 2012, *Overfladens dyp [The Depth of the Surface]* examines how evolution has been able to produce a phenomenon such as mental life, and argues that the psyche’s role in nature is to bring the world into the organism and the organism into the world (2012: 7). From this thesis follows the assertion that consciousness is a surface or *interface*, a place without materiality which nevertheless is real, a place for communication between the brain and the world beyond. That which characterizes the consciousness seen as an interface is that it is predictive.

What Hoffmeyer is saying by this is that large parts of our cognition is subconscious and related to the organism’s own anticipatory life. I believe it is this subconscious cognition that so

⁵ The titles of the chapters are: “Kropsfænomenologisk virkelighed: En cybersemiotisk transdisciplinær forståelse” and “Cybersemiotics; At indsætte den kybernetiske komponent i det semiotiske paradigme.”

concerns the aesthetics in this book, and which is expressed in Løvlie's chapter because she so explicitly relates it to the infant's immediate relation to the world. But such an immediately and physical cognition can only be expressed as a qualitative possibility. It can of course never be formulated in language or be expressed as a symbolically mediated sign.

Consciousness or psyche has served a function in evolution – it has enabled the organism to better interact with its environment. On the other hand, it does not exist as a physical, measurable quantity. It does not have any weight, volume, color, or substance. And, so Hoffmeyer warns, it cannot be reduced to the method of functioning of certain neural areas, but exists by virtue of the brain's billions of communicative processes. Like psyche, Hoffmeyer asserts that the capacity to experience has developed in the course of evolution with the aim to better equip the organism to handle challenging situations. This means that experiential existence must be connected to the organism's range of possible activities. And, he stated that we humans build layers upon layer on top of our immediate experiences, giving our experiential existence a multidimensional character which makes it hard to imagine how its appearance can be explained purely biologically. Accordingly, both the psyche or consciousness and the capacity to experience have a biological function.

However, as stated, such subconscious knowledge cannot be directly communicated. On the other hand, all of the participants in the project, which belongs to the aesthetic disciplines, will say that it can be staged indirectly in the aesthetic expression, be it musical, literary or theatrical. In other words, our hypothesis implies a perspective that is not only biosemiotic but interdisciplinary – because we believe that art can express that which the body knows and keep abduction alive. We further believe that this can be experienced and that it has an epistemological function.

What both the humanities and the natural sciences need is a common grasp on the nature of change, creativity and freedom on one side and constraints and stability on the other. In order to establish such a field of research the natural sciences and the esthetic disciplines must cooperate to keep open the immediate quality of the possible.

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WAITING FOR HISTORY. ON THE EVE OF EXPLOSION

Laura Gherlone
CIFAL, Faculty of Languages,
University of Cordoba, Argentina
laura.gherlone@gmail.com

Abstract

In 1989 Yuri M. Lotman, together with his Tartu semiotic School's colleagues, proposed a space of reflection about "The great French Revolution and the Ways of the Russian Liberation Movement", in commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the great event: as if to assess the situation, he underlined the necessity to anchor the semiotic research in the horizon of historical sciences, in order to comprehend the deep links that exist between culture and history, language and plot, world view and conception of time.

Lotman dwelt in particular upon the concept of "mechanism of Troubles" [*mekhanizm Smuty*], hypothesizing a comparative historical semiotics [*istoricheskaya semiotika*] able to elaborate macro-typologizations of the historical movements (or rhythms).

This paper intends to deal with Lotman's vision about the relations between cultural semiotics and cultural history, referring in particular to the textual corpus of Lotman's last thought (1988-1993).

1. Introduction

This paper is devoted to Yuri M. Lotman and his long reflection on the so-called "semiotics of culture", an epistemological approach that he developed in his thirty years of research on the

relationship between language, meaning and collective intelligence.

His aim was to explain how extremely complex “organisms” such as cultures can develop their own models of self-consciousness and self-description, in other words, their cultural identity. This question is even more poignant when they are living in times of crisis, marked by the encounter and clash with the “alien” [*chuzhoe slovo, chuzhoe povedenie, chuzhoi mir*], or periods of transition [*promezhutok*] from a status to its “post” condition. These last reflections constitute the theoretical core of the three years preceding Lotman’s death, the period on which now I am going to linger.

Lotman was in fact aware that the period between 1990-1993 was seeing the maturation of an “other” thought in respect to the previous intellectual production. In fact, although there were clear lines of thematic continuity, in the early 90s (due also to his precarious state of health) his way of expressing and speculating abandoned such orderliness and made more and more use of intuition, analogies and memories – reflective “explosions”, we might say¹. He himself, as evidence of the need to give a physiognomy to this phase, had considered the idea of a potential collection of articles to be released by the publishing house, Aleksandra of Tallinn. The preface for the project is found in № 268 of Archive 136 (*Isikuarhiiv*) at the University of Tartu Library – a collection of 491 units, retraced by Tatiana Kuzovkina and Tatiana Shakhovskaya, in the 3-year period between 1997–2000.

However, we can undoubtedly state that Lotman’s last thought is represented by the three monographs: *Culture and explosion* [*Kul’tura i vzryv*], *Unpredictable mechanisms of culture* [*Nepredskazuemye mekhanizmy kul’tury*], *Inside the worlds of thinking: people – text – semiosphere – history* [*Vnutri myslyaschikh mirov: chelovek – tekst – semiosfera – istoriya*].

The first was written in 1991 and published in its final form in 1992². The second was drafted in 1990 under the title of *Physiology of explosion. On the transitional periods in history* [*Fiziologiya vzryva. O perekhodnykh periodakh v istorii*]. Between 1991 and 1992, this version was followed by two others and a first publication in 1994 (in a short form) on the *Valgaskii arkhiv* (the first integral version appeared in Italian in 1994, while the final Russian version came out in 2010 by the Tallinna Ülikooli Kirjastus and the English one in 2013 by the same publishing house). Finally, the third monograph – which consists of three rather independent parts, drafted at different times (I. The Text as a meaning-generating mechanism; II. The semiosphere; III. Cultural memory, history and semiotics)³ – was written in 1988 at the request of I.B. Tauris and therefore published in English under the title of *Universe of the mind. A semiotic theory of culture* (the Russian edition came out in 1996 by *Yazyki russkoj kul’tury*, Moscow).

2. History

As we can deduce from the titles, between the late 80s and the early 90s Lotman was interested in the “physiology of the explosion”, namely the ways through which cultures overcome the periods of historical transition, creating unusual forms of semioticity: new metaphors in language, new customs in byt (or daily life), new and old forms of theatricality in gestures and behaviour, new literature (“literary fury is linked to political immobility”, Lotman [1994] 2013:

¹ Having adopted a metaphorical and intuitive language which is less systematic than previous works, the “last” Lotman is in fact often dismissed as his “evocative phase”. This rushed assessment has reduced the importance of his thought which, although it contains certain ideas just *in nuce*, stimulates and noticeably contributes to semiotic science’s international debate and to the demands that have been urgently rising in the field of language sciences, especially in the horizon of the ethics of social communication. Related to this, we can notice that the understanding of the so-called “semiotics of culture” is not always comprehensive, and is often treated as a “toolbox”: very useful for pulling out interesting interpretive “devices” but poorly understood in its entirety, both in relation to the author – who, over time, has attributed this to the different epistemological nuances – and to the semiotic science as a whole.

² The latest version with further revisions and additions was published in Lotman 2000.

³ I. *Tekst kak smyslo-porozhdayuschee ustrojstvo*; II. *Semiosfera*; III. *Pamyat’ kul’tury. Istoriya i semiotika*.

160)⁴, and new forms of “semiotics of fear” [*semiotika strakha*].

According to the Scholar, the semiotic workings is what allows culture to interpret and interiorize the ongoing change, seeing it as an a priori encoded step, or as a moment of total, *unpredictable* opening. Several of Lotman’s unpublished writings from the period between 1990–1993 are deeply linked to the three monographs and jointly thematize this interpretative “bifurcation”⁵ of the historical crisis: towards newness or towards repetitiveness:

- № 266 *Repetitiveness and uniqueness in the mechanism of culture (Povtoryaemost’ i unikal’nost’ v mekhanizme kul’tury. Chernovaya rukopis’, 1991–1992, manuscript, pages 14).*
- № 271 *Evolution – complication or simplification (Evolyutsiya – uslozhenie ili uproshchenie, 1991–1992, manuscript, 14).*
- № 272 *Waiting for language (on the eve of the explosion) (V ozhidanii yazyka (nakanune vzryva), 1992, manuscript, 21).*
- № 273 *In an open world (V otkrytom mire, 1992–1993, manuscript and typescript, 28).*
- № 279 *Repetitiveness and explosion in dynamic processes (Povtoryaemost’ i vzryv v dinamicheskikh protsessakh, autumn–winter 1992, manuscript, 15).*
- № 282 *Breakthrough outside the space. The boundaries of the infinite (Proryv za predely prostanstva. Granitsy bezgranichnosti, 1992–1993, manuscript and typescript, 37).*
- № 286 *The present day between East and West (Sovremennost’ mezhdru Vostokom i Zapadom, 1992, typescript, with changes dated 1997, 41).*

The thread that ties these writings together is the adoption of the Russian chemist and physicist Il’ya R. Prigozhin’s theory of complexity, as an interpretative framework for understanding the dynamics of culture. According to Lotman (Lotman 1990: 230), his reflection, enriched by Isabelle Stengers’s works,

has revolutionary significance for scientific thinking as a whole because they have tackled the problem of chance in the sciences and have moreover demonstrated the function of random phenomena in the general dynamics of the world.

имеют глубокий революционизирующий смысл для научного мышления в целом: они вводят случайные явления в круг интересов науки и, более того, раскрывают их функциональное место в общей динамике мира. (Lotman 2000: 348)

Lotman introduces the concept of “non-equilibrium” thermodynamics to explain the moments of historical explosions – those moments when unpredictable paths seem to open, moments in the face of which human beings must make a choice. This may consist in the reiteration [povtorenie] of already experienced cultural plots or in the responsible acknowledgement of the “dark night” (the crisis), in search of the ongoing “day” (the creativity and the newness): “In such times a clearly formulated question or even a profoundly experienced doubt turns out to be more productive than customary answers reiterating customary truths.” (Lotman [1994] 2013: 37)⁶. According to Lotman, the Russian Revolution was precisely an example of a customary,

⁴ “словесное неистовство сочетается с политической скованностью”.

⁵ Word based on Prigozhin’s theory and reread by Lotman in order to explain the dynamics of historical changes, when “the potential of all possible future paths of development” seems to be feasible (Lotman [1992] 2009: 14). See also Grishakova 2009.

⁶ “Ясно поставленный вопрос или глубоко пережитое сомнение оказываются в такое время более плодотворными, чем привычные ответы, повторяющие привычные истины.”

“usual”, imitative answer to the crisis underway, which followed the script of the French Revolution (uniting it with the typical “hyperbolism” of the Russian mentality) in order to overtake the historical stalemate – the Scholar termed this phenomenon “mechanism of Troubles” in memory of the Time of Troubles [Smutnoe vremya, 1598–1613] (significantly, in 1989 he promoted a community reflection about this topic during the conference “The great French Revolution and the ways of the Russian Liberation Movement”⁷).

These considerations introduce another important theme of the last Lotman: the role of art in the dynamics of culture. In this regard, the unpublished articles

- № 293 *The role of art in the dynamics of culture (Rol' iskusstva v dinamike kul'tury*, May 1993, manuscript, typescript, 81).
- № 278 *Fire in the vessel (Ogon' v sosude*, 1992–1993, manuscript, typescript, 26).
- № 280 *Portrait (Portret*, 1992, manuscript, with changes dated 1993 in typewritten form, 107).
- № 270 *The function of art (Funktsiya iskusstva. Chernovaya rukopis'*, 1991–1992, manuscript, 43).

are linked as much to the aforementioned monographs as to the tele-lectures on Russian culture that Lotman gave from 1985 to 1991 for Estonian Television (*Eesti Televisioon*). In 1990 he recorded the 4th series of lectures on *Man and art [Chelovek i iskusstvo]*, which was followed by the 5th and final series on *Pushkin and his entourage [Pushkin i ego okruzhenie]*⁸.

Art is a key dimension of the Lotmanian theory, perhaps the most important one. Since the 60s, analyzing the poetic and literary texts according to a structuralist approach⁹, Lotman became progressively aware that “The artistic work is a thinking structure, a generator of new information. Art is one of the hemispheres of the collective brain of humankind.” (Lotman [1994] 2013: 220)¹⁰. The study of this kind of language suggested to him that if we want to understand the culture (synonymous with kollektivnyi intellekt), it is necessary to analyze its expressive (or artistic) forms, which are thinking-generating “devices”. Their cultural function consists not only in the mere transmission of information, but in the production of a semantic excess, which means newness, unpredictability, uniqueness and evolution; the art forms have such a semiotic capacity that they can be “modelling” [modelirovanie] (also translated as “modelising”)¹¹: in other words the art forms are able to return the essence of the extra-cultural reality to the culture, causing a never-ending dialogue between the culture in itself (the “known” world), and what is beyond its boundaries and requires a modelisation¹² (Lotman [1992] 2009: 73).

Lotman writes (Lotman [1994] 2013: 171–172):

⁷ *Velikaya Frantsuzskaya Revolyutsiya i puti Russkogo Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya*.

⁸ The three previous series dealt with the relationship between people, fate and everyday life [*byt*] (1st), people and development of cultures (2nd), and culture and intelligence (3rd). Thirty-three lectures were recorded in all by Eesti Televisioon and published in Lotman 2003.

⁹ *Analiz khudozhestvennogo teksta*. 1960 (unpublished); *Lektsii po struktural'noi poetike. Vvedenie, teoriya stikha*. Tartu 1964; *Struktura khudozhestvennogo teksta*. Moskva 1970; *Analiz poeticheskogo teksta. Struktura stikha*. Leningrad 1972.

¹⁰ “Художественное произведение – мыслящая структура, генератор новой информации. Искусство – одно из полушарий коллективного мозга человечества.”

¹¹ Art has “an extreme degree of freedom in modelling reality. The freedom of artistic modelling is guaranteed by the fact that works of art are always a breakthrough into the new, into a sphere of artistic language that was until that point non-existent. Every work of art is a new text in a new language.” (Lotman [1994] 2013: 200).

“[...] предельную свободу моделирования реальности. Свобода художественного моделирования обеспечивается тем, что произведения искусства всегда есть прорыв в новую, до тех пор не существовавшую, сферу художественного языка. Каждое произведение искусства – это новый текст, на новом языке.”

¹² “Modelization” in AmE.

The function of art in the general system of different cultural spheres involves the creation of a reality much freer than the reality of the material world. [...] The meaning behind the old definition of the “arts” as “liberal” is profound and perhaps not fully understood. [...] objects of art constrained by the laws of reality acquire freedom in art, enter into new relations and bonds whereby they reveal their deep inner meaning.

Функция искусства в общей системе различных сфер культуры и состоит в том, что оно создает реальность, гораздо более свободную, чем реальность материального мира. [...] Старинное определение искусств как свободных имеет глубокое, возможно, не всегда осознававшееся значение. [...] скованные законами реальности объекты искусства получают в нем свободу, вступают в новые отношения и связи, тем самым раскрывая свои глубинные внутренние значения. (Lotman [1994] 2010: 140-141)

In Lotman’s thought and, more generally, in the Tartu-Moscow School’s theoretical framework, art has not only paved the way for the investigation of the text as a meaning-generating mechanism (essential for understanding the dynamics and the semantic richness of the culture in terms of new information) but it has marked the scientific and ethical-anthropological breakthrough towards the thematization of the explosion: “For the Tartu-Moscow School the shift from gradual processes to explosive moments was determined when the centre of scholarly attention was relocated from the field of linguistics to the semiotics of art. Art is the child of explosion.” (Lotman [1994] 2013: 87)¹³.

It is not by chance that Lotman defines art a “laboratory (or workshop) of unpredictability” [*masterskaya nepredskazuemosti*]: the reality receives freedom from art, saving itself from utopia and from the “usual”, bearer of already beaten paths or customary truths.

3. Everyday life

Lastly, a well-beloved topic by Lotman is everyday life, often regarded as a “low”, residual phenomenon in respect to the great events of history or cultural events, everlasting in the cultural memory. As stated by the Scholar, there is a sort of recursiveness between the history of humanity and that of the individual, according to a dynamic of mirroring or isomorphism (Lotman 1994a: 389) which gives life to the culture, where the daily gesture, collectively lived, is kept in the memory of history.

This reflection is well represented by the monograph dated in the summer 1992, *Literature in the context of the 18th-century Russian culture* [*Literatura v kontekste russkoj kul’tury XVIII-go veka*], published in Russian in 1996 in the 4th volume of the miscellaneous collection *From the history of Russian literature. 18th – beginning of the 19th centuries* [*Iz istorii russkoj kul’tury. XVIII – nachalo XIX veka*]¹⁴. This is specular to the Lotmanian collection dated 1994 *Conversations about Russian culture. The way of life and traditions of Russian nobility (18th – beginning of the 19th centuries)* [*Besedy o russkoj kul’ture. Byt i traditsii russkogo dvoryanstva (XVIII – nachalo XIX veka)*]¹⁵.

¹³ “Для тартуско-московской школы переход от постепенных процессов к взрывам был запрограммирован перемещением центра научного внимания из области лингвистики в семиотику искусства. Искусство – дитя взрыва.”

¹⁴ The first part of the volume was written by Lotman and bears the title of *Ocherki po russkoj kul’ture XVIII veka* [*Essays on the 18th-century Russian culture*]: Chapters 1, 2 and the Conclusion constitute the monograph *Literatura v kontekste russkoj kul’tury XVIII-go veka*.

¹⁵ This collection dated 1994 expounds the theme of the byt. Some parts of it are repeated in chapter 3 of the aforesaid volume

Lotman reviews the themes developed since the sixties, when his interest was directed to the genesis of historical phenomena such as the Russian Enlightenment, the post-Petrine era, the Decembrist current, to name but a few: a genesis that Lotman locates both in the great authors (Radischev, Pushkin, Tolstoy, etc.) and in the *byt* embodied in history, as revealed by the meaning systems of ranks, honors (uniforms, medals, titles), duels, matchmaking, women's education, games, dandyism, and domestic and urban architecture. In the essay *Architecture in the context of culture* (*Arkhitektura v kontekste kul'tury*, 1987), Lotman underlines that all that surrounds us (or the symbolic space) is the result of a thick semiotic dialog between the architectural organization – in and of itself historically stratified and full of meaning – and the non-architectural one (i.e., the ritual, daily, religious, mythological semiotics). This spatial-temporal dialog creates complex systems of codification of the cultural memory and casts light on the present: present which is interpreted through the workings of daily life. Being particularly interested in the historical crisis, Lotman emphasizes the close connection between the “great” space-time – represented by “the layout of Valletta (in Malta), Nancy, Petersburg, Lima”¹⁶ or by Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* (Lotman 2000: 679–680) – and the “little” space-time: according to the Scholar, people invent various forms of etiquettes, rituals, norms of behaviour, and subdivisions of domestic spaces¹⁷ in order to interpret, mediate and “control” the change, the reason for which the cultural researcher has to search for the symptoms of historical passages in scenicity and in the theatricalization of daily life. These passages will be viewed as more “scenic” as they are bearers of uncontrolled news.

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¹⁶ “[...] планировку Ла-Валетты (на Мальте), Нанси, Петербурга, Лимы”.

¹⁷ Forms usually documented in letters, short stories, biographies, portraits, which so represent a witness heritage of exceptional importance for understanding the “physiology of the explosion”.

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POPULAR MUSIC AND SIGNS OF TIMES. ROMANCES DEDICATED TO BUCHAREST

Mariana Neț
Romanian Academy, Institute of Linguistics,
Bucharest, Romania
mariana_net15@yahoo.com

1. Introduction

There are many ways in which cities and their images can survive times. Sometimes they are evoked in novels, memoirs and diaries. Most cities are described in guidebooks. Others are painted or, since 1894, when cinema was invented, some cities have visible and “moving” icons. But cities can also have audible icons. Music is one of them.

Some cities are immortalized in symphonic pieces. The best known examples are Vienna as evoked by Johann Strauss, Rome in the concerts of Ottorino Respighi, and Aranjuez as in the famous concert by Joachim Rodrigo. In Germany, *Berliner Luft* by Paul Linecke is an operetta composed in 1904 on a Viennese model. Various Italian cities, such as Napoli and Sorrento, as well as some Spanish cities, like Valencia and Granada, were dedicated *canzonette*. Such songs can be traced back to the end of the 19th century; they flourished in the former half of the 20th century. The first pieces of popular music dedicated to New York City also date from the turn of the century; *The Sidewalks of New York*¹ was composed in 1894 and immediately became a hit. Back on the other side of the Atlantic, the Parisian *chansonnettes* were *en vogue* in the 1920s, although the *chansonette* as a genre existed before the French Revolution.

¹ Music by Charles B. Lawlor, lyrics by James W. Blake

2. Argument

The songs dedicated to cities are signs of time, place, mentalities and ideologies. As Eero Tarasti explained (2002: 4), “Music mediates between values, be they aesthetic, ideological or whatever – and fixed ready-made objects”. And further: “Music can ‘speak’ for a given ideology” (2002: 24). On the other hand, Tarasti emphasized that “Music is largely indifferent to the ideologies or political-historical situations in which it is realized” (2002: 25). But the texts on which songs are based are not indifferent to ideologies and political-historical situations either. They play an important part in this respect. Musical texts *express* – or at least *evoke* – ideologies and political situations.

This essay will be a survey of the *romances* dedicated to Bucharest, from a broad semiotic perspective. The research will refer to the romances’ texts to a greater extent than to their music.

The Romanian *romance* is a fluid genre, easy to recognize, although not so easy to define. It is a short, naive piece of lyric popular music. Its text always tells a story – a love story, which is sometimes happy and optimistic, albeit in most cases sad or at least nostalgic. The Romanian romance flourished in the 1930s. Then their music was a tango or a waltz, but it was also bossa-nova, rumba, foxtrot and jazz. Sometimes, though not too often, the romances’ tunes evoked Romanian folklore.

This endeavour proves rather difficult, as very little research has been done in this respect. Most of the basic information necessary for this research has been found in a few books: Deda (1968: *passim*), Caraman-Fotea (1989: 43, 283), Sbârcea (1984: 145, 202), Ghiață and Sachelarie (1966: 275), as well as on various LP and Cd covers.² The list of songs dedicated to Bucharest (http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%C4%83_de_c%C3%A2ntece_legate_de_Bucure%C8%99ti) to be found online has proved useful, too. However, the online discography mentions several pieces, but is incomplete as regards the authors of music and lyrics; sometimes it explains that the texts are unavailable. The launching year may also be uncertain. Anyway, this presentation only refers to those pieces which are available (which I could either read or listen to). Some songs have been lost, probably for ever; they are referred to in some memoirs and diaries or they survive in some old people’s recollections. While the bibliography in this respect is quite scarce, the discography is also incomplete. This survey will comment upon a few pieces deemed to be symptomatic for various epochs and ideologies. The discussion will follow a chronological order.

3. The origins

The origins of Romanian romances are to be found in the music and lyrics composed by Anton Pann (1790-1854) in the former half of the 19th century; perhaps, even before that moment. Probably the first romance in the present-day sense of the term dates from the latter half of the same century, when D. G. Florescu (1827-1875) composed the music for the poem *Steluța* (Little Star) by V. Alecsandri (1821-1890). In 1887, Iancu Filip wrote the music for two already famous poems by M. Eminescu (1850-1889): *De ce nu-mi vii?* (Why Don’t You Come?) and *Pe lângă plopul fără soț* (Under the Row of Poplars Odd). Eminescu’s poetry was on nearly everybody’s lips in those times, although most people probably understood only the first level of significance. Many turn-of-the-century musicians composed romances on his verse.

But it was in the inter-war era that romances were *en vogue*, though at the end of Communist times, they were still appreciated by many. One reason for this belated fame enjoyed by romances was that they reminded people (elderly people, especially) of the dead and gone inter-war era which they considered romantic (this was only too natural, since it was the time of those people’s childhood and youth). Another reason was that romances belong to popular culture; their message is easy to understand, their music is enjoyable, and therefore they appeal to a lot

² I would like to thank Mrs. Stela Covaci and Mr. Marian Stere for their kind support concerning the documentation.

of people of average – and even below average – cultural level. For this reason, the interpretation of romances was encouraged – even demanded – by Communist Power. For all these reasons, the romance, as a genre, can still be productive.

I contend there are three main moments in the evolution of Romanian romances dedicated to the city of Bucharest, namely (1) the *inter-bellum* era (also including the 1940s), (2) the 1950s, and (3) the years 1960-1980. Things became more complicated after 1990: a completely new kind of music was composed, while the songs' topic and vocabulary were very different from what they used to be, therefore entirely different from traditional romances. This presentation will stop before reaching that moment.

4. The Inter-Bellum Era

Two hundred-odd romances were sung and hummed in Bucharest in the 1930s. Among them, I have been able to identify only seven songs in which Romania's capital city or one of its landmarks are explicitly mentioned (not always in the title). The music of many of these songs was signed by Ion Vasilescu (1903-1960). They were sung by various stars of the time: Jean Moscopol, Cristian Vasile and Maria Tănase, as well as by Titi Botez and Dorel Livianu (who were just as famous at the time, in spite of being almost forgotten nowadays). Most romances were launched on *revue* stages such as Alhambra, Cărăbuș and Savoy or in various famous restaurants. Most recordings were then made at the Columbia studios in Vienna or at Odéon studios in Paris.

Probably the first romance dedicated to the city of Bucharest dates from 1932. It was a foxtrot titled *Fetițele din București*³ (The Girls in Bucharest). Under the slightly altered title *Fetițe dulci din București* (Sweet Girls of Bucharest), this romance was still a hit in Communist times, when it was sung by Gică Petrescu.

In the same year (1932) Jean Moscopol recorded the romance *Vrei să ne-ntîlnim sîmbătă seara?*⁴ (Shall We Meet on Saturday Night?). Another recording of this piece was made by Titi Botez in the following year; The song remained in the repertory of several popular music soloists until the 1970s. Its lyrics evoked a topos of inter-bellum Bucharest, namely the small pubs on Kisselef Avenue and on the adjacent streets, where live music was played on a piano and a violin.

It was also in the early 30s, probably on the occasion of the same journey to Vienna, that Jean Moscopol recorded at Columbia studios yet another romance referring to a city landmark, namely Cișmigiu Gardens⁵. *Te-aștept diseară în Cișmigiu*⁶ (I'll Wait for You Tonight in Cișmigiu). Interpreted by other singers⁷, this piece survived in Communist times.

Another famous romance, launched in 1937, was *Hai să-ți arăt Bucureștiul noaptea*.⁸ (Let Me Show You Bucharest by Night). Unlike the previously mentioned songs, in which the city supplied only the conventional setting of the love story, the text of this romance stages an imaginary journey through the city “from the (Royal) Palace to the Avenue”⁹ passing by the Athenaeum, going farther on Calea Victoriei¹⁰ and reaching “Miorița” fountain, one of the city's symbolic “gates.” It was at this point that the lovers were to declare their intense feelings. The text of this romance is close to that of Parisian *chansonnettes*. The declaration of love is addressed to the city

³ Music: Ion Vasilescu; lyrics: Nicolae Vlădoianu and Nicolae Kirculescu

⁴ Music: Ion Vasilescu; lyrics: Nicolae Vlădoianu

⁵ The garden, located in downtown Bucharest, dates from 1847. It was designed by W.F.C. Meyer, a Viennese landscaper. Cișmigiu Garden was the first public park opened in Europe.

⁶ Music: Ion Vasilescu

⁷ All references to Jean Moscopol were forbidden in Communist times; the artist had immigrated to the United States in 1945.

⁸ Music: Ion Vasilescu; lyrics: Eugen Mirea and Nicolae Constantinescu

⁹ Kiseleff Avenue, “the Avenue” for short

¹⁰ The main axis of Bucharest and its most famous street

to the same extent to which it is addressed to the beloved woman.¹¹ This romance was an immediate hit, while its title (“Shall We Meet on Saturday Night?”) became a verbal cliché. The piece was also interpreted by various singers in Communist times. However, it is interesting to note that its text was altered. From 1948 onwards¹², instead of “from the Palace to the Avenue,” it ran: “from downtown to the Avenue.” Any reference to the Royal Palace was completely banned from this popular music text and from any other text.

Inter-bellum Bucharest was a care-free city, whose inhabitants were completely devoid of any inferiority complex. This idea is illustrated by the text of *La margine de București*,¹³ (On the outskirts of Bucharest), a romance recorded by Gică Petrescu in 1939. It runs: “On the outskirts of Bucharest / In my street covered in dust and mud ...”¹⁴ This song set a trend which was to be turned to profit on a wide scale in Communist times. The best-known example in this respect, as regards both music and lyrics, is *La crîșma din Ferentari*¹⁵ (At the Pub in Ferentari)¹⁶.

Another relevant example is *Bucureștiul meu iubit*,¹⁷ (My Beloved Bucharest)¹⁸. While the *inter-bellum* tune was a waltz, in the 1970s this romance was sung on a tune reminding of folklore. Thus, while before the War the outskirts were subtly “urbanized,” in Communist times the city was surreptitiously assimilated to its outskirts and their dominant mentalities.

In 1939, during the blackout, the romance *en vogue* was *Te recunosc și pe întuneric, București*,¹⁹ (I Recognize You Even in the Dark, Bucharest)²⁰, a true “anthem” dedicated to the city. In this love song Bucharest was shown to have preserved its charm and its system of values even during a world war and in complete darkness. This romance is reminiscent of the famous *Paris sera toujours Paris*²¹, sung by Maurice Chevalier about the same time and under similar circumstances. The romance *Cînd se sting luminile în București*²², (When the Lights Are Out in Bucharest)²³, sung on a slowfox tune and unavailable now, probably belonged to the same series.

The online discography²⁴ of popular songs dedicated to Bucharest also includes *La Șosea*²⁵ (On the Avenue), sung by the now forgotten Kosak Sisters at the beginning of the 1940s.

There are also a few hits which have never been recorded and which seem to have been lost forever, though they were frequently performed in revue shows at the end of the *inter-bellum* era. Such an example is *Ne-a văzut tot Bucureștiul împreună*²⁶, (Everybody in Bucharest Has Seen Us Together), almost unknown nowadays.

Many *inter-bellum* romances made use of diminutives (lassie, little pub, etc.) which are no longer in use. The presence of such words confer the songs a kind of outdated charm.

5. In the 1950s. In Bucharest and about Bucharest

Three main directions are manifest in the musical texts dedicated to Bucharest in the 1950s: (1) they continue the *inter-bellum* tradition of speaking about the city or its neighbourhoods.

¹¹ This romance has never been sung by a woman and addressed to a man.

¹² The king of Romania was forced to abdicate on December 30, 1947.

¹³ Music and lyrics: Ion Vasilescu

¹⁴ All the texts are in my transcription from LPs and CDs and in my translation into English.

¹⁵ Music: Aurel Giroveanu; lyrics: Nicu Kanner

¹⁶ It was recorded by Gică Petrescu in the 1970s.

¹⁷ Music: Marius Georgian

¹⁸ Also recorded by Gică Petrescu in the 1970s

¹⁹ Music: Ion Vasilescu; lyrics: Ștefan Cristodulo și Vasile Vasilache

²⁰ Sung by Zizi Șerban

²¹ Music: C. Oberfeld; lyrics: Albert Willematz

²² Music and lyrics: Nicolae Kirișescu

²³ This romance was recorded by Gică Petrescu in 1940. The recording, the music and lyrics seem to have been lost.

²⁴ http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%C4%83_de_c%C3%A2ntece_legate_de_Bucure%C8%99ti

²⁵ Music: Fromy Moreno; lyrics: Mircea Block

²⁶ Music: Ion Vasilescu

However, not a few texts also have a translation into Russian; in this case, it is the bi-lingual version that is recorded on disk and broadcasted on the radio or on television.²⁷ The last direction is represented by (3) those songs specially composed or adapted in order to celebrate the city's 500th anniversary.²⁸ Some romances fall into two categories or even into all three. That is why the following presentation will be only chronological.

For instance, the romance *În Bucureștiul iubit*²⁹ (In My Beloved Bucharest) had a Russian version, recorded by Jean Păunescu in 1950.

Two years later, Gică Petrescu recorded with Electrecord (the Romanian recording house) a second popular piece which was a declaration of love to the city. It was titled; *București, București*.³⁰ This artist would continue to sing Bucharest throughout his long life.³¹ In the following decades, he recorded some two dozen songs about the city; some of them were his own compositions. A few of these songs were revivals of *ante bellum* tunes, though their texts were slightly altered to comply with Communist ideology.

The songs about the city cannot be understood unless one is well acquainted with the city history. The romance *A mai înflorit o grădiniță în București*,³² (Another Little Garden Has Appeared in Bucharest) dates from the early 50s. Its text refers to the initiative of one of the city mayors to plant some flower beds and install a bench or two on the sites of former buildings which had been destroyed by bombs during World War II. This romance was short-lived; it did not outlive the little gardens it referred to, and its text has not survived either, except in a few people's memory.

The historiography of Romanian popular music also recorded the interesting fact that the already famous Maria Tănase went to the "Moși" Fair³³ and sang live the romance *În Tîrgul Moșilor*,³⁴ which was probably launched on that occasion.

The song *Podul Grant*³⁵ (Grant Bridge) also dates from 1959, though it is in no way connected with the city's jubilee,³⁶ celebrated the same year. The text evoked a landmark already existing in the city for half a century.³⁷ It also reminded, in fairly decent terms, that at the beginning of the Communist era, blocks-of-flats had been built on Calea Griviței, between Northern Railway Station and Constanța Railway Bridge: "From Grant Bridge / I proudly admire the new buildings / On the site where I grew up". The blocks-of-flats replaced the former buildings which had been destroyed by American bombardments.

On the other hand, the populist trend which had invaded all cultural spheres in the 1950s (actually until the mid-60s) was noticeable in popular music, too. An example in this respect is supplied by the text of the song *Calea Griviței*:³⁸ "It's early morning and the siren has buzzed / And the workers are already in place. / I'm one of them and I tell the lathe 'I'm here!' / I'm like the clock in the nearby railway station: always on time".

As already mentioned, in the sixth decade of the 20th century some light music pieces were translated into Russian. This happened especially when Romanian artists toured the USSR. For

²⁷ The Romanian Television Company was founded in 1957.

²⁸ The first official act mentioning the city of Bucharest dates from 1459.

²⁹ Music: Mauriciu Vesca; lyrics: Nicolae Nasta

³⁰ Music: Aurel Giroveanu; lyrics: Ion Socol

³¹ He died in 2006, aged 91.

³² Music: Henry Mălineanu

³³ The annual fair called *La Moși* had a century-long tradition in Bucharest. It had taken place in Obor neighbourhood during the latter half of May ever since the 18th century. This tradition was discontinued in the early 1960s.

³⁴ Music: Temistocle Popa; lyrics: Vlad Cebotenco

³⁵ Music: George Grigoriu

³⁶ It was interpreted by Gică Petrescu and the "Grigoriu" Trio.

³⁷ Grant Bridge was built in 1908.

³⁸ Music and lyrics by unknown authors; interpreter: Luigi Ionescu

instance, in 1959, Gică Petrescu recorded with Electrecord *Cîntec pentru prietenii din București*³⁹ (Song for My Friends in Bucharest). It was sung on a jazz tune. The text in Russian mentioned a few city landmarks, but especially the new blocks-of-flats and cinemas, whereas the refrain in Romanian explicitly confessed: “Now I sing for you, friends from far away, / And I feel you close by [...] / From Moscow I send you greetings, / Bucharest, my beloved city. / Fly to Bucharest, my tune, / As a friendly gift from Moscow.” This text makes us believe that the song dates from 1957, when the artist was on a tour in Moscow. It may have been meant as a counter-weight of the songs *M-am îndrăgostit de tine, Moscova*⁴⁰ (I Have Fallen in Love with You, Moscow) and *Te iubesc, Moscova*⁴¹ (I Love You, Moscow), recorded by Gică Petrescu with Apeleski Zavod, the Soviet recording house, in 1957. A belated echo of this trend can be identified at the beginning of the next decade, in 1961, when the same artist recorded with Electrecord, exclusively in Romanian, the song *Amintiri dragi din Moscova*⁴² (Dear Souvenirs from Moscow).

In 1959, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Bucharest, several songs were composed evoking the city. From various written, verbal and online sources, I have been able to identify four such pieces. Two of them were sung by Gică Petrescu. They were titled *București, București*,⁴³ (“Bucharest, Bucharest / You are my brother. / My beloved Bucharest / How did you manage to charm me? / Whenever I’m away from you / I’m yearning to come back.”) and *Cele mai frumoase fete*⁴⁴ (The most beautiful girls) – to be found, obviously, only in Bucharest.

The song *Frumos ești, București*⁴⁵ (“How beautiful you are, Bucharest!”) probably dates from the same era.⁴⁶ Even if this song was composed a couple of years earlier,⁴⁷ the hypothesis is perfectly plausible that it became a hit on the occasion of the jubilee.

Paradoxically enough, the most symptomatic piece connected with the city’s anniversary was not an ad-hoc creation but the revival of a song from before the war. It is titled *Salutare, bătrîne București*⁴⁸ (Hello, Old Bucharest) and it dates from the 1930s. The text from before the war, written in the first person singular, told the story of a composer coming back to the city after a fairly long absence and promising never to leave it again: “Hello, old Bucharest, / I’m back to you after long years, / Beloved city of my childhood, / Never will I leave you again.” The text from 1959 introduced an explicit reference to the jubilee: “Hello, old Bucharest, / It’s your birthday, you are 500 now.” That is why, to the generations born after the war, this song has always evoked the jubilee.

A salient feature of the songs dedicated to Bucharest in the 1950s is a (fleeting) reference to the slums. Sometimes the slums – Obor, Colentina – were explicitly mentioned. Another feature is the mention of the new blocks-o-flats, of which the era was extremely proud – most often without reason.

6. In Bucharest and about Bucharest in the ’60s, ’70s and ’80s.

All the already mentioned tendencies are rendered manifest in the last three decades of Communism. The online discography includes about fifty titles, but, once again, the information is incomplete. In what follows, I will mention only those songs which, by both expression and content, are closest both to *ante bellum* romances and to Parisian *chansonnettes*.

³⁹ Music: Modest Tabacnicov; lyrics: I. Helemski și C. Pastramii

⁴⁰ Music: Elly Roman

⁴¹ Music: Nicolae Kirculescu; lyrics: Constantin Cârjan

⁴² Music: Arno Babedjabyan; lyrics: Eugen Mirea

⁴³ Music: Ion Vasilescu; lyrics: Nicușor Constantinescu and Aurel Felea

⁴⁴ Music: Henry Mălineanu; lyrics: Nicușor Constantinescu

⁴⁵ Music: Radu Șerban; lyrics: Ion Socol

⁴⁶ It was sung by Anca Agemolu.

⁴⁷ The online bibliography indicates the year 1952.

⁴⁸ See note 20.

Gică Petrescu continued his career of singing light music pieces and interpreted several romances dedicated to Bucharest; in some cases, he also composed the music of such songs. *București, București*⁴⁹ is a declaration of love – hyperbolic, naive, but sincere – addressed to the city: “*Bucharest, Bucharest, / So dear you are to me. / I’ve grown up with you. / I’ve watched you growing up, / You are so wonderful. /.../ Bucharest, Bucharest, / Those who love you / Have always sung songs about you. / Now it’s my turn to sing about you, / My beloved city.*”

The song *Undeva, pe-o stradă mică*⁵⁰ (Somewhere, in a Side Street) continued the style of interbellum romances in both music and lyrics. It was recorded by the same artist also in 1970 and it nostalgically refers to a patriarchal neighbourhood in the city and to a lasting love story which strengthened the lovers’ relation to the city: “*Somewhere, in a side street in Bucharest, / There is a house with geraniums on its window sills. / Our old photographs and souvenirs / Show images of the first time we met.*” The romantic love for a woman is equivalent to the lasting love for the city.

Much later – probably at the beginning of the 1980s –, Luigi Ionescu recorded the tango *Draga mea din București*⁵¹ (My Sweetheart from Bucharest), yet another song which seems to have survived from before the war: “*Where are you, my sweetheart from Bucharest? / Where are our hopes for love? / They’ve faded, like roses in autumn. / Where are they and where are you? / I remember some much-cherished neighbourhoods in Bucharest / Singing the songs of our hearts. [...] / I was walking in the streets by your side, / We felt so good [...] With half-closed eyes, I see images from the past, / As on a screen, I see the charm which is now over.*” The rhetorical question “*Where are they and where are you?*” seems addressed to the city to the same extent to which it is addressed to the beloved one, while the “*images from the past*” and “*the charm which is now over*” refer both to the city and to the former sweetheart.

It was also at the beginning of the 1980s that Dan Spătaru recorded *Noapte bună, București*,⁵² (Good-night, Bucharest!), yet another declaration of love to the city, in which the metropolis resembles the beloved one: “*Good-night, Bucharest, good-night! / Night has cast its secret veil. [...] My poem flies to you. / And whispers in all your neighbourhoods / Good-night, Bucharest, good-night! [...] Sleep well, my beloved city / And dream your sweet dreams! / Good-night, Bucharest, good-night!*” The message is clear enough; comments are superfluous.

Many new singers became famous in the 1980s. At the beginning of the ninth decade, Mircea Vintilă recorded the romance *Strada Popa Nan*⁵³ (Popa Nan Street); in a nostalgic, troubadour-like style, the song describes the obsolete lifestyles of one of the city’s patriarchal neighbourhoods which seemed to have travelled through times with very little change.

About the same time, Nicu Alifantis composed and sang a kind of “anthem” dedicated to the metropolis: “*You, Bucharest, city of poetry, / My garden with thousands of roses, / You tempt your poets to compose / Ballads to unforgettable loves.*” The text also refers, in a ludical key, to some of the best known poets who lived and wrote poetry in the city in the last two centuries (the Văcărescu Brothers, Eminescu, Minulescu, Bacovia), the implicit assumption being that Alifantis himself was among their descendants.

This ludic-nostalgic key is also characteristic of a waltz sung by Marina Voica in the mid-eighties: *București e Micul Paris*⁵⁴ (Bucharest is A Little Paris). Its mildly ironical text is conclusive enough: “*I sit by the window and watch / The city I love. /.../ Bucharest is A Little Paris [...] But then why don’t we speak / Of Paris as another Bucharest?*” This romance shows Bucharest

⁴⁹ Music: Gică Petrescu; lyrics: Cezarina Moldoveanu

⁵⁰ Music: Vasile Veselovski; lyrics: Mihai Maximilian

⁵¹ Music: Temistocle Popa

⁵² Music: Temistocle Popa; lyrics: Mircea Block

⁵³ Music: Mircea Vintilă; lyrics: Dorin Liviu Zaharia

⁵⁴ The names of the authors of lyrics and music are unavailable; so is the year of the recording.

to be a Narcissist city (the text mentions a few landmarks: Calea Victoriei, Cișmigiu Gardens, the Athenaeum, Kisselef Avenue), also endowed with subtle irony and the sense of proportions.

7. Conclusions

1. Cities are evoked, ludically and narcissistically, in songs, while the songs dedicated to the cities increase the cities' charm and strengthen their atmosphere.

2. As far as Bucharest is concerned, there is a clear difference between the romances composed before War World II and romances composed in the Communist era. The music of *inter-bellum* romances was up-to-date: songs were composed on partitions of tango, waltz, foxtrot, rumba, jazz and other fashionable rhythms of the time, while the romances composed in the Communist era preserved tangos and waltzes but often favoured tunes drawing inspiration from Romanian folklore or rather nondescript tunes which sounded obsolete. Paradoxically, the romances' music sounded more up-to-date during the last decade of Communism, when the composition was encouraged of nostalgic tunes reminiscent of generic troubadour music. Incidentally, this trend was also fashionable in European and North-American music in the 1980s.

3. A difference is also obvious as regards the romances' texts. Many *inter-bellum* lyrics were censored after the war, while the texts composed in the Communist era were more naive and redundant than before. Some of the romances composed during the 1950s, when Romania was occupied by Russian troops, also had a version in Russian, usually included in the same piece and sung alternatively with the Romanian version. Other texts spoke of the workers' enthusiasm in factories. While some romances continued to evoke a few city landmarks, many others spoke either of the slums or of the new blocks-of-flats. The obvious assumption was that before Communism came and built flats for the workers, most of the city had consisted of slums. It was an indirect way of legitimating the Communist Power, which had "urbanized" the city and the country by replacing the slums with "modern" blocks-of-flats. Communist historians and ideologists claimed this false idea openly. It is, once again, in the 1980s that texts became more sophisticated and closer to poetry.

4. The only common factor of the romances dedicated to Bucharest is the singers' love for the city.

5. As announced at the beginning, this research has been made from a broad semiotic perspective. But nowadays I find it almost impossible to do semiotic research without placing things in context, without being acquainted with history, lifestyles and ideologies. Sometimes, semiotics merges into cultural studies. This essay belongs to both disciplines.

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CULTURAL SEMIOTICS AS *FLUXORUM SCIENTIA*

Massimo Leone
University of Turin, Italy
massimo.leone@unito.it

Abstract

The article is a caveat vis-à-vis the typological excesses of cultural semiotics. Structuralism naturally inclines toward the formulation of grids where cultural artifacts are recognized as tokens of types. Nevertheless, the article argues, such methodological attitude is not ideologically neutral. Pushed to the extreme, it risks overlapping with a politics of rigid articulation of humanity that 20th-century totalitarianisms tragically embraced. The antidote would be to pursue a paradoxical effort of cultivating cultural semiotics as “fluxorum scientia”, as science of fluid, iridescent phenomena.

An urge of attribution pervades semiotics. Peirce has imagined the sign as a triadic structure, Saussure as a dyadic one, but no semiotics could rest on a monistic ontology. Every model of sign is permeated by the idea of a cleft, and by the narrative of a quest to bridge it. In Saussure, the sign is unity of signifier and signified, but this unity concerns the phenomenology of signification more than the ontology of meaning. “Sign” could be defined as the name of everything that humans do in order to bridge the perceptible and the imperceptible, the known and the unknown, the uncanny and the familiar. Interpreting signs is tantamount to transforming a chaotic, puzzling reality into language that speaks and is understood. From this point of view,

signification is pervasive, and the scope of semiotics as vast as that of humanity, for living is, for humans, appropriating the unknown. Theories about the genesis of the human semiotic ability often relate it to the needs of hunting, and deciphering the unfamiliar traces left by preys or predators. Increasingly sophisticated languages have been created since the prehistory of humanity, yet it can be argued that the semiotic instinct still is about hunting and being hunted, about turning an unfamiliar environment into a matrix of decipherable elements.

One of the fundamental questions of semiotics, since its inception as semeiotics in the medical field, concerns whether the reading of reality can be guided by technique; whether the terrifying but thrilling experience of turning the unknown into the familiar must be invented at every step through instinct and intuition, or whether, on the opposite, such process of appropriation can be formalized, perfected, taught, and learned. Perfecting interpretation is indeed crucial in all walks of human life, and attribution one of its key processes. Medical diagnosis needs to bridge the gap between some awkward and painful manifestations of the body and the identification of a disease that provokes those symptoms and must be cured to eliminate them. Jurisprudence seeks to attribute a certain human act to a category of behaviors, and relate this to a code or law that rules its existence in society. The reader of a poem or the viewer of a painting must refer the apparently unique arrangement of words and pigments to a genre, a style, a historical and cultural context, and to the poetics of an artist in a certain phase of its evolution. Also everyday life cannot be lead without a modicum of connoisseurship, whose mastery is among the most desirable social skills. Referring fellow human beings to a precise social, cultural, and psychological characterization; ascribing their words and acts to specific categories of intentions; detecting honesty and lie: all these abilities partake in the semiotic hunting that marks the role of humans in both nature and culture.

Being unable of reading the signs of reality, and reality as a sign, means being unable to predict what reality still is not, but might be in the future. That is the case not only for the future of social reality, but also for the future of texts. On the one hand, Wall Street brokers require semiotic ability in order to forecast the course of stock exchange titles. The fact that this ability is not completely formalized as technique does not mean that it stems entirely from mysterious intuition. On the other hand, literary critiques speculating on the interpretation of a novel also debate about the future. In the structural credo, for instance, they argue that the semantic fabric of the novel will elicit a certain range of responses by its potential future readers.

Since antiquity, semiotic theories and techniques have been thought as a remedy to the uncertainty of the future. From this point of view, the place of the semiotic instinct in the evolution of the human species is that of an adaptive quality: those who better relate the current phenomenology of reality to its future developments will be able to react to them in a quicker and more appropriate way. History is replete with anecdotes of humans who failed because, as Americans say, did not see it coming. "See it coming" requires, on the contrary, semiotic skills: see a financial crisis coming, or the end of a relationship, or a new tendency in consumption.

Semiotics as a discipline has therefore faced a double task: on the one side, describing the human consubstantial tendency to decipher the unknown; on the other side, suggesting techniques in order to perfect such innate interpretive drive.

What were the main suggestions of semiotics thus far?

In the frame of Saussure's semiotics, attribution of an unknown signifier to a known signified requires familiarity with the law. It is the law that associates a red flag to a signal of danger, the lexeme "dog" to a zoological species, burning incense with a propitiatory liturgy. The titanic efforts of Saussure's followers, from Hjelmslev's glossematics to Greimas's generative semiotics, have aimed at grasping the essential law beyond every form of signification. Also those signification processes that seemed patterned by unwritten laws or idiosyncrasy, such as social phenomena or artworks, have been investigated in search of a rule of attribution: given an ap-

parently random configuration of plastic elements, or social behaviors, the application of the semiotic method ascribe them to a law, turn them into the token of a type, interpret them. In this framework, what does not mean simply has no meaning, the unfamiliar is doomed to remain such, and ignorance of the signified beyond a signifier is only temporary, destined to vanish as soon as the suitable code will be detected, known, and applied. That explains why the structural mindset never focuses on how laws are instituted, evolve, or decay: what occupies the core of the semiological project stemming from Saussure's definition of sign is the law caught at the peak of its development, the human ability to bridge the unfamiliar and the familiar as it is crystallized in a code, in a system, in the *langue*. That is also why the structural attribution has an exclusively deductive allure: given a rule, a token must be attributed to a type with no exception, and all the cleverness of the semiologist consists in coming up with the most comprehensive formulation of this rule.

That does not mean, though, that the structuralist attribution does not produce any new knowledge. On the contrary, structural semioticians serve the purpose of identifying what explicit code links a token with a type, but also that of eliciting an implicit code from tokens that seem unrelated to any type. On the one hand, the structural semiotician determines that an ostrich egg in a canvas by Piero della Francesca must be related to the meaning of that egg in the coeval heraldic code. On the other hand, the structural semiotician elicits the rule according to which Mondrian's abstract paintings have been created and prompt aesthetic answers.

Lotman's model of cultural interpretation is in line with Saussure's strategy of attribution. Each element in the semiosphere, be it an isolated sign, a text, or a whole language, signifies insofar as it stems from an underlying matrix determining its value in social exchange. Elements in the semiosphere that are not related to any modeling system are chaotic, perturbations coming from outside the semiosphere, or appear as such simply because no semiotician yet has found any suitable way to situate them in relation to the cultural text, in relation with the general pattern of the semiosphere. In Lotman's model too, the aim of the semiotician is twofold: on the one hand, mastering the cultural and sub-cultural codes that explicitly shape communication in society. On the other hand, inductively more than deductively, establishing how different, apparently random signs are indeed a byproduct of some general dynamics of the semiosphere. For instance, the cultural semiotician will be able to differentiate among different kinds of tattoos, and determine which are to be ascribed to the subculture of detainees in a certain country, which are imported from an ethnic, pre-industrial visual culture, and which are a combination of both. At the same time, the cultural semiotician will seek to put forward more encompassing hypotheses about the spreading of tattoos in present-day societies, by claiming, for example, that the fashionable permanence of tattoos, piercing, and scarification is a reaction to the sense of precariousness that anguishes youth in contemporary western countries.

An important question to be raised about Lotman's model and about cultural semiotics in general is the question of creativity and innovation. As it was argued earlier, Saussure's semiology is not primarily concerned with creativity because it is not primarily concerned with time. Semiology provides a structural photograph of the laws that, at a given moment in the evolution of language, underpin the relation between tokens and types. How these laws are created and how they evolve in history concern semiology only retrospectively, for instance when the structural laws of 17-century poetics must be retrieved in order to explain the creation of Shakespeare's sonnets. However, as regards their interpretation, what matters is not to somehow reconstruct the aesthetic reception of Shakespeare's contemporaries, but to understand through which codes *the analyst's contemporaries* read the sonnets. From this point of view, Saussure's semiology is always contemporary. Historical semiotics is possible, but has been rarely chosen as a field of investigation, for the epistemology of semiology is more apt at describing the *langue* of a sign system as static deposit of forms than at speculating on how it might have changed through history.

A giant leap is taken, though, when the structuralist epistemology is applied not to a specific system of signs, like in Saussure, or to a text, like in Greimas's structuralist semantics, but to culture as a whole, considered as system of signs. It is reasonable, indeed, to crystalize the evolution of scripts for the blind – one of the examples given by Saussure in explaining the scope of semiology as he first defined it – into synchronic still frames, since such evolution can be ascribed to a context, for instance, the changing place of sensory impairment in modern societies. The same goes for Greimas's analysis of Bernanos's works in *Structural Semantics*: here too, there was no need to place the French novelist's texts in the flux of time, like historicist criticism would do, for in this case too such evolution would be relegated in the context. In Lotman's semiotics, though, and more generally in cultural semiotics, there is no context. What is the context of a culture, indeed, if not another culture, that is, something that is external and relatively unrelated to it?

As a consequence, in cultural semiotics there is no creativity that is not somehow combinatorial, stemming from the rearrangement of existent types according to different rules rather than from the unfathomable creation of new types. Lotman's semiotics accounts for innovation also through contamination between or among semiospheres. However, like abduction in Peirce, contamination in Lotman is magically referred to more than explained. The issues of how precisely inter-cultural contamination would work, and of how it would generate change in the semiosphere, are left unaccounted for. That ultimately derives from the circumscribed character of the structuralist epistemology. In order to work as an explanatory model, a cultural structure must be closed, its topology determined by precise frontiers. Also Saussure's *langue* is a closed system, as it is closed the system of Greimas's text. However, considering a whole culture as a closed system brings about a vision of society that implies disquieting secondary effects.


In other words, the urge for attribution that is at the core of Saussure's semiology and Greimas's structural semiotics envisages culture in a questionable way when reproduced at the level of Lotman's cultural semiotics. Cultural semiotics asks at a theoretical level the same question that strangers ask each other when they meet for the first time: where are you from? The social psychology of this question is complicated, but it undoubtedly manifests a drive for attribution, and therefore control. The alien individual is seen as a puzzling novelty, a source of unknown, and therefore as a potential danger. The question "where are you from?" seeks to elicit an answer that will allow interlocutors to 'case' each other, turning individuals into tokens of national and socio-cultural types. Of course there is no need for the question to be uttered explicitly, since it is asked implicitly at every new encounter, and about all the signs that compose a person's social presence. Where is this accent from? Where is this use of words from, and these clothes, and these gestures? Getting to know someone means progressively classifying as tokens of as many types all the signs that compose the person's voluntary or involuntary signification. Stereotypes, both positive and negative, are among the types that individuals use to 'interpret' each other.

As cultural semiotics approaches a text, an object, or a cultural phenomenon whatsoever, it also tends to 'case' it as manifestation of a rule, as expression of a socially deposited *langue*. The stereotypes that cultural semioticians make use of are much more articulated than those which common people, let alone racist people, resort to. Yet, there is something in common between cultural semiotics and racism, as there is between racism and bureaucracy.

Albeit very different in many respects, these three social practices aim at creating an inventory of reality that categorizes and interprets it without residues. Bureaucracy in western universities, for instance, is churning out more and more complicated forms in order to make sure that each aspect in the life of a student or a professor is attributed to the appropriate class, turned into the token of a type. There is nothing that irritates more bureaucracy, indeed, than the unclassifiable case, whose potential novelty cannot be neutralized by reference to a specific form, set of parameters, range of criteria, etc. etc. This classificatory frenzy, which seems to ape that of natural sciences like zoology or botany, covers increasingly large areas of university life. Students' learning,

professors' teaching, the use of infrastructures, financial data, every aspect or behavior cannot be left unaccounted for but must be classified and, possibly, numerically treated. Accounting for university life is more and more tantamount to counting university life. Recounting the meaning of the academia does not require a historian anymore but an accountant.

The desire of controlling other people through turning them into tokens of predetermined types finds the most aggressive expression in racism, especially in the institutional shape it took in 20th-century totalitarian regimes. The parallel between bureaucrats and fascists might seem exaggerated, yet there is something in the epistemology of the former than dangerously resemble the epistemology of the latter. All considered, the common epistemological denominator comes down to substantial anti-humanism. Fascisms, like bureaucracies, do not understand individuals and their behaviors independently from the explanatory grid that was predetermined so as to attribute them to a class of individuals and behaviors. The kind of meta-language that fascisms adopt in order to articulate and interpret people racially is therefore intrinsically bureaucratic, and disquietingly resembles the forms of modern bureaucracy. What follows is, for instance, the visual meta-language through which Nazi concentration camps would articulate prisoners according to their race and the 'crime' they had committed.



Claiming that racism is always bureaucratic does not imply that bureaucracy is always racist. On the contrary, bureaucracy in modern societies is meant to protect individuals from the idiosyncratic abuse of power. Yet, the semiotic parallel between organized racism and bureaucracy should make us wary of collectivities where the impulse to categorize, classify, and interpret individuals attains increasingly pervasive degrees of sophistication. A society that is unable to accommodate exceptions is a dangerous society, perhaps even more dangerous than a society that is unable to come up with rules.

The parallel between organized racism and bureaucracy should warn cultural semioticians too. Medieval scholastic philosophy used to repeat, interpreting Aristotle, "*Scientia est de universalibus, existentia est singularium*", "science concerns the universals, existence refers to singular (objects)" or, with another formula: "*Nulla est fluxorum scientia*", "there is no science of fluxes". In order to produce falsifiable hypotheses about culture, indeed, semiotics must elaborate general models where cultural phenomena are interpreted as manifestation of an underpinning semiotic rule. Cultural phenomena must be stripped of their idiosyncratic particularities

and cased into a category. Cultural semiotics can of course increasingly refine the articulation of its categorical thinking, but its operations keep resting on a theoretical movement of attribution.

Yet, it would probably be reductive to think that cultural semiotics should not be concerned by the existence of singularities, as scholastic epistemology urged sciences to do. On the one hand, the risk that bureaucracy runs when forgetful of the dignity of exceptions, treating them as anomalies, recurs in cultural semiotics too. When cultural semioticians deal with texts, they usually ask them the same question that strangers ask each other when meeting for the first time: “where are you from?” Where are you from, folktale? Where are you from, epic? Where are you from, painting? Where are you from, behavior? What cultural semiotics hopes for as an answer is an indication of where, in the spatial and temporal semiosphere, the object of investigation should be placed and categorized, so revealing its intrinsic meaning in relation to a precise patterning model.

One could argue, though, that asking the question “where are you from” is not the end of the gnoseological process, but the timid beginning of it. Stereotypes and bureaucratic parameters offer a grid to interpret reality, but stopping at them means divesting humanity of its deepest character, means stripping scholarship of its inner beauty. What do we know of a scholar, when we know that he is Italian? Something, but not much. And what do we know of a paper, when we know that it has been quoted twenty times? Something, but not much.

On the opposite, there is a stage in knowledge between two people, at which the question “where are you from?” does not arise anymore. It is the stage of love, or true friendship. At this stage, stereotypes must dissolve and leave space to irony, and the irreplaceable uniqueness of the subject. A subject who, as Lévinas would suggest, is not known anymore as a façade, in its cold splendor, but as visage. Of the architecture of a façade one could argue that follows and embodies a certain style. But saying thus of a visage would bring us back to the dubious investigations of Lombroso, to the Fascist anthropology of the face.

Demanding cultural semiotics to study texts as the visage of a beloved one is perhaps excessively tainted with romantic connotations. Yet, keeping in mind the political danger of turning semiotics into a bureaucracy of cultures is imperative, not only in moral terms – since it reminds us of what humanities are about, and their substantial difference with sciences – but also in theoretical terms. As the forms of university bureaucracy will never be able to tell why a student falls in love with semiotics, or why a professor devotes most of his life to study this discipline, in the same way a cultural semiotics oblivious of its humanistic constraints will be never able to explain how, despite the despotic pressure of the language, the constraining grid of types, and the thwarting cage of modeling systems, signs and their laws are not solid structures but fluid elements, which *do change* through history. A science of fluxes is needed to understand them fully.

SEMIOTICS OF CULTURAL HERITAGES: THE DIALECTICAL PROCESS OF ASSIMILATION AND REJECTION OF OTHERNESS IN THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE AL-ANDALUS CIVILIZATION

Ricardo Nogueira de Castro Monteiro
Universidade Anhembi Morumbi, São Paulo, Brasil
castromonteiro@anhembimorumbi.edu.br

Abstract

The historic transition from the Arabic-Andalusian to the Christian Iberian Peninsula represented much more than a power shift – or even a religious and cultural transition. It represented also a semiotic catastrophe – borrowing here the famous René Thom's conception of catastrophe as a small perturbation leading to the disappearance of a stable macroform and giving place to a new one designed by the subsequent balance of structural forces (Poston & Stewart, 1978). In the above-mentioned case of a semiotic catastrophe, the macroform would be conceived as the semiosphere and its inner relations, and the catastrophe as what Yuri Lotman expressed as an overall change in the cultural structures – in this specific situation, passing from a ternary to a binary system. Lotman presents the ternary cultural structure as the one where explosive processes in certain cultural spheres coexist with gradual changes in others, whereas its binary counterpart would be marked by the perception (or misperception) of a thorough destruction of the previous order followed by an apocalyptic appearance of the new one (Lotman, 2004). The present paper aims to illustrate this catastrophe analyzing two opposing constructions of alterity: the Arabic-Andalusian representation of Christians before the Reconquista in the works of authors such as Ibn Al-Haddad (c.1030-c.1087) and al-Rundi (1204-1285) and the Christian representation of the Moors after it in such works as the masterpiece of the Portuguese poet Luís de Camões (c.1524-1580), *Os lusíadas*. The analyses frontally challenge contemporary mass media stereotypes, displaying a surprisingly modern conception of harmonic coexistence in diversity by the Muslim authors, and an openly biased and manicheist representation of alterity

polarizing Christians against non-Christians in Western writers – with little or no concern at all to the distinctions that separate Muslims from Jews or monotheists from pagan polytheists. A thorough comprehension of this semiotic catastrophe represents a key concept not only to the understanding of Iberian Culture. Its trend to binarism was widely spread both by Spanish and Portuguese Conquistadors, digging deep roots into the soil of the New World. Thus, when Fernando Baez denounces in the title of his famous 2009 book the cultural looting of America (Baez, 2009), the description of the construction of large cathedrals upon the ashes of the once majestic Inca and Aztec temples, pointed by Baez as a token of racist despise for the Native cultures, could be regarded as the mere continuation of a common practice of the Reconquistadors with respect to the formerly imposing Iberian mosques and synagogues. Another interesting phenomenon is the specific way by which Brazil has developed its unique approach to this heritage, combining some ternary aspects that helped it to define its own identity as the friendly “melting pot” defended by authors such as Gilberto Freyre (1933) and Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1936) in the beginning of the 20th century with the binary elimination, by persecution and/or oblivion, of most of the huge non-Christian legacy that was deeply rooted not only in its Native American and African populations, but also in its Iberian colonizers.

1. Introduction

The historic transition from the Arabic-Andalusian to the Christian Iberian Peninsula represented much more than a power shift – or even a religious and cultural transition. It represented also a semiotic catastrophe – borrowing here the famous René Thom’s conception of catastrophe (Poston & Stewart, 1978). In this case, it would correspond to what Iuri Lotman designated as an overall change in the cultural structures, passing from what he defined as a ternary to a binary system. Lotman presents the ternary cultural structure as the one where explosive processes in certain cultural spheres coexist with gradual changes in other spheres, whereas its binary counterpart would be marked by the perception (or misperception) of a thorough destruction of the previous order followed by an apocalyptical appearance of the new one (Lotman, 2004). The present paper aims to illustrate this catastrophe analyzing two opposing constructions of otherness: the Arabic-Andalusian representation of Christians before the Reconquista in the works of authors such as Ibn Al-Haddad (c.1030–c.1087) and al-Rundi (1204–1285) and the Christian representation of the Moors after it in an excerpt of the masterpiece of Portuguese poet Luís de Camões (c.1524–1580), *Os lusíadas*. The analyses frontally challenge contemporary mass media stereotypes displaying a surprisingly modern conception of harmonic coexistence in diversity by the Muslim authors, and an openly biased and often caricatural Manichaeic representation of otherness polarizing Christians against non-Christians in Modern Era poetry. A thorough comprehension of this semiotic catastrophe is a key concept whose range is not restricted to the understanding of Iberian Culture, for its structural role was emulated in many different cultural scenarios, and its polarization into binarism was also transposed both by Spanish and Portuguese Conquistadors into their imperial possessions in the New World.

2. Ibn Al-Haddad

The careful reading of the works of Ibn Al-Haddad (c.1030–c.1088) – some of them apparently autobiographic – and possibly also some traditional sources convinced Ibn Fadl al-cUmari (1301–1349) that early in his life Al-Haddad would have departed to a peregrination to Mecca, a journey nonetheless bounded to remain incomplete, apparently due to his real or platonic involvement with a Christian nun in a Copt convent in Asyût, Egypt (al-cUmari, 1924:385 and Guerrero, 1978) – a version disregarded by scholars as Yûsuf Alî Tawîl, who favors the hypothesis of the nun being from Almería, where the poet has worked and lived a great part of his life (Al-Haddad, 1990). According to Ibn Bassâm (d.c.1147/1148), the nun’s name, called *Nuwayra* [little light] by the poet, would actually be *Jamila* [the beautiful one], but Al-Haddad would have

changed her name to protect her identity (Foulon & du Mesnil, 2009:246) – neither of the two possibilities offering a particularly likely name for a Spanish Christian nun in those days.

Al-Haddad's lifetime takes place roughly in the period between the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate in 1031 and the first Almoravid invasion in 1086, thus corresponding to the so-called first period of Taifas. Many authors like Emilio Ferrín consider that age “as close to Renaissance as the Tuscany period of city-states” and also “the apogee of Andalusian civilization” (Ferrín, 2009: 403–404). In such an enlightened context, Ibn Al-Haddad provides us an invaluable example of inter-racial relations in the *Convivencia* era – a time characterized by a relatively peaceful and remarkably productive conviviality between Muslims, Jews and Christians in the Medieval Iberian Peninsula.

This scenario marked by a cosmopolitan, diverse and relatively tolerant society can surprise contemporary eyes with its positive and even passionate representation of otherness, as in the case of the poem *كأس عجب لك أسى ع* [Maybe, my beloved, for the grace of your Jesus' truth]. The monorhyme poem with endings in “ki” follows the *wafir* meter, (in the first verse, | u – u u – | u – – – ||). The text is full of gorgeous, meaningful alliterations, as appears already in the first hemistich, *'assaaki bihaqqa 'iissaaki*, a *paronomasia* relating the fascination the nun exerts upon him (*'assaaki*) to her condition as a Christian (*'iissaaki*), in a semantic approximation reinforced by the assonance and isorhythmic accent the two expressions share. It is important to emphasize that such resources are not punctual – on the contrary, they are structural as far as many genders of Andalusian poetry are concerned, and their permanence in Spanish and Portuguese written and oral literatures is unfortunately widely overlooked. Nevertheless, we will focus momentarily on the categories of content rather than of expression, leaving further considerations regarding figures of expression to our subsequent discussions about the next two examples.

Thus, let us consider the following translation of the above-mentioned poem directly from its original in Arabic (Al-Haddad, 1990):

١- عَسَاكَ بِحَقِّ عَيْشِكَ مُرِيخَةً قَلْبِي الشَّكِي
 ٢- فَإِنَّ الْخُسْنَ قَدْ وَلَا كَ إِحْسَابِي وَإِهْلَاكِي
 ٣- وَأَزْلَمَنِي بِمُسْتَبَانَ وَزُهَيْدِي وَنُشَاكِي
 ٤- وَلَمْ آتِ الْكَسَائِدَ عَزَّ فَوَقَّ فَيَهْنُ لَوْلَاكَ
 ٥- وَهَذَا أَنَا بِشُكِّ فِي بَلْوَى وَلَا فَزَجَّ لِيَبْلُوكِي
 ٦- وَلَا أَتَطَيَّبُ لَوْلَانَا فَغَدَّ أَزْنَقَتِ أَفْرَاكِي
 ٧- فَكَمْ أَكْبَى عَلَيْكَ نَمًا وَلَا تَرْتِيئِينَ لِلشَّكِي!
 ٨- فَهَلْ تَنْزِيئِينَ مَا تَقْضِي عَلَى عَيْشِي عَيْشِيكَ؟
 ٩- وَمَا يُذَكِّيهِ مَنْ نَارِ بِغَلْبِي نُوُوكِ الدَّكَاكِي؟
 ١٠- خَتَيْتِ نَسَاكَ عَنِ بَصْرِي وَفَوَقَّ النَّسْءِ بِشُكِّكَ
 ١١- وَفِي الْعَفْنِ الرُّطْبِ وَفِي الدَّ تَفَا الْمُرْتَجِّ عَيْشِيكَ
 ١٢- وَعِنْدَ السُّرُوسِ خَدَاكَ وَمِنْ رُؤْيُ رُؤْيَاكَ
 ١٣- نُؤَيَّرُ، إِنْ قَلَبْتَ فَاذْ عَيْشِي أَفْرَاكَ أَهْرَاكَ
 ١٤- وَعَيْشِيكَ الْمُتَبَيَّنَا كَ أَنِّي بِحَقِّ قَتْلَاكَ

- 1) Maybe, my beloved,
For the grace of your Jesus' truth,
You may want to ease this pain in my heart!
- 2) Beauty has given you the gift of bringing me life or death,
- 3) And it has made me passionately worship the crosses of the ascetics;
- 4) Never had I gone to the churches for the sake of these crosses, were it not for you!
- 5) Here I am, because of you, submitting myself to such an ordeal,
With no joyful solution to the torments that you inflict on me.
- 6) I cannot relieve myself falling into oblivion,
For your remembrance retains me into the webs of your love.
- 7) How many tears I have cried,
But you had no mercy for this sufferer!
- 8) Do you know what have your eyes decreed against mine?
- 9) Do you know how the subtle light that emanates from your face
Sets fire into my heart?
- 10) You have hidden your light from my eyes,
While it shines above the sun itself.
- 11) I see the forms of your back in the sandy dunes, in the branches of the trees,
- 12) I see your knees in the contours of an infant's bed,
I feel your scent amongst the perfumes of the flowers.
- 13) Nuwayra, no matter how much you refuse me, I love you, I love you
Bear your eyes witness
- 14) That I shall be counted among the number of your victims.

Fig. 1: Al-Haddad's original poem and translation.

In the discursive level, there is the opposition between the condition of the poet as an *infidel Muslim* and his beloved one as a *faithful Christian*. The *grace* of her *presence* is the only possible healing for the *pain* of her *absence*, and seeing her an inevitable condition, since not doing so in the denotative meaning implies to be condemned to do so in the connotative meaning by *daydreaming of her*. He presents himself as a victim of his *beloved* one – a *light* that sets him on *fire*, a *shine* whose absence throws him into an anguishing *darkness*. It is useless to try to forget her, for he obsessively remembers her, her beauty imposing itself on him and anything else with the force of a divine *decree* that subdues him, while he desperately *appeals* for her mercy to be loved in return. In his *passion*, he experiences simultaneously the *life* that emanates from her and the *death* that her absence means to him. Thereby, the organization of themes, figures and the shifts of time, space and actors result in the following table:

<i>Discursive Level</i>			
	THEMES	faithful Christian	infidel Muslim
		grace	pain
		seeing you	daydreaming of you
		presence	absence
	FIGURES	shine	darkness
		beloved	victim
		appeal	decree
		light	fire
		remembrance	oblivion
		your face	my tears
	COMPLEXITY	worshipping	
		seeing you	
		(denotatiion)	(connotation)
	ACTANTIAL	you	not-you (dunes, trees, flowers etc)
		Nuwayra	I
	ANTITHESES	oblivion	remembrance
		shine	darkness
		life	death
		passion	
	SPATIAL	church	here
	TEMPORAL	maybe	present

Table 1: Analysis of the discursive level of Al-Haddad's poem.

In the narrative level, the main opposition is between the *realization* of the subject when in conjunction with the object of his love and his *virtualization* when he is in disjunction with her. Thus, her *empathic light* appears related to states of soul such as *love*, *grace* and *mercy*, whereas the abject *fire* that burns him in her *antipathetic* absence is marked by *rejection*, *pain* and his *obsession* for her, thereby allowing the following schematization:

<i>Narrative Level</i>			
	DESCRIPTIVE V.	light	fire
	MODAL V.	realization	virtualization
	PATHEMIC V.	love	rejection
		grace	pain
		mercy	obsession
	PATHEMIC P.	empathy	antipathy

Table 2: Analysis of the narrative level of Al-Haddad's poem.

Finally, as far as the fundamental level is concerned, it is important to note that the classical opposition between *life* and *death* is transcended by what appears in the text as a complex term:

passion. Simultaneously a token of life and death, of euphoria and dysphoria, an attraction to which he in vain tries to resist in order to remain a pious Muslim, the intensity and acceleration that takes the poet towards the infinite extensivity of atemporality, in his passion he finds both the poison and the cure of his divided soul. The organization of that level can be summarized by the following table:

<i>Fundamental Level</i>		Complex Term: PASSION	
CATEGORIES	LIFE	DEATH	
PHORY	euphoric	dysphoric	
VALENCE	attraction	repulsion	
TENSIVITY	extension	intension	
CELERITY	retardation	acceleration	

Table 3: Analysis of the fundamental level of Al-Haddad’s poem.

Simple as it may seem, the usage of *passion* as a complex term between *life* and *death* should by no means be overlooked. After all, the fact that the fundamental category of *life* is convoked in the discursive level to an isotopy of figures and themes related to the imagery of Christendom whereas its counterpart *death* will correspond to the imagery of Islam implies that *passion* transcends such a dichotomy, suggesting a semiosphere whose diversity is stable enough to deal with such dualisms without falling into the kind of polarization that is characteristic of Lotman’s binary systems. Hence, the poem seems to express the values of a ternary system where otherness can be presented as a positive value – a feature to be expected in mature and tolerant societies as, in relative terms, the First Taifas era is displayed in most of its contemporaries’ eyes.

An interesting approach to analyze this phenomenon can be found in Eero Tarasti’s Existential Semiotics. According to Tarasti’s model (Tarasti, 2012), the poet’s corporality (*Moi 1*), here aroused by his passion for the Christian nun, will become a key ingredient to the restructuring of his sense of identity (*Moi 2*) – in the present case, triggering a crisis in his self-perception as a Muslim. That crisis puts him in conflict with his previous conceptions of standard social norms (*Soi 1*), pushing him to redefine them in new abstract rules (*Soi 2*) whose *revolutionary* character becomes particularly evident, for the *transcendence* associated in the text with the poet’s love suggests a social and cultural order where religious barriers have significantly decreased in importance.




Fig. 2: Existential semiotics approach to Al-Haddad’s poem

Thus, the disruptive character of the poet's passion for the nun can be read as an *explosion* in Lotmanian terms, taking place here in what the Russian semiotician defined as a ternary structure, for it appears in the semiosphere as a gradual transition to change rather than a radical opening of a horizon of possibilities. In Lotman's words: "explosion in this case is not characterized by a general catastrophe, for in its inner structure there is a constructive force that cleans the *Augias' stalls* and opens a path towards a new phase" (apud Gherlone, 2014:65). According to Laura Gherlone, "Lotman calls this dynamics a 'revolution,' differentiating it from what takes place in binary structures, defined as 'turbid' – a situation where transformation is experienced as something confuse, turbulent, irrational" (idem). The gradual transition of the Iberian semiosphere from a ternary to a binary system will be further discussed in the analyses of the following examples.

3. Al-Rundi

In their famous article "Abu 'l-Baqa al-Rundi and his elegy on Muslim Spain", Ebied and Young attribute to Miguel Casiri the alleged dates for Al-Rundi birth and death (Ebied & Young, 1976:29). Indeed, Casiri, in his classical *Bibliotheca arabico-hispana escurialensis* published in 1770, states that a poet from Ronda who was the author of *De Temporum Cognitione* and *De Haereditate* would have been born in 1204 and died in 1285 (Casiri, 1969:379). Nonetheless, no matter how defensible it would be to identify *De Temporum Cognitione* with a metric treatise attributed to Al-Rundi, the main problem is that Casiri is referring to an author whose name appears in the original in Latin as Ben Shariph Alzabdi – and if the supposition that Ben Shariph and Ibn Sharif can be a same person is more than acceptable, the fact that Alzabdi has no resemblance to anyone of the names associated to Al-Rundi is at least problematic, not to say rather compromising as far as the verisimilitude of that hypothesis is concerned. Anyway, Al-Rundi is the author of a magnificent poem: a lament enumerating the sequential fall of a series of Andalusian cities to the Christian kings in a *nuniyya* – a classical form of monorhyme poetry with verses ending in *nu*, culturally perceived in the Arabic semiosphere as an onomatopoeia of crying. The author organizes the melancholic parade of defeated cities in chronologic order with Cordoba as the only exception, for in spite of being the first to fall, it is the penultimate city in the poem – a poetic license justifiable by its status as the former capital of the Caliphate and the importance of its fall to the twilight of the Muslim civilization in the Iberian Peninsula.

Besides an analysis of the plane of content, it is important here to consider once more the structural role of alliterations and their homologations to categories of content as a vital stylistic resource to provide effects of meaning and to enrich the poetic text with varied rhetoric figures. If this procedure was already observed in the first line of the previous example, its systematic usage in Al-Rundi's *رِثَاةُ أَلْأَنْدَلُسِ* – *Rithâ'u Al-Ândalus*, or *Lament for Spain* – calls our attention to its outstanding significance in the Andalusian poetry of its time and also to the everlasting influence it would exert in the Iberian literature, far outliving the tragically effective attempts that took place especially between the late 15th and early 17th centuries in order to erase the cultural legacy associated to the Muslim and Jewish heritage that had flourished in the peninsula during the Middle Ages.

Let us consider the first verse of the original poem (El Gharbi, 2009) and also the brilliant translation provided by James T. Monroe – a reference that we will follow in our comments to all the subsequent verses (Monroe, 1974 pp. 332–334):

(1) لِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ إِذَا مَا تَمَّ نَقْصَانُ فَلَا يُغْرُ بِطَيْبِ الْغَيْشِ إِنْسَانُ
 Everything declines after reaching perfection
 Therefore let no man be beguiled by the sweetness of a pleasant life.

Fig. 3: Al-Rundi's poem, verse 1.

The poem is written in the meter *basî*, most of the text having each hemistich following the rhythmical pattern:

| u - u - | u u - | - - u - | uu - ||

Both the first and the second hemistichs of the first verse end up sharing words in the same metrical position that present a sequence of phonemes consisting, in this order, of a palatal consonant [n], a sibilants [s/S] and a long vocal [a]. Were such an effect limited to an isolated case of assonance, it would be nothing more than a figure of expression that would enrich the sonority of the text. Nonetheless, there are two very important points to be considered. The first one is that such effects appear so frequently not only in this poem in particular but also in Medieval Andalusian poetry in general that it might be considered as a stylistic coercion valid for a whole set of genres of that period. Not less important, the second point is that the assonances here, constructing homologies with categories of content, establish semi-symbolic relations that, pervading both the planes of expression and content, enrich the poetic text not only in terms of plastic beauty but also in signification. Thus, the sound association between the trisyllabic words 'nuqSânu', with its sense of loss and decay, and 'insânu', the human being, produces a semantic contagion of the first term 'decay' to the second, 'humanity', by means of their shared sonority. Thereby, besides the enunciate itself, the rhythmicity in the plane of expression and its homologation with the semantic trace of 'decay' will also reinforce the idea of the fragility of the human existence in this world.

An even more eloquent example of semantic contributions of figures of expression to the process of generation of meaning in the syncretic text appear in the 2nd hemistich of verse 2:

(2) هِيَ الْأُمُورُ كَمَا شَاهَدْتَهَا نَوَالٍ مَنْ سَرَّهُ زَمَنْ سَاءَتْهُ أَرْمَانُ
 As you have observed, these are the decrees that are inconstant:
 He whom a single moment has made happy, has been harmed by many other moments;

Fig. 4: Al-Rundi's poem, verse 2.

The most exquisite poetic resources here are a consequence of the metrical structure of the verse. The terms *نَمَزَ* [zamanun] and *نَامَزَا* [âzmânu], derived from a same root and related in form and meaning, are both located in the ending of a pair of feet: zamanun – the moment of joy – follows a |u u –| rhythm, whereas the time of suffering, âzmânu, is composed of only long syllables: – | – –||. The consequent effects of meaning are a progressive *gradation* from a brief state of joy to a long period of suffering, a *pleonasm* and an *hyperbole* that emphasize the dysphoric character of the comparison lending more weight and duration to the sad rather than the happy moments of life. This effect is also reinforced by the phonetic and rhythmic parallelism between *sârahu zamanûn* and *sâcathu âzmânu*, where once more the second pair of words begins with two long syllables whereas the first has a long and a short one.

An example of alliteration appears on verse 5:

(5) وَيَنْتَضِي كُلُّ سَيْفٍ لِلْفَنَاءِ وَلَوْ كَانَ ابْنُ ذِي يَزَانَ وَالْعِمْدُ غُمْدَانُ
 It unsheaths each sword only to destroy it
 Even if it be an Ibn Dhi Yazan and the scabbard Ghumdan

Fig. 5: Al-Rundi's poem, verse 5.

In the first hemistich, *فِي سَائِفِ* [saifi alfanâci] – “the sword to destruction” –, in which the letter “f” is associated to the semantic trace of cutting, presents a *metonym* and/or *onomatopoeia* representing the sound of the blade quickly moving in the air. Besides, “Saif” is here a *double entendre* homonymic *paronomasia*, for it designates also to the first name of Ibn Dhi Yazan, the pre-islamic king of Yemen who became legendary for his power, wealth, faith and bravery and who is quoted in the second hemistich, thus allowing also an interpretation such as “it (fate) disarms all the Saifs (as emblematic heroes) leading them to destruction”. In the following hemistich, some of the main rhetorical tools corresponding to figures of expression exposed so far are reutilized, confirming their structural role in the poem. Thus, *وَأَنْزَلَ أَوْ نَادَمُغ* [wa al-ghimda ghumdânu] has in “ghimda ghumdânu” a *paronomasia* where the three first written letters are identical; a metrical progression from “ghimda” (– u) to “ghumdânu” (–| – –) indicates a dysphoric prolongation analogous to the one described in verse 2, consolidating it as a semi-symbolic relation in the text. The word “ghimd”, that means “scabbard”, is therefore related by form and meaning to Ghumdan, which is the name of the famous and gorgeous palace from where Ibn Yazan ruled Yemen. So, in each hemistich of the 5th verse, a *double entendre* relation worked as an isotopic connector between a connotation alluding to the imagery of Ibn Yazan's saga – as an example of the prevalence of fate and the ephemerality of glory –, and a denotation associated with the weapons men stubbornly and hopelessly use to fight for their purposes.

The alliteration of fricatives with the connotation of destruction pervades the poem, as in the aspirated “هـ” and “ح” (roughly corresponding to laryngeal and palatal aspirated fricatives) in verse 3:

(3) وَهَذِهِ الدَّارُ لَا تُبْقِي عَلَى أَحَدٍ وَلَا يَدُومُ عَلَى خَالٍ لَهَا شَانُ
 And this is the abode that will show pity for no man,
 Nor will any condition remain in its state for it.

Fig. 6: Al-Rundi's poem, verse 3.

Another important resource in the poem, parallelism (in Al-Rundi's text, particularly the anaphora) marks in that verse the syntagmatic and phonetic constructions *lâ tubqî alâ âhadîn* and *lâ yadûmu alâ Hâlin*, reinforcing the hopelessness of human condition – a semantic trace that will be extended in the *Ubi sunt?* sequence in verses 6 to 9, and that possesses in the Arabic term “Ain” [Where] that starts each one of its sentences the suggestive sonority of a lamentation.

As an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the figures of expression and semi-symbolic relations in the 42 verses of Al-Rundi's poem lies beyond the objectives of the present article, let us advance now to a more general discussion about the generative path in his *Lament for Spain*:

Plane of Content				
<i>Fundamental Level</i>				
CATEGORIES	CULTURE (Islam)	NATURE (Fate)		
THYMIC	<i>euphoric</i>	<i>dysphoric</i>		
VALENCE	<i>attraction</i>	<i>repulsion</i>		
TENSIVITY	<i>intension</i>	<i>extension</i>		
CELERITY	<i>acceleration</i>	<i>retardation</i>		
<i>Narrative Level</i>				
DESCRIPTIVE V.	<i>Islam</i>	<i>Unbelief</i>		
MANIPULATION	PROVOCATION			
MODAL CONFIG.	<i>not-to-want-to</i>	<i>to-make-to-want-to</i>		
MODAL V.	<i>aboulia</i>	<i>boulia</i>		
PATHEMIC V.	<i>pride</i>	<i>humiliation</i>		
	<i>joy</i>	<i>pain</i>		
PATHEMIC P.	<i>empathy</i>	<i>apathy</i>		
<i>Discursive Level</i>				
THEMES	<i>Perfection</i>	<i>decline</i>		
	<i>power</i>	<i>fate</i>		
	<i>(carelessness)</i>	<i>fatalism</i>		
	<i>islam</i>	<i>unbelief</i>		
FIGURES	<i>Easy</i>	<i>hard</i>		
	<i>Solomon</i>	<i>Darius</i>		
	<i>Happy</i>	<i>harmed</i>		
	<i>weep (sensitivity)</i>	<i>No pity (insensitivity)</i>		
	<i>Power</i>	FATE		
	<i>Richness</i>			
	<i>Consolation</i>			<i>accidents</i>
	<i>Pleasures</i>			<i>pain</i>
	<i>Sweet river</i>			<i>beyond the sea</i>
	<i>Mihrabs</i>			<i>Bells</i>
	<i>minbars</i>			<i>crosses</i>
	<i>Kings</i>			<i>slaves</i>
	<i>Jewels</i>			<i>clothes of shame</i>
ACTANTIAL	<i>Brethren</i>			<i>Evil eye</i>
	<i>You beyond the sea</i>	<i>people of Al-Andalus</i>		
	<i>kings</i>	<i>slaves</i>		
SPATIAL	<i>Mosques</i>	<i>churches</i>		
	<i>their own homes</i>	<i>in the land of the infidel</i>		
TEMPORAL	<i>Perfection</i>	<i>An event that cannot be endured</i>		
	<i>yesterday</i>	<i>today</i>		
<i>Plane of Expression</i>				
METRICS	<i>brief</i>	<i>long</i>		
PARONOMASIAS	<i>denotation</i>	<i>connotation</i>		
ALLITERATIONS	<i>occlusives (power)</i>	<i>fricatives (decay)</i>		

Table 4: Al-Rundi's poem: generative path.

The thematic opposition between an implacable divine *fate* and the illusions of *power* men have nurtured throughout history convoke to the discursive level the main fundamental dichotomy *nature x culture*. The isotopies related to the *careless* and self-confident *Muslim* who believed to have mastered the world to *perfection* give place to the *fatalist* observer that can do nothing but witness the victory of the *infidels* over a *decaying* Islamic empire. Thus, the figures of a *happy, easy* and *pleasant* life ruled with wisdom by people like the king *Solomon* are replaced by a *harmful* existence full of *hardness* and *pain*, where the tragic fall of once powerful and ambitious tyrants like *Dario, Chosroes* or *Shaddad* are copiously enumerated. Bells ring where once there were *mirhabs*; *crosses* are raised over the ruins of the old *minibars*; *kings* are converted to *slaves*, and instead of their *jewels*, they are now covered with the *clothes of shame*. A temporal shifting out establishes the contraposition of a glorious past to a miserable present, whereas its spatial counterpart opposes mosques to churches, and the homes of the faithful to the wasted land of the infidel and the actantial shifting out establishes *brethren* of *kings* whose members are addressed as “*You, beyond the see*” as the enunciatees of a discourse that depicts enuncively the *people of Al-Andalus* converted into *slaves* under the severe judging eye of an unappealable fate. The narrative level is marked by a complex program of *provocation* in which the addressee is confronted with the humiliation and defeat of Iberian Islam and challenged in his apathy to remain indifferent to violence and injustice or to take arms in succour to his brethren against the

barbarism of the invading infidels. So, the addresser performs a manipulation by provocation imposing a modal configuration of *to-make-to-want-to* on an initially aboulic – *not-to-want-to* –, proud and hedonistic addressee. The manipulation, managing as a provocation the negative values of the system, converts the thymic category of dysphoria and the repulsion valence, as the positive values associated to pleasure, pride and power correspond to the conversion of the category of euphoria and the attraction valence. Less evident and more complex are the tensive and celerity configurations that organize the fundamental level, by which the extensiveness of the sempiternal and irrevocable decrees of fate belong to the *Nature* semantic axis whereas the vertiginous acceleration of the fall of Islamic Iberia and the intensiveness of its joy and suffering follow the *Culture* axis.

Finally, the main *femes* that organize the categories of expression in their homologies with the categories of content will equally correspond to the oppositions that organize the fundamental level. Hence, *extensiveness* and *dysphoria* will often appear associated with the metric *prolongations* previously described in this item, and the alliterations can be organized opposing the extensiveness of the *fricatives* associated with connotations of *destruction* and *decay* with the *intensiveness* of the *occlusives* that reinforce the imagery of power and pride. Finally, a far more sophisticated resource appears ruling the frequent usage of the *paronomasias* in the poem, opposing their *denotative* attributes related to the imagery of *culture* and human pride to their *connotative* qualities associated to a fatalist point of view deeply rooted in the Islamic conception of the philosophical *nature* of the universe. The Andalusian philosopher and polymath Averroes (1126–1198) – a giant who left an indelible mark in the history of philosophy and whose legacy, rejected in most of the Islamic world in the first centuries after his death, is essentially inseparable from the ascension of rationalism in Western civilization – writes in his *On the harmony of religions and philosophy* that a metaphorical approach to the interpretation of the scriptures and the creation (by means of science and reflection) is a privilege of those whose destiny is a further comprehension of reality, whereas a more literal interpretation is proper to those deprived of deeper intellectual ambitions (Averroes, 2012). Hence, Averroes states that those able to this *connotative* approach would be closer to the *nature* of *truth* – a point of view popular enough in the Al-Andalus civilization of Al-Rundi's time to contaminate his poem and organize in a systemic way his rich and abundant usage of *paronomasias* in his *Lament for Spain*.

4. Final considerations

The gradual change in the cultural representations of otherness from the idyllic and passionate admiration for the Christian nun in Al-Haddad's poem to the somewhat distant and impersonal antagonism with respect to the figure of the infidel depicted in Al-Rundi's *Lament for Spain* – more the cold executor of Allah's will than an enemy to be hated – continues its evolution throughout the centuries until reaching in the early 16th century to the kind of polarization described by Lotman in his definition of a binary system. The *Reconquista* led not only to the territorial conquest of the Iberian Peninsula by the Spanish and Portuguese Christian kingdoms: between 1492 and 1614, virtually all the Jews and Muslims of the Peninsula were forced either to conversion or to exile and tenths of thousands of books written in Arabic and/or Hebrew were burned (Amelang, 2011) in a general effort to annihilate any traces of what had for almost eight hundred years been the most advanced civilization in Europe and the Western hemisphere (Vernet, 2006). Unsurprisingly, the cultural representations of otherness in both the Iberian and the Muslim world would be deeply affected by this fierce antagonism, as can be seen in this excerpt of Portuguese writer Luiz de Camões's *opus magnus*, the gorgeous poem *Os Lusíadas* [The Lusitanians]:

<i>A - Ao Mouro, ser molesto e avorrecido,</i>	<i>The Moor, that evil and sad creature,</i>
<i>B - No pensamento cuida um falso engano,</i>	<i>Had in mind a treachery</i>
<i>A - Com que seja de todo destruído;</i>	<i>That with its lies intended to ruin everything;</i>
<i>C - E, enquanto isto só na alma imaginava,</i>	<i>And while those thoughts were in his soul,</i>
<i>C - Consigo estas palavras praticava:</i>	<i>He somehow practiced them already with his words:</i>
<i>D - «Está do Fado já determinado</i>	<i>“Fate has already determined</i>
<i>E - Que tamanhas vitórias, tão famosas,</i>	<i>That the Portuguese reach fame</i>
<i>D - Hajam os Portugueses alcançado</i>	<i>and tremendous victories</i>
<i>E - Das Indianas gentes belicosas;</i>	<i>Against the brave Indian warriors;</i>
<i>D - E eu só, filho do Padre sublimado,</i>	<i>And meanwhile, I, the son of a sublime Father,</i>
<i>E - Com tantas qualidades generosas,</i>	<i>With my so many qualities,</i>
<i>F - Hei-de sofrer que o Fado favoreça</i>	<i>Will I suffer that Fate favours</i>
<i>F - Outrem, por quem meu nome se escureça?</i>	<i>Somebody else and thus see my name die in the shades of oblivion?</i>

(Camões, 2014:14)

Fig. 7: Excerpt of the first chant of Camões's Os lusíadas.

A detailed analysis of the poem similar to the previous discussions in this article reveals a series of alliterations that, as in the former examples, establish important homologies with the opposing semantic axes that pervade the text from the fundamental to the discursive level – and, as seen before, respond also at least partially to the organization of the figures of expression. An analysis of the generative path and symbolic relations in the text is summarized in the following table:

Plane of Content			
<i>Fundamental Level</i>			
	CATEGORIES	NATURE	CULTURE
		non-euphoric	non-dysphoric
	VALENCE	attraction	repulsion
	TENSIVITY	extension	intension
	CELERITY	retardation	acceleration
<i>Narrative Level</i>			
	DESCRIPTIVE V.	fame	oblivion
	MODAL V.	virtualization	realization
	PATHEMIC V.	[glorious]	sad
		brave	evil
		victories	treachery
		favours	suffer
	PATHEMIC P.	empathy	antipathy
<i>Discursive Level</i>			
	THEMES	victories	treachery
		fame	oblivion
		Fate [glory]	ruin
		presence	absence
	FIGURES	Portuguese	Moor
		[truth]	lies
		[Christian God]	Sublime Father
		[light]	shades
	ACTANTIAL	somebody else	I, the son
		Portuguese	Moor
		Brave Indian Warriors	
Plane of Expression			
SEMI-SYMBOLISM			
	ALLITERATIONS	dental consonants	labial consonants
		/d/; /t/;	/m/; /v/
	CONNOTATION	aggressiveness	perfidy
	ALLITERATIONS	open vocals	closed vocals
		/á/;	/o/; /e/;
	CONNOTATION	victories - authority	treachery
	ALLITERATIONS	bilabial occlusive consonant	sibilant consonants
		/p/	/s/
	CONNOTATION	victories - explosion, revelation	treachery

Table 5: Camões's poem: generative path.

Here, the demonization of the moor, presented as an abject character that subsumes the negative values of the system, will paradoxically mobilize most of the poetic resources we have examined so far. The structural utilization of rhyme – unknown in Western tradition until its popularization in Muslim Spain as part of the Arabian cultural heritage since the 8th century –, an accentual configuration close and stable enough to allow an approximation with a metric structure like |u – |u – |u – |u u u | – – || (3 imbs, 1 tribrach and 1 spondee) pervading the whole poem and the systematic usage of semantized alliterations reveal that this Portuguese text, no matter its explicit islamophobia, paradoxically – and rather schizophrenically – honors the heritage of the many centuries in which the Arabian language and its literary genders dictated the patterns of poetical excellence in the Peninsula. The sibilant consonants and closed vowels, like a serpent hidden in the shadows, represent the perfidious Moor in opposition to the explosive consonants and open vowels that depict the openness, bravery and frankness – by the way, a virtue culturally associated in the West to the Germanic Franks, champions of Christendom – of the Portuguese heroes. Brazilian cultivated and popular literary genders – the last still widely practiced today – would emulate for centuries both the polarization and the formal procedures of the poem above. With a massive presence of New-Christians (descendants of former Jewish and Muslim families) among its first colonizers and too far from the metropolis to be reached by the persecutory arms of Inquisition, Brazil, as other nations of the New World, has preserved some traces of the Al-Andalus legacy in its national ethos and cultural forms of expression. The receptivity to ethnic and cultural diversity and the immediate assimilation of foreigners in a mixed society that was defined by scholars like Gilberto Freyre and Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda as a friendly “melting pot” would according to these authors be part of the Al-Andalus heritage inherited by the Brazilian civilization (Freyre, 1971, 1992; Buarque, 1995) – as the binary elimination, by persecution and/or oblivion, of most of the huge non-Christian legacy that was deeply rooted not only in its Native American and African populations but also in its Iberian colonizers would reflect the proud 16th century obscurantism that would in a few centuries take Portugal and Spain from the position of the most powerful transoceanic empires of their time to the condition of peripheral actors in the geopolitical scene.

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CULTURE OF DIGITAL NOMADS: ONTOLOGICAL, ANTHROPOLOGICAL, AND SEMIOTIC ASPECTS

Irina Kuzheleva-Sagan
Tomsk State University, Russia
ipsagan@mail.ru

Snezhana Nosova
Tomsk State University, Russia
sagan99@mail.ru

Abstract

“Digital nomads” (DN) is a metaphor, which used to be nothing but a neologism some time ago (Makimoto, Manners, 1997). But it presented the essence of the phenomenon so fairly that over the next few years became very popular in journalism. Moreover, it turned into the commonly used scientific term in the interdisciplinary discourse among social philosophers, social scientists, media theoreticians, economists, and architects.

Digital nomads are people who, in the processes of their professional activities (or studying, creating art, free time), are not confined to particular spots through using Internet technologies and mobile connection. Therefore, the phenomenon of DN belongs solely to the network information-communication society. It appeared in the context of two inter-dependent global trends: mobility and digitalization.

The number of DN increases. At first they were the inhabitants of “wireless” megapolises. Today, due to the development of satellite communication, they can be seen in countryside, cold and regular deserts, etcetera. In order to become a digital nomad, it is not necessary to be a dedicated traveler or to move from one place to another in a common, physical sense. The major point is to be always “plugged” to the Net through some sorts of gadgets. This “plugging” is the key factor which determines a digital nomad.

The culture of DN is constantly evolving and turning into the “universal” culture of the network society. In some sense, it covers various traditional cultures and subcultures and absorbs

them (assimilates). In this regard, people are starting facing different issues. The one that should really draw our attention is that the practical aspects of digital nomadism anticipate developing its theoretical grounds. Studying “digital nomadism” today is, in most cases, fixating and describing specific life situations (cases) and discussing them in blogs.

There are many questions that have not been answered yet. For instance:

- What is the ontology (form of existence and world view) of digital nomadism, which determines its culture and social practices?
- What are the anthropological changes people must go through in order to become true DN?
- What are the specific characters of digital nomadism culture as of combination of sign systems, characterized by certain processes, codes, and media?
- What determines identity and limits of this culture?
- What artifacts and “mentifacts” (Posner, 2004) constitute it?
- What are the relations between network society, civilization, and DN’ mentality on one hand and sign systems on the other?

The authors of the given paper try to find answers to these questions base their arguments on specifically developed methodological complex. It is based on the ideas from postmodern philosophy (G. Deleuze and F. Guattari) (“rhizome”, “nomadism”); theory of information network society (M. Castels); theory of “extended sensory organs” (M. McLuhan); cultural and semiotic approach (E. Cassirer, J. Lotman, R. Posner); theory of mobility (J. Urri); concept of “digital nomadism” (T. Makimoto, D. Manners) and some others. Beyond that, the authors are applying the method of “parallel metaphorization”. It is basically a search for names of artifacts and “mentifacts” in the socio-cultural system of traditional nomads which can be used as metaphors for determining corresponding artifacts and “mentifacts” in the culture of digital nomads.

1. Introduction

In the 1970s of the last century the term “nomad” (from Latin – “nomas” – shepherd) became a key one in *nomadology*, which is a metaphoric post-modernist concept of “new tribalism” by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari (1986). The concept was the result of their philosophical reflection on the eternal opposition between state power and individual freedom. Searching for something that could stand up to such power Deleuze and Guattari came up with the idea of nomads. Nomads appeared to be the power, which had been capable of destroying the strongest empires.

Aspects of new nomadism represented by J. Attali (1991) were not as much philosophical as they were social and political, economic, and partly anthropological. He argued that the beginning of new millennium was marked by establishing a *digital-nomad* form of hyper-industrial society. Attali represents the concept of “nomad goods” – affordable, compact, and functional devices and gadgets irreplaceable for super-mobile members of global techno-centrist society.

T. Makimoto’s and D. Manners’s “anarchic” book (1997) renewed interest in the nomad theme in late 1990s. The authors pointed out that digital nomads are people who, in the process of their professional activities (or studying, art, free time), are not confined to particular spots due to access to the Internet and mobile communication. “Digital Nomads” as a metaphor became popular. Moreover, it became a scientific term for interdisciplinary discourse among sociologists (Urri 2000), social psychologists (Rosseel 2000), linguists (Baron 2001), economists, media theoreticians, and architects (Kakihara and Sorensen 2001, Mitchell 2004).

IT-corporations promoted and romanticized the image of digital nomads. In reality, digital nomads are often perceived as freaks and geeks. But nowadays, thanks to the development of satellite communications, one can meet them in villages, deserts, and rain forests. Therefore, the

phenomenon of digital nomadism belongs solely to *the network information-communication society* (Castells 1996). Nevertheless, digital nomadism, as the idea and the new socio-cultural practice, was still comparatively infrequent object of scientific discourses and critics. The major problem is the following: cultural practice of digital nomads goes far ahead of establishing its philosophical and theoretical foundations that would allow predicting the consequences of its evolution and globalization for the humanity.

Many issues, concerning this new cultural practice, require permanent professional philosophical and scientific attention. First of all, we mean the questions of *ontological, anthropological, and semiotic character*. For instance: the ontology of digital nomadism; anthropological changes, which accompany its development; specifics of digital nomadic culture as of combination of sign systems; something that determines identity and limits of this culture; artifacts and “mentifacts” (Posner 2004), which constitute it. Our objective is to find general answers to these questions, applying specifically selected methodology.

2. Methodology

Methodology of our research is based on specifically selected philosophical and scientific concepts and theories. They fulfill each other and allow shaping the most ultimate conception of the object in question – the culture of digital nomads. Apart from the very concepts of “digital nomadism” proposed by T. Makimoto and D. Manners (1997), J. Meyrowitz (2003), W.J. Mitchell (2004) and of “digital goods” proposed by J. Attali (1991), the grounds of this complex consist of: post-modern philosophy and theory of post-structuralism (G. Deleuze and F. Guattari 1987, M. Foucault 2001); concept of “symbolic capital” (J. Baudrillard 1981); theory of “extended senses” by means of media (M. McLuhan 1994); theory of information network society by M. Castells (1996); concept of hierarchic network society (A. Bard and J. Soderqvist 2002); theory of “virtual reality” and “virtual class” (M. Heim 1997, U. Eco 1986); theories of mobility (J. Urri 2000) and “liquid modernity” (Z. Bauman 2000); anthropological approach (B. Anderson 1991); social and psychological approach (E. Rosseel 2000); cultural and semiotic approach (E. Cassirer 2002, J. Lotman 2002, R. Posner 2004); concepts of “digitalization” and “digital culture” (C. Gere 2002, S. Dixon 2007); and several other theories and concepts.

3. Ontological aspect

Digital nomadism is entirely the phenomenon of the modern network information-communication society. Therefore, we will consider the ontology of this society. There are at least two positions to define its specifics.

3.1. Utopian position

The very name of the network information-communication society represents its basic characteristics and trends: networking nature, informatization, domination of communication processes over all other processes, globalization, technologization, digitalization, and computerization. All those trends are interdependent. However, many philosophers and scientists believe that general technologization is the original cause of all other factors and consequences (D. Bell 1973, Z. Brzeziński 1970, J. K. Galbraith 2007, M. McLuhan 1994, M. Castells 1996, J. Naisbitt 1982, etc.).

The first opinions on this new society were formulated long before it was actually founded. Futurologists-technocrats did not deny it would face different problems. However, they believed that humanity would be able to solve them with the help from new digital and computer technologies. “Bright future” was supposed to be based on the economy of new type (“based on knowledge”, “informational”, “super-symbolical”, “service”), end of beurocracy, and victory of

democracy. Futurologists-optimists and technocrats formulated the following key metaphors for the ontology of the environment and the place of life/work: *global village* (McLuhan 1964); *global metropolis* (Kahn and Bruse-Briggs 1972); *global city* (Sassen 2001); *electronic cottage* (Toffler 1980). Being very different, those approaches still have some things in common. They describe the most traditional – for most people – places of life and work. Places that do not conflict with the human existential nature. Such optimistic view on the information future of the humanity was dominant in social philosophy, social studies, and futurology during the last third of the XX century.

3.2. Anti-utopian position

The forthcoming global society was described differently by futurologists-”anti-utopianists”; existentialists; Frankfurt School theorists; post-structuralists and post-modernists; some present-day sociologists, economists, and researchers in the field of social communication and new media (A. Huxley 2005, G. Orwell 2003, K. Jaspers 1953, H. Marcuse 1991, J. Baudrillard 1981, M. Foucault 2001, Z. Bauman 2000, P. Virilio 2010, S. Garfinkel 2000, J. Attali 1991, A. Bard and J. Soderqvist 2002, W.J. Mitchell 2004, etc.). The artistic, philosophical, and scientific concepts they represented were different. But they all had one thing in common: the lack of any “rosy expectations” in the “portraits” of the post-industrial stage of human development. They understood the ambivalent nature of technologies, which are capable of spinning out of human control and managing people, both straightly and secretly. They were under no illusion about transparency and non-hierarchical nature of the network society.

Most of the authors mentioned above realized the dominant types of capital in the network society. Those are information, symbolic, and reputation types of capital, not knowledge one, as it had been stated before. Computer technologies are capable of finding, organizing, and keeping data. They are not capable of producing knowledge. Knowledge is a product of human consciousness. Therefore, the society becomes “information”, not “knowledge-based” one. The ontology of the forthcoming society is defined here as *information-communicative, self-organizing, based on the principles of chaos and order*; and as an *organized simulacrum space*. “Space hybridity” describes the lack of distinct line between virtuality and reality and is one of the most important characteristics of the network society. It is determined by the terms *virtual reality, real virtuality, and augmented reality*. Its structure is characterized as *hierarchic networking, risomatic, neural, fractal, matrix, and fluid*. Anti-utopianists observe the effect of time and space compression and actualize the parameters of speed and mobility. The latter implies not only physical moving of people the real world, but also their “moving” in the virtual space (Urri 2000).

This society has a super-complex character because of its ontology and structure. It also faces various unresolved problems such as the lack of any distinctive line between real and virtual, information wars, hacking, total digital control and manipulation of collective and individual consciousness; digital terrorism; universal access to pornography; “digital inequality”, and some other. All that led to certain metaphoric definitions for this kind of society: super-complex/super-mobile society, society of risk, society of total control, virtual society, viral society, society of digital natives and digital immigrants, NETocracy.

The key metaphors of the ontology of space and place of residence/work in the “anti-utopian” paradigm of the network society are: *virtual space, hyper-space, augmented reality, maze, net, matrix, social nets, information highways, digital hubs, digital copies of cities, global digital agora*. These spaces, highways, and hubs are inhabited or used by digital nomads.

4. Anthropological aspect

There are utopian and anti-utopian views on the ontology of the network information-communication society. This society is a context for digital nomadism phenomenon. These views have shaped certain ideas about anthropological changes and trends that may take or are already taking place.

4.1 Anthropological changes under the utopian paradigm

Neither of the approaches under this paradigm was antagonistically related to existential and social essence of an individual, threatened the integrity of his personality, destroyed his identity, or deprived him of the freedom. Moreover, the biggest-ever “sense organs extension” (McLuhan 1994) and qualitative brain improvement with the help of electronic computing machines (Tofler 2002) were expected. New reason for being optimistic was brought by “digital nomads” at the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s. The former term was proposed by T. Makimoto and D. Manners (1997). Wireless communication and “constant plugging” created “continuous fields of presence” and helped digital nomads to do business, to study, to play the market, to participate in auctions, to order goods, and to do other things with no regard to any particular place of residence (Mitchell 2004).

In 2008, “The Economist” published a series of papers on digital nomadism (A wireless world...: 2008 n.p.; A wireless world...: 2008 n.p.). The whole spectrum of its positive characteristics was proposed to the audience. Digital nomad is a free person, at least, from an office table. He chooses what he does as well as where he does it. Being an owner of some business, he does not need to waste money on the office rental. He and his employees have meetings with partners and clients at, so called, “third places” (Oldenburg 1989). This work style increases labor effectiveness and improves democratization. Digital nomad spends more time with his family. He outsources services when it comes to something that troubles or burdens him, including his own memory. Now he does not have to *memorize* anything, because he has special devices, such as memory sticks and hard-drives, for that.

Digital nomad can travel, work, or study, permanently exploring the world around. Technologies are so good – they are mobile, multifunctional, and portable – that one does not need to carry a lot of things. It is enough to have a laptop or a smartphone and to know where the nearest “sanctuaries” – cafes, gas stations, and sockets – are. Those are places where one can recharge, literally and figuratively. Geolocation services can help with that too. Chains of special – “nomadic” – industry offer their services and products to digital nomads. The main thing is – digital nomad is free to choose partners for communication. As a result – he becomes more relaxed, active, and creative. However, there is an opposite view on digital nomadism as an “ideal” cultural practice that leads to certain anthropological changes.

4.2. Anthropological changes under the anti-utopian paradigm

Total technologization of the society led to the following contradictions and problems of anthropological nature: existential crisis; compartmentalization and distortion of identity; simulacration of consciousness; substitution of real communication for virtual one; computer addiction; unpredictable brain changes under the influence of electronic and digital technologies; lack of ability to control information flows, and so on.

J. Attali presented one of the most anti-utopian scenarios on the anthropological changes related to the digital nomadism. He argued that a nomad has particular mission, which is to contribute to the universal heritage via self-liberation. He is committed to turning his life into a piece of art instead of to boring reproducing other self-like humans. This process of “turning life into a piece of art” may be so creative that sooner or later might lead to “nomadic madness” and

“industrial cannibalism”. In Attali’s opinion, anthropological aspect of digital nomadism goes beyond the limits of the humane sense (Attali 1991).

A. Bard and J. Soderqvist draw the picture of the modern society as of the society of digital nomads, almost “from life”: virtual return to the nomadic times, which we owe to the digital networks, is very peculiar, as the idea of a permanent home does not represent some kind of “standing point” any more, which stimulates further experiments with different life styles (Bard and Soderqvist 2002). According to D. Rushkoff, only *present* matters to the people of the digital age. All their demands must be satisfied *here and now*. There is so much information in the digital world that they simply do not have enough time to turn it into knowledge. Rushkoff points out a “narrative collapse”: the new online content does not require the art of narration from a person. Rushkoff finds very sharp metaphors to reveal the essence of the amazing anthropological phenomena of the network society. For instance, he calls a digital mailbox a “big infinite loop” that causes “digiphrenia” (digital schizophrenia) (Rushkoff 2013: 76).

Total freedom from time and space routine and opportunity of self-employment are advantages of digital nomadism. However, there is an opposite side to that too. In fact, everyone, who works for himself, has a tyrannical boss. In other words, digital nomads are permanently anxious and stressed because their labor productivity is not high enough comparing to the opportunities they have. Digital nomads often act as addicts or gamblers when they cannot get rid of their need to be connected. Special surveys show that most nomads are slaves to their habits. They take the same routes and follow the same schedules every day (Gonzales, Hidalgo and Barabasi 2008: 71).

E. Rosseel also conducted a survey. But his results showed that it is quasi-impossible to predict digital nomad’s future taking into account his present. This unpredictability concerns, at least, four aspects of the nomad’s life: 1) place of his residence; 2) professional activity; 3) marital status; and 4) his personalization and subjectivization. From the socio-psychological point of view, “nomad” means mobility in literally everything. He can easily change his attitudes, place of residence, identity; he can master new social practices and professional skills (Rosseel 2001). Thus, digital nomadism as an anthropological phenomenon raises many questions and requires further research.

5. Semiotic aspect

Cultural and semiotic approach proposed by E. Cassirer (2002), J. Lotman (2002), and R. Posner (2004) considers: i) the culture of digital nomads as a semiosphere or a set of sign systems used by digital nomads to develop and maintain their identity and relations with the world around in the network information-communication society; ii) digital nomads as a community of sign users and their civilization (artifacts and technologies) as a set of texts; and iii) digital nomads’ mental culture and mentality (ideas, values) as a set of conventional codes.

5.1. Specifics, identity, and limits of the culture of digital nomads

This question may be reformulated to the question about codes and media that are involved into sign processes initiated and interpreted by digital nomads inside their sign systems. By codes we mean “a set of signifiers, a set of signifieds, and a set of rules which determine the relation of these to each other” (Posner 2004: 59) or “systems of correlation between signifiers and signifieds” (Posner 2004: 70). In this regard, key codes of sign systems, constituting the culture of digital nomads, are semantic connections between the key metaphorical terms (signifiers) and corresponding traditions, artifacts, technologies, social institutions and spaces, rituals, etc. (signifieds). Those semantic connections must be encoded and decoded identically by all bearers of the culture of digital nomads. Such pairs of signifiers and signifieds, among others, are:

“nomadism” = real and virtual mobility; “nomadic items” = mobile devices; “desert” = the Internet; “oases” = “third places” (cafes, public libraries, Wi-Fi zones, etc.); “fires” = “virtual fires” (forums and meetings in “third places”). Originally the codes of digital nomadism were artificial (conventional) but gradually have become natural (behavioral). All these codes are connected with intellectual culture (mentality) of the global community of digital nomads. It may illustrate the following statement: “Any mentality is to be understood as a set of codes” (Posner 2004: 70).

The term “medium” which is used “to designate a constellation of factors which remains the same over a wide range of sign processes” (Posner 2004: 60). *Technological* media (computers, mobile connection devices, various electronic devices and gadgets) play a special role in organizing sign processes in the culture of digital nomads. Sometimes they are hardly distinguishable from *physical* media. Conventionally speaking, we may assign the term “physical medium” to radio waves, which are some sort of an “asset” in the network society. Major *functional* media, characterizing sign processes in accordance with objectives and formats of messages, are “blogs”, “posts”, “chats”, and “forums”. The examples of *codified* media are digital nomads’ personal or corporate blogs, their local (regional) or global Internet forums. Being *biological* media themselves, digital nomads have very well developed visual, audial, and tactile receptors. Basic social media are real social spaces (cafes and libraries provided with Wi-Fi connection, co-working zones, stores specialized in selling “nomadic” items) as well as virtual social spaces (social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn). The network society has a dual ontology – virtual reality and real virtuality. Computers and smartphones are the interfaces of two parallel worlds where they connect. Semiotic processes are at the same time the processes of socialization – or social communication – in those two worlds. Social media has a specific function. They organize all other types of media that are involved in producing signs (Posner 2004: 62). The Internet appears to be a “super-medium”. It is a semiosis – semiotic continuum, which is filled with multi-variant semiotic structures situated at a range of hierarchical levels (Lotman 2002). It is a super-system, which possesses a constellation of features that influence semiotic processes.

Mobility (real and/or virtual) and “constant plugging” to the Net constitute the core of the identity of digital nomads. Those are two basic characteristics. They form the very “subject matter” of digital nomadism and, at the same time, are the technological bases for producing all sign processes. They help identify representatives of the culture. Mobility and connectivity make the culture of digital nomads super-mobile and global. It expands both horizontally (inside the same social strata) and vertically (among strata). From the point of cultural semiotics, globalization of the culture of digital nomads is a progressing semiotization of reality segments by virtue of marking them with metaphorical signifiers that are key for the given culture.

5.2. Artifacts and “mentifacts” which constitute the culture of digital nomads

Artifacts are known to constitute the basis of material culture of the society or of its civilization. Mentifacts, along with conventions, constitute its mental culture and mentality (Posner 2004: 70). The dual ontology of the network society means duality of the onto-status of digital nomads’ civilization. It is not solely represented in reality by, for instance, various electronic devices, gadgets, and other “nomadic” items. It also exists virtually, that is in the forms of electronic (digital) artifacts – video and audio files, electronic documents, computer graphics, etc. Over a long period of time digital artifacts have been predominant over material and analog ones. That is why such term as “Digital Age” may be used to determine the modern epoch as an analogy to the terms “Iron Age” and “Bronze Age”. Mentifacts of the culture of digital nomads are ideas and values they follow in their every-day super-mobile lives. By “ideas” R. Posner means “all categories with which a society interprets itself and its reality” (Posner 2004: 70). From this point of view, they include not only digital nomads’ idea of independence from stationary workplaces,

but also such categories as “mobile home”, “oases”, “virtual fires”, and others. The same metaphorical terms represent digital nomads’ cultural codes. This illustrates the following R. Posner’s statement: “Any mentality is to be understood as a set of codes” (Posner 2004: 70).

In Lotman’s broad concept of text, “every artifact with a function and a coded message can be regarded as a text” (Posner 2004: 72). The most important artifacts that provide digital nomads with their identity are mobile devices: cell phones, laptops, USB flash drives, charging devices, modulators. From this perspective, we witness self-genesis of texts in the culture of digital nomads: texts produce other texts. Therefore the question of the culture’s identity coincides with the question of the limits of its texts with its non-texts. Those limits are determined by the following opposites: “mobile – stationary”, “connected – unconnected”, “online – offline”, “wired – wireless”, “electronic – analogue”, “multifunctional – monofunctional”, “compact – massive”, “high-speed – low-speed”, “freelanced – office”. The first term of each pair is a category that determines characteristics of artifact texts. The second term of each pair determines non-text characteristic.

However, digital nomads’ artifacts and mentifacts, among other special features, are easily incorporated by other civilizations and mental cultures, including the most ancient and viable ones. For example, Muslims use the Qibla application in their cellphones, which helps to find the direction that should be faced when praying during *salat*. Catholics use an application that sends messages from the Pope. In these cases, the artifacts belong to different very strong and viable cultures and complement each other. When it comes to less viable cultures, such as youth or corporate ones, the culture of digital nomads causes anthropological changes of “tectonic” character that we mentioned in the previous part of the paper.

Therefore, the methods of cultural semiotics may be applied for analyzing the culture of digital nomads despite its specific nature. No doubt, this part of the paper does not claim to be exhaustive on semiotic-related issues of the culture of digital nomads. It represents our first attempts to reflect on the problem.

6. Conclusion

Interdisciplinary approach to studying the problem of the culture of digital nomads from the positions of ontology, anthropology, and semiotics is the most relevant because it allows studying it more profoundly. It also helps to anticipate the consequences of its further development and globalization.

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LA NEGATIVITE COMME FONCTION CULTURELLE DANS LE DISCOURS LITTERAIRE

Somayeh Kariminejad Estahbanati
Université Tarbiat Modares, Téhéran, Iran
somaye.kariminejad@yahoo.com

Résumé

La négation est un élément sine qua non au sein du langage. Depuis longtemps cette notion était le sujet de différentes disciplines comme la philosophie, la logique et la linguistique. Mais nous voyons quand même qu'elle pourrait donner lieu à une analyse sémiotique et il nous semble que quelques-uns de ses aspects n'ont pas encore été dûment explorés. Les approches et les typologies de la négation sont nombreuses. Cette pluralité s'explique par la complexité et la diversité des négations. Notre visée, sans être exhaustive, consiste surtout à envisager, à travers le discours littéraire persan, pris comme exemple, le problème de la modulation du négatif. Notre tâche consistera plutôt à montrer comment la négativité fonctionne dans des discours littéraire persan. Nous chercherons surtout à comprendre de quelle manière la culture persane élabore la négativité ? Faut-il considérer cette dernière comme une source de tensions et de limites ou une possibilité du dépassement de soi et des choses.

Du point de vue sémiotique la négativité n'est pas un fait absolu étant donné qu'elle dépend entre autres de la culture dans laquelle elle prend existence. Afin d'éclaircir ce point de vue, nous nous concentrerons sur la littérature persane où nous avons affaire à des sujets qui existent physiquement, mais qui perdent le pouvoir de parler. Dans ce cas le sujet serait frappé du sentiment d'être nié, et il commence à vivre une sensation dysphorique qui provoque un certain nombre de manifestations passionnelles chez lui. Nous sommes ainsi en présence d'une négativité interne chez le sujet. En quoi cette manifestation varie selon l'espace du vécu propre à la culture persane?

Du fait que la négativité est réversible et s'avère relative aux discours et à ses usagers, cet essai se donne comme objectif l'examen culturel des modes de fonctionnement sémiotique de la négativité dans le discours littéraire persan.

1. Introduction

La négativité en tant qu'un élément essentiel des langues participe à la construction de la signification dans la mesure où elle peut, soit créer des discontinuités et exiger la disjonction entre le sujet et l'objet de valeur soit nier un actant ou un terme. De ce point de vue, on peut supposer que la négativité fonctionne comme un moteur de sens chez le sujet. Ainsi ce travail aura pour objectif de montrer l'émergence de la négativité chez le protagoniste d'un roman persan contemporain de Parivash Sanii, sous l'effet de la culture iranienne. Selon Lotman "toute culture vivante possède un mécanisme intégré" (1999: 10) ainsi nous cherchons à préciser de quelle manière la culture persane avec une structure spatio-temporelle spécifique élabore la négativité ? En effet, dans cet essai notre objectif est l'examen culturel des modes de fonctionnement sémiotique de la négativité dans le discours littéraire persan.

Le corpus choisi est le récit *Ma portion* qui fait sous forme de biographie d'une adolescente originaire de Qom, la chronologie des évolutions historiques et sociales durant les quinze années précédant la révolution ainsi que les vingt années qui la suivent, et cela en y attachant une attention toute particulière. Il décrit tous les méandres culturels et historiques d'une famille religieuse fanatique à travers les événements pré et postrévolutionnaires en exposant leur opportunisme, calculs, tactiques et les bénéfices et les pertes subies par les personnages nombreux de l'histoire et il met la portion suspendue en l'air d'une femme qui cherche à parcourir son itinéraire en dehors de ces corridors obscurs comme un point d'interrogation immense devant les yeux du lecteur. La question : « Qui suis-je ? »

2. La définition des termes clés : La négativité et la culture

On commence par une présentation brève des termes de la négativité et de la culture qui sont considérés comme les termes clés de notre travail.

Nous vivons tous dans un monde où nous sommes sans cesse confrontés au jeu entre la négativité et son pôle opposé c'est-à-dire la positivité. On peut prendre en compte cette notion de différents points de vue. Par exemple "le sens narratif (la négation narrativisée dans le manque et dans le conflit), le sens passionnel (celui du rejet, de la répulsion, du dégoût ou de l'aversion...), le sens cognitif (qui s'exprime dans l'ignorance, le « nul n'est censé ignorer la loi »), le sens météorologique (le trou, la lacune, le vide, l'absence)." Bertrand (2010 :1) Ainsi, en parlant de la négativité il précise que "ce terme s'étend comme une isotopie sous-jacente à l'univers des discours." (2010 : 2) Il importe de souligner un point essentiel de ces définitions ; la négativité n'est pas nécessairement manifeste et visible. Du point de vue philosophique : action de nier l'existence de quelque chose dans l'intention, explicite ou non, d'affirmer la possibilité d'un monde meilleur.

Quant à la culture, si on l'envisage comme médiation sémiotique entre l'homme et la réalité est mise en avant par E. Benveniste et A. J. Greimas. Le premier appelle culture "le milieu humain", à savoir tout ce qui, au-delà des fonctions biologiques, "donne à la vie et à l'activité humaine forme, sens et contenu". Pour lui, la culture, en tant que fait humain, est un phénomène "entièrement symbolique" dans la mesure où elle est un "ensemble très complexe de représentations" qui se manifestent sous forme de "traditions, religions, lois, politique, éthique, arts", et c'est par la langue que l'homme, en tant qu'être social, "assimile la culture, la perpétue ou la transforme". Benveniste (1966 :30) La nature sémiotique de la culture est de même soulignée dans la définition que Greimas en propose. Pour lui, en effet, la culture, est "la société érigée en signification." (1984 :121). De ce fait, elle est la somme de "toutes les pratiques sociales signifiantes", à savoir "la totalité des discours que la société tient sur elle-même".

3. Le sujet ignoré par son contexte familial

Selon Lotman “ la culture se comprend comme un système sémiotique ayant une fonction médiatrice entre l’homme et le monde extérieur. La culture sélectionne et structure l’information venant du monde extérieure ; la sélectionne et la structuration varient évidemment selon les cultures. ” Au sujet du système de valeurs constitutif de la société iranienne dans les décennies 40, 50 et 60 telle que l’écrivain décrit dans l’ensemble du livre, on peut dire qu’il s’articule, comme une période où la relation entre des jeunes filles et des garçons avait un aspect négatif. Il ne s’agit de rien d’autre qu’une force sociale face à laquelle l’individu ne peut rien et qui n’est autre que la religion.

Il n’est donc pas étonnant de constater que seul le mariage permet à une fille d’être en contact avec un homme. C’est-à-dire elle doit constituer la famille, ce qui est légitime dans la société mais il ne faut pas oublier que ce n’est pas la fille qui décide pour choisir son mari et la plupart du temps c’était le père ou les frères qui décidaient et la fille n’a pas même le droit de parler aux hommes avant le mariage dans la mesure où la fille qui est aimé d’un garçon fait un malheur et une déconsidération pour sa famille. Le sujet de la négativité serait de ce point de vue un sujet dynamique et en mouvement. Mais la question essentielle porte sur le fait de savoir en quoi ce dynamisme va aboutir à la construction d’une forme de vie chez les femmes qui vivent dans telle société. Comme nous le savons, le mot négativité surgit dans la relation où un terme détruit au profit de l’autre pour que celui-ci puisse dominer dans la relation.

Dans l’histoire choisie à étudier, on constate que les éléments qui viennent de la sphère culturelle retrouvent le maximum degré de tonicité et ainsi de suite l’intensité de la présence du sujet s’affaiblit dans la relation. On est confronté à un sujet qui est ignoré par les obligations et les contraintes définies par la société. La plupart du temps le corps physique du sujet nous fait conscience de sa présence physique mais en général on ne voit pas d’actions - comme décider, parler de son destin-qui montrent la présence réelle ou autrement dit existence d’une personne dans un ancrage spatio-temporelle. Ainsi le sujet qui est une femme vit dans un lieu où les masculins peuvent décider à sa place et son avis n’a aucune importance. Elle n’est pas autorisée de donner son avis. Toutes ces privations chez une fille proviennent de la moralisation précise de cette société où elle vivait. La moralisation définit une attitude dictée par des exigences éthique propres à une communauté. Ainsi respecter les décisions acquises de la part de sa famille (c’est-à-dire son père et ses frères) pour elle, est un atout de séduction ; et, en cela, il ne fait que marquer son adhésion à une certaine image d’une personne valorisée au sein de la communauté dont elle fait partie.

Au début de l’histoire, la famille de Masoumeh décide de déménager à Téhéran mais selon un de ses frères Téhéran n’est pas un lieu convenable pour les filles, à ce moment-là, Masoumeh donne son avis mais d’autre frère Ahmad qui aime beaucoup vivre à Téhéran arrête Masoumeh et lui dit “ tais-toi, si le problème de la famille est l’existence de Masoumeh, elle se mariera et restera à Ghom ” (2013 :15)

Ainsi on est confronté à un sujet angoissé à partir des comportements des membres de sa famille. Elle a peur de tomber dans la relation de disjonction avec son objet de valeur c’est-à-dire aller au lycée et étudier. Quant aux modalités ; on est en face d’un sujet modalisé par vouloir, un sujet désirant. Elle s’efforce de présenter son vouloir-être à toute la famille quand les autres sont en train de nier sa présence. La charge modale du vouloir crée une tension qui ne s’épuise qu’avec la conjonction à l’objet de valeur. Ainsi, le parcours existentiel de Masoumeh sera constitué d’une suite de transformations jonctives (conjonction, disjonction) qui participent de la construction de son identité. Quand sa famille décide que Masoumeh doit se marier avant son déménagement, il en va tout autrement pour un sujet comme Masoumeh qui est dominée par la peur. Vu qu’elle ne peut pas atteindre à ses vœux alors son être est modalisé par un vouloir

négatif. On peut certes considérer que, face à un anti-objet qui la menace, elle aspire à une non-conjonction. « Je me rendais tous les jours au sanctuaire de Sainte Masoumeh et je la conjurais qu'ils m'amènent avec eux et qu'ils m'autorisent à fréquenter une école. Je disais en pleurant : Si j'étais un garçon ou bien si j'atteignais la diphtérie comme Zari et je mourais. » (2013 :16) Le sujet se sent fréquemment cette émotion dans différentes étapes de sa vie.

Quand toute la famille était d'accord que Masoumeh se marie avec le boucher du quartier qui était ami de son frère-Ahmad- c'est la voisine, Parvine, qui arrête l'action avant la conjonction du sujet avec l'anti-objet. Parvine qui avait un passé semblable au sujet aimerait faire quelque chose pour Masoumeh.

Masoumeh a souvent une inquiétude générale, celle-ci constitue une sorte de prémisse à la grande émotion, celle qui marque la perte de l'objet par le sujet. Le sentiment dysphorique de la peur fait du corps du sujet un centre de tensions incontrôlable. Ce sentiment naît de ce que Masoumeh ne comprend pas. Il résulte de l'impossibilité d'intégrer dans le champ des savoirs et des croyances de Masoumeh un phénomène particulier et étrange par ex : ne pas aller au lycée, ne pas parler à son amie téhéranaise

En effet cette émotion éloigne le sentiment de présence, une présence sensibilisée qui permet au sujet de se voir elle-même. Donc le sujet, malgré son désir intérieur, va vers la négativité qui provient des croyances et des exigences de sa famille ou bien de la société où il vivait. D'une autre manière le sujet n'est pas un individu isolé et idéalisé, mais un être qui agit dans la société et est conditionné par la société et la culture. En fait le sujet produit la signification par ses comportements.

Le mariage avec un autre garçon sauf Saeid qui lui plaisait gardait Masoumeh dans la négativité et enfin quand elle est obligée de se marier avec Hamid c'était comme la conjonction entre le sujet et l'objet répulsif ou dysphorique. En effet Masoumeh n'avait aucun rôle dans le choix de son époux. Même dans la cérémonie quand elle résistait devant ce mariage forcé quelqu'un d'autre a dit « oui » à sa place. La famille de Masoumeh dans le procès du mariage de Masoumeh ferme totalement les yeux et ignore l'existence totale de la jeune fille. Alors on constate la négativité absolue du protagoniste même lors de son mariage qui est un événement particulier et très important pour les filles.

4. L'effondrement du sujet

Il y a des moments où le sujet se trouve dans une étape de convulsion de l'âme et de la perte momentanée de la raison. Les effets somatiques de cette émotion saisissent facilement par l'observateur. Le sujet face à ce qui l'épouvante, demeure paralysé, sans pouvoir se mouvoir. Masoumeh se trouve dessaisi de toute compétence. On peut voir effectivement, cette paralysie qui affecte Masoumeh lors de la crise émotionnelle c'est-à-dire le moment où la relation de Masoumeh avec un garçon révèle devant sa famille.

“ On dirait qu'on m'avait versé un seau d'eau froide sur la tête, j'ai eu l'impression que tout d'un coup la totalité d'eau existant dans mon corps s'est séchée et j'ai eu la langue bloquée. ” (2013 :66).

En effet dans cette étape Masoumeh a honte surtout devant son père. Cette honte constitue un des principaux effets de la moralisation. Elle est liée à la crainte d'une dégradation de sa propre image et présuppose une certaine idée de soi. Dès que la peur s'empare de nous, nous nous traitons de lâches. Le mot peur est chargé de tant de honte que nous la cachons.

La plupart du temps Masoumeh éprouve un sentiment de honte relatif à la peur qui les envahit, à l'émotion qui bouleverse tout son être et toute sa vie, toute son identité. C'est là l'effet d'une moralisation négative de la passion de la peur. Définie par le petit Robert comme un “ sentiment pénible d'infériorité, d'indignité devant sa propre conscience ou d'humiliation devant autrui, d'abaissement dans l'opinion des autres ” (1880 :2008). La honte, sur un plan réfléchi implique

une évaluation négative du comportement que l'on a eu ou que l'on est tenté d'avoir.

Pour Paul Valéry, la honte trouve sa source dans “ l'émotion produite en quelqu'un par le sentiment d'autrui, d'une collectivité, d'une opinion publique ” (1974 :355)

En effet la honte met en scène le jugement dépréciatif des autres ; elle est liée à l'idée de dégradation de l'image du sujet dans l'opinion d'autrui. En fait, l'opinion est un croire qui modalise la représentation qu'on se fait de la valeur et des mérites du sujet ; en l'occurrence, la honte est liée à ce changement qui intervient dans le croire des autres et, plus précisément, dans l'objet du croire : la valeur du sujet, suite à un comportement jugé moralement condamnable, est totalement ou partiellement niée par l'instance morale.

Ainsi, cette émotion dépossède le sujet – Masoumeh – de son pouvoir et même de son vouloir et en ce moment un jeu conflictuel se déroule au cœur de Masoumeh en tant qu'un membre de la société où elle vivait. Elle se trouve entre deux tendances contraires ; d'une part la tendance de lutte pour arriver à son amour et ses vœux qui était contre les coutumes et les croyances de sa famille d'autre part la tendance de l'acceptation de la réalité de sa famille et de la condition d'être nié car elle est une fille et soumission à ses frères. Chacune de ces deux tendances cherche à l'emporter sur l'autre mais le sujet n'était pas tellement apte de dévaloriser ce qui était comme une valeur dans sa société alors une autre fois elle a accepté la négativité de son existence. Et elle subit un état dysphorique pour satisfaire ceux qui sont autour d'elle.

La source de tous ces malheurs viennent à une axiologie propre à une époque précise et à une aire culturelle donnée, ces figures- en elles-mêmes neutres- sont jugées soit négativement soit positivement. C'est ainsi que la liberté d'expression, tomber amoureuse de quelqu'un et l'étude pour les filles sont considérés négatives d'après les traditions et la religion de cette époque-là.

5. Le sujet fondu dans la négativité

La négativité est comme un gouffre qui avale le sujet dans les différents moments de sa vie mais quand même on constate de temps en temps un courage de la part de Masoumeh pour se libérer de la situation dans laquelle elle était emprisonnée. On définit le courage comme la volonté, qualités qui sont constitutives de la force morale. C'est précisément ce « qui fait supporter ou braver le péril, la souffrance, les rêves » Littré ; c'est en somme, ce qui rend le sujet apte à faire face à l'objet dysphorique qui est en l'occurrence défini comme redoutable.

Cette force d'âme est ce qui rend compétent puisqu'elle est dépassement voire ignorance de la peur. En somme, le courage est une peur surmonté et le courageux est ainsi celui qui agit malgré la peur qu'il connaît pour le remettre dans l'ignorance et toutes les difficultés qu'il connaît sur son chemin.

- Je pensais à une issue pour gagner plus d'argent pour pouvoir satisfaire les besoins futurs de mes enfants. Evidemment ma situation s'améliorerait après avoir obtenu une licence. Comme j'attendais à cela, tous les membres de ma famille croyaient à l'unanimité des voix que j'aurais dû renoncer à faire des études universitaires pourtant ce qui me semblait bizarre c'était que la famille de Hamid était de même avis. Le père de Hamid m'a adressé la parole avec de la compassion.
- Tu es sous pression, tu ne penses pas que ce soit difficile de faire les deux en même temps ?... j'ai fait beaucoup d'efforts pour me contrôler, mais ces jours-ci je n'étais plus aussi patiente et forte qu'avant et je n'étais pas non plus la jeune fille maladroite venant d'une province qui se soumette aux demandes injustes ou aux sarcasmes des autres, je n'étais plus quelqu'un qui ne prenne pas en considération ses désirs et sa propre volonté. Une colère s'est éveillée en moi, elle a effacé toutes mes incertitudes et a fait disparaître la terreur dont j'avais été saisie. (2013 :269)

Donc quand le sujet parvient à faire triompher la tension qui le pousse vers l'affrontement sur

celle qui lui commande de reculer est un courageux qui s'approche de l'état de la positivité. On pourrait ajouter que par le courage, le sujet se constitue en héros d'elle-même.

Quand –même d'après les événements qui arrivent à Masoumeh jusqu'à la fin de l'histoire on constate que la négativité n'est pas éprouvée comme un état provisoire, elle constitue une composante de l'identité du sujet. On dirait qu'elle est pleinement intégrée à son être et jugée comme telle. En effet si nous nous interrogeons sur l'identité qui fait état d'une femme en tant qu'instance énonçant, nous constatons qu'elle se ramène à une caractéristique fondamentale qui se voit beaucoup chez les auteurs qui dessinent les femmes de la société iranienne de cette époque-là. Ces caractéristiques sont le dépassement en soi et la fidélité. Celles-ci sont une sorte de « savoir-faire » inné chez la femme et qui se nourrit de l'ordre social.

Dans cette étape on pourrait montrer les différentes étapes de la vie du sujet.

Étape 1 : soumission le temps où elle fait tout le temps le dépassement de soi, quand elle était une jeune fille dans une famille religieuse et fanatique.

Étape 2 : le mariage avec un homme politique qui avait un esprit plus ouvert que sa famille. Elle a osé de se présenter et penser à ses vœux.

Étape 3 : quand son mari qui était un militant est emprisonné et est condamné à mort elle a compris qu'elle doit changer sa manière de vie pour gagner la vie de ses enfants et soi-même.

Mais quand même à la fin de l'histoire quand elle avait un certain âge et ses enfants étaient grands et chacun avait sa famille. Masoumeh rencontre son vieil amant à l'âge mûr et qu'il lui demande la main même si elle s'intéresse beaucoup à mener le reste de sa vie en compagnie de quelqu'un dont elle était amoureuse pourtant elle pense encore une fois à ses enfants et elle dit à Saïd : " Bien que mes enfants soient mariés et qu'ils aient leur propre vie mais étant donné qu'ils sont très sensibles au sujet de tout ce qui me concerne et je n'aime pas qu'ils soient mécontents, je dois donc les consulter avant de me décider. " (2013 :505) Cependant quand elle leur en parle, ils s'y opposent fermement sans prendre en considération l'avis de leur mère et ses besoins émotionnels. Masoumeh qui est gravement dérangée par le comportement de ses enfants refuse la proposition de mariage de Saïd. Et au moment où elle se confie à son amie intime Parvaneh :

Ma grand-mère disait toujours : La part de chacun de nous de la vie est déjà déterminée, on l'a mise de côté pour chacun d'entre nous et rien ne peut la changer ou modifier. je pense souvent quelle était ma propre portion dans la vie ? Est-ce que j'avais une portion déterminée et indépendante ? Ou bien je faisais partie de portion des hommes de ma vie qui m'ont en quelque sorte conduit au lieu de sacrifice pour atteindre à leurs idéaux ou objectifs ... On dirait que je n'existais jamais, je n'avais aucun droit, quand j'ai pu vivre pour moi-même ? Quand j'ai eu le droit de choisir et de décider ? Quand ils m'ont demandé ce que je désirais ?... Comme on dit : Personne ne me veut pour ma propre existence. Tout le monde me cherche pour sa propre existence » (2013 :524, 525)

Le regard évaluateur et jugeant ou bien le regard d'autrui force le sujet de continuer à vivre dans la négativité. Autrement dit, son attitude doit absolument paraître conforme aux valeurs de la communauté à laquelle il appartient car ce que le sujet met en jeu, c'est son identité sociale. Ainsi le sujet agit non selon un simple vouloir, mais selon un "vouloir" régi par le "devoir" imposé par le cadre axiologique qu'il s'est choisi.

Ainsi vu qu'il s'agit de son identité ou plus exactement, l'image qu'il veut donner de lui-même et qu'il veut afficher, le sujet préfère ignorer encore lui-même et rester dans une négativité sans protester et lutter contre les coutumes de sa société.

6. Conclusion

En effet les éléments qui affectent toute la vie du sujet renvoient déjà à une croyance religieuse et à une pratique culturelle. La présence du sujet est niée par des conditions historiques et sociales alors que l'interdiction des femmes de leurs droits naturels dans les pays qui sont libérales serait considérée comme un choc culturel. De même, dans la société où les droits de la femme sont ignorés par une nécessité culturelle et religieuse, on voit comment la négativité émerge sous l'aspect intérieur de la culture iranienne. Ainsi, la pratique culturelle renouvelle le sens de la vie.

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ETHNOSEMIOTICS: APPROACH TO TRADITION AND CULTURE

SEMIOTIC APPROACH IN DETERMINING FUNCTION AND SEMANTICS OF RITUAL GESTURE

Dzheni Madzharov
St. Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia, Bulgaria
madzharov.dzheni@gmail.com

Abstract

This report proposes a new approach to solving some of these problems. As the basis is used the principle that each human movement, laden with meaning, is a sign in semiotic sense of this name, and is called *gesture*. The same holds key features that distinguish it from other similar gesture. The establishment of these features and their analysis allows, at any particular use of a gesture, precise to determine its actual role and importance in the text of the relevant ritualized action (ritual, custom, celebration). These basic characteristics, that are inherent to any gesture, form the so-called *system of dimensions of ritual gesture*. The system includes the following five dimensions: physical form of gesture, environment, relationship between addresser and addressee, function and semantics. The paper examines the content and the scope of each of these dimensions. The provided scientific method allows after specifying the first three dimensions of the studied gesture to establish its current function and semantics for each particular use. The results make it possible to determine the exact purpose and meaning of each researched ritualized action, which involves the studied gesture. The method allows the identification of already missing functions and semantics that this gesture has manifested in various historical stages of its existence. Through this approach the ethnology science may reveal the mechanism of transmission of tradition and the creation of ethnic character of each culture.

Human communities use gestures to communicate in everyday life and in performing ritual actions. Most of the human movements in everyday life have meanings, which are limited only

to the content of their physical execution. However, in ritualized human behavior the gestures are always loaded with a connotative meaning. Ritualized gestures are poorly studied by Ethnology. Inaccuracies are allowed in scientific research very often when we find out the origin and nature of certain phenomena in culture. This is the result of neglect or wrong explanation of gestures, which are important elements of the ritualized action. Therefore, this paper offers a new approach for the study of ritualized movements and actions in the culture. This is an opportunity to clarify the exact purpose and meaning, function and semantics of the gesture in a ritual, custom and celebration.

Because of the fact that Anthropology, Ethnology and Folklore do not offer such a suitable method for the study of a ritual gesture I use a semiotic approach. This approach to the study of signs suggests a separation of gesture's form from the information, which is conveyed. This is an extremely important point, because very often the same physical form of gesture is the carrier of two or more different information contents. There are also reverse cases, when several gestures with a different physical form, convey the same information content. That's why the clarification of the information conveyed can be done only in the context of communication, because of this I accept the idea that each loaded with meaning movement, which participates in this process, represents a semiotic sign.

It is well known that the relationship between the form of the sign and its content is conditional and arbitrary (Crapo 2000: 186). Likewise, the relationship between the form of the gesture and its meaning is arbitrary and it is the result of a public agreement. The gesture is always used in a sign system, where it has a specific meaning, which is agreed in the community. In this case, the physical form of a gesture beside a carrier of meaning does definite activity in this sign system. In other words, in the composition of a ritualized action the gesture always has a purpose and meaning. But like a sign it has also a *function* and *semantics*.

In every ritual action, which is a part of a sign system, gesture besides a denotative meaning often has also a connotative one. There the gesture most often acts as a symbol that replaces non-attending in the ritual action object (person, event, idea, etc.). So with the participation in a ritualized action a gesture creates the *text* of the action. Outside the framework of a ritual action, time and space the gesture often loses its accepted connotative and sometimes denotative meaning. Furthermore executed outside the scope of a ritualized action the gesture is deprived of the agreed in the community standard ritual function and semantics (Tolstoy 1999: 469). There, outside the sign system of a ritualized action, the gesture is mostly just an ordinary human movement without informative or communicative value. Therefore the researched gesture should be studied and analyzed mainly in the context of the sign system (culture) where it actively exists.

Due to the close links between gesture and ideology (religion) it is imperative that the ethnological study should always be careful about the impact of this system, because it influences the use of gesture and creates its contemporary meaning. That means any gesture form can change its content. On the other hand, gestures in culture are dynamic and changing phenomena. Sometimes gestures change their role not only in ritualized action but also in the composition of the whole culture. However, any member of the community knows their actual purpose and meaning in life. How is that?

The main task of the science is to discover what are those characteristics that allow the person to recognize the exact purpose and meaning of the gesture in a given situation. This supposes to find out some characteristics of the gesture that determine its specific purpose and meaning in the context of a studied ritualized action. Like the words in a language the gestures don't exist alone, only for themselves. It must be stated that the sum total of all gestures in a culture, like the words, make up their language. This language has generally accepted rules that determine how to use gestures (Popova 2004: 70). My task was to find out what those rules or characteris-

tics of the gesture are, that allow the person to determine exactly which of the many meanings of a particular physical form of a gesture to apprehend at the moment. After many studies I have found out that the rules are more like characteristics that determine how to perceive the purpose and meaning of the gesture. These characteristics of the gesture I accept to call *dimensions*. The use of this concept makes it possible to capture and present the whole complex sum of information such as: what the signified human gesture looks like; describes its physical form; the conditionalities that accompany the use of gesture; the interaction between sender and perceiver of gesture; the purpose and meaning of a gesture in a ritualized situation, its function and semantics etc.

According to Ferdinand de Saussure the meaning of a sign is determined by its interaction with other signs from the system (Popova 2004: 70). Because of the special mode of use in a ritualized action gesture has a function and semantics that are understood only in the context of the sign system. Upon removal the ritual gesture out of this sign system its function and semantics change and even disappear. This means that these two dimensions of gesture have conditional nature and are a result of a public agreement. They depend on the sign system and also on the particular language of gestures. By the ethnological research each ritualized environment determines the specific purpose and function, meaning and semantics of a researched gesture. This requires a detailed examination and analysis of any phenomenon in the culture, which composition contains the studied gesture.

It is well known, that human movement, loaded with meaning, becomes a *gesture* only as a result of semiosis that allows the adoption of agreed meaning. In ethnological sense semiosis is this moment, in the scope of a ritualized action, in which a human movement is played in *standard* and *stereotype* way, according to the knowledge and expectations of the community. In this way the human movement becomes a gesture or more precisely a *symbol* that has a ritual purpose and carries a specific meaning.

To understand the researched gesture is necessary to consider the characteristics of the specific environment in which semiosis is achieved. This allows us to identify those elements of the environment that create the purpose (function) and meaning (semantics) of gesture. These invisible, but bound in a system elements, I call *system of dimensions of ritual gesture*. By *ritual gesture* I mean anyone involved in a ritualized action. The use of this system for the study of gesture allows all information to be accurately described and traced in development. Thus can be analyzed the mechanism for setting (changing) of each purpose (function) and meaning (semantics) of the gesture.

1. What are the elements in the system of dimensions of a ritual gesture?

With the use of a gesture in ritualized action it can be clearly distinguished the gender, age, social and ritual status, kinship, local, religious and the ethnic identity of the participants. The gesture shows the ritual status of those who perform it, but also to whom it is directed. By gesture analysis it is obligatory to consider its external visible shape, which I call *physical form of the gesture*.

In a ritualized action the physical form of gesture is used in conjunction with objects, clothing, time, space and other elements of the environment which are loaded with meaning. They all have an impact in the creation of purpose and meaning (function and semantics) of the gesture. This dimension of a ritual gesture I call *environment*.

Each gesture is performed by someone or something. In ritualized action the gesture is necessarily directed at another individual or entity that is a participant in the communicative process. In this way the reproduced gesture creates a connection between the sender and the perceiver, which I call *relationship between addresser and addressee*.

The reproduction of a ritual gesture is never an action without a purpose. That human be-

havior may be a practical one, but there is always a symbolic purpose in it. In the science, this characteristic of the gesture is called *function*. The ability of gesture to influence is one of its main quality.

In the scope of a sign system every gesture means something. *Semantics* is its second main quality.

The above mentioned five characteristics form the *system of dimensions of ritual gesture* that accompanies and defines the way for its use in any sign system (like a culture). The use of this method for the analysis of cultural phenomena makes it possible to reveal the exact and current function and semantics of the researched ritual gesture. This allows to determine the true purpose and meaning of a studied ritualized actions, in which the gesture is involved.

2. Detailed content of each dimension.

2.1. Physical form

This dimension includes the visible part of each loaded with meaning movement of the human body and its limbs, torso posture, facial expressions, movements of eyes and eyelids. In analysis of the form we should pay attention to the level, on which the gesture is performed - in vertical and horizontal, interlokutativly and also to the direction of movement - to the side, away or towards the body of the sender. *Realization*, as a part of this dimension, means what is the quality of performance of the gesture. Whether, according to the standard of community the gesture is performed in its whole content or in a part, with the use of emotion, effort or only schematically. *Standard* is a system of common rules and restrictions for the performance of any ritual gesture, which is agreed by community and each participant in the ritualized action is required to comply with them.

2.2. Environment

This dimension includes all loaded with meaning elements of the ritualized environment, which are involved in gesture performance such as: place and space; time; objects that are loaded with meaning; clothing of addressers and addressees; gestures accompanying verbal forms (words, phrases, songs, etc.) local, religious, social, political and other circumstances; features of ritualized environment and situation; and all other objects, phenomena and factors that accompany performance of gesture or have something in common with establishing and clarifying its function and semantics.

2.3. Relationship between addresser and addressee

The relationship between the performer (sender) of a gesture and the subject (object) to whom (which) it is directed is not always entirely clear. This connection beside its visible plan very often has an invisible one, too. In ritualized communication the sender always knows, that it is seen not only by those who are attending the event, but also by the forces of the Transcendental world. In this way the supernatural forces are directly involved in ritualized communication. Therefore often the performed gesture is not a personal expression of the individual, but a result of the will of those forces. So the ritual character – the addresser that stands on the visible plan is only the earthly representative (agent) of the Transcendental forces. This is the reason why we are forced always to seek for the addresser/s in the invisible (mythological) plan. Likewise, we should look for addressees of the ritual gesture that are on an invisible plan. Disclosure of addressers and addressees of the invisible plan is one of the major difficulty for the proper determination the purpose (function) and meaning (semantics) of researched gesture. Difficulty raises the fact that sometimes in ritualized communication the role of a character, with whom the gesture is connected, plays not a man, but an animate or inanimate object. Thus in the communicative process this object often acquires human characteristics (Bayburin & Toporkov

1990: 7). When we examine the relationship between sender and perceiver we always take into account the composition and status of the participants, and analyze their following features: ritual character; sex; age; number; relationships between the participants when performing gesture - in synchronic and diachronic perspective; degree of acquaintance; social status; local, religious, ethnical and national origin; the symbolic value of the subjects and objects that play the role of the addresser and addressee. The disclosure of these details is crucial in the analysis of gesture, because even a small change in one of these elements leads to a change of purpose and function and, meaning semantics.

2.4. Function

This dimension of the gesture is not always clearly distinguishable and understandable. Very often not only bearers of culture, but also researchers can not distinguish the function from the semantics of gesture. The reason for this is that the gesture is not seen as a semiotic sign that has three sides - form, function and semantics. Therefore it is required a thorough examination what use has the studied physical form of the gesture in different local manifestations of sign system (culture). Function is a characteristic ability of the ritual gesture: to mean or to represent another object; to carry information and to store knowledge; to load objects with meaning; to serve as a means of communication and circulation; to influence physically, mentally, metaphysically; to transmit feelings and moods, etc., all this in the process of a ritualized action. Put in a simple the function of gesture is the performance (activity), it does in the process of transferring information from sender to perceiver. Function is also the result that is derived from the influence of the gesture on the participants (subjects, objects) in a ritualized action. Because I'm looking at the gesture as a semiotic sign I accept that it performs the same functions as any other sign. But because of the special physical nature of the gesture a part of the famous semiotic features, characteristic of a verbal sign, are not inherent in the gesture. So I think the functions of the gesture are limited to the following sixteen: *nominative*, *cognitive (significative)*, *symbolic (representative, referral)*, *communicative (denotative)*, *pragmatic*, *appeal (conativ, regulatory)*, *contact (faithic)*, *deictic*, *symbolic*, *emotive*, *expressive*, *aesthetic*, *poetic*, *magic*, *ethnic*, *metalinguistic*.

2.5. Semantics

This complex dimension of a ritual gesture is settled last, after analyzing all factors that accompany the performance of the studied gesture. Only when any human movement, reproduced in ritualized action, fits into public contracted standard and begins its repeated and stereotyped application, then we can talk about the emergence of its sense, meaning. To clarify the actual meaning of the gesture it is necessary to trace the entire sum of the specific circumstances in which it is applied. This collection of all established meanings of gesture in the context of culture describes the range of its current semantics (Bayburin & Toporkov 1990: 21). In semiotics the term *semantics* (synonymous with *meaning of the sign*) is one of the most meaningful and harder to define, because different schools have different opinion on its scope and content. According to the linguistic semiotics *semantics* is the *sense* of the gesture as a sign, which is located in the mind of its interpreter, what he/she perceives (interprets) as an image, concept, idea, etc. Under the semantics of gesture we understand the overall plan of content of the sign with its denotative, significative and connotative meanings, including its semantics' value.

The existence of gesture in culture and mainly in a ritual, custom and celebration implies a more complex state of its semantics. Therefore, Alexander K. Bayburin and Alexander L. Toporkov introduce two concepts of specifying the semantics of the gesture as *motivation* and *explanation*, which possess different aspects in culture. By motivation they understand the explanation of gesture's meaning that gives the carrier of the culture. By explanation they understand that meaning of the gesture, which has a broader (territorial and chronological) character and

is find out as a result of systematic research (Bayburin & Toporkov 1990: 18–19). Motivation level of semantics incorporates all those current, simple and common sense ideas and concepts with which bearer of the culture explains the meaning of the gesture. It can highlight aspects of the group, local, social, ethnic and religious interpretation of the meaning of the gesture. While established after a scientific study motivation reveals the logic for appearance, reasons for public negotiation and enforcement of this meaning, and its historical continuity of existence.

Due to continuous changes in the conditions under which is created the actual semantics of gesture we can not expect to be maintained all its motivations and explanations existed in culture. However, in different historical layers of the culture are stored separate data for the passed by meaning of the gesture in the form of words, phrases, prohibitions etc. The total sum of this protected information I call *memory of the gesture* (Bayburin & Toporkov 1990: 19). To semantics (motivation level) of gesture is applied its ethnic (local and national) name. And also, all verbal forms, which are coming from, can be connected with or related to the studied gesture as words, phrases, idioms, the memories of one of its sense, meaning. Most often verbalized forms of gesture semantics and function appear as a result of its removal out of rituals, customs, his profane use or disappearance of community life (Tolstoy 1999: 482, note 11).

In ethnological study of culture there are two possible approaches for implementing the method system of dimensions of a ritual gesture – *synchronic* and *diachronic*. In the synchronic approach the research phenomenon (ritual, custom, celebration, ritualized action) we divid into main parts to determine which gesture (action) constructs the structure of the phenomenon. We are looking for other identical or similar physical and meaning forms of this gesture in the culture, and then analyze their systems of dimensions. This allows us to determine precisely the actual function and semantics of the researched gesture. In diachronic approach we study the historical development and changes of purpose and meaning, function and semantics of the researched gesture. We analyze various ritualized actions from the past and present of the culture, in which the researched gesture participates, in order to determine the sum of all its changes.

On my experience so far, the presented method for the study of ritual gesture, can be successfully applied in the analysis of any ritual gesture and household behavior that exists within a sign system. When the method is used in a comparative study of similar phenomena in two or more cultures, it allows us to trace and reveal the mechanism by which are created and developed the ethnic features of these phenomena, as well as how is build the ethnic character of each culture.

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**MODELS, SIGNS, VALUES
AND DIALOGUE**

THE ARGUMENTATIVE CONSTRUCTION IN QUEIROSIAN FICTION

Cecília Contani Baraldo
Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Brazil
cecilia.contani@gmail.com

Esther Gomes de Oliveira
Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Brazil
ego@uel.br

Abstract

This paper examines the argumentative features and semantic discourse potential found in Eça de Queirós' *The city and the mountains*. The notion of speech is focused as a source of meaning and persuasion. A mix of speeches is produced as a result of an enriched storytelling, a remarkable skill of the author who employ a multiplicity of voices as found in the Dostoevsky's model. The concept of polyphony discussed by Bakhtin (2011) in "Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics" is used to explain this operation and grasp the meanings found in the characters' wide-ranging discussion. The presence of two voices at first distinct, but afterwards integrated into dialogues and narration is not simply opposition, but a divergence that shape the argument and provide contrasting and complementary meanings. Voices that overlap in the same context and merge into a third voice with argumentative power and ability to clarify the theme in the novel. The argument is further built, to a larger extent, by the use of adjectives, thus releasing statements that this study will point out as countermeanings, a notion inspired in the psychoanalytical concept of countertransference, to cover differences that are not purely oppositions, but disagreements and agreements that can be worked out.

Introduction

The city and the mountains by Eça de Queirós takes into account two postures: Jacinto de Tormes's (the novel's protagonist) and José Fernandes's (his best friend and narrator). Jacinto de

Tormes, born in Paris, is of Portuguese descent and is the heir to a vast estate located in a village in Portugal. He never visited the place, but rental incomes from that family property allow him to afford his living in the metropolis. At a certain point in time, he started to become bored and disappointed with life among all sorts of appliances and devices available in modern urban life, plus the rush that was becoming typical. It was then that he received a letter from the estate manager, José Fernandes, notifying him that for a decision to be made, his presence was required in the farmland. Fernandes travels to Paris to see Jacinto about the issue and to persuade him to come to Portugal – and so it happens. Upon this return to roots, with the contact with the country environment, Jacinto started reflecting about the sense of life with technology and of life without it. Fernandes takes part in the plot with more than his dialogues with Jacinto: he lends his voice as a narrator.

In spite of being distinct, they exert forces of equal magnitude: none of these characters' voices overlap. Jacinto, heir to a profitable estate in the country, is delighted with Paris cultural and technological effervescence in the context of the beginning of the 20th century. He lives in a two-story house, in the city centre of the French capital and, at a certain point, hosts his best friend, who has just arrived from Portugal, José Fernandes that, as opposed to Jacinto, is eternally in love with Portugal and the quality of living associated with country life.

From that moment on, in their daily interaction, Jacinto and José display different attitudes towards the same contexts. The perspectives, however, add up to each other and alternate in the meantime, eventually generating a third perspective, which is an evolution of the previous two. Hence, the relationship between the hereby named meaning and countermeaning, further explained. José Fernandes is granted the freedom to assess and interpret his friend's attitudes as well as to establish not solely a dialog with him or between characters, but also an interaction with the reader who is involved and clearly realizes Jacinto's psychological transformation as he absorbs the contents of the arguments presented by his friend.

In order to more easily perceive the characters' consciousness modifications, the analysis will be divided into three times: Time 1, in which Jacinto falls for Paris; Switching Time, where the character is already bored and uncomfortable in the metropolis and Time 2, when they are already in Portugal, displaying love and working for their homeland. The discourse that depicts Jacinto's feelings regarding both cities where he lived is built with the use of the adjectives – this process here known as a resource of argumentative construction.

It is assumed that the book's argumentative construction has its main expression in the judicious use of adjectives, capable of allowing a deep thematic discussion with a surprisingly degree of utility for the present-day. That is attained through an undisputable capacity to assign many voices (not to be thought as lines or dialogues) to few characters allowing access to meaning and manner as they become reality.

1. The meaning and countermeaning relation

The characters represent human conscience with great support in reality to the extent that their interactions simulate or portrait daily facts. Therefore, the interaction between Jacinto and José Fernandes also occurs in an unconscious way: the two characters that at first show very different postures under the same circumstances will dissolve their contrasts and merge, embracing their unconsciousness and establishing a more advanced posture emerged from their emotional response.

José Fernandes' dense narrative is able to comprise Jacinto's evaluation and along with it compose a new meaning to the concept of happiness that lies in human conviviality in their homeland. This is accomplished by the double role or double voice assigned to José Fernandes in sharing the instance of narrator. This new posture, comprised by the overlapping of both char-

acter's views, starts to belong also to the reader that through argumentative resources dialogues with the text and realizes their concepts change.

The term countermeaning is adopted with a special connotation. The prefix counter, largely applied in already renowned expressions such as counterculture, counteract, counterclockwise, among others. A concept that best represents the desired definition is the psychoanalytical notion of countertransference. According to Freud (1912, p. 113) transferences "are new editions or reproductions of the tendencies and fantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the process of the analysis, but they have this peculiarity that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician." The psychoanalyst believed that this emotional transference is expected, but the professional is not to allow the phenomenon to interfere in their analytical posture.

Countertransference is the name given by Freud to the situation in which the analyst is emotionally involved and integrates the transference phenomenon, which, according to Leitão (2003, p. 176) "is the analyst's emotional response to the patient's stimuli." The transference and countertransference processes hold ambivalent natures, once the feelings that may be aroused develops from a human relationship and as such have double composition, that is, postures that present themselves in different ways under the same therapeutic context but that with the sessions' evolution along with human interaction between these individuals become a shared posture between the analyzed and the analyst.

The term created by Freud in German: *Die Gegenübertragung* can be divided for a Portuguese version as indicates Orozoco (2000, p.137, apud Antonelli 2006, p. 25, our translation): 1) *Gegen*, from opposition, 'against' 'that opposes to', but also holding the idea of reciprocity. 2) *über*, that means on, in the top of. 3) *tragung* that comes from the verb *tragen*, to carry, take. Therefore, according to the same author the term "against" in Portuguese does not contemplate every aspect of the word in German, once the latter carries the idea of reciprocity, integration. Consequently, countertransference is not characterized by the opposition but by the reciprocity of postures that at first are individual and only existent in the personal unconsciousness but that evolve to an emotional completion that coexists in the relation established between the person analyzed and the analyst.

Freud (1912, p.402) claims to have "(...) good reasons to assert that everybody possesses in their own unconsciousness a tool enabling them to interpret other people's unconsciousness elocutions". This is the point of interface between the idea of counter transference and the concept of countermeaning which have no further resemblance. There is, therefore, the entanglement of two different consciousnesses that individually possess forces of equivalent magnitudes that merge and unite from a relationship that may have an argumentative nature. It emerges from the possible interpretation of such consciousness that then become one as a result. Jacinto e José Fernandes are examples of this relation as people who are daily together and have different attitudes at first. During the story they unite and compose a third attitude. Being able to conduct such a process demands the handling of multiple voices at risk of harming access to subtleness, small details or nuances. As a result, the argumentation is built through a sophisticated process of use of adjectives that is associated with the characters' positioning (meaning and counter-meaning), turned to the construction of thought.

2. Polyphony

The narrator's and the main character's voices merge and compose the before mentioned relation. "The consciousness of a character is given as someone else's consciousness, another consciousness, yet at the same time it is not turned into an object, is not closed, does not become a simple object of the author's consciousness." (Bakhtin, 2011, p.7) The characters are not still

voices in the plot, but representations of consciousnesses that, as in human relations, intertwine and recover themselves. This is the process described by the relation between meaning/counter-meaning.

According to Bakhtin (2011, p.6, author's italics): "(...) rather a *plurality of consciousness, with equal rights and each unit with its own world*, combine but not merged in the unit of the event. Dostoevsky's major heroes are, by the very nature of his creative design *not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse*." Polyphony, particularly in this Eça de Queirós's work, not only designates the mixture of voices present in the text, but also presents the independence that each character is given by the author, making them different subjects, masters of their speech and autonomous enough to interact with other voices. They are, therefore, free to be built from that relation controlled by the author, but does not only evolve from him hands: the subjects of this newly created speech may generate new interactions and change.

The novel is to Bakhtin (2011) a typically polyphonic genre once that, in presenting various social voices that confront, collide, represents distinct postures and worldviews that converge to an interaction. In *The city and the mountains*, the two main voices correspond to such definition as their postures and consciousnesses converge to a union – they persuade each other and unite. Postures and consciousnesses that are opposed at times and similar or completing each other at others – consequently, they are not individual but composed by the voices and their union.

The author's perception of the work is essential for the polyphony's maintenance through the narrative. The characters are portraits of the human psyche thus, text and reality should overlay. The voices settle in the reader's mind, taking into account that he becomes familiar with polyphony and makes the characters' interaction something real and feasible. According to Bakhtin (2011, p.37):

Dostoevsky had the seeming capacity to *visualize directly someone else's psyche*. He looked into someone else's soul as if equipped with a magnifying glass that permitted him to detect the subtlest nuances to follow the most inconspicuous modulations and transitions in the inner life of a man. Dostoevsky, as if *passing the external barriers*, observes directly the psychological processes taking place in a man, and fixes them on paper...

Eça de Queirós in Portugal, similarly to Dostoevsky (just in procedure, no further comparison meant), also portrayed his reality, his culture's reality, his compatriots' and a period of time. He became eternal by portraying human mind's reality through voices that overlay and are pronounced, becoming every so often either Portugal or the he himself.

4. Analysis

The novel is narrated by José Fernandes, the protagonist's, Jacinto Tormes, best friend. The text is formed by the two characters' distinct views on happiness. While narrating Jacinto's crossing of two countries, Portugal and France, José constantly intervenes with descriptions and evaluations. His friend's and his own attitudes gradually become clearer while he, as a narrator, composes Jacinto's imaginary place and as an interlocutor in directly dialogues with the protagonist.

While living in Paris, Jacinto shows himself as someone in love with technology and incapable of living without urban life's facilities. However, his inseparable friend and story narrator's company gradually brings about another feature of his character: in returning to Portugal and country life he realizes that happiness is not in luxury, but in the country's bucolic life. The

Lusitanian fighting spirit and the author's love for such land become clear when one observes Jacinto's radical opinion changing upon realizing country life's potential.

Nature's defense does not assume a laudatory characteristic on the stillness and exiguity of Portugal's country life in that moment. In fact, it occurs in order to enlarge the Lusitania spirit in its active and laborious feature. Both lusophony's view – José Fernandes's, that praises and regards it as synonym of accomplishment, and Jacinto Tormes's, that regards it as old-fashioned and decadent – merge showing Portugal's strength and the world diffusion of its culture. The narrative is an example of how the discourse resources may contribute to the construction of new meanings.

The use of adjectives employed bears criticism of costumes and the description of social values at the time. In raising the relation meaning/countermeaning through usage of adjectives, one has access to rich possibilities of expression and through them to a better integrated and advanced comprehension of an idea. In other words, the protagonist returns to his homeland with a new vision, more valuing and also enriched that also comprises a more exempt and absorbing evaluation of the environment customs that had temporality embraced him.

The adjectives are used to assign a new meaning to another term already endowed of meanings. On the other hand, the adjective inserts the reader into the production context as it stimulates the dialogue between him himself and the text through the stimuli of the interlocutor's capacity of articulation and imagination. This term allows truth and meaningfulness "to the context but, above all, to the noun that follows the adjective and that pours in it a bit of its soul" (Lapa, 1998, p. 125, our translation). "Through the adjective, the speaker emotionally characterizes the being talked about; through the abstract noun highlights feeling, quality and state, presenting it with more enhancement, less tied to the being (...)" (Martins, 2012, p. 107, our translation).

Therefore, the process of adjective use is the semantic union between the proprieties the noun already has and the persuasive arsenal sustained by the characteristics carried by the adjectives. Such process induces the reader to a reflection where the narrated context is imagined, making it concrete in their imagination and inserting them in the work. The argumentative process makes the character's voices and consciousnesses real in the interlocutor's mind. The polyphonic construction is the ideal space for the adjective as an argumentative resource to carry all its argumentative potential in a clear and noticeable way.

Predication is the process of assigning a statement to something positioned as the subject. Whether the subject is a verbal or nominal action to whatever extent, even phrasal, it promotes a description or makes a comment. Hence, predication has the adjectivation nature, develops the narrative and makes the textual voices move as the characters' consciousness components. It also has the benefit of engaging the reader in exciting and surprising interactions.

The analyses are composed of the narrative division in three distinct moments: the first displays Jacinto's love for the metropolis – Paris, the second concentrates on the switching of this posture already under José Fernandes voice's influence to a more contemporary view on happiness and the third blends both characters' voices and show true happiness once they return to Portugal. These consciousnesses as the awareness if the times presented in the narrative [Time 1 (T1), Switching Time and Time 2 (T2)] are polyphonically linked and become clear through the use of adjectives and predication.

T1

This part of the narrative presents Jacinto inebriated by Paris's charm and falling in love for all that is new. He is dependent on technology's innovations and comfort. The metropolis is pictured as the sole possible source of happiness to the character. When the narrator describes this attitude, he presents an appraising tone perceived by the usage of adjectives in the protagonist's

voice when reported in his friend's words on value judgment. Consequently, the reader feels that both have totally different opinions about such topic.

In the following text one can observe Jose Fernandes's appraising narrative regarding his friend's consciousness while describing his concept of happiness: "(...) a man can only be superlatively happy¹ when he is superlatively civilized." (Queirós, 2008, p.7). The highlighted adjectives display the symbiosis between being happy and civilized, two adjectives that are only valuable once together, that is, they have their complete meaning at the moment they appear together in Jacinto's consciousness and in the strength of his voice.

In another excerpt the narrator, through adjectives, describes how his friend's consciousness works and lists what is considered to be civilized to him. However, every lexical choice grants the speech an appraising tone and proposes the merging of voices once that Jacinto's consciousness only takes shape in José Fernandes's appraising process, as he needs to analyze his friend's chosen postures prior to narrating in order to attribute strength to the voice. "(...) Jacinto's idea of Civilization was inseparable from the image of the City, an enormous City with all its vast organs in powerful working order." (Queirós, 2008, p. 10) The use of the highlighted adjective indicates the metropolis' dimension in Jacinto's mind, but does not provide the description with reality, once José Fernandes neither agrees with it nor visualizes verisimilitude between it and Paris' reality.

In the excerpt, José Fernandes refers to his friend as "my Prince", predication that works as an epithet. Prince of Boa Ventura is the total expression of his esteem towards Jacinto and the acclamation of what he symbolizes to Portugal. Another character arises to emphasize all of the technological occurrences acquired at the two-store house and to show the strength such opulence holds in the narrative. "(the Countess de Trèves) was marveling at my super-civilized Prince's sumptuous collection of machines and instruments." (Queirós, 2008, p.50). There is a sequence of three positive adjectives that have their semantic fields joined by the part Jacinto's consciousness that considered the mechanics of his residence his only source of happiness.

During Time 1, in which the metropolis is valued, there is also the depreciation of the mountain by Jacinto's consciousness in the voice of José Fernandes, noticed through the adjectives implying how tedious the protagonist considers the country life to be. "And it seemed to him (Jacinto), too, that there was a kind of fickle melancholy about the forms and shyapes of certain inanimate things: the futile sprightly haste of streams, the bald rocks, the contorted trunks of trees, and the silly solemn muttering of leaves." (Queirós, 2008, p.13). Although Fernandes's narrative is faithful to Jacinto's approaches, it is also distant, given that those thoughts do not belong to the narrator at any given moment.

Time of Switching

In this part of the story, Jacinto appears to be bored with the empty life of civilization. In José Fernandes's narrative his voice and consciousness as a character acquire space and the strength of both voices becomes the same as their speeches begin to merge and the positions facing daily events start to match.

In the following excerpt, the narrator's voice arises on its own. He does not describe as his friend thinks or acts, but evaluates the context where he lives and shares with his friend. His voice emerges unaccompanied and gathers persuasive strength through the chosen adjectives and adjectival phrases. "(...) in this (the City) highly unnatural creation (...) man seems a non-human creature, without beauty, strength, freedom, laughter or feeling(...)" (Queirós, 2008, p. 93) The adjectives possess a negative semantic charge and come in multiples, that is, there are six expressions used in the sequence that able to qualify, punctuating the reading and promoting

¹ We highlighted some adjectives in quotations of The city and the mountains that will be dealt with in the analysis.

persuasion. Besides, Jacinto and the reader when faced with such structure visualize a semantic unity composed by the sum of these adjectival phrases turning what was already bad into something worse.

The next excerpt points to Jacinto's transition of attitude. The narrator describes his friend's worldview no longer in a radical way, as he sees himself in doubt and the city as something negative and harmful. Such change is owing to the strength assigned to José Fernandes's voice that becomes as much or more important than Jacinto's at this point and he starts to speak for himself and for his friend. "Perhaps the City is just a perverse illusion!" (Queirós, 2008, p.94)

In this other excerpt, José Fernandes's voice is again free and with appraising strength. His consciousness now works for both postures, building in his friend's voice, a new place, invading his imaginary and modifying his worldview.

(...)in the inconstant and skeptical City of Paris he was surrounded by ever active and ever faithful friends; N° 202 was filled to bursting with comforts (...) and yet still he was sad. (...)his sadness – that gray hairshirt in which his soul was shrouded – came not from him, from Jacinto, but from Life, from the regrettable, disastrous fact of being alive! And thus the healthy, intelligent, wealthy, well-loved Jacinto slid into Pessimism. (Queirós, 2008, pp. 111, 112)

The last excerpt of this time of switching again indicates love for Portugal with its gentleness and kindness as homeland in José Fernandes's voice. Now the focus is no longer on being in the metropolis as there are neither criticisms nor praises to Paris now and the story focus switches from the French city to Portugal and its appeals that start to be noticed by Jacinto and the reader, who is convinced, along with the main character, using the adjectives as an important argumentative resource to the text voices adaptation. "Ah, little mother Portugal, still so kind to her children!" (Queirós, 2008, p.119)

T2

In this last narrative moment, happiness becomes synonym of country life for both characters. Both voices and consciousness that would follow distinct paths now unite and converge to the same reasoning. Meaning and countermeaning converge and complement each other. The characters now use all knowledge and technological evolution acquired in Paris in favor of their homeland and find a third posture that mixes all the other voices to make Portugal their source of happiness.

The voices in this excerpt resonate together as José Fernandes narrates it with his and his friend's consciousnesses. "And soon, in the face of the incomparable beauty of that blessed land, all our ills were forgotten!" (Queirós, 2008, p.149) The positive adjectives now characterize the Portuguese mountain and the narrator no longer drifts apart from the information. On the contrary, it makes it his unconscious portrait.

The union of voices is established in the following excerpt: "And may we stay here with you always, you welcoming, fertile, peaceful mountains, most blessed of all mountains!" (Queirós, 2008, p.159), in which the narrator's voice emerges in the plural. The narrative's external plurality of voices and the sequence of adjectives show that the love for the mountain is shared by both characters' consciousnesses.

In this excerpt, the narrator describes his friend's happiness in feeling as if he belongs to the country, is a product of the land so beloved by the two of them. "(...) a long, loud, healthy, genuine guffaw made me start awake and force open my heavy lids. It was Jacinto, sprawled in

a chair (...)” (Queirós, 2008, p.183). The sequence of adjectives allows the semantic sum of their meanings. Jacinto’s laugh, that is, his happiness is characterized by the sum of all these positive characteristics and is now intrinsic to his voice and consciousness.

At last, the narrator inserts a metaphor, a figure of speech that consists on the internal comparison between one element, here Jacinto, and another, a tree. This comparison search for common elements that allow an interface between the chosen words. In the story, the choice of a tree was not in vain as Jacinto, once in love with technology, now surrenders to country life appeals and can therefore, be associated to it by the narrator who had active participation in his friend’s switching of consciousness. Such metaphor becomes more evident by the uses of the adjectives at times linked to the vegetables at others linked to human beings. “(...) that withered branch from the City (Jacinto) replanted in the mountains, had taken root, sucked up the humus from that inherited earth, created sap, set down more roots (...) and burst into flower – strong, serene, happy, beneficent, and noble, producing fruit and providing shade.” (Queirós, 2008, p.259)

The argumentative process at this point presents both characters’ voices that in turn are very close, so united that they represent the same consciousness and the same reason why they seek happiness and find it. The plot comes to an end and each character views are the result of everything that was confronted by them during the narrative.

Final remarks

Argumentation within a literary text follows many paths and this work attempted to produce a study regarding the argumentative construction of the relation between meaning and counter-meaning that emerges in the work founded on polyphonic construction. The central element is the use of adjectives as it is the process by which the narrative can contribute with the meaning formation with depth and sophistication. The employed adjectives bear the characters’ voices in each assessment and we realize, in every description, the positioning of Jacinto and José Fernandes due to the direction the adjectives assign to the narrative. This argumentative resource deals with the costume criticism and the social values description at the time.

All of these promoters compound the Queirosian work and combined integrate a unique and characteristic language. The idea of countermeaning is seen as an outcome of such match: Jacinto, the protagonist, has before him a group of arguments that may lead to two distinct interpretations. In other words, the same situation during the whole context of the story generates double positive – negative reading; excitement – indifference, affection – rejection and other counterparts that persuade the reader to interact with the voice that conducts the text. In the end, the main character realizes that his country and village are his best reference of home and happiness. This posture was conducted through the text mainly by the use of adjectives contained in their present countermeaning. And this is the aspect one wished to achieve in this research.

The study of the argumentative elements and the formation of the countermeaning in *Eça de Queirós’s* narrative is, therefore, the uniqueness we attempted to grant the work. The novel is intended to be focused on association with the evaluation of such resources to facilitate the understanding the characterization of the habits met by the character in two different social contexts and compare them. As a result, it is also meant to get to know better how the writer uses argumentation as means of scrutinizing the urgencies of the early 20th century society, marked by the never-ending search for new technologies.

Two views that, at first, are divergent but as the story unfolds merge and form a third, composed by the previous ones. This new conception of happiness also starts to belong to the reader, whereas the argumentative resources form the text so that this dialogue emerges from the work and settles in the imaginary place of the interlocutor.

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MONEY TALKS: A SEMIOTIC EXPLORATION OF MONEY AS COMMUNICATION

Christopher M. Bingham
University of Oklahoma, USA
bingham.christopher@gmail.com

Abstract

Money talks. While many have heard and even used this adage in their everyday communications, few have taken the premise of this statement at face value. In this paper I posit that money is itself a form of communication and that the examination of money as communication can broaden our understanding of the human experience. Additionally, this paper attempts to answer one of the central questions posed at the intersection of Semiotics and Marxism by suggesting that money is an appropriate object for study in this endeavor. One basic premise of Marx's social analysis is that the base determines the superstructure; that material (and economic) relations influence our thoughts and expectations about how society works. As the preferred form of capital, money – the medium through which our material relations are performed – structures our interactions and our perceptions thereof.

To clarify, I am less interested in symbolic work that plays out on the physical vessels of money (e.g., dollar bills) as these aspects have been explored by Shell and Tschachler. All forms of money – the bills, the coinage, the credit card swipes – are sign vehicles which point to abstract form of value – just as the word “hello” carries similar meanings whether it is traveling by vibrations in the air molecules or electrons moving down a copper wire toward one's telephone. This paper is concerned with the communicative power of money itself, not the physical object that carries or references it.

For this endeavor I present a four-cell typology of money's communicative processes. First, money speaks through positive movement, as can be seen at the instances of purchase and sale.

Second, money speaks through visible inertia, or the times when an expected transfer does not occur. Examples of visible inertia are boycotts, budget cuts, and when someone is written out of a will. Third, money speaks through its presence. The way that money works as a universal legitimizer, conferring a general sense of credibility on the wealthy, while denying it to others despite relative levels of knowledge or expertise, illuminates the communicative power of money's presence. Fourth, money speaks as a metaphor. Similar to Lakoff and Johnson's description of orientational metaphors, our cognitive and affective experiences with money inform our understanding of the world in general, including aspects outside of the economic sphere.

In short, this paper represents an exploration into four distinct processes of semiosis whose antecedent is money. Pairing Marxism with the notion that money is communication opens new avenues for understanding the intersection of exchange value and *lebenswelt*.

1. Money Talks

We have all heard the expression "money talks," but is this adage an accurate description? Generally speaking, the phrase "money talks" conveys the idea that money motivates people to action, communicating in a way that words alone cannot. Therefore, while money may not be able to hold its own in a conversation, it does function as a form – or perhaps medium – of communication, on a level that is distinct from linguistic interchange.

This paper outlines the justification behind a semiotic analysis of money as a form of communication. Working from this perspective I will elaborate on four distinct areas or realms where money functions as a form of communication. When defining this fourfold typology I will explicate each realm and provide specific examples of how money communicates, as well as outline opportunities for empirical research in each category. Ultimately, my goal is to provide a rough sketch for a research agenda whose purpose is to explore the communicative function of money.

As a preface I must offer one caveat to the content of this presentation. Acknowledging the importance of context, I must disclose as a limitation my own cultural subject position. Specifically, I am American studying communicative culture within the US. As such, the outcome of my research may only be applicable to my own cultural environment. An interesting extension to this research would be a comparative study to map money's communicative aspects in other cultures, and to determine which aspects are uniquely American.

Before one can justify this course of research, I must first explicitly describe similar lines of inquiry that are conceptually distinct from my research goals. In other words, one may find it helpful to know what I'm not talking about considering the similarities that are present. First, a number of scholars such as Rossi-Landi (1983) and Giorgio Borrelli (2013) have endeavored to use Marxist analysis as a way to explore the process of semiosis. While this line of theory is immensely helpful to my own enquiry, my research exists more in the realm of applied semiotics. By the end of this presentation I should be able to provide a number of examples that demonstrate fertile sources for empirical semiotic enquiry.

However, by using the word empirical I do not mean to imply that I will focus solely on the physical manifestation of money. This approach, which often focuses on the interpretation of signs printed on money, (bills, coins, etc.), has already been addressed from a number of perspectives by Mark Shell (1995), Heinz Tschlachler (2007), and Paschalidis (2014). When I say that money speaks, I do not mean to say that it functions as a container for holding other types of signs such as a coin or reserve note might. Rather, here we are concerned with the way that money's movement sends a message to a receiver. For example, the cashier is obligated to accept your payment whether it is in physical cash, or electronically using credit and debit cards. It is this form of money, this abstract form of (or conveyer of) value that is the focus of this enquiry.

Additionally, I do not mean to argue that all forms of money are equivalent, that there is no important distinction between debit cards and cash. On the contrary, if spending money on a debit card feels different from spending cash, then we should seek to explore that distinction. All forms of money - the bills, the coinage, the credit card swipes - are sign vehicles (or perhaps signals) which point to an abstract form of value - just as the word "hello" carries similar meanings whether it is traveling by vibrations in the air molecules or electrons moving down a copper wire toward one's telephone. This paper is concerned with the communicative power of money as it transmits value, not the physical object that carries or references it.

Semiotics scholarship has also addressed the issue of money, although in ways distinct from the goal of this paper. Working from an economics perspective, Wennerlind (2001) uses semiotics to examine how different economic schools view the nature of money. Umberto Eco (1979) also uses semiotics to define the role of money in Marx's critique of capitalism. To Eco (1979) Marx's description of money's role in society is analogous to the *signifier* in semiotics literature. Through this research agenda I intend to explore the various signifieds.

According to Marx (1976), the base (our real relations to society and each other) determines the superstructure (our thoughts and ideas about the nature of society). Additionally, many of linguistic and social features that we consider signs (words for Saussure 1986; Myths for Barthes 2012) and ideology (Hegemony for Gramsci 2006, 2011a, 2011b; Interpellation for Althusser 2006) are aspects of the superstructure. Following Marx and Engels (1978) we must assume that aspects of the base must be antecedent to the ideas and processes within the superstructure mentioned above. Or as Schaff (1970) explains, the base indirectly determines the superstructure with humans serving as a mediating factor. Here is where money is important: cash and credit have real buying power, which is relative between individuals. In other words, money is part of the base because it is often the central medium through which we maintain our relationships to each other and to society. Money is also communicative in that it sends a message, instigating a change in the recipient. Therefore, if money is part of the base, that it functions as a form of communication, and the base influences the superstructure, then perhaps studying money as communication may be one way to help explain the nature of the sign found in the superstructure. This research agenda could provide another tool for discussing Marx's (1978) notion that "the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas," without having to assume a conspiracy of global economic elites.

To reiterate, for the scope of this presentation one should assume the following perspectives. First, that money is a form of abstract value than can be held in a number of forms. Second, that the abstract value has definite, observable communicative functions. And third, that our social interactions that involve this abstract value have the potential to influence the way that we see the world. Keeping these considerations in mind we will examine a fourfold typology of the ways in which money communicates and explicate ways that these ideas can be explored through research.

2. A four-fold typology of money's speech

Here I posit a fourfold typology of the realms in which money plays a role in the conveyance of meaning. There are, however, several limitations to the provided typology. The first limitation is my subject position as a member of the culture of the US, as stated earlier. The second limitation is that further theoretical consideration may illuminate the possibility of collapsing multiple categories into one. The categories below are conceptually distinct. However, one cannot deny the possibility of rearticulating the categories in more parsimonious ways.

The first realm in which money communicates is through positive movement, or when money is sent from one entity (e.g., person or business) to another. The second realm is through visible

inertia, wherein the fact that money is not moving between entities conveys meaning. The third realm acknowledges that money has a certain presence of force, and can speak without moving. The fourth and final realm is that of metaphor, where our knowledge of money influences meaning-making processes without the need for any money to actually be present. Each of these four realms will be explicated below in three ways. First a brief functional definition of each realm will be provided. Second, examples will be described which highlight how money functions as communication. Third, these examples will be used to propose future research projects which will further line of enquiry. Therefore, each category will represent not only an aspect of money's communicative function, but also illuminate an area for empirical research.

2.1. Positive movement

The realm of positive movement is the standard setting in which we see money used. This realm involves *movement* in that it relies on money moving from one entity to another to fulfill its communicative function. The act of payment is the clearest example of the realm of positive movement. A customer transfers something to a vendor. Whatever is sent – be it in the form of cash or a credit card swipe – functions as money, and it sends some form of message, which when decoded, tells the vendor that goods and services have been properly paid for. Additionally, this positive movement of money cannot be replicated through linguistic means; money says something that my words cannot articulate or convey.

This category is interesting in that it treats money as an autonomous communicative medium. Any number of rational individuals can verify the amount of money rendered, meaning that it is *objectively measurable*. In this category money is both ontologically positivistic (it exists in a way that is empirically verifiable to all agents involved) and symbolic (arbitrary in Saussure's sense 1986). The paper notes which are rendered for payment (if using cash) as a physical object has no real use value. The cash is then symbolic in that it "stands in" for something else, some form of pure, abstract, or intersubjective value.

The positive movement of money can also carry very specific meanings when it occurs in certain defined contexts. For example, in the realms of investment and betting behaviors, the movement of money can be read as a statement of confidence; that the sender believes that the investment will pay off. The betting practices during a game of poker, where players move money into a pot that can be won, are especially illuminating for their communicative potential. In poker, *seeing*, *calling*, or *raising* – matching an opponents bet – demonstrates an amount of confidence in ones cards. Additionally, a player with a bad hand can raise the bet with the hope of scaring other players away from the hand. This strategy is called *bluffing* and it effectively uses the movement of money to lie about the nature of ones cards. Here, bluffing is important, because, as Umberto Eco (1976: 7) suggests, signs are anything than can be interpreted, which means anything that can be used to lie. Since bluffing involves communicatively using money to lie, then it passes Eco's (1976) criteria for semiotic investigation.

Another example of the positive movement of money – although a culturally specific one – is the practice of tipping in the US. Generally a large tip is seen as a "thank you" for good service while a small tip communicates displeasure or annoyance. However, the interpretation of the tip by the server may be more complex than this simple dichotomy. Lynn's (2013) publicly available data sets show nuance in servers' speech on tipping, indicating that the decoding processes that servers apply to tips are actually quite complex. However, most of the scholarly research on tipping has been conducted from the marketing and management perspectives, and represent attempts to map tipping as a consumer behavior. Therefore, mapping the communicative nature of money's positive movement may be best served through an ethnography of tipped employees which will explore the phenomenological nature of being tipped. Examining how these

employees react to tips and talk about tips to other employees may be useful in exploring the interpretation of tips. Additionally, the inverse study – interviewing the tip-leavers – may also be illuminating in a comparative manner. To what extent do interpretations of a tip's meaning coincide or diverge between the tipper and the tipped server?

2.2. Visible Inertia

Sometimes the fact that money is not moving can send a message, we label this communicative function visible inertia. Returning to the example of tipping, the practice of “stiffing” a server – leaving no tip at all – can send a powerful message. This is a prime example of visible inertia, where the positive movement of money is expected, and its lack of movement is both obvious and meaningful. Two additional examples of negative movement are boycotts and writing someone out of a will. In the realm of visible inertia, money is, in some ways, secondary to the process of meaning construction. When writing someone out of a will, the visible inertia of the money acts more like punctuation, adding an exclamation point to a statement of disapproval.

Similarly, Boycotting a business happens for a reason that is not simply that the protestors don't want to spend money at the target business or industry. Boycotts usually occur to persuade a company to take a specific action or to end a specific practice. Here, again, money acts as the exclamation point to the protestors' attempted persuasive appeals. Additionally, the practice of boycotting is predicated on an understanding of profit-driven capitalist enterprise. As useful as getting ones message out into the public sphere may be, knowing that businesses are centrally concerned with increasing profit affords protestors another communicative avenue that if successful will more persuasively make their point. Therefore, boycotts represent another social practice ripe for investigating the communicative nature of money. However, studying boycotts may prove to be a difficult endeavor, and simply interviewing participants runs the risk of having stakeholders stick to their institutionally approved statements. A more useful method may be that of ethnography, to be present during and observe the meetings of the protestors who boycott and in the executive boardroom of the target company to see how each group makes sense of the boycott.

The interesting aspect of this realm of visible inertia is that it may be the one in which it is easiest to view how money influences affective states. Writing someone out of a will is a serious statement of disapproval, and likely ends in an emotional response from the slighted individual. Perhaps it is in this realm of money's speech that we can begin to understand the emotional effect that money can have on individuals.

2.3. Force of presence

Money does not have to move in order to communicate. During the housing bubble crisis (circa 2009) one would occasionally see news stories about people whose houses were illegally foreclosed upon, and who then fought back, sued their bank or mortgage lender, and won (cf., Lush 2011). These homeowners occasionally mentioned the difficulty in finding a lawyer willing to sue banks. The idea was that the banks had so much money that their legal defense would be impenetrable. Here, money simply sitting in the bank's coffers is enough to communicate a message to a possible opponent; the *potential* for money to be put into work against a claimant was enough to often deter litigation. This realm of money's speech is concerned with the way that by simply knowing where money sits, the money is able to communicate something about its owner (generally their relative power).

This is not to say that only large amounts of money communicate in this way, the inverse is also true. Consider the image present in cartoons and sitcoms of a person pulling his or her pockets inside out to demonstrate their emptiness. In this image it is the lack of money that

communicates a meaning in reference to the depicted person. The image works on implicature. We do not simply understand that their pockets are empty; we understand that they have no money, and the aesthetics of the pose through which they communicate this idea implies a disarmed or weak connotation. The presence of no money broadcasts a meaning.

There is an obvious and strong connection between money and power. Therefore, we should also consider the signs that people acquire that indicate their relative amount of wealth, to examine how these signs also confer upon them a type of power. Consider the way wealth is indicated by the clothing system, expensive clothes are seen to look *nicer*. Additionally, the idea of looking expensive becomes interwoven with aesthetic beauty. We can see this relationship in expressions such as by saying that someone “looks like a million bucks,” or that “he had nothing but a five dollar suit.” This relationship between the expense of a suit and its visual quality can also be seen in clothing advertisements that offer a “\$1000 suit for \$300.” Such advertisements work, not by demonstrating the visual quality of the suit itself, but by focusing on the importance of its perceived cost. Looking sharp is simply a byproduct of looking expensive. Therefore, connotations of money are interwoven with how people evaluate the quality of clothes.

So if a suit looks expensive, what then? Having the illusion of money is very important, at least in the US. The more expensive the suit, the more credibility an audience will confer on a speaker. In the academic setting its easy to see that in large lecture halls undergraduates will pay more heed to the sharply dressed professor than the one who teaches in a suit she or he has had for 20 years. The indicators of money confer with them a certain amount of legitimization, obscuring the need for directly applicable and contextually specific credentials.

How can we examine the extent of this phenomenon? Cultural studies and critical media studies may help us in this specific endeavor. Examining the way that money and legitimization are confounded into one another in popular media is one possible avenue for research. Another approach may be to utilize the methodology of audience reception studies, exposing research participants to samples of media and having them describe – in their own words – the characters present in terms of the character’s authority and financial well-being to document the nature of the correlation between the two notions.

2.4. *Metaphor*

The final realm in which money speaks is through metaphor. This realm encompasses the many instances where our knowledge of and experience with money informs our understanding of noneconomic matters. One need not have access to money in order to cite money’s explanatory power.

The prevalence of communication that falls into this realm can be seen in the sheer number of economic metaphors used in everyday speech, at least in the US. Consider some examples. When someone chooses between two difficult options, others may ask “was it worth it?” implying that despite the complexity of the situation, the two options should be able to be boiled down into exchange value for the purpose of comparison. We say that we invest time and effort into relationships and expect a return on those investments. We have all heard that “time is money” and that we should “spend our time wisely.” There was even a recent trend (circa 2005–2012) where, in certain social groups the word “money” replaced “cool” in everyday speech. It was not uncommon to hear someone say “That’s money!” in response to something that they found interesting or worthy of merit. Consider the implicature inherent in the use of the word “successful” in American English. When a person describes another as “successful” in absence of a specific context, they do not mean that the other effectively reaches their goals; the statement means that they make a sufficient amount of money.

The list can go on but I would rather focus on one specific instance of the economic metaphor

that I've seen on a handful of occasions, maybe four times in the past six years or so in television fiction. The example is this: Character A asks Character B a very important question. Character B does not know the answer and so responds to Character A by stating "Hey, man, that question is above my pay grade." The fact that this phrase only occurs a handful of times does not diminish the importance of the fact that audiences can decode it fairly easily. The phrase references practices in the government and the military that ensure that people in more important positions get paid more money than those in lower positions. When first hearing this expression I knew nothing of the specific "pay grades" but that did not diminish the fact that I knew exactly what Character B meant the moment the phrase was uttered. What character B is doing is using money as a metaphor for understanding his relationship to a specific knowledge set. In other words, with a high degree of success, economic metaphors are used to express and explain non-economic ideas. Therefore we must ask about how prevalent this and similar processes are. To what extent is our understanding of non-economic issues colored by our personal experience with the economic sphere?

The relationship cited in the pay grade example – that salary positively correlates with knowledge – is important. If knowledge of economic relations orders our understanding of the rest of the world then such a process would support the Marxist conceit that the base determines the superstructure. Money, abstract though it may be, is real. We use money to buy goods, to pay our taxes, to invest in businesses, etc. In other words, our use of money is one aspect of the base. To say that the base determines the superstructure implies that our actual use of money determines how we see order in our world. This perspective on money's communicative function bears a close resemblance to Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) description of the orientational metaphor.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) cite another ubiquitous metaphor when they describe the orientational metaphor. The orientational metaphor relies on the physical orientation of up/down to explain non-physical ideas such as good/bad, conscious/unconscious, etc. What are the implications of assuming that economic interchange determines our mental processes; that we use our knowledge of economics to make sense of non-economic data in a universal fashion, similar to how we universally apply the orientational metaphor? The proposed research here would be to create an archive of financial metaphors, how they are used, and a thick description of how each one inspires meaning in the audience. Such a study could act as a map for the various ways that through linguistic communication we utilize economic knowledge to explain and understand non-economic issues. In other words we need to better understand the ways that money speaks through influencing our evaluative mental and cognitive processes.

3. Further considerations

This research agenda represents the first steps of a long journey. It is through these and other inquiries into the communicative nature of money that we can begin to better understand money's speech. The questions raised above are important as first steps not only because they ask *what money is saying*, but they also suggest a self-reflexive effort to determine *how to better* listen to money on its own terms. My ability to understand television programming in the US is predicated on my proficiency in knowing the English language. Similarly, if we want to understand the communicative nature of money, we must first learn money's language, and map the relationship between signifier and signified over the medium of exchange value. To fully understand money's role in society we will need more than simply economic theory. Economics may help us understand how money works but it does not address how money communicates, what it says, how it makes us feel. Therefore, we must create a semiotics of money in order to better understand not only our relationship to the economy, but how our economic participation mediates our relationships with each other.

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TRANSPERSONAL POETIC COMMUNICATION

Emilia Parpală
University of Craiova, Romania
parpala_afana@yahoo.com

Abstract

On the whole, the linear or orchestral models of communication failed to integrate the sacred, vertical dimension of human communication. Transpersonal communication (TC) designates the interaction with divine entities, with ancestors or spirits beyond man's contingent existence and knowledge. TC could also be seen as the expansion and unification of the self through archetypal symbolic structures. The forms of metaphysical experience (the prayer, the meditation, the religious rituals, the mystic visions and representations) express the subjective need for transcendency, which is an immanent dimension of the self.

Understanding God is, according to Solomon Marcus (2009: 59), a mediating process which involves metaphor and self-reference. The semiotics of God implies the ternary relation: Nothingness, Infinity and Self-referentiality. Robert C. Neville (2002) remarked the dynamic character of the interpreters, as the religious signs are not static, but engaged in vivid symbolic interactions. Massimo Leone (2009: 190) noted the semiotic paradox of representation specific to TC: through iconic presentification, an absent entity is signaled by signs of visibility and vice versa. The visual representations of the sacred, following specific conventions and interdictions, illustrate the style a society or a certain creator confer to non-representable entities an iconic presence.

The artistic experience testifies to the affinity between TC and poetry – “a religious state of our spirit which gently affirms and lovingly receives the presence of God in the suave beauties of existence.” (Arghezi). In the present paper, we offer an inventory of the most representative strategies of TC in modern Romanian poetry: the endo-/exophoric reference, the dramatic address,

the semantic-syntactic models of mediated communication, the deictic system, the “figure and ground” stylization etc. Accordingly our approach is semiotic, communicational, and cognitive.

For the direct TC, our starting point is the teophany narrated in *Jacob wrestling with the angel* (*Genesis* 32: 22-32), reinterpreted in two neomodern parodic pheno-texts, viz. *Lupta lui Iacov cu îngerul sau ideea de „tu”* (*Jacob wrestling with the angel or the idea of “you”*) by Nichita Stănescu and *Minunea* (*Miracle*) by Marin Sorescu. The concept of “type scene” (Savran 2005) is useful in this comparative analysis. We will identify in Ioan Alexandru’s hymns the values of foregrounding generated by the figure – ground disposition (Stockwell 2003). The figuration process is centered on the attractor “light”, a symbolic metaphor specific to the Byzantine imagery. The figure overwhelms the ground, abolishes the perspective and imposes the omnipresent light, a sign (icon, index, symbol) of the sacred Logos. The principles of iconicity, the emphasis on the liturgical discourse, the esoteric symbols, the celebration of primitivism characterize the hymnographic poetry of the neo-modern Ioan Alexandru.

For the indirect TC, Tudor Arghezi’s *Psalms* offer the most complex semiotic system of “metonymic signs of the Sign”, transcoded in images of impressive sensoriality. (Parpală 1984).

In religious traditions, the representation of God is canonical and rigid; in poetry, the alternatives reveal a rhetorically mediated hypothetical communication; its humor and dramatic character result from ontological difference and from emotional involvement. We noticed a baroque TC in Arghezi’s psalms, a parodic one with Sorescu, a logocentric metaphysics with Stănescu, a cataphatic and expressionistic figuration with Alexandru.

1. Introduction

In the present paper, we offer an inventory of the most representative strategies of transpersonal communication (TC) in (neo)modern Romanian poetry: the endo-/exophoric reference, the parodic intertextuality, the dramatic address, the semantic-syntactic models of mediated communication, the deictic system, and the “figure and ground” stylization. We intend to correct thus the non-specific discussions on poets’ “religiosity”, common in Romanian literature studies.¹ For the (in)direct TC, Tudor Arghezi’s psalms offer the most complex semiotic system, transcoded in images of impressive sensoriality (Parpală 1984; 2009).

Accordingly, our approach is semiotic, communicational, and cognitive:

a) Peircean semiotics is particularly adequate to the dynamic approach of Eastern Orthodoxy, which concentrates on experiencing, living God. By considering the pragmatic contexts, the semiotic theory of theology amends the Christian tradition, which builds symbols of deity as static and universal.

b) Communicational criticism elaborated by Roger D. Sell (2000; 2011; 2013) suggests useful concepts: “endophoric/exophoric reference”, “community making”, “mediation”, “genuineness” etc. This “idealistic pragmatism” is a response to the post-postmodern condition, for which literature is a universal way of communication.

c) Cognitive poetics/stylistics turns to account the texture of perspectivism (*figure and ground theory*). Cognitive poetics / stylistics explored, among other new topics, the perspectivism of the text (*figure and ground theory*).

2. Transpersonal communication and symbolic archetypes

Transpersonal communication designates the interaction with divine entities, with ancestors or spirits beyond man’s contingent existence and knowledge. It is considered, alongside interpersonal, intrapersonal, media and group communication, as a level or a type of human interaction.

¹ Expressions such as “religious poet” or “irreligious poet” are “non-critical, futile.” (Balotă 1977: 152).

Linear or orchestral models of communication failed to integrate the metaphysical experience of individuals.² The essence of communication cannot be fully grasped unless it is considered, along with the horizontal dimension of socialization, “the vertical dimension of the human connection to the hierarchies of the spirit.” (Dinu 2007: 31). The double meaning, the sacred and the profane, is part of the double etymology of the term “communication”.

From a psychoanalytic perspective, TC could also be seen as the integration, unification and expansion of the self through archetypal symbolic structures. Carl Gustav Jung (1990) noted that each of the major structures of personality (the self, the ego, the shadow, the animus and anima) is an archetype. The self is an archetype of the totality, as the ego is the center of consciousness. The unconscious expresses itself through archetypal symbols, both individual and collective; God-Father, Jesus, Mohammed, Buddha are symbols of the self, of dynamic balance, opposed to disharmony and antagonisms.

As an interaction that takes place in a person’s spiritual area, TC is carried out in conjunction with the intrapersonal area. The forms of metaphysical experience (the prayer, the meditation, the religious rituals, the mystic visions and representations) express the subjective need for transcendence, which is an immanent dimension of the self.

The artistic experience attests the affinity between TC and poetry – “a religious state of our spirit which gently affirms and lovingly receives the presence of God in the suave beauties of existence.” (Arghezi 1976: 14).

3. Transcendancy – a universal concept

Though transcendancy is usually understood as referring to God – an entity which transcends our universe, the concept of transcendancy is more extensive than the concept of Divinity. Understanding God is a mediating process which involves metaphor, myth, allegory or drama. The semiotics of God implies, according to Solomon Marcus (2009: 59), the ternary relation between Nothingness, Infinity and Self-reference. Infinity is the common denominator of transcendancy in theology, philosophy, and mathematics. It contrasts with the finitude of our lives and, because we do not have a direct perception of these entities, there is a process of mediation conducted by signs that open an infinite semiosis. God is “the last indeterminate significant”, remarks a character of David Lodge’s novel *Nice Work!* (1997: 209).

Robert C. Neville (2002) observed the dynamic character of the interpreters, as the religious signs are not static, but engaged in vivid symbolic interactions. Thus, we can take the life of Jesus as an iconic, indexical or symbolic sign of the divine presence. Solomon Marcus (ibid.: 60) distinguishes between the metaphorical, indexical, symbolic, and iterative representations of the coreferent terms (God, the Almighty, the Creator etc).

The representation of the nonrepresentable is a semiotic paradox specific to TC. In a study about the veil in the Jewish culture of the invisible, Massimo Leone (2009: 190) noted that, through “iconic presentification”, an absent entity is signaled by signs of visibility and vice versa.

4. Direct transpersonal communication: the theophany experience

For the direct TC, our starting point is the theophany narrated in *Jacob wrestling with the angel* (*Genesis* 32: 22-32), reinterpreted in two neomodern parodic pheno-texts, viz. *Lupta lui Iacov cu îngerul sau ideea de “tu”* [*Jacob wrestling with the angel or the idea of “you”*] by Nichita Stănescu and *Minunea* [*Miracle*] by Marin Sorescu. The concept of “type scene” is useful in this comparative analysis. We will identify in Ioan Alexandru’s hymns the values of foregrounding generated by the figure-ground disposition.

² A fortunate exception, the final chapter of Mihai Dinu’s book, *Comunicarea. Repere fundamentale*, dedicated to “the metaphysical timbre, refused, unfortunately, by the usual definitions.” (Dinu 2007: 25).

4.1. The type-scene: Jacob wrestling with the angel

Allegorical story, legend or myth, *Jacob wrestling with the angel* concisely narrates an enigmatic event: the patriarch Jacob³ confronting an ambiguous being, which is successively attributed a double nature: of man and God.⁴ In the verses 24-27 the term *man* is used, which could be interpreted as Jesus foreshadowing, in the cataphatic way of God's embodiment. After the verse 28, which displays the performative act of changing the name of Jacob in Israel, the designation is made by the term *God*.

In this agonic theophany, TC involves both the initiation in the human-deity partnership and the perlocutionary force of blessing in the form of a symbolic name (Israel) – the full realization of the self. The revelation of divine names, central in the *Old Testament*, is interpreted by Ugo Volli as an “inaugural act of knowledge”⁵.

The revelation of God, repeatedly narrated in the Old Testament, evidences a common scenario described by George W. Savran (2005) as a type-scene structured in the following moments (alluding to Propp's “functions”):

- the preparations for the theophany – the separation of the protagonist from the community, at night;
- the visual and verbal revelation of the Divinity;
- the human reaction to the asymmetric interaction;
- the transformation and the externalization, namely sharing the experience in a larger societal context.

4.2. Nichita Stănescu, *Jacob wrestling with the angel or about the idea of “you”*

Stănescu's neomodern poem, published in the volume *Necuvintele [The unwords]*, (1969), thematizes the identity – otherness opposition, which unfolds in two types of dialogic sequences:

a) on the one hand, there is the intrapersonal communication *eu – tu [I – you]*, shaped in the dispute between the name (sign of identity) and the body / soul (signs of otherness): “Numai numelui meu nu-i spun tu;/în rest însuși sufletul meu/este tu,/tu, suflete.” [“Only my name I don't call ‘you’/all the rest, my soul itself/is ‘you’/you, soul.”] (Stănescu 1985: 347). Among the techniques of defamiliarization we note: the endophoric reference, the emphatic addressing and the reported discourse related to personification;

b) on the other hand, there is a transpersonal dialogue with an apathetic *el [he]*, symbolized in the final lines by alluding to the *Bible*: “De ce o fi spus atunci: / te-ai luptat cu însuși cuvîntul / și l-ai învins! // Să fi fost el însuși cuvîntul?” [“Why be said then: / ‘You've battled the word itself/ and you defeated it!’ // Would it have been the word itself?”] (ibid.: 349).

The protagonists engaged in the dialogue have no names, but roles designated by personal deixis: I-you-he.⁶ The authorial ethos (“I” and “you”) metaphorically assumes Jacob's experience of redefining personal identity.

The name dispute (an empty but essential sign), placed at the break of the day, highlights the romantic (Platonian) idea of Godly inspired poetry and the self consciousness of modern art. The intrapersonal and the transpersonal communication recycle the *exegi monumentum* theme:

³ The direct relationship of Patriarchs with God was aimed at salvaging the world through the revelation of the divinity. In *Psalms*, Arghezi (1980, I: 39) deplors the distance between the sacred and the profane.

⁴ Angels cumulate the ambiguous nature of messenger: divine and human (Pleșu 2003; Militaru 2012).

⁵ “the theory of true name which evokes the essence of things is applied hundreds of times in the *Bible* text, especially to people and places” (Volli: 6). The function of the proper name is not therefore to describe but to identify, by adding to the person the extrinsic quality of being called (Kripke 1982; Gouvard 1998).

⁶ For the pragmatic values of pronominal system see Benveniste (1966; 1974); for the thesis of dialogic existence see Buber (1937); the pairs *Ich-Du*, *Ich-Es* are the two ways of being through communication: dialogic and monologic, respectively. For Buber, God is an eternal „you”.

the idea that the real identity (and eternity) consist in the name the poet builds in his creation. Stănescu decided in favour of the Word / word – a logophatic option which embodies both the Divinity and the poetic creative effort.

4.3. Tudor Arghezi: the sacred in the profane

Arghezi's psalms⁷ are structured on two axes – identification and communication (Parpală 1984: 104-105) and exhibit an oxymoronic ethos: “Tare sunt singur, Doamne, și pieziș” [“So alone I am, God, and crooked!”] (Arghezi 1980: I, 24); “Ești ca un gând, și ești și nici nu ești/Între putință și-ntre amintire” [“You are like a thought, you are and you aren't/Between willingness and memory”] (ibid.: I, 50).

Arghezi rejects the traditional Christian code, its anthropological patterns, product of a vulgar imagination, and emphasizes the contrast between *seeing* and *understanding*:

Pentru că n-au putut să te-nțeleagă / Deșertăciunea lor de vis și lut, / Sfinții-au lăsat cuvânt
că te-au văzut / Și că purtai toiag și barbă-ntreagă. [Because they couldn't understand you
/ Their nothingness of dream and clay, / The Saints let us know they have seen you / And
that you were carrying a stick and a whole beard.] (ibid.: I, 50).

Undecided and longing for certainty, the poet himself claims material proofs of God's existence: “Vreau să te pipăi și să urlu: ‘Este!’” [“I want to touch you and to scream: ‘There it is!’”] (ibid.: I, 45). The state of *deus absconditus* is best shown in the *Psalm (Nu-ți cer un lucru prea cu neputință [I don't ask of you something very difficult])*, where the suffering comes from the absence of God's signs. The poet evokes the sacred time of Scriptures, opposed to the profane context of regress concerning the dialogue man-divinity:

De când s-a întocmit Sfânta Scriptură / Tu n-ai mai pus picioru-n bătătură [...] Îngerii tăi
grijeau pe vremea ceea / Și pruncul și bărbatul și femeea. // Doar mie, Domnul, veșnicul și
bunul, / Nu mi-a trimis, de când mă rog, / niciunul. [Ever since the Holy Bible was written
/ You hadn't set foot in the yard [...] Your angels used to take care in those days / Of the
baby and the man, and the woman. / Only to me, the eternal and good God, / Didn't send,
since I've been praying, / any]. (ibid.: I, 39).

In *Cântec mut [Dumb song]*, God and his angels descend the Ladder of Fire to bring solace to a dying man. It is the only theophany that occurs in the profane world of Arghezi's representations of the sacred in the profane: “La patul vecinului meu / A venit azi noapte Dumnezeu. / Cu toiag, cu îngeri și sfinți [...] Și odaia cu mucegai / A mirosit toată noaptea a rai” [“To my neighbor's bedside / Last night God came / With crook, angels, and saints [...] And the chamber with mildew / Smelled all night of heaven.”] (ibid.: I, 138).

4.4. Minunea (Miracle) – a parodic theophany

Minunea is a parodic type-scene concentrated in the initial generative statement: “Lui Lungu

⁷ Arghezi's psalms form an unsystematic corpus disseminated throughout his poetic work, from the volume *Cuvinte potrivite [Fitting Words]*, 1927, until *Frunzele tale [Your Leaves]*, 1968.

i s-a arătat Dumnezeu azi-noapte” [God has been shown up to Lungu last night”] (Sorescu 1986: 19). The vision reproduces the antropomorphic representations common to the naive surrealist icons. Community making with listeners generates comic effects based on distrust, curiosity and ambiguity:

Și-odată, fâș! foșnea ceva în pătuiag. / Când se uită în sus – Dumnezeu! / Sta așa în capul oaselor./ L-a întrebat: ‘Ce mai faci?’ / Și asta fusese totul. [...] // Dar tot Lungu susținea și altminterea, adică Dumnezeu / Îl întrebuse, / Blând și așezat de-acolo din pătuiag, parcă-ar fi fost pe tronul / Lui de aur, / Că sclipea totul în jur. [At once, fâș! something rustled in the haystack./ When looking above – God! / Just stands upright. / He asked: ‘How are you?’/ And that was it. [...] // But Lungu claimed otherwise, that God / asked him, / Gentle and settled there in the haystack as if it were on his golden throne / As everything around was shining.] (ibid.: 19–20).

In TC, a special emphasis is placed on affects, for proximity of incompatible ontological registers releases paroxystic emotions, euphoric or dysphoric. Discourse deconstruction takes place under the pressure of two emotions: astonishment and confusion. Emotions are expressed by metonymy and gradation:

1) by metonymy. The physiological effects substitute the emotion: “simt o-mpăcare mare” [“I feel great placation”] (ibid.: 22). In verbal enunciation, the state of dizziness is expressed by:

a) confusion and contradiction. Lungu doesn’t know to explain who asked whom – God asked him or vice versa: “Păi, eu l-am întrebat...adică...m-a întrebat...” [“Well, I asked him ... I mean ... he asked me...”] (ibid.: 22).

b) modal marks of suspension and questioning, following the intrusion of the enunciation in the utterance: “Eu nu știu acum...ce-o să se întâmple cu mine?” [“I do not know now ... what will happen to me?”] (ibid.: 23).

c) “annihilation of the subject” (Greimas, Fontanille 1997: 259): “A prins un fel de transparență” [“He caught a kind of transparency”] (ibid.: 23). The public invests the protagonist with the role of a saint: “Și-a pus coroană de măcăciuni de roșcov în jurul gâtului / Și-a plecat să propovăduiască în pustiu” [“He put a wreath of carob brambles around his neck / and went to preach in the wilderness”] (ibid.: 23). Or, holiness is one of the most elusive phenomena thought by humanity (Visser, Wilcox 2006: x).

2) by gradation. As excitement mounts, the protagonist loses the competence to verbalize his feelings. He cannot say anything intelligible; the crushed discourse reaches its lower point – the interjection. Invited by the crowd to preach, the saint articulates but “E-ei!”. Sorescu exploits this paradox: the peak of emotion correlates with the annihilation of the discourse. Interjection, a morphological class valued in emotional speech, connotes the limit of expression (Aijmer: 2004).

Sorescu wrote *Minunea* with a detached involvement. From one point of view, we notice the dramatic strategies generating the illusion and the comic of the situation; on the other hand, he ironically compromises the simulacrum.

5. Indirect transpersonal communication: the rhetoric of mediated transcendency

For this paradigm, the relevant samples have been excerpted from Tudor Arghezi’s psalms, displaying a communication mediated by metonymic signs of the Sign and from Ioan Alexandru’s expressionist hymns, displaying a “figure and ground” strategy of pantheistic revelation.

5.1. Tudor Arghezi: the metonymic signs of the Sign

The performance model of *Psalms* is simple: a human paradigm (“I”) addressing a divine paradigm (“you”), while the rhetoric of TC is complex due to the deterioration of the referential transparency. At both levels, it’s easy to remark the doubling of “I” and the opaqueness of “you”. God is the *Lord*, the *Father*; *Somebody*, *Someone*, *Nobody*, *Who knows who* – indefinite pronouns, because the concept of “God” has an opaque referent. The texts offer arguments for a type of semiotic reference through which the referent is signaled, not signified (Valesio 1971: 155–185).

As an abstract construct, divinity is not represented by following rational principles, but mythological-baroque ones (Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 220). In his pathetic hunting, the psalmist meets only indexis of the Sign. Arghezi amends God’s referential opacity derived from its abstract, fictional characteristics, by using “metonymic signs of the Sign” (Parpală 1985: 93–109). Signs of revelation and interdiction are:

- a) material signs: the light, the angels, the Creation vs. locks, stone relics;
- b) psychic signs: love, devotion vs. fear;
- c) linguistic signs in reported speech: “Ți-am auzit cuvântul spunând că *nu se poate*” [“I heard your word saying that is not allowed”] (Arghezi 1980:I, 17).

The Divine does not reveal as itself, hence the disappointment induced by cryptic signs: “Dar semnele, doar semne, răzlețe și-adunate, / Nu mai mi-ajung, părute, și nici adevărate. / Vreau tâlcul plin să-l capăt și rostul lor întreg.” [“But signs, only signs, scattered and gathered, / Are not enough to me, apparent and not even true. / Their full meaning and whole purpose I want to get.”] (ibid.: II, 167).

5.2. Ioan Alexandru: the *light* as “figure and ground”

“Figure” and “ground” are crucial concepts for distinguishing, in a “texture”⁸, a figure on the background on which it takes shape. In cognitive science, it concerns the theory of linguistic foregrounding, in its variant called “the theory of figure and ground organization” (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 156–204). Peter Verdonk (2005: 241) discusses two scenarios from visual arts: while in Breughel’s painting the figures gain pronounced relief from their opposition to the background, with M.C. Escher the figure can be perceived simultaneously as the ground. In cognitive poetics/cognitive stylistics, our ability to structure mental situations and texts in various ways offers a rational explanation to the figures of speech.

Peter Stockwell (2002: 21) described stylistic prominence with the help of “attractors” – figures that channel the attention of readers or listeners; the figure is a moving trajectory with well-defined edges, while the background is vague, continuous and homogenous. Unlike the surrealist writing analyzed by Stockwell (2003: 13–26), in which the goal is achieved through literal metaphor, the expressionist image is reached through the accumulation and repetition of the generalized figure. In the Romanian neo expressionism of the late 1960s the primitivism and the celebration of the phenomenal have produced highly stylized, contemplative, monochrome visions. The celebration of the Divine, the emphasis on the liturgical discourse, the esoteric symbols and the principles of iconicity characterize Ioan Alexandru’s expressionist hymns.

Masterpieces of the volume *Imnele bucuriei* [*Hymns of Joy*], 1973, the poems *Lumină lină* [*Gentle light*] and *Lumina neapropiată* [*Unapproachable light*]⁹ glorify the divine dimension of

⁸ “texture is always the experienced quality of textuality” (Stockwell 2009: 15).

⁹ Ioan Alexandru borrowed the phrase from the apophatic (negative) description of God: “he lives in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6: 16).

the world. -In his hyperbolic and oxymoronic images, the poet quotes the apophatic description of God: “He lives in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6: 16).

Alexandru’s hymnography celebrates the values of foregrounding generated by the figure – ground disposition. The figuration process is centered on the attractor “light”, a symbolic metaphor specific to Byzantine imagery. The figure overwhelms the ground, abolishes the perspective and imposes the omnipresent light, a sign (icon, index, symbol) of the sacred Logos: “Lumină lină, lini lumini / Răsar din codrii mari de crini, / Lumină lină, cuib de ceară, / Scorburi cu miere milenară. // Lumină lină, Logos sfânt” [“Soft light, soft lights / Arise from vast thickets of lilies, / Soft light, nest of wax, / Hollows with ancient honey. // Soft light, holy Logos”] (Alexandru 1973: 122).

The poet relies on the principles of iconicity discussed by Peter Stockwell (2009: 83-85). According to the quantitative principle, the expressionist stylization corresponds to the principle of the incarnated Logos; the game of parallelisms and alliterations, the emphasis on the liquids l and r figure out the cosmic invasion of light. The reference being exoforic¹⁰, the texture cohesion is not assured by internal references, but through the phonetic syntax: “Lumină lină lini lumini”. According to the sequential principle, the amplitude of the symbolic metaphor of light, the ecstatic contemplation, the emphasis on liturgical symbols ensure the endophoric reference and the coherence of the vision. According to the proximity principle, the deictic center of enunciation configures the hyperbolic image of transcendence descending, specific to Orthodox metaphysics.

6. Conclusion

The paper has considered the paradox of God’s representation in (neo)modern Romanian poetry, from a communicational, semiotic and cognitivist perspective. We discussed the (in) direct transpersonal communication in Tudor Arghezi’s psalms, the theophany textualized in Nichita Stănescu’s and Marin Sorescu’s intertextual poems, and Ioan Alexandru’s hymns, relevant to the “figure and ground” neo expressionism. The poetic images emphasize a baroque semiosis.

In religious traditions, the representation of God is canonical; in poetry, the alternatives reveal a hypothetical, rhetorically mediated TC; its humor and dramatic character result from ontological difference and from emotional involvement. We noticed a baroque TC in Arghezi’s psalms, a parodic one with Sorescu, a logocentric metaphysics with Stănescu, a cataphatic and expressionistic figuration with Alexandru.

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¹⁰ The reference to the world outside the text is called exoforic; the reference to the elements of the text is called *endoforic*. Both are important in creating texture, but only the last one is purely cohesive, acting through anaforic and cataforic mechanisms. For the application of these concepts to the analysis of the poetic texts, see Sell (2013: 21-28).

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THE ARCHETYPAL LANGUAGE OF EUROPE. THE LANGUAGE OF THE GETAE AND ETRUSCANS

George Cadar

Romanian Association of Semiotic Studies, Roumanie

cadargeorge@yahoo.com

Astract

Après quarante ans d'études et en ayant la chance d'être original d'une région de la Roumanie ou on parle encore un idiome de la langue des dacs, le département de Maramures, j'ai réussi reconstruire a bonne partie la langue archétypale de l'Europe.

Cette langue c'est la même de quelle le grand linguiste Guillaume Rergmann affirme en XVIIIème siècle dans son œuvre célèbre « Les Gètes », que c'est l'ancienne langue qu'on parle encore en toute l'Europe de XIIIème siècle. Il affirme, pour la première fois, que cette langue est blonogramique / motivée et profondément palatali-sée, que c'est la même que la langue des étrusques ou des traques et qu'elle est d'origine vlacho-pelasgiques. Dans la langue sainte, l'onomastique du nom « VALAHALLA » signifie « Les fils de Dieu ». Si on corrobore l'œuvre de Rergmann avec celle de Charles Hure, « L'écriture Sainte de l'Europe OT », on peut facilement constater qu'on a à faire avec des mots en majorité vlacho-traques.

Personne n'a réussi, jusqu'à présent, faire une traduction complète des écrits étrusques ou traques, parce qu'on n'as pas connu la prononciation exacte des mots en ces temps-là.

En ce que me concerne, j'ai réussi comprendre et étudier la prononciation diftongisée de la langue archétypale et j'ai réussi réaliser quelques traductions des écrits tracho-étrusques qui est la même langue que la langue vlacho-pelasgique.

Who are the Etruscans?

The Etruscans are a nation that historians locate in the Italian peninsula. But I believe that they are identical to the Thracians and to the Trojans, so in conclusion they occupy in the antiquity the entire Aegean-Mediterranean-Balkan area.

According to my studies I have come to the conclusion that the Etruscans are of Vlachian-Pelasgian - Scythian origin. The last nation left from the Vlachian-Pelasgian origin in Europe is the Romanian people and its language. Because of these considerations I can now understand and translate many of the Etruscan words. In conclusion the Romanian language is an archetypal language, one of the first languages of Europe.

Six years ago I met, in a village in the North of Romania, some descendants of an old voievoдал/princely family who were still speaking an idiom of the Dacian or Getae language.

Studying this idiom I have found that all the root words of this vocabulary can be found in the majority of today European languages.

In 1782 the great historian and linguist Guillaume Rergmann, professor at the University of Strasbourg, was invited by the French Academy to write a history of Europe. He entitled his book "Getae", because Rergmann considered that the Getae or the Dacians are the oldest residents of Europe.

He says that the Getae language was spoken since the XIII century B.C. on the entire European territory. He was the first scientist of the modern age who mentioned the name of Decebal, the king of the Dacians in their language "DAVAKHAVLAS", meaning *GOLDEN EAGLE*. Rergmann also said that the Getae are descended from the Scythians, who are their parents, and I believe that the Scythians are descended from the Vlach-pelasgians.

When we talk about Vlachs, we speak about *VALAHALA*, name that means in the Holy language "the sons of God". The last people who preserve this name are Romanians, who have the same identity with the Vlachs.

For this reason I now have the chance to decipher the text in the Thracian language of the ring found at Ezerovo in Bulgaria, close to the city Plovdiv. In the getae language Plovdiv means plain/field fortress/castle PLAVADAVA.

The golden ring of Ezerovo found in 1912 is an artifact of Thracian or Dacian identity from the VI century B.C. It must not be forgotten the fact that at that time the territory of Bulgaria was a part of what the historians name "Dacia Mediteranea" with the capital at Serdica – Sofia today.

The text must be read with the pronunciation of that time. No inscriptions of a Pelasgian, Etruscan or Thracian text can not be decipher if it is not known the pronunciation of the text in period it was written.

It can be found plenty of words from Etruscan or thraco-getae texts in the Romanian language until today.

Text the ring of Ezerovo:

"ROLISTENE AS NE RENEA TILTEAN HEKO APA ZEA DOMEAN TILEZYPTA MIH EPA ZHATA"




“My name is Rolistene, born Renea. Tiltean is the name of the land that I own. The ground that I walk, TILEZYPTA is my life.”

The verb “to be” as “AS” or “IS” is named the same today in the Romanian language, so is the word ARA which means *area, clay/argil, soil*. ZHATA, ZEATA, VIATA which means *life*.

Another ancient inscription found on the LEMNOS island from Greece in 1885, represents a text form the VI century B.C. written in vlacho-pelasgian, language that resembles a lot with Etruscan.

The text of the funeral stele in Lemnos:



“Nicholas wasn’t my support today. He left and he didn’t took anything with him. My dream ruined along with him. Leave my dearest, with clear soul. He left.. He ruined dying...”

The language is one of the few evidence of strength with which the Romanians can prove their identity and their age, their European primacy.

Here are some root words, the matrix words of the European archetypal language which are still kept with the same meaning only in the Romanian language:

AR-from this sacred word are born the words *area, argil, arbeit, area, servant-argat*. AR in the old language of the Romanian people means *peasant- taran- terran*. From here are formed the words *tsar-tar, Cesar, Kaiser*.

IN, INA – *flower*. The flax “in” is the first flower of clothing, the flower of Enoch mentioned in the Bible. All the flowers are protected in the GARDEN – EN – IN –ENA

Gradina in Romanian

Giardino in Italian

Garten in German

Tradgard in Sweden

Garden in English

The word *fence – gard* in Romanian means *protection, enclosure, guard* and it is used today with the same meaning. Names of flowers and plants kept until today *jasmine, root, flax, grain*

IZ, IZA – in Dacian language *water, source, river*

In Romanian *IZ*

In Hungarian *VIZ*

In Slavic *EZERO*

From here comes the word “to baptize” which means *to beat water*. The hydronyms *TISA, IZA, TAMISA, MORAVIZA, BISTRIZA, IALOMIZA*

AM, AMA – *root that forms the word “mother” – mama*

Love – *AMOUR, AMORE*.



Pelasgo-Etrusco	Albanese	Italiano	Inglese
IAA = ANI	Ana	Dalla parte	On the side
2AA = NAS	nash	di noi	of ourselves
AJ = LA	la	lasciò	he left
IOA = ROI	roi.	di vivere.	living.
3A = FE	Me fe	Con fede	With faith
2VJ = LUS	lus-in	pregano	pray
IAA = API	api	il fratello maggiore	the elder brother
2JA = A LC	a loc	e il fratello minore	and the younger brother
2JIA = A FILS	a fisi	e i parenti.	and the relatives.
AXXXX = XXXXV	45?	45 (anni?)	45 (years?)

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PROGRAMS, MESSAGES AND COMMODITIES IN ROSSI-LANDI'S MATERIALISTIC SEMIOTICS

Giorgio Borrelli
Aldo Moro University of Bari, Italy
giorgioborrelli83@yahoo.it

Abstract

One of the main points advanced by the Marxian critique of political economy concerns what Marx called the “fetishism of commodities”: exchange does not occur among commodities but among human beings. Starting from this standpoint, the Italian semiotician Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1921–1985) underlines how *economic exchange* could be understood as a form of human social communication. More specifically, communication is signs exchange: production of signs and messages, exchange of messages, consumption of messages and signs.

According to Rossi-Landi, commodities could be understood as messages which circulate in the economic sphere according to specific exchange-programs. From such a perspective, economics could be understood as a sector of semiotics, that is, as the study of commodity-messages. Particularly, in line with the Marxian theory of labour-value, Rossi-Landi proposes to analyse the entire trajectory of commodity-messages, focussing attention on the production-exchange-consumption programs which turn certain human artefacts – that is, a certain products of human linguistic work – into commodities. The meaning of commodity-messages will be constituted by the totality of these semiotic programs.

Only by studying human communication relations it is possible to understand the “language” of commodities. Therefore the Marxian orientation – as Rossi-Landi maintains – is a specifically semiotic orientation.

1. Homology and social reproduction

In his “Ideas for a manifesto of materialistic semiotics” (Rossi-Landi 1992: 277–280),¹ Rossi-Landi affirms that: “a materialistic semiotics must be a semiotics founded on social reality, on the actual ways in which men interact among themselves and with the rest of the living and non-living world. It cannot examine sign systems apart from the other social processes with which they are functioning all along.” (Rossi-Landi 1992: 278) And the best way – in his opinion – to “describe social reality at large is to approach it in terms of *social reproduction* (*gesellschaftliche Reproduktion*). Social reproduction is the totality of processes by which any society – from a primitive tribe to contemporary highly developed societies – proceeds in time, preserving itself while at the same time administering some changes in its own internal structure” (Rossi-Landi 1992: 278). To understand why the category of “social reproduction” assumes such a relevant role in Rossi-Landi’s theoretical framework, and to understand how semiotics could be founded on social reality, it seems appropriate to shift the focus to another fundamental concept in his semiotics, that is, to what he defines as *homological method*.

First of all, what does “homological” actually mean? Rossi-Landi borrows this term from biological sciences, where it refers “to a fundamental similarity due to community of descent, to a correspondence in structure and in origin” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 72, note 25) between different species. From such a perspective, homological methods consists in constructing a theoretical model through which certain similarities and correspondences – between boundaries of analysis which appear as completely disconnected – can be identified (Ponzio 2008: 8); the result of this theoretical construction is a *structured totality* in which all the parts are reciprocally connected. More specifically, the homological method consists in connecting the two sub-totalities of *linguistic production* and *material production* in a wider totality constituted by the human being, understood – from a Marxian point of view – as *product* of its own *work*. It means that, according to Rossi-Landi, the Marxian thesis on the anthropogenic character of work should be extended, including the thesis on the anthropogenic character of *language*, understood in its *verbal* and *non-verbal* dimension: human beings produce themselves through their social work, and, in this sense mankind is the result of the general process of social reproduction; but a relevant part of social reproduction is constituted by the *linguistic production*.

In this regard, it seems opportune a terminological – and, of course, theoretical – clarification. In his monograph *Linguistics and economics* (1977), Rossi-Landi specifies that the term “language” – and thus, the adjective “linguistic” also – refer to the *verbal sign systems*, more specifically, to “verbal (oral and written) codes and messages.” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 17) Of course, he is well aware of the fact that this kind of connotation could be “rather conservative,” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 17) but he underlines also that such a terminological choice depends on the will of distance himself from semiotic theories which assign priority exactly to the verbal sign-system; that is, from those theories which assert that non-verbal sign systems depends on the verbal ones. Hence, distinguishing language from non-verbal sign systems, Rossi-Landi intends to recognize

[their] reciprocal structural independence and at the same time [their] reciprocal influence. This does not mean that there was no hierarchy imposed by real needs on sign systems; but it does mean that all basic social sign systems are ‘primary modelling systems’ – according to the terminology of Lotman, who considers primary only the system of language, and secondary instead all non-verbal sign systems. (Rossi-Landi 1977: 18)

¹ Originally published in *Codice* (1979) 1–2: 121–123.

Actually, this latter consideration about the primary modelling system seems to be – notwithstanding a terminological discrepancy – perfectly in line with the hypotheses advanced by Ponzio and Petrilli (2004) about the possible comparison between Rossi-Landi's concept of *linguistic work* and the concept of *language as primary modeling* as structured by Sebeok (Ponzio, and Petrilli 2004: 218).

As is well known, modifying the notions of primary and secondary modeling systems as structured by the Moscow-Tartu School, Sebeok develops a *modelling systems theory* (Sebeok, and Danesi 2000) based on three levels: *primary*, *secondary*, and *tertiary*. *Primary modelling system* is the system that “allows organisms to simulate something in species-specific ways” (Sebeok, and Danesi 2000: 45); according to Sebeok, human animal shares such a device with the other species; indeed, every living being uses its “*sensorium*” (Sebeok 2003: 174) to structure a sign system through which an interpretation of – and a life in – the external world could be possible. Nevertheless, human species distinguishes itself from the others exactly for its typical and innate capacity for simulative modeling: the *language*, which fundamental property consists in what Sebeok defines as *syntax* (Sebeok 2003: 178). As Ponzio and Petrilli explain, syntax is

(...) what makes it possible for hominids to have not only one ‘reality’, one world, but also to frame an indefinite number of possible worlds. This capacity is unique to human beings. Thanks to syntax human language is like Lego building blocks, it can reassemble a limited number of construction pieces in an infinite number of different ways. As a modeling device language can produce an indefinite number of models; in other words, the same pieces can be taken apart and put together to construct an infinite number of different models. Thanks to language not only do human animals produce worlds as do other species, but, as says Leibniz, human beings can also produce an infinite number of possible worlds. (Ponzio, and Petrilli 2004: 215)

From such a perspective, the term “language” does not refer to the verbal sign system, but rather to “a mute verbal modeling system” (Sebeok 2003: 175) which *Homo Habilis* – the first species of the genus “*Homo*” – “must have had lodged in its brain, but it could not encode it in articulate, linear speech.” (Sebeok 2003: 175) Indeed, it is necessary to wait until the appearance of *Homo sapiens* for this modeling system to be externalized, and *speech* to arise as *secondary modelling system*. According to Sebeok, “language evolved as an adaptation, whereas speech developed out of language as a derivative ‘exaptation’;” (Sebeok 2003: 176) this means that, in the course of hominization process, language “was built by selection for the cognitive function of modeling” (Sebeok 2003: 176) and, only with the appearance of the *Homo Sapiens*, such a primary system “came to be ‘exapted’ for communication, first in the form of speech (and later of script, and so forth).” (Sebeok 2003: 176) Thus – according to Sebeok –, becoming a communication-oriented device, language enhances the nonverbal capacity with which human beings were already endowed, allowing them to operate both on the verbal, and nonverbal level (Sebeok 1998: 25); in this way, using this enhanced capacity, human animals can structure their *tertiary modeling systems*; and, from these highly abstract, symbol-based modeling processes, human cultural systems finally emerge.²

² From such a perspective, Sebeok can affirm that what Moscow-Tartu School calls “primary”, that is, the verbal sign system, is “phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically secondary to the nonverbal; and, therefore, what they call ‘secondary’ is actually a further, tertiary augmentation of the former.” (Sebeok 2003: 175)

In the light of all these theses, it should be stated that, when Rossi-Landi asserts that verbal and non-verbal sign systems are both primary modelling systems, he draws attention to the fact that the syntactical capacity is *incorporated* – as Sebeok (2003: 178) would say – in both of them. To explain such a statement, Rossi-Landi takes as example a common human utensil, as a table knife: being an utensil, indeed, a knife

(...) has the level of complexity and the utility not just of a mere word or of a syntagm, as complex as this may be, but of a proper sentence or judgment. The utensil in fact consists in parts which are produced and put together according to certain rules, like the sentence (...). Now, in what has been called the language of things (in our terminology a set of nonverbal sign systems) everything that can be done with a knife is equivalent to everything with which a knife can be put into a real relation, and thus constitutes the discourses (groups of interconnected sentences) of which the knife can be part. The syntactic relations of sentence 'knife', suitable for generating finished and meaningful discourse, depend on its semantic value, upon what it tell us. (Rossi-Landi 1977: 22)

Therefore, emphasizing that an instrument is syntactically structured – just like a sentence –, and that different utensils could be syntactically related according to certain uses – like verbal discourses – Rossi-Landi maintains that both verbal and nonverbal sign systems could be analysed in the light of the Marxian conception of *work*: the human capacity of generate, communicate and interpret articulated sounds can be understood as *linguistic work*, and it represents a further genetic development of human capacity of generate, communicate and interpret meaningful signs in general (hence, nonverbal signs also); a human capacity which the Italian semiotician defines as *sign work*. In this regard, Rossi-Landi suggests that Leroi-Gouhuran's researches could confirm the genetic precedence of the sign work in the hominization process; indeed, the French palaeontologist maintains that, since the most primitive technical levels, construction of utensils is *planned*; namely, all the operations through which an artefact is constructed are executed with a view to its future utilization (Rossi-Landi [1985] 2006: 228). In this way, every human artefact is the result of an abstractive process, and so, every human artefact is the product of a specific *interpretative work*: it is an *interpretant* for a specific human need.³

2. A Marxian conception of work from a semiotic perspective

Homological method could be understood as an application of the Marxian analyses on social reproduction to research on language and communication (Rossi-Landi [1968] 2003: 9). Thus, according to Rossi-Landi, social reproduction consists not only in processes of *production, exchange and consumption of material artefacts*, but also in processes of *production, exchange and consumption of signs*; and this is the reason why work – understood as economic material production – and language – understood as production of non-verbal and verbal signs – are homologous, that is, they are “two different manifestations of the same *structure-in-becoming*.”

³ As already said, Rossi-Landi uses the adjective “linguistic” referring to the verbal sign systems, but he clarifies that such a term could refer implicitly also to non-verbal communication and nonverbal sign systems; nevertheless, in this latter case, “linguistic” should be replaced by the more precise term “sign-communicative” [*segnico-comunicativo*] (Rossi-Landi [1985] 2006: 116). Indeed, analysing certain aspects of social reproduction from a semiotic perspective implies the fact that those same aspects *are* considered as “sign-communicative”; therefore, the use of “sign-communicative” referring to nonverbal sign systems like *work, exchange, consumption*, and so on (e.g. “sign-communicative work”), actually, it is a pleonasm. Thus, it should be stated that, when Rossi-Landi uses the formula “linguistic work” he draws the attention on the fact that verbal language presents certain characteristics and articulations which are typical of work, understood in a Marxian perspective.

(Rossi-Landi 1977: 74) This structure-in-becoming is mankind in itself.

In the light of these considerations, it should be stated that Rossi-Landi's homological method also allows us to see the Marxian conception of work in a new – semiotic – perspective; more specifically, it means that Marxian conception of work could be *semiotically* understood in two senses at least.

The first sense refers to the Marxian conception of work as *zweckmässige Tätigkeit*: if, agreeing with Marx, we consider human work as an activity conforming to a goal [*zweckmässige Tätigkeit*], we have also to admit that work is inherently *semiotic*, because that goal is actually a sign, that is, – as Rossi-Landi maintains – “a conscious or unconscious, desired or endured, ‘mental’ anticipation of the product” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 40); namely, a *design* or a *project*. Hence, language “determines the finalistic character of work, its taking place according to a *program*” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 40: emphasis mine); and a program is nothing else but an organized part of a certain sign system, that is, a set of *instructions* which are more or less implicit in certain forms of human social work. Furthermore, “*work is human social activity*” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 39) because it is based on learning, unlike every mere biological and physiological activity; and work implies necessarily teaching and learning several programs:

The individual learns to use many programs, or to obey to them. The programs are arranged in various types of sign systems, whose complete description would be equal to the complete description of culture. Only in a few cases does the individual learn the programs for use in a direct and explicit way, in the form of instruction given and received. In the great majority of cases he learns them only implicitly, while he is learning to execute them. (Rossi-Landi 1977: 45)

The second sense refers to work as specific production of sign systems. Particularly, it refers to the fact that

signs systems are systems of artefacts that could not exist in nature without the intervention of man, and if we don't want to admit that something *human* exists for man without the intervention of man himself, we must hold to the principle that every artefact, however understood, is the result of work which man has done and can do again. Generalizing, between any product or human result as absent, and the same result as present, there is a difference that can be explained (for which reason can be given) only in terms of the work carried out by men to obtain it. The most general category of these products is man himself, the historical result of his own work (Rossi-Landi 1977: 32)

In line with the Marxian thesis of the anthropogenic character of work, Rossi-Landi considers work as the factor that, through the course of the evolutionary process, allows human animals to distinguish themselves from their primate relatives, but, according to Rossi-Landi, “when work emerged, it must have been from the beginning accompanied by, or better, inextricably connected to, *signs of a new type*, suitable for favoring working operations. We are speaking here of both verbal signs (or pre-verbal, e.g., in the form of cries), and non-verbal signs” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 56).

In other words, human work is semiotic, because it is constitutively articulated through cer-

tain organized (verbal and non-verbal) sign systems, and because it is necessarily *based on* human communication, and communication is, at one and the same time, based on the *learning* and execution of codified signs; but, on the other hand, language, understood in its *practical-communicative* dimension is work, because “*communication is the execution of programs*. Learning to execute the programs, one learns to communicate and become part of the process of ‘social reproduction’” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 27). Learning to communicate by adopting certain codified signs, one contributes to *work* involved in the construction of the social world.

To sum up – concluding this part of the paper – it should be stated that the homology between work and language consists in the fact that “man has never produced linguistic artefacts without producing material artefacts at the same time. It is only by abstraction that we place the former under examination without the latter (...). A civilization that is ‘only material’ or ‘only linguistic’ does not exist in reality” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 70). Work and language are inextricably connected.

3. Commodity as message: a semiotic interpretation of the Marxian labour-value theory

According to Rossi-Landi, starting from the homology between linguistic and material production, it should be possible to analyse human communication in the light of Marxian *labour-value theory*. In this regard, it seems opportune underline that the expression “labour-value theory” was not coined by Marx, but by one of his most famous and most bitter critics, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (Fineschi 2012). Obviously, it will be impossible to discuss here all the implications of the labour-value theory; nevertheless, at least the main thesis of the theory should be underlined: the value of commodity derives from the quantity of labour contained in it, and such a quantity can be measured through the labour-time expended producing the same commodity. However, as Fineschi (2012) remarks, the set of theses which constitute the labour-value theory is controverted by another interpretation of Marx’s critique of political economy: the so called *value-form school*. The several theorists of this approach – such as Hans Georg Backhaus (2009) – hypothesise that exchange value represents the real core of the Marxian theory, because commodity can manifest its value only in the moment of the exchange, in the form of exchange value; hence, only this latter represents the form in which value can be actually measured. More recent interpretations (Bellofiore, and Fineschi 2009) underline that both approaches are on the right regarding certain theoretical aspects, but – at the same time – that both of them present some lacks, overlooking – for example – the Marxian analysis of money, and the central role played by the commodity-form in general, understood as *contradictory union* of use-value and exchange value.

In the light of these considerations, it seems difficult to set Rossi-Landi’s semiotics in the theoretical framework drawn by those analyses deriving from the so called *Neue Marx-Lektüre*, and, of course, this is not the purpose of the paper. Nevertheless, it should be stated that, trying to apply the labour-value theory to research on language and communication, Rossi-Landi does not ignore neither the theoretical relevance of commodity, nor the *dialectic of the value form* (Rossi-Landi 1977: 160). Indeed, he tries to structure a “semiotic elaboration of the two social processes which we can identify as the ‘production and circulation of goods (in the form of commodities)’ and as ‘the production and circulation of sentences (in the form of verbal messages)’” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 5) More specifically, following Marx’s 1867 *Einleitung* – that is, the introduction to the *Outline of the Critique of Political Economy* (1857–1858) – Rossi-Landi maintains that the economic moment of exchange comprehends in itself the *tripartition* between production, exchange, and consumption. From such a perspective, the general exchange process could be understood fundamentally as a communication process; namely, communication could be understood as *production of signs and messages, exchange of messages, consumption of messages*

and signs.

It should be stated that, according to the Italian semiotician, when a human sign – understood in its semantic, syntactic and pragmatic dimension – is generated to be exchanged, then such a human sign becomes a message; and this process could be based on communicative programs – derived from previous sign work – which are independent from the awareness of the sender and receiver. In a few words, humans can exchange messages ignoring the several codes on which such an exchange is based. Therefore, one of the main hypotheses of Rossi-Landi is that “between material production and consumption, the process of exchange is inserted as something unitary and dual at the same time” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 60). It means that two processes take place at the same time: “one is that of material transfer of a physical body from one pair of hands to another pair of hands. The other is that of all the sign work that must take place so that the transfer may have a *complete sense of exchange* for the two men to whom the two pairs of hands belong. It is within the sign aspect of exchange that we find production, exchange, and consumption again” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 60). The semiotic character of commodity can be understood only analysing such a dual process.

In a few words, Rossi-Landi maintains that when signs – hence, verbal signs also – circulate in the form of messages, they *are* commodities. Indeed – just like a commodity – a message is used, transmitted and received, not only according to its *use-value*, but also and principally according its *exchange-value*; more specifically, a message “is manufactured as use-value but transmitted as (exchange-) value; it is received as (exchange-) value but interpreted as use-value” (Rossi-Landi 1977:159). Indeed, on one hand – just like a commodity – a message must have a *use-value*, that is, it must be able to *satisfy some need*. More specifically, a message must be able to satisfy a *communicative need*; furthermore, a message has an exchange-value, which corresponds to the phenomenal form of *value tout court* (or, simply, value), that is, the value understood as the *substance* of the *generic social work* incorporated in every human artefact and sign. But on the other hand, when goods circulate in the form of commodities they *are* messages; in this regard, Rossi-Landi underlines that the Marxian analysis of *commodity-form* could be understood fundamentally as a semiotic *analysis of commodity as message*; more specifically, the *internal contradiction* between use-value and *exchange value* constitutes a distinction between two levels of signification. Precisely, “a commodity appears on the market as the bearer of several layers of signification; interpretation must distinguish between these different layers and trace them back to the sign-system they belong to” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 127). From such a perspective, starting from the level of production, we could analyse the use-value of a commodity as a semiotic program concerning the way in which an artefact must function to satisfy a specific need. The execution of that program corresponds to the use – or consumption – of such a specific artefact. But, actually, this is just one layer of signification, and, furthermore, a layer which generally regards the artefact understood as a product – as a use-value –, rather than its commodity-dimension. On the contrary, commodity – according to Rossi-Landi – derives its semiotic specificity from certain particular social relationships and programs of communication (Rossi-Landi 1977: 127); for example, the fact that a commodity is exposed in a shop window represents an important part of the sign work which is necessary to codify a product into a commodity; but the exchange value – which is the peculiar aspect of commodity, and the value form which gives to commodity the semiotic property of being a message – does not depend on these layers of signification. Rossi-Landi is well aware of this, and, indeed, he does not limit his semiotics to those surface levels, but he explains also how the exchange value of commodity is codified, that is, what kind of semiotic processes originate the exchange value of a commodity.

As already observed, Rossi-Landi develops his homological model in line with the labour-value theory, and in doing so he can affirm that generic sign (and linguistic) work constitutes

“the substance of value – the ‘measurer’ of exchange value” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 162). But he is well aware of the fact that value can be expressed only as exchange value:

a commodity acquires its own phenomenal form – by which its ‘value’ is expressed – in the relationship between different commodities (...). It is not that a commodity, even in isolation, doesn’t possess a ‘value’ corresponding to the portion of undifferentiated work pertaining to it; the point is that such ‘value’ cannot emerge until a commodity enters into relationship with at least another commodity, whereupon its ‘value’ becomes manifest as exchange value. Or, a commodity acquires a full-winged status as a commodity only by entering the situation of exchange. (Rossi-Landi 1977: 160)

Shifting to the sign level, Rossi-Landi affirms that the possibility of structuring and that exchanging messages depends on the existence of “rules which regulate the use of signs, that is, the modalities of codification, decodification, and interpretation of messages” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 10). On the verbal level this set of rules is represented by *speech*, understood not only as concrete linguistic exchange, but also as *code*, that is, as an ensemble of the “programs which pre-delimit all the possible exchanges, that is, all possible messages” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 165); but on the level of the economic exchange such a code is constituted by *money*, understood as the “dialectical nucleus, the minimum and original structure” (Rossi-Landi 1977: 164) of any possible exchange of commodities.

4. Conclusions

It seems that Rossi-Landi does not develop his analysis on the relation between money and commodity further; nevertheless, thanks to his homological method he has shown the way to a better understanding of how certain highly-formalized nonverbal sign systems influence the production of commodities; in this regard, an effective example is provided by certain strictly interconnected systems such as the price system, credit system, and financial system. Obviously, these extremely complex layers of signification cannot be thematised in this paper. Nevertheless it should be underlined that, considering language as work and trade – understood as mercantile exchange–, Rossi-Landi proposes a theoretical model which applies certain categories from the Marxian critique of political economy to linguistic structure and its practical-communicative use. But, his main goal is to lay the foundations of a scientific critique of the sign. Rossi-Landi demonstrates how economics could be considered as a specific sector of semiotics, and how the categories of economics can contribute to a better understanding of semiotic processes. In this way, Rossi-Landi’s thesis on the possibility of a semiotic interpretation of the Marxian labour-value theory could be framed in new research perspectives.

The work of Rossi-Landi demonstrates the intrinsically interdisciplinary nature of semiotics and how fundamental for other disciplines could be the set of instruments that semiotics has produced.

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NARCO-TRAFFIC IN THE LIGHT OF CULTURAL SEMIOTICS AND COMPLEXITY THEORY

Julieta Haidar
National School of Anthropology and History, Mexico
jurucuyu@gmail.com

Eduardo Chávez Herrera
University of Warwick, UK
keemunyunnan@gmail.com

Abstract

In this paper we approach a complex issue related to the so-called concept of *narcoculture*. Several works have addressed this matter and not only accept this cultural production, but also stress both their symbolic and aesthetic perspectives. Yet, all these works still neglect an ethical viewpoint. In order to rethink the concept of *narcoculture* from different angles, we appeal to Juri Lotman's proposals. On the one hand, we point the contradictions within the semiosphere. On the other hand, by means of linking Lotman's approach with the standpoint of complexity thinking and transdisciplinarity, we will discuss such topics as narcotraffic and *narcoculture* from a deeper analysis that incorporates reflections from the standpoint of chaotic and unpredictable processes. During the last decades *narcoculture* has inspired several everyday life features such as music, fashion, architecture, or traffickers' social status –embodied as heroes and cherished as saviors in the legendary *narcocorridos*. The concept *narcoculture* has gone far beyond, developing the so-called *narco-literature*, and even worshipping the *narco-saint Jesús Malverde*. In this paper we address the following questions: How can we approach these cultural issues from the point of view of complexity theory and transdisciplinarity? Is it possible to envisage them as cultural units? Are they cultural deviances in the sense of cultural barbarism (Lotman, 2011)?

Introduction

During the last few years, a profound debate on drug trafficking and its consequences has been generated in Mexico, as well as in many other Latin American countries. Despite the fact that drug trafficking is a complex phenomenon that entails the coexistence of several types of semiosis (ostensive, mythological, fear-based, among others), this is not the best place to describe them. This work seeks to address and to analyze the reproduction and use of the term *narcoculture* in terms of the opposition between culture and non-culture. In this analysis we will refer to diverse authors, but we'll be focussed mainly on Juri Lotman's proposals, along with some theoretical contributions supplied by complexity theory and transdisciplinarity.

We depart from a matter that has to do with the widespread use of the term *narcoculture*. Due to the overuse of this term, a fascination with narco-traffickers has developed, wherein criminals are transmogrified into virtuous heroes, a fact that conceals the darkest side and the barbaric practices of these narco-traffickers. By delving into the deep structure of drug trafficking we can observe that narco-traffickers may only perform an anticultural role bonded to barbarism, rather than to culture. In this regard, we examine and analyze the generation of this concept, whose circulation is reproduced without critical consideration (excepting from a few authors). This fact illustrates the deep degree of alienation experienced by the subjects immersed in this broken world.

1. *Narcoculture* as a dimension in the midst of anticulture and non-culture

The Colombian cultural elite, in the context of governmental drug wars, coined the term *narcoculture* in the 1990s; the very first time it was mentioned in a text was in 1995, by Gustavo Álvarez Gardeázabal—a writer and former mayor of the Tula municipality, in Cauca Valley. In this text the author, instead of providing a description of the term, praises the lifestyles of those drug dealers who grew rich trafficking drugs. His position is flimsy and anti-analytical. In addition, he compares drug trafficking with a revolutionary process, similar to those employed during the French or Russian revolutions (Gardeazábal 1995:5). This is the prevailing sentiment concerning *narcoculture* in most of the works reviewed for this paper.

In order to rethink the narcoculture concept from different angles, firstly we ought to consider its simultaneous condition as a possible cultural model and as a possible non-cultural one. In this way, the *principle of contradiction* (Morin 1997), granted by the complexity theory, is introduced. To acknowledge the existence of an alleged drug-trafficking culture as a possible cultural model wouldn't mean to consider it as a valid model for other cultures. It would rather imply the identification of a new set of tendencies in which certain mesmerized sectors of the Mexican society have identified themselves with drug trafficking from the dark side of barbarism.

To draw a parallel between the narcoculture term and the semiotic concept of *non-culture* would imply to putting forward the alleged existence of a domain outside the Mexican culture. Non-culture here is opposed to a concrete culture and is defined by its code(s) (in this very particular case the set of signs, texts and codes known as Mexican culture).

As such, we would be faced with the presence of an alien environment populated by *non-cultural barbarians*, narco-traffickers, and would face the following questions: Who are the narco-traffickers? What environment do they inhabit? What is such a thing called "narcoculture?"

During the past decade the Mexican writer Carlos Monsiváis has raised the question of the alleged existence of the narco-traffickers, versus the invention of same by cinema actors (Monsiváis 2004). Their existence is authentic, and it has influenced the mass media and resulted in stereotypes of drug traffickers as rich, enthralling superheroes.

Following Lotman's proposals on cultural barbarism (Lotman 2011), we see how the conception of the *barbarian narco-trafficker* is generated within Mexican culture by means of a process

called “duplicación reflejada” [reflected duplication] (Lotman 2011: 256). In such a way, what we entitle the *anticulture of drug trafficking* is produced. We prefer this term instead of the widely use term narcoculture, which must be conceived as a deflected image of Mexican culture that turns out to be not solely a semiotic artifact, but an outcome of barbarity. The “explosion” (Lotman 2009) of drug trafficking in the Mexican semiosphere arrived at the periphery and then moved towards the center, establishing itself as a historical process that followed the decline of Colombian drug trafficking during the 1980s and 1990s. It reached its highest point thanks to both transnational cooperation strategies for trafficking cocaine, as well as to neoliberal reforms introduced by the former Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari and to the approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. To the extent that organized crime has engaged in numerous layers of the Mexican society, it too took up a position in several cultural areas by way of altered cultural activity.

We can solely conceive of narcoculture as a possible cultural unity insofar as it’s located as a part of anticulture, which is constructed isomorphically to culture (Lotman and Uspenski 1979), with deviations caused by the mechanism of reflected duplication—this contains deep ethical involvement since both death and terror have been introduced organically in their practices. Death here is conceptualized as a necessary means of ruling, as a way of transferring and controlling the enormous amount of illegal capital originated by money laundering.

When the barbarian-narco-traffickers pass through culture, they gradually experience a process of “semiotización” [semiotization] (Lotman 2011: 257) and eventually they acquire a particular destructive role in culture: “cuanto más complicado es el sistema de reglas socioculturales, el bárbaro se considerará más peligroso, destructivo, o, por el contrario, tanto más salvador o anhelado, atribuyéndole características de fuerza diabólica” [As the system of sociocultural rules becomes more complicated, the barbarian is considered more and more dangerous, destructive, or, on the contrary, that much more of a saviour or a desired one, as characteristics of diabolical or eschatological force are attributed to him]. The barbarian-narco-traffickers burst into the receptive culture in an explosive way, and begin to recreate certain values and practices, resulting in appropriations and confiscations of what others have produced. Narcoculture, then, is proclaimed to be a “parasitic, dependent” cultural model (Eco 1994:123), unable to acknowledge itself and unable to generate self-descriptions too (Lotman 1998). This model is neither qualified to elaborate a metadescription of what it has diverted from, nor does it offer a self-sustaining model. Therefore, it’s not possible to recognize narcoculture as a “contracultural model” (Eco 1994:115). In order to attain this status, narcoculture would have to set itself up as an active, transforming source of critique and the narco-traffickers would have to be able to acknowledge themselves as narco-traffickers.

2. Narco-traffickers: semiotic-discursive subjects of barbarism and other subjectivities

Having defined the status of narcoculture, we now turn to the question of narco-traffickers’ characteristics, as subjects, with the aim of creating some semiotic boundaries of personality. Hence and in the first place we find organized crime, the most diabolic barbarian, whose primary agents are drug cartels –within which collective and individual subjects rise as drug lords. Despite the fluctuation that has taken place, we can identify seven main cartels: *Los Zetas*, *Sinaloa Cartel*, *Gulf Cartel*, *La Familia Cartel*, *Tijuana Cartel*, *Juarez Cartel* and *Los Caballeros Templarios*. Secondly, we must consider those entities that are devoted to describing or to representing different mediated practices related to drug trafficking. Such entities include journalists, writers, artists, musicians, filmmakers, TV producers and actors. Thirdly, we must also consider other subjects who maintain relationships, either direct or indirect, with criminal organizations: singers, music bands, architects, or peasants, workers and civil servants—in political, police

or military sectors. Finally, we must mention the common people—compelled spectators, who crudely experience the havoc wreaked by the drug wars.

3. Appropriations from the anticulture of drug trafficking

By means of “appropriations” (Eco 1994; Lotman 2011), the anticulture of drug trafficking has given rise to manifold mediatized depictions. These appropriations not only describe the diverse drug fabrication processes, but the distribution, consumption and control of drugs, as well as the development of networks for money laundering and the subsequent connections with political and economical power structures. These last contribute to the rise of political corruption in Mexico. The anticulture of drug trafficking, as a cultural parasite, would cover a more or less homogenous set of semiotic products: 1) Music as *narcocorridos*; 2) TV shows and videogames; 3) Soap operas and movies; 4) Narcoliterature; 5) Cults.

Let’s take a short look at these seized artifacts:

3.1. *Narcocorridos*

Narcocorridos are anthems celebrating drug traffickers’ lives, describing their lifestyles and relaying some anecdotes. They were one of the first of these appropriations to become popular, especially with the advent of *Chalino Sánchez*, who was murdered after a concert in his home state of Sinaloa in 1992. Other important singers and groups include *Los Tigres del Norte*, *Los Tucanes de Tijuana*, or *Valentín Elizalde* (also assassinated following a concert). Thanks to YouTube and other digital mass media repositories, many *narcocorridos* have associated music videos, where the violence associated with drug trafficking is exalted, through hyperbolic depictions of the drug traffickers’ lifestyles: Money-squandering is praised, as well as criminality and the exhibition of drugs, jewelry, voluptuous women, sports cars and gold-plated guns. A more recent example is found in the subgenre known as the *Movimiento Alterado* (*El Komander*, *Los Buitres*, or *Los Buchones de Culiacán*).




Figure 1. Chalino Sánchez’s record



Figure 2. El Movimiento Alterado poster-tour

3.2. TV shows and video games

There are many depictions in the U.S. mainstream media (TV and cinema) of the wars on drugs in Mexico—which wars were launched by the American and Mexican governments (Mercille 2014). According to Mercille, both TV shows and videogames can be divided in two camps, “hawks” and “doves”. Neither of these discusses U.S. involvement in the drug trade in any depth, and the Mexican cartels are featured in both as the main actors. Usually, Mexico is represented as a lawless country where chaos reigns and foreign intervention is justified. Violence and the display of guns are central topics, and the solutions to the drug-trafficking problems always entail the presence of the army or the police. On the one hand, the “hawks” reproduce a more militaristic argument and strongly favor tough enforcement of antidrug policies. Examples of this type include the TV shows *Breaking Bad* (2008-2013) and *CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) Miami* (2002-2012). The “doves” on the other hand adopt a softer line, and even sometimes mention that the drug consumption in the United States is part of the problem and needs to be addressed by American authorities. An example of this type is found in *Weeds* (2005-2012), a satirical TV show that focusses on some aspects of the drugs wars, as well as the distribution of drugs among cartels on both sides of the border.

3.3. Soap operas and movies

The genre of *narco-soap operas* became popular in Colombia thanks to the *Cartel de los Sapos* (2008-2012). However, in Mexico this genre has become more popular since the publication of the novel *La reina del Sur*, written by the Spanish author Arturo Pérez-Reverte. These soap operas pretend to be based on real life characters and plots, but they also feature their own qualities: the exhibition and display of luxurious sports cars, diamonds, yachts or lavish abodes in Miami, as well as the reenactment of dangerous circumstances that often conclude in homicides or collateral murders. These stories replace melodrama and emotional emphasis with the construction of characters that aspire to become real-life models, that is to say, someone a viewer might wish to resemble or admire (Monsiváis 2004).

When it comes to *narcocinema*, however, the situation is different. During the last 40 years a very active low-budget movie industry has been producing films about bad cops, corrupt politicians, prostitutes and, of course, drug traffickers. This industry is called “videohome”—so called because the movies go straight to video and are addressed to the Mexicans living inside the United States. The movies’ plots are often based on stories from local newspapers. A few decades

ago, these movies could have been classified as *Westerns*, or action movies, but from the 1980s on they shifted to having plots about drug trafficking. Despite that some of the stories portray myths about the all-mighty drug cartels from northwest Mexico, many videohome productions also tell the stories—real, or not—of cultural outsiders who make their way out of poverty thanks to drug trafficking. Once they succeed they come back and do good things for their hometowns: building schools, churches, hospitals, and creating jobs.

In consequence, people develop affection for these criminals. This gives rise to one of the most critical points about the plots of these films, one of the most graspable contradictions within the anticulture of drug trafficking: the magnified fondness and devotion people have for their country's drug traffickers, which fondness transforms criminals into *cultural heroes* (Lotman 1998; 2001). For example, this has happened with former outsiders coming back to their homeland as prodigal children. In such instances, and thanks to the contradictory forces of cultural dynamics, we can notice how in certain areas of culture the drug traffickers keep their “barbaric” statuses, but in some others they are treated as heroes. Examples of this type of cinema are movies such as: *Operación: Marihuana* (1985), *Sinaloa, Tierra de hombres* (1994), *La Hummer negra* (2005), or *La Banda del Carro Rojo* (1978).



Figure 3. Operación Marihuana poster



Figure 4. La Hummer Negra poster

3.4. Narcoliterature

Regardless of the fact that intellectuals haven't agreed upon an operative definition of the term *narcoliterature*, there are some researchers such as Sophie Esch (2014), who have proposed to put the terminological discussion aside and focus on current literary production. It's not really clear who started to use this term, but Esch suggests that “the original father of narcoliterature” was *Élmer Mendoza*, a Sinaloan writer who was already chronicling drug trafficking in his novels in the 1990s. It would be difficult to describe the distinctive traits of a genre that is still developing, nevertheless Esch suggests the possibility of outlining two trends within narcoliterature. On the one hand, *fictional literature* portrays drug traffickers' stories with arguments similar to those depicted in videohome productions. *Literary journalism*, on the other hand, refers to real narratives that describe the rise of the greatest drug lords and the manifold ways they enlarged their cartels and were well connected in political and governmental circles. During the rule of Mexico's former president Felipe Calderón there were three main bestsellers: *Los señores del narco*, by Anabel Hernández (2010), *La reina del Pacífico*, by Julio Scherer García (2008) and *El México narco*, by Rafael Rodríguez Castañeda.

3.5. Cults

“Los símbolos producen irritación,” Lotman says [“Symbols produce annoyance”] (1979:54). Many people have despised associating any symbolic meaning with the figure of the *narco-saint* *Jesus Malverde*. Still, this scorn is opposed to the deep devotion many people profess to have towards him. Many versions exist of the stories of the origin, death and subsequent anointment of *Jesús Juárez Mazo*, saint of the downtrodden and the patron saint of drug traffickers. Due to lack of space it’s impossible to list these versions here. In brief, we will say that *Malverde* was a bandit, a local *Robin Hood* type who stole gold coins from the rich *hacienda* owners living in Culiacán. *Malverde*’s death on 3 May 1909 is surrounded by semiotic mystery, habitual in mythological consciousness. *Malverde*’s protection continued beyond death and his image was transformed into a cult object. He is considered a sign of holiness for many *sinaloenses*. Over the years the cult of *Malverde* started to develop traits that are hallmarks of symbolic behavior: gathering and organizing its environs up to condense memory (Lotman 2001). By “protecting” handicapped individuals, thugs, drug addicts, prostitutes and evildoers, *Malverde* managed to unleash such fervor that even the drug-lords vindicate him as a part of their barbaric anti-world, deifying him and funding a shrine to him in Sinaloa. This chapel was built on *Malverde*’s purported final resting place and the history of its construction is also sodden with esoteric signs. The Catholic Church, however, hasn’t sanctioned the worship of *Malverde*. Already a symbolic memory-carrier, *Malverde* crossed the borders and settled into the so-called *drug corridor*: from Cali in Colombia, passing over Culiacán and Tijuana in Mexico, up to the south of the United States, in Phoenix, Arizona and Los Angeles, California.



Figure 5. Jesus Malverde. The narcosaint.

4. Narco-propaganda: the diffusion of contradictory meanings as fascination and terror

So far we have delved into the manifold spheres that have seized drug trafficking and turned it into a parasitical cultural model. Nevertheless, the presence of the drug traffickers has not been explicit. So, the question would be: What does organized crime create? Howard Campbell (2014) coined the term *narcopropaganda* in order to describe a set of multifarious, primitive discourses that have serious consequences for public order in Mexico. Its main message concerns sanctioning organized crime and its criminal practices. By featuring an anonymous collective addresser, *narcopropaganda* expands its terrifying effect through psychological and terrorist strategies such as intimidation, dehumanization and domination. The author puts forward a

“semantic typology of barbarism,” organized into four main types of narcopropaganda plus *narcocorridos*.

4.1. Spectacles

Spectacles involve the public display of tortured, maimed and desecrated bodies or human limbs. Specific amputations carry particular concrete meanings. For instance, the cutting off of fingers or the tongue implies that the dead person was a *snitch* (*dedo*, i.e. finger); cutting off hands signifies that the person stole money or a load of drugs. The presentation of dead bodies stands for a type of execution: a) *enteipados* (i.e. tape) are bodies that have been wrapped in duct tape in order to suffocate the victims or prevent them from calling for help; b) *descuartizados* are bodies that have been quartered; c) *encajuelados* are bodies stored in the trunks of cars; d) *entambados* are bodies crammed in metal or plastic barrels; alternatively they might have been sprinkled with acid to dissolve them; e) *encobijados* are bodies wrapped in blankets (to either stop blood seepage or for ease of transport).

Campbell mentions some other forms of spectacle designed to intimidate that imply ostension: showing up at public events heavily armed in convoys of Hummers and other sports cars, attending public cockfights, horse races, weddings, *quinceañera* celebrations, as well as provocative appearances at restaurants and plazas.



Figure 6. Encajuelados



Figure 7. Encobijados

4.2. Narcomessages

4.2.1. Narco-banners and billboards: the banners are displayed on highway overpasses and bridges in Mexican cities. The billboards are placed in urban areas. They are directed at concrete agents (the Mexican president, rival cartels, among others) and function as a notification or warning.



Figure 8. Narco-banner on the left side of the highway overpass

4.2.2. Cardboard or poster board sign: left on or near dead bodies, working as admonition and written on with spray paint, markers, or blood.




Figure 9. Poster published on the site blogdelnarco.com

4.2.3 *Narco-pinta* is graffiti sprayed or hand-painted onto a wall, the side of a house, or a commercial building. Typically, narco-pintas feature vulgar epithets and death threats.

4.3. Videos and cyber-postings

Organized crime has discovered cyberspace and has been using it to intimidate its opponents in several ways. Drug traffickers use narco-videos as a way of announcing themselves as a new power. There is a huge amount of videos showing interrogations, tortures or assassinations of prisoners captured by traffickers or corrupted cops. Quite often, signs of torture or beatings are evident on the victims' bodies, providing self-incriminating answers about their drug-trafficking activities (thefts, murders, or betrayals). The most significant website devoted to Mexican drug-trafficking news, activities and videos is blogdelnarco.com—a medium created by Mexican journalists and used to chronicle the activities of organized crime in an anonymous way. Besides these videos, it's possible to find up-to-date pictures, links to other sites, general news of and about narco-traffickers and even real-time chat.



Figure 10. Claudia Ochoa Félix's posts on a social network

4.4. Control and censorship of the mass media and information

Recently, members of organized crime have forced certain television and radio stations to broadcast and local newspapers to publish their own versions of events such as massacres, governmental corruption, assassinations, etc. Questioning or disobeying these versions entails an expensive penalty: *death*. Most of the Mexican small, local newspapers no longer report on killings associated with drug trafficking. Controlling the creation and diffusion of semiotic-discursive production (images, ideas, discourses) is one of the most critical dimensions of narcopropaganda.

Thus, by means of narcopropaganda we can recognize one of the most contradictory and frail tensions in the semiosphere of drug trafficking. The anticulture of drug trafficking feigns reality through the massive use of degenerated signs, deviated semiotic productions that aspire to depict distorted lifestyles and to conceal the deep structure of this semiosphere by using hasty mechanisms of presumptuousness. Manifold terrifying techniques are found within its core: intimidation, dehumanization and exclusion.

5. The anticulture of drug trafficking from the point of view of complexity theory and transdisciplinarity

In order to assume an ethical position about drug trafficking and studies of this phenomenon, it's necessary to consider the point of view of complexity theory and transdisciplinarity. Such position will allow us to grasp our subject matter, describe it firmly, and understand the complex working of these subjectivities, which are completely immersed in multiple contradictions. The subject embraces a trans-dimensionality defined by contradictions as part of his performance, despite being within a recursive, changeable continuum: horizontal, vertical and transverse processes are present in the scheme below, which explains in a nutshell the notion *homo complexus* by Morin (1999). From this standpoint, subjects behave in antagonistic ways simultaneously:

Homo sapiens	homo demens
Homo faber	homo ludens
Homo economicus	homo consumans
Homo empiricus	homo imaginarius
Homo prosaicus	homo poeticus

By way of the category of the *complex subject* (*homo complexus*), it is possible to approach subjects from an epistemological stance that positions them on an unsteady stability, among contradictions and uncertainty. Yet, subjects can recognize themselves in the Other and become autonomous, transforming beings. In order to construct a complex subject it's necessary to break up a set of dichotomies: subject/object, body/soul, spirit/matter, sentiment/reason, among others. Insofar as this rupture happens, subjects aspire to be recursive.

When it comes to drug traffickers as subjects, there is neither positive, opposite pole, nor trans-dimensionality; it is only possible to find negative traits. Thus, drug traffickers are unqualified to assume what complexity theory requires of them: to break their ties in a critical way, requesting self-observation, striving to link the scattered knowledge and managing to live in different ways through self-understanding. All these reflections remain absent for drug traffickers since they are located in total barbarism, away from any ethics.

Coming back to the hazardous subject, we have to keep in mind the significance of the unpredictable and mysterious processes, never expressed with severity before in the complex world of the third millennium. The *unknown* comes out from what Morin calls the *principle of uncertainty*, a tenet ascertaining that any action can unleash unpredictable consequences (Morin 1997). Only by regaining this idea will it be possible to abandon the idea of an organized, controlled and predictable universe. However, the universe is alive and was conceived from a loose and changing evolution that simultaneously shapes as order and disturbance, aware of cycles of stability and crisis. Drug trafficking is one of the 21st century's most complicated phenomena since it is global and complex. As such, it entails fluctuating processes insofar as its primary agents are extremely contradictory. Despite the fact that contradiction is inherent to subjectivities, it seems that for drug traffickers, contradiction can't be overcome due to the fact that contradiction is a condition of their very existence.

Conclusion

The semiosphere of drug trafficking/narcoculture, what we call the "anticulture of drug trafficking" in this paper, features a heterogeneity of languages and texts. Most of the studies on this phenomenon are focused on stressing the cultural production of a singular semiosphere, for instance: objects, music or lifestyles. Nevertheless, there is a generally forgotten fact: most of these products are generated by barbarism and are manifested in order to certify the *status quo* of

terror, as well as the manifold types of death that turn humans into barbarians. Since there is no ethical consideration informing such a position, it's not advisable to sustain the widespread and misinterpreted term *narcoculture*. It is necessary to address this phenomenon from the point of view of anticulture and barbarism, as well as from the standpoint of complexity theory and transdisciplinarity, as we have discussed. On the other hand, transculturality doesn't cross over narcobarbarism since this is not supportable from an ethical point of view. Moreover, the diffusion of this barbarism is bolstered by the way that drug trafficking has been bonded to various transnational powers, such as political regimes, the media, and the military.

The fascination with organized crime is disturbing. For many marginal social groups, these criminals become heroes, and a tragic simulation of reality is produced that allows these groups to live as an illegal elite with strong ties to power. Thus, from the point of view of complexity theory and transdisciplinarity, the term *narcoculture* becomes unsuitable. By means of linking cultural semiotics and complexity thinking we can gain access to several perspectives on narcoculture that are unattainable from a non-critical stance, which lingers in the superfluous depictions of music, fashion, or *narco-graveyards*.

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PEIRCE'S PRE-1867 SEMIOTIC AND THE ORIGINS OF HIS THEORY OF INTERPRETANT

Michal Karla
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
michal.karla@gmail.com

Abstract

The aim of the proposed paper is twofold: (i) to present a case study of Peirce's early (i.e. from the period before his 1867 publication of "On a New List of Categories") notion of interpretant and its origins, and (ii) to give an account of certain general features of Peirce's semiotic of the period and situating his thought about signs in the context of his metaphysical and logical writings. I would like to show how the conception of interpretant stems out of Peirce's introducing *information* as a property of terms / propositions / arguments. Information, according to Peirce, is a product of connotation (comprehension) and denotation (extension), and is represented by an interpretant-sign, being typically the conclusion of an argument, thus representing argument's premises. I will then proceed in showing the exact role which interpretant together with the notion of information play in Peirce's early treatment of deduction, induction and hypothesis as different species of the argument-genus, concentrating mainly on his conceptions and arguments either absent in his later treatments of the same subject, or unintelligible without the knowledge of the earlier theory, e.g. the concept of symbolization and its employment in Peirce's proofs of the validity of the three species of argument.

In the second part of the paper I will focus on showing certain distinguishing features of Peirce's early semiotic, building on the concepts examined in the first part. Here I would like to

present and argue for a view in which Peirce's semiotic can be seen as a product and synthesis of his earlier metaphysical and logical ideas. Since several of these connections have been already given account of, I will pay attention mainly to those having direct bearing upon the theory of interpretant and information examined. I consider these being the theory of the three worlds (and most importantly the notion of a formal world), the metaphysical notions of truth, externality and innateness from his *Treatise on Metaphysics* (W1: 57-84), and the very definition of metaphysics as "analysis of conceptions" (ibid.).

I will use Peirce's manuscripts of the given period (contained especially in the first volume of Writings) as my primary source. During the course of the paper, I will refer to existing studies more or less concerning the same topic (e.g. Murphey's *The Development of Peirce's Philosophy*, Esposito's *Evolutionary Metaphysics*) with some critical remarks.

Subject of the paper is Peirce's first account of semiotic from 1865 and its explanation in the light of his earlier metaphysical writings. Peirce's semiotic is understood as a fulfillment of the requirements of metaphysical inquiry being defined as an investigation of the conditions of possibility of empirical science, proceeding by a logical method constituted by unpsychological, formal treatment of thought.

1. Metaphysics and Representation

Peirce understood metaphysics in two ways, as "the philosophy of primal truths" (W1: 59) and "the analysis of conceptions" (W1: 63). The latter's subject is an explanation of meaning of terms such as "cause, substance, necessity" (W1: 240) and the like, the most fundamental of these conceptions being the categories.¹ We will not follow this part of Peirce's metaphysics any further in this paper.² In accordance with the former definition, metaphysics as "the philosophy of primal truths" (W1: 59) is the study of "primary conditions of all science" (W1: 59), its major-premisses (W1: 73), truths being predicated "*a priori* of the objects of experience" (W1: 61), or warrants "for inferring something not observed" (W1: 152).

What Peirce actually wrote in 1861-2 "Treatise on Metaphysics" and some other subsequent works counts rather as qualified suggestions than a fully developed theory? As I will argue it is Peirce's semiotic where we can find the actual fulfillment of these suggestions. Before that let us review some basic features of Peirce's metaphysics.

The center Peirce's reflections circle around is a proposition that experience can supply our reasoning with minor premisses only, i.e., particular propositions.³ No universal proposition can be given in observational experience.⁴ If we are thus to amplify our knowledge beyond the particular facts given in experience, we must assume the truth of a general proposition not derived from experience. Peirce's approach is transcendental in the sense that it deals with "primary conditions of all science" (W1: 59).⁵ It is on the other hand not critical in Kant's sense,⁶

¹ Ecuadorian Anthropologist. Visual Semiotic, specialist in Gender, Post-Colonial Aesthetics. National School of Anthropology and History, Mexico.

² It is a rather striking feature of Peirce's first formulation of semiotic that it is devoid of any explicit reference to the categories.

³ "All knowledge [...] is an inference from sensual minor premisses", W1: 75; see also W1: 152.

⁴ "A warrant for inferring something not observed is in itself an inference of something not observed. These assumptions [that "the observed result will be an indication of something not observed"], therefore, originate a priori. The science of these assumptions [...] is metaphysics.

⁵ "[T]he question what is the ground of scientific presumption and hypothesis [...] is a transcendental one" (W1: 240); "We find ourselves in all our discourse taking certain points for granted which we cannot have observed. The question therefore is what we may take for granted independent of all experience. The answer to this is metaphysics." (W1: 302)

⁶ "a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge", CPR A xi; "a critique ... of the faculty of reason in general", CPR A xii.

that of reason's inquiry into its own capacities, for he considers this approach as *petitio principii* (W1: 73, 77–78; Murphey 1993: 26–7), and the notion of unknowability of the *noumenon* as self-contradictory (W1: 40, 60). In his view it is objects which are the source and conditions of their knowledge. Peirce so entitles his approach as “uncritical transcendentalism” (W1: 79). The question of such metaphysics is in the first place that of accordance of a representation with its object, or, in Peirce's words: “How should the conceptions which spring up freely in our minds by virtue of the constitution thereof be true of the outward world?” (W1: 79). The method has to be devoid of any reference to psychology. Psychological (identified by Peirce with Kant's) method “starts by drawing the conceptions from the system of psychology and reasoning to their logical relations and meaning.” (W1: 63) In contradistinction to that Peirce suggest an unpsychological treatment of metaphysics, which “draws conceptions from no system but from the thoughts as they present themselves in their logical form - examining them logically - and finally puts them in their right place in the mind.” (W1: 63). One can taste here the appetizer of Peirce's much later Phenomenology or Phaneroscopy as a study of “the collective total of all that is in any way present to the mind” (CP 1.284). More importantly, Peirce is suggesting here a view of logic which is *materially indifferent*. As a study of form it does not need to consider the matter which embodies that form (the matter of thought) or the way in which this matter is present to us. “[M]eaning resides in words and other material representations” (W1: 306) Quite the contrary Peirce suggests that first we have to understand the concepts and their relations of forms of thought because the mind and its constitution are dependent upon them and not vice versa.

The main question of Peirce's metaphysics is “How are syntetical judgment in general possible” (W1: 248)? – “how can material inference be valid” (W1: 240) – “what is the ground of scientific presumption and hypothesis” (W1: 248) - What are the grounds of scientific inference? (W1: 279) The answer was given later, when he actually fulfilled the proposed metaphysical approach in his logic.

2. Towards the definition of logic

The purpose of this section is to show how Peirce arrived at his definition of logic as “objective symbolistic” (W1: 303). In 1865 Peirce gave a series of lectures at Harvard University which he called “On the Logic of Science” (W1: 161). The object of this logic is a study of synthetic, ampliative, or material inference, which is usually not considered to be a part of the logic proper. Although Peirce's concern is primarily with the scientific, or ampliative, reasoning we will see that in the end he presents a unified theory of all possible reasoning, offering principles for its generic unity and specific difference as well.

The main task of the first Harvard Lecture is to answer the question: What does logic study? What is its subject-matter? Peirce finds out that “The one great source of error in all attempts to make a Logic of Science has been utter misconception of the nature and definition of logic.” (W1: 163) The goal then is first to identify and clear up such misconceptions. So, the multitude of definitions of logic can be, Peirce observes, arranged into two classes: “those which do not and those which do give to logic a psychological or human character.” (W1: 163) Peirce's position rests in the former approach.

Since Kant, there has been a vast majority of the suffrages of logicians in favor of his definition of logic which is as follows - the science of the necessary laws of the Understanding and Reason - or what is the same thing - the science of the sheer Form of thought in general. Observe the two branches of this statement the former more psychological the latter scarcely at all so; one has two faculties and their capacities, the other thoughts as *objects* with forms. This is certainly the best definition yet given. (W1: 164)

Peirce thus sets out in the direction of unpsychological view of logic, of the formal treatment of thought. But he does not stop here and suggests that “we ought to adopt a thoroughly unpsychological view of logic.” (W1: 164) This thorough-going antipsychologism rests on the contention that the forms studied by the logician does not have to be forms of thought only (see W1: 164-5). Peirce speaks of either “form” or “logical character” (W1: 164) Every such form or character is said to have its “continual determinator”, which is any kind of matter in which the logical form could be embodied. “[A] continual determinator of a form is that in which the form inheres by the definition of the realtion of *substantia et accidens*.” (W1: 165) So the subject-matter of logic is further approximated: it is any substance (be it mental or material) capable of being a vehicle of – or, which is capable of being predicated to embody – a certain logical character or form. Thus we move from approximating logic as a formal treatment of thought to the understanding of logic as being entirely materially indifferent.

The proposition that there are substances which are continual determinators of forms studied by logic is very soon replaced by an equivalent proposition that logic is a study of representations (W1: 169). Since we can obviously come with various examples of representations which are not logician's concern, like a portrait, before proceeding further we have to discuss what representation is as a genus and to which species it can be divided in order to find out which species of representation is the subject-matter of logic.

In the period we are concerned with Peirce generally distinguishes three kinds of representations: copy, sign, symbol. They are classified “according to the different ways in which they may accord with its object.” (W1: 169) This accordance is synonymous to truth (W1: 79–80; 169–170). Representations are then divided by a different ways in which they may accord with its object. First kind of representation Peirce calls a *copy*, which he defines as consisting in the “sameness of predicates” of the representation and its object. From this definition can be inferred that any thing is a copy of some other thing given two limiting cases: if a representation had all the predicates of its object, the two would become identical (granted Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernables), on the other hand “no two things are so different as to resemble each other in no particular” (W1: 170).⁷ So for any two things there always is some predicate which they have in common, and some other, which they do not. Therefore, every copy is a partial truth and partial falsehood (W1: 170). Logical representations, on the other hand, “have absolute truth and falsehood” (W1: 170), and copies thus are not logician's concern. Second of the three species of representation is a *sign*. It has two distinctive characteristics. It is a representation of an individual object or objects, and its denotation is “fixed upon by convention” (W1: 170). As complete determination and individuality of reference is a limiting and unreachable character of a copy, so does sign lack “genuine generality” (W1: 170) which it cannot attain. It can denote a plurality of objects, but each one of them must be imposed upon the sign. Because “logic deals only with general terms”, a sign cannot be a proper object of logical study (W1: 170). The conditions which are necessary for a representation's being logical are met in the *symbol*. “The third kind of truth or accordance of a representation with its object, is that which inheres in the very nature of the representation whether that nature be original or acquired. Such a representation I name a *symbol*.” (W1: 170)

In the Harvard Lectures symbol is seen from a certain developmental point of view which is absent in Peirce's later writings. It is presented as originally being a sign in the above sense, i.e., being a representation of an *individual* conception. Through the process of its use it became more and more closely associated with that conception as to become in the end identical with it. For example the word “mushroom” was in the beginning an individual sign of the conception

⁷ Peirce gives a proof of this proposition in EP 1: 174.

of this organism which as a mental conception was general. It signified the idea of a mushroom *mediately* through the concept to which it was imposed. In the end the word became so intimately connected with the conception that it started to signify it *immediately*. “Now this readiness of excitation obviously consists in this; namely, that we do not have to reflect upon the word as a sign but that it comes to affect the intellect as though it had that quality which it connotes. I call this the acquired nature of the word, because it is a power that the word comes to have, and because the word itself without any reflection of ours upon it brings the idea into our minds.” (W1: 172–173)⁸

After this classification is provided, Peirce may return to the question of the subject-matter of logic. “I define logic therefore as the science of the conditions which enables symbols in general to refer to objects” (W1: 175). Logic is conceived of as “objective symbolistic” (W1: 303), that part of semiotic (“the general science of representations”, W1: 174) which deals with symbols, but not from all points of view (since symbol is related to its own essence, its object, and equivalent representation addressed by it), only as considering its objective relation. Thus Peirce’s unpsychological treatment of logic is based upon semiotic. The semiotic does not rest on any reference to the mind, but on the other hand, as far as mind has to be considered at all, it must obey the logical laws, which have a higher authority than the laws of the mind.

3. Objective Symbolistic

Such account would be incomplete, if we did not consider some other notions, which are of fundamental importance for Peirce’s project of offering the grounds of inference. One of these is the notion of *interpretant*. Interpretant is a representation representing some other representation as representing a certain object and therefore is itself a “more complicated” representation of the same object, being more complicated because it does not represent the object only, but also its representation. (see W1: 303) The example of interpretant *par excellence* is a conclusion of an argument – it represents the premisses as being a representation of an object (subject-term) as the conclusion itself is. Thus it has a crucial role in distinguishing the kinds of inference – every inference as symbolization (symbol-making) is a *production of an interpretant*. And the inferences are then distinguished by way of how this interpretant is produced. The quantity of an interpretant Peirce calls *information* (W1: 465). Every symbol possesses, along with the more familiar connotation and denotation, this quantity. Connotation of a symbol-term is a sum total of *marks* which are predicated whenever the symbol is predicated of something. Denotation is a sum total of individuals of which a symbol may be truly predicated. Information is defined as the product of connotation and denotation. Two cases can be distinguished. In analytic inference the product of any term’s denotation and connotation is constant in the premisses and the conclusion – the increase of one quantity is always accompanied by the decrease of the other and vice versa – so analytical inference does not bring any new information. In the case of syntehctic inference on the other hand, the increase of one quantity is possible with the other remaining constant – so new information is added either by means of extending denotation (as in induction) or connotation (as in hypothesis) of term in the conclusion as compared to the premisses. While copies have connotation only and sign denotation only, it is an essence of any symbol to have information, that is, to *denote by connoting*. (W1: 272)

The last among these notions is *symbolization*. It is a notion identical with inference, they being “the same notions” (W1: 280). Symbolization is making of a symbol-conclusion out of a symbol-premisses, and it also accords with the definition of interpretant – *the premisses are symbolized to the conclusion which is their interpretant*. Symbolization is conceived as replacing the

⁸ This conception is based upon Peirce’s reading of Locke’s Essay, iii.2, 4–7.

term in the premisses by either (a) one having the same information, as in deduction, or (b) by a more connotative one, as in hypothesis, or (c) by a more denotative one as in induction. These correspond to the three possible objects or references of the symbol (symbol, form, thing)⁹. The transcendental principle upon which the validity of inferences, their generic unity and specific difference are grounded Peirce thus formulates as “All things, forms, symbols are symbolizable.” (W1: 282; see also W1: 280–281). We may so turn to the examination of grounds of inference.

The core of Peirce's explanation is that the ground of an inference is valid if it can be derived by the very same inference it is intended to support. This rests upon a premiss that the kinds of reasoning are mutually irreducible (which itself rests upon the fact that they exhibit the forms of the three syllogistic figures which Peirce demonstrated to be irreducible¹⁰). For a weaker inference cannot establish the validity of the stronger, while resting a weaker inference on the stronger would mean reducing it in which case it would not be distinct. Moreover, these grounds are the logical grounds which depend on the property of symbols and so rest on the same ground as Peirce's logic in general – so they are metaphysically valid as far as Peirce's logic is metaphysics.

Now there are exactly three kinds of inference, that is, three kinds of possible symbolization: deduction, hypothesis, and induction. They all belong to the same genus, they are kinds of possible symbolization. But symbolization has three distinct species and thus there is also a specific difference between the inferences, which correspond to the three possible references of a symbol: symbol, form, or thing. Since these are the three references every symbol qua symbol must have, and since inference is symbolization, that is making a symbol out of another, then we can symbolize either (i) a symbol, as in deduction; (ii) a form, as in hypothesis; (iii) a thing, as in induction.

To give examples let us consider these three forms of symbolization.

Deduction	Hypothesis	Induction
All elves are immortal. Galadriel is an elf. Galadriel is immortal.	Only a very absent-minded person would forget his walking-stick in the detective's office. Dr. Mortimer has forgotten his walking stick in the detective's office. Dr. Mortimer is absent-minded.	Neat and deer are herbivora. Neat and deer are cloven-footed. All cloven-footed animals are herbivora.

In the first case of deduction, no new information is added to the term “Galadriel”. In the case of hypothesis, in the second premiss the connotation of “Dr. Mortimer” is “who has forgotten his walking-stick in the detective's office”, while in the conclusion, its connotation is increased by adding to it the predicate “is absent-minded”. In the case of induction the class of herbivora denotes only “neat and deer”, while in the conclusion it is increased to cover “all cloven-footed animals”.

Peirce then goes on to prove that all three inferential (symbolical) species are valid. Since there are three *irreducible* kinds of inference where each one has its own leading principles which cannot be reduced to any other. Peirce concludes that each symbolization must be proved by its own leading principles, that is, symbolization of symbol deductively, symbolization of

⁹ These can be perhaps distinguished as Ockham's *suppositio materialis*, *suppositio simplex*, and *suppositio personalis*.

¹⁰ See W1: 372–373 for that demonstration.

form hypothetically, symbolization of thing inductively. What does however Peirce prove by this procedure? It is not, he says, “that the kinds of inference are valid, since their proof, on the contrary, must rest on the assumption of that validity. Their use is only to show what the condition of that validity is.” (W1: 184–185). What he states is that, paradoxically, there can be no *apodictic* warrant of the scientific inference. Such a demand would be contradictory – if scientific inference was a *priori*, it would lose the character which makes it a scientific inference – inferring something *not known* – and knowable only by scientific reasoning. As we saw, Peirce said, that synthetic inference assumes the validity of some truth which is not given in it. This *must* be the case for inferring something not yet known, there must be something unknown. Thus, induction and hypothesis cannot be proven apodictically, because, in contradistinction to symbols, they depend upon the symbolization of things and forms, and we can never be sure that we infer correctly in a particular case, what this form or thing is. It is on the other hand guaranteed, that in general, if there is to be any synthetic inference at all, these forms must be valid.

4. Conclusion

We have thus seen some connections which can be found between Peirce’s early metaphysics and his little-later logic, grounded upon the notion of representation. Peirce proposed a logical treatment of metaphysics, which was seen upon its semiotic ground possible, with logical laws have higher authority than the laws of the mind. His definition of “philosophy of primal truths” is mirrored by working-out of the grounds of inference in his logic. Upon the notion of symbolization he shows what are the grounds of inference, and is able to unify synthetic and analytic reasoning in a single theory on the ground of their belong together to the genus symbolization, as well as their specific difference as symbolizing by different leading principles. Such an inquiry is transcendental because if we are to arrive at any knowledge the validity of forms, by which it can be given to us, must be the case without which such knowledge would not be possible. To end up by one last quotation:

[T]o the pupil of Kant as to the pupil of Aristotle the Analytic of Logic is the foundation of Metaphysics. We find ourselves in all our discourse taking certain points for granted which we cannot have observed. The question therefore is what we may take for granted independent of all experience. The answer to this is metaphysics. But it is plain that we can thus take for granted only what is involved in logical forms. Hence the necessity of studying these forms. (W1: 302)

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ALGUNAS TENDENCIAS DE LA SEMIÓTICA EN CHILE A PARTIR DEL AÑO 1990

Elizabeth Parra Ortiz
Universidad de Concepción, Chile
elizabeth.parra.ortiz@gmail.com

Jaime Otazo Hermosilla
Universidad de la Frontera, Temuco, Chile

Abstract

Este estudio surge del interés por realizar una revisión sistemática de los estudios de semiótica que se han producido en Chile desde la década de 1970 hasta el 2013 y organizarlos a través de una cartografía. La reflexión intenta revisar los bordes que sostienen al campo de estudio de la Semiótica en el país y responder sobre el lugar que le corresponde como campo disciplinario en el marco de la producción de conocimiento en sus dimensión teórica (epistémica) y metodológica.

Desde algunos años existe la preocupación en Latinoamérica por reinventar, por re – trazar la historia y las lógicas del desarrollo de la semiótica, ciencia que ha tenido en el mundo, una institucionalidad reconocida y diversa al mismo tiempo, pero que ha seguido desarrollándose de manera creciente (Escudero, 1998; Magariños de Moretin, 2004)).

Los escasos trabajos que se han propuesto revisar la historia y el dominio de la semiótica en Chile han sido insuficientes y parciales. No han logrado dar cuenta de manera sistemática del aporte de esta disciplina al desarrollo de las ciencias sociales, de las Humanidades, ni han propuesto una visión sistemática en torno al origen y desarrollo de sus aspectos teóricos y metodológicos. De manera parcial algunos investigadores mediados por las circunstancias históricas – políticas (Del Villar, 1996) y/o de áreas disciplinarias, (Gallardo y Sánchez, 1989; Jofré, 1997, y, más tardíamente, desde el cuerpo, Ponce, 2010) no se advierte a la fecha, que exista una visión integrada del campo de la semiótica en Chile. La imagen proyectada de la disciplina en los

antecedentes mencionados, se muestra asociada a estudios desde la lingüística, desconociendo aquellas áreas no indagadas (artes, teatro, cuerpo, interculturalidad) y los periodos no considerados (2000-2013) dentro de los primeros intentos de abordar estudios sobre la disciplina. Por tanto, la cartografía que se propuso en el marco de un proyecto de investigación asociado con universidades nacionales y de la región latinoamericana y financiado por la Universidad de Concepción, quiere dar cuenta, precisamente, de un trabajo acumulado de manera dispersa, fruto muchas veces de iniciativas personales que requieren ser atendidas, de manera integral, tal es el caso de la semiótica.

En este trabajo se dará cuenta de algunas reflexiones a partir de resultados preliminares de este proyecto de investigación. En particular, se intentará aportar un marco tentativo de clasificación de las investigaciones semióticas chilenas en función de sus compromisos más o menos explícitos con determinadas corrientes epistemológicas y/o metodológicas.

1. Introducción

Este trabajo es parte de un Proyecto de Investigación adscrito a la Universidad de Concepción¹ y que se realiza actualmente en conjunto con otras dos universidades, una de ellas chilena (Universidad de La Frontera) y la otra, argentina (Universidad Nacional de Misiones). El objetivo de dicha investigación es realizar una descripción sistemática del estado actual y evolución del dominio de la semiótica en Chile, desde sus inicios formales como informales (1969-2012), que permita proponer una Cartografía de Investigaciones Semióticas en el país y conocer las condiciones teóricas (epistémicas y metodológicas) y prácticas (institucionales) que han posibilitado la aparición y el desarrollo de la disciplina semiótica en Chile.

Este artículo tiene por objetivo elaborar una revisión panorámica de los estudios de semiótica en Chile con énfasis en las últimas dos décadas de su desarrollo y aportar un marco tentativo que permita clasificarlas en función de sus compromisos más o menos explícitos con determinadas corrientes epistémicas y/o metodológicas.

Dos trabajos previos (Gallardo & Sánchez, 1981 y Rafael del Villar, 1998) han realizado sendos estados del arte de la semiótica en Chile. Estos dos aportes constituyen información imprescindible sobre dos momentos cruciales de la semiótica en Chile. El primero de ellos, fruto de la colaboración entre el lingüista chileno Andrés Gallardo y el investigador en educación, Jorge Sánchez (a la época, ayudante de Gallardo), permitió adscribir a la disciplina semiótica un conjunto de trabajos provenientes de los más diversos campos disciplinarios a los que se les reconoce, no tanto su adscripción formal, sino su pertinencia semiótica desde el punto de vista de los autores. En este sentido el trabajo de Gallardo y Sánchez (1981) constituye una indagación temprana de los trabajos de semiótica en Chile, la cual (como veremos más adelante) tenía en ese entonces apenas 10 años de desarrollo en el país. En un segundo momento, con ocasión de la constitución de la Asociación Chilena de Semiótica y de la realización de su primer Congreso en 1996, Rafael del Villar (1996, traducido luego en Del Villar, 1998), lleva a cabo una nueva revisión diacrónica proponiendo tres grandes periodos o formas que adquirió la semiótica en Chile desde su instalación a fines de los años sesentas.

Al margen de la exactitud o imprecisión de estos trabajos tempranos, se debe reconocer el enorme valor que tuvieron como una forma de traer a la existencia, a través de la palabra, una disciplina a partir de una constelación de investigaciones muy diversas inspiradas en teorías que aparecieron tímidamente en Chile y que recién vinieron a institucionalizarse a fines de los años noventa.

¹ Se trata del proyecto VRID Asociado N° 213.174.006-1.0 "Cartografía de investigaciones semióticas en Chile" financiado por la Vicerrectoría de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Universidad de Concepción, bajo la dirección de la Dra. Elizabeth Parra y que se realizará entre los años 2014 y 2016.

Ahora bien, casi 20 años después del último estado del arte de la semiótica chilena, es lógico preguntarse ¿qué ha pasado a partir de 1996 con la semiótica en Chile?, ¿es posible detectar nuevas tendencias o nuevas etapas a partir de 1996?, ¿la lógica de desarrollo de esta disciplina sigue siendo la misma o ha cambiado? En caso que descubramos cambios importantes, ¿cuáles son los hitos que han marcado las transformaciones de la semiótica durante los últimos 20 años?

Para responder a estas preguntas es necesario revisar nuevamente los estadios fundacionales de esta disciplina y establecer a partir de ellos las líneas de desarrollo que marcarán su identidad actual.

2. Hitos fundacionales de la semiótica

Chile es un país que se conforma en el siglo XIX bajo el alero de la tradición europea guiado por los valores de la Ilustración adoptando modelos culturales provenientes de Francia y también un modelo económico y político europeo. Hablar de los orígenes de la semiótica en Chile es remitirse a académicos e investigadores formados en Europa en los años cincuentas y sesentas del siglo pasado. Tal es el caso de Eliseo Verón en Argentina, gran referente intelectual latinoamericano, quien se instaló en París y terminó convirtiéndose en un embajador del desembarco del estructuralismo en la región y, en particular, en Argentina y Chile.

En 1968 como ayudante de Levi-Strauss, Verón tradujo al español, la *Antropología Estructural* (Scolari, 2010-2011). Al igual que otros investigadores en Francia, se sumó a la tarea de elaborar una ciencia general de los sistemas de significación poniendo énfasis en la construcción de teorías y en la adecuación de los instrumentos técnicos a los modelos teóricos. Su aporte en ese momento apuntó a la refutación y crítica del funcionalismo (Ravera, 2000 citado por Scolari)

Tal como sucedió en Argentina, en la primera fase de la semiótica en Chile confluyeron el estructuralismo de una matriz saussureana y las teorías de comunicación social norteamericana de carácter pragmática. A juicio de Raver citado por Scolari, (2000) se partió del supuesto que la significación es una producción social, que los estudios empíricos discursivos son imprescindibles y que la dimensión ideológica no funciona como un cierto tipo de mensaje sino como un nivel de lectura de los discurso sociales.

En los años sesentas, en el Chile “pre-revolucionario”, según la expresión de Scolari (2010-2011:15), los estudios de comunicación y, de paso, los de semiótica, fueron impulsados por otro investigador crucial que sintonizó a Chile con el fructífero debate intelectual que instaló a la semiología y a las ciencias de la comunicación en la institucionalidad científica de Francia. Armand Mattelart, quien había llegado al Chile en 1962 a realizar estudios de corte sociodemográfico, se convence, hacia fines de la década del sesenta, de la necesidad de recombinar el marxismo con la *sémiologie* con el objetivo de potenciar la capacidad crítica de las ciencias sociales. Los resultados de aquellas hibridaciones fueron explosivos para los estudios de medios en Chile cuya base provenía de la Mass Communication Research. En ese contexto, la investigación basada en la denuncia de la concentración de los medios debía ser complementada por investigaciones orientadas al análisis ideológico del contenido de los medios. Un análisis que, a diferencia del análisis de contenido explícito tal como se realizaba en la tradición norteamericana en ese entonces, tomaba la forma de los análisis mitológicos que Roland Barthes y su equipo en el CECMAS en Francia habían comenzado a realizar.

Entre los investigadores chilenos estas propuestas de Armand Mattelart fueron acogidas con entusiasmo y aplicadas en las investigaciones críticas que caracterizaron la agenda investigativa de los años previos al golpe de Estado, las cuales más tarde decantarían en la diferenciación entre estudios semiológicos y estudios de economía política de la comunicación.

Zarowsky, investigador argentino (2008) subraya la importancia que tuvieron para este giro paradigmático, los estudios tardíos de Mattelart en Chile. Es sólo a partir de 1969, y forzando

los límites impuestos por la aproximación sociodemográfica que Mattelart comienza a abordar aspectos culturales y mediáticos de los procesos sociopolíticos e institucionales desde una mirada semiológica y estructuralista.

Tal como cuenta Zarowsky, el mismo Verón en 1974, miró con desconfianza las primeras “inserciones de la semiología en Argentina y Chile” advirtiendo sobre las distorsiones ideológicas que podrían producirse a partir de un uso culturalmente dependiente de categorías teóricas elaboradas en contextos socio-culturales extranjeros (Verón, 1974: 121). En ese mismo artículo, Verón critica en estas primeras investigaciones semiológicas chilenas, lideradas por los Mattelart, la práctica de una *lectura intuitiva* a la que le faltaba un corpus teórico estrictamente definido y una metodología rigurosamente explicitada (Verón, 1974: 122–123). Al respecto señala que “No me parece sorprendente que buena parte de los análisis emprendidos por los colegas chilenos no vaya, en los hechos, más allá de la práctica intuitiva de la lectura ideológica de los textos” (Verón, 1974:122).

A su vez, Verón (1974:123) señala que “La contradicción entre la demanda práctica (política) y las condiciones de la investigación es aún más clara en el estudio de Mattelart y Dorfman sobre el Pato Donald. En este trabajo no sólo se aplica como método el comentario intuitivo e interpretativo del material [de una manera que es, dicho sea de paso, sumamente dudosa]; el caso me parece más grave: *el problema del método ha desaparecido completamente como problema*” [las cursivas son del original].

Las observaciones de Verón en torno a la emergencia de los estudios semióticos o semiológicos en Argentina y Chile, tienden a confirmar un triángulo de influencias intelectuales entre estos dos países y París a fines de los años sesentas. Tal como lo demuestra Zarowsky en su trabajo de 2008, estas influencias tuvieron la forma de contactos esporádicos, pero significativos entre los equipos de investigación constituidos en torno a las figuras de Armand Mattelart en Chile y Eliseo Verón en Argentina.

3. Dos intentos retrospectivos

Como se indicaba al principio de este artículo, en Chile existen dos intentos por hacer el estado del arte de los estudios semióticos a nivel nacional. Estos dos intentos están separados por diez años. El primero de ellos se llevó a cabo en 1986 y el siguiente en 1996. Tras ellos, con excepción de los recientes intentos de los autores de este artículo, no se han realizado nuevos esfuerzos. Vale la pena revisar cuáles fueron los criterios de clasificación, las metodologías de indagación y los resultados de estos intentos previos.

Desde el sur del país, los académicos de la Universidad de Concepción, Gallardo y Sánchez (1986), y por encargo de Thomas Sebeok, pueden considerarse los primeros que de manera intuitiva, elaboran un panorama de los estudios de semiótica en Chile. Ellos señalaron que el primer obstáculo que tuvieron al presentar el desarrollo de la semiótica tuvo que ver con la delimitación del campo de la disciplina. En el contexto de una reflexión sobre el tema, de manera arbitraria establecieron que una obra intelectual es semiótica cuando se refiere a los sistemas de signos, como tal, es decir, cuando hay una conciencia explícita de tener que ver con los sistemas de significación y una voluntad manifiesta de dar cuenta de los de una manera sistemática. [traducción libre de los autores]

Respecto de la tradición semiótica que se practica en Chile, Gallardo y Sánchez (1986) se apresuran en aclarar que la mayor parte de la actividad semiótica en Chile se basaba en la tradición de la lingüística de Saussure. En ese contexto, los trabajos analizados se definen como estructuralistas e incorporan metodologías propias de la lingüística estructural.

La revisión desarrollada por Gallardo y Sánchez define cuatro áreas de desarrollo de la semiótica en Chile: 1) áreas de investigación, (lenguaje, literatura, medios de comunicación, expresión

artística, diseño, urbanismo y arquitectura, folklore, psicología social y filosofía); 2) descripción de sistemas de semiótica aplicada 3) trabajo institucional y 4) práctica semiótica.

Los primeros trabajos de semiótica detectados por estos autores constituyen aproximaciones aisladas que, en general, no tuvieron una continuación inmediata en las áreas del arte (Kupareo, 1964; Schwarztmann, 1969), la filosofía semiótica (Kupareo, 1964); la semiótica del folklore (Scharztmann, 1969), la psicología (Roa, 1971–1974, 1978), la lingüística (Sáez, Godoy, 1974; Rabanales 1973–1975); la literatura (Hozven, 1979), y los medios de comunicación (Colle, 1978), entre otros.

El trabajo de Gallardo y Sánchez tiene la ventaja de haber sido realizado en un momento muy temprano de la instalación de la semiótica en Chile y entregar un análisis perspectivo de las áreas que en ese momento aparecían como relevantes para la disciplina. Los desarrollos ulteriores que ésta tuvo en nuestro país tienden a confirmar la relativa dispersión inicial de los estudios iniciales de la semiótica nacional y su baja institucionalización haciendo que las investigaciones pioneras fueran fruto de la iniciativa individual más que los esfuerzos colectivos.

Metodológicamente, el artículo de Gallardo y Sánchez, constituyó un estudio exploratorio y en ese sentido conscientemente limitado. Según lo indicado por sus propios autores² esta revisión respondió a una oportunidad de incorporar un capítulo en la obra colectiva de Thomas Sebeok sobre el estado de la semiótica diversos países. Por esta misma razón los medios para garantizar una revisión bibliográfica exhaustiva (no obstante, el restringido campo científico de principios de los ochentas) fueron limitados. Por otra parte, las definiciones operacionales que permitieran establecer a ciencia cierta qué se considerarían un trabajo semiótico y qué no fueron reconocidamente problemáticas. Estas limitaciones, por supuesto, no restan valor a este trabajo pionero sino que deben servir para tomarse en cuenta en futuras indagaciones.

Posterior al trabajo de Gallardo y Sánchez, el académico de la Universidad de Chile, Rafael Del Villar (1996), en un breve artículo publicado por primera vez en francés en la *Revista Chilena de Semiótica*, elabora una sinopsis de los orígenes y desarrollo de la semiótica en Chile desde una perspectiva histórica – ideológica dividiéndola en tres etapas.

De la primera de las tres etapas de la semiótica en Chile (1969–1975), del Villar señala que la disciplina se integró a un proyecto político-epistémico de la estética y la crítica cultural. A su juicio, la intensa actividad política de esos años condicionó que la actividad se concentrara en llenar las “necesidades de ensoñación de la totalidad social”, al calor de la lucha ideológica, más que desarrollar una escuela semiótica. En efecto, en la década de los 70’ la efervescencia ideológica vivida terminó por acallar las voces de los intelectuales bajo la intervención de la dictadura militar.

La tradición estructuralista en Chile se combinó con una praxis de transformación social. Dos Centros de Investigación concentraron los trabajos de corte semiótico en este periodo: el Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Nacional y la Escuela de Arte de la Comunicación (EAC) ambos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Dada esta situación inicial, Del Villar tipifica una segunda etapa (1975 hasta 1982) durante la cual, si bien tendió a perderse la vertiente más explícitamente crítica del análisis semio-ideológico, la semiótica se desarrollará en el campo de los estudios literarios y de la estética, al alero de los departamentos universitarios que se encontraban ya bien establecidos al inicio de la dictadura. Del Villar menciona ocho departamentos de Lenguas (o afines) en distintas universidades del país en los que se desarrollará una semiótica eminentemente literaria, “Campo Teórico Hegemónico”, según el autor. No obstante, a partir de la década del 80’ emerge una semiótica

² Varias de las informaciones incluidas a continuación proviene del diálogo sostenido con los autores con ocasión de la realización de las Segundas Jornadas de Formación Semiótica en la Universidad de La Frontera, Temuco, el 24 de julio de 2014.

de las comunicaciones, desde la cual se tratará de dar respuesta a problemas concretos impuesto por el sistema productivo comunicacional del sector privado y público.

En la tercera etapa (1982 – 1996), se produce lo que Del Villar denomina una “ruptura epistémica en el campo semiótico”. Por una parte, se continúa desarrollando la semiótica (y/o semiología) en el contexto de las disciplinas literarias y estéticas a partir de una lógica de desarrollo endógeno “cuya necesidad es la de la teoría”. Por otra, emerge una semiótica aplicada a las problemáticas comunicacionales con una lógica de desarrollo exógena, que tiende a responder a los requerimientos del cambiante entorno económico-comunicacional de las décadas ochenta y noventa.

4. Factores de una irrupción disciplinaria

Para Del Villar (1998), el desarrollo de lo que él llama el *Campo Teórico Semiótico de las Comunicaciones*, fue un reflejo directo de la expansión de lo que podríamos llamar emergencia del negocio o mercado de las comunicaciones en Chile. Vale decir, la progresiva demanda por servicios asociados a la gestión comunicacional de la empresa privada y las instituciones del estado, lo que incluye gestión de imagen y marca, publicidad, comunicación estratégica, etc.

Sin embargo, tal como indica el autor, la irrupción disciplinaria de la semiótica de la comunicación estaba además en sintonía con el nuevo paradigma que regiría la Educación Superior en Chile y, sobre todo, con el sistema de formación profesional que se desarrollaría en el país a partir de la privatización y masificación de la educación terciaria.

Este fenómeno (de carácter más institucional), está asociado al anterior (de carácter más económico) en la medida que existiendo demanda por comunicadores, consecuentemente se creó un campo de desempeño profesional y la consiguiente demanda de formación en esos campos.

En resumen, fuera de las evidentes transformaciones sociales y culturales que trajeron consigo las tecnologías de la comunicación y de la penetración de un sistema global de comunicaciones, dos fenómenos acompañan este quiebre epistémico de la semiótica en Chile: el desarrollo de las empresas de comunicación publicitaria, estratégica, corporativa, entre otros y la multiplicación, a partir de los años noventa, de las carreras de formación técnica en esta área. La semiótica aplicada a las comunicaciones responderá al llamado de estos nuevos escenarios.

El que hacer de la semiótica se diversifica en aplicaciones en un espacio socio-político cultural adverso que requiere un oasis para interpretar la realidad social que se vive. Por un lado, irrumpen nuevos géneros como el video música, video juegos y en particular, la comunicación orientada a la empresa como requerimiento de la construcción de imagen, identidad, la publicidad como estrategia de comunicación persuasiva y el diseño gráfico.

Por otro lado, los estudios de semiótica encuentran un nicho de desarrollo y cultivo en la enseñanza de Educación Superior. Los planes de estudios de programas de formación profesional y técnica y en particular las carreras relacionadas con las comunicaciones como periodismo, publicidad, audiovisual y diseño entre otras, para atender los requerimientos del mercado. En efecto, la comunicación organizacional aparece como un nicho de estudio que combina la semiótica como un campo asociado a la psicología y la sociología.

5. De las humanidades a las ciencias sociales

La semiótica que se practica en Chile desde la década del 60 siguió los mismos modelos que el resto de Latinoamérica de los estructuralistas aplicados a los campos literarios y medios de comunicación, este último bajo el modelo informacional, proveniente de Estados Unidos. Aun más, Del Villar (1996) señala que lo recurrente en el medio académico en la década del noventa consistía en archivar la semiótica en el dominio de la Ciencia Literaria como una corriente al interior de ella, ideología teórica que podrá ser correcta o no, pero cuyo efecto práctico no operaba a nivel concreto.

En el caso particular de Chile, la semiótica hasta fines de los años noventa fue pasando y dejando su huella de un campo disciplinario a otro dentro de las humanidades para pasar luego hacia sus márgenes e integrarse en contextos disciplinarios metodológicamente cada vez más cercanos a las ciencias sociales. Este hecho, no ha parecido llamar la atención de los analistas de la historia de la semiótica en Chile. La disciplina ha cruzado sin grandes problemas desde el campo epistemológico de las humanidades hacia el campo de las ciencias sociales. Áreas que en Chile aparecen altamente diferenciadas, pero que en el campo de las comunicaciones parecen confluir en objetos de gran complejidad con requerimientos teóricos y metodológicos propios de una aproximación interdisciplinaria. Este fenómeno no es exclusivo del contexto chileno, algo parecido es posible percibir en las investigaciones de los herederos de la semiótica en Argentina, España y Francia, por poner un ejemplo.

Por otra parte, el desarrollo de la semiótica como cualquier saber está asociado a un lugar y un tiempo determinado. En este caso, sus orígenes y posterior desarrollo estuvieron ligados a profundos procesos de confrontación ideológica en el país que provocaron que la semiótica fuera resistida como campo científico y no se la valorara en su real dimensión investigativa. Actualmente, se observa un intento por re-instalar la discusión teórica a partir de los cambios de paradigmas.

6. Tendencias actuales

Para indagar el estado de la semiótica en el siglo XXI se requiere poner de relieve la diversidad de campos en los que se ejercitan operaciones de tipo semiótico (Jofré, 1997) y que la atraviesan donde la temática central sigue siendo la doctrina de los signos o la teoría de las significaciones. Actualmente, se podría sostener que hay intentos de incorporar otras temáticas propias del giro propiciado por el académico italiano Fabbri (2004) como son la narratividad, las pasiones y la acción, dando paso a uno de los campos con proyección en el análisis semiótico como es el arte y el cuerpo (Ponce 2010, Contreras 2012). A juicio de Ponce, (2010), es precisamente esta nueva perspectiva de estudio la que permite que el arte en sus diversas manifestaciones se integre a manifestaciones culturales y que se reconozca la gestación de un giro en los enfoques de estudios semióticos en Chile que ameritan ser estudiados con mayor profundidad. Del mismo modo, la académica Salinas incorporó los estudios de género y el análisis de los discursos de los mineros de la zona norte del país.

Otras de las vertientes que nutren los estudios arrancan desde las Tics como son el estudio de Videoclips, anime japoneses de la mano del sociólogo Del Villar, quien ha generado una línea de investigación con un equipo de jóvenes investigadores.

Del mismo modo, en la zona austral de Chile, desde el ámbito del periodismo, la lingüística y la comunicación con Iván Carrasco, Rodrigo Browne, Rodrigo Moulian; Hugo Carrasco, Mabel García, Carlos Del Valle, Jaime Otazo, Luis Nitrihual y Javier Mayorga han generado líneas de estudios desde la comunicación intercultural. Más tarde y con el influjo de Verón y la categoría de *semiosis social* como de los *imaginarios sociales* con Pintos, Castoriadis, Baeza y Dittus entra en vigencia el estudio de la producción social de sentido para levantar una perspectiva socio semiótica.

En este sentido, la revisión actual apunta a dejar en evidencia, los procesos de significación emergentes, que dan paso a nuevas propuestas o líneas de trabajo.

7. Tensión entre docencia e investigación

Una de las características con las que se ha desarrollado la semiótica en Chile es su relativa ausencia de escuelas teóricas que representen o reflejen opciones disciplinarias propias en una dinámica reflexiva capaz de reelaborar la tradición o de romper con ella. Por el contrario, existe

una cierta tendencia a la dispersión de los esfuerzos investigativos que no redundan en una reformulación de los supuestos teóricos canónicos sino que permanecen en el ámbito de la teoría aplicada.

Una explicación posible de esta tendencia es que la semiótica chilena de los últimos años es sobre todo el resultado de una explosión de la docencia de esta disciplina en el contexto de las profesiones del campo de las comunicaciones más que de una real institucionalización a nivel científico disciplinario. Esto podría relacionarse también al hecho que la semiótica, a diferencia de las ciencias de la comunicación, no aparece inscrita como tal en la institucionalidad científica del país (por ejemplo, no está asociada a un grupo de estudios en Conicyt), pese a existir formalmente como asociación científica. A esto se suma la ausencia casi total de diplomas o grados en semiótica que sean otorgados por universidades chilenas (la excepción es del diplomado en Semiótica de la Facultad de Artes de la Universidad de Chile).

Estas hipótesis hacen que se torne importante generar una revisión sobre las orientaciones que ha seguido la disciplina a través de la tensión entre la enseñanza y la investigación de la semiótica en las instituciones de Educación Superior (Universidades e Institutos Profesionales) del país.

En la década del noventa se advierte ya un predominio de la enseñanza por sobre la investigación, que quizá hoy no se aprecia tan fuertemente pero que puede encontrarse al origen de la debilidad y dispersión que hemos señalado. Este predominio de la semiótica como objeto de docencia más que como objeto de investigación obedece a la ya comentada explosión de la creación de programas de formación tanto técnica como profesional en el área de las comunicaciones. Cada uno de estos programas incorporó fuertemente a la semiótica en su plan de estudios como una forma de proporcionar un marco teórico y epistemológico para comprender los sistemas de significación y los procesos de comunicación en sus aspectos más generales y abstractos. Aunque también se trataba de una asignatura capaz de modularse en diversas aplicaciones a sistemas de significación específicos tales como la semiótica discursiva, la semiótica visual y fotográfica, la semiótica del cine, entre otros. Desde este punto de vista, la semiótica se nos aparece hoy día a la vez como un factor germinal de las ciencias de la comunicación en Chile y como marco teórico epistemológico de las diversas disciplinas que concurren a la formación de los profesionales de la comunicación.

Cabe preguntarse por lo tanto, cómo se realizó, a partir de los años noventa, el paso de la semiótica desde la docencia hacia la investigación y cómo este tránsito se ha visto favorecido o entorpecido por la dependencia que desde esos años tiene la semiótica respecto de las ciencias de la comunicación.

Puesto que cada institución resolvió estas cuestiones de un modo ad-hoc recurriendo a la creatividad e intuición de los equipos académicos que fundaron las carreras de comunicación en Chile, equipos que estaban constituidos por un puñado de académicos e investigadores de las comunicaciones más un número importante de investigadores consagrados provenientes de áreas afines a la comunicación, tales como la literatura, la filosofía, la lingüística y otras, es difícil proponer un ejemplo paradigmático. Tal vez el caso que más se aproxima a ello sea el de la creación de la Carrera de Periodismo en la Universidad de La Frontera, a principios de los años noventa. Esta Carrera es la culminación de un proyecto de reformulación del quehacer académico del Departamento de Lenguas y Literatura de la recientemente creada universidad regional (derivada de las sedes locales de la Universidad de Chile y la Universidad Técnica del Estado). A partir de los años noventa, este Departamento que se redefine como Departamento de Lenguas, Literatura y Comunicación, se esforzó para ampliar su oferta de formación en el área de las comunicaciones creando en primer lugar la Carrera de Periodismo y seguidamente el Magíster en Ciencias de la Comunicación. El equipo que se hizo cargo de esta tarea estuvo

compuesto principalmente por investigadores provenientes de las áreas preexistentes del Departamento: literatura y lingüística.

¿Qué es lo que hizo posible la emergencia de estos programas de formación precisamente en este contexto académico de la Universidad de La Frontera? La respuesta a esta pregunta tiene que ver directamente con la disciplina semiótica, pues las tensiones disciplinarias entre literatura y lingüística habían sido resueltas [al menos temporalmente] mediante un dispositivo metateórico que permitía situar ambas disciplinas dentro de un dominio mayor: el estudio de los sistemas de significación y de los procesos de comunicación que no son otra cosa en conjunto que la semiótica (según la propuesta de Eco en *Tratado de Semiótica General*). De esta forma, se legitimó la pertinencia y la pertenencia disciplinaria de la comunicación en un Departamento académico que se debía más a las humanidades que a las ciencias sociales, lugar donde se suele ubicar hoy a las ciencias de la comunicación.

Este ejemplo da algunas pistas interesantes sobre el modo en que la semiótica habría permitido en Chile la colaboración, la intercomprensión, la convergencia interdisciplinaria así como la emergencia de nuevas disciplinas en el contexto de una institucionalidad científica altamente resistente a la aparición de nuevas unidades académicas o áreas de investigación.

8. Hacia clasificación de las etapas de las investigaciones semióticas chilena

A juicio del académico mexicano Cid (2002) para trazar una línea cronológica que permita intentar establecer las etapas de desarrollo de la semiótica del conjunto de teorías aplicadas al estudio del objeto y su diseño, habrá que remitirse a los hitos que la semiótica ha seguido desde su conformación como disciplina independiente hasta nuestros días y que se puede aplicar a Chile. Desde una perspectiva global, Cid señala que la semiótica en un primer momento estuvo abocada a los estudios precursores en la cual se definieron las bases para el dialogo interdisciplinario; luego, pasó , a la etapa pre semiótica, en la cual instrumentos no propiamente semióticos posibilitaron los primeros acercamientos al estudio del objeto como tal en el ámbito social y de su significado; la etapa translingüística, coincide con el traslado de los modelos lingüísticos al estudio del objeto, buscando las analogías que lo consideran capaz de constituir un lenguaje estructurado gracias a su posibilidad de comunicar y , por último, agrega una etapa semiótica que coincide con la profesionalización dela disciplina y de los modelos que se consolidan gracias al potencial explicativo alcanzado y a la profundidad de sus análisis mediante una enseñanza sistemática con diversos grados de especialización en los Centros Universitarios.

Dittus (2008:364) por su parte, advierte que en Chile, existe un retorno de la semiótica como instrumento de análisis social y como consecuencia los desafíos metodológicos que encierra. Considera que hay atisbos de líneas, aunque sin consolidarse como escuelas por el resabio de la impronta ideologizante de la semiótica debido a su cercanía con disciplinas de las ciencias sociales, sin embargo la tradición filosófica es lo que más ha pesado en su composición como disciplina.

En esta misma línea, Juan Manuel Fierro, académico de la Universidad de La Frontera, en el primer encuentro sobre el origen y desarrollo de la semiótica en Chile, realizado en Temuco (2014) señala que partiendo de la base tradicional de la semiótica asociada al estructuralismo vigente de la época (1970) se reconocen tres momentos en su desarrollo. En un primer momento, distingue una etapa de una semiótica teórica, clásica cuyo objeto de atención fue el signo asociada a Saussure y Peirce; un segundo momento, reconoce una semiótica de la comunicación cuyo eje fueron y son los sistemas de códigos asociado al estructuralismo lingüístico y un tercer momento cuyo centro de interés está en el sujeto y los procesos de significación asociados a la hermenéutica.

9. Algunas inferencias a modo de conclusión

9.1. Una de las constantes en el desarrollado de la semiótica en Chile es su relativa ausencia de escuelas teóricas que representen líneas disciplinarias en una dinámica reflexiva capaz de constituir una tradición.

9.2. Si bien ha existido la intención por retomar las cuestiones de base para revisar como se estaba operacionalizando el que hacer de la disciplina en el país, se sigue aún en el vértigo de listados de temáticas que no logran sacar a la academia de las disciplinas desde donde provienen generando más bien semióticas aplicadas.

9.3. La confluencia de disciplinas desde donde se estudia la semiótica traza, en cierta medida las líneas de una posición epistemológica: el pluralismo de las voces y de las temáticas, de horizontes muy diferentes, donde la mirada semiótica cruza otras prácticas sociales para trabajar allí donde opera la significación. (Escudero, Signa, n.7, 1998)

9.4. La semiótica al asumir la interdisciplinariedad como método otorga la posibilidad de desjerarquizar los saberes y los conocimientos para hacerse cargo más bien de las dinámicas y transformaciones que se buscan comprender e interpretar, más que en una lógica de descripciones.

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DEED, OTHERNESS AND LOVE IN BAKHTIN AND PEIRCE

Susan Petrilli
University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
susan.petrilli@gmail.com

Augusto Ponzio
University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
augustoponzio@libero.it

Abstract

This paper evidences the philosophical orientation subtending Bakhtin's research on the interpretation of the literary text. If we separate this philosophical basis from his writings, it is easy to interpret him wrongly as a literary critic, as in fact has been the case. This implies not understanding the *sense* of his dedication to literary discourse. Publication of his early works, in some cases in recent times (between the second half of the 1970s and the second half of the 1980s) has greatly contributed to grasping this "sense". In the first place it is a question of understanding Bakhtin's "philosophy of the act, or deed" passing through a study of the relation between author and hero and therefore to his monograph on Dostoevsky (1st ed. 1929, 2nd ed. 1963) and ultimately to the study of the carnivalesque and the grotesque body through the works of Rabelais (as from the 1940s, even though Bakhtin's *Rabelais* was only published in 1965). Once the philosophical framework of Bakhtin's discourse and of his dialogism is made to emerge (the topic of the first part of this text), it is possible to relate Bakhtin's conception to Peirce's (the topic of the second part). This relation not only concerns their conception of the sign as they have proposed it. It also concerns the fact that traceable in both is a strong attention for the problem of otherness, listening and for the relation with the other in terms of "love". Both in the cosmic vision delineated in Peirce and in what Bakhtin calls the "great experience" – juxtaposing it to

the small and short-sighted experience of the individual subject assumed to be autonomous and separate from others – love becomes the essential relation not only for the human world, not only for life, but for the universe in its entirety (Peircean agapasm).

In his conversation with Saint Bernard in Paradise, Dante suggests that our body will be resurrected not for its own sake, but for the sake of those who love us – those who knew and loved our one-and-only countenance.

(Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” in Bakhtin 1990, pp. 57)

1. Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophical vision

In his 1973 conversation with Viktor Duvakin, Mikhail M. Bakhtin says: “Marija Veniaminovna Judina was an absolutely unofficial person. Anything official was a burden for her. For that matter, the same as me. Neither can I suffer the official” (Eng. trans. from the Italian in Bakhtin 2008: 347).

Bakhtin, an unofficial person: with respect to official, public circles, he came from another circle, one tending towards unofficialness even before his arrest and conviction; and thanks precisely to such an attitude, he was able to proceed in his voyage of reflection and writing, during the many long years of total exclusion from the culture of his time (Ponzio 1992; Petrilli 2012).

In his text of the early 1920s, “K filosofii postupka”, where he introduces the notion of exotopy (*vnenakodimost’*), Bakhtin also introduces the notion of “architectonics” according to which all values, meanings and spatial-temporal relationships are characterized in terms of otherness: “I-for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other”: “All the values of actual life and culture are arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world of the performed act or deed: *scientific values, aesthetic values, political values* (including both ethical and social values), and, finally, *religious values*” (Bakhtin 1993: 54)

Postupok, the word used by Bakhtin and consequently by Bocharov in the title of the text in question, means a lived act. The world of *postupok* is, according to Bakhtin, the *world of responsive praxis by the singular individual*. In this world, that which is endowed with abstract meaning and mechanical unity in the world of science, art, in academies, politics, technology, in the world of impersonal roles, jobs, tasks, duties, all this in the world of responsive praxis recovers sense and is integrated into the unity of responsible acts.

Postupok, *act*, or *deed*, contains “stup”, which means “step” in the sense of “decision”, “an important step”, “a big step”, “to take a step”, “bring himself to take a certain step”: initiative, stance, to pass from the level of the theoretic, normative, planning, to the level of personal answerable praxis. Bakhtin also uses the verb *postupať*, to act, to perform an answerable act, or deed.

In its connection with “to take a step”, “*postupok*” recalls the expression “transgredient”, connected in Bakhtin with “outsideness”, “exotopy”, “*vnenakodimost’*”: “transgredient”, from Latin *transgredo*; English, *step across, step over*. In “K filosofii postupka” Bakhtin characterizes the contemporary crisis as the crisis of the contemporary act, which has become technical, formal, mechanical action. He identifies this crisis in the separation of the act, with its concrete participative, responsible motivation, from its cultural product which is reified and as a consequence loses sense. This interpretation is similar to that offered by Edmund Husserl and his phenomenology, especially as developed in *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie* (published

posthumously in 1954). But in Bakhtin, unlike Husserl where a certain theoreticism persists, sense is not conferred by the intentional consciousness, by the transcendental subject, but by responsible / answerable praxis without alibis as performed by the single unique individual (cf. Ponzio 2008a, 2008b).

In a passage from *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, Bakhtin reflects on forms of proxy, in particular political proxy through which one's responsibility/answerability is delegated to another. Bakhtin refers to political representation where in the attempt at shirking political responsibility/answerability, the sense of uniqueness, of one's personal participation without alibis is often lost. As a consequence responsibility/answerability becomes void, specialized and formal with all the risks that this loss of sense involves (cf. *Ibid.*: 52).

As Bakhtin says:

In attempting to understand our whole life as secret representation and every act we perform as a ritual act, we turn into impostors or pretenders.

Being a representative does not abolish, but merely specializes my personal answerability. [...] The loss of once-occurrent participation in the course of specialization is especially frequent in the case of political answerability. The same loss of the once-occurrent unity takes place as a result of the attempt to see in every other, in every object of a given act or deed, not a singular individual which is concretely participative, but a representative of a certain large whole.

What is answerable does not dissolve in what is specialized (politics), otherwise what we have is not an answerable deed, but a technical or instrumental action (*Ibid.*: 52–53; Eng. trans. reviewed in light of It. trans. from Russian in Bachtin e il suo Circolo 2014: 125–126).

According to Bakhtin, Dostoevsky's "philosophy" must not be identified in the specific conceptions and standpoints of the heroes in his novels or in specific contents. He calls this mistaken interpretation "Dostoevskyvism". Instead, Bakhtin finds traces of the architectonics he theorizes in the overall structure of Dostoevsky's works which he describes as organized according to the principle of dialogism. This is what Bakhtin alludes to when he says, "affirmation of someone else's 'I' not as an object but as another subject" (Bakhtin 1963, Eng. trans.: 11), this is the principle governing Dostoevsky's worldview. Dostoevsky's "polyphonic novel" describes the character no longer as an "I", as an object, but as a centre that is "other," forming the perspective according to which his world is organized:

Dostoevsky carried out, as it were, a small-scale Copernican revolution when he took what had been a firm and finalizing authorial definition and turned it into an aspect of the hero's self-definition. [...] Not without reason does Dostoevsky force Makar Devushkin to read Gogol's "Overcoat" and to take it as a story about himself [...]

Devushin had glimpsed himself in the image of the hero of "The Overcoat," which is to say, as something totally quantified, measured, and defined to the last detail: all of you is here, there is nothing more in you, and nothing more to be said about you. He felt himself to be hopelessly predetermined and finished off, as if he were already quite dead, yet at the same time he sensed the falseness of such an approach. [...]

The serious and deeper meaning of this revolt might be expressed this way: a living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive

process. *In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition.* [...]

The genuine life of the personality is made available only through a dialogic penetration of that personality, during which it freely and reciprocally reveals itself. (Bakhtin 1963, Eng. trans.: 49–59)

This is the itinerary followed by Bakhtin from his early works. Furthermore, thanks to his early interest in the philosophy of the responsible/answerable act, this itinerary coherently develops into an interest in the philosophy of literature, where *of literature* is a subject genitive: not a philosophical vision to which literature must be subjected, but a philosophical vision which literature, verbal art, make possible.

If we now examine the last paper published by Bakhtin during his lifetime, “Toward a methodology of the human sciences” (in Bakhtin 1979), written in 1974, we soon discover a surprising insistence on the same issue proposed at the beginning of his research itineraries. The material forming this paper was mainly written toward the end of the 1930s or beginning of the 1940s. It returns to the problem of the impossibility of applying categories proper to the subject-object relationship to the human world. When dealing with human expression, the criterion for evaluating knowledge is neither “exactness”, nor philosophical “rigour” in the Husserlian sense, but the “profoundness of answering comprehension”.

The centre of value in the world of aesthetic vision is not man in general, abstract man related to abstract values like good and evil, but a concrete human being, a concrete individual, a mortal human being. All spatial and temporal moments as well as all values such as good and evil, beauty and ugliness, truth and falsehood, become concrete moments only when they are correlated with concrete values in the architectonics of the concrete individual as a mortal human being. In the aesthetic chronotope all spatial and temporal relations are correlated with man and only in this relation do they acquire valuational meaning: “high”, “far”, “above”, “below”, “abyss”, “infinity”, boundlessness”. All these expressions reflect life and the tenseness of a mortal human individual: in the horizon and in the environment of mortal man space gains body, time possesses depth and weight (cf. Bakhtin 1993: 64–65).

Moreover, according to Bakhtin, the centre of value in the architectonics of the aesthetic vision is not man considered as self-identical, but “as a lovingly affirmed concrete actuality” (*Ibid.*: 63). All constitutive aspects of the architectonics of the aesthetic vision are encompassed by an all-accepting loving assertion of the human being. In this sense, the relation of the author, and consequently of the reader, to his hero is “an un-self-interested interest”, an un-self-interested participation. Says Bakhtin:

In this sense one could speak of objective aesthetic love as constituting the principle of aesthetic seeing (except that “love” should not be understood in a passive psychological sense). [...] The variety of human values can present itself only to a loving contemplation. [...] Only un-self-interested love on the principle of “I love him not because he is good, but he is good because I love him”, only lovingly interested attention, is capable of generating a sufficiently intent power to encompass and retain the concrete manifoldness of existing, without impoverishing and schematizing it. (*Ibid.*: 64; Eng. trans. reviewed in light of It. trans. from Russian in Bachtin e il suo Circolo 2014: 146–147)

On the contrary, an indifferent loveless, or hostile reaction is always a reaction that impoverishes, breaks, ignores, neglects. The biological function itself of indifference consists in diverting the attention from what is inessential for one's own needs: a kind of economy or preservation. And this too is the function of oblivion. In conclusion, as Bakhtin says: "Only love is capable of being aesthetically productive; only in correlation with the loved is fullness of the manifold possible" (Ibid.).

Therefore, what does responsive understanding consist of in life, in the architectonics of life, in its chronotope, that is, responsive understanding with respect to what we have experienced and understood in art, in its architectonics, in its chronotope, so that everything we have experienced and understood does not remain ineffectual in life? Bakhtin's answer throughout all his work is: responsive understanding consists in recognizing, in appreciating un-self-interestedly the value of the other, in listening to the other, to the other's distinctive, peculiar word, in everyday life, in all kinds of daily praxis.

2. Peirce's semiotics and agapastic forces in the universe

By reading together Charles S. Peirce and Mikhail Bakhtin, it is possible to construct a semiotic model that explains signs and semiosis in all their complexity. This sign model is distant from oversimplifying approaches that put the *signifiant* at the service of a *signifié*, already given outside the interpretation/communication process. Peirce places the sign in the complex context of semiosis and in the relation with the interpretant. Bakhtin evidences the fact that the sign can only flourish in the context of dialogism. The implication is that the logic of otherness is structural to the sign, that otherness is at the very heart of identity. The sign is not possible without an interpretant which means that the interpretant is not secondary, an accessory. Quite on the contrary, the interpretant is constitutive of the sign. This means to say that meaning is not in the sign, but in the relation among signs (Petrilli and Ponzio 2005, 2008). Bakhtin thematizes the dialogic nature of the word, including the word of interior discourse. Therefore, both Bakhtin and Peirce evidence the dialogical nature of the sign. In fact, to be this sign here the sign must be at once identical to itself and different. Indeed, the original modality of subsisting as a sign is otherness and dialogue. By contrast with univocality, reiteration, identity which characterize signals, dialogue and otherness are the original, constitutive modality of that which emerges as a sign properly understood.

The sign subsists as a sign insofar as it is a response. A sign is a sign in relation to that which is other from itself. In fact, the sign is differentiated both from the object acting as a referent and from another sign acting as interpretant, without which it could not be a sign. Peirce's definition of semiosis is based on the notion of interpretant which mediates between *solicitation* (*interpretandum*) and *response*. Mediation distinguishes semiosis from mere dynamical action. The latter alludes to "action of brute force" which characterizes the relation between the terms forming a pair. Instead, semiosis involves a triadic relation, it "is an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant". Like Bakhtin, for Peirce too the relation connecting sign (interpreted) and interpretant is a dialogic relation. Both evidence the *dialogic* nature of sign and semiosis. In such a framework the role of otherness is no less than pivotal; as stated above, the original modality of the sign is otherness and dialogism. This aspect of Peirce's conception of the sign is central to my own interpretation of his philosophical perspective and its cosmic reverberations.

In the architectonics of Charles Peirce's philosophical system what he denominates as "chance", "love" and "necessity" indicate three modes of development regulating evolution in the cosmos. As he says in his essay of 1893, "Evolutionary Love":

Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us: evolution by fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love. We may term them tychastic evolution, or tychasm, anancastic evolution, or anancasm, and agapastic evolution, or agapasm. The doctrines which represent these as severally of principal importance we may term tychasticism, anancasticism, and agapasticism. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos may receive the names of tychism, anancism, and agapism. (CP 6.302)

Connections can be evidenced between Peirce's evolutionary cosmology, his semiotics and logic. The concept of *agapasm* and the connection with abductive inference is particularly interesting. Peirce made an important contribution to this area of research with a series of five articles published in the journal *The Monist*, beginning from 1891. In these articles he develops his evolutionary cosmology, introducing the doctrines of tychasticism (from Greek τύχη, tyche), anancasticism (from Greek ανάγκη, ananche), agapasticism (from Greek αγαπ, or ηγαπ, agape), and synechism (from Greek συνεχής, synechés).¹

Two later writings (1905) on "pragmatism", or the substitute term "pragmaticism",² unite the developments of Peirce's cosmology to his theory of semiotics: "What Pragmatism is?" (1905, CP 5.411–437) and "Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905, CP 5.438–463). In fact, we have seen that the interpretant plays a central role in Peirce's semiotics, which, in turn, is inseparable from his pragmatism as much as from his cosmology.

Peirce had already elaborated his doctrine of categories – firstness, secondness, and thirdness which are always co-present, interdependent and irreducible to each other –, in "On a New List of Categories" (1867, CP 1.545–559)³. His doctrine of categories constitutes the foundation of his ontology and cosmology. Therefore, Peirce's doctrine of categories is connected to his ontological-cosmological trichotomy (agapasm, anancasm, tychasm), to his triadic typology of inferential logic (abduction, induction, and deduction), and to his sign triads (in particular the tripartition between icon, index, and symbol) (Petrilli and Ponzio 2005).

As Peirce states in the citation above, three strictly interrelated modes of evolutionary development operate in the cosmos: *tychastic evolution* or *tychasm*, development regulated by the action of chance – "evolution by fortuitous variation"; *anancastic evolution* or *anancasm* which is dominated by the effect of necessity – "evolution by mechanical necessity"; and *agapastic evolution* or *agapasm*, oriented by the law of love – "evolution by creative love". The names of

¹ "The Architecture of Theories" (1891, CP 6.7–34), "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined" (1892, CP 6.35–65), "The Law of Mind" (1892, CP 6.102–163), "Man's Glassy Essence" (1892, CP 6.238–268), "Evolutionary Love" (1893, CP 6.287–317), and "Reply to the Necessitarians. Rejoinder to Dr. Carus" (1893, CP 6.588–6.615).

² Charles S. Peirce introduced the term "pragmatism" in the 1870's to nominate his principle of inquiry and his account of meaning according to which any statement must have practical bearings to be meaningful. The pragmatic account of meaning provided a method for clearing up metaphysical ambiguities and assisting scientific inquiry. However, Peirce was unhappy with both his own early formulations and the developments made by his fellow pragmatists William James and John Dewey in the U.S.A, and Ferdinand C.S. Schiller in Great Britain. Consequently, he was led to reformulate his own original account of pragmatism which he renamed "pragmaticism" in order to distinguish it from subsequent and more "nominalistic" versions. For further considerations on the terms "pragmatism" and "pragmaticism", see Petrilli 2010a: 50, n. 2; see also each of my entries on Morris, Peirce and pragmatism in Copley 2001 and 2010a.

³ "On a New List of Categories" is usually referred to as an 1867 paper, which is the year it was delivered as an oral presentation (14 May) to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. It was subsequently published the year after, in 1868, in the relative Proceedings (n. 7, pp. 287–98).

the doctrines that elect these three evolutionary modes as their object of analysis are, respectively, *tychasticism*, *anancasticism*, and *agapasticism*. Whereas the terms tychism, anancism and agapism name “the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos...” (CP 6.302).

Each of these three main evolutionary modes contains traces of the other two; therefore they are not pure, but rather contaminate each other reciprocally. In other words, they act together in different combinations and to varying degrees, reaching different states of equilibrium in evolutionary processes that are dominated now by chance, now by necessity, now by love. Consequently, far from excluding each other, tychasm, anancasm, and agapasm share in the same general elements which, however, emerge most clearly in agapastic evolution. Evoking the language of mathematics, Peirce describes tychasm and anancasm as “degenerate forms of agapasm”; in other words, agapasm englobes the former as its degenerate cases (CP 6.303).

Tychasm shares a disposition for reproductive creation with agapasm, “the forms preserved being those that use the spontaneity conferred upon them in such wise as to be drawn into harmony with their original” (CP 6.304). This, as Peirce continues, “only shows that just as love cannot have a contrary, but must embrace what is most opposed to it, as a degenerate case of it, so tychasm is a kind of agapasm” (CP 6.304). However, unlike tychastic evolution which proceeds by exclusion, in genuine agapasm, advance takes place by virtue of a “positive sympathy”; in other words, by virtue of attraction or affinity among the “created” – read “interpretants” – “springing from continuity of mind” (or synechism) (CP 6.304).

The overall orientation of anancasm is regulated by “an intrinsic affinity for the good”. From this perspective, it too is similar to the agapastic type of advance. However, as close to agapasm as it may be, anancasm lacks in a determinant for evolution; the factor of “freedom”, which instead characterizes creative love and subtends tychism (CP 6.305).

Agapasm, understood as a force of development through affinity and sympathy, is strongly iconic (correlate terms being notoriously the index and symbol). It is tantamount to the force of attraction, that is, to the relation of similarity or affinity among interpretants. Though the action of chance and necessity are foreseen in agapastic evolution, the forces of attraction, affinity, freedom, and fortuitousness dominate. This means to say that when agapastic forces prevail in the continuous (synechetic) flow of infinite semiosis, iconicity dominates over indexicality and symbolicity in the relation among interpretants.

The concept of continuity or synechism involves that of regularity. As emerges from her own philosophy of signifying and interpretive processes, Victoria Welby too believes that development is articulated in an open structure, therefore that continuity presupposes relational logic grounded in otherness (Welby 1983). The logic of otherness may be considered as a sort of dialogic – a logic that recovers the dimension of *dialogism* in Mikhail Bakhtin’s sense (see Petrilli 2012, 2013). In other words, following both Peirce and Bakhtin, dialogism is understood as a modality of semiosis, which may or may not involve verbal signs and may or may not take the form of dialogue (Bakhtin 1981; Ponzio 2006a). Thus described, dialogism is determined by *the degree of opening towards otherness*. Agapastic evolution is achieved through the law of love; creative and altruistic love, love founded on the logic of otherness, what we have described as *absolute otherness*.

With “pragmaticism”, Peirce coherently developed his cognitive semiotics in close relation to the study of human social behaviour and the totality of human interests, thereby evidencing the necessary implication of problems of knowledge with problems of the pragmatic and axiological orders. Beyond “reason”, Peirce theorizes “reasonableness” understood as open-ended dialectical-dialogic semiotic activity, unfinished and unfinalizable, unbiased by prejudice and regulated by the logic of love, otherness and continuity or “synechism”. He supercedes the limits of cog-

nitivism orienting his semiotic research in a pragmatic-ethic or evaluative-operative direction.

The dialogic conception of signs and the logic of otherness that orientates it are a necessary condition for Peirce's doctrine of continuity, or synechism: the doctrine that all that exists is continuous in the development of the universe and consequently of the human subject that inhabits it. Dialogism and otherness account for the logic of synechism, continuity, but also for the driving forces exerted in evolutionary processes by discontinuity, chaos, inexactitude, uncertainty, unascertainability and fallibilism (CP 1.172). And while the dialogic relation between self and other is described as a crucial condition for evolution in the creative process – both the other from self and the other of self, as Emmanuel Levinas (1961, 1972) so clearly explains –, another major and correlate force described as most firing creativity is love, that is, the force of agape.

The most advanced developments in reason and knowledge are achieved through the creative power of reasonableness, governed by the forces of agapasm. Reasonableness is endowed with the power of transforming the self's horror of the stranger, the alien, the self's fear of the other (understood as the fear one experiences of the other foreign to self) into attraction for the other, into listening and hospitality towards the other.

According to Peirce, love is directed to the concrete, and not to abstractions; towards one's neighbour, not necessarily in a spatial sense, locally, but in the sense of affinity, a person "we live near [...] in life and feeling". Love is a driving force in logical procedure characterized in terms of abduction, iconicity, and creativity. In accord with Peirce's interpretation of St. John, the development of mind occurs largely through the power of love. Agape understood as orientation towards the absolute other, even care for the other is capable of transforming the hateful into the loveable. The type of evolution foreseen by synechism, the principle of continuity, is evolution through the agency of love:

Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another's highest impulse. [...] It is not dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, but by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we draw from John's gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as for the cosmos, only so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay "The Law of Mind" must see that synechism calls for. (CP 6.289, 1893)

Peirce polemically contrasts the "Gospel of Christ", where progress is achieved through a relation of sympathy among neighbours, with the "Gospel of greed" which reflects the dominant ideology of his day and encourages the individual to assert its own rights and interests, its own individuality or egoistic identity over the other (CP 6.294). On Peirce's account, Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859), with its concepts of natural selection, survival of the fittest, struggle for existence, translates this conception of the individual from political economy to the life sciences, from economic development to the development of the living organism. Peirce himself chose the agapastic theory of evolution, and in fact considered his own strong attraction for this doctrine as possible proof of its validity (CP 6.295).

Recalling Henry James, Peirce distinguished between self-love, which is directed towards another insofar as that other is identical to self, and creative love, which is directed towards

what is completely different, even “hostile and negative” with respect to self, towards the other as “absolutely other”, as Levinas would say (cfr. Ponzio 2006b). We could propose a typology of love measured in terms of the logic of otherness, on a scale that moves from high degrees of identity to high degrees of alterity. But truly creative love, as both Welby and Peirce argue, is love regulated by the logic of otherness, love for the other, directed at the other insofar as that other is absolutely other, significant on its own account, *per sé*. The logic of otherness is agapastic logic. Peirce defines love as “the impulse projecting creations into independency and drawing them into harmony” (CP 6.288).

Developing Peirce’s discourse in the direction of Levinas’ philosophy of the self, love transforms fear of the other, in other words, fear provoked in self by the other, into fear for the other, for the other’s safety, to the point of becoming wholly responsible for the other, of taking the blame for all the wrongs that the other is subjected to. Love, reasonableness, and creativity are all grounded in the logic of otherness and dialogism and together move the evolutionary dynamics of semiosis. And given the unique, species-specific capacity as so-called “semiotic animals” (Deely, Petrilli, Ponzio), human beings are also invested with a major role in terms of responsibility towards semiosis generally, that is, towards life in all its forms over the entire planet.

From our own point of view, this approach is oriented “semioethically” to embrace questions traditionally pertaining to ethics, aesthetics, and ideology. *Semioethics* extends its gaze beyond the logico-cognitive boundaries of semiotics to focus on the relation of signs to values, therefore on the axiological dimension of sign activity, which includes the human disposition for evaluation, critique, creativity and responsibility (cf. Petrilli and Ponzio 2003, 2010). This orientation is somehow prefigured by *significs* – the term Victoria Welby chose for her approach to the theory of sign ad meaning and special focus on the problem of “significance”, therefore, on the relation of signs to values (see Petrilli 2009, 2015). The expression “semioethics” indicates the human disposition for evaluation, the value conferred upon something, the pertinence, signifying potential, and significance of human behaviour, participation in the life of signs not only on the cognitive and logical level, but also interconnectedly in corporeal, emotional, pragmatic and ethical terms.

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SOCIAL DESIGN AND ETHICS IN PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY

Raquel Ponte
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
raquelponete@gmail.com

Daniele Ellwanger
Franciscan University Center, Brazil

Lucy Niemeyer
Rio de Janeiro State University, Brazil

Abstract

Social design, developed in the 1970s with a focus on social inclusion and environment preservation, has an ethical concern about its practices. Based on Peirce's pragmatism and semiotics, this article discusses how the products of design necessarily entail practical consequences when they become existences in the world. It also investigates whether all design projects, and not only social design projects, have a social implication. Since semiotics is based on ethics, as described in Peirce's divisions of sciences, and the products of design are signs, Peircean philosophy is an important theoretical background for designers' awareness of their responsibility in the world.

1. The emergence of Social Design

The first contributions and concerns about social inclusion and preservation of the environment emerged in the 1970s and had Austrian Victor Papanek (1923–1998) as one of its precursors. He proposed that design, instead of simply targeting the economic interests of the market, should meet the needs of social groups under the principles of citizenship and ethics, creating opportunities for development. Another issue addressed by Papanek referred to the role of the designer and the industry in general, also co-responsible for the critical situation related to the

environment. The author (Papanek 1977: 66) found, even at that time, that the nearly 75% of the world population living in poverty, hunger and need would undoubtedly occupy more time in the tight schedule of designer teams. But not only did the emerging and developing countries have specific needs but developed countries also had them.

More recently, according to Margolin and Margolin (2002), social products are already produced for the market, even without reaching the required levels capable of meeting demands completely. This reality differs from that experienced in the 1970s, when Papanek considered that socially responsible designers should be dissociated from the commercial market, which ended up limiting the options of these professionals. According to Tackara (2008:12–13), there is also a search for the revaluation of what people are capable of doing, even if we are still experiencing the industrial age. In Brazil, for example, there are interesting cases of groups which, through a reserve of social and cultural resources, generate new ideas to meet their needs. This new reality can be seen as a promising situation of social and environmental innovation, with design interventions and/or contributions from public and private institutions and companies.

Since environmental concerns have emerged in parallel with social ones, for over 40 years, their trajectory has been characterized by a learning process that aimed to avoid the risks related to these areas, or at least to reduce them (Manzini 2008:42). The idea is to develop actions that promote the reduction of energy and materials consumption, while people develop their daily activities and interact with each other. One example is the sharing of resources and the exchange of products in systems that exist especially in poor countries, such as India (Tackara 2008:31–34).

The awakening of a social and environmental consciousness in the 1970s can be understood as a consequence of the economic crisis that occurred in the same decade (Harvey 2007:135), which made clear the failure of the capitalist economic system. The growth method of producers was based on encouraging consumption as a way to drain the mass production of goods. Planned obsolescence was no longer shortening the life cycle of products just through the use of less durable materials but also by changing their aesthetic aspect: fashion styles determined that an object of design, even in good working order, was no longer appropriate for the user when it was aesthetically outdated. Designers, subject to the laws of the market, practiced design with objectives related to obtaining profit for the contractors without considering other variables. But the exhaustion of raw materials, consequence of the extraction result for a production in exponential growth, and the increase in social inequality signaled the need to rethink the parameters of design projects.

Ethical concern is something inherent in social design, because it was established as one of its founding bases. Having as theoretical reference the philosophy of the American Charles Sanders Peirce, which includes his pragmatism, his semiotics and his divisions of sciences, this article seeks to understand how there is an ethical implication in the design process, from the initial projective phase to the use of products in society.

2. Design in the light of Peirce's ideas

The philosopher, in his pragmatist line, understood that there is a link between thought and action, between belief and conduct (Peirce 1877). For him, belief is a state of tranquility which we do not wish to leave, while doubt is a state of dissatisfaction from which we fight to escape, trying to come back to belief. When it breaks up a belief, doubt encourages us to seek a new one, because it is what will keep us prepared to act when the occasion requires. For Peirce, therefore, our actions are the manifestation of our ideas, because beliefs “[...] guide our desires and shape our actions” (Peirce 1877:4).

The philosopher understood that there are two worlds: an inner world and an outer one,

which are not opposed, but adjacent. Thoughts, concepts and beliefs populate the inner side, while conduct and actions inhabit the outside. These two sides are not separate, because the understanding that thoughts and beliefs are externalized in actions and behaviors which, in turn, can be internalized again in concepts, leads to an understanding that there is a continuity between these two worlds. According to Peirce, there is a movement of constant externalization and internalization, even because we can only see the world in its externality. For him (CP-8144), it is only the outside world that we observe directly. Because of that, what goes on inside can be only known if it is reflected in external objects. Thus, the inside should be externalized to become known and exist. For example, one can only know a thought of a person if he/she expresses it in words or acts; otherwise, it will keep unreachable in its interiority.

Another important theoretical framework of Peirce's pragmatism is the idea of "practical consequences" that can be understood as "experiential consequences" (Ibri 2000:33). According to Peirce, the concept can be only known through its effect on the experience, since it is in the experience that it appears from the outside. Within this perspective, one can understand the actions and decisions of designers as the external aspect of their thoughts, as well as pragmatically understand the products of design as the embodiment of the abstract concepts expressed in the briefing¹. At the moment of creation, the designer must choose between them any color options, textures, shapes, sizes, materials, among other qualities, in order to determine a new product that meets the needs and desires of the target consumer. In the projectual phase, the designer is still only dealing with potentialities to translate the concepts into existences, which can generate perceptual stimuli that reach the consumer. This first stage of conception can therefore be regarded as belonging to an inner world full of ideation. However, in order to grant autonomy to the idealized product so it can become an existence, this potentiality should be defined and externalized in its production stage, when the concept will gain real shape, color, texture. Consumers who come across a product of design can infer by its configuration what concepts generated it, since it is nothing but a representative sign of a brand or company.

This continuity between the inner and outer world in Peircean philosophy, different from a notion of duality, is also apparent in the semiotics of the American thinker, who understands the sign as a triad (CP, 1.480). The sign consists of something that is in the place of another, its object, and that has an effect on the interpreting mind, an interpretant. We can understand the products of design as signs that represent the concepts defined in the briefing, whether they are concepts of the product or concepts of a brand (Ponte 2012). The final products generated in the production that will be consumed can be seen as nothing less than the embodiment of internal ideas in the external world that will generate effects in the minds of their users. These effects, in turn, will be internalized by consumers as signs (interpretants are more developed signs), because, after their projects and production, these products will have their own existence in the world, being part of a semiotic process in society, generating effects in an infinite semiosis.

Thus, this semiotic and pragmatic process of materialization of ideas always entails practical consequences: 1) in the establishment of new social forms by adding new products to the market that will alter habits of conduct (e.g. the remarkable transformation that has occurred in human communication since the creation of cellphones), 2) in the choice of materials used in projects (the extraction of raw materials can impact the environment, if not minimized by sustained actions, such as the use of forestry trees for the manufacture of paper; or the use of materials which do not decompose quickly can also affect the environment at the end of their life cycle), 3) in

¹ Briefing is the first document generated after a meeting between designer and client, in which the relevant information about the new job is described, for example: the objective of the new product or service, the strategies of the company, the target, the needs of the consumer etc.

the design of the manufacturing process of the products (the way the project is designed as a process can provide better utilization of inputs in order to avoid waste), 4) and in the establishment of the life cycle of the design object (the short duration of use can increase disposal and create a difficult problem to solve: what should be done with so much garbage? As we can see, each designer's choice about many different variables in each stage of design activity necessarily impacts the world by generating practical consequences.

In the division of sciences proposed by Peirce, semiotics is founded on ethics, which, in turn, is based on aesthetics (CP, 1.281). The latter, for the philosopher, consists in seeking the admirable, while ethics consists of the best conducts required to achieve this goal. Semiotics, therefore, in its relations of mediating meanings, must be based on ethical conduct aimed at achieve the admirable because people are capable of programming their future conduct, ie. human beings can generalize their experiences, mediating them. Therefore, semiotics studies the laws of formation and evolution of thought in order to achieve the aesthetic ideal through a controlled ethical conduct.

Analysing the division of sciences, according to Peirce's conception, one can see that design, understood as a semiotic phenomenon, should be guided by ethics and ethics, in turn, by aesthetics. The idea that any semiotic process generates practical consequences is clearly understandable in the Peircean pragmatic thought, since it understands conducts and actions as the external side of ideas and concepts. The creation of design products – representative existences/signs of concepts – is part of a semiotic evolution that generates effects on interpreting minds (interpretants). These effects carry in themselves consequences in many aspects of the world such as those listed before. In the projectual stage, each choice made by the designer in relation to the product that he/she is developing necessarily impact on social relations, since design products, as signs, can be seen as mediators which consumers use to solve problems in their lives.

3. Conclusion

Retrospectively, the emergence of social design can be seen only as the realization of the ethical necessity after the recognition of the negative impact that design provokes when done unconsciously. What this article aims to discuss is whether, in fact, any design project, and not just those enrolled in the field of social design, carries a social implication because of its semiotic nature. Whether it is practiced consciously or unconsciously, the resulting objects carry practical implications when products become existences in the world. Therefore, it is important that designers start to become aware of such practical consequences in their projects which, materialized, will gain autonomy and continue generating interpretants in a growing process.

As human beings endowed with rational thought, we have the ability to control our behavior and therefore it is pointless to remain in ignorance of the consequences of our actions, which are nothing more than expressions of our thinking. Any designer, conscious creator of signs/existences, although not active in the area of social design, should also be aware of the practical consequences of their projects which will gain their own existence and autonomy in the world when materialized, generating interpretants (more developed signs) in a process of growth and complexity. Although most designers are subjected to the laws of the market in a capitalist world, it is possible to design an object and be conscious of its impact.

We believe that Peirce's philosophy can be an important theoretical tool to contribute to this awareness and we hope that the evolution of these signs (products of design) can generate beneficial practical consequences for society as a whole.

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HEGEL'S SEMIOTIC FUTURE: BEYOND THE END OF ART

William D. Melaney
American University in Cairo, Egypt
wmelaney@aucegypt.edu

Abstract

Without contesting the validity of dialectics to Hegel's system, I plan to show how Hegel attempts to appropriate the decisive and irreversible aspects of Romantic ideology in four moves that indicate the "semiotic turn" that typifies his contribution to philosophical aesthetics. The four moves that enable me to read Hegel as an early master of semiotics are grounded in a hermeneutical conception of how the work of art displaces the classical moment that is usually assumed to constitute the core of his aesthetic theory, which is often used to relegate his reflections on modern art to the periphery of his thought. My conclusion is that Hegel's profound ambiguity with regard to the classic is an indication that all was not well in his progressive historicism. But rather than simply argue that this ambiguity is a matter of inconsistency or a structural error, I argue that Hegel's aesthetics can be read on its own, rather than in a totalizing context, as an early example of semiotic thinking that invites us to translate the ascendancy of sign over symbol as a displacement of intuitive fullness in favor of a more "conceptual" but also less controllable proliferation of cultural signs.

Hegel's ambiguous attitude toward the development of art in the modern age complicates his contribution to aesthetics, which has been canonized as "classical" in the strong sense. My dispute with the canonical reading takes issue with the retrospective approach to Hegel's understanding of art and with received interpretations of the "end of art" thesis with which his position

is identified. In this paper, I plan to show that Hegel attempts to appropriate the irreversible aspects of Romantic aesthetics in four ways: (i) Hegel radicalizes Kantian aesthetics on the basis of a basically textual approach to sublime experience that opens up the question of community as a philosophical one; (ii) without demoting classical conceptions of art, Hegel privileges Romantic conceptions that demonstrate the ascendancy of sign over symbol in a spiraling chain; (iii) Hegel laments the fate of art in the triumph of Romantic subjectivism but also suggests how communities can reconstitute themselves on the horizon of aesthetic dissolution; so that, finally, (iv) art can be reconceived as an emancipatory adventure that redefines metaphysics through its historical unfolding as an unending series of semiotic transformations.

1. Hegel and sublime art

A careful reading of the *Critique of Judgment* demonstrates the essential modernity of Kant's response to the problem of reconciling these two conflicting aims. In transforming beauty into a symbol of morality, Kant points back to the originality of Platonic metaphysics and also opens a new path that would be traveled by the Romantic generation that followed him (Kant 2000:248–52). Beauty in the Kantian framework is not reducible to cognitive considerations but involves a process of reflection that enables the subject to assess the aesthetic object through considerations of feeling, which are irreducible to logical considerations (61). From another standpoint, if the experience of beauty refers to a realm of moral value that transcends the senses altogether, it also registers the difference between a world of pure reason and a more limited world that cannot exclude the otherness of nature. The role of the sublime in this dual system would be problematic to the degree that it marked the threshold of moral Reason. Kant distinguishes the mathematical from the dynamical sublime in the Second Book of the *Critique of Judgment*, but, on a more basic level, remarks on how the judgment of the beautiful refers the imagination to cognition, whereas the judgment of the sublime refers this same faculty to the Ideas the Reason (117).

Hegel confronts the problematic features of Kant's apotheosis of nature, while also radicalizing its aesthetic potential. The advantage of Kant's symbolic conception of beauty is that it offered an account of aesthetic experience that potentially harmonized the opposition between universal and particular in a disinterested community of spectators. And yet, aesthetic harmony becomes difficult to maintain at the exact moment that sublime experience enters into the construction of moral identity. Sublimity in transcendental aesthetics can be the prelude to reverence for the law and acquires ethical significance when it carries perception to a new phase of inwardness. This very movement threatens to invalidate the aesthetic framework itself. Hegel's response to this dilemma is to redefine sublime experience in order to restore its underlying unity but, at the same time, to reground this experience in an intersubjective setting that would allow the possibility of community to be given a new shape and form.

While clearly indebted to Kant, Hegel's view of the sublime suggests a 'radicalization' of what emerged as a sign of nature in previous aesthetic theory. The waterfall at the edge of the forest, the view of the Alps from a majestic height and the avalanche of snow on a deserted plain are sublime in different ways, but these three examples place the aesthetic subject in a limit condition that can be preparatory for ethical reconstitution. From Hegel's standpoint, however, the problem with such examples is that they import the weight of external nature into the ethical domain itself. Hegel recognizes the degree to which any natural residue can rebound as a *fatality* in the general economy of aesthetic experience. Hence, rather than threaten the value of the sublime with the possibility of crumbling under the burden of sheer otherness, Hegel transposes this same value into a human setting in which language performs the crucial role in healing the

break between spirit and nature that opened up in Kantian versions of the sublime.¹

This crucial reorientation enables Hegel to place the sublime in a new aesthetic context just as it allows him to introduce a specifically religious thematic into what would otherwise emerge as a purely literary event. First, Hegel strongly identifies sublime experience with the *symbolic* work of art in which substance predominates over concept in an unstable disequilibrium of forces. Thus, instead of standing in for the point of contact between the actual thing and the thing represented, the symbol in Hegel's dialectical presentation of aesthetics would have its home in a relatively early phase in the history of art. Nonetheless, in Hegel's system, the sublime also registers this distance in a manner that shows how the spirit has begun to liberate itself from the most oppressive aspects of material dominance. The experience of the sublime enables substance to achieve independence from finitude through a process of inwardization that involves freedom from nature. This process is described as involving religious intuition: "Only through this intuition of the being of God as the purely spiritual and imageless, contrasted with the mundane and natural, is spirit completely wrested from nature and sense and released from existence in the finite." (Hegel 1975, 1: 371).

Hegel emphasizes the role of monotheism in this manifestation of the sublime in describing the poetry of medieval Persia but more strongly in citing Hebrew scripture, where the birth of light is achieved through a divine utterance and the mind is elevated through a lyric appropriation of sovereign power. The situation of the human individual in the biblical tradition is nonetheless fraught with uncertainty. The human believer comes to view himself as unworthy before God and expresses this sense of unworthiness in cries of pain and passionate outbursts of grief, but the believer also establishes an affirmative relationship to God that is based on "righteousness and adherence to the law" and provides an internal criterion for self-assessment" (377). This division needs to be thought through philosophically so that that the distance between the finite believer and the infinite God no longer restricts us to an endless oscillation between two separate spheres of being.

2. Sublimity and romantic art

Both Kant and Hegel attempt to show that sublimity entails division and cannot provide stability to an aesthetic realm that is ancillary to a higher state of being that resolves tensions along moral or religious lines. Nonetheless, we might identify Hegel's crucial departure with his use of *religious writing* as the key to transforming the meaning of sublimity into a concern for the individual's communal existence, since the text that communicates sublime experience has now become a shared one. In contrast, Kant's version of the sublime offers a road that could be deceptive in the long run due to the manner that it provides an insecure basis for ethical life. In Kant's philosophy, the universality of aesthetic experience is not clearly preserved in sublime feeling, which signals a crisis in the unity of the aesthetic subject. On the other hand, although Hegel calls attention to how the subject is limited by external factors in sublime experience, his evocation of the sublime text places the conflict between spiritual independence and impersonal fate in a decisively interpretive context.

In Hegel's aesthetic theory, the divided nature of symbolic expression is what precipitates a new artistic phase in which the opposition between substance and concept can be resolved in favor of philosophical unity. Hegel often speaks glowingly of how this basic opposition is resolved in classical art, particularly Greek sculpture, which represents an achievement of adequacy

¹ Jean-Francois Lyotard's contention that various philosophical positions are more or less reducible to "phrase regimes" is strongly applicable to Hegel, who seeks to recover the linguistic core of sublime experience. Lyotard tends to read Hegel as exemplifying a totalizing use of Reason, but speculative thought at least has the merit of releasing the Self from the conditions of fixity, which promote a kind of wandering that is not bound to the rules of any one language game (1988: 91–97).

that is only achieved when neither term in this basic opposition is excessive to the other one. The positive value assigned to ideal adequacy explains why Hegel is sometimes identified with an extreme form of aesthetic classicism. And yet, much of what he has to say about Greco-Roman antiquity is merely historical rather than the basis for a normative conception of the classical work of art. The role of self-reflection is crucial in establishing a ground for what is best in the classical tradition, and the notion of aesthetic adequacy partakes of a particular moment in art history when adequacy was possible to achieve. Nonetheless, Hegel's account of the dissolution of the classical work of art provides us with insights into why the Greco-Roman world was incapable of providing the basis for a new and higher phase in aesthetic development. Echoing Plato's rational theology, Hegel observes how the gods of antiquity are drawn into the struggles of the finite world and "become involved in a contradiction between their grandeur and dignity and the beauty of their existent embodiment," thus reducing them to a field of arbitrary conduct (503).

This contradiction is clearly demonstrated in sculptural works that could be located in religious settings, which display a certain lifelessness, lack of feeling and the quiet trait of mourning: "It is this mourning which already constitutes their fate because it shows that something higher stands above them, and that a transition is necessary from their existence as particulars to their universal unity" (503). Again the contradiction between an abstract and indeterminate fate and particular existence is what underlies the capricious entanglement of the gods in the affairs of mortals. In short, Hegel attributes the dissolution of the classical form of art to contradictions that are introduced from the religious sphere and cannot be resolved in the domain of culture alone. For this very reason, we might even say that the religious sphere explodes the classical totality and its apotheosis of ideal form as an external force that requires a new aesthetic constellation in order to provide art itself with a further justification.

The emergence of the romantic work of art is therefore a necessary event when considered in terms of a contradiction that can only be resolved if the classical model can be diminished or subverted. The equilibrium between concept and substance that prevails in the classical work of art is only temporary. At the same time, while the pre-classical work of art remains embedded in substance to a degree that occludes its subjective meaning, romantic art connotes a process of inwardization in which the Idea continually overshadows material embodiment. Thus, Hegel can argue that "there is something higher than the beautiful appearance of spirit in its immediate sensuous shape, even if this shape be created by spirit as adequate to itself" (517). The unification that occurs in classical art does not disclose "the true essence of spirit," so that the totality of the Ideal dissolves into subjective being and external appearance before the spirit can pass through this rift to attain "a deeper reconciliation in its own element of inwardness" (518).

What Hegel calls romantic art, therefore, should not be identified with unique cultural manifestations in the fields of music, literature and painting that mark his own period. While it is true that medieval-modern art is romantic in a manner that cannot be detached from a general chronology, Hegel might easily discover signs of romanticism in art that exceeds this historical framework. A crucial assertion of dialectical aesthetics, however, is that the content of art cannot be judged on its own but in relation to an ongoing process that introduces the possibility of contradiction into the unity of the work as an aesthetic object. Contradiction may not be evident in the case of classical art, but the moment of truce may be little more than an illusion in an ongoing movement that cannot be interrupted by the momentary solace of harmony and equilibrium. It would seem, therefore, that Hegel's classicism is largely undermined as soon as the temporality of the aesthetic is given its due as a constitutive feature of what must be acknowledged as soon as the work of art is approached in dialectical terms.

Temporality pervades both aesthetic experience and the formation of art in a manner that raises the question of how it can remain a distinctive feature of the dialectical process. On the

other hand, when the temporal nature of the dialectical process opposes the classical modality that assumes historical form in Greco-Roman art, aesthetic experience runs the risk of losing its distinctive unity. The spirit of reconciliation that animates romantic art brings about a momentary truce, but it testifies to a heightened subjectivity that threatens to undermine the impressive cultural gains that follow the classical age. Hegel locates the origins of romantic art in a religious attitude that enables infinite subjectivity to emerge from itself and *in a relation to an other* that allows it to remain at one with itself: "Therefore the romantic Ideal expresses a relation to another spiritual being which is bound up with depth of feeling that only in this other does the soul achieve this intimacy with itself." (533). In time, however, the religious domain in which romantic art originates yields to an increasingly secular mentality that re-establishes the division between inner and outer. The role of subjective inwardness in chivalric romance, Shakespearean drama and Romantic fiction ultimately leads to the dissolution of romantic art, which collapses in a world in which "what was so magnificently sung, what so freely expressed, has been expressed; these are materials, ways of looking at them and treating them which have been sung once and for all" (608).

3. Hegel's thesis of art at an end

Hegel's widely cited remark that art is at an end can be interpreted in terms of both the history of art and the movement from aesthetics to semiotics, broadly considered. Hegel does not attribute the decline of art to the unique behavior of the artist, who "stands within the world of reflection and its relations" and has become too much a part of "our whole spiritual culture" to remain impervious to its demands (13). On the contrary, we learn that it is only in the long view and in a dialectical sense that our present situation can be reasonably assessed: "In all these respects art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past." (11). What this means is that art, as the basis for expressing *the highest levels of human thought*, is threatened increasingly by a triumphant modernity that no longer requires or favors the reconciliation of sign and substance. Thus, on one level, Hegel's statement seems to imply that art as such is no longer capable of anticipating and contributing to intellectual developments of the highest order. We might reinterpret this as saying that art in its classical form is outmoded to the degree that it no longer reflects the phenomenological unity that seals the meaning of aesthetic perfection. This would imply that art's intellectual significance is exhausted in the post-classical epoch, which is overburdened on the level of the concept and therefore has lost the capacity to give form and shape to what animates it spiritually.

However, the end of art, if examined dialectically, has another significance that allows artistic meaning to be transformed according to conceptual, that is to say, philosophical, criteria. Romantic art may have dissolved historically, but it also paves the way to the future in calling attention to the dynamic process through which the mind outpaces all forms of aesthetic embodiment as it moves forward in time. The development of the concept moves inexorably from symbol to sign and thus opens up the possibility of a comprehensive semiotic in which all forms of aesthetic embodiment can be translated into 'historical' terms. Such a semiotic would presuppose an intellectual community that would, in some respects, resemble Kant's *sensus communis*, but the difference between the two communities might be expressed in the difference between Kant's eighteenth-century heritage, which enabled him to identify transcendental beauty with stability and consensus, and Hegel's post-Romantic aesthetic position, which situated absolute knowing as immanent to the historical unfolding of Reason.²

2 Kant's belief in a *sensus communis* is integral to his aesthetic theory has been interpreted as implicitly political in Arendt's reading of the *Critique of Judgment* (Kant 2000: 92–97; Arendt 1992: 67, 70–72). Hegel's classicism evokes harmony and concord, and then risks losing ideal unity when sign and substance diverge once and for all. But art for Hegel would have

From this second standpoint, romantic art would open up the possibility of a new phase in our spiritual history whereby the most advanced communities can be enriched and sustained through the protracted event of art's dissolution. This final outcome of Hegel's aesthetics would not be inconsistent with the general tenor of his thought. We learned previously that each major phase in cultural history springs forth against a religious background that nourishes a specific mode of art, whether symbolic, classical or romantic, until the community that founded it can no longer sustain what it made possible. At this point, order is reconstituted as contradictions are resolved in different ways and according to different conceptions of the absolute spirit. Clearly, the process of reconstitution that would follow the dissolution of romantic art would remain something of a mystery only because we are living through that moment ourselves. Nonetheless, Hegel provided us with the tools for imagining what future community could salvage humankind from the wreckage of the romantic work of art, which in the end might become less of a catastrophe than an opportunity for growth and development, pointing beyond to a form of shared life that would be highly improvisatory.

Nonetheless, the semiotic turn that Hegel's aesthetics anticipates can be viewed with regard to both a dialectical theory of the linguistic sign and in relation to the broader history of aesthetics. Jacques Derrida has discussed how semiology is crucial to both Hegel's philosophy of consciousness and to the dialectical logic that undergirds the phenomenological edifice. In this regard, the distinction between symbol and sign is indicative of a displacement of nature that looks forward to Ferdinand de Saussure's well-known structuralist thesis concerning the arbitrary features of the (linguistic) sign. Derrida remarks that a "relationship of absolute alterity distinguishes the sign from the symbol," whereas "a mimetic or analogical participation" characterizes the relationship between the symbol and the symbolized (1982: 84). Moreover, Derrida also insists that "the place of semiology is really at the center, and not in the margins or the appendix, of Hegel's *Logic*" (71).

The distinction between sign and symbol indicates the importance of negativity to the dialectical movement that pervades aesthetics in general. Hence, in overthrowing the Sphinx, Oedipus demonstrates how the massive creature who is half man and half animal, still deeply rooted in nature, gives way to the human being who solves problems and displays a lucid intelligence that is characteristic of a species that is no longer locked in instinctual reactions. Derrida notes that Hegel astutely connects semiotics and psychology when "the production of signs manifests a freedom of spirit" (87). Nonetheless, Hegel also argues in favor of the importance of this transition as a thoroughgoing historicist when he traces the movement from East to West as inexorable, thus forgetting the sporadic nature of a break that must repeat itself unceasingly and cannot in good faith be institutionalized as uniquely Western.

In order to perceive things anew and to liberate them from the mundane world in which they are encased, we need to reject a model of reality that simply turns the Infinite into a separate domain that lies beyond the finite plane of existence. Within the context of this ambitious project, Hegel's aesthetic theory resumes a political meaning that can be traced to the aftermath of the French Revolution, when his own thought was still in formation, just as it seems to turn away from engagement in the practical sense. In this sense, the end of art does not amount to the exhaustion of promises but coincides with a new manner of appropriating "the restlessness of the negative" and to the persistence of aesthetic internalization (Nancy 2002: 3–7). The end of art that Hegel identifies with an inner movement that is immanent in the historical process is

a place in the ethical world of the modern State, even if its conceptual role were greatly curtailed. We might argue that both views of the public sphere, as either the site of aesthetic accomplishment or as a special realm that supported art as an ideal institution, are complementary. It should be noted, however, that the Hegelian rapprochement of art and politics is just as precarious as Kant's attempt to contain a sense of the sublime in an aesthetic that is threatened by its overwhelming power.

also indefinitely prolonged in the textualization of the sublime that introduces the possibility of in-finite interpretation. A radicalization of Hegel's attempt to bring Heaven to Earth is therefore implicit in his aesthetic theory to the degree that inwardization can be conceived, or perhaps reconceived, as a condition of semiotic deferral that prevents interpretation from achieving temporal closure. In such a situation, the semiotic movement that lies at the heart of the dialectical process can be said to coincide in its essential features with the future of art.

4. Semiotics and the future of art

Hegel's pronouncement on the end of art is often considered to have been premature, not only from the perspective of the art that was crucial to his own time but also in terms of the emergence of late Romanticism, European Symbolism and the flowering of the avant-gardes that occurred in the twentieth century. However, the apparent classicism of this pronouncement can also be re-contextualized as an utterance that casts light on Hegel's early response to the French Revolution as a signal event of modernity but also as one that recreated on its own terms the Greek notion of a public space in which human beings can enjoy a sense of community and solidarity as equals who are no longer bound to the division between inner and outer that beset previous social arrangements. My argument here is not that Hegel interpreted the French Revolution as classical in the way that Greek art brought together sign and substance, but that like many other young German intellectuals of this tumultuous period, Hegel already thought of himself as *living after* a momentous time upon which he chose to reflect and in relation to which his own early meta-political reflections are already an idealization of history, rather than an attempt to explain and evaluate what actually happened.

We can easily relate the early Hegel's enthusiasm for political transformation to the emergence of aesthetics the strong sense, particularly in the work of Friedrich Schiller, who lives in the wake of Kant and provides a philosophical response to a revolutionary situation. The immature Hellenism that allowed Hegel to turn a modern event into a semi-classical one fades in his later work, but the experience of living in the aftermath of this event is one that he shared with his contemporaries. In truth, modern aesthetics owes its origins to the outcome of the first political revolution in modern Europe. Jacques Rancière has discussed how Kant's notion of free play, which performs an aesthetic role in the apprehension of beauty, can be related to the need to surpass the harsh rule of law that instituted itself during the height of the French Revolution. Schiller, however, was even clearer than Kant about the theoretical importance of developing aesthetic categories in the wake of the Terror, which "still adhered to the model according to which an active intellectual faculty constrains passive sensible materiality" (Rancière 2009: 32). Schiller's response to this situation was published in 1795 as *Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*, a philosophical treatise that adopts Kant as its starting point but, in the third and concluding section, suggests to Rancière how mankind can adopt an aesthetic viewpoint on matter as "the reflection of its own activity" (36).

Hegel's reading of Schiller was crucial to the development of his own conception of dialectics, which adapted the idea of negation (*Aufhebung*) whereby "the intervention of some new and independent faculty" constitutes the sole basis for bridging the gulf that separates passive and active determination: "Thought is the spontaneous act of this absolute faculty," Schiller writes (1982: 130/131). Schiller explains that the apotheosis of feeling that strongly insists on the dynamic nature of beauty is formally opposed to the method of the intellect that strives to maintain the coherence of beauty on a conceptual level. However, there is also a "middle state" between sensuality and reason, passive and active sense, according to which "both these conditions totally disappear in a third without leaving any trace of division behind in the whole that has been made" (124/125). This third condition is the work of negation, which Julia Kristeva has

identified with the “fourth term of the dialectic,” the semiotic principle that cancels difference and allows difference to be preserved (1984: 109, 133). Art is this movement in which the *agon* between sign and substance is temporarily abated in the epochal configurations of Spirit.

In conclusion, what first emerged in the sphere of Greek political life as the principle of mutuality and was extended during the French Revolution to include all men acquires a distinctively aesthetic cast in Post-Romantic culture when the work of art breaks up, at least partially, due to the onslaught of ‘modern ideas’ and the intellectual frenzy that accompanies the dematerialization of art objects. When viewed from another standpoint, however, this same progressive loosening, if not debasement, can be interpreted as a *breaking free* in which the challenge to traditional metaphysics is taken to new heights, that is to say, beyond the position that it achieved during the Age of Enlightenment. When Hegel’s aesthetics is transformed from a limited conclusion within a complete system into a series of questions concerning the role of interpretation in a process that continually outpaces itself, we finally arrive at the semiotic condition that both guarantees the productive unfolding of meanings and allows art in all its forms to perpetually recreate the horizon of its own transcendence.

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**THE IMAGES OF THE TIME /
LES IMAGES DU TEMPS**

TRADITION, INNOVATION AND TIME

Antonio Roberto Chiachiri Filho
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
prof.arcf@uol.com.br

Rodrigo Antunes Morais
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
digo.morais@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper proposes a brief discussion about the terms tradition, innovation and their relation with time. Contemporary languages require some adjustments to our lifestyles that involve perceiving things of everyday life in order to adapt to the idea that we have the time. We will use the concept of semiosis, from Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotic and philosophic theories, and the concept of language proposed by Lev Semenovitch Vygotsky to try to understand the process of interpretants of the time.

“The symbolic order characteristic of the human species, of which language is inseparable, paved the way for the creation of a new kingdom in the biosphere, the realm signs and culture.¹”

Lucia Santaella

We start this paper discarding all that nostalgia that can somehow transpire or tangent the text. We will discuss terms that are in our everyday; things that we speak and use on a regular basis, even why we are constructed by language and the verbal language is the one that most will try to mediate our thinking and our action. We will try to start a discussion about the terms Tradition and Innovation. We think that the great link between these two terms is characterized by the notion of time. And time, a preoccupation that comes since philosophy is philosophy, is

¹ Free translation.

an issue that is gaining more followers for its thoughtfulness. To speak about tradition and innovation it is necessary that we put the following question: does technology change the time? If we think about time – as Charles Sanders Peirce taught us – as inseparable from language, and language as signs, these are loaded by time. Therefore, the action of the sign, or semiosis, is “... coextensive with the notion of thought, mind, learning and continuity²” (Santaella, 2013, p.11). Then it is a pregnancy of the time in all actions. Time is continuous and leaves traces, tips for what lies ahead. Understanding tradition as the transfer of values, beliefs and practices to every generation, and innovation as something that is apparently new, which brings news, information and “improvements” in some systems, maybe we will not be able to read these terms as independents from each other. Innovation comes from a tradition. Comes from a need that is already contained in the universe of the experience of who proposes that, the newness, the freshness of an idea, in fact, already contains signs that are constantly reevaluated. It is this current that we intend henceforth take our discussion, to understand this semiosis as “...synonymous of intelligence, continuity, growth and life.³” (Santaella et Nöth, 2004, p.157). How important, then, the Charles Sanders Peirce theory of signs is for the understanding of time? It is necessary, here, resorting to his *phaneroscopia* or phenomenology, that Lucia Santaella (2004, p.2), very clearly defines as:

... a quasi-science that investigates the ways we apprehend anything that comes to our mind, anything of any type, something as simple as smell, a formation of clouds in the sky, the sound of rain, a picture in a magazine, etc., or something more complex like a more abstract concept, the memory of a time lived, etc., in short, everything that presents itself to the mind.⁴

For Peirce, there are three and only three formal elements that constitute any phenomenon. He called them Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.

Firstness appears in everything related with chance, possibility, quality, feeling, originality, freedom, and monad. Secondness is linked to ideas of dependency, determination, duality, action and reaction, here and now, conflict, surprise, doubt. Thirdness concerns the generality, continuity, growth, and intelligence. The simplest form of Thirdness, according to Peirce, manifests itself in the sign, since the sign is a first (something that presents itself to the mind), linking a second (what the sign indicates, refers or represents) to a third (the effect that the sign will provoke in a possible interpreter).⁵ (Santaella, 2004, p.7)

But what does it all have to do with time? If, as mentioned above, time for Peirce is continuity, semiosis, or action of the sign, to form an interpretive signic network must necessarily be connected to the previous signs which produce interpretants that enable the “formation” of other signs that produce interpretants again and so on, *ad infinitum*, in a continuous current in direction not necessarily linear, however, focused on a future pregnant with the past, an undefined

² Free translation.

³ Free translation.

⁴ Free translation.

⁵ Free translation.

future, but that carries a tendency to continuity. The present will be expressed in a discontinuous singular moment, in a *hic et nunc*, but a present that is no longer a present, because it must be embodied in something to exist, that is, the unique time that a Firstness element finds matter (moment of Secondness), offers its qualities and find there a body, shifts in a time and space to make possible in an intellectual synthesis (Thirdness) an encounter in a cognitive act made by an interpreting mind according to its interpretative competence, in a logical thought, then becoming Thirdness, largely responsible for all continuity and the action that the sign will carry on its interpreter. So, semiosis occurs in time and is constituted by time. Signs that come from past are loaded by numerous possibilities for multiple meanings that “match” to the future the power to determinate new sign elements that will draw, for example, the communication processes, without which life would have no chance of walking, growing, multiplying, existing. We may not forget, however, that Thirdness only happens in function of Secondness and Firstness, fundamental categories for the dynamics of semiosis itself.

Backing to the terms tradition and innovation, it is possible to perceive that time is involved in all of it, because when we appeal to tradition to see ourselves on it or to extract parameters to innovation, we are actually trying to work with signs that are there and that will offer us new directions insofar as from them it is possible to indicate the necessary paths to another way of acquiring skills whether facilitating or making practical. In the field of communication this is no different. Contemporary communication technologies are here to witness the way that this field has been touring and the consequences arising from this movement; for us today, so fast and almost imperceptible.

Imagine, for example, the time that used to take the famous letters that Peirce sent from United States, via sea, to Lady Victoria Welby⁶, to reach the European continent where she lived. Also the time took by the answers by Lady Welby for Peirce. However, this was not a hindrance so they could communicate and exchange their experience. They were, this time, using languages and technological resources of that time, better explaining, they were using signic and technological resources available so far. And when we talk about signic resources we want to think any and all modes of action of translated languages that are available to us and which of them we are made up. “Language is not in us. It is us who are in the language⁷” (Peirce *apud* Santaella, 2004, p.63), used to say Peirce. When we are born we find languages ready, it behooves us to assimilate then and contribute to their growth. And what languages are we talking about? We are talking about all signical forms we can establish to be possible for us to communicate, to be possible to learn things and understand others, to be possible act our thoughts.

In the fourth edition of the work *Thought and Language* (2011) from Vigotsky, a Soviet psychologist (1896–1934), Jerome Bruner in his introduction of this edition (p.IX) leaves us a very important passage that is worth quoting it:

...Vigotsky elaborates in what sense he believes that dominating nature we can master ourselves. Because it is the internalization of the manifested action that makes the thought and, particularly, it is the internalization of the exterior dialogue that takes the powerful tool of language to influence the flow of thought. The man, so to speak, is modeled by instruments and tools used, and neither the mind nor the hand alone can accomplish much.⁸

⁶ Victoria Lady Welby (1837-1912), self-taught philosopher of the English language, visual artist and musician with whom Peirce shared some of his studies.

⁷ Free translation.

⁸ Free translation.

In fact, we are not isolated beings and we could not live in this state of isolation. I only exist because the other exists and allow me to exist. We expand our interpretative skills as we live and share our experiences. To acquire interpretative competence means increasing our signic repertoire for our action to aim, every more, a more harmonious coexistence, more salutary and more egalitarian. Unfortunately it is not always like this, but if we not aim the *summon bonun* what sense would have life?

Societies are increasingly connected by communication networks and, consequently, increasingly complex. In order to understand all these fast transformations, science – which can be defined as a combination of inter-subject areas (interdisciplinarity) – develops an essential role. To science focus lies in understanding the changes and make use of it, the most ethical possible.

The digital era is showing us the plot and the great complexity of relations in all sectors of knowledge and our everyday lives. A complexity that makes us think our world even more guided by technological advances. Technology implies change, what today gain a speed almost unreachable. To understand the changes is to reinterpret languages, it is to understand its access channels, it is to be adapted to the understanding of what time represents. It is to try to understand that new languages produce new forms of action. These new forms of action – that feed on the signs of the past – implies in new types of knowledge that are proposed to us and that it behooves us to improve them, work them, understand them and disseminate them. This is the role of all.

Discussions are many; interests, maybe bigger, but it is impossible to deny that the ways that are presented us everyday represent a challenge of trying to understand what life is offering us. To innovate is to make contemporary technologies our theory tools and utilities for a world more equal. Nothing on it is new. The role of technologies has being always this. However, it is not worth, in the name of it, to make use for ulterior and inhuman purposes. Repeating, to understand contemporary languages, the new technologies, is to try to understand life, life in its *lato sensu*.

But time? “Composer of fate, drum of all rhythms...”⁹

St. Augustine’s time, Kant’s time, Peirce’s time, Foucault’s time, Einstein’s time. What is this time we search and live? It is the same time of always. The time of the things in the things of the time. A time that is shown us the one we (re)interpret. A time that with the use of contemporary technological resources we can even “short” it, also shorting our distances. Always questioning it, but never obtaining complete answers. Answers that only depend on us. Only depend on our interpretation of things.

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⁹ Prayer to time. – Caetano Veloso.

ALBUM COVERS: DISCOVERING BRAZILIAN LIFE UNDER MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

Eduardo A. Dieb
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
edudieb@gmail.com

Abstract

Brazil lived under military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. The censorship was fierce and the freedom of speech too limited. At the dictatorship's final period, in Sao Paulo city, Brazilian biggest city and cultural pole, some musical groups and artists of many areas began to trace open critics to the government and to the situation they were living. This movement was called as "Vanguarda Paulista" (Paulista Vanguard), and those who were part of it had a strong political and social sense, besides the esthetic preoccupations. "Língua de Trapo" was a group of this movement, and they became quickly known not only due to their acid lyrics, but also due to their humanistic and liberal look, perceptible in the critics to the social behavior. Humor had always been present in the compositions and performances of the group that tried to talk about themes such as political freedom, sexual orientations, urban violence and censorship in a different way of those who were known as "singers of protest". The humorous and critic spirit of the group appeared in the cover of the albums and, if it was read as a text, it could show a Brazilian portrait in a particularly important moment of the country's contemporaneous history. This paper presents a brief frame of Brazilian political situation in the mentioned period, the artistic production of "Língua de Trapo" and how their album covers were already showing a political, ideological and artistic positioning. Reading the image as a complex text in order to analyze and to interpret Brazilian's socio-historical context will enable to understand the language and the messages in the album covers of "Língua de Trapo" and show a group worried to mark not only a contemporaneous esthetic but also their own political positioning in a very troubled time for Brazilian life. This study is based on theoretical concepts and texts from authors such as Guy

Debord (Society of the Spectacle), Adorno and Horkheimer (Cultural Industries) and Michel Foucault.

The musical group *Língua de Trapo* was one of the exponents of the self-called *Vanguarda Paulista*, artistic movement in São Paulo city in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. The group's music and his performance on stage were mocking political and social criticism in the final period of the Brazilian dictatorship. At a time when censorship still had strength, dealing with sensitive issues such as education, marginalized child or sexuality could lead to problems for artists.

The social criticism, political positioning and the way of the band look to the facts of life came from the critical view of its components. Using not only the songs, but the covers of albums, the group could pass political messages and depicting the moment that was lived in Brazil.

Knowing the social and political profile of a society at a given time is the basis for understanding the cultural production of this society. For his unique style of blending humor, and political and social criticism, and have originated from a vanguard movement, the *Língua de Trapo* has never been a successful name in the mainstream, remaining outside the music business.

Guy Debord's *Society of The Spectacle* (1997), helps to understand the media coverage and the everyday life. The group used parody in his music production, a style widely discussed by Fredric Jameson (1996). The discussion about the Culture Industry is based on works by key authors such as Adorno and Horkheimer, which helps us to contextualize the subject studied here.

From dictatorship to opening: the stage for the show starts to be mounted

On March 31, 1964, Brazil went to sleep as a democratic state under the rule of civilian President João Goulart and waked up on April 1 under a military dictatorship. The long period of exception lasted until the indirect election of Tancredo Neves in 1985. Brazilians were prohibited from voting directly for governor until 1982 and for President until 1989. The return to democracy began in the government of General João Baptista Figueiredo (1979-1985), with the amnesty and the restoration of multiparty system. Communist parties remained prohibited.

Military dictators have used every trick to maintaining power, including the censorship of news and political and cultural manifestations. The gates of hell were opened by the Institutional Act number 5, which overlapped the national and state constitutions, strengthened the hardliners and gave absolute power to the military regime. Brazilians were gagged and cannot speak, dull because they could not hear and blind, unable to see anything beyond what pleased the military dictators.

Cultural life also suffered direct persecution, both by censorship (milder between 1964 and 1968, absolute thereafter), which prevented the free expression of ideas and the arts, as the physical repression set in prisons and torture. After 1968, any criticism of the dictatorship was taken as a subversive and communist attitude, and therefore, liable to punishment (Ridenti, 2005, p.72). At the end of his performance, coinciding with the end of dictatorship, censorship was tested, and sometimes ignored by artists who appeared at the same time that Brazil began to return to democracy. In 1985, the conditions for the flourishing of new political and cultural settings were launched, and some already arose in the Brazilian horizon.

At the time, Brazilian Popular Music (MPB) lived in a comfortable complacency setting with big names turning into sacred cows, consecrated already becoming gods and an occasional composer / singer doing almost sealed letters of protest, because of censorship."The ways of Brazilian music were very grim: the labels were absolutely closed to anything that would indicate renewal or, at least, were extremely remote from Sao Paulo scene" says Wilson Souto Jr., owner of the space that would be known as the cradle of *Vanguarda Paulista*, the *Lira Paulistana* (Alexandre, 2002, p.42).

Certain musical groups from this scene started getting gigs more often and drew public attention, from critics and also the “pachydermic music industry that came out of hibernation and began to suspect that something happened in the cultural underworld of Sao Paulo” according Nasi, lead singer of IRA!, contemporary band from Vanguarda Paulista. (Beting, 2012, p.78).

It is part of the culture industry logic holds the absolute control of the production of the music industry, with an eye on profit, capturing popular cultural events and turning them into salable products. “Do-it-yourself” was one of the slogans of the punk movement, that is, do not wait others to do for you. This meant seeking new ways to record and disseminates the songs themselves, without depending on major labels and their standardized systems.

In Brazil the years 1980, MPB was self-indulgent and autophagy, sterile (Dapieve, 1995), in fault of the military regime and elites holding political and economic power and the consequent imposition of the dominant culture (Tinhorão, 1990). To be different had to get away from the standard. To record an LP, it was necessary to devise alternatives. You had to get away from the mainstream, turn your back to the record companies, commercial radio, the powerful Globo TV network and its plastic novelties. The little room for independent bands was possible thanks to the college radio, separated from the major labels and without the worry of producing a profit for their owners.

The new counterculture should be against the military regime, show new values, breaking with the MPB. The speech was the non-speech, lift something new from the collapse than existed before (Alexandre, 2002). Unlike the musical movements until then, the artists of Vanguarda Paulista approached the divergence in dislike of the reigning sameness. The similarity between them was an aesthetic concern and an absence of formal ways. There was only one consciousness to do something different from what was already absorbed by the industry.

There is a direct relationship between cultural production and the capitalist economic output, as this allows the projection of the laws of the market to the field of production and dissemination of popular music (Tinhorão, 1990).

But there is a filter in the cultural industry that allows only the groups or artists linked to large companies, or sponsored by them artistically, access to mass media such as radio and television, making it virtually impossible for independent artists and groups to stick this block. What is heard in the mass media is not the authentic taste popular, but false, artificial-produced by the holders of the economic and media power.

The culture of defense is not based solely on artists of a certain counterculture movement (Dunn, 2008). Other elements are needed for the rallying cry is heard and perceived socially. The symbolic production (Bourdieu) followed the procedures ever; after all, was guided by a conservative market, averse to independent news. And when something came up independent, was soon co-opted by the same industry.

All production value and meaning of an artistic movement depends on a variety of political actors (end of dictatorship and democracy), social (relationship of the members of Vanguard Paulista), artistic (no new or strong movement in music), producers (had to get away from the major record labels to show something different), critical (almost always aware of what happens around you) and consumers (the public was unhappy with the MPB).

In a scenario full of domination in the production and dissemination, and by extension, cultural and social control, the Rag language sought to show that it was possible a new form of musical expression. The Brazil in the late 1970s and early 1980s lived the agony of a dictatorial period. Musical movements of importance no longer prevailed. The company wanted political, economic and social changes. The stage was set for the show.

The Vanguarda Paulista and *Língua de Trapo*: São Paulo's songs

The Vanguarda Paulista had an innovative and challenging attitude to popular music. It was an interconnected group, but independent, artists, writers and musicians who lived in São Paulo. Categories such as avant-garde, alternative, independent and marginal are used to refer to a generation that has established in São Paulo and produced from the town (Oliveira, 2002, p.61).

São Paulo universities were barns talent and always appeared groups that were soon performing in São Paulo night. From Journalism course at the Faculty Casper Libero came, in 1979, the Laert Sarrumor & os Cumplices. With the entry of other students, as Guca Domenico, Antonio and Carlos Mello, the group was soon renamed *Língua de Trapo* (as whisperous, a popular expression in Brazil). The choice fell on the name Ari Barroso's song "Dá Nela" (beat her) because the so rag language spoke ill of everything and everyone around you.

The songs were pretentiously serious, but the group itself did not take him seriously. At shows the use of political humor in the lyrics generated identification with the public, because the historical moment of Brazil was conducive to this kind of music. The source of inspiration were the things of everyday life, society itself with its habits and bad habits, politicians and their actions, often suspected. The band tried to pick on everyone, using humor as a weapon to complaints that can laugh generate transformations in society at the time. The musical production of the group is composed of the following discography:

- *Língua de trapo* (1982);
- *Sem indiretas* (1984);
- *Como é bom ser punk* (1985);
- *Dezessete big golden hits super quentes mais vendidos do momento* (1986);
- *Brincando com fogo* (1991);
- *Língua ao vivo* (1995);
- *Vinte e um anos na estrada* (2000);
- *Vinte e um anos na estrada – DVD* (2000)

***Língua de Trapo* and the cultural industry**

The cultural industry, with the domain and the exploitation of mass media by financial, common groups in capitalist countries, democratic or even exclusively by the government in countries with closed political system, it generates a uniform cultural events. What is displayed can only be so if it is within the standard of those in power. "The whole world is forced to pass through the filter of the cultural industry" (Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985, p.118).

Thus, artistic productions such as movies, novels, texts and music go through an ideological sieve. The State and individuals controlling the mass media impose their ideology. And time also for marketing sieve, specifically in cases where the control of disclosure belongs to the private sector. In both cases, "even the aesthetic manifestations of opposite voltage dence policies sing the same praise of the steel rate" (Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985, p.113).

To break this pattern we must dare, build alternatives and try to conquer space to display their own artistic and cultural production, often an uphill battle and condemned from birth to defeat. For those who are not part of the mainstream, any artistic production outside the ghetto itself and conveyed, spread through the culture industry apparatus, whether on the radio, on television or in newspapers and magazines of high circulation, is only part of "an ideology intended to legitimize the trash that intentionally produce" (Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985, p.114).

In this view, all that is produced or aired by the culture industry lacks proper artistic value, it is not cultural event. To be served, automatically becomes part of the system. What displays and reports are then pasteurized products because they are harmless, and equal, not bring anything new. "The relentless drive attest cultural industry unit training policy" (Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985, p.116).

There was, as today is noticeable, a movement or a proto-movement to promote aesthetic and political changes in Brazil, which at that time spent by the military dictatorship of transition to democracy. And there was, above all, an attempt to escape the artistic and aesthetic uniformity that is striking feature of the cultural industry, where songs, artists and shows are repeated infinitely, varying only the form, not the content (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985).

The search for new styles and forms of artistic expression outside the mainstream just offering the very culture industry a source of new material, and, through a process of assimilation and control, allows the continuous exercise of domination and perpetuate this domination. The aesthetic and artistic breaking claim of the vanguards ends just feeding what you wanted to destroy. As much as the ideological pretensions of artists are evident, that his works are imbued with aesthetic concepts, artistic or political opposite to the dominant pattern, “as recorded in its difference by the culture industry, he (the artist) now belongs to it as well as the participant of agrarian reform to capitalism” (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985. p.123).

The artist also passes through the filter of cultural industry (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985, p.123), otherwise it will be virtually impossible to survive the production of his work without some kind of marketing, without consideration for the assignment of an artistic production or it is shelter, patronage or money. To not give up their artistic concepts or parts of them, to be inflexible, the artist is condemned to ostracism media and eternal stay in the shade and the lack of recognition by the mass. Offers an oblation to the marginal gods, but never surrender to industrial god.

If slightly flexible to appear and be accepted by the culture industry, the artist is branded as sold by their peers. However, if it does not, get the marginal image of the system. If this insertion in the cultural industry is made independently of his will to participate in disclosure, or to see their proper work by others, the artist himself becomes part of what before criticizing, which used to be excluded (Adorno; Horkheimer, 1985).

Albums covers

In some of his songs, using unusual image constructions, absurd or funny situations, the *Língua de Trapo* makes use of something “legitimate in folk art, farce and buffoonery” as Adorno and Horkheimer (1985, p.129) in an attempt to, through laughter, cause a political debate, denouncing through the farcical something that is explicit, but is not seen in society.

“We laughed about the fact that there is nothing to laugh about” (Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985, p.131). We laughed because we are placed in the position of observers something that showed and did not see. Laughed the equivalence of historical characters, the courage to use a historical fact and pain that occurred there, as we laugh, mainly by discovering ignorant of our present. We laughed our own ridiculous. True joy is a serious thing (*res severe gaudium verum*). Laughter helps to break the reality, changing customs, thoughts change, to become more critical to perceive situations from another angle (Adorno, Horkheimer, 1985).

Every album cover image is taken as a social text and can be read as such, with the name of the band, and the disc of the images used. The image (and, by analogy, the album cover) is a social practice of producing texts that arise within social practices in which we engage, within the social institutions in which we live (Foucault, 1969).

The use of images in music production – in this case, the albums covers – has a force that should not be neglected as it is the first consumer identification with the product (vinyl, CD or DVD) released by the artist. A needy time information often mutilated by censorship, image album cover offered (and still offers) a quick way to understand the spirit of a musical work or the message that the band wants to show.



Figure 1 – “*Sem Indiretas*”

(No Indirects – reference to the indirect election of the President of Brazil)

The compact “*Sem Indiretas*” (Figure 1), with two songs live from the eponymous show, use the yellow, the official color of the Direct Elections Now movement. The red stripe on the top left of the cover art highlights that it is a live disc recorded. The band’s name appears written as if it had been spray-painted on a wall with dripping paint each letter. The letter U symbolizes a language and was spelled in red. This image refers to political graffiti that at that time abounded in walls throughout São Paulo, in phrases like “Down with the Dictatorship”, “We want democracy” and the most famous of all, “Direct Elections Now”.

The components of the band appear in caricatures designed, with each taking one character. These cartoons, far from childish the band, show the sense of humor that was already trademarked the group and how they took the characters that appeared in their songs live. In front of everyone, like a stripe of censorship, the band with the name of the show and the album “*Sem indiretas*” reference to the political moment that the country was with the group giving their support to the movement for elections direct to the President and the end of the Electoral College.



Figure 2. “*Como é bom ser punk*” (It’s good to be punk)

The group used on the cover Ladies Concert at the Philharmonic Hall framework, by the Venetian painter Francesco Guardi, painted in 1782 and currently exposed in the *Alte Pinakothek* in Munich. This represents a party hosted by the Austrian court to the Russian nobles visiting Vienna.

The album cover is composed of a thick red band and a thinner yellow that frame the painting. The band's name appears above all the elements. And between the name and the ballroom chandelier (focal point frame) appears the disk name: It's good to be punk. The word punk is written in red and seems to have been graphitized because around for ink splatters and his spelling was made irregularly. Shows some strength and aggressiveness, in contrast to the mild and calm environment of the frame.

The punk movement shocked traditionalists by the speed of the music, the themes and the visual aspect of his followers. Nothing more traditional and conservative than life in a court. The cover shows how would a visual contrast between the rigid court life with a punk presence, through word of graffiti on the board. The punk movement in Brazil was at its peak in 1985, while in Europe begins to take the first signs of exhaustion.

The visual joke album cover end up gaining more strength by hearing the homonymous song, in which a punk who works as an office boy sings his difficulties through a parody of opera singing.

Pastiche and parody or sameness and creativity?

Postmodernism: the cultural logic of late capitalism (1996), by Fredric Jameson, allows us to discuss of parody and pastiche of concepts in contemporary society, illustrating the various ways you can understand artistic events that occurred in the late 1970s and for much part of the 1980s in São Paulo. The period in which the dictatorship and censorship were in full force can be known today as the time of pastiche and the simulacrum to the musical art world, although this pastiche scenario can also be recognized today. The strong presence of the heavy hand of censorship was something that all artists should count, therefore, for a work to be shown on television, theater or cinema, for a song to be recorded to disc, played on the radio and concerts, approval was required Department of Censorship of the Federal Police. And what was contrary to mainstream thinking, produced by critics of the dictatorship, or fleeing the standards imposed by the censorship was summarily banned.

There was thus the artistic standardization, with the annulment of the individual subject and its creative manifestations, predominantly repeat artistic and musical styles. In addition to censorship, the desire to succeed was an important factor (and still is) the emergence of "new" singers and groups that simply repeated in style and content, without really anything new to offer. It is a sad combination of artistic censorship with political and moral motivations with the strength of the cultural industry.

Pasteurization of art caused by the artistic production within the logic of the culture industry, quickly becomes the main artistic events in a gray and indistinct panel, where what prevails is not the creativity and, yes, the accommodation of the artists chewed formulas and repeated that can ensure more profitability for the least cost to the holders of the means of production. "The autonomy of works of art, which, it is true, almost never existed in pure form and that has been marked by causal connections, you see, ultimately, abolished by the culture industry" (Adorno, 1994, p.93).

This relentless pursuit of standardization of artistic works results in a high degree of dissatisfaction in those who are excluded from disclosing media artwork and own mass art production chain. One of the ways to earn a place in the sun and show their work is to opt for independent production and dissemination, knowing beforehand be impossible to compete on the same level

with artists, musicians, singers and groups sponsored by the cultural industry, with radio stations, television and large record labels. It is the most extensive and complete dependence and servitude. "The compensatory satisfaction that the cultural industry offers to people, to awaken in them the comfortable feeling that the world is in order, frustrates them in their own happiness she deceptively gives them" (Adorno, 1994, p.9).

The ubiquity of the cultural industry almost impossible the formation of autonomous individuals, independent and, therefore, critical. These guys are the precondition of democracy, which never existed or would have survival guarantees the absence of independent thinkers and critics of cultural industry (Adorno, 1994, p.99).

Promoters of marketed fun wash their hands when they state that they are giving the masses what they want. This is an appropriate ideology for commercial purposes: the less the mass can discriminate, the greater the possibility of selling indiscriminately cultural items (Adorno, 1994, p.136).

The text section "About popular music," by Adorno, helps you understand how strong and damaging the conjunction of cultural industry with a totalitarian regime in capitalist societies. This switches to cultural industry not only in favor of capital development, but also as disclosing the dominant political thought.

By focusing on lack of reasoning of a population that accepts without blinking, for convenience or fear of retaliation, any artistic or cultural events that are imposed, the government of a dictatorial regime seeks ways to impose their "taste" and the musical aesthetic population. It does this through the commercial interests of the cultural industry. Those who do not pray for official booklet, or, in this case, do not sing the official sheet music, automatically staying to the disclosure system edge through radio and commercial television stations, surviving only through local shows with reduced public and sale tiny runs of LPs or cassette tapes produced alternatively.

What is the path used by Rag language with their album covers, music and lyrics to face the military dictatorship and the cultural industry? Parody against pastiche, the mood against violence, free thought against dogma. The intolerance towards the standard. Against dependence and servitude, freedom and liberty.

Pastiche, such as parody, is imitate a style, a mimic coarse, repetitive and not creative because creativity requires freedom to be able to create, not plastered and standards. It is a dead expression, like a statue without eyes. Have parody serves to provoke laughter, to embarrass or honor. "Pastiche does not have life or the mood of a parody, because it lends itself to provide information required for a more critical pension censing from the observation of what has been parodied" (Jameson, 2000, p.44).

What capitalist society produces is pastiche, a mere imitation of artistic styles in several industrialized artistic events. It is an almost eternal repetition, dull and creativity, artistic events that at some point had a glimpse of innovation, but were absorbed by capitalist society (Jameson, 2000). The way to denounce the artistic sameness, pastiche that reigned in MPB and the social and political problems experienced in Brazil during the study period was the parody lyrics and musical styles, and the images used on the albums covers.

Freedom of choice of musical rhythms shows how much the group valued artistic freedom and political independence. In a disc of the band can be heard *moda de viola*, hard rock, bolero, reggae, *xote* and parody of Italian music. And the lyrics do not spare political parties, business, government and religions. Commented acidly about everything and everyone.

This imitation, pastiche, again, is not as parody. Are different in essence and in its acts. They differ in purpose and function. While the parody is used to laugh, exaggerating features of particular work, manifestation or artistic style and thus enabling a discussion of the provocation

made, pastiche lacks critical sense.

Just try to play through mimesis, qualities or characteristics of certain artistic works, making the play by play, headless and uncritical, with the intention of no longer a just and yes, also earn some money and another that is the same as the market. “The pastiche is the simulacrum of an artistic work, it lacks originality and aura, being identical copy of something whose original never existed” (Jameson, 2000, p.45).

Reinforcing the hypothesis of creative empty pastiche of artistic expressions coming from a consumer society, Guy Debord states that “the image will be the final form of reification,” since the most important thing seems to be rather than being. This seems to be, no matter individual artistic value, but the value that particular artistic expression is replaced by look, to resemble other artistic expression. This manifestation, in turn, came from a simulation of another manifestation, perpetuating the pastiche as is the work of Sisyphus, never ending and always produces the same result, condemned to eternal repetition.

By this time being dominated by pastiches and simulations, the last time tends to disappear from the historical memory of a society, as the pastiche reproduces itself, not allowing innovations.

Língua de Trapo was critical in its time, which confirms that “there is more engaging historical relic than the music of certain periods” (Wisnik, 1982, p.15). Songs with critical content, most often using humor and parody to show what the group saw as wrong. Errors that persist in haunt our daily lives, even after so many years, after the dictatorship and six presidents of the Republic elected by direct vote of the Brazilians.

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PERCEPTION AND COGNITION INSIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SPHERES

Felipe Gabriel Ervaz Garcia
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
felipegeg@gmail.com

Rodrigo Antunes Morais
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
digo.morais@gmail.com

Abstract

The contiguity existent among intermediatic immediate objects becomes clearer in contemporaneity, showing the importance to study these signs of the time today. Several technological artifacts that own different functions and dynamizations are available, for example, the interactivity enabled by the relation between videogames and Kinect (first named as Project Natal): a motion sensor of great importance at some science areas for bringing complexities never known before.

Therefore, this paper aims to explore the universe of the immediate object taken at the spheres of the technological esthetics given by the relation of Kinect + videogame, demonstrating part of the perceptive and cognitive process in the intermedia relation observed. Then, also showing how a part of the perceptive process contains temporary events incorporated in given spaces by technological artifacts. This analysis will be based on the deployments made by Lúcia Santaella, specifically in the books *Applied Semiotics* (2002) and *Liquid Languages at the Mobile Age* (2007) that show with emphasis a detailed critical analysis about the themes to be explored.

1. Introduction

The Kinect, for sure, revolutionized the technological sphere and the interaction between the users and the games. With an unique composition, beyond breaking the sedentary paradigms and ignore the joystick use in their games, it brought benefits not only for the games scope – area which was designated – but also for medicine, with treatments that goes from physiotherapy to

stroke patients, for the robotics revolution, for the pedagogical scope and even for the archaeological researches.

This accessory that was created by the Brazilian Alex Kipman with the goal of helping the users of Xbox platform was nominated by Guinness World Records the electronic artifact with the fastest selling of the history, impressing the Microsoft's executives.

This article will analyze the semiotic composition inside the games universe which uses this mentioned technology, in regarding of the interpretation questions and the perception of the signs. The analysis is going to approach the subject based on the phenomenological theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and also based on the dissertation and statements of Lúcia Santaella.

In this way, the immediate object's universe will be explored inside the technological spheres given by the relation of Kinect and videogame, approaching the perceptive and cognitive process in the relation of the intermedia observed, since the process is continuous and the semiotic creates a need of reading about itself.

2. Technological evolution

The coming of Kinect wasn't a random situation, but the result of a technological advance allowed through the years. The technology that we know and was possibly unimagined a few years ago, is given by the technological revolution of the twentieth century (XX). Beside and entailed by it, a vast control over the image. "The unquestionable domain of the images is due to the fact that the technological revolution has put an enormous apparatus to the vision service that you can't deny that the twentieth century (XX) was the century of the technovision triumph." (Santaella, 2007:259)

Then, we should understand the evolutionary character of the technologies, mainly those ones which influenced the studying and the confection of current ones, basing on the evolutionary line showed by Santaella in the "*Liquid Languages at the Mobile Age*" book, due to the Weibel theory:

- (a) The invention of photography with automation that it brought to the production of the image was contemporaneous transmitting pictures and words in long distance via scanning (breaking of two-dimensional image into a linear sequence of points in time) with the help of machines. The telegraph, the telephone, the fax, the forerunner of Nipkow television in 1884, and electronic telescope, all contributed to the development of technological systems for the transmission of sound, fixed images and moving images. With this, the imaging was immediately followed by transmission. At the same time, Weibel says, about electromagnetic waves' discovery (Maxwell em 1873, Hertz em 1887) meant the birth of new visual worlds, foreshadowing the advent of telematics culture.
- (b) After a short time the spatial form of the image, as in the painting and the photo, was followed by a temporal form in the movie. From a space environment, the image turned into a temporal environment.
- (c) The discovery of the electron and the cathode ray tube, both in 1879, established the basic conditions for the production and transfer of electronic images, which led to television.
- (d) The magnetic recording of visual signals in 1951, which had been anticipated by recording beeps at the beginning of the twentieth century, combined the film, radio and television in a new channel, the video. The technology of transistors, integrated circuits, chips and semiconductor revolutionized the data process technology in the mid-twentieth century, leading to the production of images completely generated on computers. Later,

the multimedia computers not only united all the historical possibilities of production and transmission of images generated computationally, but also opened up perspectives for interactive visual worlds controlled by the machine. These worlds brought unexpected news: virtuality, variability and viability thanks to the interaction between the information and the user.

(Weibel *apud* Santaella, 2007:259)

With this panorama that is described, we can understand the historical and cultural context of the emerging technologies that messes with the modern world.

3. Kinect

The object of our study, the Kinect (= kinetics), is an accessory for the Xbox video game platform created by the Brazilian Alex Kipman. Primarily known as Project Natal, the device enables the interaction of people with games without them necessarily need to push buttons or use joysticks, then requiring body movements. Soon, we can define the Kinect as a peripheral for body movements and voice capturing that was created with the purpose of enabling the player-game interaction and even player-videogame-player2.

The accessory goes beyond its original meaning. In other words, beyond fulfilling the purpose of helping and entertaining along with the games, the Kinect is also used for body and voice recognition, allowing it to have functions outside the universe of games. For example: to connect the Xbox platform, the individual can access the menu “Applications” by voice control without using any joystick. The same happens when the body recognition is activated on your device’s menu through the continuous movement of the hands, “waving” for the platform. All this can be used for a specific purpose that does not necessarily need to be the act of playing itself, allowing since the act of doing a simple research, till accessing an application with just commands that require specific sensory activities.


With the wide option of interaction that this peripheral allows, people started using it in unusual ways and it “escapes” from the original purpose, but they don’t stop representing a social-technological revolution, which will be explored later in this article as Kinect Effect.

Therefore, we have the interactive system given by the relation Kinect-user, how this interaction takes place and the whole human sensory system that is necessary for the process to be completed, are included in the scenario of virtual reality.

The virtual reality creates multisensory synthetic scenes, simulated in numerical language configured as data or datascapes landscapes, fully structured by abstract language, which respond to the actions of those who experience them. This produces intense effects on human perception due to the feeling of being truly immersed in a synthetic world. Differently from the e scenes that record the visible reality through devices based on “Visionica” (Virilio 1988), such as cameras, telescopes, satellites, virtual world, according Couchot (2003: 175), is entirely computational and involves completely the viewer’s body. This can change your point of view and move your body under its own command. The immersion happens because, on one hand, the body is equipped with sensory or interfaces devices that extend the sensory field, on the other hand, the environments, which the bodies are connected, are built of three-dimensional computer language qualities, composing landscapes with proprioceptive qualities that replicate spatial situations experienced when we move our bodies in the physical world (Domingues 2004: 37). (Santaella, 2007:274)

3.1. The sensor's features

We can say that Kinect is a highly innovative combination of cameras, microphones and software that transforms the player's body into a video game controller.



There is an innovative tripod that works with the Kinect sensor: video camera, depth sensor and microphone.

Fig. 1: Kinect configuration and composition (Microsoft).

Source: <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj131033.aspx>.

Color Video Camera VGA (Color Sensor) – This camcorder is for facial recognition and the detection of other features, when detection occurs in three component colors: red, green and blue. This makes capturing of a color image possible.

(IR Depth Sensor and IR Emitter) – The emitter emits infrared light beams and the depth sensor reads the IR beams reflected back to the sensor. The reflected beams are converted into depth information measuring the distance between an object and the sensor. This makes the capturing of a depth image possible.

Voice Detector (Microphone Array) – This is the series of four microphones that can isolate the voices of the players from the noise of the room. It allows players to be a few meters away from the microphone and still use voice controls.

Motorized base (Tilt Motor) – The tilt motor lets you change the slope to + or – 27 degrees, which effectively doubles the volume of the captured field of view. The slope is related to the gravity, rather than being connected to the base of the sensor. An elevation angle of zero indicates that Kinect points perpendicular to gravity.

The detection system of the skeleton is able to “see” up to six bodies – of which only two are active and possible of interaction – and also has the ability to map 48 points of the human body. For everything to work naturally, the player must stand at a distance from 1 to 4 feet of the sensor without obstacles.

3.2.1. Kinect effect

The Kinect was developed by Microsoft to revolutionize the way we play videogame and its entertainment experience, as already discussed in this document.

However, people started using the device in ways never imagined before. The use of this technology that is been studied is plural and diverse, with records from the educational context,

passing through assistance to archaeological researches and going to the operating room, taking Kinect beyond games.

That is what has been termed by Microsoft as “Kinect Effect”: the diversity in the use of peripheral, used in many different ways, bringing new experiences to the world and in a revolutionary way.

That’s why we bring a significant contribution to the understanding of multi plurality view about the usability of the sensor¹.

3.2.2. In archaeology

Students of the California University at San Diego were part of a futuristic archaeological dig in Jordan: a three-dimensional mapping of the soil which helps in accurate location details. Instead of using an expensive and complex system such as LIDAR, the team used Kinect.



Fig. 2: Archeological excavation

Source: <http://www.fastcompany.com/1771025/kinect-hacked-3-d-scanning-archaeology-site>.

After capturing the images, models can be made in 3D and project them in an immersive virtual reality environment. In addition to capturing the images, researchers can also add information about each part of the space.

3.2.3. In the student scope

The interactive learning is fundamental to engage and motivate students in the technologically advanced world of today.

Given by the nature of the digital lives of the students and having in mind their great interest in video games, educators are increasingly using immersive approaches based on games, helping students to develop their essential skills.

In classrooms across the United States, teachers who integrate Kinect into their classes reported tangible improvements in student engagement and learning.

The technology is being used as part of pilot programs underway at the district of Los Angeles Unified School (California), Chicago Public Schools (Illinois), Houston Independent School District (Texas), Scottsdale Unified School District (Arizona), Flagstaff Unified School District

¹ The analysis described here is part of a universe that encompasses the usability of the sensor; only a sample of the factual and the potential use of the same.

(Arizona), Fairfax County Public Schools (Virginia) and Loudoun County Public Schools (Virginia).

3.2.4. In Medicine

A fact to be explored with regard to the use of Kinect in medicine is the case that happened



in Brazil in 2012, the Evangelical Hospital in Londrina, located in Paraná.

Fig. 3: Doctor using the Kinect system instead of using negatoscope at a hospital in Londrina, Paraná (Brazil).

Source: <http://revistadonna.clicrbs.com.br/saude/hospital-desenvolve-tecnologia-com-ferramenta-de-videogame/>.

This was the first Brazilian medical center to develop a method that uses Kinect in operating rooms. The intention was to end with the use of film sheets in the negatoscope, a device with special lighting that assists and enables observation of radiographs. An examination sheet measures approximately 35 cm wide by 45 cm high, and a panel typically hold a maximum of three sheets. In more complex surgeries, it is common to perform the exchange of images numerous times. As the medical team can not touch anything, to avoid contamination, the display of tests was handled by nurses or assistants.

During a conversation with the IT staff of the hospital the context of using the Kinect came out. The professionals started to develop a software that uses the peripheral connected to a PC. With adjustments and repairs over the months, the INTERA emerged – Interaction between man and machine – that allowed safety, agility and dynamism at the access and movement of patient’s radiological images, with the doctor dressed in a sterile manner, without the need to contact the equipment.

4. The Perception by Pierce

After passing through the features, unique composition and usage of our object of study, we can now enter the semiotic question.

Order to understand the process in which the interaction takes place with the Kinect player when referring to the perception of it, we must first understand the theory of the perception of Charles S. Peirce, which is grounded in phenomenology, “a quasi-science that investigates the

ways we apprehend anything that appears to our mind” (Santaella, 2007:02).

Then, the development and analysis of the perceptual and cognitive question given by the relation Kinect user (or gamer), first we must understand the inference relation, reference and interpretation made possible by the sign, as shown in Santaella:

[...] in Charles Sanders Peirce’s definition, the sign is a triadic nature, in other words, it can be analyzed:

- in itself, in its internal properties, in other words, in its power to signify;
- in its reference to what it indicates, refers or represents; and
- in the types of effects that is able to produce in their receptors, that is, the types of interpretation that it has the potential to awaken in their users.

Therefore, the semiotic theory allows us to penetrate the inner movement of the messages itself, in how they are engendered, procedures and resources it used. (Santaella, 2007: 5)

With this, knowing that “sign is anything of any kind that represents something else” (Santaella, 2012:8), now, we can analyze here in semiotic terms as the process of signification is given in the relation user = Kinect.

5. Percept, *Percipuum* and Proprioception

Then appears to us the following question: how a perception that contextualizes the process of human interaction within systems that make up the universe of virtual reality is given? In other words, there is no interaction without the possibility of knowledge of interactive human being for their overall self-representation in body terms.

For this, we must begin the research process based on the Peirce’s perception theory.

The theoretician identifies and characterizes two former terms of the perceptual process that is distinguished by its characteristics: the percept and the *percipuum*.

To understand the percept, we must resort to what is external to us and presented through the perceptual process, it can only be understood through a judgment of perception, and for this last one, we won’t be attentive to a robust analysis. Soon, *percipuum* can be seen as the percept within the boundaries that “our sensors impose” (Santaella, 1998, p. 52). Briefly, the *percipuum* is to the immediate object and the percept is to the dynamic object. Rodrigo Morais gives us a good overview of these terms:

The percept remains independent and external to the mind, while the *percipuum* is found at the judgment of perception, In other words, the percept can be taken as any stimulus that hasn’t had contact with any sensory receptor, while *percipuum* is the percept at the metaphysical moment when processed by a body. (Morais, 2013:32)

For example, the *percipuum* is in the immediate object, in here and now. Is in the representation of something through a space, the sign itself. Therefore, the percept, which is connected directly to the dynamic object, presents itself to perception at a referential, metaphysical moment, the fugacity of the perceptual process.

6. Proprioceptive Question

As already discussed in this article, there is a possibility of interaction between the player and the videogame – that uses Kinect – without having, first, a self-recognition as a whole in tangible and spatial terms. The player acknowledges himself in that realities composition through his own knowledge in relation to his own image.

[...] opening up the understanding field of human recognition through the senses, it is evident that this temporal and spatial self-determination inherent to the construction of reality of each individual is directly connected to the self-image, not only in visuality terms, but understanding the imagery contemplation from synesthesia, from all sensory possibilities concerning the human. (Morais, 2013:25)

This process is enabled by the existence of a proprioceptive system, that promotes precisely this spatial recognition of the body, making its existence be one of the leading factors to the interactive cycle that Kinect searches be completed.

7. Proprioceptive equivalence in Kinect

When facing a complex system that simulates the moves of a body, the person who is interacting, instead of what you may think, doesn't find parallel realities that are separated, in other words, there is a composition of reality that makes this person perceives and interact with the technological composition, having, this complex composition all the immediate object.

With this, the self-perception, the external perception which is given by the interactive moment and the whole context that encompasses the act of playing stands to capture the immediate object.

The biological body that generates the avatar used in the Kinect interactivity can be understood as an equivalent body to the sensory representation given in virtual platforms taken by the technical apparatus analyzed here. That is, given the facts cited about the proprioception, the spatiotemporal self-recognition, it can be seen that the human being has access to itself through representations given by its perceptual possibilities, just as also happens with the body understanding generated from Kinect and projected in other technological advent.

Finally, we understand that the Kinect and all the technological advents today that permeate the contemporary life, open the doors to new studies that show a possibility in multiplicity of identity in the understanding of the human being as its own object of study.

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INSTANT COMMUNICATION: A BRIEF HISTORY ABOUT TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION

Liliane Pellegrini
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
liliane.pellegrini@gmail.com

Abstract:

The accelerating pace of life and overcoming spatial barriers marked the history of capitalism and that seems to have caused a compression process of the two dimensions (time and space). The phenomenon of compression also reflected in the representation of the world, in a way that the perception of shrinkage experienced throughout history – the once vast world – has been reduced to a global village. This paper intends to comprehend and discuss the transformations of the representation of the world by instant communication and mobility. Therefore, the article discusses the breakdown of the two-way relationship between space and time – brought by Bauman (2000) –, the compression process presented by Harvey (1992).

Fluids or liquids neither fix space nor bind time. They do not have a pre-defined shape and they are constantly ready, and prone, to change it. As explained by Bauman (2000:2) “and so for them it is the flow of time that counts, more than the space they happen to occupy: that space, after all, they fill but ‘for a moment’”. And it is this mobility and inconstancy of fluids that assimilates them to the idea of lightness. In other words, the possibility of moving easier and faster as lighter we travel. (Bauman 2000).

This “liquid-modern” kind of life is a way of living at the liquid modernity presented by Bauman wherein the members act under conditions that change in a shorter time than the necessary for consolidation of habits and routines, also ways of action (Bauman 2009). This means that this society can not remain structured for a long time.

The feeling of living at a liquid atmosphere is what Bauman understands as the essence of the contemporary society. The values we follow and defend are more volatile, as the relations between people and between human being with the world they live in. The search for instantaneity, that marked the humankind for many centuries, continues even more avid. We seek to extinguish the barriers from time and from space. We want everything here and now. And yet, we cannot longer imagine a period when was necessary to wait and to grub carefully the unknown.

1. Time and space dimensions in the contemporary society

According to Bauman (2000), time as a measurable concept, as history, began in modernity. There are some examples in history that searches to explain how the time-space wedlock became two different concepts: the astronomers measuring the velocity and the distances of celestial bodies, or Newton calculating the exact relations between acceleration and the distance passed by the 'physical body', or even Kant, the philosopher, conceiving time and space as "two transcendently separate and mutually independent categories of human cognition" (Bauman 2000:111).

While man used only natural mobility tools, the biunivocal correspondence between time and space dimensions predominated, in a way that "far" and "long", just like "near" and "soon" were used almost as synonyms. In other words, meant the amount of effort applied in order to man walk by a certain distance. The space definition corresponded to the trajectory using resources as the human body or hunt, like riding. Time, on the other hand, was defined according to the necessary duration to travel a given space using the same resources (Bauman 2000).

The development of transportation and communication facilities, during the XIX and XX centuries, represented a rupture factor of this correspondence, due time acceleration. Faster transportation facilities, as train and automobile, reduced time of spatial displacement. Furthermore, innovations in the field of telecommunications, like the telephone and the telegraph, made it possible the immediate contact between interlocutors separated by large distances.

By the time when distance began to depend on employed technology, time acquired features of flexibility and expansiveness as opposed to space, which remained inflexible, in the sense of cannot be straightened, curled and manipulated. Because, unlikely space, the possibility and change from time has made this last component a disruption factor. It was now the dynamic polo on time-space combination.

This rupture sources, however, go back to the Industrial Revolution period, which accelerate the craft production process. The instrumental rationality of capitalism has it basis the elimination of idle and unproductive time, searching ways to accomplish tasks more quickly, and so, maximize value. Time is now a tool focused mainly to win space resistance and, then, became money. Because, as Bauman explains (2000), time shortens the distances and makes it possible to overcome obstacles and old boundaries, as desired by human ambition.

The accelerating pace of life and the overcoming of spatial barriers marked the history of capitalism in such a way that seems to have caused a compression process of the two dimensions:

as space appears to shrink to a 'global village' of telecommunications and a 'spaceship earth' of economic and ecological interdependencies - to use just two familiar and everyday images - and as time horizons shorten to the point where the present is all there is (the world of the schizophrenic), so we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of time-space compression of our spatial and temporal worlds (Harvey 1992: 240).

The compression phenomenon also reflected in the representation of the world, in a way that was experimented a shrinkage perception throughout history – what was once termed as the world wide, was reduced to a global village. According to Bauman (2000), the community can be considered in these days as “the last relic of the old-time utopias of the good society”. And it was reduced to the size of the nearest neighborhood and is now classified not by its content but by its borders. Harvey (1992) also defends this same idea and shows that transport innovations significantly influenced this change, progressively annihilate space through time, as highlighted by Harvey (1992) in the following figure:




Fig. 1: Representation of the world in four stages.

The funnel-shaped illustration shows the shrinkage of the representation of the world in four stages, relating each one of them to the speed of transportation facilities of the period. The framework developed by the author of this article, coming up, appointing each phase according to the data presented by Harvey (1992) and specifies its duration¹.

Phase	Duration	Fast transportation	Speed
Wide World	350 years	Carriages and sailing boats	16 km/h
World Steam	100 years	Locomotives and boats	100 km/h
Postwar	10 years	Aircraft propulsion	480 – 640 km/h
Global village ²	Current, since 1960	Jets	800 – 1100 km/h

Table 1: Transportation facilities of each period.

The phase named by the author as “Vast World” lasted for a longer period compared to the others: were 350 years in which the representation of the size of the world has not changed significantly. This phase began with the great maritime voyages, resulting, among others factors, in discovery of lands and development of cartography. From the maritime exploration was being built a new world design – vast, however finite, and therefore, possible of be explored to exhaustion. The perception of vastness possibly derived from long transoceanic voyages to access distant continents from Europe.

From the “World Steam” phase, significant technological advances occurred in transportation in the range of about 100 years, until the aviation era, which started in motors for propulsion phase and is current with the jet engines of phase called “Global Village”.

This article does not intend to explore the transformations of each phase profoundly. However, for better understanding of the space-time compression phenomenon, will be presented two examples comparing the correspondence made by crossing the Atlantic Ocean, in different periods and by different kinds of transportation.

The first corresponds to the discovery era, where the vast world was still in the process of being completely unraveled by man (European) due to Iberian nautical science ingenuity. The letter written by Pero Vaz de Caminha to king Dom Manuel sharing news of Brazilian lands discovery, left for Lisbon on May 1, 1500. Due to the secret and confidentiality safeguarded the document at the time, there aren't accurate records of the date the correspondence was received in Portugal, however, it is estimated that was at June 15. The notification of an important political event for that period, certainly treated as priority, took more than forty days to cross the Atlantic Ocean, by the faster transportation and most advanced technology of that time, the Portuguese ship.

The second example refers to the period between the two World Wars, when opened the first

¹ Although navigation and the use of riding and carriages are prior to 1500, the calculation of the length of the table considered this date as the beginning of the period, based on data considered by Harvey (1992).

² The author used the term global village to name the space-time compression phase of the current society, in order to clarify that the speed of transportation and telecommunications tend to shorten distances and reduce the planet to a similar situation of a village: a world in which everyone would be, somehow, interconnected. However, differs from the global village model proposed by McLuhan, which appropriated exclusively to television, a unidirectional mass media to its definition. A village is characterized as a restricted territorial extension in which lives a small population that shares its life story, constituting a common-unity. Thus, communication between village members tend to be bidirectional (as dialogues between two or more individuals) and not unidirectional as the television, in which information is transmitted in a single stream to an unlimited number of potential receptors, without interaction with the sources of origin (no feedback).

aero postal mail between France and South America by the mythic company *Aéropostale*³, famous for performing risk achievements at the time, such as night flights, fly over the Andes and operate the first commercial flight across the South Atlantic, performed by one of the most daring pilots of the company – Jean Mermoz. On May 12, 1930, he piloted a single-engine loaded with 130 kilos of mailing pouch for 19 hours uninterrupted, crossing the Atlantic Ocean, since Senegal to Natal on the Brazilian coast. The provision of that service reduced the transport time of a letter between France and Argentina from thirty to eight days.

The technological innovations of transportation enabled the news across the world to be received more quickly, and what was once far, appeared closer, contributing to the perception of space shrinking due to the shorter physical displacement of the message (letter) by faster transportation facilities.

However, in addition, other innovations also contributed to this shrinking perception, as the development of telecommunications technologies, like the telegraph and the telephone. In this case, yet, the message could be switched instantly between geographically distant interlocutors, eliminating time travel of the spatial displacement, once necessary for the correspondence exchange.

At first, telegraphy depended on long wires and submarine cables to exchange messages. However, unlike correspondence by letter, that the delivery time was proportional to the velocity of the transportation and to the distance to be, telegraphic messages could travel by the electric fluid at the speed of 25,000 kilometers per second.

Since 1837, when the first telegraph model was patented, the difficulty of transposing spatial barriers would be restricted to the installation of wires and cables, because message could travel swiftly through this structure.

The world seemed even smaller, because events in distant places could be reported in terms next of the event date. Until then, the newspapers circulated with delays of days and weeks, because the only available means of obtaining the account of events was through correspondence, in a way that time for a message to go away impacted the term of its disclosure. An example of this can be found in the edition of the British newspaper *The Times* on January 9, 1845, with news reported from Cape Town eight weeks late and news of Rio de Janeiro from six weeks ago. News from New York was four weeks delayed and from Berlin, one week. With the advent of the telegraph, the flow of news information has become almost instantaneous, also inaugurating a new phase in journalism (Standage 1998).

If for centuries the communication distance was as fast as the fastest transportation of the era could travel, in 1905, according to the testimony of an Brazilian telegraph engineer (Silva 2011), it had been completed the wires and cables network required to do a telegram around the world in just nine minutes. It was established the instantaneity of communication on a global network.

Since its discovery until half of the XX century, the telegraph was the main system of long-distance communication, when it was passed over the phone, whose main advantage is the voice messaging transmission, allowing the caller to hear their loved ones who were away. Despite differences between the two systems, the instantaneity of communication, characteristic of telegraphy, also persisted on the telephony.

³ The visionary Pierre-Georges Latécoère created a regular airline to transport mail in 1919, realizing the urgent need to accelerate communication and the availability of skilled fighters pilots in World War I. Therefore was born the Air Line Latécoère, with flights between France, Spain, Africa and South America. In 1927, Marcel Boullieux-Lafont, french investor based in South America, acquires that airlines, whose corporate name became *Compagnie Générale Aéropostale* (CGA), counting 200 aircraft, 17 floatplanes and 1500 employees, including 51 pilots. Among these, hired in 1926, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, author of “*The Little Prince*”. In 1933, *Aéropostale* along with other companies, gave the company “*Air France*” that linking Europe with South America until the present day.

The time-space compression to the point of reducing the world to a global village is the striking feature of contemporary society, where the only limit not yet overcome by man is the speed of light (Virilio 1995).⁴ The long effort to accelerate the speed of the movement reached its apex: instantaneity, which, in turn, is an attribute of the changing relationship between space and time.

Thus, the change that is spoken of is the fact that space has become irrelevant, thanks to time annihilation. In this contemporary world where space can be traversed instantly, the difference between 'distance' and 'here' is nullified. "Were the outcomes of human actions before they could become conditions of their effectiveness, and before they could be deployed to make yet more differences, and the differences more profound and less contestable than before" (Bauman 2000:112).

From the time it was possible to transgress the limits to movement speed; power has become extraterritorial and went on to travel with the electronic signal speed, facing no more space limitations. The development of cellular technology was significant in this meaning. For Bauman (2001), the advent of the mobile phone serves well as *coup de grâce* in symbolic dependence on space, because the own access to a telephone point is no longer required for an order to be given and fulfilled. The difference between "close" and "far" is about to disappear.

Although instantaneity was already present in society through communication by telegraph and telephone, and the cellular combines features of both, we highlight the following differentiation concerns about the predecessors: individuality, mobility and portability.

The first, individuality, is a device for individual use, is not shared among people established in a certain fixed point, be a residence or a company. The cell phone waives the mediation of third parties (telegraph operator, operator or person who answers the phone and finds the recipient of the call). Also, allows customization of the device, such as: ringtones, color, custom covers, screen shots, applications, etc. So, each unit, although replica of another, may be perceived as unique and exclusive, revealing the preferences and characteristics of its user.

Next, there is mobility, than can be used anywhere regardless of access to a fixed point or wires. And portability: the apparatus is lightweight and can be carried in a pocket. It monitors the user in their spatial displacement.

2. Final considerations

In a society of instantaneity and inconstancy, tomorrow is elusive, ephemeral and unreal, even used to pass credibility and hope to people. As if we used an ideal of accomplishment that will probably never materialize. Between the past and the future, the human being builds a bridge between durability and transience, living in a liquid modernity where it is necessary to assume responsibilities and live in the moment instantaneously in time and space unique.

Instant factor – classified by Bauman (2001) as "cancellation of space resistance and liquefaction of the objects materiality" – allows each moment to seem infinite. The term "long-term" is not out of our vocabulary, but seems to have lost its meaning and has each time less importance, because, if we live in a society that used and discarded things and people faster than ever, gain more time is not attractive. While the solid modernity was looking for "eternal life", fluid modernity does not incorporate it (Bauman 2001).

The new formulation of the space-time binomial alters the human society and man's relationship with the environment. The liquid power is in who can liquefy. In other words, who has

⁴ Currently two of the three physical barriers were overcome: sound, heat and light. The sound barrier was broken by the super and hypersonic aircrafts, while the heat barrier was implemented by the rockets that took humans out of Earth's orbit without melting from the friction heat. However, the speed of light barrier is not something you can cross without promoting disorder in the story and even the relationship of living beings with the world (Virilio 1995).

the freedom to make decisions, occupies a more prominent space and is free to move almost imperceptible. The administration in lightweight capitalism consists in keeping the labor away from space, because the software era is no longer holding any of the two dimensions, and allows freedom of movement, volatile and fickle, by its dynamic development in any space and time around the world.

Before, the time we needed to get somewhere was the same for all people, regardless of social class. This relative equality left them on the same level. With the advent of the steam engine, there is a possibility of differentiation: the one who has access to the most effective means of transportation saves time. Even today, even with space-time compression increasingly effective, geographical distances continue, but also remain differences in mode of locomotion. Besides the differentiation between modes of moving people, like car and airplane, it is necessary to take into consideration otherwise studied in this paperwork, which is communication. In this one, the search is increasingly supplying the time to put a human being in instant contact with other geographically distant through the cell phone, for example.

And is this portable and disposable device, designed to allow the constant availability and contact with the outside world of the nomadic people that represents the culture of instantaneity. Is the way we live today that values individuality, immediacy and mobility. A world where the speed of light is no longer enough.

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A SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS ON FRANCESCA WOODMAN'S ARTWORK

Flávia Mantovani Alves
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
fla.mantovani27@gmail.com

Roberto Chiachiri
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
prof.arcf@uol.com.br

Abstract

Francesca Woodman is a milestone in the history of photography. At just 17 years old she started a large project: to photograph her own life, from birth to death; creating symbolic images of the time to represent her reality. This artwork is constituted by several symbolic elements, making use of her body and other objects to compose the scenarios. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze Francesca Woodman's life and artwork interpreting her photographs through representative forms (Imitative Representation, Figured Representation and Ideational Representation). This study will be based on the work about matrices of language and thought written by Lucia Santaella (2001) that presents a critic and detailed analysis about the explored topic.

1. Introduction

Undoubtedly, Francesca Woodman is a milestone in the history of photography. Using simple techniques and sceneries, she was able to tell great stories with only a snap in her camera.

At only 17 years old, the photographer started a great work: to tell how her life was. Since her birth until her death. Full of meaning, her photos could transport those who see them to Francesca's world, immerse in strong melancholy.

In this paper, we will analyze some photographs taken by Francesca, in order to identify different significant ways found in her work. So that, we will explore representation levels by visual matrix analogy which are worked in the work *Matrizes de Linguagem e Pensamento*, by Lucia Santaella: Imitative Representation, Figured Representation and Ideational Representation.

Imitative Representation makes conventionality imperceptible, like music sheets – where musical note symbols represent the note itself for those who can read it. Figured Representation is identified when representation conventions are through denotative figures, such as, pictograms – figures represent visible objects or actions. Finally, Ideational Representation represents abstracts ideas or concepts, through idea diagram indications.

Additionally, this research focuses on analyzing cultural conventions of the time Francesca Woodman lived – lifestyle of the society, how women were seen, the influence of arts in that society, if there was some work similar to that girl's, which elements made her daily life – in order to understand the meaning of all elements found in her photographs and understand existing connection between sign and object mentioned.

The objective shall be exploring the meanings found behind symbols forming her photos (since solid objects until the body of models).

Interpreting a “simple” photo can show us that it is not so simple. Behind its propositional function, there can be a big narrative structure, with a big symbolic dimension.

In 2010, C. Scott Willis made a documentary about Woodman family until the death of Francesca.

I think that my major surprise was to be able to read her diaries and notebooks and see her works on video. I found that her work is much more fundamental than it seems to be and that there is much to do with the celebration of life and not much with the lack, as it is shown. As her brother says on the documentary, I think the art was a religion to her and to her family. And who knows if the problem had its origin here” (WILLIS, 2010).¹

A great part has not been properly explored. Thus, through this article, we focus on obtaining more explanation about her work to better understand one of the most admired photographers in the present.

2. Cultural Conventions at That Time

The 60's was not only marked by excitement and political conflicts, but also by the great artistic development. It was the time for changes.

The emergence of counterculture influenced by social movements was a great milestone for the youth at that time. Based on criticisms to the authorities' values and middle class' lifestyle, many people adopted alternate styles and ideas. Hippies created one of the most famous styles – simple clothes, long hair, drugs, free life, sex and music.

Young people started to live in a more simple and informal way. Liberal attitudes concerning drugs and sexuality were a huge revolution for that time.

This big cultural change was assimilated by all arts. For example, in popular music, protests against political matter at that time were very common. A big struggle for civil rights of population, through songs full of hidden meanings that confused and faced the government.

Francesca Woodman was born among all these facts and excitement. A young lady who was never interested in politics and had a particular lifestyle and a different way to see the world.

It is not possible to say that these disturbances happened in the United States influenced her work. However, we cannot deny that Francesca also made history, as well as other young people of that time.

¹ Available on the website: <http://imagineimedentrodeti.com/paixoes/francesca-woodman/>

3. Francesca Woodman – Life & Work

Francesca Woodman was born in 1958 in the United States. Her father was a painter, her mother was ceramist and her brother was a moviemaker that was she grew up in the middle of the arts. At 13, her parents gave her a camera, but they did not know it would change her life and the way she looked at the world from then on.

Francesca started to photograph the world around her in black and white. She started to find alone the camera tools, as well as lighting to be used in her photos. She soon noticed that photograph was her great passion.

At 17, Francesca went to Rhode Island School of Design, where she started her big project: Photographing her life. But unlike many other photographers, this girl showed a unique style in her work. Exploring elements, such as Naturalism of female shapes (using nudity), Surrealism, phantasmagoric touches, Symbolism, Barocco and Futurism were constant part in her work.

In order to create her sceneries, the girl used elements of nature, such as leaves, flowers and branches, as well as local buildings of where she lived (houses and walls). From these elements, Francesca photographed scenes that were reference to her own existence. Even using some colleagues as models, the history created in photographs was based on her own.

Always with a melancholy and sadness touch, she used a lot of hide-and-seek – she hides the body behind wallpapers, plastic bags, piece of glass and on the floor – to show the big contrast between her fragile body and hardness of solid objects. Such elements helped to form a complex set of symbolic density, her work.

Her photos can transport those who see to Francesca's world. Since her birth, her teenager findings of sexuality, difficult passage to adult life until her premature death.

Francesca creates a parallel universe for herself. She lived her job and her job lived her strongly intense, so that her destiny was established. At 22 years old, her photos showed phantasmagoric elements, symbolizing the passage of her life to the moment of her death. As her work used to reflect her reality, her life also came to an end.

Few days before her father takes part of a big exhibition of his work, Francesca finished her work and her life, when she threw herself from the window in 1981. Her face was disfigured, like the faces in her last photos.

The young photographer only became famous after her death, when her work was exhibited at Wellesley College. Today, Francesca is one of the most distinguished photographers in the world, due to her originality and intensity.

4. Language and Thinking Matrix

According to Lúcia Santaella, Language and Thinking Matrix explain the origin of existing languages. These are formed from three main matrixes, based on human perception. They are: Sound, visual and verbal matrix.

Representative or symbolic forms,

are those that reproduce the appearance of visible things, and this appearance is used only as a mean to represent something that is not visibly accessible and, as a general rule, has an abstract and general character” (Santaella, 2001, page 246).

“*Representamen*” plays its role with no need of similarity and analogy to the subject mentioned. Normally, this relation happens through an association of ideas – so that symbol can be

interpreted, such as referring to that object. Thus, it becomes a *legi-signo*, working through a replica.

4.1. Classification of symbols

The meaning of symbols can only be interpreted through cultural convention codes. And, then, it is required to recognize these cultural codes to identify the symbols for its figurative representation. An example to be mentioned is the cross that is a Christian symbol.

Representative visual forms show something of the visible world (thirdness) and, from here, branches are created for secondness (denotative and referential) and firstness (iconic, mimetic). However, Santaella (2001) says that it is only possible because there is certain similarity between this form and that she means.

Representative forms work as symbols and refer to the object that mean due to a rule or habit or convention working to make these forms to be interpreted, such as referring to that object (Santaella, 2001, p.248).

Interpreting an image can show very complex meanings. They can tell us great histories from their symbolic elements. And they can be deciphered from specific representation forms: Analogy, imitative, figured and Ideational.

5. Representation Forms

5.1. Representation by analogy

Representation by analogy is the first modality of representative forms. It happens through conventional symbolic forms that maintain similarity relations to what they represent. In turn, these forms are structured according to general laws and cultural conventions.

Thus, cultural conventions are necessary for understanding. But their symbols present similarity between sign and object mentioned. For example, the representation of a king, when placed in the middle of the figure and bigger than his vassals, shows his power and his central social position. There is a cultural convention to understand, such as size and position (similarity between sign and object).

In this representation by analogy, there are three other types of representation that will be analyzed as follow:

5.1.2. Imitative Representation

This representation is done through mimetic prominence. Visual form is also connected to the object through a system of conventions. But as imitative aspect is strongly present, conventionality is almost imperceptible.

A good example is the music sheets that imitate the direction, the movement, velocity, and form of sound configurations.

5.1.3. Figured Representation

In this case, conventions of representation happen through denotative figures. They can be considered a type of writing, connection between symbol and object as figured.

Pictographs are an example of figured representation, because they are figures representing visible objects or actions that are also part of a system of cultural conventions.

5.1.4. Ideational Representation

Ideational representations represent abstract concepts or ideas. They are formed by more schematic figures (idea diagram indications). For example, Chinese writing, where expression “too hot” is “very hot” is represented by the union of two ideograms of “fire”.

6. Representations Found in Photographs of Francesca Woodman

Analyzing the work left by Francesca Woodman reveals the existence of all representative forms. However, in each photo, some of these representation levels are more outstanding than others.

Examples that will be presented below show an emphasis in some types of representation, even such photographs have all of them.



Image 1

Francesca used many things of hide-and-seek game in her photos. In the case presented above, she hides her body behind the wallpaper creating the environment. The contrast between her body and the paper reveals the fragility she used to establish to herself. The superposition of solid materials on her body creates this effect.

Thus, a representative form is created. That is, additionally to reproduce visible things (the female body and wallpaper); the photograph also represents something abstract.

Here we can see a case of Ideational Representation, where an abstract concept or idea is represented through superposition of simple elements.

The wallpaper now has new functions: Armor and camouflage. Francesca wishes to show a shady atmosphere about her reality in most of her photos. Thus we can conclude that her work becomes an escape of the real world. This escape seems to be so delightful that mix and merge with reality, making impossible to differ one and another. Her work became her own life.



Image 2

Picture taken in the beginning of her project, focusing on portray her life. In this case, the moment of her birth.

The position Francesca takes can be assimilated to the same position of a baby when leaving maternal womb. At the same time, it can also represent the form of her mother's womb.

Also, similarity between the photo and the position of Jesus Christ crucified shall be analyzed. This would give purity to the baby that had just been born, with no contact with earthly "sins".

In this photo presented, we can find two types of representation: Imitative Representation and Ideational Representation.

When analyzing how Francesca imitated the position of a baby, womb and Jesus, the Imitative Representation is identified. She also used positions to remind an idea already found in people's mind, through existing cultural conventions.

Ideational Representation is found through an abstract idea (birth).

Joining these two representation forms enrich the analysis of this photograph. Francesca shows that, when she was born, her life was intended to be full of melancholy, such as symbols presented in the image.



Image 3

In the end of her work and also her life, Francesca's photos had a phantasmagoric atmosphere. Faces were not evident anymore, like in the beginning of her work.

This "stain" touch in the face portrayed before represents the time passage and her untying with life. She was preparing herself to the end.

Interpreting this picture leads to identify *Ideational Representation*. Through the movement game and also the lack of illumination, the moment of arrival of her death is represented. An abstract concept (death, agony) through the composition of simple symbols and gestures.

The idea of death is reported using the figure created with fast movements of her head. So there is no more focus, reflecting the agony Francesca had been facing. She knew her work was coming to an end, as well her life.



Image 4

When discovering her sexuality, Francesca used mirror games under her body, in order to represent her curiosity and findings about her own body. Face is also blurry, that would represent her confusion when facing the subject.

Thus we found an example of *Figured Representation*, when assimilate the mirror to her intimate body parts and also the action to touch and find her.

There is also an *Ideational Representation*, as sexuality is an abstract term that can be represented through a game of objects and position of the model.

This is one of the cases where more than one representation form is made evident and complementary very clearly. This set can communicate the message that Francesca used to create her scenery. They are not required words, only a set of elements positioned and mounted so that meanings are clearer to the eyes of those observing with attention.

And it is exactly the art of gathering such symbols and meaning, making Francesca's work unique and innovative.



Image 5

This photo brings the same idea of the hide-and-seek game about the wallpaper.

Using the combination of solid elements with her body, Francesca explores the fragility she assumes to her.

Tree barks around her arms represent a kind of armor, as if Francesca was not strong enough to live with no protection. At the same time, they also have an idea of camouflage. She would be hiding from the world, a fear to face her own reality, preferring to concentrate only in her photographs. It is a great example where reality mixes with the world created by Francesca, where she was safe and under control. Here we have the *Imitative Representation* (when tree barks have an image of armor) and *Ideational Representation* (barks represent the abstract idea of protection and safety).



Image 6

With this photo, Francesca reinforces the idea that her work reflects her own life, even when using different models.

Naked women represent the transparency that her work wishes to have, when portrayed her feelings and her way to see the world where she lived. It was only Francesca and her life.

It is important to say that we did not find Francesca smiling in her photographs. It also happened in the image presented. It shows that the image she showed to people about herself was not so positive. Once more, the fragility established for her body and her personality was in evidence. Francesca built her self-image in order to show elements found in her work: The phantasmagoric, distressed and melancholic atmosphere.

We found an example of *Imitative Representation*, exactly because women are “imitating” Francesca, when holding her face in their hands, like saying, that they were Francesca Woodman. Literally, they would be “imitating” how the photographer showed herself to the world.

7. Final Considerations

Francesca Woodman knew how to explore different ways of representation in her work. That is why her work became a reference in the history of photograph.

From simple elements, she could create complex meanings. Her work is similar to a story-

book, with no words needed to tell them. In order to find a sense and linearity, you have just to observe the symbolism in her picture.

It is fundamental to notice that more than one representation way is found in a sole picture. Their sceneries are made of a combination of imitative, figured and Ideational representation. Although they are different, these representations bring a common objective to Francesca: Making her feelings and confusions transpire through photographs. In several moments, the young photographer represents her fragility when hiding her body behind solid elements; explores her femininity using elements of nature, such as flowers, proving her passage to teenage years, discovering sexuality – through mirrors placed between her legs, arrival of death, with figures created by the movement of the body, always restless, showing agony because life is coming to an end.

The combination of these different forms of representation, as well as her interpreting, shows how Francesca's work is valuable to the history of photograph. A young girl, born among artists, living in a time of cultural explosion, started a seemingly simple work: show people how her life was. The differential was exactly the way chosen to portray it.

The thin line between work and life was left behind by the young photographer. Her work used to show exactly what she lived.

Always in a melancholic and figure way, it seems that Francesca wanted to show how her life was traced to a tragic end, since the beginning – as she had planned and portrayed her end, like the rest of her work.

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VIRTUAL AND PHYSICAL AESTHETICS OF THE HUMAN BODY–WITH REFERENCE TO THE FASHION DESIGNS OF JEAN-PAUL GAULTIER

Miki Okubo
Université Paris 8, France
mimi.okb@gmail.com

Abstract

In his work, the human body is often both abstracted and concretized. These strong, opposite expressions are present simultaneously. “Abstraction” means human body represented as numerical/digital information while “concretization” means vivid existence in a real, physical sense. Today, the human body seems to be becoming an increasingly informational object. People have very detailed numerical knowledge about the body. In addition, technological developments allow us to construct our body image in a way similar to androids or robots: an ensemble of complicated wire circuits transmit electrical signals to be integrated into a central part like a brain. When it comes to the perception of heat, for example, people can comprehend according to a specific color shown on a thermometer’s screen. Virtual images settle progressively in our mind. “Skin Series”, where Gaultier used three identical models, illustrate clearly this observation. Each piece represents muscle, blood vessels and bones. His illustration shows a kind of simplification to figure these organs and everyone will understand what he represents. However, in spite of their closeness, these organs will never be visually familiar to us. Our awareness is drawn to them only during specific occasions like an accident or an injury. Advanced medical knowledge and detailed anatomical knowledge have given us a typical human body image. In short, a reconstructed body through new technologies is very different from a real body, accompanied with smell, perspiration and weight.

Furthermore, Gaultier is one of the first couturier to appoint atypical/untraditional fashion models. Today, the an unusual body seen on the catwalk no longer causes sensation because

we have become accustomed to this kind of surprise, seeing various models, large, small and different. However, at the time Gaultier first introduced this idea, it caused a scandal amongst the conservative realm of Haut Couture. Certainly, there are many variations on the form of the human body. Gaultier dressed a man of rough structure in his finest feminine dress. He put the finest lace stockings on well-muscled masculine calves.

What I attempt to theorize in my presentation is the modern relationship between virtual image and the true, physical human body in order to understand the reality of contemporary fashion concerning body consciousness and physical perception.

1. Introduction

Jean-Paul Gaultier, born in 1952, French Haute Couture and Pret-a-Porter couturier, never received formal training for his profession. His diverse, innovative, provoking fashion, radically confronts critical issues in conventional Haut Couture. Unfortunately, his works have been misunderstood and incorrectly evaluated partly due to his excessively provocative slogans. The revaluation of his designs and creations concerns his manner of representing the human body which radically influence our body consciousness.

In his work, the human body is often represented as both an abstract object and a concrete figure. These strong, opposite expressions are present simultaneously. The “abstraction” of the human body refers to a stylist’s use of numerical/digital information or virtual images to represent the flesh while its “concretization” refers to a vivid representation of a real, detailed, physical existence. Today, the human body seems to be becoming an increasingly non-subjective object but an “objective” one thanks to very detailed numerical and biological information about the body. Along with this vast knowledge, technological developments allow us to construct images of the human body way similar to those of androids or robots.

Jean-Paul Gaultier is one of the first couturiers to appoint atypical or untraditional fashion models. Today, an unusual body seen on the catwalk no longer causes sensation because we have become accustomed to this kind of surprise, seeing various models, large, small and different. However, at the time Gaultier first introduced this idea, it caused a scandal amongst the conservative realm of Haut Couture.

In my presentation, I attempt to decode the modern relationship between virtual image and the true, physical human body in order to understand the reality of contemporary fashion concerning body consciousness and physical perception.

2. Who is Jean Paul Gaultier?

Jean Paul Gaultier was the creative director of Hermès from 2004-2010. Born in a modest family in a suburb of Paris, he lived with his parents and grandmother who gave him an initiation into couture during his childhood. Through his grandmother, he discovered the corset and was inspired to create the famous design: “cone-shaped bra” (**Figure 1.**). In 1971, he started working as an assistant of Pierre Cardin who was deeply impressed by his sketches. He presented his first individual collection in 1976 (aged 24), and another one in 1981. His revolutionary success impacted fashion. Since then, he has been known as the “enfant terrible”¹ of not only French Fashion but also in international fashion context. Jean-Paul Gaultier collections are inspired by street wear, popular culture, striptease, sadomasochism, etc., deviating completely from the formality or normality of conventional Haute Couture’s, thus, celebrating the outsider.

¹ The surname “terrible child” is due to his “different” professional career, whereby he passed through many traditional *maisons*, with a radical attitude and an ignorance of Haute Couture world’s conventions. He turned fashion creation upside down, surprising his clientele.

Beyond the apparent eccentricity of his creations, there are other, more interesting characteristics notable in his style: an original portrayal of the beauty of human body. Liberated from standards, far from convention, he plays with it, jokingly, sometimes even transforming human body into something absurd, not sophisticated, ridiculous, nonsensical, unstylish even bad-looking!

Traditionally, fashion has been an ardent pursuit of the absolute ideal human body. The infinite study and insistent effort to achieve this ideal is called “fashion”. From this point of view, Jean-Paul Gaultier’s creation is contrary to all norms in traditional fashion. This deviation holds great meaning, his artistic expression opened a door toward possible new representations that liberate the human body from all kinds of existing stereotypes.

3. “Cone Bra”: Abstraction of the human body

In Jean-Paul Gaultier’s creations, the designer radically transforms the body into a completely unrealistic form. One of the most famous examples is the cone-shaped bra. This costume was beloved by Madonna (**Figure 2.**). She appeared in a cone-shaped bra during her “Blond Ambition Tour”² in 1990. The unrealistic form resembles an android robot, far from being “sexy” in the usual way. Madonna in this nude pink corset, accentuating feminine body parts, was absolutely provocateur for spectators, triggering fashion’s most legendary moments. This corset with a cone-shaped bra was first presented in Jean Paul Gaultier’s Autumn/Winter collection in 1984.

Gaultier is known for being one of the first designers to appoint plus-sized models or untraditional models on his catwalk. Beth Ditto³, American singer-songwriter, author-interpreter, well known for her activities with the indie rock band Gossip, was appointed as fashion model for the Jean Paul Gaultier collection Spring/Summer 2011. The presence of Beth Ditto in the show was definitely a standout moment. She appeared on the catwalk wearing a black mid-length dress, the breasts covered with delicate pink lace and small flowers, shaped like the cone-shaped bra corset. Her performance surprised conservative amateurs of fashion, opening up a new road toward more creative rendering of the human body. The appointment of Beth Ditto was significant not only for showing the designer’s favour for “plus-sized” or “untraditional” models but also displaying his open-minded attitude toward LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender, and feminist, too. (**Figure 3.**)

Eve Salvail, Quebecois, born in 1973, was also appointed by Gaultier as his model. Several years after abandoning modeling, Gaultier ushered her back into the European fashion world in 1992. He shaved her head and tattooed a Chinese dragon on it. Salvail reappeared on the catwalk in a heavenly corseted temple dress fastened tightly her torso, using the opportunity to come out as a lesbian. The public was shocked.

What is the purpose of appointing “atypical” mannequins such as Beth Ditto, Eve Salvail or even male models in women’s fashion shows, adorning them in dresses and other traditional feminine garments? Why did he dress such diverse models in the same *cone-shaped bra* corset? We can understand his decision to dress various bodies in the same costume as a kind of homogenization of body image despite the undeniable diversity in real human body shapes. Each different body can be prepared as uniform and homogeneous ones. Jean-Paul Gaultier’s purpose was to focus on representing strikingly diverse bodies with one “universal” body image using the human body as a “media”.

² “Blond Ambition” is a tour carried out by Madonna in 1990. During this acclaimed four month tour, Madonna gave fifty-seven concerts in twenty-seven cities all over the world.

³ Beth Ditto, born in 1981, is an American singer and song-writer. Feminist and lesbian, Beth Ditto shows her militant attitude for contesting social conventions, and for the freedom of sexuality, especially for homosexuality.

4. Living fashion mannequins: Concretization of the human body – Scenography of the Jean-Paul Gaultier exhibition at the Barbican Art Gallery, London (2014)

At the Barbican Art Gallery in London this year, an exhibition titled “The fashion world of Jean Paul Gaultier from the sidewalk to the catwalk”⁴ featured 32 mannequins coming to life with interactive faces created by high-definition audio-visual projections. Featured among these 32 “living” mannequins, are the voices and faces of Eve Salvail (model), Melissa Auf der Maur (bass player) and Gaultier himself. These collaborators lent their faces and voices (speech and song) for this innovative scenography project. (Figure 4.) Rambling through the exhibition to survey presented works, visitors’ attention was overcome by the mannequins’ “living” faces, brought to life by fixed video-projectors; especially that of Gaultier himself, which engaged on-lookers with his personal commentary on the exhibition. When the visitors walked through the exhibition space, the scenography gave a strange impression. Compared with exhibitions where artists show their works on certain “immobile” or “fixed” supports, these “living” mannequins can in effect become an obstacle because they strongly attract visitors’ attention, sometimes enough so that they pay much less attention to the designs on display. According to the designer’s statement, he did not want to use neutral, identical, “immobile” supports to show his works. Rather, he hoped to stage his creations in a living context; as if real human bodies were wearing them.

In my opinion, the significance of this scenography characterized by spatial and video-projector usage for audio-visual effect is, first, the “differentiation” or “detachment” (Brecht’s *distanciation*) of “identical” fashion mannequins’ bodies. Jean-Paul Gaultier also provoked the stereotypical fashion models body image: thin, sophisticated and homogeneously standardized. Fashion models, walking on catwalk, have a standardized look and perfect body-line. His intention of projecting real faces on identical fashion mannequin heads means, secondly, his challenge. Throughout this scenography, Jean-Paul Gaultier demonstrated that we can make up a neutral, prototypical body without specific features to appear different, original, unique.

In the first argument concerning the costume *cone-shaped bra corset*, Jean-Paul Gaultier showed a kind of “homogenization” of body image beyond the diversity of human body shape. The second argument about a scenography with “living mannequins” concerns the “differentiation” of fashion mannequins’ identical bodies in order to concretize and *distanciate* as if each individual owns a different body. Now, we observe the third point of view, referring to Gaultier’s two creations about human body representation and body consciousness.

5. “Skin series” and “Nude dress”: Virtualization of the human body – Flesh wearing flesh, the body wearing bodies: body tights⁵

5.1. “Skin series” (Figure 5.)

Three, tight, separate printed costumes represent muscle, blood vessels and the skeleton. The costume representing muscle is coloured by realistic shades of red and orange flesh, while those of blood vessels and heart (coloured red) and bones (coloured black and white) are illustrated in a pop-art manner. Using the pop-art manner, each tight costume shows a different layer of human body. His representation of the inside of our body stirs up typical virtual/digital images we meet constantly in our daily life. These images can be seen in anatomical illustration books, at medical examinations, or on computer screens such as in tridimensional animations and games. These printed tights emulate body and tattoo arts from all over the world. This garment allows us to wear a kind of second skin on our real skin. What was Gaultier’s real intent in representing several diverse inner layers of the body as a second skin?

⁴ This retrospective exhibition took place from April 9 to August 25 in 2014, in the Barbican Art Gallery of London.

⁵ Body tight is a tight covering entirely the body.

These tights turn our bodies inside-out, exposing muscle, blood vessels and skeleton. These costumes may be considered as a kind of transparent cloth exposing what is inside. However, I would like to regard the effect as “turning inside-out”. Kiyokazu Washida⁶, Japanese philosopher, gave an interesting explanation about the effect of the cloth turning inside-out, referring to Yohji Yamamoto⁷’s cloth design in the 1990s. Kiyokazu Washida theorized on the meaning of wearing cloth that “turns inside-out” in terms of our body consciousness from the point of phenomenological view. The clothes created by Yohji Yamamoto in the 1990s, usually black, provoking stereotypical beauty norms in fashion, carved his way in deviating from the main stream of fashion kingdom. Certain jackets and pullovers were turned inside-out, exposing any sewing traces which generally are well-hidden. Concerning the act of wearing clothes, Washida explained that the inner side of cloth directly contacts our body/skin while the outer side works as protector against the outside world. According to him, turning our clothes inside-out means exposing our corporal “intimacy” toward the “exterior” society. The role of cloth is therefore overturned. However, in my opinion, Gaultier’s design goes beyond this case. These tights expose human’s muscle, blood vessels and skeleton, which are clearly much more intimate than skin because they are located in the internal body. But, this intimacy is a just a “mask”. The muscle, blood vessels and skeleton are painted, numerically designed and printed on the material. What we see on them is a kind of “general” organ image or the interior image of human body. Wearing these tights, in reality, doesn’t mean the exhibition of our own interior, nor our intimacy, but allows us to put on a “general” model of the inside of human body. Their images are virtual and can potentially belong to anyone, all human beings.

5.2. “Nude dress”⁸ (Figure 6. & 7.)

Look at another creation of Jean-Paul Gaultier, that is, the nude dress that could go as far as making us feel ashamed when we imagine ourselves in it. It is a series of tight-fitting dresses, with illustrations of nipples, omphalos and pubic hairs on their surface. Human beings, as highly civilized animals, dress themselves for the purpose of covering the intimate parts of our body. Showing in public once again these hidden intimate parts should cause sensational confusion. However, Gaultier could respond to the ordinary public’s reaction by saying that the intimacy here is virtual, not real, and that his costumes are a representation of visualized body image as well as a humorous illusion... That is why “Nude dress” plays an important role in the consideration about the relationship between the act of wearing and body image.

Here, we can apply the same way of thinking as previously in the “Skin series”. In short, these “Nude dress” are prepared as a kind of a suit of armor, which makes your own body invisible by covering completely with a “ready-made nude”. The nude exposed in public doesn’t belong to anyone. Those who wear this costume do not have to feel ashamed because it does not show their body, nipples, omphalos or pubic hairs. This means a representation of a “typical” nude, not a particular one but “universal” one.

6. Conclusion: escape from the self or self-representation of “inter-subjectivity”

Practicing fashion or costume wearing is a way of self-representation via our own body. For carrying out this self-representation (fashion), we have to be responsible for our own body; we

⁶ Kiyokazu Washida, Japanese philosopher and phenomenologist, is author of many books concerning philosophical analysis of the vestment and the act of wearing clothes.

⁷ Yoji Yamamoto, Japanese fashion designer, is famous for his creations of the street fashion style, especially by the usage of black. He created many vestments “too large and too long”, “damaged” or “inside-out”.

⁸ Nude dresses are garments which are designed as if the person wearing them were nude. These dresses show nipples, omphalos and even pubic hairs on their surface.

have to care for it, maintain its good condition, exercise it, etc. All we have to do, from head to toe, can be exhausting.

Jean Paul Gaultier proposes an alternative point of view for fashion as a self-representation via the human body. Wearing a costume featuring many different layers of the internal body, in the inside-out manner (observed in the tight costume “Skin series”), or enveloping the body with the painted “Nude dress” (which plays a role of armor to protect our real existence against the society), nullifying the variety of body shapes by shoving them into the same corset (observed in “corn-shaped-bra” costume) or revealing a fact about human body’s homogeneity and its potential for transformation by projecting images on identical fashion mannequins’ heads, does Jean-Paul Gaultier reveal the true meaning behind his innovative fashion creations ?

Everything Gaultier did throughout these trials is a kind of sublimation of the body image as a universal object.

Wearing garment as a way of self-representation is based on our individual body as media. The art of Gaultier offers us an alternative way to enjoy ourselves in fashion. Individuals can obtain metaphysical and universal images of human body. The designer may say that the media (human body) does not have such an importance but it can easily be turned out, modified, deformed, made invisible or visible and even nullified, thanks to the art of fashion.

Paradoxically, Gaultier’s fashion creations are not self-representations but representation of inter-subjectivity. Playing with the possible appearance of human body, the designer constructs the “universal” image, which confronts stereotypical and shared understandings. After consideration, the act of wearing clothes, that is, the practice of fashion, is free from all restrictions and negative judgements of the body (“ugly”, “unsophisticated”, “ungraceful”), but fashion becomes an activity permitting a liberated body consciousness in order to sublimate the individual body image as a “universal” one.

We know that some of Jean-Paul Gaultier’s creations are radical and that his costumes do not seem like realistic clothes for the majority of fashion amateurs. Why did he create these absurd garments? For what purpose did he intend them? The act of expression carried out by a fashion designer is in a dilemma. Although the creation of a designer is considered his own artistic expression, when he presents his works, it is not through his own body that the designer carries out his exhibition, but through the medium of fashion mannequins’ bodies. The self-representation in Jean-Paul Gaultier’s creations is “distanciated” and “differentiated”, transforming into a kind of sharable expression for those who appreciate them. They benefit from the simple joy of wearing the designs thanks to a universalized body-image, free from self-consciousness.

Illustrations:



Fig. 1: Shirred velvet strapless dress with cone-shaped bra cups, Women's prêt-à-porter autumn/winter 1984-85.



Fig. 2: Madonna's cone-shaped bra.



Fig. 3: Beth Ditto's costume.



Fig. 4: Exhibition's Scenography, London, 2014.



Fig. 5: Skin series.




Fig. 6: Naomi Campbell in front of the Cabaret Michon, Rue des Martyrs, Women's prêt-à-porter spring/summer 1993.



Fig. 7: Nude dress.

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TRANSMEDIATION AND SCHIZOPHRENIA: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSAL

Rodrigo Antunes Morais
Faculdade Cásper Líbero,
Centro Universitário Belas Artes de São Paulo, Brazil
digo.morais@gmail.com

Antonio Roberto Chiachiri Filho
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brazil
prof.arcf@uol.com.br

Abstract

Transmediation in technological environments enables a semiotic equivalence in the translation process of languages in the technological aesthetic territory, thus demonstrating that the digital immediate object may be equivalent to the immediate object transmediated by advents derived by the convergence of telecommunications. So, digital advents for interactivity of gestural control (gestural interfaces) are becoming increasingly more accessible to different audiences, for example, kinetic simulators for the development of environments that assist robotics and its advances in biotechnology. For these reasons, many technologies called “touchless screen”, as kinect or leap motion, demonstrate the possibility of interactive immersion in three-dimensional environments that reveal the opportunity to understand a representative user immersion in technological environments. This demonstrates the possibility of using these technologies in the treatment of schizophrenic people, because the possibility of creating an ubiquitous universe comprising an aesthetic of simulated environments from the intensification of subjective volatility of personality can help psychiatrists in the development of avatars derived from hallucinations of certain patients to assist in their treatment. This paper aims to show that there is a possibility to create visual avatars from hallucinated data based on a repertoire once auditory hallucinated by a patient. This process enables the interactivity of psychiatrists with their patients so that they can become possible the contact with the hallucinated narrative, demonstrating the quest for understanding the equivalence between immediate objects that are transmediated inside and outside the visual environment, highlighting places of experience from symbols

representing something that is not visibly accessible. This study will have base in the avatar therapy by Langlois, which is engaged in treatment via virtual world using avatars, and in the matrices of language a thought by Lucia Santaella for demonstrating sound and visual matrices in contiguity through representation by analogy.

This present paper makes an explanation about a phenomenological proposal for the study of transmediation and schizophrenia. It is divided into three parts. In the beginning it will be explored the main characteristics of schizophrenia, regarding the concepts of dynamic object, immediate object, percept and percipuum. In the second part it will be presented the avatar therapy developed by Julian Leff and its main features, what takes to the last part: a new proposal for the evolution of avatar therapy.

1. Characteristics of schizophrenia

To start it is necessary to explore the main features of schizophrenia that will form the basis for the proposal to be made in this paper.

Currently, for psychiatry, schizophrenia is regarded among the most serious diseases of the mind and can be characterized as a group of pathologies that denote changes in thinking through hallucination. Thus it is reasonable to understand that this analysis of schizophrenia raises the possibility of an understanding that initiates a strand of study that opens the doors to research the thought and language derived from hallucinatory events, i.e., it is taken for basis schizophrenic hallucinations, which in turn are taken here as a real perception of an object that has no external stimulus; it is still possible to say that the hallucinated object is real for the person who is passing through a period of hallucination.

To deepen the notions of this main feature of schizophrenia and to make possible to continue the understanding about perception and cognition in schizophrenic logic we have the words of Oliver Sacks:

When the word “hallucination” first came into use, in the early sixteenth century, it denoted only “a wandering mind”. It was not until the 1830s that Jean-Étienne Esquirol, a French psychiatrist, gave the term its present meaning – prior to that, what we now call hallucination were referred to simply as “apparitions.” Precise definitions of the word “hallucination” still vary considerably, chiefly because it is not always easy to discern where the boundary lies between hallucination, misperception, and illusion. But generally, hallucinations are defined as percepts arising in the absence of any external reality – seeing things or hearing things that are not there (2012:Introduction 1 – 3).

At this moment it is possible to understand that a hallucinated event participates in the repertoire of the hallucinating person, i.e., sciences that comprehend the structure and functioning of the human mind can show that schizophrenics bases language and thought from a repertoire that is not always given from external stimuli.

With this overview it is evident the tendency that studies about hallucinated events has in only consider the biological and medical scope, they do not notice that the characteristics of philosophy and communication – as well as a variety of other sciences – can help in the comprehension of hallucinated realities. Thus, it easy to find a necessity to approach perception and cognition through the “counterarguments to the theories that have to appeal to ‘sense-data’ for explaining the perception.” (SANTAELLA, 2012a:90)

Starting this contextualization it must be considered that all the analysis on sensory stimuli and sense-data performed until here has a much larger amplitude in Peircean theory; which qualify everything perceived as a percept.

In a 1970 article, R. F. Almender tried to demonstrate the consistence about Peircean theory of perception. He argued that this theory is sustained in a metaphysical realist stance theory and so it is epistemologically coherent. Peirce affirmed, without hesitation, that all we perceive is a percept. What is out of us and arrives to us, what is arrested in a perception act, is called percept. (SANTAELLA, 2012b:89)

Accordingly, it is possible to observe the percept as everything that forces itself to the recognition without using support, in other words, it is the object of perception. Santaella still presents an ambiguity found in Peircean theory about the exploration of the percept:

In one hand, [...] percepts are not presented with a mental nature. They are not mental constructions. Instead of it they are compulsive initiators of thought, insistent and demanding, uncontrollable and precognitive. In the other hand there are some moments that Peirce gives to the percept a mental character. (2012b:92)

Santaella demonstrated that there are moments in which Peirce places the percept independently; not tied to any interpretative mind. But, in other moments, there are reports in which Peirce elects the percept to a mental product, as can be seen below:

Notwithstanding its apparent primitiveness, every percept is the product of mental processes or, anyhow, of processes that are mental for every intensive purpose. (PEIRCE *apud* SANTAELLA, 2012b:92)

It can be seen that there is a moment in which the percept is taken as a product of cognition. For this situation Santaella present a solution elaborated by Richard Bernstein in which he says that Peirce solved this ambiguity about the two meanings for the percept when he created a third term, the *percipuum*. So, the percept remains independent and external to mind, while the *percipuum* is in the perception judgment, i.e., the percept can be understood as any stimulus that still did not have contact with any sensory receptor, while the *percipuum* is the percept at the metaphysics moment when it is processed by an organism.

Considering the hallucinations it is possible to conceive that the analytical differentiation is not related only to the percept, but also to the *percipuum*. This indicates that the percept, even if it was not propagated by external stimuli, is the same in a mere psychological evaluation about sense-data, both for hallucinating people and for any other person who has not any mental disorder. Thus, the beginning of hallucination happens in the fast moment when the sensory interpretation starts, i.e., in the transitory fugacity from the percept to the *percipuum*.

Therefore, when the perceptual irregularity embody in the mind of a hallucinating person – already in the cognition – it is accentuated an interpretative duality, because the object that

propagated the stimulus is not real; while the percept insists in its reality. This is what makes the cognition of this person not apprehend this judgment of perception as something wrong. In example, Peirce says:

... judgment of perception only can refer to a simple percept that will never exist again; and if I judge that it seemed to be red, when, in fact, it did not seem red, it must at least to be recognized that it seemed to be red. (PEIRCE *apud* SANTAELLA, 2012b:108)

This explanation demonstrates the emergence of subjective thinking and the need to study the importance of the signification given to these percepts in the mind of schizophrenics; what is constantly discussed in the avatar therapy currently worked by Julian Leff.

2. Avatar therapy

Avatar therapy is a kind of therapy developed by Julian Leff, Emeritus Professor in UCL Mental Health Sciences, that tries to create an avatar of the voice hallucinated to make possible people with schizophrenia control what they hear. This three-dimensional computerized system allows a kind of new therapy that is not based on pharmaceutical treatments and its objective is to reduce the frequency and severity of episodes of hallucination.

The first step is to help the patient to create the three-dimensional computerized avatar of the voice heard, i.e., the patient is instructed to create a face of the entity heard translating a sound matrix into a visual matrix. When this face is created the computerized system synchronises the avatar's lips with therapist speech, so the therapist situated far from the patient can speak through the avatar in real time. Thus, the therapist can pretend to be the voice heard by the patient and stimulates the patient to resist or even fight the voice making possible the patient starting to control the hallucinations.

Julian Leff says:

Even though patients interact with the avatar as though it was a real person, because they have created it, they know that it cannot harm them, as opposed to the voices, which often threaten to kill or harm them and their family. As a result the therapy helps patients gain the confidence and courage to confront the avatar, and their persecutor.

This makes it possible to think about a new proposal for the evolution of the avatar therapy.

3. A new proposal for the evolution of avatar therapy

According to Julian Leff the avatar therapy do not achieves higher results because the avatars have no longer realistic features. It is what hinders the spatiotemporal reality immersion of the schizophrenic.

Therefore, it is possible to start a strand of study which understand that the transmediation in technological environments enables a semiotic equivalence in the translation process of languages in the technological aesthetic territory, thus demonstrating that the digital immediate object may be equivalent to the immediate object transmediated by adverts derived by the convergence of telecommunications. So, digital adverts for interactivity of gestural control (gestural interfaces) are becoming increasingly more accessible to different audiences, for example, kinetic

simulators for the development of environments that assist robotics and its advances in biotechnology. For these reasons, many technologies called “touchless screen”, as kinect or leap motion, demonstrate the possibility of interactive immersion in three-dimensional environments that reveal the opportunity to understand a representative user immersion in technological environments. This demonstrates the possibility of using these technologies in the treatment of schizophrenic people, because the possibility of creating an ubiquitous universe comprising an aesthetic of simulated environments from the intensification of subjective volatility of personality can help psychiatrists in the development of avatars with more realistic features.

Allied to this technological environment, to create an avatar it must also take into consideration its graphic construction. So this process enables the creation of visual avatars for hallucinated data that formerly were part of an only auditory hallucination. This process enables the interactivity of psychiatrists with their patients so that they can become possible the contact with the hallucinated narrative, demonstrating the quest for understanding the equivalence between immediate objects that are transmediated inside and outside the visual environment, highlighting places of experience from symbols representing something that is not visibly accessible.

This contiguity between sound matrix and visual matrix can be understood through the theory of representation by analogy made by Santaella:

These symbolic forms in Peirce’s sense means conventional but they are at the same time motivated by maintaining ties of resemblance to what they represent. Although these forms are structured in a system and represent their objects by general laws, established by habits or convention, there is however, between both (sign and object), a relation by analogy that is characterized by a certain content of apparent or diagrammatic similarity. (2005:248-249).

These forms, a Third in the Peircean theory, bring the possibility to represent more faithfully the hallucinated voices of schizophrenics, demonstrating a spatiotemporal immersion that can more effectively create a reality from advents that enable the interaction with technological environments. Such reality for Peirce is not independent of the previously hallucinated thought:

Peirce’s “reality” is not “independent of thought”, just like Scotus’s *realitas* is an *ens rationis*, or mental entity, in the sense that we make the distinction in our mind (but still has a basis in the existent thing). Reality for Scotus has a basis in the existent thing, a Second. Peirce takes Scotus’s notion of reality, frees it from the “idle” and complicated distinctions which burden it (like non-adequate identities and such), and recycles it, after adding the notions of the scientific method and synechism, defining it as the object of final opinion. As a result, the basis for the notion of reality for Peirce is a Third. (MAYORGA, 2007:153)

The proposal presented here shows that the junction of applied sciences with theoretical sciences is accentuated for the infinite and necessary contiguity for any use in research. What is evident, then, is the need of applied sciences such as psychiatry and neuroscience seek sources in theoretical sciences. Thus showing the possibility of working with Peirce’s semiotic in studies that previously were taken into the walls of the biological area.

The aim here were to show the possibility of joining the study of matrices of language and though with studies of technology environments for the evolution of the treatment of schizophrenia, leading patients to have the freedom to insert themselves into a harmonious spatiotemporal hyper-reality without assumptions on individual characteristics; made in an universal consciousness original content.

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TIME: THEME AND CONTENT IN A VIDEO ART WORK

Edson Pfitzenreuter
Unicamp – University of Campinas – Brazil
(<http://www.unicamp.br/unicamp/?language=en>)

Roberto Chiachiri
Função Casper Líbero – Brazil
(<http://casperlibero.edu.br/>)

Abstract

Denbigh, in his book *Three concepts of time*, asserted that time is a topic that perplexes. The tendency of understanding time as something existing, something that is ‘out there’ is one of the factors that provokes this. He continues his argument stating that time is an abstract entity, a necessary construction to cope with the changes involving existents. This statement is the starting point for diving in the meaning of a video. For this analysis it is necessary discussing image and its form of relationship with time, emphasizing how long the materiality that constitutes the image stands.

Memory has been considered concomitant to our sense of personal identity for a long time. It is the medium throughout the record of our past memories survives within us besides the ego awareness’ basis.

Whitrow (2005)

1. Introduction

Santaella and Nöth (2001: 193) classifies images, inserting them in the visual matrix, putting the images in the universe of indices, but they say that “it does not mean this language is unable to achieve the purest levels of iconicity.” This statement allows to accommodate the notion that a picture in general is an icon and as such it represents by similarity between objects and signs visual qualities. These qualities can only be compared with other qualities. We intend to enrich the reception of the analyzing video comparing its visual qualities with different images.

The challenge here is to think about image and time. For doing this, we started our reflections, about a video made by the Brazilian artist Felipe Barros. We used a synchronous approach, taking images of different places and epochs comparing the similarities which may exist, emphasizing the visual qualities, in order to highlight some aspects of the relationship between time and image.

2. Time

Discussing some image and time aspects, the first concept we have to elucidate is the time itself. Task already considered difficult by St. Augustine, in his Confessions when in BOOK XI, he says: “What, then, is the time? What, then, is time? If no one ask me, I know; if I want to explain him, who asks, I know not”.

Whitrow (2005) discusses the time quoting several scholars who have dedicated to this topic: Jean-Marie Guyau in the second half of the nineteenth century said that time is not an earlier condition, as a Kantian intuition, but a result of our experience of the world. Whitrow also quotes Robert Hooke, who in the seventeenth century, wondered about the existence of a sense that would give information about time, concluding that none of our senses are capable of it, but memory has to do with this.

To Denbigh (1981: 3) one of the difficulty causes of dealing with time concept is the fact that it is taken as a real thing, when in fact it is not. He is clear at this point: “Time is not ‘out there’ as a substantial thing like a flow river; it is rather an abstract entity, a construction. The things which are ‘out there’, on which the construction of time is based, are the material objects and their events and processes”. The time concept would have been created, as Denbigh declares, accounting for the changes and events:

... the clouds are moving and changing their shapes; plants are growing and withering; the positions of the heavenly bodies are slowly shifting; and men themselves progress inevitably from birth to death. The great value of the time concept is that it provides a systematization; all such events and processes of change can be treated as elements within a unique serial order.

For example: I looked the apple yesterday and it was green; I look today and it is ripe. We have here two perceptions that could refer to two objects, but several factors, like the fact that they were at the same place, suggest that there was the same apple; in this case, I only can understand that it is the same fruit if I include the idea that there is a change, which must have occurred in the period between yesterday and today. In other words, it is necessary the time concept. This necessity is also emphasized by Peirce (CP 6.416):

That time is not directly perceived is evident, since no lapse of time is present, and we only perceive what is present. That, not having the idea of time, we should never be able to perceive the flow in our sensations without some particular aptitude for, it will probably also be admitted.

The statement that time is a mental construction can be translated into Peirce’s terms as time is a semiotic construction because there is no thinking without signs. It is well known the ar-

gument with which Peirce answers negatively to the question: “Whether we can think without signs”, in the article “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”.

Time, therefore, is the result of a semiotic process in which events and changes are perceived and articulated. This process allows a mental organization in which different perceived things are understood as different moments of a temporal process. Taking the example given above, the ripening process of the apple is a possible interpretation of the perception of two apples; in this case, the ripening stage of each moment I look at the apple is index of the time passage.

Time is a broad subject, including the relation between time and simultaneous events that were important to Einstein theory, as well as theories in many fields of knowledge, but the ideas we have seen here are adequate to develop our reasoning.

3. Image

Time has many implications in different areas, so its comprehension is difficult, but the notion of image is not also easy. A first distinction to be made is shown by Santaella and Nöth (1998: 15) on the two domains of images: “the first is the domain of images as visual representations (...). The second is the immaterial realm of images in our mind.” In this case, we are talking about the first domain, those images that these authors specify as “drawings, paintings, prints, photographs, films, television, holographic and infographic images.”

We are interested in pictures of the first domain and we need to know what possible relations they establish with time, however, classify how this relationship occur is not easy because time is always present in the image in one or another way. About this subject Santaella and Nöth (1998: 75) proposes a division between intrinsic and extrinsic time in the image. The last one can be of three kinds: time of wasting; time of the reference or utterance, and the lack of time. We are interested in the time of wasting defined as how long the image materiality takes to waste.

3.1. Time in images

In another chapter of the same book, Santaella and Nöth (1998: 157) propose “the existence of three paradigms in the image production evolutionary process: the prephotographic paradigm, photographic and post-photographic”. Time in the figurative images will appear differently in each one of these paradigms and the comprehension of this difference provides a path to understand the relationship between time and image.

Dondis’ book (1974) presents a useful proposal when she says about the three levels of the image, which she call abstract, figurative and symbolic. The concept of symbolic level is different from the Peirce’s concept of symbol; besides that we have here some ideas we can articulate with Peirce’s thought creating a methodological procedure to think about images.

When analyzing any image, the ideal situation is that at the first moment, we have to pay attention to the abstract level, the visual qualities such as formal aspects: patches of colors, lines and directions.

As Maurice Denis (apud Chipp 1978: 90) says, “a picture – before being a war horse, a woman or any anecdote – is essentially a flat surface covered with colors given in a particular order.” This is a difficult task because as Dondis says (1974: 74) “Abstraction, visually, is simplification toward a more and more intense and distilled meaning”.

In a second moment we would see the splashes of color representing something by similarity, they can be seen as something like a man, a woman, a dog, etc. but normally we first see a man, a woman or a dog; we automatically tend to see things, animals or persons; as if the representations of these things have nothing to do with the formal elements that allow their existence as visual representations. Is is necessary some visual training to see the abstract level.

Finally, if we have a representation of a man, for example, this man could represent a sort of

idea. This is the symbolic level.

One image useful to exemplify this analysis is the Norman Rockwell painting, *The Gossips*, created for the cover of “*The Saturday Evening Post*,” of March 6 in 1948¹.

In the level of formal qualities, the image shows colors, lines, textures and a kind of structure similar to a grid, the lines and colors can be perceived as representing several people who are probably part of the same community. The characters are presented in pairs where one is looking to the right and another to the left, showing different facial expressions. The painting becomes meaningful when we see the juxtaposition of different images as representing different moments in which one person tells something to another, the next draw of the same person show facial expressions changings, showing surprise or laughter, representing synthetically what happens when a gossip is spread. To understand this, we must build a notion that between one pair of images, and another there is a time interval. A representation of time is implicit in this image.

The work of Dennis Oppenheim, *Reading Position for Second Degree² Burn* is an example of a completely different kind of relationship between time and image. This work, performed in the context of conceptual art, shows two pictures and a text. In the first photo there is a man lay on the sand with a book over his chest, in the second picture he is in the same position but his skin is sunburned except where the book was.

A photographic sign can be understood as icon, index and symbol, as says Dubois (1986: 51). A photograph is icon because its visual qualities denotes its object; it is symbol since “All images are analyzed as interpretation-transformation of real, as an arbitrary creation, cultural, ideological and perceptually codified”. At least photos are mainly indices, which have real connection with the referent, or as Barthes (1984: 14) says: “the photograph always carries its referent.”

These images have visual qualities that allow us to recognize them as two photos taken from the same person at different times. The verbal information reinforce this interpretation of a changing in the object of the sign. As it is written, it took five hours of exposure to the sun for the sunlight marks the skin, but not the space protected by the book.

There are several chains of meanings in this work; among them, the fact that the mark left by sunlight on the artist’s skin is a negative mark. This expression shows the origin of the photography name, in Greek *phōtos* and *graphé*, meaning light mark. It is worthy mentioning that time left its mark on the skin and this is what generates the image and hence the meaning. The two photos record a time that is not a symbolic interpretive construction, but a concrete mark of its passage. We have time on the relation between sun and skin.

We cannot forget that many artists of that time worked with this approach, among many examples we can see the work of Richard Long, *A Line Made by Walking³* (1967) that is a mark left on the grass while he walked over it several times, in Sommerset, England.

There is also another thing which can be seen in these examples; they show the result of changings created by processes occurred in time. The record of these processes could have scientific purposes, as the record of a bacteria culture growing or the slab deformation, but our interest here is the works of art that use the changing brought up as the time passes by. Those works in which the transformations function as the passage of time indices, providing the polysemy that is inherent in art and inviting the viewer to navigate on the multiple meanings.

¹ <http://www.nrm.org/2014/02/norman-rockwell-museum-welcomes-back-norman-rockwells-the-gossips/>

² <http://www.dennis-oppenheim.com/works/148>

³ <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/long-a-line-made-by-walking-p07149>

3.2. Image deterioration

An important point made by Santaella and Nöth (1998: 81) with respect to extrinsic time is degradation; for her, “The most obvious form of extrinsic time appears in the wasting or aging image.”

The photographs are made of materials, they are surfaces coated with photographic emulsion made of silver salts. These materials also go through temporal changes, mainly when they deteriorate. This degradation happens because of environmental conditions, such as humidity, temperature, light, air pollution; all these things affect the chemical composition of the film.

Museums have a controlled environment in order to minimize the deterioration of works of art, since it is not possible to avoid it at all, but the degradation can also appear as constitutive element of image, in works of art that use the deterioration process to generate meanings⁴. Some artists can use deterioration that had already happened in something, appropriating the deteriorated thing itself or some representation of it. This is the case of a photo essay by Andy Goldstein: *La Muerte de la Muerte*⁵.

In 1979, Goldstein made a series of photographs in cemeteries of Buenos Aires from the oval shaped photo-ceramics that are placed on the graves or found on headstones. The pieces of photo-ceramics were damaged and images were almost unrecognizable.

The image loss is inevitable, but the action of the photographer transforms it into language, leading our eyes to the perception of how little is left from the person buried there, his portrait, is also dying. Goldstein's photographs were shot and printed with technical accuracy showing the photographs damaged in the tombs. About this exhibition, Bril says that the photographs show the three deaths:

The first happens, in accordance with Barthes, already in the time to take the picture; it would be the death of the individual being transformed into an object. The second is physical the death and finally come upon the overall death in image effacement and affirmation of oblivion.

4. The Video

Goldstein's work shows photographic image representing other photographic images in the destruction process. This idea leads us to the video that motivated these reflections: made by Felipe Barros, artist from Alagoas, Brazil, who took part in the Djerassi Resident Artists Program, in Palo Alto, California, in 2010. During that period he made several videos related to time in which he produced the decay in the photographic image with chemicals that damaged the photographic support.

From all videos he produced in California, we will analyze one called “98001075056”, which shows a sequence of images being vanished, as shown in Fig. 1. At the end, there is a video in reverse showing an image regenerating.

The video lasts 3:11 minutes and shows the credits, five photos disappearing, and one image appearing. These images appear in the following sequence:

⁴ We can see some recent examples of this in the exhibition *The Stumbling Present: Ruins in Contemporary Art*, that happens at the Art, Design&Architecture Museum at the University of California, Santa Barbara between October 2012 to January 2013.

⁵ <http://andygoldstein.es/lamuertedelamuerte/index.html>

00:01 – Video Title.
 00:07 – Couple 1 (Fig. 2)
 00:36 – Couple 2 (Fig. 3)
 01:12 – Young man (Fig. 4)
 01:41 – Woman (Fig. 5)
 02:19 – Couple 3 (Fig. 6)
 02:50 – Starts appearing Child
 03:04 – Beginning of the fade-out
 03:06 – Child (Fig. 7)
 03:07 – Black screen (End of the fade-out)
 03:09 – Credit of the author
 03:11 – End of the Video

Fig. 1. Vanishing process

The artist says about this process in his Master's' Dissertation. He does not say who are the people, but indicates that they are his family (Barros 2012: 16). The first photograph shows a couple (figure 2); the visual aspects of the photo allows us to interpret it as a very old photo. The act of made this interpretation is one segment in a process where a sign generates an interpretant that is another sign. The interpretation is the generation of a Dynamical Interpretant that is "whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign" (CP 8.315), but it also is the "effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign"

Signs have its material qualities, as Peirce says:

Since a sign is not identical with the thing signified, but differs from the latter in some respects, it must plainly have some characters which belong to it in itself, and have nothing to do with its representative function. These I call the material qualities of the sign. As examples of such qualities, take in the word "man," it's consisting of three letters – in a picture, its being flat and without relief. (CP 5.287)

Putting these definitions together: the material qualities constitute the sign which produces an effect on one mind. So, in the case of picture 2, the photograph's visual characteristics, as the sepia color of the photography and the appearance of the couple, especially their clothes, causes in the viewer's mind the effect that the object of this sign is an old couple.

The next image (figure 3) also shows a couple. The contrast, the position of women and the neckline of her blouse, are elements which allow the interpretation that this photo is newer than the other. This idea will be enhanced in comparison with the other pictures in the sequence.

When we have two images in sequence, we already have possible meanings that emerge from the relationship between them. So, we can think there is some relationship between the two couples, which gets other possibilities when we see the figure 4, which shows a young man.

After these images it is possible to establish an interpretative hypothesis: the imagetic sequence follows a logic which goes from older to newer photographs.

The picture does not assure the relationship among this man and the other people, the picture changes the meaning of the previous ones accordingly to that hypothesis, so it is not totally impossible to think that the previous pictures show the grandparents and the parents of the young

man.

The image that comes after (figure 5) shows a woman, the image itself does not offer much data to establish a temporal sequence between these photos and the others. Probably it is newer than the couples' pictures, but the hypotheses of a continuous temporal sequence changes and it is possible to think that the photographs representing the woman and the man are approximately from the same time.

The possible relationship between these two photos is highlighted because there is only one person, but the established relationship doesn't allow to say they are mother and son, siblings, mates, etc.

The last picture which will be destroyed (figure 6), shows a couple, they seem to be newer than the other two couples and give us impression to be wearing social clothes, indicated by the tie. We know that these pictures represent the same family and there are some similarity between the different faces, none information is provided, so we can only make hypothesis, like as the man and woman in this photo are the same from the previous photos.

At the end there is a reversed video (figure 7), showing the movement of fragments of photographic emulsion with pigment, these pieces start to join one another showing something that resembles a face, but soon starts a fade-out that will make the screen totally black. The pigment begins to show a photography in an orderly manner on the screen when the screen becomes darker, the recorded image begins to appear when a videographic feature begins to hide it. We can still identify a photography different from others because it is colorful. In the clues to the perception that the image gives, we can see a face of a smiling child. Only these last two photos show smiling people.

4.1. The Image deterioration shown on the video

The video is a type of image that falls into the category of intrinsic time, an image that consists of time, and "this constitution depends, on one hand, from the characteristics of the device from which the image is produced and presented" (Santaella and Nöth 1998: 76). The device here is a video camera; as well as the photographic camera that registered the old pictures. There are some features in a video that already existed in a photography, such as the framework, the shooting angle and lens, but I want to highlight that it is an image what is linked to that photographed, its referent, as Barthes (1984: 41) says:

We would say that the Photography always carries its referent, both affected by the same amorous or funereal immobility, at the heart of the motion world: they are glued together, limb by limb, like chained to a corpse in certain tortures doomed; ...

The video image analyzed is also attached to the referent. We have faded color photos from people with clothes that is no longer used, what qualify as old photographs. Even before we see the movement of the video image, time is present in the difference between video time and that one of the photographs, creating a similar situation to that mentioned by Barthes (1984: 142) in a photography showing Lewis Payne sentenced to death in 1865 with the caption "He is dead and will die." He is dead when I see the picture, but he will die when it was taken. In Barros' work the pictures belong to a different time from that of the video record, even if the people who appear in the photos are alive, time when the photo was taken, has passed, died.

The photographs, taken by Andy Goldstein, represent the deterioration of the image material basis; in the case of the video we are talking about, the artist provokes and records this process. He says (Barros 2012: 17) that this happens when he puts "printing photos on a full bleach transparent container, which by the action of chlorine corrodes printed silver-based photos". With this process, after about five minutes, the picture is completely destroyed. The destruction of image lead us again to the theme of dead. Bazin (1960: 4) says something interesting about that:

If the plastic arts were put under psychoanalysis, the practice of embalming the dead might turn out to be a fundamental factor in their creation. The process might reveal that at the origin of painting and sculpture there lies a mummy complex. The religion of ancient Egypt, aimed against death, saw survival as depending on the continued existence of the corporeal body. Thus, by providing a defense against the passage of time it satisfied a basic psychological need in man, for death is but the victory of time.

Bazin and Barthes present two different stances to death that has been pointed before in the origin of our notion of time. Mulvey (2006: 60) notes that:

... for Bazin and Barthes, photography touches the complex human relation to death, but their shared perspective then diverges. For Bazin, it is to transcend death, part of the process of mourning; for Barthes, it is ‘the dive into death’, an acceptance of mortality.

The photos in the analyzed video show the two aspects together, remember that those people died, but it also a reminder of died people. These two characteristics are inherent to the sign, as put Santaella (2009: 65) “the mere presence of the sign denouncing the absence of what it represents.”

The sign has a power to represent, but this power is lost when the material basis of the sign decay, when the emulsion that bound the pigments dissolve, the organization of colors is lost and nothing guarantees the similarity between pigments, sign basis material, and what it represents. The fading of the figure also reminds us that signs are things and as things sign deteriorates, as well as people they represent. When losing the sign, we also lose the memory and history.

There are several factors in this video that indicate ways to interpretant generation: the title is one of them. The number 98001075056 appears as a puzzle, but in Brazil it can be recognized as the sequential number of the ID card. The word identity, however, has a broader meaning than the document, pointing toward other meanings as pointed by Barros’ (2012: 16):

In video 98001075056, I try to act directly on the materiality of images when I appropriated from old photographs of my family. The name of the video is my ID number, national identification document, which sought to address the idea of identity by descent.

Erikson (1978: 36) was a psychologist who worked with the concept of identity. When he writes about a neurosis suffered by a doctor campaign, he said he was impressed with the lost sense of identity form patients and presents a concept of identity by saying: “...this sense of identity provides the ability to experience one’s self as something that has continuity, sameness, and to act accordingly”. (p. 36)

The identity is related to the perception of being the same person over time, despite changes; it is the feeling that something remains. Several facts collaborate in the construction of this feeling, but one of them is memory. If time exists as a mental construct that accounts for changes, when dealing with long-term changes, it is necessary to record them with the help of memory devices to which the human being has accessed, such as diaries, photographs, letters, etc. We need memory to remember the events and organize them temporally, if we lost memory we cannot know what changed, or what remained.

This is the irony of the title of the work of Barros: it is a number sequency that identifies him,

as well as the photos of his ancestors, but the photos are dissolved, disappeared, and without some form of registration there is no way of knowing which genetic drifts of those people exist in the artist, so the identity is lost, breaks into flakes of pigment emulsion. On the other hand, the image of the child at the end leads us to think about new things and also indicates some hope that not everything is lost, but we should not delude ourselves, in the video there is not an idea of redemption by the child: it is necessary effort for seeing an image forming and identifying the child. Maybe we could start to see the identity as indicated by Bauman (1998.36):

Instead of building their identity gradually and patiently, as to build a house upon the addition of roofs, floors, rooms or hallways - a series of “new beginnings”, which is experimenting with forms instantly grouped, but easily demolished, painted over each other: an identity of palimpsesto.

Palimpsest in this case is a great word because for putting new information, word or image in a palimpsest it was necessary to erase the information that existed on the parchment. Barros erases the information in photography and on this empty paper that was the support of the photography, we can design our reflection and thoughts instigated by those images, which brings a new look on them.

Notes

1. A note on references to Peirce's work: All references to The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce Volumes 1 – 8, take the form CP n.m where n and m indicate volume and paragraph number respectively.
2. All translations from books in Portuguese are authors' made.

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THE MYTH IN TRIUMPH OF THE WILL (TRIUMPH DES WILLENS) – AN ANALYSIS OF THE SYMBOLISM USED IN THE AUDIOVISUAL NARRATIVE OF LENI RIEFENSTAHL

Sílvio Henrique V. Barbosa
Faculdade Cásper Líbero e ESPM
shbarbosa@hotmail.com

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the symbolic images – and clearly inspired by the mythologies of the West and the East – inserted at crucial moments in the narrative of the most important political documentary in film history, *Triumph of the Will*, directed by German film maker Leni Riefenstahl.

Symbols of power of ancient civilizations are reworked by Nazism, as the spread-winged eagle, representing the Roman Empire, and at the same time so many other peoples and civilizations, which now appears holding a swastika.

The most important Nazi symbol, adapted from Hindu and Buddhist mythology, is also a divine representation: stylization of sunlight expanding symbolizes the divine power itself. Carl Jung distinguishes natural from cultural symbols and both are present in this documentary, which combines ancestral myths – Pagans and Christians – as the Messiah to the figure of the protagonist of the movie: Adolf Hitler.

1. The Myth in *Triumph of the Will (Triumph des Willens)* – An analysis of the symbolism used in the audiovisual narrative of Leni Riefenstahl



“... My film is just a document. I showed what everyone witnessed or heard about. And everyone was impressed. I was the one who set this impression, who recorded it on film. “

(Leni Riefenstahl)¹

00:03:04 – Scenes of clouds. Not seen from below, as we are accustomed, but there – beside us – as if we were floating with them. Yes, we are in the sky, flying with the imagination and through the lens of Leni Riefenstahl, Adolf Hitler’s favorite film maker. She was chosen by him to create the most important audiovisual narrative of Nazism, recording the most crucial congress of the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi Party) from September 4th to 10th, 1934, in Nuremberg.²

For one minute and nine seconds we admire the sky and we can define inside the clouds, right beside us, a plane... an aircraft with the insignia of power; the plane of the Chancellor Adolf Hitler.

00:04:13 – Now, our visual focus changes. We fail to look at the sky itself and come to see what is on the ground. The old city of Nuremberg, founded as a castle in the 11th century arises; a city with almost a thousand years and with a strong symbolism for the Nazi Party created itself in that same state, Bavaria. It is there that the congress of the National Socialist Party happens since its embryonic stage in 1927, repeating in 1929 and then – with Hitler in power – annually from 1933 to 1939, when the Second World War begins. Nuremberg, reminds Germans the promise of Adolf Hitler: to build a new Reich, an empire to last for another thousand years.³

For one minute and 16 seconds, we see the city from above and at a certain moment, the plane casts its shadow over the historic buildings. The shadow of Hitler’s plane, for only nine minutes, brings us to some important myths.

The format of the plane reminds the shadow of a large bird, referring Germans to the image of the eagle, the symbol of the Roman Empire, an animal that represents the Divine Being in different cultures because it can fly close to the sun. And which is now adopted as a symbol, next to the swastika, a swastika of Nazism.

¹ Leni Riefenstahl’s interview to the *Cahiers du Cinema* (1961).

² In this Congress, Adolf Hitler must prove to the Germans and to the world that he is the undisputed leader of the Nazi Party just two months after the purge that led to the murder of 85 people, almost all members of his paramilitary forces, the SA (Sturmabteilung) with three million militiamen..

³ *Mein Kempf*, Adolf Hitler.



The eagle rests on another Nazi symbol: the swastika

But how this eagle, which appears in many other moments of the show-documentary, which is a symbol of power in so distant civilizations, can lead us to associate it with the Divine in the contemporary world? It can because the myths are present and are picked up by our unconscious. The symbols come from what Carl Jung called the “collective unconscious”, ie the part of the psyche that retains and transmits the common psychological inheritance of mankind.⁴

Eagle, symbol of strength and beauty, which circulates between heaven, abode of the gods, and the Earth, where we live, sometime back there, in pre-history, conquered the position of divine spokesman. And it kept it during kingdoms and empires, in various cultures, from the prairies of the American West to the Siberian steppes.⁵

The image of the eagle, in my view lies in Jungian definition of natural symbol, which we can decipher drawing the most archaic origins, “that is, ideas and images that we find in the earliest records and in the most primitive societies” (Jung, 2008: 117).

Carl Jung distinguishes the natural symbol of the cultural symbol, used to express “eternal truths and which are still used by religions, having gone through numerous transformations and more or less conscious elaboration process, thus becoming collective images accepted by civilized societies” (Jung, 2008: 117).

⁴ Carl Jung, 2008

⁵ The Power of Myth, Joseph Campbell.

1.1. The return of the Messiah



Hitler greets followers in Nuremberg

“Behold, he cometh with clouds, and every eye will see Him, even they who pierced Him; and all kindred of the earth shall wail because of him. Yes Amen. “. Revelation 1: 7

Overlapping the divine image represented by the shape of the eagle, which appears as a natural symbol, though it has been rescued from the history books and brought to Nazi flags and banners, there is an even more pronounced presence of a cultural symbol, this still alive in memory and in the religious traditions of the Germans. The shadow on the historic buildings of Nuremberg remembers the most important reference of the dominant faith of Germany. The open wings of the plane of Hitler cast a shadow over Nuremberg in the cross shape, symbol of suffering, martyrdom, but also the victory of life over death.

The risen Messiah, says the holy book of Christians, will return to the world of men to rid them of injustice, suffering, and finally, from all evil.

As Wilkinson and Philip (2005: 3), the myths “are ambiguous and subtle, and have several meanings. They are not fixed, but flexible: they adapt themselves to changes and new knowledge.”

Leni Riefenstahl knew how to manipulate these myths in her audiovisual narrative – the two symbols, pre-Christian, represented by the eagle, and the Christian one, by the cross – got movement. As the eagle of the pagans, the cross of the Christians also speaks strongly to the German people. And both indicate the same thing: the Divine Being, the *Messiah* returns from heaven to end the suffering of the people, with the shame of defeat in the 1st World War, with the division of weak and corrupt parties, with the social chaos, economic crisis and unemployment, and the fear of a Communist uprising on Germany. Adolf Hitler, who embodies this Messiah of the German people deserved to be portrayed as the Messiah in the eyes of the director.

And last but not least, the eagle is never represented alone. The bird flies to the sun, the

greater symbol of divinity, and it takes at his feet the swastika, an ancient representation of the solar myth, the divine force that makes life flow through the universe.

There are only nine seconds of shadow over the beautiful city and then we lost that divine image of the Christ or of the eagle, depending on who reads it, and then we can see from above the perfect military parade.

Few seconds, 33 to be precise, and we exchanged the sky and what we can see from there by the ground.

00:05:29 – The camera filming the sky finally leaves us and we can see the world now through the eyes of those who have their feet on the ground. These are scenes, at the aerodrome, of clearly excited people with the approach of the leading aircraft... joyful and beautiful faces, happy faces, of men, women and children, many children. A selected audience, handpicked as the cheerleader of a game show.

00:05:57 – The long awaited leader has not yet appeared. But there are plenty of arms raised in the new greeting that the whole country is taking. New greeting? The raised arm and the cry of *Heil* is nothing new. The greeting is actually in the Roman Empire. The Caesars were well greeted by the population when appearing in public. The *Hail Cesar* has a distinctly religious connotation. Caesar is the living representation of the gods. He is a god that must be worshiped with its human form. Therefore, the Ave in Latin wins the connotation of a salute with a sacred tone.

Likewise in German, *heil* has a clear religious significance; the Ave Maria's preach in German means Heil Maria. Man welcomes, therefore, the new Messiah just as Catholics pray in German to the mother of God, or as the other Christian denominations refer to acts of God.

00:06:03 – Finally, the first apotheosis in the film. He, who comes from heaven through the clouds, appears in the door of the plane. Nods... smiles... The Messiah is among his people. He follows, cheered, the aerodrome to the city centre, in a long motorcade, in an open car, shot by every possible angle: the right, the left, the front, top, and even by an unseen cameraman positioned right behind him. Invisible because disguised as a Nazi officer, in uniform as all other 44 cameramen and assistants, a crew of 170 people, perhaps the greatest in film history.⁶

00:07:33 – Amid the procession, which lasts almost four minutes, and in which all eyes are on Adolf Hitler, the invisible becomes visible for the first time, not by Leni carelessness at the time of editing the film, but for the lack of option in the cut images. A cameraman appears in a quick picture on the left corner of the screen, in a scene that if was cut by the perfectionist director, would take away the sense of continuity offered by the numerous angles at which the parade happens. Something that surely went unnoticed by the crowd, who saw the film in theaters in the 30s, but with the help of slow motion or pause, does not escape from the watchful eye of most observers.

00:08:02 – The smiling leader, hailed by jubilant crowd that packs the streets, is surprised by a woman and a child, disregarding the safety cords that prevent people of approaching him, appear conveniently in front of the procession. The car of Adolf Hitler stops and he gets from the child a bouquet of flowers.

Mother and daughter, deeply grateful for the kind gesture of Germany's most powerful man, smile and make the Nazi salute as the car part again. With this simple picture, Leni Riefenstahl sets the standard that charted all political marketers from the 30s of the last century to now. Since she immortalized the affective gesture of people's father with his children, it has become

⁶ In *Triumph of the Will: cinema in the service of ideology*, Ana Elisabeth Rodrigues explains that "the team worked for a week, filming over fifty hours of film at various angles, many innovative for its time (...). The idea that guided Riefenstahl was that the film would consist of endless moving images. The motion of objects is supported by a dynamic, produced by film techniques, such as drives, the travelings, the camera up and down and the various positions of the camera." " In <http://www.oohdahistoria.org/n11/textos/elizabethfaro.pdf>

the rule to associate the loving image of the candidate to small. It is a dominant thought that someone who cares about children, worries about the future and the continuity of our name, our family, our tribe, clan, state, country, empire, civilization, species... Anyway, this man may be someone devoted only to the good things.

“As vegetarianism and habits of not smoking and not drinking and refusing to marry projected an increase of image above the normal human being”, says Richard Evans, professor of history at the University of Cambridge.⁷

An attempt, perhaps, to achieve the definition of Nietzsche’s Superman, the *Übermensch*, the Overman, as says SOUZA (2014: 104) “is the Auto Suppression of man... Because he would have the same characteristics of the previous God, now designed in himself... as a superman.”

00:08:38 – The procession follows and the documentary wins appearance of a tour into the medieval centre of Nuremberg. The camera stops in palaces, houses, monuments that speak of a glorious past, a past idealized further given the serious economic crisis facing the country since the defeat in the First World War. These are images that seek to neutralize the bitter taste left by the recent years of hyperinflation.

And the show comes to an end with the entry of Hitler at the hotel. Amid new ovations, more happy faces, keen eyes, the leader appears in the window of the balcony to greet his people once more before the rest.

00:11:15 – Night falls on Nuremberg, but the show must go on. Nazi formations lit by torches parade to the sound of brass bands, a military serenade throughout the city. The fire shining, again, refers to the symbolism, this time the German, also called Scandinavian or Viking. Fire with their aggressiveness is also builder of civilization. The fire is the power of the pagan gods, like Odin and Thor. For the Greeks, Prometheus stole it from the gods and gave it to the men, allowing the progress of our species. The fire heats food, helps to forge the weapon and the plow, brightens the night and keep away predators and the enemy.⁸

00:14:00 – Two minutes and 45 seconds later, and we have the dawn of a city still sleepy. The windows are opened and reveal the day being born with Nazi flags fluttering in medieval buildings. We have a sequence that resembles a sightseeing tour, in channels and beautiful buildings facades.

00:15:54 – And it is around Nuremberg that the movement is really happening. The huge camp of Hitler militants awakens. Tents lined up like a military camp. They are the whitest of whites, smarter and stronger among people. The intended, according to Adolf Hitler, to lead the reconstruction of a white Europe, free of inferior peoples, as Slavs, Jews and Gypsies, racially inferior immigrants who came from distant Asia to steal space of legitimate people that shall dwell there. “The nation that does not value their racial purity will perish”, says the leader in the bedside book of the Nazis, *Mein Kampf*, and also the leader of the Labour Fronts, Robert Ley, in the speech he will make in next day (00:31:34).⁹

00:20:17 – The streets are crowded again to attend another ceremony in honor of Adolf Hitler. As a Carnival parade, German peasants dressed in costumes of all rural areas of the country, walk through the streets to the sound of folk music... a profusion of short images, close-ups of children and young people. In each group, there are those who carry baskets of food. We have a minute and 20 seconds of parade, with healthy, beautiful peasants, Aryans, according to the Nazi design and, of course, happy with broad smiles, especially when positioned in front of Hitler to greet him. And then again the myth is reused, it is retold and inserted into the audiovisual narrative of Leni Riefenstahl.

⁷ Galileu Magazine, ed.193 – August, 2007. <http://revistagalileu.globo.com/Revista/Galileu/0,,EDG78263-7855-193-3,00-O+MAIOR+SEGREDO+DO+III+REICH.html>

⁸ *The Complete Encyclopedia of Signs & Symbols*, pg. 200.

⁹ *Minha Luta, Mein Keimpf*, Adolf Hitler, Brazilian Edition, 2001.



Hitler receives the offerings of peasants

00:21:55 – Amid the greetings with the raised right hand, farmers offer to Hitler the fruits of the harvest. Is it a meaningless scene? No, actually, it is the restoration of paid traditions linked to the cycles of the planet. The Earth provides the food. Gods who take care of the seasons, the rain, the sun, the fertility of the land itself, at last, deserve a thank you. And human communities, from the Neolithic, offer to the gods these fruits of the first harvest. The German tradition, lost with the rise of Christianity is now resumed. The many pagan gods are incorporated now by the *Übermensch*, the Nietzschean overman, in the Nazi point of view of Nietzsche's philosophy.

He, who at the beginning of the documentary, comes from heaven bringing hope, receives the offerings of its believers.

00:22:30 – After being welcomed by the people in the streets, it is the turn of Hitler to meet his personal army, which officially is an army of workers, which form the German Labour front. Workers wearing military uniform and that have, in the shoulder, not the German flag, but the swastika.

Hitler says goodbye to the streets to address the opening of the congress. And gets in front of the departure from the hotel, the smiles and of course, many greetings with arms raised, adults and children, workers and peasants, shown in open images interspersed with close-ups that illustrate the feeling of joy.

00:24:38 – The eagle, the party symbol, appears illuminated with a single light, in a dark environment; the legend tells us this is the room where happens the congress of the National Socialist German Workers' Party. The eagle with open wings is resting on the other party symbol, the swastika. The second apotheosis of the documentary happens in this palace, attended by the diplomats of the allies of Germany, representatives of the party, military and the main German churches, less Jewish, for obvious reasons. The speech of Rudolf Hess, Hitler's right hand, begins.

00:28:20 – A succession of apologetic phrases of party representatives, interspersed with constant applause and standing ovations, culminates in the salute to the leader, seen in close-ups at different moments of the speeches: *Sig Heil, Sig Heil, Sig Heil*, says Rudolf Hess looking to Hitler, that immediately raises to receive also with the right arm raised, the greetings of a delirious crowd.

1.2. Triumph of the Will



Hitler comes to the *Grand Finale*, the parade at Nuremberg aerodrome

The spectacular staging should cause the same feeling of monumentality of Nazism to the public and to those who could watch at the cinema this official document of disclosure of the party, the documentary that Hitler ordered to Leni Riefenstahl.

The actress who decided to direct his own films won Hitler and the German audiences with success *Blue Light* (*Das Blaue Licht*), becoming a professional with direct contact with the power and direct access to Adolf Hitler to discuss his shooting script and the perspective under which should immortalize Hitler on the film.



Leni Riefenstahl (right) and Hitler during the meeting with peasants

A vision, as noted, mythical, which explores the symbols of Germanic cosmology and Christian cosmology, showing Nazism as the force that restores the pre-Christian past glories to lead Germany to its great future.

00:35:50 – “One nation, one leader, one Reich, one Germany” – With this sentence, the German workers greet Adolf Hitler and summarize the future of all under his command. The event brings together 52,000 men from the labour force created by his government to reduce unem-

ployment in the country. Workers use uniform and the swastika on their shoulder. They carry shovels but manipulate them like weapons. An army of workers that in a few years will be revealed to the world as the most effective fighting force in history.



Workers of the labour force

00:45:31 – Young people, the future ... Hitler now has his encounter with the Hitler's Youth, thousands of boys who greet him with the right hand raised.

00:50:20 – “We want you to be obedient and you must practice obedience,” Hitler speaks to the young people. In the new society that is shaping, Hitler wants order and obedience above all! And at the end of this speech, the leader, as always, is applauded and welcomed. The cameras behind the crowd show Hitler leaving the area in an open car, being intensely cheered, while the Nazi anthem is sung with arms raised in the Nazi salute.

00:57:27 – Night. The show now takes the size of an overproduction, of a carnival choreography, complete with title: Seas and flags, and signed by Hitler's architect Albert Speers. Acting as a choreographer, he creates the parade of thousands of Nazi banners at the Zeppelin field. As a Brazilian samba school, the wing has its own theme: Seas and flags, toward apotheosis, a huge vertical structure, illuminated by spotlights and named Cathedral of Lights. A pagan cathedral, where instead of Christ on the cross is the enormous eagle with open wings welcomes pilgrims resting on the swastika.

On stage, or pulpit of the fake cathedral, the preaching is not done by a religious leader, but by the nations' own spiritual guide, the Fuhrer.

01:04:00 – Day. The giant eagle is shown in a horizontal movement, from head to foot, holding the swastika. A merger takes of the Nazi symbol and creates the image of three men crossing an ocean of carefully lined up soldiers. A new reference to the Jewish-Christian myths, the scene immediately takes us back to Moses, who opened the Red Sea, allowing the passage of his people to freedom in the Promised Land.

The ceremony is a tribute to the late President Hindenburg. At the sound of the funeral march, Hitler approaches the pantheon flanked by leaders of its two paramilitary forces, the SA and the SS. As there were no nearby buildings to make this the images, Leni creates the first effective crane in film history, holding a small lift in the Nazi flag mast.

01:07:26 – The lift goes up and down allowing perfect and large images, movements up and

down, recording the sea of Nazi flags moving, as if on their own, towards the podium where the leader is. Close-ups show the black soldiers (SS) running, in tune. It is a carefully rehearsed ballet.

01:11:25 – In the first reference to the massacre of opponents and leaders of the SA, Hitler states that are losers those who bet on the division of the Nazi movement. “It stands firm as this training today.” In this ceremony, which takes almost 11 minutes in the documentary, there is no room for demonstrations of joy. Hitler is serious while he greets dozens of soldiers of the SS and SA.

01:15:42 – Fade out from the Nazi flags. Fade in. And the day breaks with Leni cameras again showing the flags. And the wind takes care to show, behind the flag fluttering, Hitler approaching open car saying goodbye to the people of Nuremberg.

There are thousands of people in the windows, sidewalks and bleachers watching the parade of the new flags presented by Hitler to the paramilitary formations. In close-ups, Leni shows and identifies with credit caption one by one the Nazi leaders.

This is a great show, as in the carnival, with the different wings marching to Adolf Hitler Square, in the centre of Nuremberg. Leni shows the parade from many angles, with her cameras positioned in buildings everywhere and also spread at ground level, near the public.

In an especially happy angle for a director, the camera can capture the SS, Hitler’s favorite troop, marching under sunrays illuminating the black men, giving them a sacred appearance. The Black Guard brings the personal banner of Adolf Hitler and is euphorically acclaimed by the people who squeeze in the square.

01:34:40 – Hitler and his commanders are entering the final scenario of the show. The palace where the Congress was opened, now attends the closing speech. The eagle, until now viewed over the swastika, changes position. It decorates the podium just below the leader. And back there, on the wall, and above all, is the swastika. In an unprecedented scene throughout the documentary, you can see beads of sweat on Hitler’s face, exclaiming greatness and superiority of the Germans:.. “who knows that he is the holder of the blood better and consciously use it to achieve leadership and never give up! “

01:44:15 – And as if explaining the title of the film, *Triumph of the Will*, Hitler says: “It is my will and desire that this State and this Reich can withstand the millennia to come. We can be happy knowing that this future belongs to us completely. “

01:48:04 – After the endless applause and shouts of Heil! (Hail), Rudolf Hess takes the microphone and says, summarizing the goal of the congress and the documentary itself: “The Party is Hitler! But Hitler is Germany, as Germany is Hitler! Sig Heil” (Hail Victory).

The party anthem is sung by all present, while Leni intersperses images of people with a fusion to the swastika and to her marching soldiers, as in the lyrics. Final scene... Fade Out.

1.3. CONCLUSION



Hitler dividindo as águas

Leni, hailed as one of the most important film makers in history, did not escape the judgment of history itself, getting the rest of her long life the taint of Hitler film maker. She met with absolute technical rigor in order to portray the grandeur of the Nazi regime and to enhance the figure of Hitler.

Defending herself of her many accusers during the second half of the 20th century, Leni said that her work was merely a document of what everyone has witnessed or heard, in an attempt of explaining that in ours days

find some concordance in the opinion of the documentarist Bill Nichols that states “the documentary (audiovisual genre) restates the historical world, making it an indexed record; it represents the historical world, shaping its record of a prospect or a distinct point of view. The evidence supports the argument of the restatement or the perspective of representation.¹⁰”

According to Josep Catala: “the image becomes the most genuine representation of social reality, the reality as it is imagined and, therefore, as it is lived and used.”¹¹

“Taken without ideological prejudices, documentaries Riefenstahl are obviously exercises in style, research techniques, lighting and angles” says Hugo Estenssoro.

Leni faithfully fulfilled his duty to his patron that, beyond this documentary, will finance other works signed by the director, as the double documentary *Olympia*, the first full audiovisual coverage of the Olympics in 1936 in Berlin, and the novel “Lowlands” (*Tiefland*). Recorded during the war, this movie used slave labour of Gypsies borrowed by her production from concentration camps and was finished only in 1954, after she paid the penalty of three years in detention decreed by the denazification tribunal created by the allies.

In 2002, at one hundred years old, Leni reached an agreement with representatives of the German Roma Gypsies admitting what she had denied until then: gypsies were persecuted and exterminated by the Nazis during the war.

Ideological issues that have always defined the analysis of her work, little by little, lose influence on our academic studies. However, from an ethical point of view, we will never understand how the quest for technical perfection may have taken her to forget so many moral issues so relevant to humanity.

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¹⁰ Bill Nichols, 2005.

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FROM ELVES TO SELFIES*

Simonetta Persichetti
Faculdade Cásper Líbero, São Paulo, Brasil
spersich@uol.com.br

Abstract

This article aims to discuss and analyze the new phenomenon that pervades social networks, the selfies. What meanings can hide such wave, such profusion almost *ad nauseam* of self images in this era of pretty much endless images? What is the cultural and imagetic difference between the old self-portrait and the contemporary selfie? Old and new dialogue in this text, passing through semiotics, communication and archetypal ideas of the Jungian thought, in this world of image-representation, image-editing in which the photographed is at the same time the editor of an imagined image.

Quietly they began to appear in social networks, in conversations, in discussions, and proliferated like mushrooms after a heavy summer rain. One of the phenomena of the 21st century, the selfie, according to the Oxford Dictionary (2013), is an informal photograph, a self-portrait taken with a mobile phone or a webcam and instantly shared on social networks. A phenomenon which, incidentally, does not make that much sense, for pictorial and imagistic representations have always favored portraits and even self-portraits. Art and photography books have always dealt with this subject, and many have tried to explain it from both the sociological and psychological points of view. I know of no photographer who has never made his/her self-portrait. But, let's face it, it has grown to a scale that had never been imagined before the era of digital networks.

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Four years ago I developed a course for the Museum of Modern Art of São Paulo (MAM) entitled Photography and Symbolism, whose content I have discussed in several other courses and lectures throughout Brazil. In it, through mythological figures and literature, I tried to understand and analyze the myths, symbols and archetypes of contemporary society, always having the image as the backdrop, especially the photographic image, the portrait and the self-portrait.

Although the course is fairly recent, the theme of myth and photography has long intrigued me. Not by coincidence I did my Master's and my PhD in the field of Social Psychology, and in my post doctorate I am also developing a study on mythology and identity construction of political characters, more precisely of Brazil's presidents. But that is another story...

The first time I heard the word selfie was from the mouth of a freshman from the Cásper Líbero School of Journalism, in São Paulo. Interestingly, she was showing a self-portrait by the Chinese photographer Li Zhensheng, taken in communist China in the 1960s.

I decided to delve into this to try to understand how, out of the blue, such an archaic model of self-representation has become the darling of contemporaneity. To try to understand the symbolic behind this image and their senses nowadays. In the words of psychologist Carl G. Jung, "a word or an image is symbolic when it implies something beyond its obvious and immediate meaning" (1964:20).

The discussion is not new. Mythology and literature, as I already pointed out, have focused on this issue. How can we forget the myth of Narcissus, who was condemned to live an unfulfilled longing for love when he fell in love with his own image? For days and nights he stared at his picture reflected in the water, without ever getting to reach it. Or, if we think in the famous book by the Irish writer Oscar Wilde (1884-1900) *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1890), in which the subject portrayed never gets old: it is the picture that, over time, displays the wrinkles that should be on his face. This desire becomes for Dorian Gray a terrible reality. A slave to an absurd ideal, that of eternal youth, it makes art be confused with everyday life.

What then of the thousands of selfies circulating in the social networks? Anonymous and not so anonymous people. A phenomenon that spreads exponentially. Who does not remember Barack Obama's selfie during the funeral of the South African leader Nelson Mandela in December of 2013? The self-portrait was taken with Prime-Ministers David Cameron, of the UK, and Helle Thorning Schmidt, of Denmark. The international media seemed not to like it.

Whenever I hear the word selfie, I do not know why, come to my mind the elves, which, according to Norse mythology, were creatures of the light. Young and beautiful demigods. And it seems to me that this is how people who publish their selfies see themselves, or would like to be seen. Shiny and luminous people. It is not always so. However, most times they are images devoid of composition, concepts and aesthetic concerns. The result leaves much to be desired, to say the least.

It is therefore in this context that I wish to discuss the self-portrait, or selfie, function of representation, setting and fiction in a society in which entertainment is the keynote of the culture of knowledge, of life.

1. Portrait, self-portrait and one's self representation

Portraits are fascinating. Perhaps the most seductive and difficult language, both in painting and in photography. The synthesis of the meeting of the vision of an image producer and someone who lets himself/herself be "immortalized" through strokes or lenses. An exchange between objectivity and subjectivity and the desire to see and be seen.

There is a social and political attitude in the act of portraying and being portrayed. But unlike pictorial portraits, in which the imagination and gestures of painters are often valued more than the represented subject, the photographic portrait, born in the early days of photography, was used ideologically by the bourgeoisie of the second half of the 19th century with the aim of

placing itself before the society of the time and of forging its own identity.

After all, born in the midst of a positivist philosophy, photography fit nicely with the idea of the cool and impartial look so dear to the thinkers of the time: “I only believe in what my eyes see.” “Honorific representation of the bourgeois self, the photographic portrait popularizes and transforms a traditional function by subverting the privileges inherent to the pictorial portrait”, says Annateresa Fabris. The author continues:

But the photographic portrait does much more. It contributes to the modern affirmation of the individual as it takes part in the configuration of his/her identity as a social identity. Every portrait is simultaneously a social act and a sociability act: in different moments of its history it obeys certain rules of representation governing the modalities of figuration of the model, the ostentation he/she makes of himself/herself, and the multiple symbolic perceptions raised in social exchanges. The model provides to the lenses not only his/her body but also his/her way of conceiving the material and social space, inserting himself/herself in a network of complex relationships of which the portrait is one of the most significant emblems (Fabris, 2004:38–39).

Used always with “noble” purposes, valued as an expression, described and reported both by writers and philosophers, the portrait raises multiple questions about its status. It is history or fiction? Reality or invention? Identity or otherness? “Photography builds a social identity, a standardized identity that often defies the concept of individuality, making possible to forge the most diverse typologies” (Fabris, 2004:15). But when we talk or think of portraits we are referring exactly to what? We often feel challenged by the Sphinx of Thebes: “Decipher me or I’ll devour you.”

Fabris also points out that for the French poet Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867) imagination is an essential part of a portrait: “The poet attributes to the portrayer a divinatory capacity, since it is his/her job to guess what is hidden, besides capturing what is allowed to be seen” (Fabris, 2004:21). For the German philosopher Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), the portrait falls into the realm of romance: “It is, above all, a product of the imagination, and yet no less true to the personality of the model”, as writes Fabris (2004:21).

In these almost 200 years since the invention of photography the portrait has always had prestige and was the subject of a number of analyses. Thus the amazement with the spread of selfies and of the idea that seems to be behind the importance of the self-portrait today, if there is a concept or a latent reflection in it at all.

It must be taken into account that this cult of the image and of the portrait is not recent. The Czech philosopher Vilém Flusser (1920–1991), in his book *Filosofia da caixa preta* (1983), points out the magical aspect of the image that precedes the technical picture. He speaks of the disappearance of the need for decoding a technical image (photography, film), since its meaning is imprinted automatically on the surface, like a fingerprint: “When photography becomes a model of thought, it changes the very structure of the existence, of the world and of society” (Flusser, 1983:73).

We seek similarities, memories, when we look at a photographic portrait. And not necessarily artistic or aesthetic originality. What we want is to unravel what that face means to us. Analyzing the relationship of the camera with the human face, Baudrillard makes of the portrait an act of defacement and stripping of the character of the model. Faced with the playacting that the individual makes of himself/herself, the lenses cannot idealize or transfigure him/her as image: capturing the similarity does not mean capturing the mask, the secret otherness that every being

carries. What Baudrillard demands from photography is just that: not so much “to search for the identity behind appearances”, but “behind the identity make emerge the mask, the figure” of what haunts the human being and diverts it from its identity (FABRIS, 2004:75).

The fascination of the portrait and the self-portrait is precisely this: its fictional character (as, indeed, of any photograph), the possibility of creating, of posing, the construction of any number of characters acting in each photograph. It is a way, as Fabris points out, to “dodge once and for all the existence of the original subject”.

We are all the time ritualizing and recreating a good part of everyday life. The roles alternate, and photography ends up becoming one of the means used to consolidate this idea and give concreteness to what we are seeing. Vision is measured by our knowledge, by our construction of the world from the representations. And the representations reflect or imitate the social reality.

The French professor and researcher François Soulages raises an interesting controversy on this subject when he asks whether the portrayer is a photographer or a photography director. He raises the possibility of a photographic dramatization, the change of concept from “this existed” to “this was played”: “Is the portrait a genre that gives the object ‘one (or several) human being(s)’ to be photographed or is its practice that produces a photographic appearance of a visible phenomenon?” (2010:65–66). And then he ponders: “The photographic portrait is full of close tensions and contradictions: does it really distinguish itself from photography, which would be, like painting, the competence of art? Maybe this is just a fact?” (2010:66).

If it is a fact, it is possible to analyze the contemporary selfie from the perspective of the entertainment society, or of a civilization of the spectacle, as defined the Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa (2013).

In a society in which you’re worth something when you become visible, the rapid spread of an image via social networks allows for immediacy in the integration to a world of consumption, leisure and a “pseudo” way out of anonymity. If each period has an eye and a representation undoubtedly the 21st century’s is that of visibility. No matter how much or what we do for that to happen. Aesthetic relations that give us the impression of belonging when in fact they offer just traces: what about the civilization of the spectacle? It is a civilization of a world in which the first place in the current value raking is occupied by entertainment, in which having fun, escaping boredom, is the universal passion. This ideal of life is perfectly legitimate, no doubt. Only a fanatical Puritan could blame the members of a society who want to give playfulness, relaxation, humor and fun to lives normally engaged in depressing and sometimes stultifying routines. But transforming into a supreme value this natural propensity to have fun has unexpected consequences: the trivialization of culture, the generalization of frivolity ... (Vargas Llosa, 2013:30).

In the case of photography, it is always good to remember that building an image is never a copy of an external world, but the realization of the imaginary of a subject within a society, a culture, a given historical moment. Images that pass for social representations.

2. Representation and contemporary image

Social psychologist Serge Moscovici departs from the study of social representations to understand how and why humans act and think in a certain way, affirming the historic character of consciousness. In other words, how the subject is presented and represented through the images he/she builds when he/she wants to know and appropriate the world.

From the moment that the image becomes one of the main forms of knowledge and of transmission of this knowledge, we no longer live our experiences directly and start to experience them through the representations: “everything that used to be directly lived has become a representation” (Debord, 1997:13).

In our case, today knowledge or recognition passes through the selfie: when reflecting on the identity imprinted in photographic portraits, Roland Barthes refers to an imprecise, if not

imaginary, identity, often close to myths and stereotypes, to the point that it is possible to speak of similarity even in the face of unknown models. Questioning the identity of the photographed subject leads the author to a radical conclusion: the individual resembles infinitely the other images of himself/herself, he/she is a copy of a copy, whether real or mental (Fabris, 2004:115).

We have thus moved beyond the time in which the portrait and the self-portrait meant much more a discovery of identity or of affirmation in the world, a way to place ourselves in society as unique beings, to the selfie, a craze that, although somehow also inserting us into a context, leaves uniqueness aside and makes us all look the same. The same poses, the same smiles, creating a break between the subject, the self, and the image, which is increasingly featured as a pose. An imposed rule, in which the apparent spontaneity and the speed with which the images are disseminated through social networks lead us to believe in the authenticity of the portrait and the portrayed.

In a narcissistic society, in which little is produced and reproduced, selfies feature, as Umberto Eco (1984:60) would say, an “allegory of consumer society”, a false individualism, focused on the rapid achievement of the desire to be seen, to achieve visibility, and thus to begin to exist in a society in which image and entertainment are inseparable.

The forms of this neo-individualism centered on the primacy of self-realization are countless. Alongside the subjective autonomy, hedonism and psychologism, a new relationship with the body has developed: obsession with health, cult of sports, fitness, leanness, beauty care, cosmetic surgery... manifestations of a narcissistic society (Lipovetsky; Serroy, 2011:48).

There is no innocent look. Photography is always the construction of a representation. As Boris Kossov reminds us (2007:54), every photograph is a creation, “a testimony that materializes from a process of creation, i.e., construction. In this construction lies the aesthetics of representation.”

In the aestheticized world we live in, representation involves the immediacy of a fact and a situation. Today’s photograph, the self-portrait, is not intent to be more heroic, but rather an image that plays with banality. Selfies will probably be replaced soon by another representative form of the way we see ourselves and how we want to be seen.

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THE LAW AS A SOCIOCULTURAL DISCURSIVE PRACTICE

Aparecida Zuin

Federal University of Rondônia Foundation, Brazil
profalazuin@unir.br; alazuin@gmail.com

Bruno Valverde Chahaira

Federal University of Rondônia Foundation, Brazil
professorbrunodireito@gmail.com

Tiago Batista Ramos

Federal University of Rondônia Foundation, Brazil
tiagoramos8@gmail.com

Abstract

This article presents the Law while producer and disseminator of sociocultural discourse. The basis starts from the idea that language, here in particular the juridical language is notorious brand of culture and social relations, and after all it's the language that can express concepts, norms, behaviors, in other words, a condition that provokes relationships, actions and reactions. In that sense, the arising from methodological procedures of the American Semiotics Theory, commonly known as Peirce's Semiotics, will base the proposal based on the process of signification, or at best Peirce's terms, the process of semiosis that requires basically the philosophical model of pragmatism. The article takes as its theoretical basis of Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Jr., in this case, to contextualize the Theory of Juridical Norm. Moreover, extends the notes highlighting the way the study of law by the language, in terms of the Norberto Bobbio, in what concerns the function prescriptive.

Introduction

Many theorists have presented the idea that Law is not pure logic, which means that cultural, social, technological issues and politics permeate the reading of the facts and the formulations of laws. In the words of Gregorio Robles: “in social life of men, as communication system, the law is language or, in other words, the law is text” (2005, p. 2), and while text is subject to interpretation, as yet, condition *sine qua non* to produce other texts.

To Bobbio, the author thinks he can distinguish three fundamental functions of the language of Law, namely: descriptive, expressive and prescriptive. Therefore, confirming that it is in the language that Law exercises its own sociocultural discursive function.

In this sense, the text and language conceptions transcend what are routinely reserved to them in the common studies. Therefore, the proposition bases on semiotic studies, in particular, the American Semiotics, also known as Peirce’s Semiotics (foundation by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), to broaden the debate.

The work starts with the presentation of what is Semiotics and the object of study of this science. Then, it refers to the sign, the language and the process of semiosis and then conducts the issues and/or themes in relation to Law and its relations with the world, society and culture.

And to justify that the endeavor is bold, we brace on the same words of the learned teacher Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Junior (2009: p. 1): “the undertaking to carry out even an outline, of a pragmatic normative legal communication takes a certain audacity and great risk. This is because the very notion of pragmatics is quite imprecise [...]”

Thus, the pragmatic becomes the focus of the work, therefore, conceived as a dimension of semiosis is part of a theory of Peirce’s Semiotics, whose idea is the study of the sign related to their interpreters.

Once this phase is overcome, the place for the sign and the socio-cultural reality is reserved, whose configuration of the *do-do* (constant in the prescriptive function) cannot stop being span by the mode of *do-say* from Law as a communicative act in order to achieve in the recipient of legal language some *do-know*. Because the language, in this case the one used by Law, places symbolic exchanges that allow communication between the subjects and that generates social relations or even interrupt, modify or change behaviors when needed.

The propositions based on work of Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004), *theory of rule of law*, are extended precisely because the author elaborates the thought about Law in the parameters of the functions of language. That is, we are interested in fixating on the prescriptive function without greater pretensions (such as previous approaches), because it is Bobbio’s conception that the prescriptive function modifies the behavior of others. Thus, the function of the prescriptive language makes real the *do-do* of the subjects.

This attempt joins the requirements of interpreting legal norm through the studies of language to foster, in the words of Paul de Barros Carvalho (apud Bittar, 2010): “[...] the possibility for the public, with distinct formations, not only legal entities, can understand and identify interfaces between communication codes and the legal system”.

1. The Semiotics as a science of languages

To understand the role of law, we need to talk a little bit about the functions of these social discourses. According to Landowski *apud* Zuin (2012: p. 10): “all social discourses have a main or primary function. Most social discourses have a character eminently pragmatic (Landowski, 1992), that is, seeking to satisfy some practical need of the human being”.

In the same way, Bobbio formulates that a legal norm is a proposition:

We mean that it is a set of words that have a meaning. Based on what we said above, the same normative proposition can be formulated by varied enunciations. What matters to the lawyer when he interprets a law, is its meaning.

[...] There are various kinds of propositions. You can tell them apart based on two criteria: *the grammatical form and the function*. [...]

[...]

I believe that it is possible to distinguish three fundamental functions of language: *the descriptive, the expressive and the prescriptive*.

[...]

We are interested particularly in the prescriptive function: a body of laws or regulations, a code, a constitution, these constitute the most interesting examples of normative language [...]. (Bobbio, 2014: p. 74-79)

It is observed, if found according to Landowski (1992) the main or primary function in social discourses in order to satisfy any practical need of the human being, it is possible to say, then, that to Bobbio, in this line of thought, the function of prescriptive language aims also to satisfy practical social issues, such as: informing, communicating, transmitting knowledge etc. After all, as Bobbio asserts, the prescriptive function is propriety of the normative language, because it implies while it influences the behavior of others, tending to transform it, using for that the *performance* which is its characteristic: the *do-do*.

Now, before the *performativ do-do* it is necessary first a *do-say* – present in the communicative act of law to society. So that the individual can be influenced and receive properly the targeted communication, ensuring the intelligibility of the message by an effective process of formulation and transmission, as provided in the law norms, the recipient “needs to believe”, “to assume” and take it as credible; There it is what makes it worthy of credibility.

That means in the words of Bobbio (2014: p. 48):

[...] the first point which, in my judgment, is necessary to have clear in mind if we want to establish a theory of the rule of law with solid basis, is that every legal norm can be subjected to three separate appraisals, and that these appraisals are independent of each other. In fact, before any legal norm we can put a triple order of questions: 1) if it is just or unjust; 2) If is valid or invalid; 3) if it is effective or ineffective. These are the three distinct problems: the justice, the validity and the effectiveness of a legal norm (emphasis added by the author).

Thus, in the order of law, although the prescriptive function aims at the objective of disciplining social coexistence, the guidelines of positive law (nomoempírico prescriptive system) also demands conducting the conduct of social subjects, in order to modify their behavior. Hence, saying that the law as a socio-cultural discursive practice is imbued, according to Bobbio, with characteristics residing in the prescriptive propositions, and yet in the pragmatic of Tercio Sampaio Jr, in sight of the law being here a place of communicative act. To Zuin (2009: p. 152) that is also presentified in the action proper of language, which is: the persuasion, because in order for the rule of law to be effective it is necessary and ongoing the act of persuading or continuing to persuade, in any communicative context.

When it comes to the rule of law, in this case we are forced to recognize the modal value

of doing, which to Greimas & Courtès (2008: p. 202) is “an operative (do-be) or manipulative (do-do) *do*”, given that it is a doing that modifies the behaviors, transforms and rules other statements. By the framework of Ferraz Junior this mode of *doing* is in the *pragmatic doing* and may extend into *cognitive doing*. It says “may” in the sense that by the nature of *pragmatic doing* there are investment of socio-cultural, descriptive values, therefore, understanding the law as socio-cultural discursive practice, because it is invested of programs of *persuasive doings* and *interpretive doings*.

So, by being the place of communicative act, the mechanisms and procedures of structuring of the legal language, treating it as a totality of meaning, are guided by the ways in which the norms are organized to produce certain values of “certain society”, without, however, disregarding what keep or modify them, in the socio-cultural context.

2. Law as discursive sociocultural practice

Several researches have presented the establishment of links between Peirce’s semiotics and the legal language; in other words, researches are gradually driving the contribution of semiotics to a theoretical linguistic and methodological meeting, looking forward to generating a interdisciplinarity among its fundamental principles. And what are these principles? The basic principles for the establishment of these relations are found in the Semiotic Theory of perception, of the sign and the interpretant. It is precisely in this contribution that we can get the answers for the effective understanding of the ways in which the meanings are transformed into cognition, i.e., it is in the interpretant theory that we can find the understanding of the mental processes, the production of cognition in the minds of interpreters.

Nöth (1995, p. 130) draws our attention to the way in which the phenomenological categories of experience developed by Peirce, the *cognition* is understood:

On Peirce’s philosophy, the traditional triad of mind corresponds to its three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. The feeling belongs to the Firstness, the category of the immediate and of the qualities not yet distinguished. Volition belongs to Secondness, category of dyadic interaction between the self and the other (the first and the second). Cognition belongs to Thirdness, the communication category of representation “between a second and a first”. (CP 5.66)

Consequently related to this phenomenon is the proposal of Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Jr. (2009: p. 7) mentioning that it is not enough to the study to be based in linguistic aspect, considering not being the purpose “study the language of Law or its normative manifestation; but investigating Law itself, while required, for its language existence”. Therefore, Law is taken to the linguistic level, without however, dismissing from the investigation what is competence of the legal standard, the regulations of behavior, the possibility of conflicts, the immanent characteristics that lead us to another level, that here is presented – the discursive level. After all, asserts Ferraz Jr. (2009, p. 8): “On behalf of the laws of the regularities of language proceeds usually an investigation of the political discourse, philosophical, scientific, etc”.

And under the normative point of view, in the words of Norberto Bobbio (2014: p. 25) Law as a rule of conduct:

Approaches the legal experience and apprehend its characteristic features is to consider Law as a set of norms, or rules of conduct. Let us begin by a general statement of the genre: the legal experience is a normative experience.

Still to Bobbio and correlated to the assertion of Ferraz Jr (2009) that more important than studying the language of Law or their normative manifestation is to investigate the law itself, while requires, for its existence, of language, goes for the studies of law as a rule of conduct to capture the senses of modes like “our life develops into a world of standards” (Bobbio, 2014: p. 25). So, in the world of standards is worth even the subject’s experience with respect to the standard he established, otherwise nothing will mean, why didn’t went through own *legal experience* of which proposes.

So, although I need the subject’s experience with the world of life so that he can put himself in the communicative act and understand the meanings of the standards that you are put, rises in autonomous and heteronymous imperatives considered by Bobbio (2014: p. 91), a paradox to this positioning; yes, the category of *requirements* of legal order is very large, because they understand both the moral rules as the rules of grammar, both legal norms as a prescriptions.

This implies a change in the paradigm of Habermas, given that in the relationship of the subject with the cognitive object present in the theory of communicative action there is the predominance of free and public use of reason of the subject about the object, given the idea of subject-subject relationship for effective discursive formulation. However, what is formulated by the prescriptive legal language function, in the words of Bobbio (2014: p. 91) in this area is not discursive.

In this extension, Law shall become a phenomenon predisposed to each generation, group, culture or even individual, which depends on the development, establishment and access to content, the standard; once, to understand the legal world every culture has its unique way of expressing it and interpret it, i.e., each of which has the experience related to the world of life, although the proposition too prescriptive with regard to binding force.

[...]

So far, talk of imperatives (or commands). But the imperatives (or commands) are those prescriptions that are more binding force. This greater binding strength is expressed by saying that the behavior predicted by the imperative is required, or in other words, the imperative obligation to generate a person to whom it is addressed. Imperative and obligation are two correlative terms: where there is one, there is the other. One can express the imperative in terms of obligatory action-object (Bobbio, 2014: p. 97)

However, to Bobbio is not thrown that mostly this implies a veiling that’s behind the legal language, i.e. the prescriptive function which aims to:

presuppose knowledge of function that has the normative system to characterize a given society, and cannot be answered except through the study of the rules of conduct that have shaped the lives of those men, distinguishing it from the lives of other men, belonging to another company inserted in other normative system (Bobbio, 2014: p. 27).

In another contribution:

We believe to be free, but in reality, we are involved in a very thick network of rules of conduct, from birth to death, heading in this or that direction our actions. Most of these rules has become so habitual that we realized more of his presence. However, if we observe a little, outside, the development of a man's life by nurturing activity exerted by their parents, their teachers and so on, will realize that he develops guided by rules of conduct (Bobbio, 2014: p. 26).

In this same sense are content-related issues of mental representations of which are of the utmost importance for the Legal Science, therefore, to understand the Law interpretive possibilities is required; because the idea of pragmatic communication acts priority is only validated from the decision to put in a speech and in communicative situation, using the terms of Fernandez Jr. (2009: p. 12). And amplify, even the standards of conduct that are part of the prescriptive function intend to highlight positive or negative imperatives of both species, without, however, fail to target the legal rigor formulated experience, because they are of linguistic signs that talks. In this line, in the pragmatic dimension is the Constitution that may be significant for the legal language, why is it that people drive in the purposes of prescriptive function, whether spontaneous or compulsory membership of the selfsame thought may be the norm.

So, say that the law aims to "regulate social conduct admissible" not exempt, greatly to conceive such dynamics in the molds in social events circumscribed. On the contrary, while producer of discursive socio-cultural, as is provided for puffed admitting the complexity of human phenomena, which are: economic, social, cultural, philosophical, communicative, etc. After all if it were not the fundamental question of law would be lost, because there would be a fundamental in Exchange point. Is given to this rationale that Ferraz Junior points towards communicative situation. And in this mat is based the principle of Peirce's pragmatic, given the privilege of this dimension to the semiosis, considering how the author emphasizes, the norm as linguistic fact, incorporating the ludic dimension (Fernandez Jr., 2009: p. 12). Deserves quoting in terms of Ferdowski: "other dimensions: syntactic and semantic aspects relevant to studies of the legal standard, but stresses be pragmatics the deprecated due to the principle of interaction" (2009: p. 30).

And we add, if Law whose capacity for mediation is formalize the symbolic universe of legal order, for recognizing the man how to be "symbolic" and as such, unlike other animal species by the condition of seizure of the senses to the highest level of abstraction, the experience from this symbolic formalization, actually seized and perceived, is capable of transforming the mental world psychological, socio-cultural, and receptor interaction. Under Ricardo Souza Pereira (2012), here are the reasons why the option by the pragmatic point of view to the approach of the legal language, because if on the one hand is the very function that you intended – to prescribe, sanction, force, from the point of view of semiosis as the filing of Ferraz Jr.

As for the design of the pragmatic point of view, objective this study to be a facilitator of communication between he who emits the norm and the recipient of this, it might just be a standard receiver. However as pragmatically the end is reached, it ceases to be a mere receiver, however, to become knowledgeable of the same, which makes the Act of language, much more effective.

And likewise Law as discursive practice, socio-cultural that shall assume the function of bookie-human relations, because communicational conceives not only language and the signs as investigation of semiosis, but the interaction that conceives as media with the selfsame thought may be. For this understanding takes Carlos Eduardo Bianca Bittar which teaches:

Then one realizes that the corporeal presence of law is not as unitary, nor as homogeneously; Notice that Law something is missing when it is extracting their socio-cultural substances, expressive, discursive, politician-squeeze (...). If so, then you're faced with a phenomenon that coexists with other phenomena, some depending on other intrinsically, extracting its articulation, on others if structuring, with others living dialectically, etc. To this end, and Law at this very moment, opens a new vision for what is the reality of Law, a sense that no appeals to that artificial reality [...] (the author's original spelling). (Bittar, 2003: p. 15).

In that consent Bittar complements:

On the other hand the discursus is the use of rationality depurative of ideas, opposed to the notion of intuition (noésis); o discursus involves the cursus a proposition to another, so that all reasoning is conditioned by this route. On the other hand, the speech is understood as being logos, i.e. the transport of thought (noûs) eidetic structures to the sphere of communication, the use of the noûs in articulation of language. The logos, in fact, is the noûs done in Word, which is to say that there is a passage of the symbolic abstract and symbolic thought of noetic and the formation of ideas, for the symbolic and expressive concrete (the author's original spelling). (Bittar, 2003: p. 71)

Consequently, the process of signification (semiosis) is present on narrativity of mediations not at random, to the extent that mediation is a semiotic process-discursive, so is the process of narrativity, as a cognitive mental map not merely narrative. Because, in this map the narrativity is a property that characterizes a certain kind of speech (Greimas, 2008, p. 328), in this case, the discourse of law who writes and/or subscribe to the way in which social subjects must *know-how, could do, and should do* the discursive communication situation in legal culture, in history, in society. This model although abstract is justified to the extent that the normative Communicator (Fernandez Jr. 2009, p. 43), in this context, also happens to assume different positions within other social discourses. There are rooted the bases that make up the phenomenon of law while practice cultural discursive.

Final considerations

The Semiotics developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, conceived as logic, cannot be confused with an applied science, in the words of Santaella, whereas Peirce was effort to configure general confiscation signal concepts of the senses from the abstract-formal procedures. Meets retain in this line that the theoretical procedures of Peirce contributed to the advancement of American pragmatism, once through the triadic scheme of the sign, very different from the dyadic model of Ferdinand de Saussure, allows the relationship of semiosis (meaning) that designates an action; or an influence that supposes the cooperation of three subjects in the process: the sign,

the object and its selfsame thought may be.

This idea occurs the action of man in the world, even if only by the full experience, whereby he will call Firstness, which is nothing but things out of place or of any material (Aguilar, 2004: p. 47). However, good and takes into account the character of the sign and triple action first, because it is then a second – the Secondness that occurs by contact with something that requires a modification to the reactions, the aspect of mutual relationship. Thus, in transaction, as proposed by Araújo (2004: p. 47), Peirce mediation occurs or for modification of Firstness and Secondness, and at this level occurs the communicative processes.

Law fit in this third dimension, because it represents something that provokes, urges, modifies, persuades, creates mediations typically and genuinely features of your communicational situation, i.e. normative representation while is represented, because habit, growth, diffusion, memory, intelligence, cognition follows its Constitution deontic to argumentative validity consequently discursive. By Charles being implies the mind of another interpreter generating *sign equivalent or more developed* than Peirce (1972, p. 94) entitled as *selfsame thought may be*. And, with all this determines, the pragmatism of Peirce was presented by notorious: “the characters of all signs used by a *scientific intelligence*, that is, by an intelligence capable of learning from experience” (1977, p. 45), constitute a kind of abstraction along with the note. (Aguilar, 2004: p. 54). The Law in this area, while the third category concerns “or mediation process, continued growth and future always possible by acquiring new habits” (Santaella, 2003:p.39), standards, customs, nod, Convention, situation of communication/interaction; because through Law if represents and interprets the world of laws; is the layer of intelligibility that demand in the profusion of cognitive.

The Peirce’s Semiotics in the area of law, is a field of knowledge in development that seeks to understand the processes of signification that permeates the legal discourse. As a specific semiotics can be applied to the processes of cognition that proposes to replicate, given the cognitive potential of the human species.

In short, these approaches came to the pragmatic dimension by the fact that the complexity of discourse if appeals to the understanding of others, in the words of professor Fernandez Jr. in this context, what gives meaning of your unit is the possibility of pragmatic speech, that is, the rules make up a unit due to the possibility of fundamenting discursive behavior (Ferraz Jr., 2009: p. 20). Finally, under the angle of Pragmatics of discourse, as the author asserts, interests manifest themselves through values (2009: p. 151).

If to Norberto Bobbio prescriptive legal language function meets what you propose, that is, modify the behavior of the individual, also influence the ways as he welcomes, in this case the plays through the cognitive mechanisms, even if indirect mode, while prescription influence is direct, which means that is the language that the selfsame thought may consent in *do-do*. Or, as prescriptive function permeates the dynamics of heteronomous imperative, given that comes out of the sphere of Kantian morality: *the autonomy of the will that is the quality that has the desire to be the law itself*; toward the legislator’s speech, because *This is internal, moral legislator and legal is external*, as accentuates Bobbio.

Law as discursive practice would not change socio-cultural, since in the discursive function pragmatically immanent here contains, tell us of the Ferraz Jr.: “observations that lead us to conclusions unsatisfactory about the legitimacy taken as a justification problem last normative discourse”. (2009: p. 172).

Because, as the author (2009: p. 172) even says: “his character of endless game shows, by analogy, that any attempt to require recent standards, able to decide without any redress, on the” smoothness “of the game, about whether the game is still being played or if it is being done only in appearance, requires criteria that are not within the system, but somehow, out

of it". Well, so therein lies the placement of every speech is endowed with ideology, and given the impossibility of leaving the ideological limit, it does not give the right to become irrational and accessible the legitimacy of legal discourse, considering that for formal pragmatic need to allow participants the communication understand each other about something that the world puts; soon, culminates in the proposal for a new rationality, understood as provision of subject capable of producing and grasp the meanings of language-cognitive process, while enabling the social order.

Finally, as a producer of cultural discourses is also able to manage the *competency* of the individual in order to lead you to a *know-how* choices, analyze, share, but, above all, experience it with ethics and critical thinking. Therefore, an experiment of knowledge, which would boost the perception of culture and would relativize the standards and values of the norm of each society, taking into account the *know-how* which, moreover, understands the aesthetic experiences and stestic of this same society.

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**SEMIOTIC PARADOXES:
ANTINOMIES AND IRONIES IN
TRANSMODERN WORLD**

SEMIOTIC CHOICE AND TERMINISTIC SCREENS AS SEEN IN CROP CIRCLES

Jonathan Griffin
University of Tartu, Estonia
JGrantGriffin@gmail.com

Abstract

What is a crop circle a sign of? Responding to this question from a semiotic standpoint requires no specific conclusions from us regarding crop circles' origins. What is interesting for us here are the multiple but mutually exclusive possibilities for understanding what a crop circle is a sign of. We find logical boundaries according to which different semiotic options arise, such as 'entirely human origin' or 'not entirely human origin'. Under such logical bifurcation, we find further bifurcations which also serve as mutually exclusive options. This logical geometry tells us, perhaps, nothing about the actuality of events, but it does tell us something important about possibility, which in this sense should be seen as semiotic possibility. That is, for this dimension of possibility, we see the irrelevance of judgments from present-day physics, modern cosmology, and the like. A semiotic way of looking uncovers this logical dimension for sign possibility that we negotiate as we navigate what we encounter of the universe and as we seek to understand it. In Peircean terms, within experience we seek to work out some interpretant which will fix the *crop circle as representamen* to some object. Since multiple ways to do this exist, we find semiotic choice in some sense. Depending on what choice we make, subsequent semiotic possibilities for our world of experience will arise – certain new ones opening up and certain others being precluded. That is, a kind of semiotic filter (what Kenneth Burke called a terministic screen) will then “color” our experience and establish what we might think of as a trajectory for it. While many of us already have such filters in place which preclude for us the semiotic possibilities available in crop circles (or any other percepts), we can still see broader sign pluralities in their logical dimension and how each of them has a particular geometry for

shaping future experience. These semiotic choices we make form a greater terministic screen or interpretant according to which we order our worlds and direct our lives. We are speaking here of a form of analysis that we can use to look closely at the semiotic choices we make, the filters that arise from them, and the kind of lives that emerge as we sustain such trajectories.

Opening Remarks

What is a crop circle a sign of? This subject may set some teeth on edge by its very nature, but asking this question with a semiotic intent does not require us to speculate on the actual origins of such objects, or to be concerned about questions of alien life. While those may be worthwhile, our focus will be the sign possibilities for crop circles and how we go about making such a semiotic choice. So even though this subject is likely to be approached with either a passionate embrace or an automatically skeptical attitude, let us keep firmly in mind that we are not concerned one way or another with discovering crop circle origins. Regardless of our conclusions about that subject, the issue of semiotic possibility and how we navigate this may be relevant for us.

What is the current crop circle situation?

We should state early on what is meant by *crop circle* today for anyone who is unclear. In brief, the bulk of these formations began to appear in the second half of the 20th century, increasing in frequency during the progression from the 70s to the 90s, though precursor formations did appear earlier. While the term *circle* is still used following earlier patterns, these structures today often move beyond purely circular shapes. In fact, the complexity and the information content of these formations have increased significantly, apparent in the large 2001 Milk Hill formation comprised of 409 circles. Many people seem unaware of this complexity and have a much more basic idea of crop circles, which can lead to overly simple hoax explanations.

The epitome of such explanations came in 1991 when Doug Bower and Dave Chorley surfaced and publicly claimed that they were the ones behind more than a decade of crop circles. The method they hatched was to use wood planks, a rope, and a hat fitted with a wire to keep a straight line while pushing crops over. To demonstrate their method, they pressed out a rudimentary formation. This method can indeed account for some formations. Nevertheless, Bower and Chorley's claims (if true) are insufficient to cover either the sheer volume of such structures or the complexity and forensic evidence found in many.

One scholar with some interest in this topic is Richard Taylor, physics professor at the University of Oregon and director of their Materials Science Institute. In an article written for *Physics World* in 2011 ("Coming soon to a field near you"), Taylor mentions a "Triple Julia" fractal pattern formation that appeared overnight in 1996, and he says that even in the more than 15 years since, "scientists still do not know the answer" to how it was made (Taylor 2011: 26). After all, he says, contemporary "crop-circle designs are more complex than ever featuring up to 2000 individual shapes arranged using intricate construction lines that are invisible to the casual observer" (Taylor 2011: 29). He speculates that part of what makes this possible is access to computers, GPS, and lasers. In addition, some methods of bending stalks also appear to be inconsistent with simple force. Forensic evidence points to radiation exposure. The pulvini (or visco-elastic joints) on plant stalks "were elongated compared with undamaged crops in the same field" (Taylor 2011: 29), apparently the "result of superheating from electromagnetic radiation" (Taylor 2011: 30). Taylor's own position is that this phenomenon is a fascinating art movement that now uses microwaves. He once guessed in an article for *Nature* that masers or magnetrons may be involved. Given his concern that long-term damage is being done to crops and our food supply, his indication that scientists do not know what technology is behind

these formations reveals a real indeterminacy in this phenomenon, which opens up the field of semiotic possibility.

Contributing even further to the indeterminacy in this case is the fact that whoever is behind these creations does not step forward. For whatever reason, those responsible do not claim these often masterful works, even though people tend to want credit for such. Accordingly, Taylor's confident conclusion that human artists are responsible is not at all a given from the field of possibilities itself. The nature of the agents and their motives is not certain in the absence of more direct observation. Taylor's conclusion is in some sense a choice, a guess from a range of possibilities. Certain conclusions may be ruled out for him in principle from the outset. After all, the indeterminacy automatically leaves open multiple possibilities at a logical level, and thus semiotic possibility is compounded.

Semiotic Possibility

Intersecting with this dimension of indeterminacy, though, is a plane of logical incompatibility or mutual-exclusivity that brings stability to semiotic possibility. When we ask the question, "What is this crop circle a sign of?", we have a certain intelligible range of mutually-exclusive options. This is especially clear in relation to the crop circle's origin. Perhaps the first major plane of possibilities is Life or Non-Life, whose single case would probably be some natural force or process. On the other hand, the incompatible possibilities under Life are much broader. The first logical distinction, it seems, is between so-called Intelligent or Non-Intelligent life, with "intelligent" as shorthand for anthroposemiosis capacity. And so forth in further distinctions.

These origin possibilities have logical dividing lines between them and are thus incompatible or mutually-exclusive. In "Catalysis and scaffolding in semiosis", Kalevi Kull describes this dimension of "*incompatibility* as a fundamental precondition for semiosis" and as "itself the source of indeterminacy" (Kull 2014: 118). He makes clear, too, though, that it also brings in logical clarity, for "the simultaneous application" of two exclusive possibilities "would lead to logical incompatibility" (Kull 2014:118). In this way, incompatibility gives a clarity to the semiotic possibilities without resolving any questions of indeterminacy. There remains the question, then, of how the various semiotic possibilities get collapsed into specifics – that is, how are meaning choices made? In the presence of various options that have not been collapsed by direct observation, how is it that we come to establish that a crop circle indicates one thing rather than its converse? Given the wide range of possibilities, how do humans actually affix some particular meanings rather than others that they exclude? Answering this question thoroughly would require more time than we have now, but hopefully we can make a good beginning.

Terministic Screens

We should recognize here that whenever we encounter even our first crop circle, we may already have certain semiotic possibilities excluded from our view. That is, in terms of logical possibility, the formation may have been created by a non-human, extraterrestrial life form. Nevertheless, if we have concluded against the existence of such life forms in our previous semiosis, no such sign possibility will appear to us. It will be, in effect, screened out from the beginning. No such option was even considered and then ruled out. Kull has described this process as "singularization", saying that "a sign may become very rigid, which means that the plurality of meanings has decreased and can ultimately collapse into a single meaning. Then the process becomes automatic (mechanical)" (Kull 2014: 118). The resulting role such fixed meanings play in our subsequent semiosis overlaps with what Kenneth Burke means when he speaks of terministic screens. He tells us that every time we choose some terminology for understanding the world, we necessarily make "a selection of reality, and to this extent it must

function also as a *deflection of reality*" (Burke 1966: 45). Burke has in mind the way a colored lens filters a photograph and reveals some textures rather than others, directing the attention in some specific way. Certain semiotic possibilities emerge for us while others are filtered out.

The semiotic choices we have previously made screen out other meaning possibilities, and these screens are in place even as we encounter new situations. Certain planes of meaning are no longer even options, and the meaning landscape morphs for us, thus also shaping experience—that is, what that experience *will be like*. And inasmuch as volition is always involved, the vast panoply of our motivations play a role in what semiotic decisions we make and what meanings then arise. Our desires, our commitments, what we refuse to see or not to see – all these play a role in how we build our own experiential world. So if we encounter a crop circle embedded in sufficient indeterminacy to support multiply incompatible conclusions, the semiotic choices from our life so far may at the outset restrict the field of potential meanings so that our present conclusion is a given – not from the present situation's evidence but with our terministic screens providing the primary evidence. If, perhaps, we encounter this crop circle without having made any relevant semiotic choices in the past, any choices we do make about what this crop circle is a sign of will then shape subsequent semiosis and color experience. For instance, once I have decided that all crop circles are the work of aliens (or hoaxers), I am likely to automatically filter experience accordingly. It will take a substantial challenge to my conclusions to cause a reworking of my filters. And the longer they are maintained, the more difficult they are to restructure.

Concluding Remarks

It should be clear, now, that we see here a general theme with implications far wider and more important than how we see crop circles. Rather, the way we make sign choices when given any semiotic indeterminacy and possibility will restrict what meaning can actually exist in our world. And this will shape *what it is like* to be in that world. But this will also have an impact on the semioses around us. When we make semiotic choices toward the most destructive possibilities, we help create that world. In so doing, we might even preclude all but the more destructive options for others, thus coloring their world of experience in darker terms. But for semiotic creatures, inward realities shape outward ones as we corporately build objective structures. In viewing a crop circle, some of us may find certain options of meaning excluded at the outset, and maybe that is okay. It is how we learn and grow as bounded-rational creatures. But since meanings shape both inward and outward experience for ourselves and for others, we have good reason to stand in vigilant watch over what kind of world our screens help to create.

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VISUAL SEMIOTICS

GENDERING THE NATION: FEMALE REPRESENTATIONS ON CYPRUS POSTAGE STAMPS

Sonia Andreou
Cyprus University of Technology
ss.andreou@edu.cut.ac.cy

Stephanie Stylianou
Cyprus University of Technology
sm.stylianou@edu.cut.ac.cy

Eviprides Zantides
Cyprus University of Technology
evripides.zantides@cut.ac.cy

Abstract

The proposed case study aims to discuss the ways and roles in which the female figure is represented in postage stamps produced in Cyprus, after state independence in 1960. While female role portrayals have been examined in the local culture in the forms of lifestyle magazines and radio advertisements (Maniou & Photiou, 2013), the potential interest of a postage stamp analysis has been overlooked. However it is important to note, that the social role of women of Cyprus is documented and analysed using theoretical framework in a number of studies and books. The current study is based on the notion that ties the importance of the selection of postage stamp representation with a nation's profile. As Bushnell argues (2011), the postage stamp designs produced in order to represent a nation's image are chosen following decisions essentially made by formal committees of experts and civic personalities. As a result, the figures and symbols recruited are obviously "revealing to one extent or another political and cultural values in a society". In the analysis/interpretation of the data a combination of methodologies was employed, namely content and semiotic analysis. A sample of 158 plates was selected from a corpus of 1.121 postage stamps printed from 1960 until 2013, all of which feature at least one recognizable female figure. The starting year 1960 stands as a landmark in the island's history

and it signals the beginning of state independence. The postage stamps, as well as information regarding their production, were collected from the Cyprus Postal Museum and the Cyprus' Ministry of Communications and Works publications. Upon close examination of the female iconography on the postage stamps the research reveals a strong preference for specific roles, intricately related to the country's socio-cultural context, including religion, heritage and prevailing social norms, but also to specific historical experiences and national imaginings.

1. Introduction

This paper proposes a closer examination of the female roles preferred in the case of Cyprus postage stamp design, starting from the landmark date for the island's history – 1960 (state independence) – until recent years, more specifically 2013. The researchers have collected a corpus of 1.121 postage stamps in total, including definitive and commemorative issues. The rationale behind this selection is based on the historical background of the country. The year 1960 was chosen as a proverbial starting point, because it marks the end of the colonial period and the start of Cyprus's history as an independent state, following the Zurich agreement signed on the 16th August of 1960.

Upon this agreement, the newly-funded Republic of Cyprus began printing its very own postage stamps. The three first designs were presented on the very same day that the Zurich agreement was signed (Castle 1987).

It should be at this point noted the role and importance of the postage stamp and consequently its design for a country's status, especially when we are discussing newly funded states. Although, the postage stamp seems to be a neglected medium of research in comparison to a country's official touristic branding, its flag or even numismatics, can and should be read as a text with significant political purposes transmitted through the images they depict (Deans and Dobson 2005). The stamps are a provider of national identity as they are simultaneously government documents and representatives of the country, which they have been published as symbols of the state's "official culture" (Osmond 2008). While, postage stamps are to be considered a strong vehicle for the transmission of national identity they have also recently been acknowledged as objects of popular culture (Child 2012).

The principal motivation that encouraged this study was the lack of substantial and rigorously documented bibliography as far as Cyprus is concerned, both, regarding the field of postage stamp design as well as female representation in stamp design. However, it needs to be acknowledged that role portrayals have been examined in the local culture in the forms of lifestyle magazines and radio advertisements in recent years (Maniou and Photiou 2013).

Moreover the social role of the Cypriot woman has been discussed using theoretical frameworks in a number of studies and books, such as *The Cypriot Woman: A Research* (Milona et al. 1982). The specific work is quite seminal and has been the base for a number of studies concerning the island. It investigates the psychosocial conditions in the country through the years, attempting to gain a deeper understanding of the Cypriot mentality in respect of the woman's social role and status.

We are attempting to link our findings with the social status of women in Cypriot society as this is documented and shown in relevant theoretical framework. Interestingly enough the publication of Cyprus's first postage stamp came in parallel with the decision that the women of Cyprus are guaranteed to have voting rights equal to those of men (Γεωργίου 2013). Interestingly, Koliou (2006) remarks that the patriarchal model is still quite dominant in Cypriot society and this is evident both within the institution of family and general society practices as relevant studies show.

2. Literature review

A rather small amount of researches concerning the portrayal of women on stamps has been documented in worldwide bibliography although the findings are without a doubt enlightening.

Theorist David Bushnell (2011) traces the development of “philatelic feminism”, regarding Argentina, Colombia, Cuba and the United States of America in his own study. The author argues that while a country’s postage stamp design actually constitutes a bureaucratic decision, it can reveal and even influence political and cultural values in the range of a specific society. Bushnell finds a significant increase in the usage of female figures in the postage stamps of the United States and Cuba, especially after the 1940’s. Also a lack of international female figures in the United States postage stamps and diversity in the representation of professions is documented. In contrast, countries such as Cuba and Argentina tend to use more international figures instead of native famous personalities. Bushnell believes that the decision of placing an actual female figure on the postage stamp design constitutes a general recognition of feminine accomplishments in the past century and also an effort to be seen in a favourable light not only by feminist movements, but additionally by the general female population of the country. While this may be true let us not forget that feminine figures were and still are employed countless times to represent allegories, with liberty being one of the more popular ones in various countries.

Ogletree, Merritt and Roberts (1994) in their study *Female/male portrayals on U.S. postage stamps of the twentieth century* have found that gender representation on the United States’ postage stamps is consistent with the general tendencies of female/male portrayal in other forms of media, throughout the 20th century. As could be expected, male oriented representations are predominately more; the traditional role representations are significantly higher than non-traditional ones, but note a small decline concerning the traditional male portrayals after the 1980’s. According to the authors, the findings indicate a general awareness towards gender bias and this fact alone reflects views formulated in the specific society under consideration.

3. Method and definitions

The entire corpus was studied without sampling taking place. The reason for this decision lies in the framework the authors wanted to investigate, that is all the postage stamps issued by the Republic of Cyprus since its independence till present day. The researchers have chosen to include both definitive issues as well as commemorative. The term “definitive” refers to a postage stamp that belongs to the regular issues of the state, it is sold by all the post offices within the country for a long period of time and it serves everyday postal needs. On the other hand, a commemorative postage stamp is issued by the state for a limited time period in order to commemorate or honour an important person or event (Carlton 1997).

The authors have taken a sample of 158, clearly depicting one or more female figures. The criteria for this choice were for the representation to be easily recognisable as female, thus excluding portrayals that did not possess any easily understandable female characteristics. Furthermore, the researchers did not consider stamp designs that simply reproduced earlier postage stamps depictions for the coding to be valid.

The 158 postage stamps selected to be included in the research were divided into twelve categories, rated by two coders separately. An inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among the two coders. The inter-rater reliability for the coders was found to be Kappa = 1.000 ($p < .001$), 95% CI (0.078, 0.182) (See Symmetric Measures, Appendix A).

The categorization was based on the relevant study of Ogletree, Roberts and Merritt (1994), although, it had to be modified in order to accommodate the main topics that emerged from the corpus. These categories are the following:

1. Individuals
2. Religion – representations deriving from Greek Orthodox religion
3. Greek Mythology – female representations featuring or inspired by the sphere of Greek mythology
4. Allegory

The particular category was further divided into two subcategories:

CATEGORY	QUANTITY	%
Individuals	14	8.9
Religion	64	40.5
Greek Mythology	30	18.9
Allegory	3	1.9
· <i>Symbol of beauty</i>	1	0.6
· <i>Symbol of freedom</i>	2	1.3
Spouse and/or parenthood	8	5.1
· <i>Motherhood</i>	5	3.2
Education	1	0.6
Historical events	2	1.3
Social themes	6	3.8
· <i>Refugee</i>	4	2.5
Professions	6	3.8
Women in sports	4	2.5
Traditional Culture (Cyprus)	14	8.9
Other	6	3.8
TOTAL	158	100

Table 1: Numbers and percentages of female representation by stamp category

According to our results the overwhelming majority of female representations were found mainly in stamps illustrating religious themes. The number is 40.5%, out of which 59 solely focus on the portrayal of Virgin Mary, while the 5 stamps remaining show Saint Lazarus's sisters. Other anonymous female figures depicted on religious scenes do not hold significant roles (anonymous female figures).

The second largest category was predictably the one associated with *Greek Mythology*, 18.9%. The design of these postage stamps is influenced by various myths deriving from the Ancient Greece, concerning the nature of the world in the form of stories about native gods and heroes attempting to explain universal mysteries in a semi-didactic manner. Aphrodite the goddess of love and beauty is the one that holds higher position and appears more often in contrast to other mythological female characters (10 of 30 postage stamps).

The next category entitled *Individuals* is represented by 8.9%, and presents particular interest due to the fact that depictions showing actual Cypriot women are very few. Only 3 out of 14 images contain a female figure that could be a Cypriot, whether celebrated or anonymous. The majority of the representations under this category are recognisable international figures such as Diana Princess of Wales (1961–1997), Queen Elizabeth II (1926–) and Mother Teresa (1910–1997). The only known female figures on postage stamps that are actually Cypriot come from two vastly different contexts. The first postage stamp was published in 1996 and is honouring a

lesser known Cypriot hero with the name 'Maria Sygklitiki', *Μαρία η Συγκλητική*. The second female portrayal on a postage stamp is this of visually impaired Paralympic winner Karolina Pelendritou (1986–).

The fourth category documented concentrates on images deriving from the traditional-folklore Cyprus culture and is represented with 8.9%. Many of those postage stamps are dedicated to the regional costumes that can be found across the island.

The subsequent category *Spouse and/or parenthood* features 5.1% of the corpus. It depicts women participating in aspects of the institution of traditional family such as marriage and parenthood with the necessity of the presence of a male figure. However, a group of these stamps show the female as a mother figure bonding with a child without the presence of a male counterpart.

The next two categories *Professions* and *Social Themes* both rank 3.8% each. The first group depicts a number of professions, some of them linked with tradition, such as the profession of the needlewomen (traditional Cyprus embroidery) and farmers, as well as nurses shown in two cases tending exclusively on male children. The social themes category is further divided in the stamps that present the issues of providing care for the elderly and AIDS campaigns for the alert and its treatment. The other four remaining postage stamps are solely focused on the image of the woman going through the experience of being a refugee. These depictions are related with the 1974 Turkish invasion and the displacement of hundreds of Cypriots.

The group *Women in Sports* features 2.5% of the corpus and celebrates the female participation in major athletic events such as the Olympic Games of Los Angeles (1984), Atlanta (1996) and Sydney (2000). It is important to note that, the Republic of Cyprus issued postage stamps for all the other Olympiads since 1960 as well as Commonwealth Games, but female figures were not presented.

The *Allegory* thematic group with the total amount of 1.9% contains representations that show women having allegorical and metaphorical meanings or being the symbols of a broader idea or notion. The first subcategory consisting of two postage stamps (1.3%) uses the female figure in order to allegorically portray the idea of freedom and fight for liberation.

The second subcategory contains only one postage stamp (0.6%) and is entitled *Woman as a Symbol of Beauty*. It illustrates an abstract female figure wearing a crown and was issued for the event of Miss Universe contest (2000) which was held in Nicosia, Cyprus.

The *Historical Events* group consists of two stamps only, (1.3%). The first postage stamp is focused on an engraving entitled *The Confession* first published in the British newspaper *Illustrated London News* in 1878. During that period Cyprus was becoming part of United Kingdom's protectorate after the Ottoman Empire has agreed to give away the island in exchange for military support. The particular illustration was part of a bigger collection published by the newspaper and was supposedly depicting the day of the regime's change in a pseudo – documentary way. The second stamp commemorates the 40th anniversary of EOKA's (an organization that fought for the self-determination of the island) formation.

The education category on the other hand, although consisting of one stamp only (0.6%) shows more interest in terms of postage stamp design and consequently the female representation as it seems to reflect other relevant studies.

The last category is entitled *Other* and features 3.8% of the entire corpus. It is composed of postage stamps that could not be easily assigned in a specific category by either of the two coders.

5. A semiotic look on selected stamps

During the content analysis the researchers came upon some interesting findings concerning the biggest thematic category of Cyprus postage stamps. The group that deals with depictions

deriving from Greek Orthodox Christianity's repertoire counts 64 stamps, the majority of which represent the Virgin Mary (59 postage stamps). The rather large amount of stamps is significant as it shows a preference for dominantly religious thematic groups. This fact seems to illuminate the high position that religion and the Church hold in Cypriot society. Interestingly enough the portrayals of Madonna seem to have a direct influence on the separate groups that depict women as mother figures and refugees.

The image of Virgin Mary seems to have the maternal dimension of her personality as the dominant quality, making her accessible to the pilgrim not unlike an ordinary woman who understands humanity's anguish. According to the study conducted by Ioli Kalavrezou (1990) on Virgin Mary's status in religion, her role as 'Holy Vessel', *Θεοτόκος*, shifted to accommodate the image of a Mother for all the believers, thus changing her title to 'Mother of God', *Μήτηρ Θεού*, during the period of Iconoclasm (8th century). This introduction of Mary as a now accessible, understanding and sentimental motherly figure was slow and is reflected on the distinctive iconography of each period. The role of Virgin Mary as a strong mother figure is additionally indicated by the Gospels (PG 100, col. 1476D), where Jesus Christ while addressing Saint John exclaims: "Here is your Mother", and then towards Virgin Mary "Woman, here is your son". Christ himself goes on to explain the above statement: "Be for them what all that mothers are naturally for their children" (Kalavrezou 1990).

In the subsequent section, the authors will attempt to showcase the influence that the major thematic group of religious representations and specifically the ones highlighting Virgin Mary's role as a mother figure have on other stamp categories. In particular, the authors have chosen to demonstrate this relation by presenting two postage stamps from two different categories.

The first example (figure 1) is a postage stamp designed by A. Tassos and issued on the 28th of April 1975, almost a year after the Turkish invasion and features a work by the Cypriot painter George Paul Georgiou. Starting from the title of the image *Virgin and Child from Liopetri*, sometimes referred to as *Virgin Mary from Liopetri* we can spot connotations with both the figure of Madonna and the notion of been a refugee, as Liopetri is a village situated in the geographical district of Famagusta, thus certainly been affected by both the invasion and occupation. On a first level of analysis we can easily note how the pose prepares the reader to perceive the connotations of a signified (Barthes 1983). The way the woman is holding the child has clear connotations with the idea of motherhood and could be linked to the caring and loving way Virgin Mary herself is holding Baby Jesus. The woman is almost attaching the child to her body in a protective manner and their heads are tenderly touching as in gentle embrace.



Fig. 1: *Virgin and Child from Liopetri*, 28 April 1975, A. Tassos.

On a deeper level of analysis we can notice the meaning constructed by colours and the values they help to create (Barthes 1988). Nevertheless, we should always have in mind how

colours tend to create a multitude of codes, depending on the societies and cultures they are used by. There definitely are broader trends and tendencies with the aid of which psychologists and other researchers attempt to construct a single and universal “language of colours”, but there are still colour associations with limited contexts (Leeuwen 2011).

Starting from the main figure, which is the mother or according to the title of the postage stamp *the Virgin*, we can notice that she is having her hair covered with a black scarf. This sign has clear connotations of death, in this context the demise of a close family member, most probably a husband (Pastoureau 2008). Additionally, the rest of the woman’s clothing points to a poor and socially low background. More specifically, she is wearing the traditional rubber boots usually worn by land workers and farmers. The child she carries is simply wearing a white shirt alluding to the values of colour white, such as innocence and pureness of soul (Beasley and Danesi 2002).

Next to the group of figures which seems to be almost compressed by their own frame, a candleholder is standing. On the level of iconology which takes into account the cultural and historical context of the image (Panofsky 1939), this item is rather significant as it is a part of the Divine Liturgy process of the Greek Orthodox religion and it alludes once more to the spiritual nature of the woman/Virgin. The main colours of the depiction are a combination of burgundy and gold, related to religious imagery, while the background is a deep hue of purple usually signalling emotional devastation and mourning (Gage 1999).



Fig. 2: *Mother and Child on the way of becoming refugees*,
7 October 1991, A. A. Ioannidis.

The second example presented (figure 2) is a postage stamp designed by A. A. Ioannidis, issued on the 7th of October 1991 on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The engraving featured on the stamp is in black and white, a colour combination that tends to be associated with notions such as mourning and loss (Gage 1999). The postage stamp is entitled *Mother and Child on their way of becoming refugees*. This title is intersemiotically translated (Jakobson 1959) by placing in the middle of the picture a group of tents, used as temporary housing in emergency situations, more specifically a war in our case – 1974. Furthermore, the framework is deliberately narrowed down in order to be associated only with the refugees of Cyprus stopping the production of any other associations. This is achieved by placing the outline of the island’s shape next to the woman’s figure making it clear to the viewer that we are discussing the Cypriot refugees. This type of depictions could be associated with the second biggest trauma of 1974, a trauma that is gender-specific and relates to the inability of women to accomplish their role as caretakers. As Cockburn (2004) asserts during that period the mother was considered the primary caretaker of the children due to the fact that men were forced into military recruitment, having as a consequence for the mother to be experiencing the anxiety of keeping the children safe as her main responsibility.

By showcasing the visual examples deriving from the categories *Motherhood* and *Refugee*, the researchers attempted to demonstrate the link between those categories with the largest thematic group of the corpus that is *Religion*. Furthermore, going to a more spiritual level it seems that in some cases the female figure serves as a metaphorical vehicle for the mother's pain while employing forms and even phrases that allude to Virgin Mary and her own loss of a child.

6. Discussion

The researchers have been able to draw some general observations regarding the nature of the postage stamp as a modest or low key cultural memorial, especially, in the field of female representation in the Cyprus context. The images represented on the postage stamps are proving to be individually ephemeral but simultaneously substantial reflections of the society that produced them (Deans and Dobson 2005). One of the major reasons for conducting this research in the first place proved to be a big obstacle in the end, and this has been the lack of significant literature. However as mentioned before, our findings were able to be linked with the results given by the few relevant literacies concerning Cyprus.

According to other researches the Cypriot female tends to have a secondary role in contrast with the Cypriot male within the family institution, as well as the society and this is reflected by the small corpus the researchers were able to gather. She is associated with strongly emotional values (Milona et al. 1982). According to sociologists Lia Milona's research (1982) the female Cypriot believes that motherhood is her main goal in life and her biggest achievement. The 80% of the participants – all of them female – answered that having a child reinforces their status within the family and society, as they complete their natural role and destiny. Furthermore, the 44% of the participating women consider the birth and catering of the children as the biggest happiness of their lives.

As documented in international literature women tend to feel quite closer with their respected religion in comparison to male believers. This might be caused by the man's traditional role as the one who is a more active citizen and far more controlled by social laws. The traditional female tends to be regarded as the member of the family who is regulated much more by laws and norms deriving from the ethos of her religion (Hamilton 1978). As Milona (1982) asserts the female's role in patriarchal communities is tied with the domestic environment and this brings her closer to the spiritual realm of the religion. The 82% of the participants – female Cypriots – tends to believe that they are very religious, feel extremely close to God, and the institution of Church. As the postage stamp is considered a product of the official state and according to some researchers also a part of popular culture (Child 2005, 2012) definitely reflects social attitudes towards women within the Cyprus contexts. In this sense the subtle messages that postage stamps convey might potentially impact users/members of a society and their understanding of the type of male/female roles that are being sent (Ogletree, Roberts, and Merritt 1994).

Additionally, the results might be hints to uncover aspects concerning the social status of both sexes in the Cyprus context and the ideologies behind them. The female figure seems to be a large part of the postage stamps' representations in Cyprus holding important and key roles as a symbol of motherhood. However, the corpus following fifty three years (1960–2013) does not document and honour significantly any fights or accomplishments of the female gender. What is more not even known Cypriot women who excel in their respected fields are commemorated.

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Appendix A

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
CODER 1 * CODER 2	158	100,0%	0	0,0%	158	100,0%

CODER 1 * CODER 2 Crosstabulation

			CODER 2		Total
			0	1	
CODER 1	0	Count	138	0	138
		% within CODER 1	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%
		% within CODER 2	100,0%	0,0%	87,3%
	1	Count	0	20	20
		% within CODER 1	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% within CODER 2	0,0%	100,0%	12,7%
Total	Count	138	20	158	
	% within CODER 1	87,3%	12,7%	100,0%	
	% within CODER 2	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Asymp. Std. Error ^a	Approx. T ^b	Approx. Sig.
Measure of Agreement Kappa	1,000	0,000	12,570	,000
N of Valid Cases	158			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

Appendix B

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18/12/2014

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Παραχώρηση άδειας χρήσης εικόνων γραμματοσήμων

Από: **miraculous@dps.mcw.gov.cy** εκ μέρους **philatelic@dps.mcw.gov.cy**

Εστάλη: Τρίτη, 16 Δεκεμβρίου 2014 11:00:00 πμ

Προς: **andreousonia@hotmail.com**

Κυρία Ανδρέου,

Έχω οδηγίες να αναφερθώ στην επιστολή σας ημερ. 8 Δεκεμβρίου 2014 με την οποία ζητάτε άδεια χρήσης απεικονίσεων γραμματοσήμων σχετικών με τη λαϊκή κουλτούρα της Κύπρου.

Σας πληροφορώ ότι η άδεια για απεικόνιση των γραμματοσήμων σας παραχωρείται, νοουμένου ότι η απεικόνιση δεν θα είναι στο ίδιο μέγεθος με τα γραμματόσημα δηλαδή πρέπει να είναι μικρότερα ή μεγαλύτερα από το μέγεθος που εκδόθηκαν και να φέρουν διαγώνια γραμμή.

Μαρία Ηρακλέους
για Διευθυντή
Τμήματος Ταχυδρομικών Υπηρεσιών

INTERPRETANTS AND THIRDNESS IN THE WORLD OF THE QUANTA

Baranna Baker
Independent Researcher, USA
(barannabaker@gmail.com)

Abstract

Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr and Charles Saunders Peirce: What do these men, separated by both a continent and time, all have in common? Fundamentally, the ability to see universal concepts in completely novel ways. All were revolutionary thinkers with the ability to strike to the core of the fundamental elements of what makes up existence. The common thread between all three: the universal – pure being, what the Latins referred to as *esse*. Being is the essence of life itself. Yet when we get down to the most basic, sub-atomic level of being itself, we arrive at the ultimate paradox of existence: that between how things seem to be and how they truly are. Peirce died in 1914, at the very advent of quantum physics. Bohr was just out of college then at 29, and Heisenberg was only 13. Peirce left the world his theory of signs, just as Bohr was beginning to explore the world of the atom, and Heisenberg was taking his first basic science classes. Heisenberg later befriended Bohr, but neither man met Peirce, and their revolutionary discoveries about the quantum world were published years after Peirce discovered that existence consists of the triadic action of signs. Yet Peirce's concepts of the interpretant and Thirdness mesh strangely well with Bohr and Heisenberg's Copenhagen Interpretation of the discoveries of quantum physics, with its emphasis on the role of the observer. For what Bohr and Heisenberg discovered about the basic fundamentals of nature seems to validate Peirce's belief that, no matter how closely one looked at the world, no matter how strong a microscope one put it under, what one would find would be the action of signs. It is indeed by this action that the world moves from chaotic randomness to concrete wholeness. The ultimate paradox of being itself is therefore found in the triadic action of signs.

[...]the basic changes in modern science must yet be considered as expressions of changes in our very existence and thus as affecting every realm of life. If this be the case, even those who try to fathom the essence of nature creatively or philosophically must take notice of the changes in the scientist's idea of nature that have taken place during the last two decades.

Werner Heisenberg ([1958] 1970)

[...]we meet in experimental evidence concerning atomic particles with regularities of a novel type, incompatible with deterministic analysis. These quantal laws determine the peculiar stability and reactions of atomic systems, and are thus ultimately responsible for the properties of matter on which our means of observation depends.

Niels Bohr ([1963] 1987)

[...]the highest grade of reality is only reached by signs[...]

Charles Sanders Peirce to Lady Victoria Welby ([1904, Oct. 12] 1977)

Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr and Charles Saunders Peirce: What do these men, separated by both a continent and time, all have in common? Fundamentally, the ability to see universal concepts in completely novel ways, blending philosophy and mathematics with scientific and creative inquiry in ways never dreamt of before. All were revolutionary thinkers with the ability to strike to the core of the paradox of what makes up existence. The common thread between all three: the universal, pure being, what the Latins referred to as *esse*. They all played on their skiff of musement, as Peirce would say, searching for the keys to the universe, and all, in their own way, finding them. Peirce died in 1914, at the very advent of quantum physics. Bohr was just out of college then at 29, and Heisenberg was only 13. Peirce left the world his theory of signs, just as Bohr was beginning to explore the world of the atom, and Heisenberg was taking his first basic science classes. Heisenberg later befriended Bohr, but neither man met Peirce, and their revolutionary discoveries about the quantum world were published years after Peirce discovered that the world consists of the triadic action of signs. Yet Peirce's concepts of the interpretant and thirdness mesh strangely well with the paradox of Bohr and Heisenberg's atomic theory, with its emphasis on the role of the observer. For the paradox that Bohr and Heisenberg found at the root of all existence seems to validate Peirce's belief that, no matter how closely one looked at the world, no matter how strong a microscope one put it under, what one would find would be the action of signs.

In order to understand how Peirce's semiotics fits into Bohr and Heisenberg's world of the quanta, we must discover first what that world consists of. The atom is made up of a proton, a neutron and multiple electrons swirling around the former two in a chaotic pattern of randomness. (Atomic particles much smaller than these have since been discovered; most exhibit the same, strange, erratic behavior as the randomly orbiting electron.) What Bohr and Heisenberg simultaneously discovered (while on a forced vacation from one another) was that there was one thing that seemed to stop the elusive electron in its tracks: observation (or as Bohr put it, the measuring apparatus). This was the only explanation for the quantum weirdness exhibited by the electron when tests were performed on it. What the two formulated on their separate retreats was what came to be known as The Copenhagen Interpretation. It incorporated Bohr's Principle of Complementarity with Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and came to the conclusion that

the world, at its smallest level, was statistical and uncertain, not objective in the way Newtonian mechanics had claimed for centuries. The objective world we experience simply does not exist at the most basic levels of existence. The building blocks for the world we experience as concrete are as effervescing as air. This idea was puzzling, to say the least, even to the two men involved. Heisenberg quotes Bohr as saying, "If you think you understand quantum mechanics, you have not understood quantum mechanics." (1970)

In addition, The Copenhagen Interpretation claimed that to refer to the idea of the physicality of atomic matter at all is an oxymoron. Atoms, the building blocks of the world, have nothing that corresponds with the idea of matter. And yet they are the basis of every substance we see, including ourselves. The realization Bohr and Heisenberg both came to was that the Newtonian world of material things does not exist at all until someone looks for it. The world we live in is observer-created. Heisenberg puts it succinctly, in *The Physicist's Concept of Nature*, when he says:

It has become clear that the desired objective reality of the elementary particles is too crude an oversimplification of what really happens, and that it must give way to very much more abstract conceptions. For if we wish to form a picture of the nature of these elementary particles, we can no longer ignore the physical processes through which we obtain our knowledge of them. (1970)

Bohr, in his philosophical writings puts it thus: "Far from involving any special intricacy, the irreversible amplification effects on which the recording of the presence of atomic objects rests rather remind us of the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation." (1987) But how on earth could this paradox possibly be? What proof led these two brilliant men to come to this startling conclusion at the same time, separated by miles of distance?

Heisenberg and Bohr's ideas were their responses to a little quantum experiment known as the double-slit experiment, which illustrated that electrons appear as waves of probability when not observed, but show up as particles when someone looks for them. The experiment is set-up thus: On one side of a barrier wall with two perpendicular slits in it is a hot tungsten filament that shoots out electrons. On the other is a television screen that records any electron that comes in contact with it. With one slit closed, electrons are projected at the wall, and those that get through the hole are recorded as dots on the screen. One after another, the electrons are propelled through the hole, and each time they appear as particles. However, open both slits and something strange happens. Instead of recording a series of dots left by individual electrons, an *interference* pattern appears, as would appear when two ocean waves overlap while hitting a wall. Instead of individual particles hitting the screen resembling the pattern that little bullets fired through the hole by a machine gun would show, a target pattern is found, such as one would see should one direct a wave of water at a wall. But these are not waves of matter the screen is detecting, but waves of probability that the electron will show up at any given place on the screen. And it is not that the little particles of electrons are moving through the barriers, one-by-one, like they are surfers riding a wave. Each electron actually spreads out in a wave-like fashion and goes through both holes at once. Talk about a paradox, indeed!

If reality is objective, as Newtonian mechanics suggested, then this experiment makes no logical sense. Once a particle, always a particle. The same machine gun-like pattern should be seen whether we open slit one, open slit two or open them both at once. But this is not what happens. However, when we set-up a detection mechanism at the other side of the two open holes

to see which one the electron is going through, what we see is one electron after the other going through either hole one or hole two. Basically, when we are looking to see what happens, the particle acts like a particle, when we turn off the detecting mechanism, the particle turns into a wave. Now you see it; now you do not! This is quantum weirdness, the ultimate paradox, at its best. Look for a particle, you see a particle; turn your gaze away, and the particle turns into a wave. The electron is both particle and wave at the same time. This kills any idea of an objective world, making it literally impossible for us to visualize what is happening on the atomic level. The final paradox of reality is that we can never see reality in its primal state.

Here, Peirce's idea of the *interpretant* suddenly becomes fundamental in order for the world to exist for us at all. The interpretant is what Peirce calls the mental connection that exists between a sign and its observer. Peirce sees this act of consciousness as an idea of something, which links the two together, but what if the meaning of interpretant is expanded to encompass the idea of the mere observation of something, before conscious thought occurs at all? Then particles become particles, when we engage the interpretant and look for them. Omit the interpretant, and particles turn into waves. Peirce's triadic action of signs then becomes an explanation for how the world exists for us as we experience it: solid, objective, Newtonian to the core. As Peirce, paraphrasing Kant, says, "All cognition of objects is relative that is we know things only in their relations to us." ([1868] 1991) We only know of objects via the action of the interpretant (an observation), which connects sign-vehicle (the waves of quantum particles) to the sign (the object we see), making it cognitive to us. It explains what Heisenberg means when he states:

We can no longer speak of the behavior of the particle independently of the process of observation. As a final consequence, the natural laws formulated mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary particles themselves but with our knowledge of them. Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not these particles exist in space and time objectively, since the only process we can refer to as taking place are those that represent the interplay of particles with some other physical system. (1970)

The interpretant, in the form of an observation, is therefore central to our apprehension of the world. It is what allows us to visualize things objectively. To walk around touching tabletops, and marbles and other hard surfaces, which are actually made of nothing but probability waves composed mainly of empty space. Peirce describes the interpretant as the "appeal of a sign to the mind", saying thus:

Let us now see what the appeal of a sign to the mind amounts to. It produces a certain idea in the mind, which is the idea that it is a sign of the thing it signifies and an idea is itself a sign, for an idea is an object and it represents an object. The idea itself has its material quality, which is the feeling that there is in thinking. (1991)

We look for something, the interpretant engages it, and there it is. Only Peirce's triadic set-up of sign, sign-vehicle and interpretant makes this idea even slightly comprehensible. Peirce goes on to say, "Thus our mere sensations are only the material quality of our ideas considered as signs. Our ideas have also a causal connection with the things that they represent without which there would be no real knowledge." (1991)

The paradox here is that, without the interpretant, the material world, as we know it does not exist at all.

Another of Peirce's concepts further aids us in better understanding the world at the atomic level. Here the link is what Peirce called *thirdness*. Peirce explains it in the following manner:

I should define Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness thus: Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other. (1991)

In the case at hand, *firstness* is the world at the atomic level. *Secondness* is the objective world as we experience it and *thirdness* is our observation of it, which transforms the First into the Second.

The idea of firstness being life at the atomic level meshes well with Peirce's thoughts on the matter. He says

The unanalyzed total impression made by any manifold not thought of as actual fact, but simply as a quality, as simple positive possibility of appearance is an idea of Firstness. Note the *naïveté* of Firstness.[...]The idea of the present instant, which, whether it exists or not, is naturally thought as a point in time in which no thought can take place or any detail be separated, is an idea of Firstness. (1991)

Note how the words *positive possibility* parallel nicely with the *potential* or *probability* so predominant in the laws of quantum physics. Firstness is the state the world is in when it is totally unanalyzed – i.e. unobserved. The quantum world is truly the manifold of all existence, yet in many ways, it is no more than a quality. It is no more than an appearance on a television screen of an interference pattern that suggests what electrons do when unobserved. There is a certain *naïveté* involved on the electrons' part. They only seem aware of being particles when we stop and take a look at them. They do exist in the present instant, that moment before we consciously look for them. And the quantum world is indeed interconnected without any appearance of separation; the most minute particles known to us will sometimes split due to a crash collision amongst two electrons, sending one half of the particle clear across the globe. Yet the now separated particles still continue to affect one another. The ultimate state of firstness, it would appear, is found at the atomic level.

The atomic world fits so well into the world of signs, it is startling. Peirce describes the First thus:

The First must be therefore present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation...It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free...It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation: it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence...Stop to think of it, and it has flown. (1991)

The quantum world is everywhere, all the time. It permeates all we are and do. It has always existed since time began. It was here at the birth of the universe and will continue until its death. Everything we interact with and are surrounded by is composed of it, including ourselves. It is second to none. It is literally the source all the triadic relations that make up our world spring from. It is spontaneous to the extreme, with its freely moving particles of probability waves. It is the initiative, the very beginning act, necessary in order that anything else exist. It is firstness incarnate, preceding all other form of existence. It cannot be differentiated, yet it has no unity. It is primeval, indivisible. It has no parts; there is no matter in what makes up what we see as matter. The paradox of life at its most basic level, the level of firstness, is that matter does not exist.

Secondness is the world as we experience it. It is the semiotically subjective element of our world that makes up what we term *objects*. It is in the moment after firstness that the world loses its quantum character. The objective world we experience every moment of our lives is what meshes with Peirce's category of secondness. It does take effort to become conscious of the world. It is necessary that we observe it before it becomes our reality. Remember the paradox of quantum weirdness: if we do not look for a particle, it does not exist. True it is usually an unconscious effort, but we are all at times aware of more intense observation and the effort it takes. A day trip to the local museum to stare intently at the artwork there, in order to get at its meaning, is all that is needed to show that. It takes so much effort to observe something intently that museums now have cafeterias on their premises, so you can replenish all the energy it has taken. The effort we exert while unconsciously changing the structure of *esse* – 'being' – every second of our existence does not leave us running for food. In fact we do not notice it at all until we stop and focus on what we are doing. There is no hidden purpose or agenda behind it. It is completely prescinded from any such thought. It is too instantaneous for that to happen. Most of the time the objective world rolls out at our glance, with no thought of purpose on our part at all.

"Thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as constituting the mode of being a sign. A sign mediates between the interpretant sign and its object," (1977) Peirce explains in his correspondence to Lady Victoria Welby. In the model we have been looking at, the quantum world is the object, which gives us the raw material, through our unconscious observation in the form of the interpretant. This enables us to view the world of signs that surrounds us, which we experience as an objective, deterministic world. Existence (for each of us a highly individual experience) is truly the mode of being that allows us to view the world objectively. It is truly *our* world, and it consists of the action of signs. As Peirce puts it, "...all our thought and knowledge is by signs." (1991) Peirce further notes "If you take an ordinary triadic relation, you will always find a *mental* element in it. Brute action is Secondness, any mentality involves Thirdness." (1991) Thirdness is the glue that links our reality together. In other words, it is the mental element that in truth creates this world out of seething foam of random probabilities. The quantum world becomes our objective world through the thirdness – the mentality – of our experience in it.

"First and Second...are categories which enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience...The Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and brings them into relationship." (1991) What brings the atomic world and our objective world into relationship is observation. If we are observing it (and we always are when not asleep), the gap between the two worlds is bridged by our conscious gaze. Look for the world, and you will find it. Observe it, and there it is. The Third is the element of relationship that our gaze gives. In an observer-created world, the conscious gaze is as certain as the relationship that changes the atomic world into the world we experience as solid matter.

Science has now shown us that our experience of the universe is only half of the picture, a paradox frightening for many, intriguing for other. Still, when visualized as consisting of a triad

of Firsts, Seconds and Thirds - signs, sign vehicles and interpretants - our interactions with the atomic world, and how those relationships create the very things we are interacting with, seem, perhaps, a little less mysterious, a little bit less of a paradox. The quantum world might be forever outside the limits of our perception, but we have none-the-less discovered it. And in the end, life consists of actions; observation simply provides the setting for all the action to take place in. "All the world is a stage," ([1599] 1974) Shakespeare said, and all the world consists of action: the triadic action of signs.

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SIGNS OF SPACE IN ARTISTIC, SCIENTIFIC AND CHILDREN'S DRAWINGS: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

Eirini Papadaki
Lecturer, Technological Educational
Institute of Epirus, Arta, Greece
papadaki@teiep.gr

Abstract

While drawing, children, as well as artists and scientists are energetically searching, choosing, simplifying, abstracting, analyzing, composing, completing, correcting, comparing, demarcating. All these processes form the way that the human brain elaborates cognitive material in every level. Children's and adults' drawings can be seen as critical tools and discovery processes, valuable perception aids, visual thinking mechanisms and routes to knowledge (Papadaki 2013). Both children and adults use the same resources (lines, shapes, orientation etc.) in order to realize meaning. These semiotic acts "should be seen as part of an intertextual chain... as stages in an ongoing dialogic process" (Van Leeuwen 1998:275). Artists, scientists and children alike construct knowledge as they deploy meaning across different modes and combine them in image ensembles (Kress 2003:141).

This paper provides the framework of a larger research which is still in development and tries to interpret children's understanding of space by examining children's drawings of spaces having in mind artistic and scientific spatial drawings. The research focuses on drawings made by children between 4 and 12 years old (kindergarten and elementary school).

1. Space in art drawings

Space is a major, as well as a complex concern in art and it has been so throughout the history of art. Some artists, such as Frank Stella, see the creation of space as the principal goal of art. From Renaissance art that tried to depict three-dimensional space using perspective to 19th century art of Turner and the Impressionists and further on to 20th century experiments of

spatial and space-time representations much has changed. Art has never stopped investigating the concept of space. Abstract explorations of space are nowadays common. Space is implied through the examination of surface, texture and color. Conceptual ideas about space are implied through optical impressions.

2. Space in science drawings

a. Mathematics, physics

Dictionaries define mathematical space as a set of elements or points satisfying specified geometric postulates or the infinite extension of the three-dimensional region in which all matter exists.

In scientific drawings a topological statement or drawing determines a spatial relationship, like something that is included in something else. Geometry is the study of spatial forms. It involves representation of shape, size, pattern, position and movement of objects in the three-dimensional world, or in the mind of the learner. It investigates three-dimensional objects and two-dimensional shapes as well as the concepts of position, location and movement.

b. Architecture

A challenge in terms of representation, architecture relies on drawings. The form of the three-dimensional building appears as lines on the two-dimensional paper. Form encloses space and by doing so gives space its shape (Spankie 2009:12). For Adolf Loos, the creation of space should be driven primarily by the effect that the designer wishes to exert upon the spectator. Through drawing, the architect externalizes initial thoughts in sketch form, tests ideas, evaluates solutions and solves problems before they occur. He/she speculates on alternatives. The architect uses drawing as a critical tool (Haralambidou 2007:234) or a set of instructions. He/she accepts standard representational conventions, the language of drawing, in order to firstly observe and record and secondly as a way of “thinking aloud”. For architecture, drawing generates space.

3. Children’s drawings of space

How space is perceived in the children minds is a much studied subject in developmental psychology. A child’s drawing of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional piece of paper is a puzzling achievement. Drawing appears to be a useful tool in fostering mental model building with respect to the representation of spatial relations (Leopold & Leutner 2012:9). The process of drawing makes topological relations among components explicit and therefore helps the learner to identify relations among the components of a displayed object (Larkin and Simon 1987).

We live in a three-dimensional world and should, therefore, be able to understand and depict depth, continuity, surrounding, order, enclosure, scale. Drawing helps children “represent features and relations structurally analogous to those of the reference objects” (Leopold & Leutner 2012:2).

The drawings for this research are made by children aged 4-12. There are different phases in the development of sign processes in children, as the sign system evolves during the process of aging (Sebeok 1977). Based on Piaget’s theory on mental development in children, Krampen (1991) speaks about “developmental semiotics”. A child begins to produce meaning by indexical signs based on present objects (perception and perceptual activity). At this stage, children start drawing simple schemes—the lowest level of semiotic structure or mere foregrounding of a sign (Krampen 1991). As they grow older, they go on to producing meaning by symbols (imagination). They now draw more complex functional schemes—second level of semiotic structure or syntactic information (Krampen 1991). Finally, through high degree of abstraction, the child

comes to produce meaning using signs. The third level of semiotics entails context. For Peirce (1965:143) the relevant phases are named iconic, indexical and symbolic, while Bruner (1966) talks about the enactive, the iconic and the symbolic phase. Luquet (1927) has proposed five stages in children's development: scribbling, fortuitous realism, failed realism, intellectual realism and visual realism. Children's drawings are considered a type of symbol appearing in the transition between symbolic play and imagination (Krampen 1991:22). Matthews (1984:1) suggests that "the child builds iconography on a substratum of symbolizations" at a very young age, before and during the "scribbling stage".



Figure 1: a car drawn by Christos at the age of 3

not see it as an external schema — the internal is equally important. In this drawing, the car, despite the fact that it is a very nice abstraction, has not taken the form of a symbol.

Figure 2, drawn at the age of 4, is a rational approach. It focuses on functional elements, like wheels, seat, steering wheel. The convertible schema helps him with his goal and the linear representation helps him grasp the meaning. The indication of the environment, a line, shows his try to perceive functionality.



Figure 2: a convertible car drawn by Christos at the age of 4

In figure 3, drawn at the age of 5, the relation of the car with the wider environment, like the sun, the sky, the clouds, the tree, the earth, characterizes the fact that he has at this point placed the car in its natural surroundings. However, the car still has a central position in the drawing and defines space. In the specific drawing, there is a strong element of subjectivity. The wheels, like two big blue eyes that look at the viewer implicate a tendency to shape a face. The body of the car is shaped in this image as a trapezoid. This is the schema that Christos chose and will use from this drawing instance on, in order to represent the car. In many instances it will tend to be reshaped more and more as a triangle, trying to represent dynamics, eg to depict racing cars. This is a route from the picturing of the experiential relation to the sign. The sign at this stage entails syntax.



Figure 3: a car drawn by Christos at the age of 5

Figure 4 shows different drawing instances of cars drawn by Christos at the age of 5,5. The numbers on the cars denote racing cars. The third drawing is the final drawing of a series of drawings concerned with car races. Christos considered it as the best and completed one, so he did not have to draw any other. When asked why this was the best one he answered that the biggest car in the drawing is the leader of the race (shaped almost as a triangle because it is the




Figure 4: different drawing instances of racing cars drawn by Christos at the age of 5+

most dynamic and the faster one) and that Christos himself is standing near the finishing line and he is going to be the first who sees the winner. The biggest car is therefore the one that is closer to the spectator. In this drawing, Christos managed to give the illusion of space, using techniques such as placement on paper, size, color and detail. The closest car is colored with a darker, warm color, it is bigger than all the others and details such as the driver and the number on it are shown perfectly clear. The second car of the race still has these characteristics (except that it is smaller and less of a triangular shape), but all the others are not colored, small and the details are not visible. We, the spectators, cannot see them, as they are too far away. Christos has managed to show depth/space.

4. The research

About 1000 children from 12 schools in Greece were asked to draw four images of spaces: their room, their house, a map and a maze. The research took into account two important issues:

- the importance of the socio-cultural influences (see Alland 1983, Arnheim 1954, 1969, Golomb 1992, Goodnow 1977, Kellogg 1970) that shape children understanding and depiction of space, as well as their understanding of the value of drawing
- the importance of the curriculum in the children familiarization of the various drawing techniques

The sample for the research was chosen randomly but includes children both from big cities and from small villages, both in mainland Greece and in islands, in order to examine children from various Greek socio-cultural settings, following both the standard school curriculum and the enlarged zone curriculum, which includes drawing, PC learning, theatrical education, foreign language and music.

The children that took part at this research were between the ages 4-12. The reasons for the selection of this wide age-group were many: the examination of the developmental direction (both physical and mental growth) in spatial presentation of children drawings and the acquisition of specific techniques of spatial representation depending on age, school curriculum and socio-cultural influences, the possibility of following universal laws of drawing space (learned

from art and/or science) and leaving aside socio-cultural influences as children grow older.

For the purposes of this paper, as well as for the sake of economy, and as the research is still in development (in the process of gathering the children drawings from the island of Crete and mainland Epirus), I will focus on the presentation of three main issues that seem interesting about children's use of the semiotic system of drawing in order to present space: a) organization/arrangement of objects on the paper provided, b) depth (as an implication of space) and c) socio-cultural differences between the children living in a big city and the children living in a village. I will use as the sample of this small study the 400 drawings I have gathered up to this point. These drawings were made by children living in northern Greece, in the city of Thessaloniki and a village nearby called Koufalia.

5. The first findings

The notion of space implies a certain organization and arrangement of things. Agreeing with Golomb, there are two main compositional schemes in children drawing, which are noticeable in the sample gathered do far:

1. Alignment of items in a grid like fashion along both horizontal and vertical axes and
2. Centering strategies, which organize items around a pictorial center (Golomb 1992:166).

The youngest children of the sample drew with vivid colors and much enthusiasm the first two themes: their room and their house. There were many similarities in the drawings. The vast majority of the children (almost 80%) in the space provided for drawing their room drew a bed. The bed represented their room, as the main reason they stayed in their room was sleep. The bed was usually drawn as seen from a point above it (borrowing the Japanese bird-eye view technique). Young children use the biggest abstractions, the objects are thought of as being important in themselves, without any reference to their surroundings. The concept of space is not fully grasped at this stage.



Figure 5a, b and c: Drawings of children aged 4-5 (elementary school). Theme: my room

In some drawings there were other elements of the rooms visible in the picture. However, the bed was still the most important object of the room, either being at the center of the picture or vividly colored, enclosed in a space by itself, etc.



Figure 6a, b and c: Drawings of children aged 4-5 (elementary school). Theme: my room

Most of the children placed the objects of their drawings in horizontal and vertical axes (defined by the space on the paper provided for their drawings) and only a small minority organized the items around a pictorial center. There were no noticeable differences between the children living in the village and the children living in the big city, as far as the drawings of their rooms were concerned.

The case was similar with the drawings of the children’s houses. Almost all the children drew on a baseline (the one marking the bottom end of the provided space) the same square with the triangle on top which they have learned to decipher as the “home”. There were two interesting tendencies regarding the house drawings: a. many children drew their houses as transparent, using the X-ray technique, so that the spectator could peep into the house (figure 7c) and b. many children drew figures of their mother and father beside or in the house, trying to imply that their house is where their mother and father are (figure 7a and 7b). There is no sense of scale in the drawings: the human figures are almost the same size as the house. Some children living in Thessaloniki drew blocks of flats (figure 7d), while the children living in Koufalia drew only detached houses.



Figure 7a, b, c and d: Drawings of children aged 4-5. Theme: my house




Figure 8a, b, c, d, e and f: Drawings of maps by children aged 4-5



Figure 9a, b and c: Drawings of mazes by children aged 4-5

Figures 8 and 9 show drawings of maps and mazes by children aged four to five years old (kindergarten). The drawings produced in order to represent maps and mazes by the four-to-five year olds seem to be influenced by images not directly associated to the children experience, but rather mediated to children through books and/or television. The images of maps seem like guidelines to go to a specific place. The similarities between the drawings prove that the task was faced collectively, rather than individually. The drawings were treated as a group project.



Figure 10a, b, c, d, e, f: Drawings by first grade pupils. Theme: my room

The drawings collected from the first grade are much different. The children drew their rooms following at a greater extent centering techniques (figures 10a, 10d and 10e). More furniture and personal items appear in the children's rooms (figures 10b, 10c, 10d and 10e). As the first grade marks the first year that children have school homework, the desk is the main furniture in the drawings of the children's rooms.

Regarding the drawings of the children's houses, distinguishing features of the houses are used in order to stress the uniqueness of each specific house (figures 11b and 11c). A furnished balcony and a dog nearby (figure 11c), a staircase in the house and a tractor outside (figure 11b) characterizes the place as unique, determines its identity. It is now recognizable by everyone as a specific child's family home. The underlying of the uniqueness of a house seemed especially important for the children living in the village. When asked where they live, children living in the big cities answered with a street name and a number. Children living in villages, however, gave a descriptive answer: "at the stone house at the end of the street", or "at the green house behind the white fence".

The first attempts to show depth—using the technique of perspective—are visible (see figures 10c, 10f and 11a): children draw the closest object in the room bigger (figure 10c) or on a different baseline at the bottom of the page (figures 10f and 11a).



Figures 11a, b and c: Drawings by first grade pupils. Theme: my house

As far as the drawings of maps and mazes are concerned, first grade pupils seem to be very much influenced by TV images, school books' exercises and electronic video games (figures 12a, b, c and d).



Figures 12a and b: Drawings of mazes by first grade pupils
Figures 12c and 13d: Drawings of maps by first grade pupils

The only difference of the drawings made by the second grade pupils that have been collected so far is that there is less color and that the vast majority of the mazes are drawn as strictly geometrical spaces.




Figure 13: A drawing of a bedroom, using geometrical shapes, by a girl in the third grade

The pupils of the third grade were the first to produce geographical maps. It is easy to understand the reason why such maps are firstly drawn at this age, as in the Greek educational system the subject of Geography is introduced in the third grade. Other than that, it is interesting to point out that the majority of the images are drawn using only pencil, while almost all of them use the bird-eye view combined with the centering technique. Geometrical shapes are widely used.

From the fourth grade onwards the concept of space seems to be successfully perceived in the children's minds and implied in their drawings. Spatial depth (the notions of far and close) is visible. It would be interesting to find out whether children are taught of the concept of space or how to represent it in drawing in the school curriculum, but this is a theme for another research.

A very clear difference between the drawings made by the children living in the village and the children living in the big city was found to be the speed of spatial development. The easy

explanation for that seems to be the different, wider curriculum offered to the children in the schools of the big cities. The enlarged zone program of the city schools offers to the children subjects like music, foreign language, PC learning, theatrical education and art. These classes, including the art class are required classes for all the children of the school. In the schools of the village Koufalia, on the other hand, the typical school program, which do not offer the above mentioned classes, but is strictly oriented around the study of the semiotic systems of language and mathematics—does not encourage artistic ability. When asked their opinion about drawing, children living in the village said that —drawing is for small children—easy to understand why, as they stopped engaging with it as soon as they entered the first grade. On the contrary, children living in the big cities see drawing as a serious system of knowledge, like linguistics and mathematics. Consequently, the children living in the village were weak in capacity to draw space. Their lack of skill did not, however, mean lack of knowledge on the subject.



Figure 14: Starting to show depth and understand vertical and horizontal alignment, a drawing by a boy in the fourth grade

6. Discussion

In all the drawings that I have gathered so far, the perception and representation of space is firstly experiential. The description of space is inseparable from the child's experience in it. The drawings themed "my room" and "my house" describe the experience of the child's usage of specific objects; the narrative is first and foremost experiential. Of course, these drawings are descriptive right from the outset. In the drawings of maps and mazes, however, the majority of children seem detached from personal experience.

All the children have already done big deductions: they have decided on scales, proportions and sizes, what to put into the frame of the picture and what to leave unseen, they have represented the three-dimensional world into the two dimensions on a piece of paper. Between the ages of 4 and 7, most children do not understand the concepts of a map or a maze and try to conceive them using mediated images, seen in television, school books or elsewhere.

Following the drawings and agreeing with Piaget, "representational thought or imagination at first appears to ignore metric and perspective relationships, proportions, etc. Consequently, (the child) is forced to reconstruct space from the most primitive notions such as the topological relationships of proximity, separation, order, enclosure, etc., applying them to metric and projective figures yielded by perception" (Piaget 1976:4). The relationships termed "topological" by geometers are regarded as elementary from the standpoint of the theoretical reconstruction of space. After many drawing instances and attempts, the child comes to terms with basic metric relations. Children's drawings seem geometrically consistent after the age of 7: notice the ways the furniture of the rooms are positioned.

For Piaget (1956) drawing is the tool to represent spatial conception. It was the practice of drawing that geometry was founded on, as Piaget quotes his teacher and philosopher of mathematics Léon Brunschvicg. Through their drawings during the years, children continuously revisit and reconstruct previous topological knowledge stemmed from cognition. Both artists and scientists start from experience and sensory perception, but after long periods of research, they arrive at aesthetic perception—that means deduction, abstraction, removal from experience, from the personal, the particular, the one and moving on to the universal, the collective, the unarguable truth. At some time, children are able to conceptualize metric relations, like direction



Figure 15: Drawings by children in fifth and sixth grade.

(see the drawings of mazes) or distance. Wittmann writes that “according to Piaget, children have always had an implicit knowledge of what modern mathematicians could not conceptualize before the introduction of topology around 1900”.

Between the ages 7-12, children are able to apply projective geometry, symmetry (correspondence in size) and generally a clear and successful illusion of space in their drawings. If we

follow the history of art, we will see that the techniques used to create space were invented in the fifteenth century, after the Renaissance period. During the research, I was surprised to find out some similarities of the stages of children drawing with the pre-history of human image-making. It is as if the child follows the same historical route in a few years. According to Marcusen (2008), almost all primitive art and, historically, all pre-Greek art basically have the metric structure at which the child invariably arrives.

Many well-known modern artists highly valued the simplicity of forms, the abstract thinking and free spatial orientation in children drawing. In 1912 Kandinsky wrote that the child has the natural ability to absorb the thing as such (Fineberg 1997:46). Kandinsky, as well as artists like Klee and Feininger were collectors of children's drawings and they even used some of them as resources for their work. Kandinsky sought in children's art to reveal an abstract, universal language.

If we examine children's drawings with a Vygotskian lens like Brooks (2009) does, we will find that drawing can function as a mediator between a child's spontaneous and scientific concept. For Vygotsky (1987) spontaneous concepts derive from direct encounter with things, experience, memory and increasing generalizations. See, for instance, through figures 1-4, how Christos started with drawing his family's car and continued experimenting until he formed a satisfying for him sign for cars and then for racing cars. This procedure involved high mental functions, as Christos had to find the structural elements of cars, he had to make reductions, abstractions from the thing known through experience (the family's car) and then make groupings and generalizations in order to imply through one drawing the notion of the whole kind (cars and specifically racing cars). His drawings imprinted his thinking route. Through his continuous drawings, he experimented on the notion of cars, from the specific to the general, and learned more things about the essence of cars. His newly acquired knowledge was communicated, again through his drawings to other people (his family, his classmates).

The same experience-memory-thinking-abstraction-grouping-generalization scheme is visible in the drawings of the children of the sample studied, as they grow from 4 to 12 years old. At young ages, they defined their room with its more functional element—a bed, for sleeping, or a desk, for studying. They went on to include in the drawing many personal things, what stemmed from their experience with the room—they placed the objects in their surroundings and examined relations, distances, orientation of objects as such and in relation with each other. This examination became crucial for their understanding of space and spatial representation. The older children removed the objects from the burden of personal associations (figure 15). This study from the thing as such to the thing as related to its surroundings and other things and then to the generalized thing requires high mental functions and is the exact procedure scientists and artists follow, as shown in previous research (Papadaki 2013).

Scientific concepts, on the other hand, as Vygotsky (1987) puts it, need the following of the opposite path: the drawing subject does not now go from the thing to the concept, but rather from the concept to the thing. In order to test this route, we asked children to draw maps and mazes, which, obviously, they had no experience with. Younger children were much influenced by mediated experience and tried to bring the concept closer to known things, e.g. maps of treasures, as seen in toys, books or television, maps as directions to go to specific places, as seen in children's party invitations. The first drawings of mazes were exact copies of images seen somewhere, even if they were not exactly mazes—far from it. The last drawing attempts, however, as shown in figure 16, included a big percentage of architectural mazes and many geometrical influences. Going from the concept to the thing is a much more difficult task. For children living in big cities that have the chance to follow art classes in school, this process takes place faster and easier. It was puzzling to see perfect architectural mazes and geometrical shapes

made from students of the second grade and third grade. These students were not yet or were hardly introduced to Geometry.

All children should be able to acquire competence in such a valuable tool for their cognitive development. As a meta-cognitive, deliberate, meaning-making activity, a perfect semiotic system that could be the base of a kandiskian universal language, children drawing involves high mental functions, entails discovering the essence of things and concepts and uncovers, in the same way as art and science do, important information about the world. Children's drawing communicate the visible, but unseen.

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INTERPRETING PICTURES: A SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL SEMIOTIC MODEL FOR VISUAL IMAGERY

Howard Riley
University of Wales Trinity Saint David,
Swansea, UK
howard.riley@sm.uwtsd.ac.uk

Abstract

Semiotics is a powerful tool of interpretation, able to facilitate the negotiation of multiple meanings from visual works. This article introduces the provenance of systemic-functional semiotic theory, and contextualizes its application in the domain of illustration. Demonstrating the flexibility of a visual semiotics through the compilation of a chart formulated for decoding visual (rather than linguistic) modes of communication, the article examines divergent interpretations through an analysis of selected illustrative practice. Alternative interpretations and insights are shown to be negotiable as a result of a series of choices made by both artist and viewer. Semiotics reveals how images generally deemed to be straightforward and natural within their conventional discourse are actually cultural constructions, the result of social and historically formed positionings.

1. “Look! The Sun obeys my syntax”

Velimir Khlebnikov’s (1913) wry observation about how our languages structure our realities is an apt introduction to an article which explores how a semiotics of language may be adapted to analyse and explain how visual work may also structure our experiences of the world in a shareable form.

Semiotics, the study of signs within society, is a powerful tool of interpretation, able to facilitate the negotiation of multiple meanings from visual works. This article introduces the provenance of systemic-functional semiotic theory, and contextualises its application in the domain of drawing. Demonstrating the flexibility of a visual semiotics through the compilation of a chart

formulated for decoding visual (rather than linguistic) modes of communication, the article examines divergent interpretations through an analysis of selected drawing practice. Alternative interpretations and insights are shown to be negotiable as a result of a series of choices made by both artist and viewer. Semiotics reveals how images generally deemed to be straightforward and natural within their conventional discourse are actually cultural constructions, the result of social and historically formed positionings.

2. The Provenance of Systemic-Functional Semiotics

Semiotics is generally understood as the study of *signs*, and the discipline was first mooted in Europe by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1916). Semiotics is often used to analyse how meanings are negotiated within the process of communication, but can also be useful as a means of synthesising work.

A *sign* is anything that can be used to stand for something else, or as Umberto Eco (1976:7) quipped “Semiotics is...the discipline studying everything which can be used to tell a lie...”, illustrated, for example, in Magritte’s famous warning about the treachery of words and images:



Fig. 1: Rene Magritte 1929 *The Treachery of Images* oil on canvas 60x80cms Los Angeles County Museum of Art.

As a linguist, Saussure realised that language was (and still is!) a system of arbitrary signs, *symbols* (written words, spoken sounds) which bear no relationship to their referents in the world: the word *pipe* bears no relation to a real pipe, and neither does the word *Ceci*, or ‘this’, as Magritte asserts. To that extent, Saussurean semiotics would seem of little use to visual artists.. However, the American philosopher Charles Saunders Peirce (1867), working much earlier, had already recognised a taxonomy of signs, including some which actually do bear relationships with their referents: *iconic* signs, which resemble their referents – as does Magritte’s image resembling a pipe, and *indexical* signs which are caused by their referents, as Magritte’s handwriting points to – indicates - the speed and pressure of the hand that made it. A synthesis of the insights of Saussure and Peirce affords the possibilities of a visual semiotics which *can* be of use to visual artists, and it is this potential we shall explore in this article.

3. Functions of Communication

Saussure's work influenced the Russian Formalists, who were theorising language and literature around the time of the 1917 revolution. Roman Jakobson (1958), a founding member of the Moscow Linguistic Circle and later a member of the Prague Linguistic Circle, developed a model of six *Factors* involved in the process of communication: the *Sender* and *Receiver* of the *Message*, within a *Context* involving the necessity for *Contact* and the sharing of a *Code*. These six factors have their corresponding six functions of communication: the *Emotive* drive of the Sender and the willingness – the *Conative* drive – of the Receiver to negotiate the *Poetic*, the function which draws attention to the Message itself, which is normally *Representational* of its subject-matter. The *Phatic* function ensures Contact is maintained, and the *Metalingual* ensures both Sender and Receiver share the same Code:




Fig. 2: Roman Jakobson 1958 *Model of Communication*.

For the purposes of visual artists, the Sender becomes the *Artist*, the Receiver becomes the *Viewer*, and the Message becomes the *Artwork*.

3.1. Systems and Functions in Semiotics

Systemic-functional linguistics is a theory of language derived and refined from Jakobson's model by Michael Alexander Kirkwood Halliday (1978) in the 1960s and 1970s. Essentially, Halliday noted that the Emotive function and the Conative function might be combined into an *Interpersonal* function. Jakobson's Representational function is re-named the *Experiential*, since what is represented are our experiences of the world, and Halliday recognised that the crucial function for any analysis of the arts – Jakobson's Poetic function – is actually about drawing attention to the formal qualities of the work, so although Halliday, working with language and written text, termed this function 'Textual', we shall retain Jakobson's original term, *Poetic*, for the model presented as figure 3.

The term *system* in systemic-functional semiotics stands for the ranges of compositional choices available to us. It is a term introduced by Halliday's teacher, linguist John Rupert Firth (1957) who also introduced the term *sociological linguistics* to locate the study of language within

its social perspective, suggesting that social context and language are *interdependent*: social context influences use of language; language-use influences social context. This interdependency is referred to by linguists as *register*, a concept equally applicable when visual artists consider how to compose a drawing suitable for a particular age-group, for example, or viewers from a specialist discipline. Firth followed the Russian linguist Mikhail Bakhtin (Holquist 1981) and members of his circle formed around 1917, who had recognised that communication in all its aspects was always *dialogical*, Bakhtin's term to explain the context of situation between the participants in any act of communication.

4. A Systemic-Functional Semiotic Model of Communication applied to Drawing

Finally, in this potted provenance of semiotic theory, during the 1980s and up to the present, Michael O'Toole (2011), a pioneer of visual semiotics working at Murdoch University in Perth, Western Australia, has argued that Halliday's model for language is equally potent when adapted for the analysis of visual codes of communication, and demonstrated this by analysing examples of painting, sculpture and architecture. In general terms, humans have devised visual codes of communication expressed through a variety of media and processes – for example, drawing, painting, photography, film – which function to make tangible to others our moods and attitudes towards the experiences represented. Specifically, in illustrative terms, we compose images which represent our experiences, or simply tell stories, and the processes of composition – our selection and combination of visual elements – affect the viewers' attitudes towards what is represented.

In terms of drawing practices, Firth's notion of *system* includes the range of mark-making media, the range of grounds, the range of compositional formats and sizes, the range of line qualities, textures, colours, in other words the elements of visual language available for selection and combination into a visual means of communication. Such choices carry the potential for meaning, *where there is choice, there is meaning*: for instance, the mark of a 6B pencil carries more potential for gestural connotations than the mark of a 2H pencil. Their potential for meaning comes from their differences.

Figure 3 represents a model of communication, adapted by the present author and research student Amanda Roberts (Riley 2014; Roberts and Riley 2012; 2012a) for the study of drawing from O'Toole's own adaptation of Halliday's model for language. In this model, the three functions are arranged horizontally, and the varying degrees of attention at which any work may be scrutinised are here arranged vertically and labelled *Levels of Engagement*, from the level of detailed scrutiny of individual marks within a work, right up to the work in its wider social context, where systems relating to display – of framing, lighting, or the placement of the work within a print format or on screen – might be studied. The matrix thus formed by these two axes contains the systems – ranges of choices – appropriate to each level of engagement:

Function Level of Engagement	EXPERIENTIAL (<i>what</i> is represented: experiences of the world)	INTERPERSONAL (<i>how</i> the viewer is <i>positioned</i> in terms of <i>mood and attitude</i>)	POETIC (<i>how</i> perceptual and emotional experiences are represented)
Drawing as Displayed	<i>Proximal</i> Perceptual Values. Theme Narrative Genre Representational/abstract Interplay of Episodes.	Attitude, Modality: Intimate/Monumental Public/Private Active/Passive Rhythm/focal points: Dynamic/Static Calm/Agitated	Overall format and size. Gestalt relations: horizontals, verticals, <u>diagonals</u> . Framing devices. <u>Colour palette</u> . Systems of Geometry: <u>persp ortho axo</u> etc.
Episodes of the Drawing	<i>Distal</i> Perceptual Values Primary Geometry (layout of surfaces and edges) Actions, events central to narrative. Distance between Surfaces in the Scene.	Position relative to scene (Orientation of viewer). <u>Gaze/eyework</u> . Modality: happy/gloomy, calm/excited etc.	Secondary Geometry: (perspective/non perspective projections). Interplay of figures/passages Contrast of tone/texture
Combinations of Marks (sub-assemblies)	<u>Haptic</u> Perceptual Values Edges: occlusion of surfaces Direction Transparency/opacity Atmosphere Time of day	Sense of 'affordances' in the scene. Heavy/lightweight Flatness/illusions of depth	Textural Qualities of Media/Ground. Relative Positions of Marks. Relative Sizes of Marks. Division of Picture- Plane: ratios, angles. Overlap of shapes/tones
Individual Marks	Effects of light on surfaces in the environment. Spatial Depth. Scene Primitives.	Sense of textural differences. Indices of mark- maker's movements: speed, pressure.	Position and Size of Marks within Picture Plane. Interaction between Medium and Surface. Picture Primitives.

Fig. 3: A Systemic-Functional Semiotic Model for Drawing.

Having introduced the systemic-functional model and indicated its provenance, it is time to demonstrate how it might be used to facilitate the negotiation of meanings available in drawing practices. This in part entails the identification of the formal compositional means through which an artist positions the viewer; "...to lay bare the device," as the leading Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky (1929: 147) advocated¹. Examples of the author's drawings are used as case studies.

¹ In his seminal history of the Russian Formalists, Victor Erlich (1965:182) explains:

"It is worth noting that this typically Formalist phrase (*laying bare the device*) is a free translation of a passage from William James' *Psychology*, dealing with the impact of verbal repetition on the perception of individual words. The passage was quoted by Lev Jakubinski in his essay on 'The Sounds of Poetic Language', *Poetica*, 1919. The original text reads as follows: '...it (the repeated word) is reduced, by this new way of attending to it, to its sensational nudity.' (William James 1928 *Psychology* New York p. 315). The Russian translation of James' work, Jakubinski's direct source of reference, actually anticipates the Formalist terminology: '...having thus looked at the word from a new viewpoint, we have laid bare (*obnazili*) its purely phonetic aspect'".

In practice, the application of the semiotic chart is more fluid than its rigid format implies. Interpretation and their implications need not occur in an ordered or linear way. While the chart offers a structure within which to separate and categorise these connections, images examined can offer several different interlinked observations, associations and responses simultaneously. Materialist or denotative readings of how and what the drawing communicates are necessarily combined with connotative understandings of what is negotiated.

5. Case Study: *Drawing Precedes Writing*

In the sequence of oil pastel drawings, Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7, little of what we experience and recognize in the physical world appears to be represented. Of course the drawings themselves (and, incidentally, the reproductions presented here) are a part of our physical world: the very textures produced through the combination of oil pastel and paper, scratched and rubbed, indicating their maker's involvement, may evoke in the viewer similar previous experiences of texture, and perhaps volume.



Fig. 4: Howard Riley *Depiction Precedes Writing 1*. Oil pastel on paper. 16x10cms.



Fig. 5: Howard Riley *Drawing Precedes Writing 2*. Oil pastel on paper. 16x10cms.




Fig. 6: Howard Riley *Drawing Precedes Writing 3*. Oil pastel on paper. 16x10cms.



Fig. 7: Howard Riley *Drawing Precedes Writing 4*. Oil pastel on paper. 16x10cms.

When the viewer engages with these drawings at the level of the *Combinations of Drawn Marks* then a pattern emerges which is common to all the drawings. The central position of the square, resting in each drawing on a horizontal base line, symbolises stability and epitomises visual balance, attributes associated with our facility for structuring order from chaos, metonymically representing our capacity for language. Against this constant compositional structure, change within the series is more easily recognized. At the level of engagement *Individual Marks*, through the choice of high-contrast boundaries between shapes of saturated colour and the selection of textural gradients and tonal gradients, illusions of depth are produced. As the sequence of drawings progresses, contrast is reduced and colours desaturated with the effect that

depth illusion is diminished. Colour combinations progress from warm to cool, thus altering the mood.

The solid square in the centre of figure 4 is set in ambiguous space, an illusion produced by the combination of light and dark tones arranged contrary to normal visual experience of the world illuminated by a single light source. In figure 5, the central square is surrounded by angular linear elements with no apparent Gestalt relationship: a chaos of elements whose edges vary from sharp to blurry, indicating various distances in the illusory depth of the picture. The effect of such random placement of pictorial elements within the subdivisions of the drawing's surface, together with the ambiguous readings of pictorial space, may well unsettle the viewer whose eye-paths are being jerked around, having no definite focus point.

Simultaneously, the viewer attempts to decode the ambiguous symbols - arbitrary signs emerging at the base of the pictures, an operation rather like word-captions anchoring images in more conventional codes of communication.

At this stage, viewers may pick up allusions to their visual experiences of the world - not least, allusions to illusions. This play between the drawer and the viewer, and the tensions induced in the viewer, is the essence of the *Interpersonal function* of drawing, made visible through the selection and combination of choices from the compositional, or *poetic* systems: specifically, systems of choices to do with the degree of sharpness or blurriness of contrast boundaries in the drawings, and to do with the tension between the static stability of the drawings' Gestalt structure (central square on horizontal line) and the dynamic instability of the randomly placed floating elements.

In figure 6, by appropriate selection of compositional choices from the systems of tonal grading, tonal contrast (at boundaries) and the relative positioning of marks, the tubular elements appear to occlude, or be occluded by, the now less-than-solid central square. Thus the illusion of penetration is evident: the visual elements occupying the chaotic background are becoming ordered through interaction with the central square, representing our capacity for structuring *via* language. With no more resolution of the quasi-alphabetic anchor-block (relay-block?) and no obvious representation of their physical experiences, viewers may resort to metaphoric interpretations. The sequence may be understood as the gradual dissipation of the central square, representing our capacity for language, from solid volume in figure 4 to tissue-like insubstantiality in figure 7. However, the tubular elements themselves become dissolved in the fabric of the picture plane in figure 7, even as the 'caption' becomes, temptingly, almost meaningful. This sequence of drawings illustrates the proposition that our ability to write comes from our prior ability to depict. Depiction precedes writing.

Writing itself has emerged from a background of visual ambiguity, metaphorically representing the chaos of our unstructured world, and has pierced and penetrated our observations of the material world to such an extent that the two have become one: language is interwoven with our perception of the fabric of the material world, we see the world through the filter of language yet its visible form remains forever arbitrary, forever open to negotiation.

6. Conclusion

An application of the systemic-functional semiotic model is shown to facilitate the negotiation of meanings generated from the drawings. Subsequently it is concluded that no drawing practice is beyond the realm of the semiotic, and semiotic analysis is applicable across the whole domain of visual imagery as a method of generating meaning. This article has demonstrated specifically the rich potential of gestural drawing as a means of illustrating social relations at the heart of all representational art: the relations between subject-matter, artist and viewer. A model of systemic-functional semiotics such as the one featured in this article might well inform the

future practice of those interested in extending the potential meanings of drawing in particular, and those of visual imagery in general.

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POLISEMIOTICITY OF VISUAL POETRY BY VIKTOR ZHENCHENKO

Iryna Zhodani
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, Ukraine
zhodani@yandex.ua

Abstract

In modern art writers very often choose not only traditional ways to express their emotions and thoughts. Sometimes they use more than one secondary modeling system (according to terms by the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics). There are a lot of words which pertain to the phenomenon of synthesis of some arts (intermediality, heteromediality, heteroperceptuality, creolization, interaction of arts and so on), but to my mind, if we use the methodology of semiotic, the best of them is the term of the Polish researcher Marta Kaźmierczak “polisemioticity” which has a parallel with intersemioticity.

This thesis is dedicated to synthesis of literature and graphic arts in visual poetry by a Ukrainian author Viktor Zhenchenko (books “Visual Poetry” (2000) and “Thirst for Two People” (2001)). A lot of his works are about tragic events in the Ukrainian history such as Kolyma, famishment, genocide, Gulag, prohibition of the Ukrainian language, extirpation of the best Ukrainian writers, painters, scholars and other people of culture and science.

Visual poetry by Viktor Zhenchenko is full of verbal and graphic symbols which supplement each other and create the new composite whole. In his works we can see many Ukrainian and international symbols, such as wing, gallows, boots, labyrinth, square, circle, candle, sabres, swallows and so on.

The separate part of the book “Thirst for Two People” is the alphabet for adults where each letter is associated with some important idea-symbol.

Visual poetry by Viktor Zhenchenko consists of different codes and the author is permanently looking for new and original forms of this synthesis of two secondary modeling systems.

His works are characterized by graphic imagery, non-linearity of perception and versatility of significance which is inherent to the symbol.

In modern art writers very often choose not only traditional ways to express their emotions and thoughts. Sometimes they use more than one secondary modeling system (according to terms by the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics).

There are a lot of terms which pertain to the phenomenon of a synthesis of some arts. The formation of these words is reflected in the table below.

prefix / root	multi- (from Latin <i>multus</i> 'much, many')	poli- (from Greek <i>poly</i> 'much, many')	inter- (from Latin <i>inter</i> 'between')	hetero- (from Greek <i>heteros</i> 'other')	without prefix
semiotic	multisemioticity	polisemioticity	Inter-semioticity		
medium (-a)	multimediality		Intermediality	hetero-mediality	
mode, modal	multimodality				
code	multicodal semiosis				
sense, sensory	multisensoriality				
percept, perceptual				hetero-perceptuality	
creolization					creolization
synthesis of arts					synthesis of arts

Table 1: Formation of terms which pertain to the phenomenon of synthesis of arts.

In the table you can see that there are different roots (*semiotic, media, mode, code, sense, percept*) and different prefixes by Latin and Greek origin (*multi-, poli-, inter-, hetero-*) from which scholars coin new words that name the phenomenon of synthesis of some arts. To my mind, such roots as “media”, “mode”, “sense”, or “percept” are too general and relate to other subjects. For example, “media” is associated with mass media, “sense” and “percept” – with psychology, “creolization” – with anthropology, “code” – with the theory of information, and only the root “semiotics”, to my mind, is the most relevant because it also refers to the methodology of semiotics.

The prefix “hetero-” means “other”, that is why we cannot use it to name a synthesis of arts. The prefix “inter-” means “between” and it can be used when we talk about the translation from one art to another. The prefixes “multi-” and “poli-” have the same meaning “much, many” and we can use them to write about a synthesis of arts. That is why I think that the most specific terms for the phenomenon of a synthesis of arts when using the methodology of semiotics are “multisemioticity” and “polisemioticity”.

Visual poetry is one of the forms of such phenomenon. It has an ancient tradition in Ukraine, in particular in baroque epoch. But in the XX century, when visual poetry was very popular all over the world, this form of art was suppressed in the USSR as formalism. For example, Viktor

Zhenchenko remembers how a KGB agent threatened him to deport to the Kolyma region for his 3 visual poems published in a newspaper (Moisiyenko 2001: 19). That is why only now visual poetry in Ukraine is becoming very popular.

This paper is dedicated to the synthesis of literature and graphic arts in visual poetry by the Ukrainian author Viktor Zhenchenko. He is a famous opera singer (bass), poet and translator. He has written 11 collections of poetry, and two of them consist of visual poetry: *Visual poetry* (2000) and *Thirst for two people* (2001) books. His son, Igor Zhenchenko, is a graphic artist, who helped his father to draw the visual part of the poetries in the above-mentioned poetry collections.

The basic themes of the analyzed books are tragic events in the Ukrainian history, such as Kolyma camps, famishment, genocide, Gulag, the prohibition of the Ukrainian language, repressions of the best Ukrainian writers, painters, and scholars.

One of the famous visual poetries by Viktor Zhenchenko is the “Tragedy” poem. It describes a Gulag labor (in fact, concentration) camp with especially hard conditions of life and work which was situated at the Kolyma, a region in the Russian Far East. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn called it “the pole of cold and cruelty” because in the years of mass repressions (1932–1954) near one million people were killed there, and a lot of them were Ukrainians. For instance, the killed victims included Mykhailo Drai-Khmara (a Ukrainian famous writer and professor who knew 19 languages). Therefore, for Ukraine Kolyma became the symbol of cruel treatment, coldness, death, and extirpation of the best Ukrainian people.

In visual poem by Viktor Zhenchenko, we can see the word “Kolyma” which looks like a barrack because of its grey uneven surface. The barbed wire is around this word. It symbolizes the pain of the prisoners who suffered mainly for their love to Ukraine like Jesus suffered for all people. Under the visual part of poem we can read the text: “Snows, barracks, wire, darkness... And cry of millions people: ‘Mother! Mo...’” In Siberia the winter continues up to 8 months with a lot of snowfalls, strong winds and the temperature falling down to 60 degrees below zero. Thus, the people who came back from Kolyma remember only snows, barracks, barbed wire and darkness. To my mind, here darkness also means a victory of evil, despair and hopelessness. The culmination of this visual poem is the torn off word “Mother”, which means tearing off lives of millions of people.

Another work dedicated to this theme is “The Telegram to Swallows”, in which we can see a telegraph pole and five swallows near it. Under the wires, we can read the text: “Mordovia stains with blood FS Vasyl Stus is crucified as Jesus FS No cries, no repentances FS This is not people, but Herod FS”. (Here I use my own abbreviation “FS” from English words “full stop” to reproduce the style of telegram as it was done in the Ukrainian text by the author.)

Mordovia is a Russian republic, in which a maximum-security labor camps were located, too. In 1980-s, almost all the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group who had been fighting against violations of human rights were prisoners of this camp. One of them was Vasyl Stus, a talented writer, who was nominated to the Nobel Prize (According to some sources, in 1984 The International Committee for Awarding the Literary Nobel Prize to Vasyl Stus in 1986 was founded in Toronto. In conformity with other sources, H. Bell nominated him in 1985). However, the Soviet Union leaders did not want to have any Ukrainian Nobel prize-winners. They knew that this Prize is awarded to alive people only. That is why, according to the memoirs of prisoners, Vasyl Stus died in very mysterious circumstances. All of his prisoner friends think that he was killed because of the Nobel Prize prospect (Ovsiyenko 2011).

Vasyl Stus was a political prisoner in Mordovia during 7 years, but he died in a camp in Perm region. I think that Viktor Zhenchenko use here the word “Mordovia”, firstly, because of Stus’s lost health there and, secondly, because of the consonance between the words *Мордовія* and

мордувати (which translates as ‘torture’) in the Ukrainian language. In such way he wanted to come into notice to death of Vasyl Stus as a result of tortures. That confirms the following line of the poem: “Vasyl Stus is crucified as Jesus FS”. The telegraph pole looks like the cross which Jesus was crucified on. Here we can see again a parallel between the Ukrainian intellectuals and Jesus Christ. This story continues in the last sentence where the author compares Russian nation with Herod because of the lack of repentances for their actions.

Let us turn to the picture of visual poem. We can see five swallows there. According to dictionaries of symbols and signs, a swallow is connected with Jesus Christ (Adamchuk 2006: 97) and it symbolizes the Resurrection (Roshal 2005: 820). It is a pure bird (Voitovych 2005: 408), in contrast to evil raven (Voitovych 2005: 408) whose silhouette we can see at the end of the broken wires. The broken wires symbolize here the broken lives of the Ukrainian political prisoners. Three ravens on the old version of this visual poem (book *Visual Poetry*, 2000) are the confirmation that it is not only an illusion. This opinion can also be supported with the Ukrainian abbreviation *KP* (from word *кранка* – ‘full stop’), which is so consonant with the Ukrainian raven’s caw *кап* ‘kahr’. In the Ukrainian folk ballads a cawing raven always foretells the death of the Cossack (Cossacks were free warriors in the territory of Ukraine in XV–XVIII centuries who protected their lands from enemies. Cossacks have been national heroes for Ukrainian people. There are a lot of songs, ballads and stories about them.). That’s why in our country raven is a bad bird that brings death, tears and evil (Talanchuk 2002: 336–341). Under the flying ravens, we can see the grave. Comparing old and new versions of visual poem we can draw a conclusion that the author evolves from sullen and black work (grave, cross, three big black ravens and only three small swallows) to more positive and lighter work. In the new version of visual poem we cannot see any more the grave and big black ravens and the number of swallows increases from 3 to 5. To my mind, in such way the author tries to show the win of good under the evil.

The next visual poem “Target” continues the theme of the difficult fate of a poet. We can see the target where numerals are substituted with the following words: “The word of poet, and heart, and body were always under the battle sight”. Besides that on the target we can read the surnames of poets who were killed. In the table there are names, ages and reasons of death of each writer from this visual poem.

Name	Age	Reason of death
Ukrainians		
Vasyl Stus	47	he died in a camp in Russia
Jevgen Pluzhnyk	37	he died in a camp in Russia
Mykhailo Drai-Khmara	50	he was shot in a camp in Russia
Vasyl Symonenko	28	he was killed by the KGB agents
Mykhail Semenko	44	he was shot by the KGB
Mykola Zerov	47	he was shot by the KGB
Mykola Voronyj	66	he was shot by the KGB
Oleg Olzhych	36	he was killed in a German concentration camp
Olena Teliga	35	she was shot by the Gestapo

see the gibbet with the following text on it “This gibbet is new. Only words are hanging on it. Only words” and the word “LANGUAGE” under the noose.

This poem sends us back to XVIII–XX centuries when the Ukrainian language was forbidden by Russian and Soviet Union leaders. For example, in 1720 tsar Petro I issued the decree to prohibit printing of Ukrainian books. In 1763, tsarina Kateryna II issued the decree prohibiting the teaching in Ukrainian language in Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. In 1876, Oleksandr II signed Emsky decree which prohibited the printing and importing the Ukrainian books, producing Ukrainian plays, and teaching in the Ukrainian language in schools. There were many of such orders, decrees and acts.

At that time even some words were forbidden, so that the phrases had to have Russian forms, and the whole Ukrainian language had to be similar to Russian as much as possible. By that time, some Ukrainian words had already been forgotten. This poem tells us about such killed words. The language consists of words and after the deaths of words comes the death of the whole language. The shade of this killed Ukrainian language we can see under the noose.

Another visual poem is “Ancient experience”. The work consists of the picture of high boots and the following text: “– Who realizes revolutions? – Boots. – Who balances pro and contra? – Boots. – Whose idea is to occupy the world? – Boots.”

The boots in the picture are quite like tarpaulin boots which are used mainly in the army. These boots have eyes, a nose and a big mouth with teeth. In the dictionary of symbols and signs teeth are an image of aggressiveness and strength (Adamchyk 2006: 46). In Greek mythology soldiers of Jason grew from a dragon’s teeth. A mouth is linked with taking food and therefore with destruction as well. As an organ which devours food, a mouth can be connected with power (Adamchyk 2006: 171). In the visual poem, one tarpaulin boot is turned left. To my mind, it was done because the author wanted to pay attention to a big mouth and big teeth.

The symbolism of boots which personify the idea of power and holding (Adamchyk 2006: 171) may be confirmation of this thought. So, Viktor Zhenchenko tries to tell us that from ancient times and to our civilized time the force incarnated in an army governs this world. Not intellect, but only force.

The visual poem “Stamp of chauvinist” also concerns our history when the words “independence”, “nationhood”, “freedom”, “sovereignty” and “indivisibility” were forbidden. People who drew attention to these ideas were killed or imprisoned. Such fate was common for most Ukrainian intellectuals. Among them there were a lot of writers and professors, actors and scientists, and many others.

Russian chauvinists are still afraid of these words in our days. They are ready to seal stamp “NO” on every one of these ideas. Of course, a stamp is a symbol of power (Adamchyk 2006: 147), and in this context we understand that the author had in mind the most influential chauvinists, perhaps the leaders of Russia. Besides that in the picture we can see the road sign “Stop!” which also, in their opinions, has to stop the movement of Ukraine in this direction.

The following two visual poetries “Moan” and “Fate” are dedicated to the passivity of contemporary Ukrainians who have forgotten about the glory and heroic deeds of their forefathers. “Among thirsty steppes grey-haired glory moans during centuries, calling her replete, sleepy contemporaries.” This text is written on the four sabres which create the Ukrainian letter “C”. In the original text every word in this poem begins with this letter constructing alliteration: “*С*еред *с*праглих *с*тепів/*С*тогне *с*толіттями *с*ива *с*лава/*С*кликаючи *с*воїх *с*итих/*С*онних *с*учасників”.

For Ukrainians, steppe (a big plain without forests) is a symbol of freedom and independence because Zaporizka Sich was built just there. It was a military-administrative organization of the Zaporizhian Cossack Host in XVI–XVIII centuries in the central part of Ukraine. It was

the place free from tsars, masters and other people who enslaved everyone. But it was also a dangerous place because of its natural unprotected state (I mean the open plain) and the necessity to defend the Cossack territories with sabres in hands. The glory of the victories over enemies branched forth on the whole Ukraine. But now it is old grey-haired glory because in our days Ukrainians are complacent and sleepy. They do not want to fight for their freedom. That's why the glory moans when it sees how contemporaries turn to the status of slave. It has been continuing for 3 centuries: since 1775, when Russian tsarina Kateryna II ruined Zaporizka Sich. From that time Ukraine no more had such a powerful army. (I want to remind that this poem was written in 2000–2001 before the Orange revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014).

The visual poem "Fate" continues this theme. In the picture we can see the Ukrainian big letter "P", which begins the word *раб* ('slave'), and the man who embosoms legs of his master. Besides that there is the following text: "Oh, God! Even new age can't throw out slave from us." After the long supremacy of Russian state Ukrainian free people begin to teach how to serve the tsar and this lesson lasted during 3 centuries. That is why to this time some Ukrainians find tsar, because they got used to be slaves. Viktor Zhenchenko dispraises these slavish habits of contemporaries.

The visual poem "Immortality of Ravel" is dedicated to bolero. It is the Spanish folk dance which is doing mainly by couple. This is a very passionate dance with graceful movements, slowing steps, significant pauses, and expression of postures.

The most popular bolero was written for ballet by French composer Maurice Ravel in 1928. It is so famous that Viktor Zhenchenko writes about Ravel's immortality because of this work. The visual poem consists of word "Bolero" in which each letter is placed not straightly and looks like scheme of steps by dancer. The last step develops into the turning. Inside of letter "O" we can read such text: "Bolero is the dance, the torment, the circle, from which you will never get out. It turns you and turns. And you no more want to turn in this lenten and protocol being from this magic circle".

The circle is a symbol of infinity, perfection and the absolute (Sheinina 2003: 31) and here it emphasizes the perfection of Ravel's music. Besides one of the most popular stagings is the production of ballet by Maurice Bejart in which the principal dancer dances on the big round dais. Maybe just that staging inspires Viktor Zhenchenko to use the symbol of circle in his poem.

Conclusions. The visual poetry by Viktor Zhenchenko is full of verbal and graphic symbols which supplement each other and create the new composite whole. In his works we can see many Ukrainian and international symbols, such as the cross, circle, grave, gibbet, boots, sabres, swallows, ravens, teeth, mouth, stamp, and others. Some geographical objects (like Kolyma, Mordovia) and persons (like Jesus Christ, Vasyl Stus) also became symbols in his visual poetries. Even the letters Viktor Zhenchenko uses for this aim. We could see Ukrainian letters "І", "С" and "Р" in such role. The poetries with these letters were taken from the separate part of the book "The alphabet for adults" where each letter is associated with some important idea-symbol.

The visual poetry by Viktor Zhenchenko consists of different codes and the author is permanently looking for new and original forms of synthesis of two secondary modeling systems – literature and graphic arts.

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TAKING A STEP OUTSIDE THE PHOTO AND FRAME: HOW SHOULD DRAWINGS BE ANALYSED IN THE CONTEXT OF GEOGRAPHY EDUCATION?

Markus Hilander
University of Helsinki, Finland
markus.hilander@helsinki.fi

Abstract

The combination of geography and semiotics seems to be rather rare. Nonetheless, geography as a discipline has always been visually oriented because of the usage of maps. However, geographers tend to be interested in the final meanings of visual representations rather than the processes during which the meanings are being produced. To approach these processes, we printed a photo taken in New York City (2008) on an A3-sheet and asked in total 64 Finnish high school students to draw around the photo. Next step of our study is deciding in which ways we are to analyze the drawings in question; during our presentation, we hope to gain new ideas from the audience to approach our data-set.

In the 1970s, Roland Barthes stated that connotations are likely to be important in semiology. He continued that connotative phenomena have not yet been systematically studied. In addition, a Finnish researcher, Virpi Blom, has said that the analysis of connotation is in the heart of interpretation. When it comes to the drawings we have collected, we can, for example, focus on what sorts of connotations the students have drawn. In her book, *Decoding Advertisements*, Judith Williamson approaches advertisements both as signifieds and signifiers. The same division can be used for drawings as follows: when the photograph itself is the signifier, the drawing is dominated by the photo; instead, when the drawing is the signifier, the drawer abandons the ready-made signified (the photo), and a semiotic act will take place. The former example is to do with synecdochal signs, the latter with metonymic signs. When it comes to visual literacy and semiotics, iconicity, indexicality, and metonymic signs are said to be the most important aspects we should concentrate on. It was Barthes who said that there is an abundant literature

on metaphor, but next to nothing on metonymy.

In addition, there are other interesting findings in the drawings; one, for instance, is whether the students have drawn people in their city landscape or not. It seems that quite often people are not drawn. Is it because of a human being is somewhat difficult to draw or do youngsters really not consider people to be part of an urban landscape?

1. Introduction: A drawing task

The combination of geography and semiotics is rather rare. Nonetheless, geography as a discipline has always been visually oriented because of the usage of maps. Therefore, geography has much to do with signs, as well as communication and the difference between illusion and reality (Cobley 2010: 3); maps and their coordinates work as indexes locating places on the globe. However, geographers tend to be interested in the final meanings of visual representations rather than the processes through which the meanings are produced. To approach these processes, a photo taken by Markus Hilander (2008; see Figures 1 and 2) in New York City was printed on an A3-sheet and a total of 64 Finnish high school students were asked to draw around the photo. In addition, members of the audience of the presentation at the World Congress of Semiotics in Sofia, Bulgaria were asked to draw their mental images. Once a researcher has collected a visual data-set, many questions must be faced about the ways in which to approach it. The next step of the research was to make a final decision about how to analyse the drawings collected.

The present plan is to examine the idea of *punctum* by Roland Barthes (1981) and his “blind field” (*champ aveugle*); that is, to consider the surroundings of a photo that have been cut off from the photo itself (Knuuttila 2007: 49). If we should draw our mental images around a given photograph, what sort of signs would those drawings be? To what extent would these drawings explain and give meanings to the photo itself? The instruction for the high school students and the audience in Sofia was as follows: “What sort of things and mental images do you relate to the photo? Imagine you could expand and/or continue the photo and the landscape it depicts by drawing around the photo”.

In this methodological paper, two concepts to conduct a content analysis of the drawings are introduced. As a geographical way of approaching the drawings, the “development compass rose” that is introduced in literature of didactics of geography (e.g., Lambert, Morgan, and Swift 2004) is used. Likewise the four principal compass points, elements in the drawings are sorted into four domains: natural, social, political, and economic. Eero Tarasti also finds four cases in his “Z model” that are used as a semiotic way of interpreting the drawings. Tarasti’s categories are as follows: body (M1), identity and personality (M2), social roles and institutions (S2), and norms and values (S1). The final aim of the research project will be opening up what sorts of information can and cannot be reached with these analytical tools.

Next, the photos and drawings are examined as two types of connotations: signifiers and signifieds. Then, the development compass rose and the Z model will be introduced and it will be demonstrated how they could be used as vehicles for an analysis. For illuminating the models, two examples of the drawings made by the audience of the presentation in Sofia will be submitted.

2. Two types of connotations

In the 1970s, Barthes (1977: 85) stated that connotations are likely to be important in semiology. He continued that “[c]onnotative phenomena have not yet been systematically studied” (Barthes 1977: 90). Furthermore, a Finnish researcher, Virpi Blom (1998: 212), has said that the analysis of connotations is at the heart of interpretation. When it comes to the drawings that have been collected, it is possible to focus on what sorts of connotations the students and the

audience of the presentation have drawn. In her book, *Decoding Advertisements*, Judith Williamson (1978: 31–36) approaches advertisements as both signifiers and signifieds. The same division can be used for the drawings. When the photograph itself is the signifier, the photo dominates the drawing; on the other hand, when the drawing is the signifier, the subject abandons the ready-made signified (the photo), and a semiotic act will take place (Tarasti 2000: 139). Photographs depict only a part of the landscape by the *pars pro toto* principle; this makes photos metonymic signs (Knuuttila 2007: 47). In visual literacy teaching, icons, indexes, and metonymic signs are emphasised as the most important aspects (Seppänen 2008: 191). Barthes (1977: 61) said that “there is an abundant literature on metaphor, but next to nothing on metonymy”.

2.1. The photograph as signifier

Williamson (1978: 31) states that a “product, which initially has no ‘meaning’, must be given value by a person or object that already has a value to us, i.e., already means”. Therefore, the product being advertised—or as in this research, the drawing—is the signified, and the correlating thing is the signifier (Blom 1995, 8: 17–18). In a case where the photograph’s elements continue smoothly to the drawing, the drawing is dominated (d-ed) by the photograph; hence, the photograph is the signifier (Tarasti 2000: 139). In Figure 1, the printed photograph depicting the city of New York with people, cars, and skyscrapers can be seen. On the right side of the photograph, there is half a building, which the subject has completed leaving the left side totally blank. Gillian Rose (2012) says that these sorts of signs, or connotations, are synecdochal signs. She writes that this “sign is either a part of something standing in for a whole, or whole representing a part” (Rose 2012: 121). There is an advertisement for a Finnish shipping company that is a good example of a synecdochal sign; even though only the letters *NG LI* can be seen, Finns will understand that the letters stand for *Viking Line* (e.g., Hilander 2013).




Figure 1. Drawing by a 27-year-old woman from Brazil

2.2. The drawing as signifier

When meanings are transferred to the product from other objects that co-exist in the advertisement, the product itself comes to mean. The product becomes the sign itself, the signifier, which gives meanings to its surrounding elements and events (Williamson 1978: 34–36; Blom 1995, 8: 18–20). The product, or the drawing, now has the power; it becomes the dominant (d-nt) (Tarasti 2000: 139), whereas the role of the photograph is reduced to a signified. In Figure 2, the subject has implemented a semiotic act and abandoned the ready-made signified; he has drawn elements, such as a television, a shelf, and a sofa, that do not have much in common with the urban landscape depicted in the photo. Rose (2012: 120) calls these kinds of connotations as metonymic signs; it is something associated with something else, which then represents that something else. In this case, the drawing explains the photograph's connotations by filling the blind side with the subject's own ideas, thoughts, and mental images. Next, the development compass rose and the Z model are introduced and Figures 1 and 2 analysed more in depth.




Figure 2. Drawing by a 46-year-old man from Greece

3. The development compass rose

The four domains that the development compass rose encourages the viewer to attend to and explore the links between are natural, social, political, and economic. A teacher or a researcher can place an image, an issue, or a phenomenon in the centre of the compass. A range of questions about the place and situation that the photograph *re*-presents (see, Conclusion) can be generated for each of the four compass points. These can then be compared with questions generated about an apparently different situation, and the commonalities between them explored (Tide global learning 2014: n.p.). The domains are:

1. *Natural domain*: These are questions about the natural as well as the built environment: energy, air, water, soil, living things, and their relationships to each other.
2. *Social domain*: These are questions about people, their relationships, their traditions, culture, and the ways in which they live. It includes questions about how gender, race, class, and age affect social relationships.
3. *Political domain*: These are questions about power, who makes choices and decides what is to happen and who benefits and loses as a result of these decisions and at what cost.
4. *Economic domain*: These are questions about money, trading, aid, ownership, buying, and selling.

In Figure 1, there are no elements of the natural environment drawn; only the built environment in a form of skyscrapers is present (natural domain). At the same time, the skyscrapers indicate wealth and money (economic domain). In addition to the natural environment, people are also excluded from the drawing (social domain). However, private motoring can be interpreted as a cultural feature; perhaps the subject imagines that people are inside the cars and buildings (see, Hilander 2012: 221). The non-visible people could be local because they are driving their own cars; vehicles drawn have not been marked as public transport or taxis.

In Figure 2, the natural environment is present in the form of a painting with mountains (natural domain). The television and other furniture—a sofa and a shelf—imply the wealth of the resident (economic domain). However, the drawing does not give any hints about where in the world the apartment might be located (social domain).

4. The Z model

In his theory of existential semiotics, Eero Tarasti introduces the Z model. It discovers the movements between the subject and the society. Tarasti (2012: 328) refers to the subject by a French word *Moi* and to the society by *Soi* that means “the subject observed by others”. With his theory, Tarasti (2012: 316) takes part in philosophical and methodological discussions of signification conceived in the 2010s; that is, he aims for what is called “neosemiotics”. However, this paper will not concentrate on the philosophical background of the model (see, e.g., Tarasti 2012). Tarasti (2012: 330) calls his model a “Z” model considering its inner motions between four categories. In order to conduct a content analysis of the drawings using the Z model, the four categories must be taken as independent entities. They are:

1. *M1*: This represents the ego and the body, which appears as kinetic energy, desire, and gestures. The ego is not yet conscious of itself, but rests in the naive Firstness of its being.
2. *M2*: This is the category in which the mere being of the subject becomes existing, as in Peirce’s Secondness. Ego discovers its identity, personality, and reaches a certain kind of stability or permanent corporeality via habit.
3. *S2*: This is about societal and institutional practices. It consists of applied values, choices, and realizations from *S1*.
4. *S1*: This is an abstract category that refers to norms, ideas, and values, which are purely conceptual and virtual; they are potentialities of a subject, which can either be actualized or not into *S2*.

In Figure 1, *M1* and *M2* categories are not present because there are no people drawn in the picture. The subject has continued the pedestrian crossing, which can be taken as a moral sign of *S1*; for instance, cars are not permitted to drive over people. The crosswalk could also be interpreted as a recommendation for walking. Private motoring tells something about values (*S1*) and pollution. Moreover, as a daily practice, private motoring can be linked to *S2*.

In Figure 2, the subject has drawn a painting with mountains that can remind some people of leisure: hiking, travelling, and downhill skiing. These activities are related to body, and, therefore, to *M1*. The apartment’s interior decoration with the television, sofa, and shelf—that is, incidentally, depicted as tall as the skyscrapers in Figure 1—describes the dweller’s personality (*M2*). The furniture also hints that the dweller has enough money to buy them (*S2*). However, the viewer cannot know if the dweller is watching a documentary about New York City voluntarily or forced (*S1*).

In summary, there are at least two differences in the results depending on which one of the models is used in the content analysis. Firstly, when using the Z model, *M1* and its body trigger the viewer to think about the meanings of the painting with mountains in Figure 2. Does the subject or the potential apartment dweller like downhill skiing? If so, is the subject or the

dweller more of an outdoor person than indoor person? Does the subject or the dweller live in a city or in the countryside? Answers to these questions depend on where in the world the subject or the possible dweller lives. The background information tells us that the subject is from Greece; the largest ski resort in Greece is close to Athens. However, it might be more intriguing not to consider the lifestyle of the drawer himself, but to determine how the drawing explains the photo and its meanings. In this approach, there is a profound juxtaposition, or a binary, of natural and urban landscapes in Figure 2. In the context of the drawing and the photo, it seems that the documentary about New York City on television is more exotic than the painting and all the possible outdoor activities to which it refers, because the painting on the wall is in sight round-the-clock, whereas the documentary lasts only for a while. However, one could argue that the apartment itself in the picture indicates the busy life of a citizen rather than a life spent in the countryside. In addition, mountains can also be associated with other things than just outdoor activities, for instance, with danger and the unknown, or climate change.

Secondly, the meaning of the pedestrian crossing, in Figure 1, would not stand out if the development compass rose had not been satisfied. The pedestrian crossing could be associated with the third domain of the compass, that is, the political domain and its decision-making dimension. However, the crosswalk as a *punctum* was not revealed until using the Z model. It was specifically the S1 category that suggested the ways in which figure 1 expresses values and norms.

5. Conclusion: What is the source of meanings in the photo?

Comparison of different methods can be useful and advantageous as long as the aim is not solving which one of the methods is the best. Instead, the aim should be to deepen the interpretations with the help of different views and perspectives that the various methods provide (Rakkolainen and Ehrling 2010: 347). In a case where the researcher uses pre-existing codes, the research can be called “etic” derived research. Based on the very limited experience of using the development compass rose in this paper, this might be called etic research. The four domains – natural, social, political, and economic – appear somewhat stiff and inflexible as a tool for content analysis. With the compass points and their questions, it is difficult to see beyond the drawings and their elements into the meanings.

When the researcher allows the data-set to represent, the research is based on the “emic” viewpoint, that is, the viewpoint of the interviewee, informant, or the data-set (Rakkolainen and Ehrling 2010: 326–327). The name of the Z model is an abbreviation for Zemic model; “Z” describes the motion between the four categories and “emic” refers to the fact that the movement takes place within the model (Tarasti 2012: 330). The inner motion of the model is thus included in the name itself. From this perspective, the Z model helps in considering the elements drawn in a wider and more complex way than the development compass rose allows. Nonetheless, both models produce different sorts of information that complement each other.

One must keep in mind that the data-set introduced here is very minimal. The audience of the presentation in Sofia gave us in total 11 drawings and only two examples of those are given in this paper, because the aim was not to introduce finished research results, but to discuss different options for conducting a content analysis. However, according to the outcomes of the development compass rose and the Z model regarding the two drawings, slight differences can be noticed. The former seems to lean more on the expectations of the viewer and the researcher, whilst the latter gives an opportunity to stay open to the data-set helping the researcher to engage in the drawings made by young people. This is very welcome in geography education where the aspects of everyday life of young people are increasingly significant (Tani 2011).

In addition, there are other interesting aspects to search for in the drawings, such as the pres-

ence or absence of people. It seems that quite often people are not included in the drawings. Is this because a human being is somewhat difficult to draw or because people are not considered to be part of an urban landscape? In the photo of New York City, there is also one geographical hint on the upper left corner regarding the location where the photo has been taken. Unfortunately, neither one of the subjects paid attention to the tip leaving the [Bro]adway sign uncompleted.

It is desirable that a researcher does not think that the research is finished after the process of coding the data-set. The next step is to analyse and interpret the coded data-set and answer the research questions. In this study, the question was asked what sort of information it is possible to gain with the different methods on which content analysis is built. The bigger picture, or a research task, is as follows: because a photo never completely presents the world, that is, it can never present the world objectively, does it then *re-present* the worldview of the photographer or the viewer?

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WHAT IS A LETTER?

Robin Fuller
Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
rofuller@tcd.ie

Abstract

“What is a letter?” may at first seem to be a grammatological question; a question for those who study writing systems. Historically this question has often been seen as unproblematic – letters are symbols for sounds organised according to the *alphabetic principle* wherein each letter stands for a single phonetic segment. That alphabetic orthographies often depart from the alphabetic principle has, historically, not been taken as counter evidence undermining the legitimacy of the alphabetic principle but as evidence that letters have been misused (Harris 1986: 101). More recent studies of English orthography, such as those of Geoffrey Sampson (1985) and more recently and thoroughly Des Ryan (2011) have provided accounts of the variety of functions a letter can fulfil within alphabetic writing systems, rather than simply judging orthographies as they exist as degenerate realisations of an ideal principle.

Beyond grammatology, the extra-linguistic meanings attributed to “visual” or “material” aspects of letters is of increasing concern – notably in growing field of *Linguistic Landscapes*, as well as the semiotics of typography (Van Leeuwen 2005; 2006). For the grammatologist letters are differential units of orthography; for the visual-semiotician or sociolinguist the letter is often a polysemous aggregate of connotations. The non-positive, differential account of the letter and discussion of the semiotics of the embodied letter have at times been presented as fundamentally at odds with one another (cf. Drucker 1994: 44; Seargant 2012: 188). It will here be argued that rather than these two positions contradicting one another, each describes the letter in a different semiotic context.

Nevertheless the primacy of the differential nature of the letter will be here asserted; yet at

the same time it will be argued that the differential letter is independent of language and orthography. Section five below provides a provisional sketch of a fundamental semiotics of the letter, underlying both the grammatological and visual-semiotic. By “fundamental semiotics of the letter” it is meant the semiotics of the letter prior to its exploitation in any particular sign-function or semiotic system. Regardless of any semiosis the letter enters into (be it within an orthography, a mathematical notation system, or in a *linguistic landscape*), the letter is in some sense, prior to any functional context, semiotic.

1. The immaterial controversy

The subject of this paper is the letters of the alphabet, yet this is not an investigation of the varieties of letters existing in history and the present. In discussion is the twenty-six or so letters of the modern European alphabet, derived from the Roman, used in various orthographies, notation systems and forms of graphic communication. When looked at orthographically, one could say that in each language that uses the alphabet, the letters (having special functions native to an orthography) are not the same (Crystal 1996: 292). However, my aim is to discuss the letter prior to its utilisation in a particular functional context. These twenty-six or so symbols have been developed into a set of components that can be used in a vast array of semiotic contexts.

Saussure (1974: 119–20) famously explained the non-positive nature of the phoneme by metaphorical reference to the letter <t>. Saussure provided three renderings of the letter and stated that they remain functionally identical whether rendered on a different surface or in a different manner. All that is necessary for a mark to function is recognition of its identity as <t> and recognition that it does not have another identity, such as <ɖ>, etc. That Saussure was not attempting to develop a theory of writing, but to explain the phoneme is frequently overlooked. Nevertheless, we can accept that Saussure did (albeit indirectly) assert a theory of the semiotics of the letter through use of this metaphor. Saussure’s simple statements about the letter – that its identity is not tethered to any particular graphic realisation; that its purpose is to be differentiated from other letters – does not imply that the *only* possible semiotic function a letter can have is non-positive and differential, he simply gave the subject no attention.

Van Leeuwen, who in the opposite manner to Saussure explains writing with reference to speech, writes

This view of the ‘distinctive’ role of speech sounds is quite similar to the view that letterforms have no meaning in themselves [...] In my view, however, distinctive features can become meaningful [...] The same reasoning can be applied to the distinctive features of letterforms (2005: 141).

Van Leeuwen is of course correct: an embodied speech segment, or letter, can enter into any number of semioses. Yet it is vital to note that sound or graphic qualities communicate in addition to, not in contradiction with, the differential role of the phoneme in a phonology, or the letter in an orthography. As Umberto Eco wrote

a sign-function is realised when two functives (expression and content [or signifier and signified]) enter in a mutual correlation; the same functive can also enter into another correlation, thus becoming a different functive and therefore giving rise to a new sign-func-

tion. Thus signs are the provisional result of coding rules which establish *transitory* correlations of elements, each of these elements being entitled to enter – under given coded circumstances – into another correlation and thus form a new sign (1976: 49).

That is to say, whether a letter is taken as a “purely negative and differential” unit – whether three renderings of the letter <ʈ> are taken to be functionally identical, as Saussure noted – or the three renderings provide independent meanings, depends upon what we are asking of the letter. Whether the three <ʈ>s are dispersed in a text whose linguistic content is being deciphered, or whether they are seen as indexical evidence of the presence of particular authors (or any other semiosis) is not fixed. As expression functive substance the graphic mark is not obligated to any content.

Nevertheless all things are not equal. There is a fallacy in arguments that suggest that recognition of meaningful differences in rendering of letters contradicts the Saussurean point that letters are first of all differential units independent of any substantial realisation. As will be elaborated below, the fallacy lies in the fact that recognition of “visual”/“material” significance is dependent upon a prior recognition of the differential and non-material nature of the letter. It is only when a letter’s identity is recognised, that a particular embodiment can be taken as meaningful.

2. Potestas

David Abercrombie (1949: 59) defined the three attributes of the letter in classical grammar as follows – “*figura* was the letter as written, *potestas* as pronounced, and by its *nomen* it could be identified for discussion”. Although Abercrombie was concerned with the letter within orthography, this paper uses expanded definitions of these three attributes to discuss the fundamental semiotics of the letter.

If we begin by thinking about the semiotic function of the letter within alphabetic orthography, as noted above, the letter is often supposed to function according to the alphabetic principle: a letter’s *potestas* should be one sound, and one alone. Yet, that the alphabet was most likely invented (or developed) as a set of symbols standing for individual segments, does not explain the synchronic function of letters in actually existing orthographies.

As we know, the alphabetic principle does not account for English orthography. A very simple example: the letter <c> frequently stands for [s] and [k], sounds also indicated by <s> and <k>. In other contexts <c> can indicate [ʃ] as in <precious>. And so on. English orthography cannot be explained as having a few anomalous deviations from the alphabetic principle. Even if one were to map all the possible sounds a letter or letter combinations refer to, this would still fail to explain the function of letters within English orthography. Even those orthographies which are said to be highly alphabetic, such as Finnish, depart from the alphabetic principle in their use of upper and lowercase letters as differences in symbols occur for reasons other than differences in sound. Often letters make visual distinctions which the spoken language fails to represent. It has been demonstrated by Sampson (1985: 203–204), that English orthography has tendencies towards logography, as letters combine not simply to stand for sounds but to form word symbols (logographs) allowing graphic distinction for homophones such as the various meanings and spellings for [raʔt]. Ryan has examined aspects of writing normally considered to fall outside of the English writing system, including constructed homophony (a form of non-standard spelling) (2011), and the use characters intentionally rendered to have more than one reading (2015). Ryan argues that these fringe activities serve to demonstrate the interaction of phonetic and graphic functions of letters in writing. There have also been numerous sociolinguistic studies

into the role of non-standard orthography (or transgression of “highly-regulated” orthography) in the construction of cultural identity (Sebba 2012).

We need not go through this in further detail. It suffices to say that even within “standard” orthography the roles which letters play are varied and not yet fully understood. We can therefore expand Abercrombie’s sense of potestas from “sound” to any use to which the letter is put in a given system. Rather than thinking of a letter as relating to a particular sound in a given language, a letter is better thought of as a component used in writing; a component which we can put to various uses. The same components are used in various orthographies, in which they may have similar or entirely different functions. We can expand the meaning of potestas further, beyond the linguistic-orthographic, as letters can be, and in fact are, used in numerous notation systems, such as algebra and symbolic logic. Therefore the potestas belongs to a system but the letter does not. In a structural sense, the letter pre-exists the potestas which it is given.

The second definition for “letter” provided in Florian Coulmas’ (1996: 292) *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Writing Systems*, is a function-based definition of letter as “a graphic symbol that represents one or more phonemes of a language [...] defined in terms of its function within a system that represents speech”. The potestas is the letter as it functions in a system. Although the system need not be orthographic-linguistic, we can (akin to Saussure and van Leeuwen), explain potestas with reference to the phoneme. In a phonology a phoneme is not defined by its positive phonetic substance, but according to its non-positive and differential nature. The term “grapheme”, in analogy with “phoneme”, has been used to describe the non-positive and differential nature of letters within orthographies (Vachek 1966). Others, notably Peter Daniels (1991), have rejected the term grapheme as theoretically imprecise.

There are several reasons why the term “grapheme” is here avoided. Firstly Daniels’ critique is valid: it seems inappropriate to apply a common term to such divergent writing systems as Chinese and English. Even within alphabetic orthographies there are difficulties with the term (cf. opposing views on whether upper and lowercase letters constitute independent graphemes in Crystal 2008: 220; and Sampson 1985: 25). More directly relevant, it is necessary here to assert that the letter is differential regardless of particular linguistic-orthographic contexts. “Grapheme” is a term used to describe a letter attributed with a particular non-positive differential role. But that to which is given a graphemic function – the letter itself – is already non-positive and differential.

As Sampson (1986: 20, 25) notes, a blackletter character and its roman type equivalent can be considered to be functionally identical despite differences in style. *The Complete Works of Shakespeare*, whether printed in blackletter or roman, involves functionally identical strings of letters: a sonnet read from either book would be the same sonnet. Within this specific semiotic context the visual difference would be functionally irrelevant. Another example is the 1916 Proclamation of the Irish Republic which famously was printed in such haste that more than one typeface was used in the body of the text. The switches in typeface are orthographically irrelevant (however, their orthographic irrelevance does not preclude other semioses, as the presence of variations in character style is a necessary index of an authentic copy).

But there are notation systems which rely on letters in a similar manner to linguistic orthographies, as differential units, in which differences in typeface style is of vital importance. In the mathematical notation shown in figure one, blackletter and roman characters have been assigned precise potestates such that if the character set in blackletter were set in roman the equation would cease to make sense. This greater precision in differentiation does not mean the letters now function owing to graphic substance, or due to their “materiality”. What matters is that a distinct potestas has been applied not only to letters (e.g. <a> ?) but to the particular style of the letters (e.g. <a> ? <ā>).

It might be argued that mathematical notation is irrelevant: that it just so happens that letters are used when any other set of symbols would do. Such an argument would prioritise the letter's historical role as indicator of sound and ignore its synchronic existence. Letters are graphic components used in various sorts of notation and are not tethered to the denotation of sound, nor linguistic use. Letters are symbols that have been developed into a uniquely vast inventory of stylistic variations that can be rendered with a great many technologies (from pencil to specialist software LaTeX) and can be recognised with even greater rapidity and ease. Letters certainly do not construct mathematical meaning (they are arbitrary), but they are the best materials available.

That the letter is not tethered to sound can be clarified with reference to Saussure's explanation of linguistic identity through the metaphor of the 8.25am Geneva to Paris train. Regardless of whether the train is composed of new carriages and passengers each day, we recognise that it is the same train each day owing to its being functionally identical (Saussure 1974: 108). We need to reverse this metaphor to understand the letter. To prioritise the letters linguistic function over all others is akin to calling a car that once carried passengers to the capital of France, "to Paris". The letter has an identity prior to any of its functions.

3. Figura

If the letter is not defined according to a particular potestas, but is rather that to which a potestas is given, must it be defined as *figura* – as shape?

As already discussed letters come in different shapes, and we have seen that sometimes these different shapes are given precise potestas (as in the mathematical notation), and sometimes variations in letter style will not carry such a precisely defined function (as in the Proclamation of the Irish Republic). In each of the tens of thousands of typefaces available the letters are designed slightly differently. The letters will further be rendered differently depending upon the quality of printing or digital display they are realised through. And each person's handwriting will render letters differently again. Yet, we recognise such variations not as unique symbols but as different renderings of the same letters. This identity is independent of attributed *potestas*: the mathematical notation supplies potestas to different versions of *the same letter*, and the Proclamation does not.

On the book cover shown in figure two there are two styles of letter. The letter ⟨a⟩ in ⟨graphics handbook⟩ and in ⟨Ken Garland⟩ is orthographically identical. Yet clearly the shapes are communicatively different. It is not my purpose to develop an analysis of the visual semiotics involved here, but let us say for the sake of demonstration that the author's name being set in a sans-serif connotes matter-of-factness, and the title lettering being composed of a modular units is iconic of the modernist approach to graphic design which the book endorses. Such semiotics of the letter can be referred to as the *connotative* or *semantic* values associated with letterforms. Whatever the meaningful difference between the styles, this connotative semiotics of the letter is not of the same nature as the differences in letter style in the mathematical notation example. In the mathematical notation a precisely and unambiguously defined difference in potestas is applied to the letter styles and on the book cover it is not. Nevertheless, the following point is both fundamental and crucial: just as in the orthographic context the recognition of (connotative/semantic) meaningful differences in the styling of letters on the book cover is completely dependent firstly on recognition of the two differently-styled shapes sharing, in an abstract sense, the same identity. The different meanings attributed to each letter ⟨a⟩ must follow recognition that both are in fact ⟨a⟩: both belong to the same abstract conventional category, and it is the differences in realisation of this identical abstraction that allows semantic/connotative meaning to enter.

4. Nomen

Ultimately, if a letter is neither function (potestas) nor shape (figura), the letter is to be understood as *nomen*. Here *nomen* does not mean literally “name”, as name varies across languages, but the associative category to which the letter belongs. This is Charles S. Peirce’s *symbol* at its fullest degree of abstraction – its meaning conventionally established independent of particular instances of its occurrence. Peirce’s explanation of the symbol with written and spoken words as examples applies equally to the letter:

[the symbol is] itself a kind and not a single thing. You can write down the word ‘star’, but that does not make you creator of the word, nor if you erase it have you destroyed the word. The word lives in the minds of those who use it (1931–58: 169).

And,

we speak of writing or pronouncing the word ‘man’; but it is only a *replica*, or embodiment of the word, that is pronounced or written. The word itself has no existence although it has a real being, *consisting* in the fact that existents *will* conform to it (1931–58: 165–66).

Likewise, the embodied letter regardless of the peculiarity of its embodiment is a token of a non-embodied abstraction. This definition of the letter as *nomen* is similar to the first definition of letter supplied by Coulmas in his encyclopaedia of writing systems:

[a letter is] one of a class of shapes which are recognized as instances of abstract graphic concepts which represent the basic units of an alphabetic writing system. Each of these units has a name, for example ei, si, kei. Thus the letter em is the class of all Ms no matter how they are shaped; more precisely, it is the class of all conceivable letter shapes to which the name em applies (1996: 292).

To this we must, however, add several qualifications. Firstly, as already noted, letters are not united under a “name” tethered to a specific phonetic/orthographic realisation such as “em”, but are held in a general category here called a *nomen*. More importantly, the “alphabetic writing system” to which a letter belongs need not be linguistic-orthographic. Finally the definition of letter as an associative category uniting various shapes is not one definition of the letter sitting next to the Coulmas’ orthographic definition (see section two above), but structurally must precede the exploitation of the letter with attributed potestas in a given orthography or other system.

5. Paradigm figura

Coulmas (1996: 292) notes that regarding the variety of shapes held to be the same letter, “it is difficult, if not impossible, to define these prototypes in terms of invariant graphical features”. Coulmas is correct that a definitive inventory of the shapes united under a *nomen* cannot be provided. However we can, with the aid of a metaphor of Peirce’s, shed some light on how it is

that certain tokens are united under the same nomen.

Between the pure abstraction of the symbol and its particular substantial realisation as token, there are what are here called *paradigm figura*. On the one hand, these paradigm figura are what particular letter tokens approximate, and at the same time, the paradigm figura result from a generalisation of all prior letter tokens. When the typeface designer opens FontLab, or when we lift a pen, we approximate a particular paradigm figura. At the same time, the sum of such approximations leads to a continual morphing of the paradigm itself.

Peirce's metaphor of the composite photograph is here relevant. The composite photograph was a nineteenth-century technique in which photographic portraits were overlaid in an attempt to determine human types. Despite the scientifically dubious nature of this practice, Peirce found it useful in metaphorically describing the nature of certain concepts. The idea of 'yellow' is not held mentally as a specific light-wave frequency, but rather as an approximation based on previously experienced yellows (Hookway 2002: 29). Likewise, when we think of an object such as a 'chair' we conceive of a mental composite image of previously encountered chairs, the overlay of which forms the general idea of chair. In a similar way we can think of paradigm figura of letters not as precisely defined schemas, but as soft-edged composite images.

The uppercase ⟨A⟩ in most roman typefaces and non-cursive handwriting adheres approximately to the following structure: two lines descend diagonally left and right from an apex, linked by a horizontal line. An inscribed letter that adheres to these rules is a *token* of this paradigm figura. That a serifed ⟨A⟩ has 'feet' and a bold sans-serif ⟨A⟩ has a flat rather than pointed apex are the details with softer edges in the composite image of the paradigm: their presence or absence does not inhibit recognition of the figura.

The symbol is entirely abstract. All that the symbol demands of its paradigm figura is that they are agreed to be, by convention, paradigm figura of the symbol. The paradigm figura is also abstract in that it is independent of any substantial realisation. However, unlike the relationship of symbol to paradigm, the relationship of token to paradigm figura does demand that certain attributes be approximated. In Eco's terms (1976: 184), the type/token ratio is one of *ratio facilis* meaning that for the token only "some features are pertinent and some others are variable and inessential for the isolation of the given-unit".

It is overly simplistic to imagine that letter-tokens are independent realisations of paradigm figura: letter-tokens are most often realised as members of alphabets – typeface or lettering styles. These alphabets themselves impose constraints and conventions on how the token realises the paradigm. In a sans-serif alphabet – such as that of Helvetica – every stroke will most likely be in reference to a paradigm figura. In contrast, in a script typeface some strokes will be flourishes that do not relate to a paradigmatic form but to the typefaces own native stylistic conventions. In essence each alphabet establishes *native coding conventions* determining how the letter-tokens fulfil paradigms. Such native coding conventions are unique to each alphabet, but they are not entirely freely invented, as native coding conventions are themselves often governed by more general conventions – which we can call *paradigm coding conventions*.

Returning to figure two, ⟨graphics handbook⟩ is rendered in a modernist modular style. Such alphabets are constructed with a minimum of possibilities – all letters the same width, all strokes the same thickness, all curves perfect circle arcs, etc. Thus the design method forces the letters to depart from paradigm figura due to adherence to native coding conventions at the expense of paradigm coding conventions.

In contrast, a more conventional printed alphabet, such as that found in the typeface Times New Roman, is governed by conventions not only found in Times. Certain strokes are heavier than others – it is "stressed" – and serifs of a particular style occur at particular points. The placing of serifs and stress are more or less the same as many other roman typefaces. In that

sense they follow a paradigmatic sets of coding conventions. But what makes Times Times is the subtleties in the exact application of the coding conventions. It is in this sense that they are “native” to Times. Further native conventions determine, among many other things, the relative proportions of the letters – in the case of Times there is a large x-height and short ascenders and descenders – and equally all exceptional “conventions” which may have only one application.

Conclusion

Letters pre-exist – structurally if not historically – the systems (or contexts) that supply them with functions. Nevertheless, letters are not semiotically neutral prior to their exploitation in particular semiotic systems. Letters have been developed into a uniquely vast range of styles that can be rendered and recognised with ease in an array of functional contexts. What allows this is recognition of the letter as nomen – it is only when the identity of letters is recognised that visual similarities and differences can become meaningful. Saussure was more or less correct in his description of the letter as non-positive and differential, but this applies to letters more broadly, not just within alphabetic orthographies. Whether <ɋ> looks like any of his three examples is not at first important, as long as each is recognised as <ɋ>. It is only after this recognition of identity that the visual semiotician can note differences in renderings of <ɋ>, and thus detect a specific content.

The semiotic richness of the letter resides in the fact that prior to its exploitation in a particular sign-function or semiotic system, there are several stages to its realisation, and at each of which a precise potestas can be applied, or a visual-semiotic distinction can be made. This is the fundamental semiotics of the letter, which underlies the use of letters in any particular semiotic context. In standard orthographies the potestas is applied at the level of symbol. As we have seen, in certain forms of mathematical notation, different paradigm figura of a symbol (themselves governed by paradigm coding conventions) can be supplied with potestates creating a greater degree of differentiation than is found in standard orthographies. The example of the Proclamation of the Irish Republic demonstrates that this richness is also at work in semiotic contexts not governed by strict potestates. Orthographically all the symbols that are realised as differently styled tokens on the Proclamation have the same potestas. However, because the symbols have slight differences in their approximation of paradigm figura, the tokens are then able to serve as indices of the authenticity of the document.

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TOWARDS A QUANTITATIVE VISUAL SEMIOTICS?

Yannis Skarpelos
Panteion University, Athens, Greece
gskarp@panteion.gr

Abstract

Visual Semiotics, as is the case with most of Visual Studies so far, have not found yet a sound and methodologically rigorous equilibrium between ‘visual’ and ‘semiotics’. Instead, following existing examples, they scrutinize visuality, the gaze and other similar objects of inquiry, or work on visual grammar and syntax. In all cases, they deal mostly with meta-language about images than with images themselves. They deal mostly with words used to describe the visual (either produced by the researcher or by others) than with the visual itself.

In this paper, I am to propose the use of existing software tools in order to achieve research in quantifiable signifiers in visual images, and their manipulation towards a quantitative semiotics. Concepts like ‘entropy’, ‘hue’, ‘saturation’, ‘mean RGB’ etc. are the computed signifiers which are actually visible but so far visual researchers were unable to tap upon. Illustration of the method will be provided by my current research.

1. Introduction

Decade after decade, the number of photos produced per year is multiplied, reaching the incredible amount of 380 billion in 2012. According to Schwartz (2012) 3.8 trillion photos had been taken from the invention of the camera till 2012. This number is amazing (though it may be a mere guess), and still leaves beyond contemplation video and all forms of “moving” images, as well as multimedia products, software interfaces, computer games, to name but a few types of modern visual data. Almost two centuries since the invention of camera, five centuries of print images, millennia of hand-drawn pictures, and two decades of digital media, the visual realm is now vast enough to be considered under the name of big data.

On the other hand, it looks like visual semiotics is more comfortable with less data. Actually, one or few images are considered enough. Half a century after the famous essay by Roland Barthes, “Rhetoric of the Image”, we still “start by making it considerably easier for ourselves” (Barthes 1977: 33). We are thus replicating, more or less, what is already known, at least methodologically. But the advent of big visual data readily available, combined with the epistemological shift in Digital Humanities, plus the opportunity to use software appropriate for the analysis of visual images, compose a new framework for the exercise of visual semiotics –namely, a quantitative visual semiotics.

In the following paragraphs I will take as an example the semiotic analysis of music album covers, to demonstrate a still highly experimental approach to such a version of semiotics. My approach takes into account, as a distant precursor, the work of Groupe μ in *Traité du signe visuel* (1992).

2. The analysis of music album covers

Man, if you want to see where the world's been,
just look through some old album covers
Patty Smith

Jones and Sorger remind the reader that “when Johnny Rotten of the Sex Pistols proclaimed, ‘if people bought the records for the music, this thing would have died a death long ago’, he illustrated the importance and power people place on ‘the look of music’” (Jones and Sorger 1999: 68). As Toivanen points out: “The album cover art is an essential part of the vinyl record use experience. The record is not just for listening, but to be held and looked at, as well. ‘The artwork is a continuation to the soundscape of the album’” (Toivanen 2014: 34).

Music disc covers of any format (vinyl or CD) are cultural artifacts of a specific status. As cultural artifacts, “images converge into a single scope: That of transmitting old ideas in order to awaken new perceptions and the desire to consume” (Fiore and Contani 2014: 40). While, as Patti Smith said once: “Man, if you want to see where the world's been, just look through some old album covers” (quoted in Jones and Sorger 1999: 70). Existing literature on album artwork (cf. Robertson 2007; Bestley 2014; Blue 2011; Grant 2001; Jones and Sorger 1999) shows that it is connected to the cultural and political values of the social environment within which they were produced and consumed (Chapman 2012; Lowey and Prince 2014; Shaw 2014; Hickam and Wallach 2011; Karjalainen and Ainamo 2011; Karjalainen, Laaksonen, and Ainamo 2009; Alleyne 2014; Inglis 2001), or even the global environment of the last two decades with its globalizing impact on both visuals and values.

Album art has been connected to LP and its large 12-inch format (Jones and Sorger 1999: 70; Bartmanski and Woodward 2013: 7), so that its replacement with the much smaller CD cover “has led many to lament the decline, even the disappearance of album art” (Inglis 2001: 83). It is intriguing to find that more than a decade later, despite the familiarity of music CDs, the same stance is held (Toivanen 2014: 39).

Androutsopoulos and Scholz suggest that:

Every vinyl or CD record is a semiotically complex textual unit. It consists of the sound material of the CD itself and the verbal and visual material of the CD cover and booklet, which includes pictures, acknowledgments, and various promotional texts. While record cover and booklet are certainly peripheral in terms of artistic value, they are nevertheless quite important for the self-presentation of the artists. (Androutsopoulos and Scholz 2003: 469; cf. Fiore and Contani 2014: 38)

Album covers are multifunctional visual cultural artifacts, since they:

- “Ensure the protection of the recording they contain” (Inglis 2001: 83; Jones and Sorger 1999: 68).
- They serve as an advertisement (Jones and Sorger 1999: 68). They or their artwork are used in posters, digital or print advertisements. In being a sort of advertisement by themselves, “they reflect the conventions of other media forms, notably the news headline and/or lead, which act as an enticement to the reader to continue reading; and the magazine advertisement or television commercial, which similarly seek to attract and retain the consumer’s attention” (Inglis 2001: 84).
- They are “an accompaniment to the music (...) an integral component of the listening which assists and expands the musical experience” (Inglis 2001: 84). Inglis mentions that the listener may wish to refer to the artwork of the cover during listening to the music, or even read or sing the lyrics provided in the sleeve. There are other ways in *accompaniment* as well: the artwork may represent the ‘myth’ or the ‘mythological narrative of those involved in the production of the music (the composer, the songwriter, the singer, the band etc.), participating in the production or reproduction of their identity. As Tuomas Holopainen said, with the visual design “we try to create our own Nightwish universe, imagination land, own Nightwish mythology” (quoted in Karjalainen and Ainamo 2011: 31). Another good example offers the “non-representational and abstract album artwork” of Autechre, that complements their secrecy and mystification of their way of doing music (Brett 2015: 9). Another way to put this connection between cover artwork and the music in a larger totality, is the work of artists and studios like Hipgnosis, the studio “effectively translating sonic experiences into still images and accelerating the rock album cover’s development” (Alleyne 2014: 251). Finally, and against the grain of most of mainstream rock covers, the punk covers, “lowbrow, offensive, and easily reproducible on a limited budget” (Acock 2014), duplicate the ideological premises and visualize the cultural directions of punk.
- It is a way to engrave the authority of the ‘label’ (the company) upon its products, inscribing visual elements of its brand on it. According to Pat Dolan in 1940s, “each album should reflect the quality of the Columbia name” (Schmitz in Jones and Sorger 1999: 72).
- The cover has an aesthetic value. “The LP format’s material packaging is relevant for understanding its reported aura” (Bartmanski and Woodward 2013: 6). For example, Inglis mentions that the Beatles’ “album covers themselves have been seen as groundbreaking in their visual and aesthetic properties, have been congratulated for their innovative and imaginative designs, have been credited with providing an early impetus for the expansion of the graphic design industry into the imagery of popular music” (Inglis 2001: 83).
- The cover is a way to approach and experience the work of music. “Cover designs depict what the product means, not what it physically is” (Alleyne 2014: 252), and thus it offers a key to its interpretation by the audience, even if this is not an ‘open’ work. On the other hand, in Brazilian hip-hop the meaning resides in an “attitude” which “is essentially linked to the representation of ‘reality’ and more specifically working-class daily life in Brazil’s impoverished suburbs” (Pardue 2005: 61), and this representation happens visually on the cd covers. According to Pardue, “Hip-hoppers implicitly make correlations between the technologies of image manipulation that comprise the appearance of the CDs and their perspectives on ‘reality’” (Pardue 2005: 62; cf. Pardue 2010: 50). The same holds for the metal scene: “An essential part of the attraction of metal music is not only how it sounds but also how metal looks. Album covers, dressing, stage constructions, posing in photos, facial expression, postures, spectacular shock effects, and small details telling about the extremely precise aesthetics of the sub-culture constitute the visual code system of metal” (Karjalainen and Ainamo 2011: 31).

- “There is an important sense in which an album sleeve can be seen as a commodity in its own right” (Inglis 2001: 84). As such, the cover is a collectible cultural artifact, like many other mass culture products like posters, or photographs (cf. Fullerton and Rarey 2012). Jones and Sorger realize that “LP album covers have not yet lost their cultural status for designers and consumers alike” (Jones and Sorger 1999: 70).
- The cover is a means of communication between the artist(s), the illustrator/designer, and the fan base. In this function, Fiore and Contani indicate that heavy metal album designers utilize “excessively strong images (...); to this end they need the grotesque as a leitmotif for an efficient dialog among all the factors in play” (Fiore and Contani 2014: 39). The authors follow Goulart and suggest that “It is (...) the images and illustrations that the authors (or artists) direct in the function of interlocutor to the social audience or consumer market of heavy metal recordings, t-shirts and videos” (Fiore and Contani 2014: 40).
- The cover is a means of visualizing identity, not only of the artist(s) or band, but also of a sought identity (be it a group, ethnic or local identity) (cf. Weston 2011).
- Finally, the cover artwork may become a sign of fandom, as exemplified in its social media use, or in mashup videos in Youtube.

Album covers are conceived as “visual signposts” of their era (Evans in Inglis 2001: 85). They allow for “a textual analysis yielding rich insights into the ways in which they invite or allow the consumer to decipher them” (Inglis 2001: 85).

From a semiotic point of view “record covers [...] convey meaning through all of the semiotic resources of which they are composed: language, typography, images, and layout” (Androutsopoulos and Scholz 2003: 469), and they therefore require a multimodal analysis. Such an analysis requires a strict selection of one or a few covers, since it will either repeat itself or delve into minutiae without being able to provide the wider image. It is no surprising, then, that Androutsopoulos and Scholz analyze only one cover, as “a particularly suitable example” (Androutsopoulos and Scholz 2003: 469); Inglis analyzes only 12 of the “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Beatles album covers in existence” (Inglis 2001: 84); Shaw is limiting her analysis to four covers from a series of 51 CDs (Shaw 2014: 37–38). Androutsopoulos and Scholz declare: “this is by no means a representative cover for European rap records in general, it does provide an excellent illustration of how a ‘local’ instantiation of the ‘global’ genre is visually encoded” (Androutsopoulos and Scholz 2003: 470). It is clear then, that the selection is not based upon any idea of sampling. It is rather based upon the scholar’s convenience.

3. Methodology

In my research, the focus is cultural dynamics. In short, I am interested in the way cultural artifacts incorporate signs of cultural trends, values, ideas related to a dynamic and changing environment. I am also interested in the ways such artifacts change in time according to this changing environment. Instead of analyzing some dozens of visual images, I attempt to look at 24,066 images covering a certain area of cultural production during half a century. I use as my sample the cover artwork of all the albums produced in Greece since 1960. Existing bibliography (Dragoumanos 2007) shows a prolific production of approx. 28,000 albums. It is impossible to analyze such an amount of visual data the traditional way. Here, as Manovich put it, *software takes command* (2013).

Software can extract tens or even hundreds of measures for each image, which can then be analyzed in many ways. In the examples of this paper I used an open source program (ImageJ) as well as macros created by the Software Studies Initiative and distributed under a GNU license at their website.¹

¹ <http://lab.softwarestudies.com/>

Existing software allows, for example, measuring entropy. For software mechanics entropy “is a measure of the degree of randomness in the image” (Thum 1984: 203), “an intuitive understanding of information entropy relates to the amount of uncertainty about an event associated with a given probability distribution. The entropy can serve as a measure of ‘disorder’. As the level of disorder rises, entropy increases and events are less predictable” (Sonka, Hlavac, and Boyle 2008: 25). Thus, “the higher the entropy, the more complex the image” (Marques 2011: 466).

On a more semiotic ground, the balance between order and fragmentation (i.e. entropy) “is about the degree of coherence of the world” (Groupe μ 1992: 35). On the other hand, it is clear that the meaning of entropy in our software is quite different from the teleological use of it by Arnheim (1971), and criticized by Groupe μ . We could expect that when the “coherence of the world” is less valued, when the world appears to be incoherent or fragmented, when personality is more important than collectivity, then visual representations would be more entropic. So, as our society proceeds towards postmodernism, we should expect visual cultural representations to become more entropic.

On a sociological level, this would be compatible with R. Inglehart’s findings that Western societies moved from materialist towards postmaterialist values, as more generations have “spent [their] formative years in conditions of economic and physical security” (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987: 1296; cf. Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1981; Abramson and Inglehart 1992; Inglehart and Abramson, 1999). Changing values “are reshaping religious beliefs, job motivations, fertility rates, gender roles, and sexual norms and are bringing growing mass demands for democratic institutions and more responsive elite behavior” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 15). With the shift to postindustrialism, the values that gain salience are those connected to “self-expression (...), through which people place increasing emphasis on human choice, autonomy and creativity”, and self-expression (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 20–21). Are they also affecting the structure of our visual cultural artifacts towards a certain direction? And since the analysis of such a huge amount of images renders it impossible to analyze them at the figurative level, is it possible to trace such changes beyond the figurative level to the plastic (abstract) level?

4. Discussion

One could visualize entropy by comparing one of the most entropic with the least entropic album cover artworks in my sample. A reference to the cultural context of their publication can induce the meaning of the two covers:



Image 1. D. Savvopoulos, “To Perivoli tou Trelou” [A Fool’s Garden] (1969).
This album cover’s entropy is 7.59279.

The first cover (image 1) comes from the late sixties (1969). One could suggest that entropy was the cultural mood of the era: hippie culture, weed, Rock, Vietnam, peace movements, May 1968; a world in constant motion, turbulence and unrest. What is more: this unrest was in a strict contradiction with domestic rule – the military dictatorship imposed in April 1967. Thus, beyond the visual signs (and maybe, even, as a clue to their “deciphering”), entropy could be a second order sign, signifying sympathy with youth movements throughout the West that could be overlooked by the censorship mechanism.




Image 2. En Plo, “En Plo” [On Board] (1989).
This album cover’s entropy is 0.218448.

The second cover (image 2) comes from the late eighties (1989). It is the cover of the only album by an alternative, underground group. I think that the intertextual reference to *The Beatles* so-called ‘white album’ is quite strong, not only because of their perceived similarity (actually, the latter has even less entropy than the former), but also because of their ironic connotations. Produced at a period when the expectations of a whole decade seemed to vapor among political scandals, together with a complete change of the prevailing socio-cultural and economic values, the purity of the cover seems at once impossible, romantic and utopic.

One should mention, though, that this example shows that even if we expect visual cultural representations to become more entropic, the correlation between entropy and time is not linear.

The difference in entropy between the two covers is evident without need to use any instrument but the eye. What happens when the researcher is confronted with a huge number of images, with slight differences between them – something like ‘the 24,066 shades of grey’? In that case, the quantitative approach seems unavoidable. From a sociological viewpoint, one could manipulate numerical data, proceeding towards a sort of quantitative visual semiotics, which I will now try to showcase. But will it still be ‘semiotics’?

First of all, new types of visualizing a kind of sign available for quantitative manipulation are possible. For example, we can follow the fluctuations of entropy on the album covers from 1960 to 2010 as an expression of cultural dynamics (fig. 1).²

² The first four years of the period examined here are represented with only 12 covers, which makes impossible to make any valid observation for them.




Fig. 1. Mean entropy on the album covers' artwork per year (1960–2010).

In figure 1 one may observe that there is a trend towards an increase in entropy, which might have been expected if we mechanically transfer the second law of thermodynamics into cultural systems. But, as Arnheim has noted (1971), we should not take the law as a universal constant and use it in cultural artifacts. What is evident in this diagram is that the mean entropy of all albums' artwork shows an interesting pattern, with micro-trends in periods of stability, fluctuations in periods of crisis, sudden turns to a different direction, and so on.

There is fluctuation in the period of military dictatorship (1967–1974); a sudden but short term fluctuation with no direction at the beginning of the 1980s, when Greece turned from a long period of rule of the political Right to a socialist government with strong leftist overtones; a decrease in entropy during the second half of the 1980s, when the cultural values began to change due to the incorporation into European Union, but also to an economic crisis and austerity measures, followed by political scandals and unstable short-lived governments; a steady increase during the 1990s, when a new modernizing effort was undertaken; a sunk during a legitimacy crisis in the early 2000s, followed by an increase after the 2004 Athens Olympics; and a stabilization the years before the current economic, political and cultural crisis, which is not represented in my sample.

What may be inferred from such a reading is that “entropy”, as well as other similar measures seem to be related to the cultural, political and social environment within which they are encoded and decoded. There may be no single referent (or signified) for such kind of signs, but they still deliver a message.

Though entropy in visual messages may relate to socio-cultural reality, it is hard to find data for long periods spanning half a century. I experimented co-relating entropy dynamics to changes in socio-cultural indicators. For instance, I compare entropy with Gross Domestic Product.³ As is clear in this figure 2, the GDP rise follows the entropy trend, though no evident relationship with short-term fluctuations is found.

³ The GDP data were obtained from the *Index Mundi* website (<http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/greece/gdp>)




Fig. 2. Mean entropy of album covers' artwork compared to GDP in constant 2000 USD (1960–2010)

In fig. 3 I compare entropy with inflation rate.⁴ There appears to be a tendency for a rise in entropy in periods of low inflation rates, which is compatible with our hypothesis: low inflation rates mean economic security, hence the opportunity to pursue personal goals, and promote individualism vis-à-vis society. In any case, the lack of longitudinal data for the whole period don't allow for a definite thesis on the connection between visual entropy in cultural artifacts and post-materialist or mixed values.⁵




Fig. 3. Mean entropy of album covers' artwork compared to inflation rate (1960-2010)

⁴ Inflation rate data were obtained from the *Trading Economics* website (<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/inflation-cpi>)

⁵ Eurobarometer studies offer a time-series from 1980 (when Greece was accepted in European Union) until 1995 (Schmitt et al. 2008). After 1995 the materialism/postmaterialism questions were asked only sporadically.

5. Conclusion

Music albums' cover artwork is an intriguing cultural and communicational artifact, similar to advertisements as well as all other forms of mass images, appropriate for semiotic research. Album covers are available in digital form, since they are collectible by themselves, as well as since they form part of the metadata used for the digital promotion and sale of music. The digitized covers available to visual researchers are, therefore, much more than any semiotician could hope to see – and hence to analyze. It is exactly this amount of available data that calls upon us to face new challenges in socio-semiotics, cultural semiotics, as well as the semiotics of cultural change.

Our semiotic traditions, used to the analysis of exemplar items rather than huge collections, are not helpful enough to answer such challenges. In this paper I have proposed the search for signs that may be discerned through computer software and be abstractly presented in quantitative terms. These signs have certain communalities with the ones suggested by Groupe μ for the analysis of plastic (non figurative) signs: entropy; mean values for red, green and blue; hue vs. saturation. Actually, taking the first steps in the realm of big visual data, the distinction between iconic and plastic signs is losing importance, while the available toolset allows for the transition from the concrete forms to the abstract quantitative signs.

With the example used in this paper, I have shown that such an approach is possible; that it may be further visualized; and that it allows – *inter alia* – the understanding of the temporal dynamics of visual signs, as well as its co-relation with cultural and social variables.

To be sure, this attempt is still highly experimental, and there is a need for further experimentation with other measures beyond entropy, in order to fully grasp the possibilities of a quantitative visual semiotics.

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STRIKE A POSE: THE SEMIOTICS OF ELECTORAL IMAGES IN CYPRUS AFTER STATE INDEPENDENCE IN 1960 UNTIL 2013

Eviprides Zantides
CyprusUniversity of Technology, Limassol, Cyprus
evripides.zantides@cut.ac.cy

Anna Zapiti
CyprusUniversity of Technology, Limassol, Cyprus
anna.zapiti@gmail.com

Abstract

Political advertising as a communication process aims in attracting the viewers' attention towards what a candidate or a party has to say with the 'intention of influencing their political attitudes, beliefs and/or behaviors' (Kaid, 2004). In electoral photography the candidate does not only attempt to establish a program with the voters but also a 'personal link' with them, articulated through 'a style of life of which he is at once the product, the example and the bait', heroized through the iconography of his appearance in familiar social settings, gestures and other predetermined set ups (Barthes, 1993). As Capistran (2013) argued, the posed, constructed and photographic image of the candidate in the studio or another controlled environment indicates the power of control by the individual represented. Dumitrescu (2010) identified two communication roles that political posters play; the first is to provide "factual" information about the candidates whilst the second is to present "nonverbal" information through pictures of the candidate, signaling behavioral intent. Political posters can also significantly alter their motivational and persuasive power simply by using images that elicit emotions such as fear or enthusiasm (Brader, 2005). Different feelings and preferences can be elicited through the image of the candidate alone.

The purpose of this study is three-fold: to examine which non-verbal attributes/connotative mechanisms are used by candidates in the construction of their political image; to investigate the linguistic meaning of headlines—isolated and in respect of the candidate's image; and to explore the semiotic characteristics of the typography used in the main headlines. One hundred

and forty seven (n=147) political posters were taken for analysis. These posters came from presidential and parliamentary elections from the 1960s until 2013 in Cyprus. All posters include an image of the candidate. The posters were drawn from the Press and Information Office (PIO) in Cyprus, the archives of different newspapers and magazines and from various advertising agencies that have dealt with these posters. The methodology of content analysis was used and the coding frame developed was based on previous published work.

The data revealed that there are changes in the connotation procedures on the photographic messages of the political candidates as well as in the linguistic meaning and the typography of the headlines used. The study shows that political images, linguistic messages and typography of headlines vary over a period of time and suggest that there are associations of these changes with socio-historical landmarks and events.

1. Introduction

Political posters have a long contribution in the history of political campaigns. Seidman (2008) remarks that “Many memorable election campaigns have helped national parties and their candidates to secure or maintain power” whilst posters, billboards and banners were the primary media of political communication in the nineteenth century and continue to be in importance in many countries today. Political advertising as a communication process aims in attracting the viewers’ attention towards what a candidate or a party has to say with the “intention of influencing their political attitudes, beliefs and/or behaviours” (Kaid 2004). With the appearance of television and the development of internet and social networking today, posters have a declining usage, however the political pose and electoral approach for mass persuasion through visual communication re-adapts its presence and techniques regardless of the medium. Seidman (2008) defines six key elements that affect the design, content, and usage of posters produced in the political realm, being *Technology, Social Attitudes, Education, Legislation, Advertising & Political Marketing* and *Art & Graphic Design*. The current study concentrates on *Art & Graphic Design*, particularly from the perspective of the candidate’s photographic image, the linguistic meaning of the main headline and the typography used in Cypriot elections since independence in 1960.

The pictorial/electoral imagery printing, other than painting or just text, became possible with the invention of lithography in 1796 by the German *Alois Senefelder*. With this printing evolution, not just political, but pictorial posters in general were mass-produced and distributed in much of the Western world.

“In electoral photography the nominee does not only attempt to establish a program with the voters but also a ‘personal link’ with them, articulated through ‘a style of life of which he is at once the product, the example and the bait’, heroized through the iconography of his appearance in familiar social settings, gestures and other predetermined set ups” (Barthes 1993). Interestingly we can observe how *John Kennedy* in the 1960s was evidently careful about his public photographs, paying particular attention in the lighting, his gaze, the background colours and his pose.

2. Investigating the literature review

The political poster is one of the most pervasive or even persistent expressions of political behaviour. For this reason, Dumitrescu (2010) stated that political posters are an important part of the visual battleground of election campaigns around the world and parties and candidates spend significant proportions of their campaigns communication finances on posters. She also identified two communication roles the poster content plays. The first is to provide “factual” information about the candidates. The second is to provide “nonverbal” information through

pictures of the candidate, signalling behavioural intent.

Political posters may promote different messages but they may also produce different emotions. In his study, Brader (2005) found that posters can significantly alter their motivational and persuasive power simply by using images that elicit emotions such as fear or enthusiasm. Specifically, when messages include enthusiasm eliciting images, campaign ads reinforce motivation and loyalty. Therefore, voters exposed to such messages show greater interest in the campaign, are more willing to vote and rely more on pre-existing references to choose a candidate. On the contrary, campaign ads including messages and fear-eliciting images cause a shift in decision-making criteria and changes in political choice. These findings underline the central role of emotions to whether and how a political campaign ad works.

Different feelings and preferences can also be elicited through the image of the candidate alone. Capistran (2013) argued that the posed, constructed and photographic image of the candidate in the studio or another controlled environment indicates the power of control by the individual represented. He conducted a semiotic analysis of the political posters from the pre-campaign period of the Mexican election in 2012 and found that many published images of candidate are of a testimonial type. These photos reinforce an informative rhetoric which is based on the concept of information. Candidates appeared controlled, smiling, safe, with a look of kindness and self-confident gestures which are “favorable” postures. The number of strictly posed photos was reduced while there were many images of candidates making speeches.

In a study investigating 20 years of election in Western Europe, Adams et al. (2006) found that while mainstream parties displayed consistent tendencies to respond to public opinion shifts, there is no evidence that niche parties responded to shifts in public opinion. Additionally, they found that in situations where niche parties moderated their policy positions they were systematically punished at the polls. Such findings suggest the need to analyse the posters of candidates from different political parties in search of the different messages and policy opinion that they express.

3. A brief historic and political background of Cyprus¹

Political advertisements can be an expression of the political and national history of a country, reflecting significant milestones in a nation's history. This can be the case with a country like Cyprus which has a long history of wars and national struggles for liberation, peace and democracy. Cyprus was under the British rule until the 1960 when, after a four-year liberation struggle, the island became independent and was proclaimed a Republic. When in 1963 the President of the Republic proposed some amendments to facilitate the functioning of the state, the Turkish Cypriot community responded with rebellion, the Turkish Cypriot Ministers withdrew from the Council of Ministers and the Turkish Cypriot public servants ceased attending their offices. In 1974, a coup was staged in Cyprus by the military junta, then in power in Greece, for the overthrow of the then President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. Turkey used this pretext to launch an invasion in Cyprus in which the Turkish troops eventually occupied 37% of the island's territory. The Turkish invasion, signified a major change in people's lives since almost 40% of the population became refugees while others were enclaved and then forced to leave through the years.

The elections of 1960 were the first elections in the newly independent country. The elections of 1965 were postponed but the elections of 1973 and 1977 could reflect and reveal how the Turkish invasion changed the political advertising messages. In the following years, Cypri-

¹ More information on the Cyprus history can be retrieved from a relative website of the Press and Information Office in Cyprus (www.aboutcyprus.org.cy) and from the site of the Cyprus National Guard Official site (www.army.gov.cy).

ots attempted to recover economically and emotionally. Therefore in following elections of the 1980s and 1990s, politicians addressed the struggling people of Cyprus for a vote. Additionally, two other major events might have also played a role in the determination of the photographic image, the text and the final product in general of a political poster in the proceeding elections. The first is the acceptance of Cyprus in the European Union. Specifically, on 1 May 2004 Cyprus joined the European Union, together with nine other countries. The EU membership was accompanied by both privileges and obligations that set the formation of a newly acquired national identity; that is the European one. The second major event took place in March 2008, a wall that for decades had stood at the boundary between the Republic of Cyprus and the UN buffer zone was demolished. The wall had cut across *Ledra Street* in the heart of Nicosia and was seen as a strong symbol of the island's 32-year division. On April the 3rd 2008, *Ledra Street* was reopened in the presence of Greek and Turkish Cypriot officials. Since April 2008, a number of crossing points have opened up between the north and the south side of Cyprus bringing the two former communities closer according to some people or further apart, based on others.

Political campaigns through mass media are created for different elections like when presidential or parliamentary may take place in a country. For the present research, political posters/ advertisements from both parliamentary and presidential elections were selected.

4. The current study and research purposes

The current study deals with the analysis of political posters in Cyprus for the past 50 years, since state independence in 1960. The analysis includes not only the photographic image of the candidate but also the general set-up and the feelings that are promoted through the image. The importance of the study of political posters rests on the assumption that they could reveal both the candidate's strategy and the candidate's attempt to make some difference at the polls, in respect of their historic and social context. Having in mind that the ideological messages of a poster are largely hidden and implicit in nature, Barthes (1977) argued that the work of semiotics is important because it can reveal this masked ideological components in the produced collection of signs. For this revelation, he demonstrates the particular areas of focus: a) the denotative/connotative aspects of the image, b) the connotative aspect of the linguistic text in their relationship to their concomitant image, c) the way in which signs have been coded with ideological content and d) the way in which viewers/receivers, because of their cultural knowledge, likely to read or interpret the message. Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) also stated that since images are socially constructed, "the communication requires that participants make their message maximally understandable in a particular context, therefore they choose forms of expression which they believe to be maximally transparent to other participants". In other words, political posters communicate a message through both the image and text, but the interpretation is always affected by the cultural, social and political context and current situation of the country. Therefore, in the present research, political posters from 1960 until 2013 were used and both image and text were analysed in order to examine how ideologies are constructed in different contexts.

The purpose of this study is: a) to examine which non-verbal attributes and connotative mechanisms are used by candidates in the construction of their political image; b) to investigate the linguistic meaning of headlines in political advertisements; and c) to explore the semiotic characteristics of the typography used for the main headline texts.

5. Methodology

One hundred and forty seven (147) political posters, web and print advertisements were taken for analysis. These posters came from presidential and parliamentary elections from the 1960s until today. All posters include an image of the candidate. The posters were drawn from

the *Press and Information Office* (PIO) in Cyprus, the archives of different local newspapers, local magazines and from various advertising agencies that dealt with political campaigns. There was a reduced amount of posters and advertisements from the decades of 1960 and 1970 due to the fact that very few newspapers and printing companies were operated at the time, as well as, for the reason that *Makarios* was simultaneously both, president of the republic and Archbishop of Cyprus. His double role as a religious and political figure made him powerful and popular among people with limited opposition to worry about. As a presidential candidate he did not really have the need for political campaigns to convince his voters (usually the majority of the population) during these first decades.

In terms of the corpus, it is estimated that most of the available material was collected in order to have a comparable number of posters and advertisements from each category to compare. From the rest of the decades, the material was randomly selected.

The posters were analysed using on a coding frame that was developed based on previous published work. The coding frame included variables concerning three major semiotic resources: the analysis of the photographic image, the analysis of the linguistic messages and the analysis of the Typography used for the main headline text. The variables concerning the **photographic image of the candidate** and the general set-up of the poster were the following: (1) *eye contact*, (2) *point of view (low-angle, eye-level, high-angle)*, (3) *point of view (face-to-face, profile)*, (4) *size of photo*, (5) *close-up photo*, (6) *pose impression*, (7) *facial expression*, (8) *objects*, (9) *clothes*, (10) *feelings* and (11) *set-up*. The variables for the **linguistic analysis of the text** were the following: (1) *emphasis*, (2) *discourse*, (3) *image of the candidate*, and in terms of **typography**, (4) *case*, (5) *slope*, (6) *shape*, (7) *weight/value*, (8) *orientation*, (9) *location*, (10) *texture* and (11) *scale*.

Each decade from the 1960s until today is characterised by a major historical event as described in the brief historic and political background of Cyprus. Therefore, the political posters were divided in different periods based on the historical milestones on each decade. The periods were the following: (1) 1960–1973 which is the period before the Turkish invasion, (2) 1974 until 2003 which is the period after the war and (3) from 2004 until the latest elections in 2013 which is the period from the inclusion of Cyprus in the European Union and onwards.

6. Results

Analysis of the image.

A crosstabulation comparing all the variables of the coding frame across different decades was performed. As for the image, significant differences were found concerning *eye contact*, *point of view (face-to-face, profile)*, *pose impression*, *facial expression* and *objects*.

In detail, there were significant differences across time periods concerning *eye contact* of the candidates [$\chi^2(2)=14.33$, $p=0.001$]. Specifically, in the majority of political posters in the period from 1960–1973, the candidates do not have *eye contact* (88.9%) while in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards the majority of candidates have (72.5% and 71.3% respectively).

There were also significant differences across time periods concerning *point of view (face-to-face, profile)* [$\chi^2(4)=31.3$, $p=0.00$]. In detail, in the majority of political posters in the period between 1960–1973, the candidates have a *profile* photo (66.7%) while in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, most pictures of candidates are taken from the *front* (90.2% and 94.3% respectively).

The analysis also indicated significant differences across time periods concerning the overall *pose impression* [$\chi^2(4)=28.56$, $p=0.00$]. Specifically, in the majority of political posters in the period between 1960 and 1973, the candidate is presented mostly as an *older and experienced man* (66.7%) and in the rest of the cases as a *controlled, self-confident, smiling man* (33.3%). There

are no candidates presented as *young and good looking*. On the other hand, in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, the majority of the candidates are presented as *controlled, self-confident, smiling men* (92.2% and 72.4% respectively). In the rest of the posters, they are presented as *older and experienced* or as *young and good looking*.

In addition, there were significant differences across time periods concerning *facial expression* of the candidates [$\chi^2(8)=64.68$, $p=0.00$]. In detail, in the majority of political posters in the period from 1960–1973, the majority of candidates have a calm facial expression (66.7%) and in the rest of the cases they are smiling (33.3%). There are no candidates with positive, neutral or sad facial expression. On the other hand, in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, the majority of the candidates are presented either with a smile or with positive facial expression or less frequently with a neutral expression. In very few instances they are presented as calm or sad.

The *objects* present in the posters were also found to differ across time periods [$\chi^2(6)=40.09$, $p=0.00$]. In particular, in the majority of political posters in the period from 1960–1973, there are no other objects (66.7%). However, in the case where the candidate is the archbishop of Cyprus, he is presented sometimes holding his sceptre (33.3%). Similarly, in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, the majority of the candidates are presented with no other objects in the picture. Interestingly, only after 2004, the flag of Cyprus and the European Union become present in the posters.

Analysis of text.

Significant differences were found concerning emphasis, discourse, image of the candidate, case, shape, location and scale. In detail, there are significant differences across time periods concerning *emphasis* of the linguistic message [$\chi^2(2)=30.29$, $p=0.00$]. Specifically, all the political posters in the period from 1960–1973 emphasize on ideology. In the period from 1974–2003 the majority of the posters emphasize on ideology (82.4%) and the rest on party affiliation (17.6%). On the contrary, in the period after 2004 until today, the majority of posters emphasize on party affiliation (59.8%) and the rest on ideology (40.2%).

There were also significant differences across time periods concerning *discourse* on the poster [$\chi^2(12)=23.99$, $p=0.02$]. Specifically, in all the political posters in the period from 1960–1973, the discourse emphasizes on ideology. In the period from 1974–2003 the discourse in the majority of the posters emphasizes on ideology (45.1%) and the rest on national security and the war of 1974 (21.6%) and the credibility of the candidate (17.6%). Similarly, in the period after 2004 until today, the discourse in the majority of posters emphasize on ideology (59.8%) and less on national security and the war of 1974 (9.2%) and the credibility of the candidate (12.6%).

The *image of the candidate* through the text was also found to differ [$\chi^2(4)=66.97$, $p=0.00$]. In detail, all the political posters in the period from 1960–1973 represent a strong leader. In the period from 1974–2003, many of the posters present either a knowledgeable (39.2%) or a strong leader (35.3%). On the contrary, in the period after 2004 until today, the majority of posters represent an inspiring leader (74.7%).

Significant differences across time periods were found concerning the headline letterforms in the poster [$\chi^2(2)=7.83$, $p=0.02$]. Specifically, in the majority of political posters in the period from 1960–1973, the text is in capital letters (66.7%). On the contrary, in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, the text in most posters is in small letters. The shape of the text present in the poster was also found to differ [$\chi^2(6)=45.19$, $p=0.00$]. Particularly, in the majority of political posters in the period from 1960–1973, the shape of the text is serif (66.7%). In the rest of the posters, the sans-serif shape is used and there is no use of rounded shape of text or script. On the contrary, in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, the text in most posters is sans-serif shape. There are also posters using script shaped or rounded shaped text.

There were also significant differences across time periods concerning the placement of the text present in the poster [$\chi^2(12)=21.55$, $p=0.045$]. Specifically, in all the political posters of the period from 1960–1973, the text is near the candidate. On the contrary, in the majority of the posters of in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, the text is again near the candidate but there are also instances where the text is either in the top or the bottom of the poster or somewhere away from the candidate.

Finally, the emphasis on the text and the picture [$\chi^2(4)=21.70$, $p=0.00$] was found to differ across decades. It is interesting that only in the period from 1974 until 2003, there is more emphasis on the text than the picture of the candidate in the majority of the posters.

7. Discussion

The current study had three levels of analysis and research. First, to examine which non-verbal attributes/connotative mechanisms are used by candidates in the construction of their political photographic image, second to investigate the linguistic aspects of headlines in political advertisements and third to examine which semiotic dimensions characterise the typography of the main headline texts.

For the first level of analysis, the results indicated that after the Turkish invasion in 1974, candidates have *eye contact* with the viewers as well as pose with *frontal* portraits (point of view). This representation of where do the eyes look is often associated with the idea of demand (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006). After the 1974 war and the entry of Cyprus in the European Union in 2004, the candidates are looking at their voters attempting/demanding to develop a relationship of engagement, in equal 'visual terms' with their viewers/voters. In the period from 1960–1973, the candidates are *profile* photographed, look *older and experienced* with *calm facial expressions*, offering their profiles to be 'looked-at', voters are not being part of their gaze, the candidates are there to be admired. During these first decades, *Makarios* as archbishop of Cyprus was obliged to have a holy and religious photographic image (usually with a sceptre, an *object* to remind his sacred role) which inevitably was reflected and used for defining a divine/holy presidential portrayal as well. On the other hand, in the periods from 1974–2003 and from 2004 onwards, the majority of the candidates are presented either with a *smile* or with *positive facial expression*. It is evident that the Turkish invasion on the island in 1974 and the 2004 European Union entry were critical points changing the ways that politicians constructed their image on electoral campaigns. In general, and after 1974, the photographic image of candidates though its representation, becomes friendlier, approachable and vernacular, obviously on an attempt to gain the citizens' trust – and consequently their votes – via 'equalising' their photographic profile and visually pose at the same level with them. Maybe this approach attempts to give the impression that candidates are part of the voters, and being like them, they would understand and share similar problems and needs. Additionally, after 2004, the European flag is also evident on most of the campaigns, reminding the voters of the candidates' 'commitment' to develop a new European identity for the people of Cyprus, a change under a European perspective.

For the second level of analysis, thus in respect of the linguistic message, it is observed that the period from 1960–1973 *emphasizes* on ideology. In the period from 1974–2003 the majority of the posters emphasize on ideology and the rest on party affiliation whilst interestingly, in the period after 2004 until today, the majority emphasize on party affiliation and the rest on ideology. Party affiliation is a very popular approach of attracting voters in Cyprus and it is interesting to observe that this emphasis was put aside after the 1974 war, a period that ideology seems to have been more important for the re-construction of a divided nation.

In terms of *discourse*, all the political posters in the period from 1960–1973 emphasize on ideology. In the period from 1974–2003 the discourse in the majority of the posters emphasizes

mainly on ideology, then on national security, the war of 1974 and the credibility of the candidate. In the period after 2004 until today, still the discourse in the majority of posters emphasize on ideology, however less on national security, the war of 1974 and the credibility of the candidate. This might be due to the fact that even until now, on-going political negotiations are failing to provide any solution for the unification of the island and candidates seem to give up in using these arguments in their campaigns, especially with Cyprus being theoretically under the official security of the European Union.

Additionally, for *the image of the candidate* through the text, all the posters in the period from 1960–1973 were found to represent a strong leader, in the period from 1974–2003 many of the posters describe either a knowledgeable or a strong leader whilst in the period after 2004 until today, the majority of posters designate an inspiring leader. The findings could be interpreted in respect of the historical context of Cyprus. The state independence was established in 1960 where a leader had to be strong to provide the foundations and start the nation, whilst after the war invasion in 1974 the candidates are knowledgeable and strong leaders, thus people who would have the understanding, awareness and strength to find a solution for the divided nation. After Cyprus joined the European Union, the portrayal of inspiring leaders in political advertisements is usually what is related and expected with the European philosophy, which are people who could foresee opportunities and perspectives that open under the European umbrella.

In the final level of analysis it is interesting to see how typography compares with the linguistic meaning, the image and the historic context of the advertisements. In particular, before 1974 the writing/letterforms appear to be imposing, loud and aggressive whereas after the war, typography calms down and becomes more friendly and personal. This seems to match and support the photographic message as well as the linguistic text, where campaigns become ‘friendlier’ and ‘polite’ after the invasion of 1974 a conclusion that reflects very well what Williamson (2002) describes that, “[w]e can only understand what advertisements mean by finding out how they mean, and analyzing the way in which they work”

Specific tables and images can be provided upon request to the first author.

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COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS

NEUROSEMIOSIS – AN EXPLANAT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Karl Gfesser
Universität Stuttgart, Germany
(kgfesser@web.de)

Abstract

How does mind come about? Or more precisely, since long existent, how does mind reveal itself from matter – from the biotic, complex and highly organized matter of the brain? In trying to answer this question, philosophers get entangled in subtly differentiated hypotheses such as the identity *of* mind and matter, causality *through* matter, correlation *to* matter, representation *of* matter, reduction *to* matter, emergence *from* matter, supervenience *on* matter – mind understood here as consciousness and matter then as the brain, even though both terms correctly apply only in their processuality. The idea of a *condition*, used in this context, remains conceptually unclear and is not applicable.

In this paper, I will try to identify, as clearly as possible, what kind the processes under discussion are. To avoid misinterpretations, I will try my best to shun inappropriate metaphors, analogies and pleonasms. Epistemological curiosity – an instinct, by the way, whose neurological exploration is still pending – is pressing for further research, even though some claim it is a futile endeavor: we are denied neurological access to our consciousness, they say, since the brain is structured as an organ of survival and not made to reach self-awareness. I do not lay claim to bridging this gap of cognition, neither do I intend to avoid the problem out of resignation. However, no inappropriate *explanans* shall be added to the *explanandum*, but such an *explanans* shall be hypostatized, which will allow a conclusive *explanat*. Neurosemiosis should be readily comprehensible in terms of meta- and object language in order to make clear what the object under discussion is. I will make the bold assumption that the human brain is a semiotic system. For this reason, the descriptive object language shall be *semiotically* oriented, the controlling

meta language shall be *semiotic*; if both were to coincide, the object, the neuronal process and the resulting process of consciousness could not be grasped. In particular, I will investigate the issue of free will, contested by some brain researchers, because without willful, conscious intentionality, we could not conceive of a self-aware personality, without which we could not explain cognitively and, ultimately, we would not understand reason, which is the epitome of all that.

It is certainly difficult to define what constitutes consciousness without using twisted metaphors that all too often turn out to be pleonasm. The use of possessive, instrumental, local and directive prepositions (in the example of the hypotheses cited above), probably unavoidable, gives a hint how normal language – in other situations so helpful – can be misleading, as it insinuates that the relation of the brain to mind were instrumental, the relation of consciousness to the brain were spatial. And the research of neuroscientists in turn has not reached beyond results dealing with perception – namely, vision, audition, gustation, olfaction and tactility –, in addition to interoception such as thirst and hunger, pain and pleasure, as well as proprioception, self-perception in time and space, not to forget affections such as fear, aggression, emotional attachment. The greatest enigma, however, we have not yet solved: apperception and self-aware cognition. Philosophers and cognitive scientists as well as brain- and neuroscientists have some problems in describing, or rather circumscribing, neuronal and cognitive processes and the connection between the two. There is monistic agreement about this connection that is only questioned by a few persistent dualists. It goes without saying that any circumscription of a process is not the process itself.

Neurological researchers, in describing their work – which ultimately is the activity of their own brain – cannot avoid using so-called natural language. If language is natural, it points to its origin, to the nature of man who has created this language both as part of nature and through conflict with nature and with himself and his own kind. In trying to understand brain activity, we apply a measure that comes from this very activity of the brain itself. We presuppose hypotheses and make experimental use of equipment with the aim to confirm those hypotheses according to a given theory – just as cerebral activity, consciously or unconsciously, brings about mental activity, which is also formed by language and therefore may be understood in semiotic terms, since natural language is the sign system all other sign systems are derived from. Our aim is to trace the genesis of semiosis.

Semiosis owns its genesis to the primary sense of sight and to the intention to handle and make something, at first by hand, later through the use of tools and then machines and nowadays with technology enabling access to the nano range. To intend something, to see, to illustrate, to depict, imagine, treat, represent, reflect on, realize, understand, conclude, reach, discuss, negotiate are examples of performative verbs referring to possibility, reality, causality, finality, intentionality, activity, communicativity.

The genesis of semiosis (Gfesser 2004) also goes back to the intentional impulse as well as to the explorative drive of man, in systemic unity of brain, body and the outside world. “[...] the brain’s architecture is [...] dynamically coupled with the systems in which it is *embodied* and the environment in which it is *embedded*.” (Welshon 2011: 263) This also applies to the semiosis of cognition. (Gfesser 1997)

Those systems are the organs of the human body, not least the peripheral and the central nervous system of which the brain is a part. This is the most complex of all systems, consisting of 10^{10} to 10^{12} neurons, each connected to, “on average 7,000” other neurons, some with “as many as 100,000 connections”, 10^{14} connections in bit/sec. The number of synapses in the human brain varies “between 60 and 500 trillion in adults and approaching perhaps 1,000 trillion – a quadrillion – in prepubescent children.” (Welshon 2011: 331)

The brain's components are manifold: from the bigger parts, the midbrain, hindbrain and forebrain only the latter will be mentioned, composed of the cortical cerebrum consisting of the prefrontal, frontal, temporal, parietal, occipital, and cingulate cortex, the subcortical cerebrum consisting of the corpus callosum, claustrum, basal ganglia, the limbic system consisting of nucleus accumbens and amygdala, the subcerebral system consisting of pituitary, hypothalamus, epithalamus, and thalamus. Welshon declares: (2011: 324–26):

Finally, there is the *neocortex*, or, as it is also called, *isocortex*. These terms refer to the phylogenetically young and structurally complex cortex that constitutes 90 per cent of all human cortex. [...] Within the category of neocortex, functional subdivisions are usually introduced. First, we can subdivide between *idiotypic cortex* and *homotypic cortex* or *association cortex*. Idiotypic areas include primary motor cortex, primary somatosensory cortex, primary visual cortex and primary auditory cortex. Association cortex constitutes the largest region of the human brain.

If one part of the brain is able to be the core of consciousness then it may be this region because “there are *unimodal* or *modal-specific* zones, *heteromodal* [...] *higher-order* zones and *supramodal higher-order* zones.” (Welshon 2011: 326) This is the region where special functions interact and create loops. (Harth 1995: 70–73) Those creative loops will be able to culminate in consciousness. Harth assumes: (1995: 145):

Consciousness is like a wedge driven between the *whence* and the *hence* [...] where intentionality, volition, and creativity is spawned. The sources that feed into these loops may be sensory inputs that then are modified by the system. [...] Other sources are concepts, nascent ideas, originating at higher cognitive levels, for example, through associations, that then generate images. Finally, [...] the cerebral dynamics may be affected by fluctuations of neural activity [...]. [...] these fluctuations contain bits of old memories and associations of different strengths, the faintest ones blending into and becoming part of the neural background noise. Any one of these may be admitted into self-referent loops and, once selected, will be amplified and lead to further elaboration and imagery.

The grammatic concepts of *subjunctive II* – if it would have happened – and *future perfect* – it will have happened – may serve to illustrate what is meant by the whence and the hence: consciousness, being here and now, nonetheless is switching from the present into the past, transmitting the past into the present or future by hypothesizing now that, which already would have been done or will be done. Consciousness is meant as an indivisible but discernible mental or psychic process, an instant mode of sensitive, appetitive, self-aware, emotional, intuitional, intentional, perceptual, experiential, cognitive moment.

The development of the brain from *hominid* to *homo sapiens sapiens*, knowing and self-aware man, occurred through the tools-creating use of the hands and the cognition-guiding use of language, through conscious attention and directed effort in the cingulate cortex, in alternation with thinking and decision-making in the prefrontal cortex and emotional and episodic weighting of these processes in the limbic system. First and foremost, this development is due to the behavior of humans in their environment: *locomotion* accompanied by *emotion*, *extension*

condensed to *intention*. Once the *existing external* object was abstracted to an *imagined internal* object, it could be linguistically externalized and thus be communicated. This perspective throws some light on the opaque origin of consciousness.

Compared to the development of the *hominid* to *homo erectus* who lived on a somewhat animal level for millions of years, the development of human consciousness took a very short time, about 200,000 years. Once the process had started, the use of the hands, now communicable through language, accelerated – even though we have to assume that language is not of genuinely communicative but rather imaginative origin. *Similar* perceptions evoked *analog* imagination that called for designations to allow repeated use, it called for a repertoire of individual signs that could be shared supraindividually and thus serve for communication. Physically, this was made possible through the lowering of the larynx and through an enlarged pharynx that provided space and resonance for articulated sounds.

Consciousness is *individually embodied, ecologically embedded, and socially distributed*, (Gfesser 1997: 147–148; Walter 2014: 30–32) based on sentience in *iconic* similarity, observation in *indexical* identity and meaning in *symbolic* interpretation. *Iconic-indexical* denoting progressed to the point of *symbolic* denoting. (Peirce 1960: CP 2.247–2.249) People communicated an idea by pointing at something and thus denoting it, which found expression in the grammatical function of verb, subject and object. This is to be found in all languages analyzed for this structure and reveals the unity behind multiplicity.

Grammatical functions as such are semiotic functions stemming from neuronal functions. Within these neuronal causes, I would like to differentiate between a *causa efficiens*, an efficient cause, and a *causa finalis*, a final cause, which acts back on the efficient cause. The final cause is intentional, the efficient cause is neuronal in nature. The intention activates dynamic neuronal patterns thereby ascertaining itself. The frequently used expressions supervenience and emergence, however, are functionally unclear expressions referring to their logical complement, namely subvenience and substance, which in both cases is nothing but the brain itself. Materially, these expressions explain nothing.

Materially, the brain is an efficient cause, just like the human organism as a whole. For this reason, it is an error in judgement for brain researchers – who confine themselves to the examination of the brain and, besides, are only able to examine smaller parts of the brain, due to technological limitations, – to make general statements about human abilities. The brain is part of the whole, but it doesn't stand for the whole. Neuronal semiosis commences in the peripheral nervous system, not in the cerebral system, even though it culminates there in the neocortex. "The neocortex records patterns in a hierarchy" that it retrieves "autoassociatively". (Hawkins 2006: 88) Hierarchy here means the six layers of the neocortex. Within these layers, the neurons form patterns, i.e. a collective neuronal activity, (Hawkins 2006: 136) but the neurons also interact between the layers of the above named regions of the cortex in an ascending and descending manner.

The patterns of the neocortex, which may be considered a *causa formalis*, a formal cause, offer a prediction for an intended neuronal activity. "Prediction is [...] the primary function of the neocortex and the basis for intelligence". (Hawkins 2006: 112) "Prediction is the application of invariant memory sequences on new situations. Therefore, all cortical predictions are predictions by analogy", (2006: 222) allowing for intentional and imaginative recourse. Foucault speaks metaphorically of a "murmuring of similarities", an "always possible recourse of imagination". (1971: 104) Johnson states: "...any adequate account of meaning and rationality must give a central place to embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by which we grasp our world." (1987: XIII)

Neuronal interaction occurs through dendrites and axons. Dendrites receive signals. Ax-

ons, if within an electrical readiness potential lasting about a millisecond, informally known as spikes, send signals to other neurons by secreting chemical neurotransmitters at synapses. “The number of possible patterns that can exist on only one thousand axons is larger than the number of all molecules in the universe.” (Hawkins 2006: 163) Harth calls the descending and ascending neuronal interaction between the layers of the cortex “the loop”. The loop is “self-referent” and “is to be accomplished by an optimization process [...]” (1995: 107) Werth explains this self-reference as physical-psychoic intereffect: “certain neuronal processes bring about feelings,” but it is also the other way round, “feelings bring about neuronal processes.” (2010: 151) “This could be called the complementarity principle of neurobiological phenomena and feelings.” (2010: 152) It would be futile “to look for a consciousness independent from sensory perception, thoughts and emotions. Their entirety make up consciousness.” (2010: 86)

Consciousness in its entirety is produced by a cerebral vibration of 40 Hertz, a “temporal structuring of brain activity, thus the creation of simultaneity everywhere in the brain.” (Pöppel 1982: 183) Pöppel deduces “that all activities that occur within a temporal frame in different regions of the brain are the experience of perception *itself*.” Roth declares: “In terms of its cellular components and intrinsic synaptic structure, the cortex is very homogenous [...]” (1996: 106)

The meta language of brain research is chemical, physical, cybernetic, biological, but also metaphysical: there are verbs used like to react, to cause, to determine, to signal, to inform, to correspond, to stimulate, to effect, to fire, to embody, to influence, to mirror, to model. Janich urges brain researchers “to relate *descriptions* of neuronal processes to *descriptions* of people’s verbal and cognitive performances.” (2009: 74) The point here is that brain researchers take sentences of observation about some brain activities as fact, and assume they are using an object language, although they are caught in an arbitrary meta language without having defined its “normative basis”. (2009: 179) An object language in turn requires operationalization so that “an explanandum – a phenomenon to be explained – is sufficiently defined.” (2009: 179)

With regard to the models of brain researchers, Janich urges to make a distinction between “a model of” and “a model for”. “The former should be taken as a partial model of the structure of an object, the latter as a partial model of its function or functions. It must be possible to describe both in the form of ‘X is model of/for Y in relation to criteria C.’” Epistemologically, this concerns the question “whether nature provides a structure to the model or whether the model presets or imposes a structure or a function on nature.” (2009: 165–166)

To make a decision for the one or the other above-mentioned model resides with the individual brain researcher. After all, the ones doing the research are the brain researchers themselves, and not just their brains. One such researcher, for example, wants to make us believe that the self or the ego has vanished: “In reality [...], a concept such as ‘the’ self does not exist.” (Metzinger 2011: 23) That is an assumption due to over-determined, over-interpreted studies of cerebral action patterns that are merely isolated, local and barely regional in scope. The concept of the self or the ego eludes this type of studies because it cannot be mereologically defined, and is physiologically not perceivable.

Feyerabend does not think mereologically, i.e. not *pars pro toto*, in noting: “[...] the world is a projection of the brain, which in turn is part of the world [...]” But “the totality of world-brain is lacking the resources required to know itself.” (1997:137) Likewise, McGinn (1996: 72) believes that the brain can neither make its phylogenetic origin nor its ontogenetic development an object of examination – which is inconsistent, even if it may be true. “Who can be so smart, for evolutionary reasons, to consider mankind, for evolutionary reasons, too dumb for true self-awareness?” (Janich 2009: 78) Nørretranders notes succinctly: “Since consciousness is a primary entity that is exclusively measured through conscious experience, we have to face the fact that the only criteria for consciousness is itself. [...] *Conscious is only the conscious mind*.” (1994: 321)

Now, what about Libet's well-known and repeatedly reconstructed experiment, which showed that the decision to move a hand only becomes conscious after "an average of about 350 ms" (1983: 623) and thus, at the very first, is not a conscious and therefore not a deliberate decision? Libet et al. state: (1983: 635–636):

It is clear that neuronal processes that precede a self-initiated voluntary action, as reflected in the readiness-potential, generally begin substantially *before* the reported appearance of conscious intention to perform that specific act. This temporal difference of several hundreds of milliseconds appeared fairly consistently regardless of which of the available criteria for onset of RP or for the time of awareness are adopted.

Experiments of this kind are concerned with actions, according to Janich, (2009: 160) and not with behavior or reflexes. "But it goes without saying that acting cannot be subject of experimentation for the very fact that it is not sheer, natural behavior." Acting yields personal experience. And "*experience* can be defined as *what has befallen a person in acting*. A person acting experiences success or failure of his actions." (Janich 2009: 149) We learn from experience, which in turn will influence our future actions. Logically and practically, an action cannot be repeated. This does not fully apply to the study participants in Libet's experiment. They only followed instructions and behaved accordingly, they were not truly performing volitional actions.

Nørretranders remarks this about Libet's experiments on readiness potential: "It is true that consciousness sets in only *after* the brain has become active, but on the other hand, it does set in *before* the hand starts moving." (1994: 351) "0.2 seconds pass from the conscious experience of the decision to its execution. [...] The conscious mind has enough time for a veto before the decision is put into action." (1994: 351) Libet's test persons "could interrupt themselves. Thus they had free will. *The conscious mind cannot begin the action, but it can decide not to perform it.*" (1994: 351–352) A person putting in a veto is able to announce it, which means "that a willful decision becomes a conscious willful decision through the fact that a person making a decision is mentally able to predict how he or she is going to behave [...]" (Werth 2010: 182) It seems that consciousness needs a certain time for reflection. Libet et al. admit: (1983: 640–641):

The absence of any larger meaning in the simple quick flexion of hand and fingers, and the possibility of performing with capriciously whimsical timings, appear to exclude external psychological or other factors of controlling agents. [...] There could be a conscious 'veto' that aborts the performance even of the type of 'spontaneous' self-initiated act under study here. This remains possible because reportable conscious intention, even though it appeared distinctly later than onset of RP, did appear a substantial time (about 150 to 200 ms) before the beginning of the movement as signaled by the EMG.

There is a "neural voting" by different kinds of synapses. "*Excitatory* synapses say 'yes' because they make electrical current flow *into* the receiving neuron, which tends to 'excite' spiking. *Inhibitory* synapses say 'no' because they make current flow *out* of the neuron, which tends to 'inhibit' spiking." (Seung 2012: 55–56) Seung calls readiness potentials action potentials. "In axons, electrical signals are brief pulses known as *action potentials*, each lasting about a millisecond. [...] Action potentials are informally known as 'spikes', owing to their pointy appearance [...]. When a neuron spikes, it is said to be 'active.'" (2012: 48)

Inhibition is crucial to the operation of the nervous system. Intelligent behavior is not just a matter of making appropriate responses to stimuli. Sometimes, it's even more important to *not* do something – not reach for a doughnut when you're on a diet, or not drink another glass of wine at the office holiday party. It's far from clear how these examples of psychological inhibition are related to inhibitory synapses, but it's at least plausible that there's some sort of connection. (Seung 2012: 56)

From Libet's experiments with only a few probands, Metzinger, among other authors, concludes that humans cannot have free will. One of "the most stupid arguments for free will is: 'I *do know* that I'm free because I experience myself as free!'" Metzinger, however, wants to make us believe that the notion of free will is a delusion, based on the incongruous argument that the world we experience "full of colorful objects" is only a world consisting of "mixed wave-lengths of the most diverse kind". (2009: 191–192) Apart from the fact that benevolent and malicious actions have corresponding effects or consequences, Metzinger's comparison, by equating psychic spontaneity with physical receptivity, is nothing but a category error. Besides, he contradicts himself by postulating the "unconditional will to self-awareness, to truthfulness" and a "will to clarity" (2009: 337) or by stating: "But whatever is *available* for *volitional* attention is also that, which we consciously experience." (2009: 73)

To know to be able to want something, to not be able to want something, to be supposed to want something, in other words to know about the possibility of volition as well as about its limitation and obligation ascertains us of our existence. According to Kant

the will [...] is a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects (whether the physical power is sufficient or not); that is to determine our causality. [...] Now, here there comes in a notion of causality justified by the critique of the pure reason, although not capable of being presented empirically, viz., that of freedom; [...] the law of causality from freedom, that is, with a pure practical principle. (2012-2013: 14–16) Practical principles [...] are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being. (2012–2013: 16)

Clearly, any act of volition, any willful decision is biographically conditioned. An unconditional will is nobody's will, no will at all. Will cannot be defined as such, but only in the predominant personality persisting – nonetheless experientially, cognitively and mentally changing – in the connectome, that is "the totality of connections between the neurons in a nervous system". (Seung 2012: XIII) Even if a decision commences on the subliminal level, its effect is supraliminal, since the limen is both border and connection at the same time. Peirce remarks: (1958: CP 8.311):

I cannot admit the *will* is free in any appreciable measure [...]. [...] chance can only amount to much in a state of things closely approximating to unstable equilibrium. Now in the act of willing there is no such state of things. The freedom lies in the *choice* which long antecedes the will. *There*, a state of nearly instable equilibrium is found.

Peirce, not a neuroscientist but above all a semiotician, states after semiotic and epistemological, but also psychological studies: (1960: CP 1.112):

The observation of facts has now taught us that the ego is a mere wave in the soul, a superficial and small feature, that the soul may contain several personalities and is as complex as the brain itself, and that the facilities, while not exactly definable and not absolutely fixed, are as real as are the different convolutions of the cortex.

Peirce's different convolutions of the brain, called connectomes by neuroscientist Seung, also contain the complexity of the soul, of the ego, of the self, of consciousness, personal identity – whatever modalities of mind one presupposes in neurophysiological studies. “[...] neuronal connectomes will vary greatly across individuals and will be strongly influenced by experiences. These are the connectomes we must study if we want to understand human uniqueness. And we should examine them for traces of the past, for what could be more integral to our uniqueness than our own memory?” (Seung 2012: 184) “The problem is that the doctrine's central quantity – the connectome – has been unobservable.” (Seung 2012: 132)

The reason is that the “brain contains 100 billion neurons, a fact that has overwhelmed even the most fearless explorers.” (Seung 2012: XIX) Neurons spread out to other neurons by branches. “A branch of a neuron, called a *neurite*, can extend from one side of the brain to the other, yet can also narrow to 0.1 micrometer in diameter. These dimensions differ by a factor of one *million*.” (Seung 2012: 41) Contact between neurons is achieved through the synapses and through communicating neurotransmitters. “More than one hundred neurotransmitters have been discovered so far”, notes Seung. (2012: 43–44) “Axons send signals to other neurons by secreting neurotransmitters at synapses.” (2012: 48) “The brain secretes thoughts!” (2012: 45)

“One important property of a synapse is its strength, its weight in the vote conducted by a neuron when ‘deciding’ when to spike. It is known that synapses can strengthen and weaken; you can think of such changes as *reweighting*.” (Seung 2012: 77–78) “Synapses can also be created and eliminated, a phenomenon I'll call *reconnection*.” (2012: 78) “Reconnection provides added capacity for information storage, compared with reweighting alone.” (2012: 90) “It might seem that synapses are [...] generated ‘on demand’ only if needed for cell assemblies or synaptic chains. But in fact synapses are created randomly, and then the unnecessary ones are eliminated.” (2012: 89) “We know for sure that reweighting and reconnection happen in the brain. Whether these phenomena create cell assemblies and synaptic chains is unclear, however.” (2012: 93)

It is plausible to view the cerebral reweighting and reconnecting as the balancing principle of reason. Reason judges the validity of principles. And it is preceded by an effort of the will to fathom those principles. Reason is the pursuit of knowledge, the mental desire to understand that goes back to a child's bustling curiosity. “The connectome is where nature meets nurture.” (Seung 2012: 95) Herder speaks of the thoughtfulness of man, which is “the moderation of all his powers”, the “reason” of man. “*Man has been put in the state of thoughtfulness, which is his property, and this thoughtfulness (reflection) freely asserting its influence has invented language.*” (1901: 45–47) “Man shows reflection when the power of his soul is so free that it can create a wave in the ocean of his feelings that goes through all his senses, create ONE wave, if I may call it that, stop it, direct his attention to it and be conscious that it be attentive.” (Herder 1901: 47) Hegel speculates dialectically: “The *understanding determines*, and holds the determination fixed. *Reason* is negative and *dialectical*, since it dissolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing, it is *positive*, since it generates the *universal*, and comprehends the particular

therein.” (Hegel 2010: 10)

Let me come to a semiotic assessment. I would claim that semiosis begins right in the neuronal system, sensually fed, of course. There is only a difference concerning the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origin of semiosis, because much of the ability for semiosis was phylogenetically developed over many generations but, from an ontogenetical perspective, is still innate. Not being a neuroscientist, my explanation of neurosemiosis is in *semiotic* meta language and in *semiosically* oriented object language. In support of my argument, I mentioned some persuasive approaches and insights in the field of brain research, mainly certain zones in the association cortex, namely the unimodal or modal-specific zones for reception, the heteromodal zones for perception, the higher-order and supramodal higher-order zones for apperception, further the creative loops and their self-reference, their selections and amplifications, the hierarchy of the six layers of the neocortex and their patterns, the ability of prediction, the ascending and descending neuronal processes, finally the reconnection and reweighting of neurons.

Semiotically speaking, according to Peirce, a sign is the relation of the quality, the object and the interpretant. (Peirce 1960: CP 2.243–2.253) The external sign relation consists of the physic-energetic quality, the external object, the external interpretant, which is an individual’s mind. The internal sign relation is the sign-internal quality, the sign-internal object, and the sign-internal interpretant. If semiosis originates in neuronal processes, neuronal processes and sign internal processes of the sign-internal quality, the sign-internal object and the sign-internal interpretant are a *complement* of each other, in such a way that the sign-internal quality is the spiking of neurons as “an actual existent”, (Peirce 1960: 2.243) the sign internal object are the neuronal patterns and loops, the sign internal interpretant is the connectome. There is no gap of explanation. Having said that, we are switching from *semiotical* terminology to *semiosical* terminology: the *explanandum*, i.e. the sign process, is *complementary* to the *explanans*, the neuronal process; they are not identical because they are different in nature, one is mental, the other biotic. The *explanat* belongs to the concept of *neurosemiosis*, which is both a *neuronal* and *semiosical* synchronic process, the ascending and descending loop in the hierarchy of the six layers of the neocortex.

Lacking a criterion for the differentiation of *neuronal* and *semiosical* processes, which would be a third category, namely a *complementary neuronal-semiosical* object language, I have to confine my explanation to *semiotical* meta language. I see similar concepts among a number of different authors. It seems to me that there is a relation between the concepts of sign processes discussed by Bense (1983: 44, 109) such as *generation*, *degeneration*, and *superisation* of signs and certain neuronal processes such as *connection* and *reconnection*, *weighting* and *reweighting* mentioned by Seung, and the ideas of selection, creative loops, self-reference, optimization, amplification mentioned by Harth, and finally the idea of prediction mentioned by Hawkins und Werth.

I see a link between connection and reconnection and generation and degeneration, between supramodal higher-order zones, selection and loops, and superisation, between weighting and reweighting of neurons within interactive patterns of cell assemblies or synaptic chains, and the starting point of consciousness. Weighting and reweighting is crucial for prediction and decision making. Decisions may not always be conscious, nonetheless, they are volitional. Decision-making includes deliberation, and deliberation implies intention and understanding. According to Hegel, sometimes it may be necessary to negate what we have understood because understanding is not always reasonable.

Reason as the epitome of the conscious mind, particularly amplified and optimized cognition, may be what Peirce meant by defining the “*ultimate* logical interpretant”, which “is of a general application [...] [...] a *habit-change*; meaning by a habit-change a modification of a per-

son's tendencies towards action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions of his will or acts, or from a complex of both kinds of cause." (Peirce 1960: CP 5.476)

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EXISTENTIAL SEMIOTICS

COMPOSING GESTURE-TOPICS: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO VILLA-LOBOS' AFRICAN FOLK DANCES

Cleisson Melo
Universidade Federal da Bahia, Brazil
son.bass@gmail.com; cleisson.melo@helsinki.fi

Abstract

One of the most important Brazilian composers, Heitor Villa-Lobos has developed a remarkable creative and exuberant language. Understanding his style, ideology, technique, strategies, and so on, remains a challenge. This paper is concerned to offer a reconsideration about Villa-Lobos' music and its relationship with the Brazilian musical hybridism to identify the use of the Brazilian nationalistic elements as a step to realize his compositional ideology.

An existential semiotics-based analytical approach should be a powerful means to highlight Villa-Lobos' compositional ideology, especially to explore of the mechanics of composition and expression in a particular genre known as "dance", in relation to specific Brazilian national and nationalist creative features emerging from his particular creative processes which allows identify cultural-musical signs into the Brazilian orchestral music. To demonstrate it, this paper is trying to portray his approach of the use of representative components in his musical gestures writing as sound movements provided with meanings through cultural experience, via the analysis of the first movement of *Danças características Africanas* (African Folk Dances). This music was one of the first attempts to conduct to the "musical miscegenation" in the way to building the "*alma brasileira*" (Brazilian soul) as the Brazilian musical language of concert.

1. Introduction

One of the most important Brazilian composers, Heitor Villa-Lobos (1887–1959), developed a remarkable creative and exuberant language. In general, his music is associated with the emerging nationalism of Brazil in the turn of the 20th century. Nevertheless, understanding his

style, ideology, technique, and strategies remains a challenge.

Villa-Lobos lived in Paris for a few years during the 1920's, his time in Paris provided him a close experience with European modernism and composers. His Brazilian culturally mixed experience associated with the styles and fashions in Europe in those days was significant to the rise of his personal style. Certainly this distinct view of "different" approaches of modernisms gave him tools to influence the modern Brazilian musical language through that cultural miscegenation.

Villa-Lobos' involvement with popular music and folklore of Brazil lent him unaccountable melodies, rhythms, sounds combinations, and so on. This involvement can be clearly noticed in many of his works. This cultural/musical hybridism seems to be relevant to his compositional attitude, since he was engaged with Brazilian modernism and representation of national elements.

Consequently, the strengthening of Brazil's national borders set off discussions about nationalism, national culture, and identities. So, deriving from the diverse social processes that established the roots of Brazilian music, there was a "demand for new theories and critical tools that could cover more subtlety aspects in different contexts" (David 2006: 243). Brazil's diverse soundscape is the framework that fomented the search for the *ethos* of the Brazilian musical aesthetics.

However, some questions need to be addressed. What legitimizes a Brazilian musical aesthetic? Does the compositional process adopted by Villa-Lobos follow a formal aesthetic or set of rules? Does the national imaginary (and symbolic negotiation of it) follow a unique ideological form within the compositional process? Is there a way to keep a "central signification" (Debrun 1990: 39) in Brazilian musical discourse? Regardless of the uncertainty suggested by these questions, it is difficult to deny that there are sound traces in Brazilian music that help identify it as Brazilian musical language (signs).

Identifying national markers in music is certainly a complex endeavor. Following the proposition by Paulo Salles (2013), "national" can be defined as "marked", while "no-national" or "universal" can be classified as "unmarked". So, "precisely in this asymmetry lies much of this embarrassment with correlating 'non-nationalism' to the Villa-Lobos style, with trying to understand his peculiar borrowings of modernist European gestures through the bias of Brazilian modernism. It is worth pointing out that this difficulty is not inconsiderable when somebody tries to define what is 'national' in music" (Salles 2013: 685–686).

On the other hand, dances represent an important cultural component in Brazil. In Brazilian folklore, dancing is directly linked with tradition and culture. As an essential element of folklore, it could be understood as a strong expression of a nation and its culture. In particular, research about Brazilian orchestral dances holds great promise. Yet until now a critical study of this repertoire has been minimal. Thus, to investigate Villa-Lobos' dances should clarify his "musical miscegenation" as his way to building the *alma brasileira* (Brazilian Soul), i.e. the Brazilian musical language.

An analytical approach based on existential semiotics shows the processes, strategies, and ideology of Villa-Lobos, especially if one explores the mechanics of composition and expression. However, applying this approach to specific Brazilian national or nationalist features – emerging from his particular creative processes – will allow us to identify cultural-musical signs in the Brazilian orchestral music. Thus, this paper aims to portray Villa-Lobos' gestural writing as the construction of representative elements and meanings through *Danças Características Africanas* (African Folk Dances), focusing in the first movement of it.

2. African Folk Dances and Brazilian Music Galaxies

Danças Características Africanas was originally written for piano solo between 1914 and 1915,

and orchestrated by Villa-Lobos in 1916. This work is one of the first steps of Villa-Lobos to develop his own style. According to Villa-Lobos, melodic material was taken from a community of Africans and Indians – *Índios Caripunas* from Mato Grosso, the west-central region of Brazil.

This piece has three movements. They are nominated as 1) *Farrapós*, subtitled as Indigenous Dance no.1 – Young People's Dance; 2) *Kankukus*, subtitled as Indigenous Dance no. 2 – Elder's Dance; and 3) *Kankikis*, subtitled as Indigenous Dance No.3 – Children's Dance.

The piece was first performed at the *Semana de Arte Moderna* (The Modern Art Week) in 1922. That international event held in São Paulo was extremely relevant in outlining Brazilian language of modernism, which included literature, plastic arts, lectures, music, and poems. Villa-Lobos has used an octet version of that music. Despite contrary criticism, African Folk Dances has had an impact because of hybridism and non-conventional language. With no doubt, African Folk Dances marks the beginning of Villa-Lobos' disruption with the "conventional" style in the sense that it develops his own creative style.

As it is well known, Brazilian music is based in three distinct influences; African, European, and Native Indigenous. First of all, we must consider those influences, through an imagery dimension of three distinct galaxies. This viewpoint by Paulo Costa Lima (2011) gives us a wide and deep perspective of this "kaleidoscope of matches and mismatches, small and big bump" (Lima 2011: n.p.). The "fusion" process was not established in order to melt one in another, but in the way to administer tensions among them in the same space, i.e. universe. So, "the gradual emergence of something different, perhaps a kind of synthesis that the discourse on national attempts systematically to capture from the 19th century" (Lima 2011: n.p.).

In addition, this tension administration involves a power relationship. Considering the "cultural power" of European colonizer, the competition for space (and symbolic forces) puts the other two galaxies at a disadvantage. The European galaxy had the power – the enslavement of black people and elimination of indigenous societies. On the other hand, we should consider that these "gravitational pull" happened on Brazilian universe. Considering that the African cultural presence has made Brazil as a society, or in other words, it was developed in the Brazilian universe, African cultural presence cannot be considered something external, but an important element in the rise of Brazilian culture.

Thus, despite the colonizing power, all attempts of representations will bump to the African galaxy. At the same time we have a paradox; the desire of the colonized in being like the colonizer. This otherness negation is a (probably necessary) paradox in the construction of a collective ethic; based on the combined overview of all interests.

However, to understand African Folk Dances in this context and the framework demonstrated above gives us a different, wide, and deep perception of the distinct elements approached by Villa-Lobos, which we will discuss later.

3. Musical Gesture

Studies around musical gesture have grown during the last decades and issues involving it are not new. There are many approaches to musical gesture (Lidov 1987; Hatten 2004; Souza 2004, 2009; Gritten 2006; Iazzetta 2007; Kühn 2011; Zbikowski 2011) and, no matter the context, there is no formula or closed units to be applied. Research about musical gesture is not systematic, but it is significant to the development of musical signification grammar. In this sense, semiotics applied to musical gesture has been extremely beneficial to draw an analytical tool.

Considering the connection with movement, we should avoid generic associations with physical gestures or tied to a formal function in music, such as opening and closing gestures (Chaplin 1998). On the other hand, gesture is more than movement, "but a movement which can express something" (Iazzetta 1997: 03). Following this viewpoint, we can point out the stud-

ies of Zbikowski, Köhl, and Greimas as noteworthy contributions to the approach of this paper.

Zbikowski (2011) has developed his metaphor and music theory of communication-based gesture comparing physical gestures accompanied by speech with the musical grammar. Likewise, Köhl points to “gestalt perception, motor movement and mental imagery” (Köhl 2011: 125). As a result, these approaches place us in a position to understand gesture as a directionality agent. In the music context, gesture is a conductor of the expression of the composer. In other words, in the compositional field, gesture is a strong manipulation attitude, even if we consider temporality, signification, narrative, continuity, and so on. In this way, we can claim that gesture is a means to clarify compositional attitude through musical narrative. It could directly correlate with cultural experience.

On the other hand, Greimas (1987) demonstrates a distinction between natural and cultural elements in a semiotic system through gestural system. His approach points out to gesture as “substance” of body movement. Not so far from the music context, gestural sense lies in the perception of directionality; an idea of intention.

At the same manner that natural gesture – a natural phenomenon, as a motor motion – is based on physical movement; learn, develop, and transmit it is a social-cultural phenomenon. In this sense, the transformation of natural gesture into cultural gesture can provide us different typologies of culture – typology of socialized gesticulation, especially if one wants to explore a specific culture or composer.

According to Greimas, the signification of the word *meaning* is understood as referencing or direction – referencing as code of expression and code of content, and the latter as intentionality. In his viewpoint, intentionality establishes a relation between “the itinerary covered and its end points” (Greimas 1987: 27). Thus, it could be applied in the music context as well, approaching composer’s intention and compositional thought. Therefore, it is possible to realize gesture as a directional element of intention of composer within his cultural experience, i.e. a temporal construction of directionality.

This temporal construction manipulated through the continuum can be “modalized”. It allows gesture to bear and convey meaning and semantic gesture in modal categories can create a particular sense effects in the musical discourse. These modalities act on the value of object in sense to “affect the modal existence of the subject” (Fiorin 2007: 04). Furthermore, to understand that the value applied to an object/sign is in its representative value and also in its relation to other sign/object could provide a web of connections in a musical work. Those connections, based on the values applied to a sign, offer coherence and directionality to the musical flow.

In this manner, gesture as a sign may be relevant to the structures of production of values. It can be understood as representative values used by composers. Compositional attitude of composer reflects, in this way, representations of socio-cultural experience in discourse. Thus, one can say that representative values seem to be fragmented. Nonetheless, from this strategic manipulation and segmentation of the continuum emerges the notion of intentionality, which increase the significant character of gestural syntagma. On the other hand, based on the modality semiotic concepts, these apparently fragmented ideas are elements of narrative tied to the form of music and production of values.

As production of values, musical gesture can be significant in the process of figuring composer’s identity embedded of ideology and attitudes. In the same manner, the values produced are fundamental in the determination of discourse modalities.

Even considering that gestural units cannot constitute a signifying system, as linguistic system is, what determines the identity of an object is its value and the opposition relation maintained with other objects. Thus, according to Greimas gesture is incorporated into the communication process and transformed into autonomous codes. Therefore, it reacquires mythical contents es-

establishing a “functional organization and narrative, which control the musical discourse, from the music compression as mythical communication” (Souza 2009: 297).

4. Villa-Lobos and Existential Semiotics

Despite the great number of distinct analytical approaches to Villa-Lobos' works, understand his style, strategies, and compositional process still a challenge. Besides, it is very difficult to portray a wide framework of Villa-Lobos' work. His musical language is not systematic, but it is probably connected to his expressive impulse, cultural experience and personality.

Considering that music semiotics can embrace a wide range of approaches, existential semiotics opened a new paradigm in the analytical studies of signification and communication. “Semiotics is in flux” (Tarasti 2012: 71), studying the sign in movement and flux gives us new possibilities to understand compositional attitude and process. Knowledge provided by existential semiotics opens new horizons to demonstrate Villa-Lobos' gestural and compositional process/attitude, especially through cultural experience and ideology.

As known, the existential semiotics combines *Moi/Soi* (individual and collective subjectivities). “It portrays semiosis not only as a movement of the collective Hegelian spirit” (Tarasti 2012: 29), but even musical gesture, energy, process, attitude, ideology, and so on. Following modalities concepts as processual concepts, analyzing Villa-Lobos' works based on existential semiotics could provide significant tools to understand Villa-Lobos style and process from another viewpoint. In other words, it is possible to reveal some new clues about Villa-Lobos compositional process in the building of the Brazilian soul.

Thus, in the Z-model (figure 1), M1 is primary kinetic energy, the corporeality, desire, body; M2 is identity, personality, habit; S2 is social rules, practices, topics; and S1 is values, norms, general codes.




Fig. 1: Tarasti's Z-model – *Moi/Soi*.

Applying it to Villa-Lobos, M1 is his primary corporeal rhythmic and kinetic experience, phenomena, elements, his basic rhythmic entities; M2 is all the primal rhythms and gestures as developed into his personal manners and habits; S2 is genres, topics, and so on, representing the rhythmic social experience in Brazil – in this cases dances; and S1 is Villa-Lobos' aesthetic – rhythm as one of the basic elements, slow-fast, and so on.

With regard to disclose the compositional attitude/process, a compositional theory probably is a good way to that. Lima (2011b) has investigated Lindembergue Cardoso's¹ (1939–1989) work and pointed out to the articulation of a compositional theory through his composition teaching process. Based on Cardoso's notes, Lima shows four points of his compositional practice: “compose what”; “with what”; “for what”; and “why?”. According to Cardoso, that process is in order to place students to face their choices. This theory (process) exemplifies the compos-

¹ Lindembergue Cardoso (1939–1989) was born in Bahia/Brazil. He was one of founders of *Grupo de Compositores da Bahia* (Bahia Composers Group) – important movement in 1960's and 1970's, which was concerned to musical education and disseminates contemporary music. Cardoso composed a great number of music in distinct genres and developed an important approach about teaching composition.

ing ways (“with what”) based on creative process (“what”), dimension (“for what”), and indefinitions/answers (“why”) (Lima 2011b). Crossing this theory and existential semiotics should provide tools and means to demonstrate compositional attitude, gestural, and process (figure 2).




Fig. 2: Z-model and compositional theory.

Considering the simultaneity of events in music (sound), communication between *Moi* and *Soi* happens in different dimensions and directions. Through the theoretical framework demonstrated above, this intersection (IS) (figure 3) should be understood, in this case, as Villa-Lobos’ compositional ideology. In other words, horizontal and vertical aspects of music, divided in distinct layers and dimensions, could be evidenced in order to reveal some aspects of Villa-Lobos compositional process.



Fig. 3: Moi-Soi – communication/intersection.


5. Analyzing

A very expressive gesture is presented in the opening of this piece (example 1). This textural gesture carries a communicative and semantic load through the range of the orchestra. It was articulated in order to keep enough energy in this short time. The energy accumulated is directed to reinforce the beginning of the theme. It provides a powerful communication and semantic load through manipulation of continuum. This gesture illustrates Villa-Lobos’ compositional strategy (attitude) – directionality and expression. An idea of directionality and intension is very clear, reinforcing the beginning of theme – since theme stars with just one note. In a linguistic-narrative way it could be seen as a pointing gesture. Villa-Lobos is intentionally pointing and directing to reinforce the theme through this textural gesture. Thus, Villa-Lobos’ gestural attitude is strongly communicative and expressive – personal style.

Example 1: African Folk Dances, 1st Mov. mm. 01–09.

A quick check throughout the score of African Folk Dances, the first thing one can notice is the rhythm. The emphatic rhythm, and strategies of repetitions evoke the communality sense to this piece. The principle of communality, strategies of repetitions, and construction of temporality are reflected on the careful treatment of the emphatic rhythm. One can say music is “time architectures”, and actually it is (Lima 2011a). Villa-Lobos used it perfectly, approaching the rhythm in a widely way more than simply beats or patterns, covering the whole of music – constructions of temporality.

Example 2 shows African-rooted rhythms present in this music. They carry influences of Brazilian popular music – *maracatú* and *baião*. It reflects Villa-Lobos personal experience and identity.



Example 2: Rhythms: Maracatú and baião.

Thus, an african-based rhythmic construction keeps traces of communality, especially through strategic repetitions. *Moi 1*, the kinetic, the corporeality is embodied by those rhythmic strategies. This supposedly rhythmic symmetry reflects the representative communality tied to Villa-Lobos identity and personality (*Moi 2*). The “primal rhythms” and gestures are developed into his personal manners and experiences. The strategy of repetition adopted by Villa-Lobos could be quite predictable, but on the other hand it keeps the communality and sometimes it contrasts with harmony. This compositional attitude is demonstrated by example 3. This gesture is a clear demonstration of Villa-Lobos’ intention of using rhythmic repetition as compositional strategy in the construction of his discourse. Villa-Lobos is using his personal experience to denote the African environment and communality in this music. At the same time it sounds very Brazilian.

The image shows a musical score for four staves. The top staff is in treble clef with a 2/4 time signature, starting at measure 25. It features a melodic line with dynamics *p*, *mf*, and *sf*. The second and third staves are in bass clef with a 2/4 time signature, featuring a rhythmic accompaniment with dynamics *ff* and *p*. The fourth staff is in bass clef with a 2/4 time signature, featuring a harmonic accompaniment with dynamics *p* and *mf*. The score includes various musical notations such as slurs, accents, and dynamic markings.

Example 3: African Folk Dances, 1st Mov. mm. 25–28.

Social experience of Villa-Lobos (*Soi2*) is represented by this “popular influence” and in the superposition of different layers of rhythms and gestures. It results a rich Brazilian rhythm with African influence in the main plan.

This rhetorical representation is evidenced in example 4. The melodic material (2nd staff) is reaffirmed by repletion. *Baião* rhythmic figure is in the percussion section. The triple figure, in

this context (3 against 4 or 2), expresses the African genre and topic into this music. Nonetheless, this figure is not in the piano score, this insertion of “new material” suggests that Villa-Lobos’ compositional attitude was intentionally influenced by his social experience. The values represented are tied to the musical narrative and Villa-Lobos’ social and cultural experience. The elements of musical gesture are significant in the compositional process embedded of his ideology and attitude. Thus, the mythical load works to organize the narrative and establish a communicative musical discourse.

At the same time, the representation of the indigenous is demonstrated by apparent simplicity of thematic material (primitive aspects). Villa-Lobos strategically uses the indigenous element represented by “primitive aspects/elements”. Taking into account the Brazilian mix culture (galaxies), example 4 is a good demonstration of the balance among those “galaxies”. This representation is strongly supported by Villa-Lobos’ social-cultural and personal experience (*Moi2-Soi2*) and conducted by his personal style (*Soi1*).

One significant aspect to be considered is the representation through different layers. It is a good demonstration of intersection of *Moi-Soi*. It indicates Villa-Lobos’ intentional discourse in the sense of balancing those “gravitational pulls” among the galaxies of Brazilian universe.

Example 4: African Folk Dances, 1st Mov. mm. 34–36.

In this blended *Moi* and *Soi*, the apparent triumph of *Moi* has been shown by the seduction of the rhythmic appeal, the emancipation of the rhythm. The rebellion of *Moi* against *Soi* is controlled breaking tonal expectations and delaying resolutions. Harmony acts dynamically as answer and question. Villa-Lobos uses some modal modifications and especially the whole-tone scale to expand and delay the resolution, breaking the staticity dominant-tonic.

Example 5 shows the whole-tone scale, procrastinating resolution and expanding the tonality. It breaks the “predictability” of the rhythm and the dominant-tonic resolution. This staticity of non-resolution harmony over the communal aspects of the rhythm introduces unpredictable elements into this music.



Example 5: African Folk Dances, 1st Mov. mm. 102–105.

This distinguished texture is relevant to the discourse of this music. The gesture is turning the sign in another communicative direction. It is indexing the communicative and representative energy to lead to other musical material and draw the attention of the listener. The musical gesture is carrying enough energy to communication and meaning.

However, that gesture works in order to balance internal forces through tonal and rhythmic expectation breaking. At the same time, that communicative-narrative gesture highlights the coherence of Villa-Lobos' compositional and choosing process. The linearity within the continuum leads to the corporeality embodied by those rhythmic strategies. The approximation of subjectivity and objectivity of this gesture narrows the narrative regarding to musical making.

6. Concluding remarks

Understand Villa-Lobos' style still being a complex endeavor. Thus, "the notion of identity followed by Villa-Lobos would not be an essence to be discovered, but the construction of a sense" (Souza 2010: 196). In this sense, this paper attempted to show, in parallel with the musical grammar, gesture as a compositional strategy; part of the composer store of intonations. In the same manner, faced with different analytical approaches to Villa-Lobos' work, existential semiotics could be extremely significant to reveal "new points" about his music and style.

Through the theoretical framework demonstrated above, in "the light" of Tarasti's existential semiotics, it could be possible develop an analytical tool to track Villa-Lobos' compositional process, attitude, and personal style. Probably, identify a specific style would not be possible, but a unique style in some pieces. In other words, this analytical approach could show some peculiar aesthetic and style of Villa-Lobos in African Folk Dances.

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TOWARDS A UNIFIED CONCEPTION OF THE LINGUISTIC SELF WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SEMIOTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland
wasik@wa.amu.edu.pl

Abstract

This paper focuses on the human self as a member of a society and an active participant of observable interpersonal and assumable intersubjective collectivities in relation to its linguistic and communicative properties. Making use of the notion of the self originating in the philosophical works of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), it opts for explaining the nature of self-consciousness in terms of the duality of its manifestations in the mind. Accordingly, it treats the human self as (1) the subject (or the *I* who experiences, thinks, and speaks), and (2) the object of his or her own experiences, thoughts and utterances (or the *me* as a physical person). By the way, attention will be paid to the fact that, regarding the specificity of particular languages, the distinction between the mental subject and the physical person expressible in English does not make sense in the same way, for example, in Spanish, Portuguese or Italian where one speaks rather about twofold qualities of an ego, i.e., corporeal-empirical and subjective-rational. Thus, with regard to sending or receiving and understanding or interpreting activities of communication participants, one refers to intercorporeal and inter-subjective relationships among them. To end with, one must emphasize that the notion of the self as such is not fully mutually translatable from one language into another and has different connotations, for example, in English, German and Polish.

All in all, the aim of this paper is to report on steps of its author's reasoning which allowed her to propose the notion of the linguistic self approachable predominantly, if not exclusively,

from the viewpoint of the significative-communicative acts performed by humans in their life-worlds. Thus, the paper will expound on selected philosophical outlooks on man and his mental endowment responsible for the emergence of language. In particular, the subject of deliberations will constitute such terms as conceptual and methodological tools as (1) the ecology of organisms from biology, (2) existence and transcendence from phenomenology, (3) the distinction between the physical and logical domains from human linguistics, and (4) forms of beings of the subject and modalities of their expression in verbal and nonverbal means from existential semiotics.

1. Introductory remarks

This paper discusses foundations of a positivistic conception of the human individual from the perspective of self-oriented studies. It focuses on the self in relation to its linguistic and communicative properties as a member of society and an active participant of observable interpersonal and assumable intersubjective collectivities. Making use of the notion coming from philosophy and psychology, it explains the consciousness of the self in terms of the duality of its manifestations in the mind. Accordingly, it treats the human self as: (1) a mental subject, i.e., the *I* as an internally conceivable experiencing agent who formulates and interprets his thoughts in sign patterns, (2) a physical person, i.e., the *Me* as an externally observable object of experience who sends and receives its messages through sign practices.

The aim of this paper is to convey a report on reasoning steps which has allowed the author to propose the notion of the linguistic self approachable from the viewpoint of its significative-communicative acts performed in the domains of its everyday life. In expounding on selected outlooks on the species-characteristic endowments of man responsible for the emergence of language, it exposes particularly the notions of (1) ecology derived from biology, (2) existence and transcendence – from phenomenology, (3) physical and logical domains of communication – from human linguistics, and (4) forms of beings of the subject and modalities of their expression in verbal and nonverbal means from existential semiotics.

2. On the linguistic faculty of humans

Whenever issues of the relationships between language and man, language and thought, and of the approachability of language in social interactions are under consideration, it is right to note that the emergence of the linguistic faculties of humans goes hand in hand with their intellectual and emotional growth. This ascertainment clearly follows from scientific evidence provided, *inter alia*, by such contemporary scholars and researchers as especially Tomasello (1999, 2003, 2008), Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002), Jackendoff (2002), Jackendoff, Pinker (2005), Pinker (1994, 2002), Pinker, Jackendoff (2005) and others, regardless of to what degree they acknowledge genes or the environment to be decisive factors in the development of language. To be precise, some psychic, cognitive and interpersonal abilities in conjunction with language skills cause that human individuals are aware of their own knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, preferred values, desires, goals and intentions. Moreover, as it results from arguments set forth by respective authors, it is exactly thanks to linguistic abilities that human individuals, on the one hand, realize the non-identity of their own mental states with the mental states of others, and, on the other, are capable of sharing intentional states with others as well as ascribing their mental states to other individuals.

Taking up the topic of the human self in the context of the study of language and communication, it is worthwhile remembering that language may fulfill manifold roles in relation to a human individual. For example, Joseph A. DeVito, an American scholar whose books on interpersonal communication have appeared since 1970s, maintained, with reference to func-

tions of language distinguished by Roman Jakobson (1960), that languages, acquired through social interaction allow human individuals to develop speaking skills and that their use results not exclusively from pure communicative matters but is conditioned by culture. DeVito (1976: 34–36) pointed out that human communication, when looking from the point of view of higher needs of its participants, serves to stimulate thoughts, to provoke questions, to entertain others, to reinforce or to change attitudes and to change the behavior of others. It is thus understandable that human beings, distinguished by their capacity for acquiring and using natural languages try to understand and influence their environment, for example, in the domains of philosophy, religion, art and science. In fact, symbolic communication constitutes a prerequisite for the emergence of society based on shared norms and values where individuals realize their roles in the domains of everyday life.

Against the background of statements characterizing language as a human faculty, theoretical distinctions and concepts, which have paved the way to the crystallization of the notion of the linguistic self, deserve a more detailed explanation. They have been elaborated by representatives of disciplines focusing on man and his broadly understood conditionings, such as ecology, studying interactions of living organisms with each other and with their environments, phenomenology, interested in the nature of human consciousness and experience, human linguistics, treating language as a relational property of communicating individuals and existential semiotics dealing with semiotic processes of human subjects who cope with their being in the world through the rational acts of consciousness.

3. The ecology of biological organisms vs. human ecology

Interests in mutual relationships between communicating individuals and their environments bring to mind the ecological way of reasoning rooted in the naturalist heritage of Ernst (Heinrich Philipp August) Haeckel ([1866]1988). As has been pointed out by Wąsik, E. (2010: 75), the term *ecology* referred initially, according to this German biologist and philosopher of evolution, to the studies of the relationships existing between organisms and their environments. Subsequently, it became popular in the domain of sociological studies concerned with the spacing and interdependence of people and institutions. The idea of “human ecology”, initiated by Robert Ezra Park and Ernest Watson Burgess (1921), was propagated by Amos H. Hawley (1950). It should be added that the word *ecology* connoted also the care for endangered species or for the purity of the environment in which living systems function. And more importantly, in the 1970s practitioners of linguistic studies, especially Einar Haugen (1972), put into use the term *ecology of language* with reference to a neutral understanding of the German term *Ökologie* coined in 1866, which has been further elaborated, e.g., by Wąsik, Z. (1993a, 1993b) and Wąsik, E. (1999a, 1999b) (see more Wąsik 2010: 75–76).

The notion of the ecology of language has been defined in Wąsik, E. (2010: 75–79) as a domain dealing with extrasystemic conditionings of language or extralinguistic properties of languages spoken and understood in human communication. As it turned out, specifications of the so-called ecological variables which determine the functioning of languages in societies led ultimately to interests in their speakers. According to Haugen (1972), the real ecology of language constitute minds of monolingual or multilingual individuals interacting with each other as members of particular speech communities. Thus, as has been stated by Wąsik, E. (2010: 76), languages depend on people who realize their communicational tasks speaking them. Therefore, external conditionings of verbal forms of communication are factors taken into account by representatives of contact linguistics, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and other domains of study. The assumption that the crucial part of the ecology of language constitutes the ecology of language bearers is thus equal to the statement that the only active subjects in linguistic communication are humans as organisms, mental subjects and agents in social encounters.

4. Transcendence and existence as key concepts of phenomenology

Since conscious states of human minds experienced from the first-person perspective are decisive for human action, a way to understand psychological aspects of human communication is to refer to phenomenology concerned with philosophical studies of consciousness. One has to mention that it is things as they appear in human experience, or ways of how human individuals experience things and the meanings of them which have been called phenomena in keeping with the distinction made by Immanuel Kant (1781) between *noumenon*, i.e., ‘the thing-in-itself’ existing beyond human cognition and *phenomenon*, i.e., ‘the-thing-for-us’ existing as appearances of cognized reality. It was, however, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1773/1807) who first had applied the term *phenomenology* to describe the nature of experiential reality in his *Phenomenology of spirit* (rendered also as *Phenomenology of mind*), with reference to the distinction made by Kant (cf. Phenomenology online 2014). From among representatives of phenomenology in the 20th century, one has to enumerate here especially Edmund Husserl, the author of *Logical investigations* (1913/1900) and *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy* (1913), Martin Heidegger, the author of, *inter alia*, *Being and time* (1927), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), the promoter of embodied cognition and the author of *Phenomenology of perception* (1945/1944), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), the author of *The transcendence of the ego* (1936–1937), and *Being and nothingness* (1943).

These philosophers paid attention to conscious experiences of human individuals, realized by senses from a subjective viewpoint. They tried to get insight into subjective experiences, sensual perceptions, thinking and feeling of humans. What results from the phenomenological approach to man in which the intentional attitude is an inseparable component of experiencing, all human experiences are directed toward things in the world. Consciousness, being always the consciousness of an object, even if the object does not exist in reality, is, according to the proponents of phenomenology, always intentional.

The notions of transcendence and existence refer to two ways of practicing phenomenology. The transcendental phenomenology, concerned with knowledge and cognition, must be characterized as phenomenology of consciousness. It exposed the notion of the transcendental ego, in the consciousness of whom and thanks to consciousness, the being of things was made possible. The notion of transcendence in the study of phenomena was referred, just by Husserl, to the method which he called eidetic reduction. By its means, eidetic or invariant aspects of phenomena as appearances of things should be explained and described with reference to the intentional structure of consciousness of an individual. He postulated an explication of how the meanings of things were constituted by consciousness in consciousness through procedures of reduction and constitution of meaning of which phenomenological reflection consists. While the transcendental reduction amounted to withdrawal from the natural attitude and from the everyday world toward the intersubjective level of the transcendental ego, the constitution of meaning amounted to the return to the world from consciousness as it shows itself in consciousness.

Admittedly, even though Husserl initially insisted upon describing acts of creating the meaning of things performed at the ideal level of a transcendental ego, phenomenology has exposed immediate experience as a source of knowledge and appreciated the role of the human body in shaping mental representations. While this initial phenomenological inquiry of Husserl was the search for transcendental essences and a description of the way how phenomena are constituted in and by consciousness, existential phenomenology was concerned with being and experiences lived by human individuals in their life world. The turn toward existential aspects of experiencing was observed in the philosophy of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but also Husserl opted for including the notion of the life world of everyday experience in the phenomenological consid-

erations in his last work *The crisis of the European sciences* (1970[1956{1935–1936}]). Heidegger and Sartre believed that human individuals create their own values and determine the meanings for their life through acts of consciousness, subscribed, however, to the idea of the primacy of existence before consciousness. They argued that existence cannot be reduced to consciousness of it, and moreover, that there are also such aspects of existence, or being-in-the-world of which an individual is not conscious.

5. The physical and logical domains of human communication

The terms *physical domain* and *logical domain* borrowed from human linguistics promoted by Victor H. Yngve (1996), an American physicist and linguist, are useful for estimating the agency role of communication participants. In accordance with Yngve's view, what is accessible in the real world is not the language as an abstract system of lexical items but only the people who communicate with each other. Therefore, researchers should depart from the concrete manifestation forms of the linguistic properties of communicating individuals, while studying how they assemble into discursive communities through the realization of shared tasks (as stated in Wąsik, E. 2000 and 2003) as constitutive aspects of human ecosystems formed in the natural and socio-cultural domains of human life (cf. also Wąsik, E. 2010: 75).

Hence, the distinction between the physical domain and the logical domain of communication, including observable and inferable facts as extraorganismic and intraorganismic properties of human individuals, allows practitioners of linguistic studies to apprehend investigative consequences that result from their application (see Wąsik, E. 2010: 91–99; especially 93–94). On the one hand, there are objective facts empirically available through direct testing in actual speech acts, which belong to the physical domain, such as the communication participants as concrete persons, the physical sound waves linking them as speakers and hearers, physical objects and other parts of surroundings utilized by them as relevant for the realization of their tasks. And, on the other hand, there are mentally assumed tasks and the knowledge about the referential value of communicational means they use, which belong to the logical domain being grasped through inferences based on reasoning only. Moreover, human individuals are able to communicate about the nature of things and states of affairs being remote in time and space, which do not constitute parts of their proximate surrounding, or about conceived or imagined facts and this way to transcend or to exceed beyond the boundaries of their current experience.

6. Forms of beings of the subject and modalities of their expression in verbal and nonverbal means as basic concepts of existential semiotics

The nature of the significative-communicative activity of human individuals is explained within the theoretical framework of existential semiotics postulated by Eero Tarasti (cf., *inter alia*, 2000, 2009, 2011 and 2012). Existential semiotics assumes that four forms of being of a subject or stages in its development from the individual corporeal ego, through the individual observer's mental ego and the conceptually potential social ego to the actually role-oriented social ego, are pivotal and decisive for semiotic processes (cf., e.g., Tarasti 2011, especially: 328–329). Respective forms of being are, in Tarasti's model, (1) *Being-in-myself*, the bodily ego, (2) *Being-for-myself*, the ego discovering his/her identity and corporeality via habits, (3) *Being-in-itself*, the ego actualizing or not his/her norms, ideas and values through acts of transcendence while performing his/her institutional roles in socially established practices, and (4) *Being-for-itself*, the ego implementing or realizing his/her norms, ideas and values through the conduct in his/her universe of existence.

Subjective forms of being are manifested in the communicative behavior of human individuals. During their significative activity triggering the creation of verbal signs, values, which are

transcendental, are transformed through the modalities of their expression, indispensable for articulating their positions towards existential reality. Through their utterances in verbal communication, human individuals articulate their attitudes, desires or expectations in volitional, epistemic, deontic and obligational modalities consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or pointless, directly or indirectly. These modalities of verbal expression are also accompanied by gestures and facial movements, prosody, pitch, volume, intonation, etc. One must stress, however, that sign processes appear in the minds of human individuals in consequence of their psychological states. At first the products of these sign-processes have a significative value for their originators and afterwards they may be interpreted to their recipients.

To explain the social behaviors of people including their verbal products, in terms of existential semiotics, it is essential to remember that the acts of human consciousness precede and determine the creation of signs which constitute the representations of internal awareness of the individual's mind pertaining to his/her own subjective states. In view to the fact that human individuals constantly shape themselves through their significative-communicative activity, the subject-oriented semiotics should investigate language along with other semiotic means, such as clothes, dance and music, etc. knowing that the signs convey information about bodily, psychological and socio-cultural conditionings of their creators.

7. On the concept of the self in the study of human communication

The examination of the forms of being of human individuals on the basis of their signs is a complement to how to approach the communicating self from the point of view of its activity. Thus, it should be noted that the concept of the self as such, widespread in philosophy and psychology, which presupposes that a human individual is simultaneously an exceptional and irreplaceable acting subject and the object of his/her own experience who stands in relationships with other individuals and other living beings while establishing and sustaining meaningful contacts with their social and natural environments, had been adopted by American theoreticians of communication already starting from the 1960s. In accordance with definitions delivered by American philosophers of pragmatism, as especially William James (1890 and [1892]1961/2001) and George Herbert Mead (1934), the concept of the self presupposes, if one relies particularly on their particular stances that thinking processes of an individual consist in internal conversations, in which the *I*, i.e., the self as a subject, responds to the *Me*, i.e., the self as an object of experience. By the way, it must be stressed, however, that, due to specificity of particular languages, the distinction between a subjective mental *I* and an objective physical *Me*, expressible in English or French, does not occur in the same way, for example, in Spanish, Portuguese or Italian. In some languages, one has to speak about the twofold qualities of an *ego*, i.e., corporeal-empirical and subjective-rational. Thus, with regard to sending or receiving and understanding or interpreting activities of communication participants, one refers to intercorporeal and inter-subjective relationships among them. One must emphasize that the notion of the self as such is not fully translatable from one language into another and has different connotations, for example, in English, German and Polish.

Alluding to the notion of the self, communication scientists working in the intellectual climate of the American pragmatism (cf., e.g., Barker 1977: 111–132) have formulated general statements pertaining to communicating selves. Basing on their views, one can say that different parts of the self of an individual are activated in the course of communication. Recognizing him- or herself as being separate from the environment but having common properties with other members of the group, an individual behaves stimulated by feelings of which and the stimuli of which he/she is usually aware, and which are discernible by others. Repetitive behaviors, called habits, of which individuals are predominantly unaware, are activated automatically;

they relate to the public and private spheres of the selves. Moreover, reactions of communicators to particular situations reflect their values, i.e., moral or ethical judgments of things being sometimes sources of conflict within an individual and barrier between individuals, their attitudes, i.e., learned tendencies to react positively or negatively to objects or situations, as well as their beliefs, opinions and prejudices, since individuals act according to what they accept as true. The communicative behavior of individuals must be, therefore, considered as resultant from all these factors and dependencies between them, which are not always perceptible by other communication participants or researchers.

8. Concluding remarks

Communicating individuals function within their physical and social environments both, in the physical dimension, as concrete persons who send and receive messages as observable meaning bearers and, in the logical dimension, as mental subjects who generate and interpret messages as meaningful and understandable. Accordingly, the personal *Me* of the self appears to outsiders as an empirically accessible object and the subjective *I* only as an rationally assumable agent. A clue to the self, both a physical person and a mental subject constitutes both verbal and nonverbal signs, but only verbal signs allow to probe into existential problems in the best way, as far as all kinds of signs can ultimately be translated into the signs of natural languages. Languages provide for human subjects a base for expressing the content of their experience at the level of vocabulary and grammar while reflecting their inner thoughts and emotions and helping to describe their own forms of being. To sum up, the obvious truth that natural languages contribute to the formation of linguistic communities, in which the individual selves live, and to determine the ways of their living as social selves in their world of everyday life constructed, shaped and modelled collectively through communication, undoubtedly justifies to use notion of the linguistic self.

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SIGNS AND EXISTENCE: THE EXISTENTIAL SEMIOTICS OF EERO TARASTI BETWEEN EXISTENTIALISM, SEMIOTICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Roberto Mastroianni
University of Turin, Italy
roberto.mastroianni@gmail.com

Abstract

The existential semiotics of Eero Tarasti proposes to explain which dynamics come into play in “states before signs are formed,” or in “existential situations,” in which mankind and the signs are positioned, before they crystallize into forms that can be analysed, classified and studied. This research project is presented as a: *Epistemological choices*; a *new theory of the subject*; a *new aesthetic perspective* and a *new existentialism perspective*. This lectured presents a panoramic vision on the relationship between *signs, existence and transcendence*, which developed as a result of constant philosophizing to establish an “existential clarification” of semiotics. The theory of Tarasti selects existentialism as a philosophic *koiné* and does so by confronting the thinkers responsible for making it famous and identifiable (Kierkegaard, Sartre, Jaspers...) and proposes a semiotic point of view on: the existential condition of humankind”; the “existential states in which the subject and the signs are collocated before being ‘immersed’”; the “relationship of the subject with ‘otherness’ and the world”; and the “ethical and political components of human existence.” *Existential semiotics* can be considered a species of *semiotic existentialism*: a semiotic theory which examines the relationship between existence, possibility, the conditions of existence and semiotic processes. There are various existentialist forms, origins and structures, which can be divided into two broad categories: *ontological existentialism* (Heidegger, Maritain...) and *anthropological existentialism* (Sartre, Levinas...). The highest form of *ontological existentialism* is that which is rooted in the Heideggerian tradition, which stems from *Sein und Zeit* and which refers to the imperfect parallelism between two couples of concepts, such as “existential/existentiell” and “ontic/ontological.” For Heideggerism and post-Heideggerism, “existentialism is the theory of the various possible modes of being, considered

abstractly as pure and neutral *a priori*, indistinct and indifferent to any kind of concrete distinction, even if by nature they also always represent concrete and distinct modes, which constitute the *a priori* foundation of the possibility of concrete, ontic decisions (*existentiell*). Every concrete relationship of the individual is *existential* [...] ... a concrete aspect of their being, conditioned and ontologically motivated [...] by the existentialism of being” (Pareyson, 1950: 219). From this perspective, the concrete problems encountered by the individual in daily life would be “*existentiell*,” while the specific problems of reflecting upon, and serving, existence itself would be “*existential*.” Existential thought could thus only be carried out inside an existence. Its roots would therefore be profoundly “*existentiell*” (Heidegger, 1977 and Pareyson, 1950: 185). Tarasti thus chooses to make his own “extended version” of existentialism: a vision which has more in common with the French-style *anthropological existentialism* rooted in the teachings of Levinas (transcendence) and Sartre (the situation of humankind). The lecturer proposes a philosophical, Semiotic and Anthropological vision on the relationship between “sign” and “existence” in relation to the “existential situation,” which precedes the *formation of signs*, the semiotic construction of the subject.

1. Existential semiotics

In recent years, Eero Tarasti has devoted a good deal of his intellectual energy to trying to outline “existential semiotics.” He does this in order to explain which dynamics come into play in “states before signs are formed,” or in “existential situations,” in which mankind and the signs are positioned, before they crystallize into forms that can be analyzed, classified and studied.

What binds the various versions and the author’s research together is the relationship between *signs, subjects and transcendence*, which developed as a result of constant philosophizing to establish an “existential clarification” of semiotics. In his efforts to produce a new semiotic theory, Tarasti’s choice of field is sound. He selects existentialism as a philosophic *koiné* and does so by confronting the thinkers responsible for making it famous and identifiable (Kierkegaard, Sartre, Jaspers...). The author could therefore seem to be renouncing his own semiotic vocation in order to devote himself to a broader form of philosophic research. This is in part true, but only in part, as this work can be fully incorporated into philosophic contemplations of the status of signs and language and the philosophic tradition of story-telling without seeking to abandon, however, the “sign doctrine,” which is a form of linguistic philosophy.

Tarasti’s theoretical challenge is, therefore, to produce a new “general theory of semiotics,” that will be able to correlate existential issues, by questioning how signs and their meanings are established. These issues include: “the existential condition of humankind,” the “existential states in which the subject and the signs are collocated before being ‘immersed;’” the “relationship of the subject with ‘otherness’ and the world,” and the “ethical and political components of human existence.”

For Tarasti, “reality is made up of *energy fields* governed by specific laws,” of which both the subject and the signs are parts. These are the “situations in which the sign is manifested, given that it is always in relation to a specific, existential situation” (Tarasti, 2009). This perspective expresses a preference for a vision of existence indebted to anthropological readings of existentialism, which are widespread in the French sphere (Levinas, 1998). It rejects post-Heideggerian ontology, presenting existential semiotics as an advanced, but still incomplete, attempt to correlate a possible semiotic reading of the existential condition of humankind in the world, its ethical dimension and the emersion of sign systems, which give meaning to the anthroposphere, and their temporal and spatial dimensions.

2. Semiotic Existentialism: ontological existentialism or anthropological existentialism?

Existential semiotics selects existentialism like *Koiné*. Tarasti refers to existentialist writers. He uses the same vocabulary and discusses issues which are both existentialist and *existentiell*.

At this point, it is fundamental to understand the type of existentialism Tarasti chooses and which he correlates to semiotic traditions. He does so after developing a “general theory of purpose and meaning” that can correlate “existential states of being” to those which precede the appearance of signs and systems of meaning.

From this point of view, existential semiotics are like a “third generation of semiotics” that seeks to surpass both ‘classical semiotics’ (Peirce, Greimas, Sebeok..) and “second generation” semiotics (Eco, Barthes, Kristeva ...).

“First generation semiotics” put forward general theories of purpose and meaning, which served as a backdrop to semiotics of the “second generation,” which sought to elaborate operative semiotic theories, making less complete reference to the texts, sign systems and meanings. “Third generation semiotics” discusses the problem of formulating a new semiotic theory that can correlate the emersion of signs with the nature of the subject, temporality and human spatiality.

Existential semiotics can be considered a species of *semiotic existentialism*: a semiotic theory which examines the relationship between existence, possibility, the conditions of existence and semiotic processes. It is thus necessary to identify the forms and characters of the existentialist calling of Tarasti’s semiotics.

There are various existentialist forms, origins and structures, which can be divided into two broad categories: *ontological existentialism* (Heidegger, Maritain...) and *anthropological existentialism* (Sartre, Levinas...).

The highest form of *ontological existentialism* is that which is rooted in the Heideggerian tradition, which stems from *Sein und Zeit* and which refers to the imperfect parallelism between two couples of concepts, such as “existential/existentiell” and “ontic/ontological”. For Heideggerism and post-Heideggerism, “existentialism is the theory of the various possible modes of being, considered abstractly as pure and neutral *a priori*, indistinct and indifferent to any kind of concrete distinction, even if by nature they also always represent concrete and distinct modes, which constitute the *a priori* foundation of the possibility of concrete, ontic decisions (*existentiell*). Every concrete relationship of the individual is *existential* [...] ... a concrete aspect of their being, conditioned and ontologically motivated [...] by the existentialism of being” (Pareyson, 1950: 219). From this perspective, the concrete problems encountered by the individual in daily life would be “existentiell,” while the specific problems of reflecting upon, and serving, existence itself would be “existential.” Existential thought could thus only be carried out inside an existence. Its roots would therefore be profoundly “existentiell.” (Heidegger, 1977 and Pareyson, 1950: 185). Existential semiotics does not make this distinction itself. Instead, it tends to merge with the broader “existential condition.” As he does not discuss this distinction openly, Tarasti finds himself handling the notion of the “existential condition” imprecisely, in our opinion, not putting forward a “rigid definition” of it. Instead, a “broad version” is loyal to the *post-Sartrean slogan* (“existence precedes the essence”) in which existentialism, as a cultural movement, has long been recognized.

Tarasti thus chooses to make his own “extended version” of existentialism: a vision which has more in common with the French-style *anthropological existentialism* rooted in the teachings of Levinas (transcendence) and Sartre (the situation of humankind).

3. The Subject, Otherness and the Existential Condition

The subject is one of the central themes of Tarasti’s theories. It is analysed in relation to the existential condition which characterizes it, the construction of identity and the otherness, to which transcendence always tends guide the subject.

From this perspective, the relationship between “sign” and “subject” is analysed in relation to the “existential situation,” which precedes the *formation of signs*, the semiotic construction of the subject,” *otherness and the world*. From this point of view, the subject and the semiotic process

are both part of an existential situation which defies the logic of the “equal exchange of pieces of information” and which embraces a more dynamic, open form of semiosis, in which the “subject and the “world” are subjected to constant construction and deconstruction processes.

From this point of view, “existential semiotics” resembles the “interpretive semiotics” of Peirce. It recognizes the subject as a chain of signs and interpretations and the production process as an open semiotic process (*infinite semiosis*). At the same time, this new semiotic theory distances itself from that of Peirce, in terms of its existential, ethical and political interest and its intuitive, informal character.

From this perspective, the sign, the formation of meaning, the construction of the subject and of the method are inserted into a dynamic process which produces identity in relation to otherness. The otherness is a fundamental element of Tarasti’s theory: the “subject” is formed in relation to “otherness” in a type of open, interpretive semiotic process, which displaces the centre of semiotic activity in dialogue between inter-related subjects. The code of this relationship is determined by the existential situation, so it becomes important to understand these states in which signs emerge and codes are formalized. Attention to the spaces in discourse (spaces produced by semiotic practices referred to as discourses) makes existential semiotics a semiotics of communication, which focuses upon the anthropological, existential spatiality produced by meaning processes.

This type of semiotics thus refuses the idea that “communication” is an “equal exchange of pieces of information.” It refuses the “engineering-style model of communication” (issuer, recipient, message, code, channel), instead opting for an “idea of “communicative community”-style communication (language/spatiality/united by communications and speakers who produce a community).

Tarasti refers to the space of discourse/dialogue in the semiotic process as the semiotic construction of the *subject, the world and otherness* – the “existential condition.” He thereby attributes an ulterior meaning to Sartre’s concept of the “existential situation.”

For the author, the “existential condition” represents the totality of “conditions which *precede* the formation of signs; the so-called *pre-signs*” (Tarasti, 2009: 22).

From this perspective, the sign “always appears in relation to a given situation [...] I mean, the situation in which the sign shows itself as its determined, concrete, spatial-temporal position.” In addition, “the sign can be placed in any type of existential relationship with the situation itself. It can negate or affirm it” (Tarasti, 2009: 23). This layout is wedded to an anthropological vision of existentialism, a French-style vision which refers back to Sartre and Levinas.

The “in-situation” sign (as in Sartre) and this “situation” assume a socio-historic and, in some respects, a political tone...Transcendence (as in Levinas) is crucial to constructing the subject, otherness, the world and human relationships. This set-up (as in Levinas) has strong ethical components and recognises the central element of the anthropological dimension in the dialogue.

The rejection of Heidegger’s ontological existentialism thus opts in favour of the application of a French matrix, of anthropological existentialism.

But the refusal of Heideggerism and of his results does not end here. It is not limited to the rejection of a “strict definition” of the term “existential.” In fact, according to Tarasti, the term *Dasein* has been given a “broader” meaning. It has stopped meaning the condition of an individual *being flung* (the *Dasein/to be* Heideggerian *here*) into the world and has become the term with which an “existential phase” is designated, with the socio-historic characteristics from which signs extensively emerge.

From this point of view, transcendence is the desire to surpass realist acceptance of the world as it is and to move towards a political, ethical and planned reality of *subjectivity in semiotic relations with the world*.

4. Existential Semiotics or Existential Hermeneutics

A structure (such as Tarasti's), which recognises the relationship between *the subject, otherness, the signs and transcendence*, as based upon *language/dialogue/discourse* and the *refusal to realistically accept reality*, is like many philosophic, hermeneutic and dialogic structures (such as hermeneutic philosophy, the dialogism of Bakhtin, the thinking of Buber and Gadamer...).

Tarasti's work is ambitious and very interesting, perhaps precisely because it creates short-circuits between philosophy and semiotics, which find more fertile ground on which to express themselves in the triad of *subject, sign and transcendence*.

This perspective should be more explicit in Tarasti's theories. Let us hope it becomes so in a subsequent phase. The author should make the value of *dialogue/discourse* more explicit in the semiotic theory he is developing.

Tarasti, like Gadamer, Arendt *et alia* considers language to be distinct from contemporary semiotics (Volli, 2002 and Volli, 2007). He recognizes it as "*in-between*" the people who speak it. For this reason, the "existential space," or the "existential situation which precedes the establishment of signs," is essentially a spatiality in *dialogue/discourse*.

This perspective would benefit from being developed until extreme philosophic consequences are reached, but Tarasti is not doing this for the time being. If he were to expand his research to cover the relationship between *language, existence, otherness and transcendence*, contemporary Hermeneutic philosophy (Gadamer) would be fused with ontological existentialism (Heidegger) and it is not clear why this is not being done.

In Tarasti's mind, transcendence is an unshakable need for the otherness of the subject. This theory owes much to the theories of Levinas. This concession creates a checkmate situation for a theory of meaning that is too easy. It is based upon an "equal exchange of information," and is evolving into a more complex theory of communication. But Tarasti stops here and does not examine the "existential situation" to an adequate degree, if doing so means embracing ontological existentialism. He should recognise (as Heidegger says): that the *Dasein* is positioned on a linguistic axis; that language is the "opening" through which humankind and the world end up being positioned; that transcendence is an element of existence; and that being (from the Latin term *ex-sistere*, to be outside) is an ontological aspect of humankind. In this way, *existential semiotics* might embrace Post-Heideggerian contemporary thought and intense *dialogism*.

Tarasti's theory on *dialogue/discourse* much resembles Bakhtin's theory of polyphony and is very similar to existential hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer...).

For this reason, the author's refusal of Heidegger's thoughts is difficult to understand. Heidegger's theory on *Dasein* is, in fact, based on a notion of being thrown away, which characterises existence like *ex-sistere* (to be outside and to go beyond reality towards possibility). This idea of transcendence, together with the centrality of *dialogue/discourse* could become the presupposed theory of semiotics, which specializes in otherness, the subject and existence. In this way, semiotics, which seeks to correlate the existential situations that precede the formation of meaning and signs, can find an ally, and not an enemy, in philosophic hermeneutics. This is because Heidegger's being always exists in a situation and location. He or she is not a transcendental subject, but the "human being who has been disposed of" (*Geworfenheit*), a finished, concrete being, who is historically situated, a single, complete existence which corresponds to a certain emotional state and collection of prejudices.

In addition, all the Heideggerian speculation on whether the charter of the sign is "usable" might open up a semiotics that is attentive to the ethical implications of the human condition and to its relationship with otherness, which cannot be reduced to a field of research like an "existential project" that "makes sense" within an ontological opening, made up of language and signs.

This new theory of semiotics with its fruitful intuitions could be strengthened by a more care-

ful investigation of the “worldiness of the world”, which is a “character of the very being” that is constituted through the usability of things and their meaning in our lives. This is because, in the world, mankind (which Tarasti refers to as “the subject”) always organizes itself in relation to its options, inserting them into projects and assuming them as instruments. The character of “postponement” (*aliquid pro aliquod*) of the sign (§17 in *Sein und Zeit*), as a built-in, non-accidental nature, will perhaps be researched in greater depth and thus strengthen the Bakhtinian dialogism of existential semiotics.

For Tarasti, this will probably be the fertile path that will lead to further innovative thinking and which will better reconcile certain perspectives of existential semiotics with post-Heideggerian and post-Gadamerian philosophic hermeneutics.

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**SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OR UNIVERSAL CULTURAL
CONCEPTIONS?
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL RIFT**

A SOLIPSISTIC PARADIGM OF NEW SEMIOTICS IN THE LIGHT OF EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS

Zdzisław Wąsik
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland
zdzis.wasik@gmail.com

Abstract

The subject matter of this lecture will constitute a phenomenological and linguistic typology of significative-communicative properties of man as a semiotic animal embedded in its ecological surrounding of living and non-living as well as natural and artificial systems. Focusing on the semiotic self as an investigative object, new semiotic studies following the solipsistic anthropocentrism are counterpoised to traditional semiotic studies governed by the rules of collective semiocentrism. Instead of dealing with sign- and referent-related properties of communicational products, practitioners of new semiotics are interested in the dynamic properties of human individuals on account of their sign- or meaning-processing activities. This lecture will investigate the difference between animals and humans as to the nature of their subjective universes on the basis of existential phenomenology, philosophy of biology, and biological semiotics. Furthermore, it will take a look on the defining characteristics of speech derivable from the contrast between the verbal and non-verbal means of animal and human communication from the perspective of anthropological linguistics.

Having compared the subjective states of organisms with respect to the absence or presence of intentionality, slave or master relationships, closeness and openness of their environments, existential phenomenologists have argued that animals are bound in totality to their subjective universe and humans may transcend it by going to another kind of reality. As conscious individuals humans are endowed with free will allowing them to change and to shape their world of everyday life. Animal organisms have been described as behaving instinctively and human organisms as comporting themselves with reflection and stance-taking. Semiotically inclined phenomenologists have applied the sign- and meaning-processing-oriented approach to ponder

the existential modes of animals and humans in terms of their being in the world as immanence and being for the world as transcendence. Immanent subjects are regarded as existing in their environments and transcendent subjects as being able to go beyond their universe of life. Additional divergence between animals and humans have been observed in their ego-related awareness of corporeality or intercorporeality and subjectivity or intersubjectivity status and in their conscious awareness of the meaning of being alive and the ability of taking stand to the existence in the surrounding or existing for the surrounding. Considering the organism's relations to the world they live in, it is the matter of becoming in the world and becoming of the world as a result of these relations. Important are relationships of organisms to their environment in terms of how they affect it or how they are affected by it. Organisms differ, therefore, in the potential networks of affective relationships with their environments. In another context of scientific reflections, representatives of anthropological linguistics have derived the species-specific properties of animals and humans, with regard to their communicative means, from: immutability or interchangeability of sender-receiver roles, innateness or experientiality in generational acquisition and transmission, naturalness or conventionality of origin, constancy or variability and stability or changeability, boundedness or displacement ability in time and space, instinctiveness or intentionality, globality and continuity or segmentability and discreteness of patterning, etc.

1. Introductory remarks

The subject matter of this article constitutes a typology of significative-communicative properties of man as a semiotic animal embedded in its ecological surroundings of natural and artificial systems. With the focus on the self as an object of new semiotic studies, the solipsistic anthropocentrism is counterpoised here to the domain of traditional semiotic studies governed by the rules of collective semiocentrism. Instead of dealing with sign- and referent-related properties of communicational products, the article pays attention to the dynamic properties of human individuals on account of their sign- or meaning-processing activities while exposing the differences and similarities between *Umwelt* and *Lebenswelt* as the subjective universes of animals and humans on the basis of existential phenomenology, philosophy of biology and biological semiotics. Furthermore, it takes a look on the defining characteristics of speech derivable from the contrast between the verbal and non-verbal means of animal and human communication in the light of anthropological linguistics.

2. The subjective universe of organisms in the light of phenomenology

The first subpart of this article deals with phenomenological interpretations of differences or similarities between animal and human environments, confronting the notions of *Umwelt* and *Lebenswelt*. The term *Umwelt* 'surrounding world' applied to the subjective world of animal organisms by Jakob von Uexküll since 1909 (cf. 1921[1909]), is parallel to the term *Funktionskreis(e)* 'functional circle(s)', which was added in the second edition of *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere* in 1921, and subsequently also to *Umweltröhre(n)* 'environmental pipe(s)', introduced along with the superordinated term *Umwelttunnel* 'environmental tunnel' slightly later by Uexküll in the second edition of his *Theoretische Biologie* (1928[1920]), cf. Uexküll (1926[1920]). *Umwelt* metaphorically modelled as a "soap bubble" refers to a particular environment of an animal acting at in a "functional circle" (*Funktionskreis*) of medium, food, enemy or sex (cf. Uexküll 1982[1940]: 59–60, especially 71), and *Umweltröhren* (cf. Uexküll 1928: 70, 108) illustrate a sequence of all environmental circles that the individual organism has to pass in a stroll throughout its whole life (cf. Uexküll 1957[1934]).

2.1. Perceptual markers of subjective significance in the universe of animal organisms

Having studied the behavior of animal organisms entering into relationships with other objects from their environment, Uexküll noted that animals, from unicellular microorganisms to

hominids, as living objects endowed with the so-called *Ich-Ton* (i.e., a property of subjectivity, rendered in the English translation of original German terms signifying musical tones by ‘ego-quality’), are capable of discerning meaning from environmental signals. Such meaning is attributable to objects, which possess qualities of being significant for the satisfaction of needs of a cognizing subject, as, e.g., *Weg-Ton* ‘path-quality’, *Wurf-Ton* ‘throw-quality’, *Trink-Ton* ‘drinking-quality’, *Fress-Ton* ‘eating-quality’, *Sitz-Ton* ‘sitting-quality’, *Hindernis-Ton* ‘obstacle-quality’, *Kletter-Ton* ‘climbing quality’, etc. (cf. Uexküll 1982: 27–31).

2.2. The life-world of humans as an investigative object of mundane phenomenology

Another kind of a subjective universe was proposed in phenomenology under the label of *Lebenswelt* describing the pre-given world in which humans live by Edmund Husserl (mainly 1970[1956{1935–1936}], cf., *inter alia*, also 1970[1913/1900/], 1970[1913/1901/], 1970[1913], and especially 2008/1916–1937/). The spherical dimension of human surroundings is visible in Edmund Husserl’s depiction: “In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each ‘I-the-man’ and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this ‘living together.’” (1970[1956]1935–1936}: 108). This term “life-world”, coming from mundane phenomenology as the translation from the German original by Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann (1973 [1975]), was abandoned by representatives of social constructivism Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966/1967) in favor of “the reality of everyday life”.

2.3. Ontological-ethological interpretations of the relationships of organisms to their natural environments

How the patterns of these relations that animals have to their *Umwelt* and humans to their *Lebenswelt* or, in general, that organisms have to their natural environments, are interpreted in existential phenomenology is shown on the basis of a comparative study on Jakob von Uexküll’s, Martin Heidegger’s, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s, and Gilles Deleuze’s onto-ethologies done by Brett Buchanan (1975). In Buchanan’s opinion (1975: 5, 39–114,) contemporary biologists would be disappointed from Heidegger’s division of the beings in the world, in which, for example, the stone has no world, the animal is a captive of the world and the human – a world-forming being.

For Heidegger (1962[1927], 1995[1983]) the existence in the world, named after the German term *Dasein* (*da-sein* ‘being-there’), is a property of humans only. He describes behavior (*Benehmen*) of animals and their *Umwelt* in terms of restrictedness and functional boundedness in comparison to the comportment (*Verhalten*) of human *Dasein*, which is free and unbound in its opening to the world. Animals are admitted to have relations with things through the outward extension of their body, but they are said to lack an access to the things in themselves and to the being of these beings because they cannot transcend their captivity by things.

Recapitulating the position of Merleau-Ponty in his writings, Buchanan (1975) notices that Merleau-Ponty (1943/1938/[1983/1963/], 1945/1944/[1962], 1968[1964]) does not distinguish between various kinds of the world in which organisms live. For him the “environment”, “ambiance,” “entourage,” or “milieu” is a relational structure of organism’s behavior, whereas the organism is to be seen as a functional whole determined by perceptions of its experiencing body. Behavior forms thus a relational enclosure to such an extent that the organism is structurally united with its world.

In Deleuze’s (1992[1968], 1990[1969], 1988[1981/1970/]) philosophy of affections, elaborated after Benedict Spinoza (1883[1677]) and extended in cooperation with Félix Guattari (cf. Deleuze & Guattari 1987[1980]), important are relationships of organisms to their environment how they affect it or how they are affected by incoming stimuli. Organisms are said to differ in potential networks of affective relationships with their social, cultural and natural environments.

3. The theoretical stance of existential semiotics toward the being forms of human individuals

In the second subpart, a search for the roots of existential semiotics launched as a conceptual and methodological framework by Eero Tarasti (2000, 2009, 2011, 2012) starts with rethinking the layouts of human-centered semiotics in the light of philosophers who paid attention to “existence” and “transcendence”. Therefore, it goes back to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1777/1807/[1793/1807/]), who characterized his approach to reality as phenomenology while alluding to Immanuel Kant (1724[1724]), but who, unlike Kant, expressed his conviction that phenomena constitute a sufficient basis for a universal science of being.

3.1. Modes of human existence: Being in itself and being for itself

The main emphasis is put on Hegel’s categories of *an-sich-sein* ‘being-in-itself’ and *für-sich-sein* ‘being-for-itself’, which subsequently turned into subjective and objective being in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard (1813[1813]) when he spoke about an individual as an observer of him- or herself or the observed one who was a subject or such an individual who was what he/she was because he/she had become like it. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980/[1905–1980], 1956 [1956]), a skeptical reader of Hegel and Kierkegaard in line, translated Hegelian concepts with *être-en-soi* and *être-pour-soi*. For Sartre, the being as such becomes aware of itself through an act of negation and, when becoming an observer of itself, it shifts its attention into the position of being for itself. Having noticed a lack in its reality, this being begins with the first act of transcendence when it strives to fulfil what it lacks.

3.2. Modality acts of self-awareness in personal and subjective spheres of individual and social manifestation forms

Hegelian concepts of *an-sich-sein* and *für-sich-sein*, have been changed into *an-mir-sein* ‘being-in-myself’ and *für-mich-sein* ‘being-for-myself’ by Jacques Fontanille (2004). Following his contribution to somatic semiotics, one can detach the individual objective and subjective from social objective and subjective being forms of human body (*soma*) in a new phenomenological sense (*séma*), i.e., *être-en-moi* and *être-en-soi* from *être-pour-moi* and *être-pour-soi*.

Fontanille’s distinctions have influenced Tarasti (cf. 2011: 328–329) to classify the corporeal and mental, individual and social modes of human existence and transcendence into four modality acts of self-awareness, having been reconstituted here in a cohesive description as follows: (1) *an-mir-sein* – *être-en-moi* – ‘being-in-myself’, in which an individual is willing to appreciate his/her/its existential bodily self-worth; I represents bodily ego of human self which appears as kinetic energy, expressions of needs, wants or desires through gestures and intonations; (2) *für-mich-sein* – *être-pour-moi* – ‘being-for-myself’, in which the individual can reflect upon him-/her-/it-self while transcending to the position of an “observer”; the attitude of an “observer” shifting, for the lack of his, her or its existence, to the transcendental acts of an ego discovering his, her or its existential identity; (3) *an-sich-sein* – *être-en-soi* – ‘being-in-itself’, in which an individual transcends to probable chances, conveyed by purely conceptual and virtual norms, ideas, and values, which he/she/it must either actualize or not actualize in society; (4) *für-sich-sein* – *être-pour-soi* – ‘being-for-itself’, in which an individual refers to an actual role as realized by the conduct in his/hers/its world of existence, which are determined by aforementioned norms, ideas, and values.

Summarizing postmodern thought on semiotic phenomenology, one can consider the existence modes of animal and human subjects in terms of their being in the world as immanence and being for the world as transcendence. Immanent subjects are viewed as existing in their environments and transcendent subjects as being able to go beyond their universe of life.

4. Semiotic universals of language in animal and human communication

The subject matter of the third subpart constitutes the author’s (Zdzisław Wąsik 2007, and

2014: 65–78) classificatory elaborations and extensions of Charles Hockett's (1959a[1958], 1959b, 1960a, 1960b, 1966[1963]), Stuart Altmann's (1962), Hockett's and Altmann's (1968), as well as Charles Osgood's (1980) approaches to defining characteristics of speech derivable from the contrast between verbal and non-verbal means of communication in the universe of animals and humans. Accordingly, semiotic universals of language have been divided into four groups: (I) form and structure of language; (II) substances of codes and channels of communication; (III) cognitive faculties and communicational abilities of human beings across cultures and generations; (IV) relationships between the signifying and signified sides of verbal means as well as between verbal means and their users (see Wąsik (2014: 72–73).

4.1. Structural-systemic set of semiotic universals of language

Group I embraces systemic properties of language making up domain of linguistics studies, such as: *semantic referentiality* where the semantic function of verbal signs results from their reference to reality and the relation between signs and their referents always repeats in a similar way although always in new contexts; *conventional arbitrariness* – the relationship between verbal signs and their referents is not natural by origin but depends upon the social usage and customs conditioned by free and non-motivated choices; *discrete distinctiveness* – verbal means are not continuous and global but articulated and segmented as mutually distinguishable and replaceable contextual entities, units or constructions; *double articulateness* – verbal means can be divided into the smallest meaningful text elements (morphemes) and smallest diacritic text elements (phonemes); *morphological duality* – verbal means can be divided into two classes of signs, grammatical and lexical morphemes; *bipartite significance* – verbal means as constituents of predication frames can be divided, on the syntactic level, into sentences and word phrases that realize, on the logical and semantic level, both the function of propositions and concepts; *functional and compositional hierarchicality* – on the subordinating level, text elements of lower order function within entities, units or constructions of higher order, as phonemes, morphemes, semantemes, words, phrases, sentences, utterances, discourses and texts, and, on the superordinating level, text elements of higher order consist at least of one entity, unit or construction of lower order, as text, discourse, utterance, sentence, phrase, word, semanteme, morpheme, and phoneme; *binary isomorphism of text structures* – segmental text structures, as syllable, stem, word, phrase, clause, sentence, are isomorphous as to their binary forms consisting of a constitutive component and an accessory component; for a syllable, the constitutive component is a vowel or semivowel, for a stem – a lexical morpheme, for a word – a stem, for a phrase – a determined word, for a clause – verbal phrase, for a sentence – the main clause; accessory, in turn, for a syllable is a consonant, for a stem – a derivational affix, for a word – an inflectional ending, for a phrase – a determining word, for a clause – a nominal phrase, for a sentence – a subordinated clause; *syntagmatic integrativity and paradigmatic commutability* – verbal signs can create entities, units and constructions appearing as segments and/or suprasegmental features; *combinatorial-productive openness* – the system of language functions as an open system, so that its users have the opportunity to produce an infinite number of signs from a finite number of simple elements and phraseological constructions.

The specification of characteristic features of language that belong to the domain of linguistics can lead to the formulation of its semiotic definition when language is confronted with other systems of understanding on the basis of searching for the *genus proximum* of the linguistic sign among the other semiotic objects. Examined on the syntagmatic level of utterances and locutions, both simple signs and composed signs are regarded as complex signs of higher order as to their global meaning, where the sum of their components does not equal the sum of their partial meanings. All meaningful forms as simple signs or composed signs are considered as members of the same paradigm when they replace each other within the same context of locutions and/or utterances.

4.2. Phonic realization of linguistic texts in speech as non-systemic properties of language

Non-systemic properties of language constituting group II should be relegated to the interest of physical acoustics. The object of study is reduced here to non-systemic properties of speech sounds, as follows: *vocal-auditory*, verbal signs have a phonic character, they are emitted through the vocal tract and received by ear; *centrifugal transmission and directional reception* – sound waves expand in all directions, but they are received from that direction in which the listener finds himself; *evanescence in time* – phonic substances of speech sounds due to physical laws are transitory and volatile; *linear integration over time* – receivers apprehend sound waves as a sequence of segments arranged in a line (cf. Wąsik 2014: 74–75).

4.3. Extrasystemic properties of language as an investigative object of the neighboring disciplines of linguistics

Groups III and IV, in turn, pertain to extrasystemic properties of language studied by human-centered semiotics. Group III has been précised in the following order: *interchangeability of sender-receiver roles* stating that the communicating individual who can be both a sender and a receiver of his or her signs and the signs of other individuals can produce, perceive and reproduce their own or foreign signs as many times as they want; *complete (total) feedback* – the sender, while speaking, can not only simultaneously perceive reactions of others, but he or she can also react to the form and content of what they emit him- or her-self, which also gives them the possibility of controlling and/or correcting their errors; *cultural transmission* – languages are not genetically inherited, but generationally transferred through education and participation in culture; *creativity, learnability and forgetability* – as far as speech faculties can be inherited, every representative of the species *homo sapiens*, understood also as *homo animal symbolicum*, can not only acquire every language but also create his or her own linguistic system or forget a given language, which they have learned; *translatability* – the feature of learnability implies also the feature of translatability of every language learned by users as a second, third or fourth, and so forth, language; *conventionally determined changeability in time and variability in space* – bearers of a given language, as members of communicative communities, can contribute, on the basis of social agreement or contacts between different languages or their different varieties, not only to the formation of new but also to mixed languages or their new functional and stylistic varieties as well as new expressions and utterances never heard before in a given language, etc.

Group IV encompasses: *specialization* stating that language has developed to perform various semantic and non-semantic functions; *contextuality* – the meanings of verbal means specify themselves in dependence of environments; *translocation* (displacement) – users of a given language may speak about things remote in time and space; *metadesignation* – a language may serve to speak about the language as an object of reality; *prevarication* – the extralingual reality of verbal signs can be both true and false, observed and inferred, as well as imagined and real, and the like; *pragmaticity* – linguistic utterances can be interpreted directly according to their locutionary meaning or indirectly as exerting an impact upon receivers due to their illocutionary force; *intentionality* – senders can deliberately manipulate with a sense of utterances; *transparency or opacity* – the meaning of expressions are either overt or covert when their receivers understand them immediately or interpret them only through paraphrases; *gestalticity* – verbal means possess a producer-oriented recognizable shape; *fossilization* (lexicalization) – verbal signs strive to become independent from their derivational meanings, motivation or etymology (see Wąsik 2014: 74–75).

Among the most relevant species-specific properties of animals and humans in communication, distinguished in the research on the semiotic universals of language, the following pair of oppositions might be distinguished: immutability vs. interchangeability of sender-receiver roles, innateness vs. experientiality in generational acquisition and transmission; naturalness of signaling means vs. conventionality of origin, constancy or variability and stability or change-

ability of language; boundedness vs. displacement facility in time and space; instinctiveness vs. intentionality; globality vs. continuity or segmentability and discreteness of patterning, etc.

5. Conclusions

To end with, it may be noticed that the ideas of transcendence, displacement, openness and metadesignation, as distinctive properties of humanity, are common for philosophers, psychologists, semioticians and linguists. What is important in the enumeration of differential characteristics of humans in comparison to animals are the convictions of philosophers pertaining, *inter alia*, to the awareness of being alive and taking stand to the existence in the surrounding and to existing for the surrounding, the endowments with the free will allowing to change and to shape the world of everyday life as well as to becoming in the world and becoming of the world as a result of organismic and interorganismic interrelationships.

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FOR A SOCIOSEMIOTICS: CENTRIFUGAL AND CENTRIPETAL FORCES

Anti Randviir
University of Tartu, Estonia
randviir@ut.ee

Abstract

The emergence of sociosemiotics in the second half of the 20th century was of a controversial nature. It came along in the process of specialisation in the social and humanitarian sciences, accompanied by the discovery of new research areas and objects, oftentimes of *ad hoc* essence. Due to relatively specific studies, the paradigm of sociosemiotics did not appear in clear theoretical structure, nor was it featured by fine boundaries. It was characteristic that understanding this vague area was even echoed in terminology – sometimes this new land was and is being called social semiotics, sometimes sociosemiotics. Yet there are some decisive and essential arguments for preferring the latter.

On the other hand, search for the roots of sociosemiotics takes us back to the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. There we can find movements in the study of man, culture and society that were driven by aspiration for a holistic paradigm. The pragmaticist context of the birth of modern semiotics set up a completely novel understanding how to study meaningful phenomena and was defined by the pragmatic dimension of semiotics. This understanding was shared by ground-breaking works that formed ground for the birth of several disciplines individual disciplines during later years. Yet the foundation of psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology, philology was the same essentially semiotic soil.

The introduction of sociosemiotics is an example of the logic of disciplinary evolution in the course of formation, separation, joining and re-formation of research areas characterised by terms as multi-, poly-, cross-, inter-, transdisciplinarity. In the context of sociosemiotics as a possibility to again join together the semiological and the semiotic trends, it seems important to understand the fundamental need to study man, culture, society and environment from a coher-

ent and holistic perspective. That, at the beginning of the 21st century, leads us back to certain fundamental scholarly principles the held a century ago.

1. Conversion or dispersion?

The emergence of sociosemiotics in the second half of the 20th century was of a controversial nature. It came along in the process of specialisation in the social and humanitarian sciences, accompanied by the discovery of new research areas and objects, oftentimes of *ad hoc* essence. Due to relatively specific studies, the paradigm of sociosemiotics did not appear in clear theoretical structure, nor was it featured by fine boundaries. It was characteristic that understanding this vague area was even echoed in terminology – sometimes this new land was and is being called social semiotics, sometimes sociosemiotics. Yet there are some decisive and essential arguments for preferring the latter. ‘Social semiotics’ has its historical roots in rather characteristic and circumstantial issues that pertain more to the level of the policy of scholarship than the latter itself. First, during decades following World War II, ‘social issues’ came to the front in at least two aspects. On the one hand, quests for handling societies and creating stabile and manageable social systems obtained a sharpened status. Another aspect was connected with these practical problems of handling social organisations – an overall inclination towards the so-called leftist ideologies (e.g. Marxism, ‘socialist’ tendencies that were switched into scholarship) as opposed to those that were associated with the social collapse of previous ‘world order’ that had led to the disastrous events of World War II.

‘Social semiotics’ seems to have appeared as a combination of these two major points. Here we can draw an illustrative example that is explanatory in several aspects. The study of subcultures – that oftentimes is associated with social semiotics – has been considered as a hijacking of the notion of culture, and turning it into a *device* for displacing the ‘social’ as a source of explanation (Jenks 2005: 133). Tremendous problems and consequences arise from here. Subcultures, taking up a logical trail, appear as life-styles or ways of life instead of referring to certain social groups that have to do with class division. For example, consider a thin pneumatic mucky Liverpool boy dressed in rugs playing with mates alike with him in a backyard of a grey apartment house. His situation might have been explained in social, societal and sociological terms: having been born into a specific primary group, he found himself in an inescapable vicious circle that pre-determined his further life-cycle. From the viewpoint of post-war culture studies (especially, for example the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies) that introduced the notion of subcultures as it is mostly comprehended today, that boy was to be treated a member of a subculture who had chosen his way of life according to his free will. That, of course, was in a suitable coherence with the concurrent governmental policy and practical actions (or inactions) concerning social matters. Furthermore, ‘subcultures’ became into a cliché to designate ‘reparable young white male youth’ (Jenks 2005: 135).

We can see immense and tragic consequences that follow from this example and how this example characterises the emergence and several trends in ‘social semiotics, if we put the previous sentence into other words. Namely: subcultures lost their status as a ‘blank object’ of study, and became into a conventional symbol or a symbolic notion agreed by default to stand for a more-or-less specific societal congregation that was based on voluntary membership and followed a common way of life. It is self-evident that the totality of societal issues and practical problems were much more demanding to map than to just hide them behind the notion of ‘culture’. The latter became a ‘spin-off-term’ stolen from traditional fields concerned with the study of culture (cultural anthropology, cultural psychology, semiotics, theory of culture), and was thrown out there to stand guard in front of societal issues that were simply covered by it. Alike tendencies can be seen also in connection with semiotics, and unfortunately in connection with ‘social se-

miotics' as an area formed of case studies based on similar backbones of spun (not to say hijacked or stolen) terms of semiotics. On the one hand we can witness how specific semiotic or semiological terms have been ruthlessly taken out of the context of semiotics in order to bring charm to, for example of gender, media, fashion, and so on. This is not to say those would not appear as analysable in semiotic terms, but sporadic application of semiotic terms has not benefitted the relevant application nor made semiotics more comprehensible for a wider range of researchers and readers. As a most frequent example, we can even name the 'signifier' and the 'signified' – terms seeming easily graspable and elegantly applicable. However, it has been exactly drawing them out of the semiotic context that has taken them to purely material and materialistic level. The latter has nearly nothing to do with the original Saussurean paradigm and suchlike misinterpretation (the signifier as the word 'tree' and the signified as the real object we can chop for firewood) has no explanatory value in the studies and fields they have been deported to. Rather, one of the few side-effects has been the gradual misinterpretation of semiotics and semiology in general, and associating them with the very concrete structuralist methodology.

From another angle, 'social semiotics' as studying, for example advertising, mass media or gender, points to a different misleading way of building up pseudo-disciplines and misinterpreting the so-to-speak parent disciplines. These are often created on the basis of case studies. This, in turn means that they frequently lack of systematic research methodology and rely on the insight of a concrete scholar and are thus determined rather to the status of ideological exclamations than scholarship proper. (A good example here concerns again the issue of subcultures as related to core cultures.)

2. Major premises of sociosemiotics

On the other hand, search for the roots of sociosemiotics takes us back to the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. There we can find movements in the study of man, culture and society that were driven by aspiration for a holistic paradigm. The pragmaticist context of the birth of modern semiotics set up a completely novel understanding how to study meaningful phenomena and was defined by the pragmatic dimension of semiotics. This understanding was shared by ground-breaking works that formed ground for the birth of several disciplines individual disciplines during later years. Yet the foundation of psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology, philology was the same essentially semiotic soil.

The introduction of sociosemiotics is an example of the logic of disciplinary evolution in the course of formation, separation, joining and re-formation of research areas characterised by terms as multi-, poly-, cross-, inter-, transdisciplinarity. In the context of sociosemiotics as a possibility to again join together the semiological and the semiotic trends, it seems important to understand the fundamental need to study man, culture, society and environment from a coherent and holistic perspective. That, at the beginning of the 21st century, leads us back to certain fundamental scholarly principles the held a century ago and can be seen as major (not all premises of contemporary sociosemiotics as well:

Linguistics	Ethnoscience
<p>Premise 1: Language is a conceptual code underlying speech behaviour. Corollary: The primary goal of linguistic description is a grammar – a structural description of the linguistic code.</p>	<p>Premise 1: Culture is a conceptual code underlying social behaviour. Corollary: The primary goal of ethnographic description is a “cultural grammar” – a structural description of the cultural code.</p>
<p>Premise 2: Each language must be studied as a unique structural universe. Corollary A: A language must be described in terms of its own distinctive elements and principles of order (within the framework of the linguist's metalanguage and his theory of linguistic structure). Corollary B: Linguistic codes and the grammars that describe them are by their nature not amenable to structural comparison.</p>	<p>Premise 2: Each culture must be studied as a unique structural universe. Corollary A: A culture must be described in “emic” terms; that is, in terms of its own distinctive elements and principles of order. Corollary B: Cultural codes and cultural grammars are by their nature not amenable to structural comparison.</p>
<p>Premise 3: The structure of a language can be discovered by applying systematic and explicit procedures to a corpus of evidence. Corollary A: The evidence supporting a grammatical description is a potentially public, finite corpus of data to which an explicit set of analytical procedures has been applied. Corollary B: A grammar is thus testable (to see if it accounts for the data) and amenable to alternative analyses.</p>	<p>Premise 3: The structure of a cultural code can (or must) be discovered by applying systematic and explicit inductive procedures to a corpus of evidence. Corollary A: The evidence supporting an ethnographic description is a potentially public, finite corpus of data to which an explicit set of analytical procedures has been applied. Corollary B: An ethnography is thus testable (to see if it accounts for the data) and amenable to alternative analyses.</p>
<p>Premise 4: Since the linguistic code is mainly unconscious, the data for grammatical analysis must consist of speech behaviour, not informants' statements about the code.</p>	<p>Premise 4: Form 1: The primary data of ethnographic analysis consist of informants' statements about the code and records of their speech behaviour. Form 2: All available data, including behavioural records, the ethnographer's intuitions/and speech behaviour, provide evidence from which an underlying cultural code can be inferred, and against which descriptions can be tested.</p>

Table 1: R. Keesing's comparison of linguistics and ethnoscience (Keesing 1972: 301).

From this very open outline of the study of culture and social behaviour, at least two kinds of

observations follow. On the one hand, as said, the study of sociocultural systems must engage the pragmatic dimension. Here lies an advantage of cultural anthropology as compared with cultural semiotics that inclined, or at least is accused in inclination towards structuralism. The pragmatic dimension of social and cultural phenomena means that suchlike studies by their nature belong to social sciences proper: next to the researcher and the object of study, there must always be involved a third party in the face of the informant or the user of meaningful phenomena analysed. It does not mean that the informant must necessarily be embodied in a physical human shape – the party providing the researcher with the possibility of ‘reality check’ can also be formed by a textual body as a corpus of evidence. On the other hand, if we view cultures as semiotic systems, then they coincide with sociocultural systems that have been defined by R.M. Keesing as systems that “[...] represent the social realizations or enactments of ideational designs-for-living in particular environments” (Keesing 1974: 82). This exactly the standpoint of contemporary sociosemiotics: we cannot and must not approach isolated semiotic phenomena in their artificially isolated environments, but have to keep always in mind the complex ‘man-culture-society-environment’.

Perhaps at this point we should recall that alongside with the emergence of the society and the ‘Self’ as its unit, in parallel there came into being contemporary macrosemiotic research units called ‘cultural codes’ by Keesing that seem by now halted at the notion of the semiosphere. Interestingly, Keesing’s ideas about the study of culture coincide not only with the pragmaticist ideas of dimensions of semiotic study, but also with the Saussurean semiological principles that led Saussure to the formulation of semiology as a part of social or general psychology. Talking about the centripetal forces that have led to contemporary sociosemiotics, we should probably remind that alongside with the pragmaticist and the semiological manifests, at approximately the same time, there emerged similar proposals by Vilfredo Pareto (1935) who designed much of contemporary societal studies under the title of sociology or general sociology with very similar principles as Saussure’s semiology and Peirce’s logic or semiotics. The same tendencies could be detected in cultural psychology and anthropology. These views share understanding of human environments as (semiotically) constructed or at least as mediated by signs and available through signs. Simultaneously have these views taken us to conceptions of the research object of social sciences and humanities as a whole. In different studies there have been applied various expressions for signifying the holistic network of suchlike research objects that condition each other and are mutually connected. Yet their contents and methodological logic for the analysis of man, culture, society and environment is alike, if not practically the same. We can recall, for example, of the following: ‘social world’ (Schutz 1967), ‘social system’ (Parsons 1952), ‘culture’ (Kluckhohn 1961), ‘*Lebenswelt*’ (Garfinkel 1967), ‘mundane reason’ (Pollner 1987), ‘semiotic reality’ (Merrell 1992), or even ‘semiotic Self’ (Wiley 1994) or ‘signifying order’ (Danesi 1998).

While oftentimes, and surprisingly in the context of semiotics itself, these notions lack concrete instructions for concrete communities, Keesing represents culturo-anthropological view offering quite clear understanding and suggests, as numerous other scholars of culture and society, that at the study of meaning-based communities, we must concentrate at issues pertaining both to perception, cognition and articulation. Alike research programs have been put forth by several authors and disciplines, beginning from grounds for contemporary sociocultural analysis as represented in the hypothesis of linguistic relativity or in principles of ethnomethodology; in semiotics perhaps most straight-forwardly in the seven major strategic points of the signifying order (Danesi and Perron 1999). These points also fit together with another major source for the formation and formulation of sociosemiotics: the systems theory which reached, in the semiotic context, its high tide in the face of J.Ruesch’s *Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations* – probably the most holistic and monolithic contribution not only to semiotics and psychology,

but for all social sciences and humanities published already in the 1970s (Ruesch 1972).

Whereas social semiotics in its centrifugal influences could be associated with the analysis of quite concrete types of objects (gender, media, etc.), then the actual holistic nature of the study of culture and society shows that in the course of socialisation, all societal structures become functional on the metalevel. Ideological tendencies that cast light at specific developments or phenomena in culture and society (feminism, the emergence of 'new species' as transvestites, accentuating or underemphasizing differences between races, social groups, gender roles) may, and in fact have, led to insularised and isolated areas of research. The sociosemiotic understanding of the analysis of culture and society calls for – and reminds of – the need for holistic and complex study perspective that would aim at transdisciplinarity.

Cooperation between people forming a society can be described through institutions mediating their interaction, and by the more-or-less commonly consented goals of teamwork. The aims of societal interaction influence the structure of institutions and their mutual relationships. It is important that besides treating societal organisations as institutions, we should have an alike attitude towards sociocultural sign systems. Suchlike a view would probably also help to understand how social situations conjoin social groups diachronically too, and to see how the semiotisation of the world is arranged via diverse communities of competence (linguistic, communicative, cultural, semiotic competence). From these considerations we comprehend the centripetal forces that are at work at the formation of a transdisciplinary paradigm centred at sociosemiotics as aiming to study sociocultural systems as complexes formed of man, culture, society and environment.

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REVELIO! A (SOCIO-)SEMIOTIC READING OF THE HARRY POTTER SAGA

Gloria Withalm
University of Applied Arts Vienna, Austria
gloria.withalm@uni-ak.ac.at

Abstract

Though it's already seventeen years that Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone appeared, the first novel of the Harry Potter saga concluded by Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows in 2007, the craze about the Boy Wizard has a bit decreased but is by far not over: in 2012 the Leavesden Studio near London (where all eight movies were made) opened as the Warner Bros. Studio Tour London and J.K. Rowling started her interactive website Pottermore; since 2010 fans can visit Hogsmeade and Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry at the Orlando, FL theme park Wizarding World of Harry Potter which has just got a second part depicting Diagon Alley; and in 2016 the first part of a new trilogy dealing with the author of *Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them* will hit the movie theaters all over the world.

It is already seventeen years that *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone* (Rowling 1997) appeared: the first novel of the Harry Potter saga concluded with *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows* in 2007.¹ The craze about the Boy Wizard has decreased slightly, but is by far from over. Books appear in new editions; all the films are constantly aired on television; ever new DVD and Blu-ray boxes appear on the market; and there are various activities connected to Harry Potter (from conferences to websites) – enough to keep older fans on track and attract ever new fan generations.

¹ A brief summary of the saga: Surrey, England in the early 1990s. An eleven-year-old orphaned boy, raised by his maternal aunt and her husband, is told that he is a wizard and will receive his education at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, somewhere up north in Scotland. Already in his first year he is confronted by Voldemort, the wizard who has murdered Harry's parents, but failed to kill the little boy. Over the next years the boy and his friends, in particular Ron and Hermione, continue to fight the Dark Lord, until, at the end of the seventh and last book, Harry is finally victorious and during a duel Voldemort dies of his own Killing Curse.

Reading the books, watching the movies and buying collectibles is definitely not confined to young adults, the original primary target group, nor is all that done just for fun, as the long list of books and articles analyzing the texts and the phenomenon demonstrates. Authors – and even a few scientists are among them – come from the entire spectrum of the humanities. However, there are so far not too many semiotically oriented papers.

In this essay, I will attempt to read the texts from three different canons (the novels, subsequent writings by J.K. Rowling in print and online, and the movies), from a socio-semiotic perspective inspired by the work of Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. I will focus on the character of magical performance which can be examined in view of his concepts of materiality, signs and bodies. Unfortunately, other questions touching a more comprehensive (socio-)semiotic analysis can only be briefly mentioned; the same goes for topics obviously related to specific sign systems like runes and divination as well as the strong intertextual and intratextual relations presented in the saga.

1. From one *Philosopher's Stone* to three *Deathly Hallows*: a brief introduction to the Harry Potter universe, the “Potterverse”

There are the seven books (*Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone*, ...*Chamber of Secrets*, ...*Prisoner of Azkaban*, ...*Goblet of Fire*, ...*Order of the Phoenix*, ...*Half-Blood Prince*, ...*Deathly Hallows*; Rowling 2004a–e, 2006, 2008a) published in ever new editions both in the UK and in the US, not to mention the translations appearing in more than 70 languages plus the three smaller books (*Quidditch Through the Ages*, *Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them* and *The Tales of Beedle the Bard*; Rowling 2001a, 2001b, 2008c) and a sort of prequel of approximately 800 words (Rowling 2008b). There are eight movies (Columbus 2001, 2002, Cuarón 2004, Newell 2005, Yates 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011); and rumor has it that in 2016 the first installment of a new trilogy will be released focusing on the *Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Them* and its “author” Newt Scamander. In 2012 Rowling launched the *Pottermore* website with a chapter by chapter presentation of the books and tons of additional background texts (as of December 2014, the last three chapters of book five plus books six and seven are not yet online).

Since 2010 fans can visit (a reconstruction of the film architecture of) Hogsmeade and the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry at the Florida theme park The Wizarding World of Harry Potter. It has recently opened a Diagon Alley part (Diagon Alley is a famous street in the Harry Potter stories). In July 2014 another theme park opened as part of the Universal Studios Japan in Osaka; a third one in Los Angeles is under construction. The Leavesden Studios near London (where all eight movies were made) opened their sets in 2012 for the Warner Bros. Studio Tour London, and since 2009 a Harry Potter exhibition is touring the world. Last but not least, there is the massive merchandising, both in shops and online, offering e.g. replicas of wands, scarfs in the colors of the four houses, bookmarks, etc. Since December 2012 even in King's Cross Station there is a Platform 9¾, the train platform where Harry and his cohorts leave from for Hogwarts.

2. A first closer look on the saga from a semiotic view point

There aren't too many semiotic papers in the strictest sense on the series², but a lot has been written in closely related or overlapping areas. First and foremost, there are a number of analyses on the narrative structure. John Granger, perhaps the most important Harry Potter pundit, has published a discussion of the ring composition in each individual book and with regard to the

² In the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, a panel dealt with the topic “Factual Fiction: A Structural Analysis of *Harry Potter*”. The four papers presented appeared also in the proceedings: Ellis 2012, Estep 2012, St. Dennis 2012, Williamson 2012.

whole series (2010).

Another aspect of the books that has been widely discussed is the overall intertextuality, both in the narrower sense of alluding to other literary texts, and in the broader sense of references to history, culture, and, above all, mythology. J.K. Rowling revived the genre of the English boarding school novel – to name just the most prominent example: *Tom Brown's School Days* (Hughes 1857; cf. Granger 2009 ch.3) – and fused it with other genres. On the level of particular writers, scholars have found parallels to both C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien. When it comes to cultural and historical references, we may look at actual persons, like Nicolas Flamel, the French medieval alchemist, whom Rowling remodeled to be part of her universe. And there are all the mythical creatures, from basilisks or centaurs to unicorns and werewolves.

Moreover, we find also intratextual relations, like the two stones that figure prominently in the series: the Philosopher's Stone in the first novel, used to create an Elixir of Life (which “will make the drinker immortal”, Rowling 2004a: 149), and the Resurrection Stone introduced in the final book (Rowling 2008a), which can bring back a shadowy version of dead persons. There are many more examples that can easily be recognized. One of them may even count as part of the above mentioned chiasmic structure. When Harry, Ron and Hermione try to secure the *Philosopher's Stone* towards the end of the first book, they are suddenly entangled by a magic plant that almost chokes them:

‘Devil's Snare, Devil's Snare ... What did Professor Sprout say? It likes the dark and the damp –’
 ‘So light a fire!’ Harry choked.
 ‘Yes – of course – but there's no wood!’ Hermione cried, wringing her hands.
 ‘HAVE YOU GONE MAD?’ Ron bellowed. ‘ARE YOU A WITCH OR NOT?’
 ‘Oh, right!’ said Hermione, and she whipped out her wand, waved it, muttered something and sent a jet of the same bluebell flames she had used on Snape at the plant [...]
 ‘Yeah,’ said Ron, [...] – “there's no wood”, *honestly*.’
 (Rowling 2004a: 299)

Close to the end of the *Deathly Hallows* book, the trio is again harassed by a plant, this time the Whomping Willow that guards the secret entrance to the Shrieking Shack: one has to push a knot on the trunk to immobilize it, as Hermione's cat Crookshanks did in the *Prisoner of Azkaban* (Rowlings 2004c: 362). This time Ron doesn't know what to do:

Panting and gasping Harry slowed down, [...] peering through the darkness towards its thick trunk, trying to see the single knot in the bark of the old tree that would paralyse it. Ron and Hermione caught up, Hermione so out of breath she could not speak.
 ‘How – how're we going to get in?’ panted Ron. ‘I can – see the place – if we just had – Crookshanks again –’
 ‘Crookshanks?’ wheezed Hermione, bent double, clutching her chest. ‘*Are you a wizard, or what?*’
 ‘Oh – right – yeah –’
 Ron looked around, then directed his wand at a twig on the ground and said, ‘*Wingardium Leviosa!*’ The twig flew up from the ground, [...]. It jabbed at a place near the roots and at once, the writhing tree became still.
 (Rowling 2008a: 713–714)

Socio-semiotic aspects of the saga focus, of course, on the societal make-up of the wizarding world and the political situation there. In this context, a lot has been said on the stratification of the society, including the position of non-human magical beings like the house-elves, or on the increasing rigor ending in the final installment in a fascist system.

Another topic would be the organization of the school community and the rituals that structure the year at Hogwarts. One of them is the start-of-term banquet with delicious food, preceded by allocating the first-year students to one of the four houses (Gryffindor, Hufflepuff, Ravenclaw, and Slytherin). However, contrary to an ordinary school, in Hogwarts this task is carried out by the Sorting Hat who reads the mind and personality of the child with regard to the characteristics related to the four houses. Among the other festivities in Hogwarts (and in wizarding families in general) we find Halloween, and Christmas at Hogwarts is celebrated with those students that stay in the castle over the holidays. In both cases, all well known elements and decorations are present, except maybe that the wizard crackers, i.e. the magic version of Christmas crackers, sometimes contain “a rear-admiral’s hat and several live, white mice” (Rowling 2004a: 220).

The skill of mind reading is not confined to the Sorting Hat: among wizards the respective technique is called *Legilimancy*. However, there are still more decoding processes present in the series. At least three practices described in the novels are akin to *interpretive reading*: one is divination in its various forms, from stargazing, as done by the centaurs, to the methods Professor Trelawney is teaching: palmistry; and seeing the future in tea leaves or by looking into a crystal ball. Hermione, who considers divination to be “very woolly” (Rowling 2004c: 122), likes other courses better: *Arithmancy*, a form of divination based on numbers, and translating texts written in ancient runes.

3. Magical (sign) processes

“*Revelio*” – the first word in the title of this essay refers to a spell, one of the major magic processes we encounter in the written and filmic texts. Casting spells is a typical topos in stories about witchcraft. However, spells in the Harry Potter saga have specific features that can be discussed in terms of the semiotic theory developed by the Italian semiotician and philosopher Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. The way Rowling meticulously describes the procedures and the effects presupposes that magic processes in general and spells in particular have always had both semiotic and material qualities simultaneously.

In the middle of the first chapter of the *Philosopher’s Stone* (“The Boy Who Lived”), we are confronted for the first time with magic when Dumbledore arrives at Privet Drive in Little Whinging, Surrey. Already since early morning a strange cat is sitting on a wall:

For some reason, the sight of the cat seemed to amuse him [Dumbledore]. He chuckled and muttered, ‘I should have known.’

He had found what he was looking for in his inside pocket. It seemed to be a silver cigarette lighter. He flicked it open, held it up in the air and clicked it. The nearest street lamp went out with a little pop. He clicked it again – the next lamp flickered into darkness. (Rowling 2004a: 15)

In the film version of the scene, the lights are actually whooshing from the lamps into the device. But there is even more in this scene, though we are allowed a closer look at the very process only later on. Dumbledore

set off down the street towards number four, where he sat down on the wall next to the cat. He didn't look at it, but after a moment he spoke to it.

'Fancy seeing you here, Professor McGonagall.'

He turned to smile at the tabby, but it had gone. Instead he was smiling at a rather severe-looking woman who was wearing square glasses exactly the shape of the markings the cat had had around its eyes. (Rowling 2004a: 16)

Explanation: Minerva McGonagall is an *Animagus*: she can change into an animal at will. In the movie *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone* (Columbus 2001), we can watch how she does it. When Ron and Harry are late for their very first Transfiguration class, the desk is empty except for a cat. Satisfied that they escaped a reprimand, Ron panted, "Whew! We made it! Can you imagine the look on McGonagall's face if we were late?" A split second later he realized how wrong he was: with an elegant leap the cat turned instantly into Professor McGonagall.³

4. Rossi-Landi on "Signs and Bodies"

These last two examples showed two different magic processes which both involved very material effects. Let us now consult Rossi-Landi's semiotic theories. Forty years ago, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi wrote a paper titled "Signs and Bodies", which he presented at the first Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies in Milan in June 1974. Later on the text appeared in the proceedings, edited by Chatman, Eco and Klinkenberg (Rossi-Landi 1979; 1992b).

In this relatively short text he proceeds from five propositions concerning the relation between signs and bodies, and since the paper is not widely known, I will present some central quotes:

A, All signs are bodies;

B, Not all bodies are signs;

C, All bodies can be signs.

And

D, Signs are not bodies;

E, All bodies are signs. (Rossi-Landi 1992b: 271)

Rossi-Landi formulates his main working hypothesis as such: whereas D and E belong to idealistic semiotics, the propositions A to C form "the basic model of materialistic semiotics" (Rossi-Landi 1992b: 272). He continues by further discussing the intricate relation:

According to this hypothesis, materialistic semiotics starts with bodies, and by realizing that bodies can be *or not be* signs, comes to consider signs as a subclass of bodies-in-general (Rossi-Landi 1992b: 272).

Rossi-Landi also makes a remark here that is of importance for our understanding of particular sign and material operations:

³ In the novel, McGonagall demonstrates transfiguration by changing "her desk into a pig and back again." (Rowling 2004a: 147)

As speakers of at least one natural language, we all distinguish between “signs” and “bodies” to some extent. [...] All we need to add at this stage is that ‘bodies’ in the widest sense must refer to *all conditions of matter, including energy*, and that ‘signs’ stands for semiosis in general. (Rossi-Landi 1992b: 272; my emphasis)

Later in the text Rossi-Landi argues against “Semiotical Panlogism”:

Bodies, and not signs only, are the world’s furniture. Bodies are to be met both outside of signs and within signs themselves. Interpreters are bodies with needs, desires, illnesses, etc., and not only bodies capable of using signs. [...] If you kill a man, you kill a man, and not only an interpreter. Social life, while being entirely covered by sign systems up to the point that without signs it wouldn’t be social and, possibly, it wouldn’t even be life, consists also of something else. (Rossi-Landi 1992b: 275)

Rossi-Landi concludes by asking for several lines of investigation that he actually carried out himself over the next decade, starting with his “Theory of Sign Residues” in which he further elaborates the specific materiality involved in semiosis.⁴ Without conducting an in-depth discussion of his semiotic models, I’d nevertheless like to mention at least one aspect that is related to the matter–sign relation. The most comprehensive concept in Rossi-Landian socio-semiotics is *Social Reproduction* – “the sum total of all processes by means of which a community or society survives, grows bigger, or, at least, continues to exist.” (Rossi-Landi 1985: 175)

Viewed in their totality, there are several different processes that act within social reproduction. The basic one, summarized in the *Schema of Social Reproduction* (Rossi-Landi 1975: 65; 1985: 38), is the cycle of *production – exchange – consumption*, composed of “three indissolubly correlated moments” which social reproduction “always comprehends in a constitutive way” (Rossi-Landi 1975: 65). The moment of exchange, conceived in a twofold way, is at the very center of the schema. It is *simultaneously* both external material exchange, and sign exchange, which is in itself the reduplication of the entire cycle and comprehends again “three indissolubly correlated moments”: sign production, sign exchange and sign consumption.

1. External material **production** which, although *it uses signs*, produces not signs but bodies.


2. EXCHANGE, which is always, at the same time and constitutively,

{	external material EXCHANGE, that is, the process of exchanging not signs but bodies;						
{	sign EXCHANGE, that is, communication, including as such within it: <table style="border: none; margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="padding-left: 10px;">sign production,</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 10px;">sign EXCHANGE in the strict sense, and</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="font-size: 3em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="padding-left: 10px;">sign consumption.</td> </tr> </table>	{	sign production ,	}	sign EXCHANGE in the strict sense, and	}	sign consumption.
{	sign production ,						
}	sign EXCHANGE in the strict sense, and						
}	sign consumption.						

3. External material **consumption**, which, even when *it uses signs*, consumes not signs but bodies.

⁴ In his last lecture in Bari in April 1985, Rossi-Landi came back once more to the topic of signs and their residues (Rossi-Landi 1988).

When switching from the verbalized schema (which already includes a spatial presentation of the internal relations) to a diagrammatic form, the most adequate configuration seems to be the triad. Proceeding from the basic triad P–E–C, the two different moments of exchange can be visualized by reduplicating the triad of sign production, sign exchange and sign consumption within the major point of exchange.



5. The semiotics of spells and other magic practices

Analyzing magical processes as described and depicted in the Harry Potter saga in the light of these concepts reveals them to be excellent examples of the sign-body duality. Magical sign processes are *always simultaneously and in a constitutive way* material and sign processes. The semiotic elements and the material elements are indissolubly correlated.

Sign production in the process of magic is always and at the same time the production of something material in the strict sense, hence the semiotics of Rossi-Landi is the appropriate background theory. Magical processes are part and parcel of the Potterverse. Though, according to Rowling, the ability to do magic is innate; it is not confined to wizard/witch families and can occur also in “Muggle-born” children (i.e. of non-magical parents).

Since spells are definitely the central magic procedures, my examples come from this domain. In general, a spell consists of an *incantation* (vocalized or non-verbal, that is, only mentally represented) mostly together with a specific *movement* of the *wand*; the *intent* to cast the spell;⁵ and the *effect/result*. (Maybe it’s too far-fetched, but this triadic structure of spells seems to be akin to certain models of signs or semioses.) Based on the books, we find several classifications of spells, like transfiguration, charm, jinx, hex or curse (cf. <http://harrypotter.wikia.com/wiki/Spell>). For our purpose I propose another simplified way of arranging spells, or acts of magic in general, into two major categories, differentiating between:

- (i) the materiality of the magic process; and
- (ii) the materiality of the result.

The first category comprises both the corporeal quality of the process itself, and whatever emanates from the wand when a spell is cast. The second category touches the actual changes of the target of the act of magic. Beginning with the second category, we have already witnessed, in Ron Weasley’s words (Columbus 2001) one “bloody brilliant” act of magic, the auto-transfiguration of an Animagus. Transfiguration is one of the major subjects taught at Hogwarts, at

⁵ After Bellatrix has killed his godfather Sirius Black in the *Order of the Phoenix*, Harry tries to cast a *Cruciatus* curse on Bellatrix that fails to produce the proper effect. She claims to know why: “You need to *mean* them, Potter! You need to really want to cause pain – to enjoy it” (Rowling 2004e: 891).

one point in the *Chamber of Secrets* movie we are allowed a closer look at the spell and wand movement involved when Professor McGonagall demonstrates how an animal is turned into a water goblet (Columbus 2002).⁶

Even if they are not capable of changing into an animal, wizards and witches can disguise themselves as objects, as is the case with Horace Slughorn early in the *Half-Blood Prince* where he appears to be an armchair. Yet he can't fool Dumbledore:

And without warning, Dumbledore swooped, plunging the tip of his wand into the seat of the overstuffed armchair, which yelled, 'Ouch!' 'Good evening, Horace,' said Dumbledore, straightening up again. Harry's jaw dropped. Where a split second before there had been an armchair, there now crouched an enormously fat, bald old man who was massaging his lower belly and squinting up at Dumbledore with an aggrieved and watery eye. 'There was no need to stick the wand in that hard,' he said gruffly, clambering to his feet. 'It hurt.' (Rowling 2006: 81)

In the wizarding world even memories appear in material form as silvery-white gossamer-like threads. Just like files from a hard disk, they can be extracted from the brain, stored away in vials, and later on, be poured into the Pensieve and revisited:

Then, very slowly, Slughorn put his hand in his pocket and pulled out his wand. He put his other hand inside his cloak and took out a small, empty bottle. Still looking into Harry's eyes, Slughorn touched the tip of his wand to his temple and withdrew it, so that a long, silver thread of memory came away too, clinging to the wand-tip. Longer and longer the memory stretched until it broke and swung, silvery bright, from the wand. Slughorn lowered it into the bottle where it coiled, then spread, swirling like gas. He corked the bottle with a trembling hand and then passed it across the table to Harry. (Rowling 2006: 580)

Now to the first category. The books are full of vivid descriptions of the corporeal aspect of spells. You "aim" and "shoot" a spell at somebody; if you do not "dodge" or "leap aside" to avoid the spell, it will "hit" you – and you will experience or even suffer the result: from a mere tickle (*Rictusempra*) to confusion (*Confundo*); losing the own wand (*Expelliarmus*); being unable to move (*Impedimenta* or *Petrificus Totalus*); being stunned and unconscious (*Stupefy*); feeling unbearable pain (the *Cruciatus* curse); or in the worst case: dying (*Avada Kedavra*).

The spell can also result in more or less massive (temporary or permanent) visible and tangible changes of the body or the targeted object: objects can be raised into the air (*Wingardium Leviosa*); caused to explode in flames (*Confringo*); made bigger (*Engorgio*) or smaller (*Reductio*); or made to vanish completely (*Evanescio*). Among the spells causing body alterations we find: *Furnunculus* (to produce boils and pimples); *Episkey* (to heal minor injuries like a broken toe or nose); a vomiting slugs hex; a stinging hex which swells the face beyond recognition; and the *Sectumsempra* curse that slashes a person, resulting in deep, mostly incurable wounds (only

⁶ In the book, the children have to turn a beetle into a button. (Rowling 2004b: 105)

Snape knows an incantation to heal them; cf. Rowling 2006: 618). However, since the casted spell itself has a corporeal quality, you can “block”, “repel” or “deflect” a spell. It can “rebound” on a wall and “bounce back” or hit an object and smash it.

The tip is the most important part of the wand, as many different objects can emerge from or shoot out of it: *Lumos* lights the tip of the wand; *Aguamenti* produces a jet of water (Rowling 2004d: 394; 2006: 714); when two persons make an *Unbreakable Vow*, a “thin tongue of brilliant flame” shoots from the wand of the person casting the spell, “making a fine, glowing chain” around the hands of those engaged in the vow (Rowling 2006: 49). The wand can also be used for decoration purposes: “Hermione made purple and gold streamers erupt from the end of her wand and drape themselves artistically over the trees and bushes” (Rowling 2008a: 133); when the incantation *Orchideous* is spoken, a “bunch of flowers burst from the wand tip” (Rowling 2004d: 338); and both in the last book and in the movie, Hermione conjures a wreath of Christmas roses when they visit the grave of Harry’s parents (Rowling 2008a: 365).⁷ The tip of the wand can be used in a less amiable way, as with the *Incarcerous* spell: ropes fly out of the wand and tie up the targeted person (e.g. Rowling 2004e: 826; 2008a: 187).

In one particular case, something extremely powerful erupts from the tip: the Patronus of the witch or wizard who casts the spell. Everyone has his or her own unique Patronus, a silvery shining guardian-being who shields a person against Dementors. Harry learns how to produce a Patronus in his private lessons with Remus Lupin in the *Prisoner of Azkaban*, and later on he teaches his friends in the *Order of the Phoenix*. The most common effect, however, is a flash or jet of light shooting from the wand. When in the first book, Harry finally finds his own, personal wand, “a stream of red and gold sparks shot from the end like a firework” (Rowling 2004a: 96). The light jets come in different colors for different spells: silver (*Rictusempra*), red (*Expelliarmus* or *Stupefy*), or, when the Killing Curse is performed, green.

Having a corporeal quality themselves, spells can collide in mid-air, which happens several times throughout the series. The most spectacular collision of light jets, however, appears in the final battle between Voldemort and Harry when they both cast their respective spells:

‘*Avada Kedavra!*’

‘*Expelliarmus!*’

The bang was like a cannon-blast and the golden flames that erupted between them, at the dead centre of the circle they had been treading, marked the point where the spells collided. Harry saw Voldemort’s green jet meet his own spell, saw the Elder Wand fly high [...]. And Harry, with the unerring skill of the Seeker, caught the wand in his free hand as Voldemort fell backwards, arms splayed, the slit pupils of the scarlet eyes rolling upwards. Tom Riddle hit the floor with a mundane finality, his body feeble and shrunken, the white hands empty, the snake-like face vacant and unknowing. Voldemort was dead, killed by his own rebounding curse, and Harry stood with two wands in his hand, staring down at his enemy’s shell. (Rowling 2008a: 814–815)

6. Semio-magic epilogue

Those who know Rossi-Landian semiotics may consider it odd to refer to a materialist sign theory to talk about a children’s book dealing with the wizarding world. However, for the pur-

⁷ However, when it comes to conjuring, the items a witch or a wizard can produce are somehow limited by *Gamp’s Law of Elemental Transfiguration* which contains five *Principal Exceptions*, such as food (Rowling 2008a: 325) and, as is evident by the existence of the vaults at Gringott’s (the bank in the wizarding world), money.

pose of recalling Rossi-Landi's discussion of the interrelation between signs and bodies, I hope that choosing such well-known and loved literature to analyze has helped to raise awareness of a topic vital to semiotics. The material aspects of sign processes are often neglected, but have to be taken into account, in order to avoid the idealistic trap. Why not do so with the help of literary examples? After all – to end with one of the last sentences spoken by the great wizard Dumbledore in the film *Harry Potter and Deathly Hallows Part 2* (Yates 2011) – “Words are, in my not so humble opinion, our most inexhaustible source of magic.”

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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND IDEOLOGY IN ANIMATION FILMS

Maria Katsaridou
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
mkatsaridou@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper is part of a research on social semiotics and ideology in animation films, which is grounded on the theories of Saussure and Greimas and Courtés. Animation, apart from being a complex semiotic system per se, also hosts under the term “animation film” many different forms of animation, such as cel animation, stop motion animation, computer generated animation, and others. These forms are related to different methods of production, technology, techniques, geographic allotment of production and socio-economic conditions. The aim of this paper is to evince through examples from animation films that even though the meaning is produced within the semiotic system of the animation film, it is related and connected to production, material culture and thus society.

1. Introduction

This essay is part of a research in animation films which is grounded on the theories of Greimas and Saussure. There are many different forms of animation and they are related to different methods of production, technology, techniques, geographic allotment of production and socio-economic conditions. The research covers the period from 1995 to 2009 which is a period of continuous change in the animation industry and in film production methods in general. These changes are affecting the semiotic system of animation films. The aim of this essay is to show through examples from animation films that the production of meaning is linked to social conditions and material production methods since “The semiotic systems are produced by the exo-semiotic process of material production” (Lagopoulos 1986: 236) and thus, in order to study the production of meaning and ideology in animation films there is a need for connecting the semiotic system with its material production and society.

2. From animation production to the production of meaning

Whether cinema was invented in 1889 by Charles-Émile Reynaud and his Theatre Optique or in 1895 by the Lumière brothers, cinema from its early years was identified with live action films while animation films were associated with the visual effects of Georges Méliès. This dichotomy resulted in the devaluation of animation as a cinematic form and was grounded in the demand for “realism” and the misconception that live action films “depict reality” while animation films are “products of the imagination” and thus, “not real”. The false belief that the cinematic sign has a referent in the natural world led to the assumption that animation is not cinema but something “other”. In our days due to the rapid and continuous technological progress, the change in production methods and the massive use of animation and visual effects in live action film production that led to the consequent merging of the cinematic forms, we have realized more profoundly that all cinema is constructed, mediated and manipulated and so it is difficult to claim that any cinematic sign has a natural referent outside the semiotic system. The above is consistent with Saussure’s principle of arbitrariness in which is clearly stated that in every sign the connection between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary and the sign has no referent outside the semiotic system.

Many media and animation theorists like Lev Manovich (2001), Alan Cholodenko (1991, 2008), and Alexander Alexeief (1994) support the position that there is no difference between animation and live action films and that “film per se is a form of animation”. (Cholodenko 1991: 22–23, 2008: 10) or as Alexeief expresses it: “Anyhow, it is legitimate to consider cinema as a particular kind of animation, a sort of cheap, industrial substitute...” (Alexeief 1994: xix). While this is a very strong argument when we examine animation practice per se and we are addressing the question “what is animation?”, I argue that in the course of the history of cinema, animation and live action films have evolved into two different forms of cinema due to historical and social structures that led to the production of their distinctively different *langues*. According to Saussure, *langue* is a sign system in which the value of every sign is defined by its difference with the other signs of the system. It is a system of pure values “determined by nothing else apart from the temporary state of its constituent elements” (Saussure 1986: 80) and thus, it is not determined by any relations to objects. In his famous metaphor of language with a chessboard, he notes: “... a state of the board corresponds exactly to a state of the language. The value of the chess pieces depends on their position upon the chess board, just as in the language each term has its value through its contrast with all the other terms” (Saussure 1986: 88). For Saussure is central that all sciences should pay greater attention to the fact that their objects belong to two different axes, the axis of simultaneity (*axe des simultanités*), which refers to the relations between things that coexist and are independent of time, and the axis of successive (*axe des successivités*), which refers to the individual (as opposed to holistic) changes of all these things over time. These two axes define the first two of the four fields of linguistics that are following: (a) For Saussure the first and most important is the field of synchronic linguistics (*linguistique synchronique*), which studies the axis of simultaneity, that is the structure of language (the *langue*), as social system, and this at a static, simultaneous state. (b) The second is the diachronic linguistics (*linguistique diachronique*), which studies the axis of successiveness, that is successive forms of elements of *langue*. (c) The third is the linguistics of speech (of *parole*), namely the use of *langue*, and it is of secondary importance compared with the first type of linguistics. (d) The three previous linguistics is for Saussure “internal”, in so far as they are related to the language per se. He adds to these external linguistics (*linguistique externe*), which is a social linguistics, because is linking language with its outside socio-historical environment.

It is clear from the above that Saussure does not connect langue with the *exosemiotic*¹, which in our case is the material production of the animation films and that he relates langue and parole to two different branches of linguistics and he defines langue as the field of study of linguistics.

Many Marxists have criticized Saussure's separation of langue and parole: for example Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) criticizes Saussure's splitting of langue and parole as separating individuals and society where it matters most, at the point of their production. Eventually, theorists from the French semiotic tradition have shown that a semiotic analysis of parole is possible. Algirdas Julien Greimas (1966) developed thoroughly a narratological method of analysis that allows the analysis of *parole*. More recently, Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos and Karin Boklund-Lagopoulou (1992) have provided us with a methodology that links the analysis of meaning with the social sciences and makes the *social semiotic* analysis of parole possible.

To return to animation theorists, Paul Wells (1998, 2007), Maureen Furnish (2008) and Giancarlo Bendazzi (2006) agree that animation has developed its own language in the course of its history. This language is continuously evolving and changing due to social changes and the constant technological developments that lead to consequent changes in production methods and labor. Animation is identified as such and differentiates itself as a cinematic form through its language that is connected to its material production methods. As the societies and the methods of production are changing, consequently the language of animation is constantly evolving and changing.

We cannot ignore the connection and interrelation between the semiotic, which is the language, and the exosemiotic, which is the material production, and thus, in order to study the production of meaning and ideology in animation films, we need to see it in connection with the material production and society. In order to achieve this, I have applied in the research an articulation of semiotics with Marxist theory, following Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1990) and Lagopoulos (1980, 1986, 2000). This articulation with the exo-semiotic is grounded mainly on Lagopoulos's theory and more specifically in his *articulation of production*.

Lagopoulos defines three exo-semiotic articulations of a text: a) the *articulation of production or of derivation*, which is identified with Saussure's amorphous substance of ideas and consists of non-formalized ideology, that is, what Louis Hjelmslev calls the substance of the content; b) the *articulation of manifestation*, which consists of the substance of the expression, the manifestation of the semiotic system with the help of an exo-semiotic material (for Saussure it has a material nature and coincides with the phonic substance); and c) the *parallel articulation*, which is created by the reference of the semiotic system to external material referents (Lagopoulos 1986: 236–238).

The articulation of production bridges the semiotic with the material, socio-economic and technological, dynamics of society and through it the semiotic field is constituted. It follows that the epistemological and theoretical constitution of the semiotic field cannot be independent from the epistemological and theoretical formulation of material production, and that the main axes of the semiotic systems derive from material production. It further follows that for every structurally different type of society, which is founded for mainstream Marxism on the concept of mode of production, the semiotic fields in their historical specificity are differently structured. Thus, the a priori generalization of the structure of the semiotic field is misleading. It finally follows that, in the interior of a given society, to every structurally different social group (the fundamental social groups being founded for Marxism on the concept of 'class' in certain types of societies), corresponds a different variant of the general semiotic system of the society (see also Houdebine [1977: 164–165], who refers to Volochinov's views on language); thus, the general use of the concept of a general 'cultural text' is misleading. (Lagopoulos 1986: 236).

¹ The term *exosemiotic* in Lagopoulos (1986) defines "the outside of the semiotic system".

3. Analyzing animation films: case studies

Animation production is mainly geographically allocated in three areas: 1) Europe, where many different techniques have developed and the focus is on artistic expression and art films; 2) USA, where the industrialization of production and commercialization prevailed; and 3) since the 1980's we are witnessing the phenomenon of the impressive and continuous development of Japanese animation (anime), that is challenging American domination.

Usually when we refer to animation one of the first things that comes to mind is the productions of Disney. Since the early 1940s the dominance of Disney Company is undeniable and therefore we can say that it is both the dominant animation paradigm and that it expresses the dominant ideology. "It is safe to say that in no other medium has a single company's practices been able to dominate aesthetic norms to the extent that Disney's has". (Furnish 2008: 107). In other words, "Disney orthodox animation is the predominant language of animation". (Wells 2002: 4). The basic characteristics of Disney animation are: 1) industrial production 2) technological pioneering 3) films for children 4) films produced for universal consumption 5) strictly defined aesthetic code. The diachronic huge success of Disney led all other animation producers to be defined in relation to Disney animation, either by trying to imitate it or by standing in opposition to it. As Furnish writes: "In every type of cultural production, there are dominant forms of expression that tend to define it within the minds of people in the general public, if not specialists in the field. During the 20th century, the practice of 'animation' typically was identified by four characteristics: it was 1) American 2) created by cel artwork 3) made by men 4) made at the Disney studio". (Furnish 2008: 13)

The period under examination here covers the years between 1995 when Pixar released *Toy Story*, the first 3d computer generated feature film, and 2009. This is a period of constant changes in production methods and struggle for dominance in the field. During this period America is still dominant but its domination is challenged by the continuous rise and expansion of Japanese animation production. Disney and the American animation industry in general, following the demand for technological pioneering, has replaced cel² animation with computer animation and Disney, even though its dominance is not absolute, is still considered the leading company. The films that are used as examples below were produced during this period and their production technique is not only an aesthetic choice, but affects their deep structure. It is extremely interesting that these films are discussing and defending specific ideological choices concerning their production methods, labor and the social conditions leading to the choice of the way they are constructed.

3.1. Artistic creation versus industrialization of production: The Triplets of Belleville

Although it is difficult to refer to a European history of animation, as it is characterized by a great variety and diversity in the techniques and production methods that are applied not only from country to country but even within the same country, there is a common characteristic: if Disney/USA films have as their dominant characteristic industrialized production, Europe emphasizes art films, personal expression and aesthetic value. The relationship of European films with the arts remained unbroken and uninterrupted until the early 21st century. Even though many European films which have been produced by small groups and with almost no budget can be regarded as masterpieces, they did not succeed in reaching broad audiences. *The Triplets of Belleville* (Sylvain Chomet, 2003) apart from winning many prizes, enjoyed great commercial success and for this reason it is chosen here as a case study. Animation art films are usually short. This could be considered as a feature length art film. It is a hand drawn musical with very little dialogue and a film very rich in intertextual references.

² Cel animation is a type of hand drawn animation first applied by Disney.

The film narrates the story of an old woman and her orphaned grandson who wants to take part in the cycle race *Tour de France*. The Mafia kidnaps him together with other cyclists and takes him to Belleville in order to exploit his love of cycling to make money. His grandmother, madam Souza, succeeds in rescuing him with the help of three old singers.

Analyzing the film, the antithesis between art film productions versus industrialization/commercialization of entertainment is striking. All the codes merge to form the poles of this basic antithesis. The film is mostly concerned with the process of creating and the artist. If the bicycle race connotes the process of production, it is transferred from France to Belleville, a place that signifies the American way of life and industrial production. The Mafia, the production companies, are exploiting the artists. Due to industrialization the production process becomes not only mechanical but also mechanistic, leading artists from the pleasure of producing to the unhappiness of work done for profit. Competition and industrialization leads the artist to a race giving him no pleasure and in the end leaves him drained. The antithetical pair *unique* versus *identical* is another difference between art production and commercial production. While artists are poor, the industry is rich. Even though in the movie the grandmother finally rescues her grandson leading their adventure to a happy ending, the movie doesn't resolve in the same optimistic way the conflict between artistic and commercial production. The film concludes that the art films are old, with no production budget and they are defeated by the new, rich commercial production companies. The end phrase of the film is "yes, it's over", one of the few sentences used in the film, which leads to a sad conclusion for the European art films: The era of artistic expression is over.

3.2. The defense of identity: *Spirited away*

Hayao Miyazaki's Studio Ghibli is one of the best known Japanese anime studios in existence today and he is often referred to as the *Walt Disney of Japan*. Studio Ghibli has taken a different track from western companies when it comes to animation production. While Disney has chosen to base its production on technology and innovation, Studio Ghibli on the other hand is still producing films with the traditional Japanese anime, that is hand drawn, limited animation³ and has instead decided to use technology only as a background tool.

Spirited away (Miyazaki 2001) is the highest grossing film to date in Japanese cinema, as well as winning the 2003 Oscar for Best Animated Feature Film and a Golden Bear at the Berlin International Festival in 2002.

The film narrates the adventures of a teenage girl in the spirit world in order to save her parents, who have been transformed into pigs because of their gluttony.

The codes of the film are formed around the poles of the opposition between traditionality versus globalization. From the title itself, *kamikakushi* (hidden by kami/ deities), which alludes to Japanese folk belief, through many of the film's principal characters, such as Yubaba (a descendent of yamauba or mountain witch) and Kamaji (a *tsuchigumo* or earth spider) who are characters found throughout Japanese folklore, Japanese mythology and Shinto religion, to clothes and architecture like the traditional Japanese baths, all connote the intrinsic "Japaneseness" of the movie, supported by the choices of production methods and expressed by the specific technique that is used and the resulting aesthetic. "Westernness" on the other hand is the negative pole of the antithesis, connoting gluttony, consumerism and loss of identity. It is a movie in which Japanese animation is defending its identity.

3.3. Blame consumerism, not technological innovation: *WALL-E*

WALL-E (Pixar 2008) is an American 3d computer animation film (CGI) produced by Pixar Animation Studios. As mentioned above, Pixar is considered a technological pioneer. Its movie

³ In order to reduce production cost, in limited animation they don't draw the intermediate frame and design each time only the features that change.

Toy Story (1995) signified the entry into a new era for animation production as it was the first 3d animation feature film entirely constructed with the use of computers, which led to a radical change not only in the animation film industry but gradually also affected live-action film production, redefining the position of animation in the film production process as a whole. While redefining the position of animation in contemporary film production and projection, Pixar threatened the absolute sovereignty of Disney Company in the field and altered the prevailing stereotypes both in the aesthetic field and in movie content. The reaction of Disney came in 2006 when it bought Pixar. Despite the acquisition, Pixar was not incorporated into Disney but still retains its autonomy, both in the organization of its production line, which is based on a different model than the one Disney applies, and in the choice of the themes of its films.

WALL-E follows the tradition of Pixar's films in recording huge success: in addition to its numerous awards and high revenues it is considered by the public and many critics as one of the best movies of all times. For example, TIME Magazine ranked *WALL-E* first in its list of the "Best film of the decade" (Corliss 2009).

It is particularly interesting that while Pixar has led to the creation and dissemination of digital animation and is continually investing in new technology and software which in turn affect the organization of production and of human labor, the deep structure of the film focuses on the impact of technology on human labor and society.

The basic antithesis of the movie is expressed through the antithesis *humans* versus *robots*. Humans are categorized both under the code of nature, as biological organisms which are, and this of the consumer class, while the robots belong to technology under the culture code as well as in the productive/working class under the social code.

Therefore the antithesis between humans and robots is primarily an antithesis between nature and technology, namely nature and culture, and secondly between consumption and production. The consumerism of the humans leads both to the destruction of the natural environment and the destruction of their culture. It could therefore be argued that consumerism leads people to self-destructive behavior. The only thing that helps them to survive is a part of their culture: technology, robots. Robots ensure the survival of people, the remedy of the ecological disaster, the rescue of civilization and finally, the return of people to their natural environment.

The second antitheses that of consumption versus production, is associated with the social code. In the film a monopolistic company has the role of absolute monarch. As mentioned above, humans belong to the consumer / middle class and the whole production of this society is based on a new working class, a "technological proletariat" consisting of robots. The company- authority imposes its ideology and most people and robots follow it and reproduce it, massively and unquestioningly. Eventually the film defends technology. For the movie it is the upper-class ideology that leads humanity to destruction, not technology that is constructed to serve people. Full automation leads to a dystopian society but people can choose how they want to live. What is being criticized here is the consumerist-capitalist economic system. Summarizing, the film moves on two axes: first, exercising criticism towards the consumer society that leads to the destruction of the environment and culture, and second, defending technology as part of human culture. The movie proposes a change in the political-economic system, in which, however, a clear separation of classes is maintained, and a return to a more natural lifestyle and a more traditional production model without giving any clear suggestions about the proposed economic model and the role of technology in it.

4. Conclusion

The languages with which we conceive the world are social products and their production depends on social conditions and material culture. If semiotics ignores the social practices from

which the semiotic systems derive, we are inevitably heading to greater or lesser misconceptions. As I am following here the reasoning of Karin Boklund-Lagopoulou, it wouldn't be possible for me to express it in a better way, so I would like to conclude this essay with her own words:

We are constrained by the “languages” through which we conceive the world. If we do not have a theory of the production of these languages through the process of production and reproduction of human society, then the very possibility of scientific knowledge is lost (since science is itself a language), and we are simply all playing a game with signs. ... If there is no relation between semiotic systems and social practice – a practice that is not independent of semiotic systems, but that also has non-semiotic parameters – then the game is just in our mind. Which seems to me, personally, to be rather pointless.⁴ (Boklund – Lagopoulou 1983: 23)

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NOT NATURAL: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CINEMATIC SEMIOSIS

Rea Walldén
Athens School of Fine Arts, Greece
rwallden@yahoo.com

Abstract

This paper argues for the constructed character of cinematic semiosis, without negating its specificity. It is framed in the wider epistemological discussion regarding the arbitrary or motivated status of semiosis in general, and of specific semiotic systems in particular. In this context, cinema has been one of the most contested cases, its expression-substance being both complex and heterogeneous, and including a component of moving, photographic image. This paper uses Hjelmslev's model of stratification of the sign-function (introduced in his 1954 essay "La stratification du langage") as a methodological grid, on which to demarcate the areas of discussion. Hjelmslev's model is a formalization of Saussure's epistemological rupture with regard to the definition of the sign, consisting in the radical de-essentialisation of semiosis which results from the fundamental semiotic arbitrariness. In this model, the traditional questions regarding the relation between the signifier and the signified are analyzed and re-situated into the conceptually distinct but interrelated issues of signification, reference and material support. Therefore, the question of the social constitution or relative naturalness of a semiotic system can be reformulated as concerning, on the one hand, the relation between its content-plane and expression-plane and, on the other, its relation to its exo-semiotic content-substance; while the specificity of extra-linguistic semiotic systems can be reformulated as concerning their expression-substance, and how this affects the previous question. The paper proceeds with a critical investigation of the main groups of arguments against the socially constructed status of cinematic semiosis, and attempts to refute them. These include arguments stemming from the concepts of iconicity, indexicality, and the literal indexicality of the photographic image, as well as arguments supporting a derivation of cinematic semiosis from the human cognitive faculties or even the physicality of the human body. The paper concludes with certain observations on the ideological character of the naturalization of the social and its political implications.

Introduction

Following Saussure's tradition of semiotics, the present essay argues for the constructed character of cinematic semiosis. It is framed in the wider epistemological discussion regarding the arbitrary or motivated status of semiosis in general. The essay begins with a summary of the main onto-epistemological premises composing the definition of the sign at the level of *langue*. Then, it situates the areas of contestation of the premise of social construction, when cinema is the semiotic system under consideration. It proceeds with a critical presentation of two large groups of arguments against cinematic semiosis' socially constructed status, and attempts to refute them. On the one hand, it investigates arguments founded on an assumed naturalness of the semiotic system's relation to referent reality; on the other, arguments founded on the shared human nature of the sign users. Finally, the essay examines the way such arguments become significant in the context of the larger debates over aesthetic realism and the biological foundation of the social and human sciences. It concludes with certain observations on the ideological character of the naturalization of the social and its political implications.

1. The onto-epistemology of semiotic systems in Saussure's tradition

In Saussure's tradition of semiotics, the ontological status of the semiotic unit is secondary to semiotic structure. In other words, ontologically, semiotic systems are not composed by signs; they are articulated into signs. Saussure's famous definition of the sign in *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916 [1972]) as "double-faced entity" (99) which links "a concept and an acoustic image" (98), is logically the last step of his definition of *langue*, i.e. of language as a system. Therefore, the present essay starts by reiterating the well-known definitional characteristics of *langue*, emphasizing their onto-epistemological aspects. The transition from *langue* to "semiotic system", i.e. the generalization from "linguistic" to "semiotic", is legitimized by Saussure's own prediction of the birth of a new science *sémiologie* [semiotics], of which "linguistics is but a part" (33). The present essay addresses precisely certain difficulties of this generalization, with the intention of arguing for its fundamental validity.

First and foremost, *langue* is a social construction. This means that *langue* is different from the sum of the natural abilities of its users – and consequently of the human species in general – which (abilities) make it possible. In Saussure's words, *langue* is "a social product of the faculty of *langage*" (25) and what is "natural to man is [...] the faculty of constructing a *langue*" (26). In other words, what is natural to the human species is the semiotic ability, which is clearly distinct from its products, i.e. the different *langues*. Furthermore, *langue* is different from its individual use, i.e. *parole* [speech], which it makes possible (30–31). This definition is clearly at odds with the presently dominant tendencies of Analytic Philosophy of Language, which dissolve the level of *langue* between universal logical structures, often ultimately connected to the biology of the human species, and linguistic use. One has to observe that by solely concentrating on the individual, either as carrier of the universal or as an actor in the communication act, what is avoided is a concept of society as structure. Saussure's definition opposes such a position, postulating clearly that *langues* are the products of social communities and, therefore dependent on socio-historical conditions.

Secondly, *langue* is described as an abstract and dynamical structure. The crux here is the conception of structure. The obvious clarification explains that *langue* is not limited to a semantics, it is not just a dictionary; it includes grammar, syntax, rules of production and use, relations and hierarchies. Then, it is equally important to stress the abstract character of this structure – both in the levels of the signified and the signifier; what Saussure formulates as "*psychique* [mental]" or existing "*dans le cerveau* [in the brain]" (32). However, *langue* is *abstract* as opposed to

being a *concrete* object; it is by no means an “abstraction”. It is different, and ontologically prior, to its possible actualizations in concrete institutions. Furthermore, although a structure, it is not a static one. As it is made clear, *langues* change through time by the action of *parole*. What has led to the common misunderstanding of *langue* as static is, on the one hand, its relative stability when compared to *parole*, and on the other, Saussure’s choice of a synchronic point of view. “Synchronicity” is a scientific point of view, not an ontological attribute.

Thirdly, *langue* is fundamentally arbitrary. While at first glance arbitrariness concerns the link between the signifier and the signified, it proves to have a much more radical meaning. In the first place, the “arbitrary” link is meant as conventionally, i.e. socially, constituted. Saussure’s intention is to oppose it to any idea of naturalness, not to imply that it is freely chosen by the user. In this sense, Saussure places his theory in the long historical debate over the naturalness or conventionality of language. Already in 4th c. B.C. in Plato’s *Cratylus*, Hermogenes, following Democritus, argues for a conventional link between names and things. However, intrinsic part of Saussure’s definition of the sign is the notion of differentiability, summarised by the famous dictum: “in *langue* there are only differences [...] without positive terms” (100) and expounded in connection with the concept of “linguistic value” (155-169). What *langue* does is to articulate the unperceivable and amorphous continua of sound and thought into double-faced formal units. Following Oswald Ducrot, I call this kind of arbitrariness “fundamental”, “to distinguish [it] from the arbitrariness of each isolated sign” (Ducrot & Todorov 1972: 30). Fundamental semiotic arbitrariness is Saussure’s epistemological rupture. It entails that semiotic communities articulate/shape the way they perceive the world through the process of giving it meaning. This move is analogous to Kant’s epistemological revolution; however, it transfers the locus of articulation from the cognitive capacities of the human species in general to the semiotic constructions of particular social groups. Similarly to its philosophical ancestor, it does not deny the independent existence of the world. What it does question is our ability to perceive, know and understand the world independently from our semiotizations.

As the individual sign is no longer constitutive and semiotic systems are not necessarily limited to “natural languages”, Louis Hjelmslev introduces the concept of “sign-function”, i.e. the structure of the constitutive relations of the semiotic phenomenon. In his 1954 essay “*La stratification du langage*”, he proposes its model.

Hjelmslev analyzed semiotic systems according to a double distinction: (a) between content and expression and (b) between form and substance. From this double division result four *strata*: content-form, content-substance, expression-form, expression-substance. Form selects substance and it is manifested by it. The substance-strata are ‘semiotically formed’. To speak of the *manifestante* without implying that it is so formed, Hjelmslev uses the term *matière*. Each substance-stratum consists of three levels: (1) the level of social, collective perceptions, which belongs to the stratification in the strict sense; and the (2) socio-biological and (3) physical levels, which don’t. Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere (Walldén 2012a: 58–61), the intersection of the sign-function with the communication circuit causes a certain redoubling of the exo-semiotic substance, because of the differentiation between the sides of production and reception of the message. All the semiotic strata are intelligible constructs. Literal materiality belongs to the exo-semiotic realm. Signification is defined by the insoluble relation between content-form and expression-form, and not by reference to the exo-semiotic.

	CONTENT		EXPRESSION		
SEMIOTIC	(Sed) content-form		(Ser) expression-form		<i>sign-function articulations</i>
	content-substance 1		expression-substance 1		FORM
					SUBSTANCE
EXO-SEMIOTIC	<i>production</i> content-subst. 2	<i>reception</i> content-subst. 2	<i>reception</i> expression-subst. 2	<i>production</i> expression-subst. 2	Level 1 <i>social perceptions</i>
	<i>production</i> content-subst. 3	<i>reception</i> content-subst. 3	<i>reception</i> expression-subst. 3	<i>production</i> expression-subst. 3	Level 2 <i>socio-biological</i>
					Level 3 <i>physical</i>

Table: An extended model of Hjelmslev’s stratification.

In this model, which is a consistent formalization of Saussure’s definition of the sign, the traditional questions regarding the relation between the signifier and the signified are analyzed and re-situated into the conceptually distinct but interrelated issues of signification, reference and material support. Therefore, the question of the social constitution or relative naturalness of a semiotic system can be reformulated as concerning, on the one hand, the relation between its content-plane and expression-plane and, on the other, its relation to its exo-semiotic content-substance; while the specificity of non-linguistic semiotic systems can be reformulated as concerning their expression-substance, and how this affects the previous question.

2. Cinema as a semiotic system

The Saussure-ian tradition of opposing the concept of natural semiosis has found in cinema one of its most contested cases. Cinema seems to combine the greater number of ill-fitting characteristics, as its expression-substance is both complex and heterogeneous, the central component of which consists in moving, photographic image.

The main definitional questions with regard to cinema were already opened by Christian Metz’s inaugural text “*Le cinéma: langue ou langage*” (1964): (a) whether it is appropriate to study cinema as semiosis and (b) what kind of semiosis it is. The first question is implicitly answered in the affirmative by the very act of a semiotic approach. Then, comes the need to define what is particularly ‘cinematic’ about cinematic semiosis. This means, firstly, the distinction from the other kinds of semioses, which amounts to the question of specificity. Secondly, it means the distinction between what is cinematic as opposed to what is filmic, in other words what belongs to the code of this semiosis and what to the messages/texts it produces. Finally, it also means to distinguish cinema’s elements that belong to the realm of the semiotic from those that don’t, considering that, apart from a signifying mechanism, cinema is also as a social institution, including an economy, a technology and a power structure.

The semiotic identity of cinema, as recognized – but not defined – by its expression-substance, can be situated in four areas. Firstly, it includes images. It shares this characteristic with other semiotic systems, such as painting, all of which are addressed by visual semiotics. Secondly, it shares with photography the specificity of using photographic images. This characteristic was given exceptional importance by André Bazin, who argued that it radically affected cinema’s and

photography's ontological status. In this, cinema differs from animation, as well as from digitally produced films. The present essay, nevertheless, argues against this distinction. Thirdly, cinema uses a succession of static images in order to create the impression of moving image. Moving image is its *differentia specifica par excellence*. Cinema was born when technology made moving image possible, and even in speaking films this remains its definitional characteristic. Metz considers as specifically cinematic codes the ones pertaining to the moving image, while Umberto Eco identifies the cinematic code with the moving image. Fourthly, cinema since the 1930s, includes auditory elements; it is a complex audio-visual system. As Metz has conceptualized it, cinema's multiple expression-substance is composed by five elements: moving photographic image, writing, speech, music, noises (1964: 71; 1971: 10, 17–18; [1973] 1977: 112–113). Eco disagrees that this complexity pertains to cinema's *langue* level, arguing that it takes place in the discursive level of film. This point is not so important in the present argumentation. Finally, a whole other group of questions arise from the fact of cinema's multiple, complex and not fixed articulations, which are also beyond the scope of the present essay.

The essay's working hypothesis is to accept cinema as functioning at the epistemological level of *langue*. It considers cinema as a signification system, by which is meant what underlies the way that every film produces meaning and which makes this production of meaning possible. It accepts, following Eco, that "semiotic systems do not necessarily have two articulations; [and that] the articulations are not necessarily fixed" ([1976]1979: 231).

A provisional attempt to apply Hjelmslev's stratification on cinema could propose the following organization: Cinema's form articulates multiply its semiotic substance, in a way combining Eco's triple articulation and the articulations of audial elements. Cinema's expression-form relies on two spatial and one temporal dimensions. Its expression-substance 1 is comprised by the perceptive image of moving light and shadows, as well as sound. Its production-expression-substance 2 includes the processes and conditions of *mise-en-scène*, shooting, post-production etc. Its reception-expression-substance 2 includes the processes and conditions of reproduction, projection etc. Its expression-substance 3 includes from the light and sound waves to the recording materials.

3. Naturalness as a relation to the referent reality

A common group of arguments about the increased "naturalness" of cinematic semiosis relies on its assumed motivated relation to its referent reality. In order to formulate the terms of the problem, an aspect of Charles Sanders Peirce's theory can be of use. One of the trichotomies proposed by Peirce classifies signs, according to their relation to the referent object, into: *icons* (similar to it), *indices* (causally connected with it) and *symbols* (arbitrarily linked with it). The two first categories appear to describe a more "natural" connection than Saussure's tradition would accept. Cinema semiosis has been conceptualized both in terms of iconicity and indexicality.

Before verifying whether cinema's sign-function is iconic and/or indexical, one has to investigate whether the so-called iconic and indexical signs have indeed a natural relation to their referent. Umberto Eco refutes this fundamental precondition. He considers the icon-index-symbol trichotomy as "untenable", first and foremost because it "postulates the presence of the referent as a discriminant parameter" ([1976]1979: 178). One must remember that the referent is not really an object but an abstract entity and a cultural convention (66), while – most importantly – signification has nothing to do with the existence of a corresponding object (62). That is why we can tell stories about the gods and lies. Eco proceeds to show the conventional character of the constitution of all the so-called iconic and indexical connections, one of his central arguments being the necessity to learn to recognize them as such.

The concept of iconic sign attributes particular metaphysical properties to the image. Eco investigates several aspects of this concept (viii, 178, 190–217, 231–234). Firstly, image is often considered as a non-analyzable primal entity. This would mean that the frame is the absolute *primum* in cinema sign-function, as Metz seems to think. However, Eco proceeds to show that image is both analyzable and coded. Inspired by Prieto, he proposes a list of the codes pertaining to image, and their articulations, and then a classification of all codes according to their articulations, including the cinematic triple articulation ([1968]1972: 596–598, 601–603; [1966]1976: 215–217, 225–227; [1976] 1979: 231–234). Secondly, the traditional philosophical definition of image relies on the concept of similarity. This resurfaces in Peirce's definition of the iconic sign as linked to its object by similarity. Eco begins by problematizing the concept of similarity itself, showing that its definitional relation to the image is circular. He then proceeds to show that the recognition of similarity between images and objects is constituted conventionally. Thirdly, image is sometimes considered as caused by the object, as is the case of an imprint, which leads us to the discussion of the concept of index.

The concept of index is defined through a causal link or a physical connection to the object. Eco's critique of the concept intersects with many parts of his theory of semiotics ([1976]1979: 115–119, 161–165, 178, 186, 190, 219–224). Firstly, he observes that the signification of the so-called indexical sign does not really depend on its connection to its object, because it exists irrespectively of the existence of its supposed cause. For example, smoke as a sign of fire continues to signify it even if there is no fire at all, and it is caused instead by dry oxygen. The inferred cause is “pure content” (221). Secondly, the very act of inference, i.e. the attribution of causality, relies on a convention. Thirdly, the choice of this particular perceptual unit as a signifier for this particular content-unit, i.e. the constitution of the sign as a sign, is conventional.

In the case of photography and cinema, however, the issue of indexicality appears in its more literal sense. The traces on film made by the physical, mechanical and chemical interaction between light, camera and film are indexical not as signs but as physical objects. They do constitute proof of existence of something; the question is what of. Using Hjelm's extended model, one realizes that this link does not connect the signified (content-form) to its referent (content-substance 3), but the material trace (expression-substance 3) to its material conditions of production (expression-substance 2). Therefore, it does not affect the conventional nature of photographic (and cinematic) semiosis.

4. Universality based on human nature

Another group of arguments supports a certain universality of the systems of signification, as based on the shared nature of the human species. Although by no means limited to the visual semiotic systems, this line of argumentation has found a particularly fertile field there. The turn toward biology has become increasingly dominant since the 1980s. The present essay addresses some aspects of the arguments developed in the frame of the so-called “cognitive film semiotics”, which draw their concepts from the cognitive sciences, pragmatic linguistic theories and Noam Chomsky's linguistic theories. They develop in clear opposition to the basic epistemological premises of Saussure's tradition of semiotics. They tend to be more compatible with Peirce's semiotics, which does not postulate fundamental semiotic arbitrariness, and its subsequent ontological priority of the system over the unit and centrality of the social. Cognitive semiotics is the last step of a shift of research interest from *langue* to *parole/text*, to the textual traces of enunciation, to the empirical act of communication, to the mental faculties of cognition and perception of the empirical people who partake to this act.

One should start by confirming that there is an undeniable causal link between our natural faculties and anything that we do, including constructing and using systems of signification.

Already in *Cours de linguistique générale*, it is clearly stated that the ability to create semiotic systems is natural to the human species, while communication takes place between human beings. The significant difference is the locus and nature of this causal link. What we share, according to Saussure, is the semiotic faculty, i.e. the ability to create semiotic systems. What is common between those systems is their constitutive structure, what Hjelmslev calls *sign-function*, not their exact form. The relation between the human semiotic ability and the different semiotic systems is one of *condition of possibility*; unlike the relation between each semiotic system and its instantiations, which is a relation of manifestation. Moreover, when Saussure-ian semiotics discusses the human semiotic ability, it does not enter into the discussion of its biological grounding. The grounding without any doubt exists, and it is a fascinating area of research, but it is of a different epistemological order than semiotics. This distinction of epistemological order is crucial not to be crossed lightly; for the same reason that when we fly, we generally prefer a pilot in the cockpit and not a physicist, no matter how excellent the physicist is and despite the fact that flying planes is based on physics.

The other component of this group of arguments is their emphasis on the individual speaker and their dissolving of the social level of signification. From Chomsky's "competence" and "performance" to Donald Davidson's "prior" and "passing theory", there is nothing left between the individual and the act of communication. Theorizing the individual as a bearer, on the one hand, of innate abilities and/or conceptual structures and/or universal conceptions, and on the other, of an unstructured and accidental mass of experiences, leaves no space for the fact that meanings are socially constructed and organized. The emphasis on the speakers has often been explained as an effort to celebrate their freedom, as opposed to the supposed passivity which has been attributed to them by the concept of *langue*. However, the scientific invisibility of social structures does not entail their disappearance but rather their interiorisation by the investigating subject.

The idea of universal cultural conceptions in the strict sense is easily counter-argued, if not completely refuted, by the findings of the sciences of history and anthropology. An easy example are the different divisions of the color spectrum throughout history and in different societies, fact which opposes the proposition that color terms are cultural universals; while the connotations attributed to them diverge even more widely, problematizing any ideas of an instinctive response to them. A more plausible approach would be the one exemplified by the research of Chomsky on deep structures and universal semes. One can conceive of the existence of some very general and very abstract structures underlying all semiotic systems, other than their constitution as semiotic. Nevertheless, the double danger facing the effort to locate them, is either the unconscious "universalization" of one's one culture or the "substantiation" of one's metatheoretical constructions. In the case of cinema, efforts of formulating a cognitive film grammar have led to simplifications, such as the identification of the concept of "grammaticality" with temporal and logical linearity in narration by Dominique Chateau (Buckland 2000:126–130).

A more extreme version of universality arguments grounds signification not in our mental capacities but on the literal physicality of the human body. The paradigmatic case are is the theory by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who introduce image-based, embodied and *inherently meaningful* schemata, based on metaphor and metonymy. As Warren Buckland explains, these are considered "inherently meaningful because they gain their meaning from the body's innate sensory-motor capacities" (40). He then proceeds to present the example of their "container schema": "The container schema, which structures our fundamental awareness of our bodies, is based on the elements 'interior', 'boundary' and 'exterior'. [...] Sometimes, theories are understood in terms of a particular container, a building" (42–43). An obvious counter-argument arises here from the undeniable fact that there are cultures – and individuals – who don't conceptualize either bodies or buildings as containers. When I compare theories to buildings I base

the analogy on their attribute of being constructed and structured; and I suspect that this is the underlying metaphor of structuralism too. In any case, what one deals with here are connotations – metaphors and metonymies indeed – which are socially and historically constituted and by no means “inherently meaningful”.

However, the crucial axiom of both subtle and crude embodiment approaches to signification is that the properties of “the fully grown body are shared (uniform and constant)” (42). The first difficulty then is to whose body one refers. The body of a Scandinavian woman or a Pigmy man, a crippled 20-year-old medieval farmer or an athletic 60-year-old Hollywood star? There is no such thing as the typical human body. The process of defining which characteristics to consider typical is entirely social and entails the danger of normalization. Secondly, what such theories should not underestimate is the social conceptualization and construction of the body as such; this complex multi-way interaction between society and nature.

5. The debate over aesthetic realism in film theory

In film theory, cinema’s assumed privileged relation to reality has had different foundations, some of which this text has already investigated. The most naive is the notion of cinema as an unmediated opening to reality, as a “window” or “mirror” or “slice of reality”. This position is easily refuted by a listing of the technical mediations and creative choices that lead to a film’s construction: from the choice of what to shoot and the manipulation of the pre-filmic elements to the frame and shooting choices, from decoupage and editing to sound-design and mixing. A certain improvement of the previous notion conceives cinema as a neutral recording of an already-coded reality, or – according to Pier Paolo Pasolini – as a secondary writing of the language of reality. This formulation still greatly underestimates the amount of choices and the degree of manipulation this “recording” allows or, rather, necessitates. A third, fourth and fifth lines of argument are based on concepts of iconicity, indexicality and the literal indexicality of photographic technologies, all of which have been addressed previously in this essay. A final line of argument is based on the richness of the sense stimuli cinema provides. The greater the range of sense stimuli an art involves the closer it comes to our experience of reality, the argument goes. It founds cinema’s assumed closeness to reality on a persuasive virtuality.

The last line of argument displaces the discussion from the belief that cinema has a privileged relation to reality to the observation that it *gives the impression of* having such a relation, and to the subsequent question of why it is so. This is cinema’s famous concept of *impression, illusion or effect of reality*, which practically means the forgetfulness of the fact that a film is constructed. There are three groups of reasons given for this impression. The first group is inspired by the cognitive sciences, and looks to the constitution of human perceptual apparatus, starting with the *phi*-phenomenon that allows us to see as continuous movement the rapid succession of static images. The second draws on psychoanalytical concepts and research, and explains the function of identification mechanisms. The third group of reasons relies on internal coherence and previously constituted conventions of representation.

These issues have been entangled in the history of cinema theory with the different aesthetic ideologies regarding realism. In this context, the questions of what cinema is and how it functions have been subordinated to the ones about what is a good film and what kind of films should be made. These were always intertwined with ethical and even political issues. Realisms and counter-realisms are all based on some notion of truthfulness, conceptualized in different ways as verisimilitude, immediacy or sincerity. The complexities of this debate exceed the scope of the present essay (see Walldén 2012b). What is relevant though is the realization that the “naturalization” of construction, the forgetfulness of the existence of the medium, results in mystification.

6. The debate over the biological foundation of social and human sciences

The discussions around the naturalness of cinematic semiosis in particular, and semiosis in general, are framed in a much wider epistemological debate, regarding the biological foundation of social and human sciences. The effort of “modeling” the human and social sciences on the natural ones is as old as modern science itself, since the Enlightenment, considering that in the process of constitution of the sciences as sciences, natural sciences have been the leading and paradigmatic case. However, there has been a wide range of such efforts: from structurally incorporating methodology to borrowing specific concepts. The foundation of a social or human science on human biology has been one of the most common and the least successful ones – one has only to remember Social Darwinism or Freud’s early efforts to ground his findings on literal human anatomy.

The recent rapid progress in brain and genetic sciences, as well as in theoretical physics, has left the human and social sciences with the feeling that they have been left behind. This feeling is partially justified. It is true that 20th century positive and natural sciences’ findings and hypotheses are yet far from being incorporated into the cultural consensus and everyday lives of our societies. However, one has to realize that the generalization of Newtonian physics into the General Relativity theory does not affect at all the way we build houses; while something much smaller but of a similar epistemological order to building, such as the invention of a new material, does. While the human and social sciences must certainly revise and contemporize the ways they intersect with the positive and natural sciences, it is also useful to question the very validity of such intersections; have they been really essential to their theories, or have they been used as legitimizing devices ultimately inessential to them? Most important is to remember that historically such efforts have been usually unsuccessful. Now that this tendency is once again fashionable, it is useful to address the reasons of this lack of success.

Firstly, quite often they ignore or underestimate historical and anthropological observations. This tendency was presented previously in this essay. Secondly, they often misunderstand the scientific findings they refer to. They may generalize local results, turn scientific hypotheses into axioms, or ignore in other ways the constraints of a specific theory or research. The third and most common problem though, is the way that is enacted the connection between the social science and its assumed-as-grounding natural science. This connection, this passing from one epistemological order to another, is one of the most difficult moves that our sciences have to address. The dangers facing this effort are two: reduction and metaphor. The former is the result of the oversimplification of both sides of the division and the collapsing of the two epistemological orders into one, or their unproblematic immediate link. Examples of such a reduction is the explanation of class structure by evolutionary biology or the interpretation of an emotional statement as an advanced form of instinctive stimulus-induced reaction. The danger of metaphoric use consists in a term or a group of terms being detached from the system that defines them and transported over the epistemological divide, in either direction, losing in the process their initial meaning. This is the case when one uses quantum physics’ terms in narratology or argues about the linguistic capacities of genes. What is the common factor in this wide range of fallacies is the naturalization of the social. And the stakes of such a move are very high.

Conclusion

This essay has argued for the social construction of cinematic semiosis in order to support the Saussure-ian approach to semiotics in general; and specifically its epistemological premise of the fundamentally social and constructed status of signification. It has proceeded to frame this discussion into the wider debates over aesthetic realism and the biological foundation of the social sciences, both of which have political implications. Particularly the latter locates a crucial

decision that the science of semiotics has to take, which will determine its future development.

As we have seen, one of the leading contemporary tendencies in semiotics is an effort toward “naturalization”. This can be explained to a certain extent by the desire to gain the status of natural sciences, which is perceived as higher. I argue that, although historically understandable, this effort is mis-oriented. On the one hand, it seems to forget that what constitutes an endeavor as scientific are the criteria of scientificity, such as refutability and the ability to predict future results, not an uncritical borrowing and misapplication of other sciences’ theories. The enthusiastic but uncritical endorsement of the natural sciences amounts to an ideology of scientifism, and a subsequent loss of scientificity. On the other hand, it seems to forget that if significations are not conventional, then they are independent from history and, therefore, unchangeable unless by biological evolution. This amounts to the unchangeability of the status quo; a very conservative, even reactionary, world-view. In a single move, semiotics has managed to both lose its critical dimension and eternalize the status quo! Last but not least, one is not allowed to forget that racism is also based on the naturalization of the social.

In conclusion, the naturalization of the social is a definitional characteristic of ideology. In Louis Althusser’s words: “One of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology” (1970). For this reason, as Metz put it in 1978, “la sémiologie [a une] allergie radicale a l’idée de ‘nature humaine’ [semiotics has a radical allergy to the idea of ‘human nature’]” (1).

One upon a time, semiotics launched its project as an uncovering and dismantling of ideology. What will its project be for the future?

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SEMIOTIC SPACE AND BOUNDARIES – BETWEEN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND SEMIOTIC UNIVERSALS

Tiit Remm
University of Tartu, Estonia
tiit.remm@ut.ee

Abstract

This paper studies the opposition of social construction and cultural universals in the field of space and spatial metalanguage in social and cultural research. In more detail I focus on the notion of ‘boundary’ and its object, asking how can an understanding of semiotic and spatial nature of boundaries help social and cultural research?

I argue that ‘boundaries’ should be considered being by definition of semiotic and spatial character. This leads to the understanding that boundaries (as far as there is a reason to consider them namely boundaries and not for example, *mediation*, *translation*, *explosion*, etc.) are, first, depending on recognition and distinction by some subject and, second, enforcing spatialization of the distinction. Thus, bounding is a practice of semiotization that dynamically interrelates levels of conceptualisation and levels of spatiality. The latter is based on the semiotic understanding of space as being grounded in relations of co-existence and their recognition by at least an indexical *umwelt*.

While boundaries are semiotic and often descriptive social constructions, there are also aspects of boundaries that can be approached as cultural or even semiotic universals, most notably so-called boundary mechanisms and basic semiotic nature of space and spatial distinctions.

The paper concludes with exploring the applicability of the theoretical argumentation for a semiotic approach in archaeology. In what sense can we talk about cultural boundaries in research, as social constructions or cultural universals, as parts of object level world image or parts of researcher’s models, as material objects or as structural relations? How can we find

boundaries in fields like archaeology and how can we improve our knowledge by considering these boundaries?

Boundaries and the concept *boundary* are in semiotics and humanities often discussed either in a theoretical manner or in contrast, limited to particular applications and less as a comprehensive semiotic framework for analyses. Considering *boundary* in the context of spatial metalanguage highlights the tensions between social constructions and semiotic universals present in searches for applicability of semiotics in archaeological studies (see also Lagopoulos 2003, Lang 2005, Preucel 2006).

For methodological purposes boundary mechanisms are important object-level phenomena that enable a grounded construction of study object, for example, in archaeology where any cultural phenomena appears as a study object exclusively through re-construction. Boundary as *spatializing distinction* and traces of boundaries can be seen as traits to be looked for when studying the sociocultural world. Boundaries could thus be added to the list of patterns of uniformity, uniformity of relationships and identity of meaning or logical coalescence that Pitirim Sorokin has pointed out as traits that should be looked for when studying the sociocultural world (Sorokin 2006: 9–10). However, there remains the question of limits of employing the concept and possible changes in applying it. In the context of Juri Lotman's notion of *semiosphere*, boundary might appear as a universal basic element of semiotic world. However, a closer look reveals also the specificity of the notion and object of *boundary* which suggests that it is not a universal unit of description of the semiotic universe but has its heuristic limits.

I argue that *boundaries* should be considered being by definition of semiotic and spatial character. This leads to the understanding that boundaries (as far as there is a reason to consider them namely *boundaries* and not *mediation, translation, explosion*, etc.) are, first, depending on recognition and distinction by some subject and, second, enforcing spatialization of the distinction. Thus, bounding is a practice of semiotization that dynamically interrelates levels of conceptualisation and levels of spatiality. The latter is based on the semiotic understanding of space as being grounded in relations of co-existence and in recognition of these by at least an indexical *umwelt*.

Boundary is spatial. The statement might seem obvious and uninformative. It is crucial however to note that also the most abstract kind of boundaries are spatial. They are spatial as descriptions and projections. Thus, observing and cataloguing numerous boundaries is not enough, one needs to understand different kinds of spaces behind them. For example, Cassirer's distinction between *actional, symbolic* and *abstract space* (Cassirer 1944: 42–43) can be taken as a starting point here. These refer respectively to the geographical spatial dimension of practices, organisation of world image and self-descriptions, and to abstract category of space that can be used as a modelling tool.

Spatial metalanguage is a tool of cognition applying sets of spatial relations for representing organisation of the object field. Aimed for adequacy and usefulness of descriptions metalanguages can be based on different concepts of space that combine spatial relations in variable ways. In one dimension, this abstract conception of space is derived from particular world image and symbolic space related to it, which is again based in spatiality of practices. In another dimension, this abstract space as a spatial model is aimed for representing the object field which involves its own symbolic space of world image and spatiality of practices in it.

From a semiotic perspective *space* can be defined as a set of recognized spatial relations. The latter, spatial relation refers again to a situation of at least duality in object field or co-presence of two objects. From the semiotic perspective the recognition of this duality of actual or potential objects by someone is essential. While this minimal spatial relation can involve two objects, one

of these could also be the recognising agent as an object of recognition or alternatively, it can be the environment as an object of recognition. According to this view, the mere relation and gap between subject and object ought not to be considered spatial as long as it does not involve distinction of the object from something else. In discussion of the ontological basis of socially organised geographical space, Edward Soja emphasizes the human ability to objectify the world by distancing oneself from the object world, conscious human distancing from inanimate objects (Soja 1989: 132). In my view, the situation of recognising a dual relationship in the object world requires a recognising subject of some kind with at least indexical object-world. Thus, an animal Umwelt (according to Kull 2010) is required but not necessarily a *conscious human person*. In addition, it is reasonable to consider the distancing between a subject and its environment as *spatial* as long, as it involves both parties as objects for the subject-agent (or as Soja characterises *existential alienation*: “a state of separation from oneself and from the objective world” [1989: 133]), in other words, as long as the semiotic situation involves the act of bounding. The requirement of co-presence of objects points to an essential aspect of semiotisation – objects that are otherwise not possibly co-present in actuality can be brought together by semiotic mediation – by actualising a past object by remembering it or combining representations of various near, far and imaginable objects into co-existence in one “cognitive space”. As space is based on recognition, it refers first of all to the organisation of knowledge and through this to the organisation of the object of knowledge.

According to this basis, there is a potential for different spaces – differing by involved relations and their variable organisations. As the minimally presumed duality can involve either two objects or an object and the subject as its own object the general primacy should not be attributed neither to ego-centric nor non-egocentric orders. The notion of *space* should thus be understood as a holistic set of recognised spatial relations. Regarding the concept of boundary, it should be kept in mind that there can be different ways of organising spatial relations into a holistic *space*. This results in heterogeneity of spatial metalanguages.

Considering *space* as a set of recognised spatial relations, it is necessary to understand the kind of *space* related to the boundary and interconnections of different spaces through boundary. For example, institutionalised borders relate abstract and symbolic spatiality to practical one and they are expressed and forced by material means. Boundaries in the context of non-spatial phenomena exist in relation to spatial descriptions. Constituting a boundary is at the same time spatializing the object and thus it should be asked, of what kind, at what level, and of which significance is this space.

Besides being spatial, boundary is fundamentally semiotic in the sense of being based on recognition. The mechanism of boundary can be found in distinction, more specifically in spatialising distinction. It is basically recognising difference by someone, thus, it is not a mere difference, but an act of distinction – with a particular agent and its perspective, relational in nature and concerning certain level of abstraction. From an external perspective, boundaries might appear ambivalent and arbitrary, from the perspective of the “world” of the boundary, they are however rather concrete and indispensable.

The boundary as a distinction depends on subject’s recognition and interpretation. *Distinction* as a way of organising space reminds the works on *social space* by Pierre Bourdieu – which is an interesting connection here. According to Bourdieu (1994: 24–25), who relies on Émile Benveniste, the significance in social space is essentially difference that creates difference or distinctive distinction that requires subject with specific competence or in other words, subject situated at the particular *field*. It is remarkable that Bourdieu did not discuss *boundaries* themselves, boundaries of a social class for instance. That would probably be because while he was concerned with *distinctions* he did not focus on descriptively outlined wholes and their rela-

tions. In Bourdieu's context, acts of distinctions can be seen related to boundaries but they do not set up wholes with the distinction of co-existent internal and external domains. The holistic dimension for him is instead in *social space* where distinctions are made and could be seen as episodes of internal boundaries. Constituting a systemic hole from these would presume additional conceptualisation – e.g. in the form of explicit description of social classes and belonging *in* one or another.

For Lotman, in contrast to Bourdieu, *boundary* is a central notion in semiotic study of culture in relation to notions like cultural space (1975), semiosphere (2005), text (1977) and explosion (2009). The notion of boundary in Lotman's theory has also been extensively discussed (e.g. Andrews 2003; Kim 2014; Monticelli 2008, 2012). Lotman's proposal for topological metalanguage and the notion of *cultural space* is based on the idea that boundary divides otherwise homogeneous space into distinct internal and external space (Lotman 1975: 104). Similarly, semiosphere is characterised by the external boundary and organised by heterogeneity of internal boundaries. For the semiosphere and its each part or sub-sphere, there is a *semiotic I* from whose position the boundary is constituted (Lotman 1990: 138). The function of boundary is to filter and adapt the external into internal (1990: 138). Boundary is thus the distinction made by *semiotic I* between its own semiotic space and that of not, the distinction that both bounds and mediates. Semiotic space again is here not merely a set of semioses, but a particularly organised domain of semiosis, the domain of *semiotics of particular culture* as distinguishable from alternative ones (Lotman 1990: 125). In this sense, the space of semiotics of a culture is comparable to the notion of *signifying order* as the basis of culture: "a complex system of different types of signs that cohere in predictable ways into patterns of representation which individuals and groups can utilize to make or exchange messages" (Danesi, Perron 1999: 67).

In Lotman's conception of *boundary* three functions have been highlighted: "(1) the boundary as an instrument of internalization, separation or closure; (2) the boundary as an instrument of connection [...]; (3) the boundary as an instrument of differentiation, the acceleration of semiotic processes and the generation of newness" (Monticelli 2008: 193). The first one is related to the *metasystemic self-description*, the perspective of the *semiotic I*, which centralises and draws the external boundary of the internal homogeneous structural whole. The second function is related to the boundary as a dialogical mechanism providing partial translatability of at least two different systems, so to say intersystemic play: "The boundary as bilingual belt and space of intersystemic play is the place where the homogeneity of the structural whole is suspended in order to make dialogue possible" (Monticelli 2008: 200). Envisioning this connective boundary as a space of its own, Monticelli equates for the third function this *border-zone* or *boundary-space* with Lotman's notion of periphery.

This equation is however partly misleading. Boundary and periphery can overlap in spatial imagination as well as in empirical material and Lotman also refers to the *periphery of periphery* as a border area (1990: 141). However, as analytical categories *boundary* and *periphery* are significantly different and are related to distinct spatial structures and distinct perspectives. Boundary separates internal and external space and should be understood namely through this relationship. *Periphery* is a binary notion with *core* or *centre* – which is the domain of dominant organisation and self-descriptions, periphery in contrast the domain of dominated and heterogeneous organisations and processes. As a *separating instrument* boundary separates the internal from the external (system from its environment or from another system) and is the marked element of self-descriptions. Periphery and centre are instead aspects of the internal organisation of the system. For spatial self-descriptions boundary would be the marked element (the dominant organising factor), the marked element for systems internal organisation would in contrast be the centre which defines the *type of semiotics* characteristic for the system and defines what remains

peripheral. While spatial discreteness is crucial for boundary, continuity is emphasised in relating centre and periphery. At the same time, the semiotic mechanism of periphery is indeed close to that of connective function of boundary: active mediation of the own and the foreign. However, a dominant feature of culture can be active interaction with the external domain, which should be described as positioning the cultural centre or core on the boundary of culture. This can be found not only in the case of founding St. Petersburg, referred to by Lotman, but also as a typical trait in the culture of large cities in general. This poses also a typical problem for talking about boundaries in archaeological material – in what sense should e.g. grave constructions be considered as articulations of cultural centre or boundary and of what kind, related to what cultural subsystem or activity?

Thus, in addition to the distinction of perspective from inside of the culture and scientific metalevel, related to separating and connective boundary respectively (see Lotman *et al* 2013: 53) a dynamic plurality of perspectives, wholes and boundaries can be found in the interactional reality of sociocultural world.

There are three points to be emphasised in the basic Lotmanian idea stating that boundary separates semiotic space of a culture (or some other system) from its environment. First, (1) boundary and the distinguished space are described from the perspective of the culture. Second, (2) it is not a *semiosic space* as congeries of semioses but namely *semiotic space* as more or less coherent system of semioses for which boundary has the function of constituting the whole and thus spatializing and also has the function of textualisation. As a whole this semiotic space has its characteristic *type of semiotics* and thus recognition of boundaries by an observer presumes the textualisation already at the object level (e.g. in considering a culture or a city as a text and not as a language like system). Third, (3) the notion of space needs to be contextualised. Space as an organised whole is based on a set of recognised spatial relations; boundary and bounding as making distinction forms this spatial whole. This reveals that expressions *domain*, *space* and *sphere* (*oblast*, *prostranstva*, *sfera*) in works by Lotman and colleagues (e.g. in Lotman *et al.* 2013) should not be taken as random but referring to levels of semiotic organisation. *Domain*, as in distinction of *cultural* and *non-cultural domain*, referring to a set of relations and differences where there can be limits but not significant boundaries. *Space* referring to distinction, organisation and spatialisation of differences, particularly by boundary. *Sphere* denotes again a particular form of organisation of relations where bounded area is characterised by internal structure through centre and periphery and several sub-spheres.

In his *The structure of the artistic text* Lotman defines space of an artistic text as a set of objects purified from all traits except those regarded as similar to ordinary spatial relations (contiguity, distance etc) (Lotman 1977: 217–218). This is a clear example of the use of *space* as a modelling tool. Lotman refers to abstract space also when discussing the concept of semiosphere (Lotman 2005). Indeed, semiosphere applies a concept of space as a modelling device. However, the spatiality becomes an object there: the semiosphere is a system that takes its spatial organisation as an object of structuration. The process of structuration involves the definition and dynamics of boundaries and relations of centre and periphery that respectively appear not primarily as spatial but as systemic traits.

While boundary is spatial, boundary-like mechanism can be more general. *Mediation*, *disruption*, *explosion*, *crisis* are all notions about similar mechanisms without actualising specifically spatial aspects. Conceptualising something as *boundary* would thus require considering its difference from other possible mechanisms of distinction and mediation.

Cultural distinctions and boundaries are not merely ideational but they are also applied and objectivated in interactions and in particular environments. This corresponds to the position that sociocultural systems or *enactments of ideational designs-for-living in particular environ-*

ments should be studied (Keesing 1974: 82) and makes boundaries tangible and valuable elements for researching cultures. Talking about cultural boundaries is talking about cultural space and respectively, some particular way of thinking about culture. Thus, it should be asked, what does the notion of boundary actualise in theories about culture and on the other hand, how do these boundaries exist in empirical world? For example, considering landscape as environment as understood by people, it appears a vital issue to recognise significant boundaries in the surroundings and also inventing and marking the boundaries. Boundary is in this case an object of recognition linked to the environment and the way of relating to it but not necessarily a part of the physical environment.

Culture is constantly relating to its boundaries and creating them. The act of establishing a boundary is also creation of semiotic reality and its objectivation. Articulating boundaries generates (1) the shared knowledge of the boundary and thus also (2) the limits of respective signifying order. A central basis for culture can be found in ability to share one's ways of orienting towards the world (Parsons, Shils 2008: 162). Establishing a boundary constitutes an area where a particular way of orienting to the world is shared and also controlled. Beyond the area of common *type of semiotics*, establishing the boundary establishes also the place for sharing different ways of orienting towards the world, for meeting cultural *Others* physically and more importantly, informationally.

In studying culture and history, theories are not merely interpretational frameworks but they are crucial for constructing research objects. Thus, attention to cultural boundaries involves particular conceptualisation of culture as well as particular roles of boundaries in these conceptions. Besides being elements of abstract spaces, boundaries are also essential means of making sense of the world at the object level or practical relationship to the world. The potential involved in combinations of these aspects is what makes boundaries valuable for studying culture – and makes semiotic perspective valuable for archaeological inquiry.

In the following I outline some preliminary points in a study aiming to bring together semiotic and archaeological perspectives on boundaries.

Essentially semiotic and spatial, boundary is a tool for making sense of the world – cultural universal and social construction. Considering that existence of a *boundary* presumes a subject making the distinction and some particular kind of spatiality as a framework for the boundary, it is central to ask who is the deciding subject, what kind of spatiality is involved and what is the focus in drawing boundaries in archaeological study on culture? Three main domains of boundaries in archaeological study of culture should be pointed out. These are:

- 1) the domain of constructing and delimiting the research object;
- 2) the domain of theoretical models explaining culture;
- 3) the domain of world view or cognitive reality of the studied community itself.

The first one is focused on the metalevel, aiming

1.a) for defining or localising the research object in chronological and geographical dimensions, understood in a universalistic manner; this can involve bounding as a method for object construction but not necessarily.

1.b) Further, this domain can aim for classification of artefacts – that is, projection of constructed wholes and boundaries to the level of study material and finding differences or breaks in unities to represent boundaries. In essence it is integration of common traits into unities and interpreting lack of unity or of artefacts as boundary. A concept characteristic to this domain is *archaeological culture* as a concept targeted essentially for organising excavated material into some kind of wholes (see also Roberts, Vander Linden 2011, and more particularly in East Baltic context, Lang 2005). Presuming existence of these “cultures” in past reality should be considered as retrospective projections.

The second domain involves boundaries more directly but as elements in theory building and explaining culture, that is, as spatial modelling tools. This approach presumes there to be a culture at the object level, culture that needs to and can be explained. There is a variety of definitions and theories of culture. Boundaries have different roles and nature depending on the conception of culture. Further, boundary can have the role of delimiting the semiotic world of a culture:

- 2.a) drawing the distinction between culture-object and that of non-culture or
- 2.b) an element in a theoretical model explaining the functioning of culture.

While both of these take their spatial conceptions from the metalevel, they can also involve significant distinctions made by the object community itself. The first one aims to delimit and define the object namely as culture, the second one focuses on explaining cultural functioning. A good example here would be the concept of *semiosphere* with its external and internal boundaries. Semiospheric boundaries represent distinction making at the object level but their spatiality is depending on the theoretical framework at the metalevel that often involves also interdisciplinary mobility of concepts like *sphere* or *field*. Differences in archaeological artefacts are common and have been made by archaeological subjects, part of them also recognised as differences. Thus it is possible to model functioning of culture on these observable similarities and differences as patterns. However, there are two major problems. First, archaeologists find extremely small portion of the material culture of only small segments of past communities. Second, as long as a model of functioning of culture involves attitudes of people towards each other, things and life in general, the model remains highly hypothetical.

This takes us to the next type of boundaries – namely asking about distinctions that existed for the past community itself, either explicitly as boundaries (that is, spatialized distinctions) or as functional cultural mechanisms of boundary, mediation, translation etc. The problem with this spatial distinction existing for the community is that the fact of recognition in the community is difficult to prove and it is difficult to define its particular status, e.g. being generally shared or particular, with unified meaning or diversely interpreted.

3.a) What did the community see as a boundary? Boundary can here pertain to actional as well as to symbolic spatiality (or also abstract in some cases) and can have projections between these. Spatial organisations can be various and the domains of cultural world image to which boundaries are related can be of different kind. In the context of culture as a complex system, each artefact as well as its location or relation to anything else can potentially be interpreted as being a sign of significant boundary.

3.b) For actual research it is crucial to ask, what functions as cultural boundary mechanism or mediator and translator, between what and what is the role of it in the cognitive reality of the community? Culture involves different boundaries at different levels, with different actualisations. However, to make use of the study, we need also to de-limit the object-culture and interpret it according to some model (aspects of previous points) – some possible boundaries to be more pertinent than others, depending on the research question.

Combination of semiotic understanding of boundaries with conceptions of culture could point to a way for talking about boundaries in the archaeological research on culture. Boundaries functioning in culture and existing in the cognitive reality of the community are particularly pertinent for Lotman's semiotic framework. However, Lotman suggests studying cultural world image through the material of textual self-descriptions and descriptions of the world. Availability of this textual material remains often a problem for applying semiotic approaches in archaeological study. Still, expressions of a community and its culture that reflect the world image can be found. Interpreting these is partly related to interpreting textual self-descriptions.

It is possible to presume the *subjectivity and agency* of the community in making signifi-

cant distinctions and researchers can speculate about the spatialisation of the referential system, world image. As a result we can ask about possibility of interpreting differences of excavated artefacts as *boundaries* or in other words, whether differences in artefacts (1.b) give reason to search in it mechanism of distinction according to a model of culture (2.b), for example, a *semi-spheric boundary*. The latter is related to the community's world image through the concept of *semiotic I* of the semiosphere.

In this line the framework of understanding boundary as an element in spatial metalanguage could support making connections between different conceptual levels and spaces as well as enable useful projections between object and metalevel in semiotic studies of culture.

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
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
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APPLIED SEMIOTICS



An Outline for a Theory of Political Semiotics

Chairmen:

Andreas Ventsel (andreasventsel@gmail.com)

University of Tartu, Estonia

Peeter Selg (pselg@tlu.ee)

Tallinn University, Estonia

Mari-Liis Madisson (ml.madisson@gmail.com)

University of Tartu, Estonia

Semiotics Applied to Marketing Communication

Chairmen:

Ricardo Nogueira de Castro Monteiro (castromonteiro@me.com)

Universidade Anhembi Morumbi, São Paulo, Brasil

Richard Tressider (R.Tressider@shu.ac.uk)

Sheffield Business School, UK

Musical Semiotics

Chairmen:

Eero Tarasti (eero.tarasti@helsinki.fi)

Helsinki University, Finland

Gabriele Marino (gaber.en@libero.it)

University of Turin, Italy

Semiotics of Cultural Heritages

Chairmen:

Eero Tarasti (eero.tarasti@helsinki.fi)

Helsinki University, Finland

Jean-Marie Jacono (jean-marie.jacono@wanadoo.fr)

LESA, Université d'Aix-Marseille, France

Dario Martinelli (dario.martinelli@ktu.lt)

Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

Hamid Reza Shairi (shairih@gmail.com)

Université Tarbiat Modares, Iran

Pirjo Kukkonen (pirjo.kukkonen@helsinki.fi)

Helsinki University, Finland

Semiótica de la Marca / Semiotics of Brand

Chairmen:

Antonio Caro (antcaro@ono.com)

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

Dimitar Trendafilov (trendafilov.dim@gmail.com)

New Bulgarian University

Semiotics of Color

Chairman:

Mony Almalech (almalech@abv.bg)

New Bulgarian University

Semiotics of Religion

Chairmen:

Ugo Volli (volli.ugo@gmail.com)

University of Turin, Italy

Massimo Leone (massimo.leone@unito.it)

University of Turin, Italy

Mony Almalech (almalech@abv.bg)

New Bulgarian University

Semiotics of Food

Chairman:

Francesco Mangiapane (francescom@gmail.com)

University of Palermo, Italy

Cinema and Semiotics

Chairman:

Anne Dymek (annedymek@gmail.com)

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France

Design Semiotics and Post-Structuralism

Chairmen:

Melahat Küçükarslan Emiroğlu (melahat.kucukarslanemiroglu@bahcesehir.edu.tr)

Bahcesehir University, İstanbul, Turkey

Research methods for educational semiotics symposium

Chairmen:

François Victor Tochon (ftochon@education.wisc.edu)

University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

Gary Shank (shank@duq.edu)

Duquesne University, Pennsylvania, USA

Semiotics of Web surfing and its users / Semiótica de la navegación por Internet y sus usuarios / Sémiotique de la navigation par Internet et leurs usagers

Chairman:

Rafael del Villar Muñoz (rdvillar@gmail.com)

University of Chile

AN OUTLINE FOR A THEORY OF POLITICAL SEMIOTICS

FROM ALBERTI'S WINDOW TO TODAY'S INTERFACE. A SEMIOTIC READING OF THE SEEING METAPHOR IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Sorin Nicolae Drăgan
National University of Political Studies and
Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania,
dragan.nicolaesorin@gmail.com

Abstract

What do Alberti's *window*, Pinker's *window*, Alice's *mirror* and *the windows* proposed by the *new media* have in common? All four represent metaphors for seeing, an interface through which man is granted access to reality. The window motif updates the issue of the identity-alterity, interiority-exteriority report. We suggest the complementary solution of the "seeing", "speaking" and "understanding" operators for any grid of semiotic reading of the world.

Looking beyond the seeable (signs), speaking with purpose (conveying a cultural content) and understanding the semiotic of place (constructing meaning) represent requirements to be assumed in the political discourse.

Where is the cultural sign interpreter placed with regards to the interface? The paradoxical report them between closeness and opacity is well known. In an epistemological sense, taking a closer look at something does not mean seeing better. The issue of the subject position within the semiotic act is crucial. Sight is an incomplete instrument of knowledge, which needs the mediation of other senses in order to access the construction of meanings (Stoichiță, 2013: 82–85). It is the reason for which the construction of significance becomes an operation involving all three operators: seeing, speaking and understanding.

The paper examines the role of the imaginary, of the symbolic representations conveyed in the message construction, in the preferential enabling of certain codes, a fact which directs both the political discourse construction as well as the negotiations of power relations. Furthermore, we have undertaken to identify the constituent signs of metaphorical representations specific to the pragmatic level of political discourse, the coherence between "speaking" and "doing" (J.L.

Austin's *How to Do Things With Words*). Our hypothesis is that the emphasis on the cultural and social "genealogy" of signs (myths, images and connotations activated), including in the "rhetoric archive" of cultural tradition allows the reading of any type of reality (Beciu, 2009: 25).

1. The *Window*, Opening from Culture to Nature

1.1. A Paradigm Shift in the Theory on the Leon Batista Alberti Perspective

L. B. Alberti (1435), next to F. Brunelleschi (1425), provides Western culture the first great illusion of representation, perspectival image of reality. Moreover, a paradigm shift occurs in apprehending the window motif, the expansion of its utility function, including its aesthetic aspect, to elements which foreshadow the cognitive function. For Alberti, the painting was an open window to the world, "an open window through which I see what I want to paint" (Stoichiță, 2013: 10). Beginning with Alberti, the painting instates a new *logic of the discernible*. In the same train of thought, the window establishes a new *order of looking*, a reality constructed from the artist's perspective.

For almost half a millennium, the perspective method governed the acts of representing reality, including here Dürer's and Leonardo brushings. Another effect of the new paradigm of the looking theme captures an aspect less approached in the literature: an exemplary analysis of the forms of representing the image, of the topological structures common to painting and media configurations, derived from the window motif. The old paradigm of Western representation (Stoichiță, 2013: 65), *the window* is a virtual construction which operates on both elements of the imaginary as well as on elements of rationality. The window becomes a space for visible signs which make up reality: "Before *art*, as before *nature*, the window isolates a fraction, however it allows it to put itself forth as a new entirety." (Stoichiță, 2012: 68)

The Albertian method enables two concepts that will become constitutive to any act of representing reality in media constructions. The first is *perspective*, the other is the *story (historia)*. The two notions empower the encounter of two fundamental dimensions of human nature within the construction of a text: the idea of order (a constituent of any aesthetic text) and the idea of narrative (which activates any interpreter of a communicative act). Narrating is an event, an act of creation of great imaginative fruitfulness. The narrative act potential in the construction of the public image of a subject is recognized (Borșun, 2011: 159).

How can we understand the manner of representing reality in the postmodern society from the perspective of an archeology of looking? How do society's power struggles determine the metaphors of looking and how do they direct the screen figures?

A space for looking, *The Window* represents a margin, a threshold that invites dialogue, a crack in the image which allows the passage between myself and the World. The window motif updates the issue of the identity-alterity, interiority-exteriority report. The window invites you to experience the act of looking.

Gérard Wajcman distinguishes this screen figure as a key concept, a pictorial object fundamental for thinking (2004: 64). The French professor would go on to unveil the transparency ideology, specific to postmodern society. Its effect is to limit the individual's space of freedom, by dismissing the "desire part associated with any visual endeavor" (Stoichiță, 2013: 14), as Lacan had shown. In this context, the political discourse lies behind the connotative marks of the *transparency ideology* (the metaphoric ideal of democracy), and the media plays a special part, seductively disguised behind a *tyranny of images*.

1.2. Frame Theory and Alberti's Frames

The painting is the result of a virtual construction that starts by drafting an imaginary object

(*rectangular frame*)¹. The method described by Alberti means an *act of establishing a semiotic code*, the conventions which intermediate the function-sign construction specific to the cultural unit (*the painting*). The concept of frame is rediscovered in sociology by Erving Goffman (1974). This time, the frames represent principles by which we are able to organize human experiences, which help us define communication situation (Goffman, 2007: 268).

Goffman's frame is formal and abstract, just like the Albertian frame. The communication sciences were contaminated by the notion. Professionals in the field have become familiarized with the concepts of perspective, visibility, frame, angle, etc. The all stem from a liminal screen device, Alberti's Window.

The media interpretation frames may sometimes be construed as interpretation schemes for events in a certain context (similar to Alberti's construction). The viewer's perception is oriented by the manner of event construction. According to Iyengar & Kinder (1987: 4), the most important topics for media networks also become a priority for the public: "By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged. *Priming* refers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations." (1987: 63)

The interpretation frame theory has become relevant from the perspective of looking metaphors and for political communication².

1.3. Case study – A Pictorial Model Becomes a Type in the Media Discourse Constructions

In short, it is about highlighting a structural isomorphism between the image configurations proposed by some aesthetic texts and the image configurations in the media discourse. The idea of establishing such an analogy stems from the theoretical approach on the issue of *classifying or of representation margins* from the pictorial texts (Stoichiță, 2012: 55). A stylized illustration of the screen, the window is one of these images establishing certain relations with the World. The representation hyper-coding, the frame windows in the media discourse form into *types* whose interpreters expand to the meaning of 15th century aesthetic discourse.

In painting *Crist in the House of Martha and Mary* (1618), Velázquez proposes a new representation paradigm. A structural composition within a typological configuration containing two representation methods: "*Alberti's window*" and "*Bamboccio's window*" (2012: 30). A duplicated image, the image whose theme is the image. The technique of overlaying frames is a configuration type familiar to the media discourse, editorially motivated by the principles of coherence and discursive cohesion. This is one of the image *types* we aim to analyze in detail. Annex No. I illustrate a mechanism of identifying cultural artifact (α_1) for one media type (γ_1).

"Alberti's window" is a metaphor of perspective method, a coherent and homogenous representation of a reality event (2012: 29). Alberti's interpreter sees reality from the artist's perspective. "Bamboccio's window" accidentally classifies a real event: it may crop a fragment from reality (2012: 30), "without deviation or alteration", similar to a live broadcast of reality. The two image levels represent two moments of reality; *introductive scene*, commentator space and *reference scene*, the fragment of reality proposed to the spectator. The interpreter simultaneously sees the two fragments of reality. Furthermore, he must operate the inter-contextual relation (hyper-coding) between the two image levels (2012: 33). The Viewer-interpreter is involved twofold in the painting, in two different manners (2012: 65). On the one hand, he visualizes the main scene,

¹ "First of all about where I draw. I inscribe a quadrangle of right angles, as large as I wish, which is considered to be an open window through which I see what I want to paint", L. B. Alberti, *Op. cit.*, p.27.

² "This process is accompanied by political communication becoming more visual, more performative, more theatrical and more aestheticized", Holly, 2008: 317.

in a dialogue with the enunciation scene main actors, almost “face to face”. We will call this initial interpretation level as a *contextual reading of the event*. On the other hand, he is oriented to view the background images. This is the reading *meta-communicational level*, where the event seems to be talking about itself.

One of the hypotheses of this study implies that perspective organizes, on the one hand, the field of vision (the selected fragment of reality) and, on the other hand, it subjects the looker’s position to this field. People learn to look at things through a filter whose configuration is fashioned by the staging of discourse (Eco, 2008: 290).

The analytical decoding scheme for a media *type-configuration* similar to a *cultural artifact*, for duplicated images, follows a procedure which implies the:

- (1) – MONITORING › (2) – SELECT › (3) – IDENTIFICATION › (4) – COMPARISON › (5) – SELECT MEDIA-TYPE › (6) – HIGHLIGHTING OF THE ORIGINAL CULTURAL UNIT SEQUENCE

Mathematical formalization of the procedure is as follows:

(6)	(5)	(4)	(3)	(1) + (2)
α_i	$\leftrightarrow \gamma_i$	$\leftarrow \omega_{t_i}$	$\leftarrow \omega_{1_i}$	$\leftarrow \omega_{1_{i1}}, \omega_{1_{i2}}, \omega_{1_{i3}}, \dots, \omega_{1_{ik}}$
			$\leftarrow \omega_{2_i}$	$\leftarrow \omega_{2_{i1}}, \omega_{2_{i2}}, \omega_{2_{i3}}, \dots, \omega_{2_{ik}}$
		
			$\leftarrow \omega_{j_i}$	$\leftarrow \omega_{j_{i1}}, \omega_{j_{i2}}, \omega_{j_{i3}}, \dots, \omega_{j_{ik}}$

$\alpha_i, i = 1 \div n$, it represents *cultural artifact i*, which serves as a topological model for the type γ_i *media frame*;

$\gamma_i, i = 1 \div n$, it represents the *type γ_i media frame*, which was selected to represent the frame category topologically similar to the α_i topological model, of all the j media stations emblematic frames;

$\omega_{t_i}, i = 1 \div n, t = 1 \div j$, it represents the *emblematic media frame* for television station t , selected from its own category to represent frames topologically similar to *cultural artifact i* (assuming that we have identified a number of “ k ” topologically similar frames);

The initial stages imply the accomplishment of abstraction processes, from which to only retain the objects containing topologically pertinent traits. The final stage (6) implies a special semiotic labor. The highlighting of the referent (cultural artifact), implies the vectorialization of various competence types in terms of pertinently identifying an original group. An important role in the success of such operations is granted to *encyclopedic competence*, understood in terms of a language-independent world cognition (Borțun, 2011: 59).

One of the fundamental tenets of this paper is the updating of the looking motif, of its epistemological evolution and transformation in all forms of reality construction, from the tradition of painting to narration, from cinematic to media discourse.

2. The World Seen through the Window of Alberti and Pinkler and Sometimes through Alice’s Mirror

The window admits a consistent semantic freedom and allows the association of visual devices that share certain similarities, such as the mirror, for example. The mirror allows looking “*through*”, while the mirror allows looking “*in*”, although, in many cases, looking “*in*” also

implies the possibility of looking “*beyond*” or “*through*”³. This feature is frequently practiced in political life interactions, where looking saves seeing, being focused on something internal overlooked by the speaker, aspects related to publicly inexpressible understandings.

The place of Alberti's painting, as a window for portraying reality, is now taken by language, a window into human nature. Language “*reflects the way we grasp reality, and also the image of ourselves we try to project to others, and the bonds that tie us to them. It is, I hope to convince you, a window into human nature.*” (Pinker, 2007: 11)

The new way of operating postmodernism⁴ allows us to experience the transgression of world limits. The mirror is a metaphor of looking, which allows such exercises.

From the semiotic perspective, the mirror image is not a “real” image, similar to the pictorial image or the media simulacra, but the manifestation of an object effect, a virtual image. The transmitter is also a co-transmitter. Expression and content also coincide, and “the referent of a mirror image is a purely visual matter. The speculated image is not a sign and cannot be used to deceive.” (Eco, 2008: 286)

However, Carroll cancels the focal distance from the object and puts Alice in the mirror. The *sign seeker* (Stoichita, 2013) may be tempted to look for meaning in the founding myths thus describing initiatory experiences, the journey to the world beyond (Culianu, 2007). Language, a symbolic instrument created by man, is constitutively charged with fictional potential. It may mediate journeys to possible worlds, basically exploring its limits.

Similar to the window, the liminal screen illustration, the mirror is a space of thematized experiences of looking⁵.

Alice, journeying through the mirror, “has gained a knowledge of her identity, she can think logically without losing her imagination” (Auden, 1991: 176).

As the liminal illustration of the screen, the mirror, pushes looking to the limits, thematizing the pictorial discourse, so does the mirror push the limits of language in literary discourse, testing its ability to convey meaning. Both have an essential role in the configuration of political discourse.

3. The Subject Position in the Semiotic Act. Between Narcissus and Pygmalion

The interiority-exteriority dichotomy is seen today in Shakespearean terms: to be or not to be (on the screen)? The latter issue, beyond the charm of the drama referent, draws attention to an important aspect. The media discourse, similar to the political one, not only represents means of conveying and presenting reality, capable of providing a real *Imago Mundi* (Frumușani, 1999: 239), that could update social reactions such as those of Andersen's tale, *The Emperor's New Clothes*: “The Emperor is naked!”. Both play an essential part in the social construction of reality. They can both create reality (through pseudo-events) or they may annihilate it. The politician has a single shakespearean choice: to be... on screen!

However, being on screen does not guarantee accurate knowledge of reality, a fact demons-

³ “the other day, at the coffee shop, a lonely teen glared at the room; sometimes his eyes stopped on me; I was then certain he was *looking* at me without being sure whether or not he actually saw me: unthinkable distortion: how to look without seeing?”, Barthes, 2010: 32.

⁴ I understand postmodernism in the sense portrayed by Umberto Eco: “an ideal category, or better still, a *Kunstwollen*, a way of operating. We could say that each period has its own postmodernism, just as any period has its own form of mannerism (in fact, I wonder if postmodernism is not simply the name of *Manierismus* as a meta-historical category.”, 1983: 102-103.

⁵ “To pass to the other side of the mirror means to pass from the designation report to that of expression, without stopping at intermediaries such as manifestation, significance. It means to reach a realm where the language is no longer linked to what it designates, only to what it expresses, so which meaning”, Deleuze, 1991: 188.

trated daily by politicians.

The position of the subject in the semiotic act becomes essential in the construction and establishment of meanings. His perspective is unique, although the experienced share with others are similar. His view is inimitable, it defines identity, and the particular manner of perceiving reality. Bakhtin (1990) introduces the concept of “*law of placement*” in order to explain this phenomenon (Holquist, 1990: 21), which becomes relevant for understanding the identity-alterity relationship, I-Other: “each person is in a unique place for seeing the world as the fundamental condition for understanding” (Holt, 2003: 226).

To understand reality through its representation places the subject in an insurmountable, but fascinating paradox, fully exploited in the media discourse. Postmodern man is somewhere between Narcissus, a victim of *self-interference* (Marcus, 2011: 837) and Pygmalion, a victim of the *simulacrum*, fundamental component of the Western imaginary (Stoichiță, 2011: 281).

Looking is an incomplete tool of knowledge, which requires the intermediation of other senses in order to gain access to the construction of meaning (Stoichiță, 2013: 82-85). It is the reason for which the semiotic construction becomes an operation involving all three operators: looking, talking and understanding.

4. Political Discourse Metaphors

4.1. Imaginary, Metaphor and Political Discourse

The political discourse is a space where reality is redefined through linguistic categories, “as the political language is both a form of describing/illustrating the world and a manner of strategic actions taken within and for the world” (Frumușani, 2012: 146).

Hence, the refining of speaker discursive strategies, used to apprehensively open the *Romanian imaginary dowry*, appears not only as evidence, but also as a necessity in the Romanian public discourse. Especially considering that Romania is, according to some authors, a special case: “This proximity of the Romanian culture and imaginary stems from ancient cultural and historical roots which make Romania, perhaps from all of Europe, the country which retained a unique mythological substrate, not covered, I would say concreted, by a rationalistic culture as seen in Western Europe” (Wunenburger, 2003: 27).


To that effect I’ve observed the dynamics of meanings within the domestic political discourse and metaphoric mechanism, such as possible correspondences in the *rhetoric archive* of our cultural tradition.

Linguistic knowledge is oftentimes either a metaphorical knowledge, a cognition through images (Coșeriu, 2001). The successful use of a metaphor increases the speaker’s authority, who proves capable of subtle associations, of understanding the *community semiotic treasure*, of “thinking with his heart” (Bortun, 2011: 128).

4.2. Coherence between Words and Actions. Political Discourse Issues

By analyzing the discourse sequences which demonstrate this aspect, in the local political discourse, the results implied a certain semantic stability, as well as convergence to the idiom “*Words aren’t worth two pence*”. This is part of the structural metaphor class (the idea of trust is structured in pragmatic, trading terms).

The semiotic code constructing the metaphoric mechanism may be schematized as follows:



The dowry of the Romanian imaginary is rich in idioms concerning the relationship between words and actions. These represent the premises of a “colorful” metaphorical language, called *metaphoric references*: “Beating the wind”, “To carry fire in one hand and water in the other” etc. All these linguistic achievements help us classify metaphors in a certain *cultural pattern* (Iliescu *et al.*, 2008: 26).

The story behind the metaphor is much older. The fundamental theme is the appropriateness of *speaking* and *doing*, a central theme in the theory of language acts.

The relationships established between statements and the world bears nuances in the Judeo-Christian cultural pattern: “What would you prefer? Promise and not deliver or be reserved, but finally adopt the unobtrusiveness of the act? [...] We all often say that he who “cants” bears no credit. But things are different here: it’s better to do things differently than how you said you would do them, if what you say is doubtful” (Pleșu, 2012: 240).

4.3. Forms of Looking Metaphors in the Political Discourse

Looking metaphors can gain profound meanings in the social construction of reality on various levels:

- (i) *cognitive* – “Here’s how I see Romania”, “We must show legislative transparency” etc.
- (ii) *social practice* – “he glanced beyond the walls”, “I’d show the white feather!” etc.
- (iii) *emotional* – “Their eyes met”, “He seems blinded by his own ambition” etc.

Visual experience is integrating, which explains the semantic wealth of looking metaphors (Marcus, 2011: 828).

Analyzing recent political discourse (2013-2014) and applying a process of abstraction for metaphoric constructions of looking, including those involving semantic marks specific to the same (clear, transparency, opacity, vision, blindness, perspective, etc.), one may identify a few looking metaphor *types*. The outcome is similar to that known in the literature (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, Danesi, 1990, Ortony, 1993 & Coulson, 2006):

- (i) UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING
- (ii) KNOWING IS SEEING
- (iii) THINKING IS SEEING
- (iv) SEEING IS TOUCHING

4.4. Conclusions

(i) To look metaphors as mediators between the imaginary and rationality means freedom in semiotic constructions.


(ii) Metaphoric representations are crucial to the relationship between words and actions.

(iii) The presence of imaginary forms within the political discourse allows the mediation of meanings. The imaginary can provide coherence and consistency, legitimacy and power to the discourse and political actions (Wunenburger, 2005: 117).

(iv) The lack of passion for politicians in terms of rational and argumentative discourse order, the absence thereof from the domestic public sphere metabolism is expressed through the *unusual combination of “European” dynamism and Oriental sensuality* (Pleșu, 2013) overwhelming the Romanian political scene. Thus, the hypothesis according to which the lack of a natural order in discourse rationality can explain the difficulties of adapting to linguistic, social norms etc., specific to the Western world gains plausibility.

(v) This postmodern disarray of Romanian political life seeking for an identity (*Pirandello Effect*) has an alternative in a coherent system of symbolic representations, identifiable in the Romanian imaginary.

Saying a lot with few words represents the formula of expressiveness. For this reason, the paper is a plea for refining the speaker’s discursive strategies, in an attempt to apprehensively open (in a gesture of semiotic common sense) the Romanian imaginary dowry.



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THE UPRISING OF SOCIAL VALUES AS A STAKE OF THE 2012 GREEK ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN. FOLLOWERS OF SYRIZA ARE DESIGNING THE NEW POSTERS FOR THEIR PARTY CAMPAIGN

Lazaros Papoutzis
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
sfinas3@gmail.com

Anastasia Christodoulou
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
nata@itl.auth.gr

Ifigeneia Vamvakidou
University of Western Macedonia, Greece
ibambak@uowm.gr

Argyris Kyridis
University of Western Macedonia, Greece

Abstract

Election campaigns became the most suitable spatio-temporal contexts where and when any (possible) President will implicitly or explicitly connect to some powerful mental images, adapted to the social and cultural embeddings. In this paper, we focus on the study of 25 election campaign posters during the 2012 election campaigns in Greece as they had been ordered and produced by particular followers-designers of the left-orientated party of Syriza. In the Greek elections of 2012, Syriza's rise has put pressure on the traditional forces to create a wider coalition and had produced many "alternative" posters. The aim of this piece of research is to illustrate the socio-cultural meaning of these posters: the literature offers three general conceptions of the receivers, as-mass, as-outcome, and as agent. The audience-as-agent conception (poster creators as transcoders of political ideology/ followers-designers) has largely come to dominate our understanding of the engagement between the viewer and text, therefore this model allows

us (the viewers) to move toward the idea that viewer engagement can itself create social value – whether cultural or political. Our research is based on socio-semiotic methodology (Barthes, 1977; Kress, et al 1996; Lagopoulos & Boklund-Lagopoulou, 1992; Randviir & Copley, 2010), which is not confined to a formalistic approach of texts, but scrutinizes them as an integral part of a material, socioeconomic and political context. We apply this methodology in order to determine the messages ideology in relation to the world of left-orientated politics. The analysis led to a series of important data referring to the structuring of the verbal and iconic message of the posters and how this messages and signs are connected with “new forms” of politics, which are reproduced by Party followers. Political posters have the potential for meaning (are signs with appearance, information and targets), but that meaning probably, cannot be directly transmitted from any designer to the gaze of voters. It can only be mediated through the voters’ social context, which lies outside the designer’s control. This semiotic mechanism, in which followers-designers and voters are connected through posters, is where socio-cultural value being more realized.

1. Introduction – Theoretical background

The main exponents of politics and at the same time official bodies of ideology are the political parties, the so-called ‘parties of power’ within and outside Parliament. Mass communications comprise institutions and techniques by which specialized groups use communication tools to disseminate symbolic messages in a crowded and heterogeneous audience (Janowitz 1988). Under a sociological perspective, mass communication has the character of a social relationship in which a big amount of people and groups takes part. Thus, political advertising, arranges to feed the masses with social standards, which ensure systemic balance, especially in an election campaign period.

Therefore, the mechanisms of mass culture use various methods of influencing by means of indirect, diffuse and internalized coercions, thereby introducing the so-called symbolic violence, as Antonio Gramsci had designated, *a cultural hegemony* (Petras & Veltmeyer 2001), which is no other than the dominant culture (Gramsci 1971; Eagleton 1991; Manheim 1985; Althusser 1984). According to Baudrillard, the mass media are not simple coefficients but modulators of the dominant ideology, through which promote definitions of reality which completely invalidate critical thinking – crafting, in fact, a fake reality (Hall 1980) and giving the receiver the feeling that the thought of the transmitter is his own thinking, confirmed by a third party (Downing 1980).

Posters were used as a tool both in politic actions and war, but with certain limits, which made them acceptable because of the situation. The end of the First World War and the various political upheavals in Russia and elsewhere, were two important factors that influenced the direction of political posters for something new, not commercial. This thing didn’t satisfy both governments and poster creators. Until 1950’s, the idea of political posters was a “medium of advertising persuasion” or an “artistic” medium of advertising (Barnicoat 1972).

The poster is a prime form of ideological speech; it is a creation of advertising – being integrated into mass communication. Used largely by advertising because its visual-scenic status enables it to transmit polysemy and high density signals mainly through its virtual function. As a carrier of meanings, it produces ideology allowing intervention codes inherent in society. At the same time, it uses images, concepts, ideas, beliefs, myths, etc. available in the mainstream culture. The poster, in other words, is not merely a reflection of the dominant ideology; but a process that we could argue, which is one of the most typical examples of “myth” in a Barthesian sense. Barthes (1979) describes the myth as a particular semiotic system, derived from a first semiological chain which existed before myth. The myth namely is a second semiotic system. So,

political campaigns are the most suitable for projecting social or other values and also ideology of each party. As well as, it derives a question which Andreas Ventsel puts (2014: 175-192) on how to visualize hegemonic relationship in photography, as photography is a strong instrument on which power relations are established (in our case in political posters).

In Greece, there are 7 major political parties that are elected in the Parliament after the latest elections of 2012 (New Democracy – Syriza¹ – Pasok – Golden Dawn – Independent Greeks – Dimar – KKE). Syriza is the major opposition party, led by Alexis Tsipras (40 years old) and elected 71 MP's. In the Greek elections of 2012, Syriza's rise has put pressure on the traditional forces to create a wider coalition and had produced many "alternative" posters. Election campaigns became the most suitable spatio-temporal contexts where and when any (possible) President will implicitly or explicitly connect to some powerful mental images, adapted to the social and cultural embeddings.

In this political and ideological context we focus on the study of 24 election campaign posters during the 2012 election campaigns in Greece as they had been ordered and produced by followers of the left-orientated party of Syriza. The aim of this piece of research is to illustrate the social meaning of these posters. The key question is how people make signs in the context of interpersonal and institutional power relations to achieve specific aims.

Political posters have the potential for meaning (i.e. are signs with appearance, information and targets), but that meaning cannot be directly transmitted from the designer to the gaze of voters. It can only be mediated through the voters' social context, which lies outside the designer's control. Our researching question refers to this context where social value is realized. Obviously, the definition of values is difficult to be given while value is that man believes he deserves in life. It would be, in other words, an illusion to give a definition for the term value, since the boundaries of terms are socially defined and we understand that vary depending on the 'filter' we use to analyse them (ideological, cultural, economic, scientific, philosophical, etc.).

What a person or a culture considers as a value, for others it is demerit. The general use of the term in social sciences implies any object of any need, attitude or desire. The interest of sociologists did not focus on the validity and relevance of the scientific importance of values, but regardless of their definition, they considered values as 'empirical variables' within social life. For social scientists, the scientific importance of values was not related to whether the values are true or false, valid or not, but to explore the use of the term by the people in a society where those who profess to believe them as true and correct. So, social values are ideas and beliefs of the majority of members of a society for the desirable and undesirable, the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly (Christodoulou 2013).

Studying ideology brings semiotics in an interdisciplinary contact with philosophy and the social sciences. U. Eco describes ideologies as codes that are present in the messages with a number of associations (Nöth 1995: 377–378). Ideology operates primarily at the level of associations, often by unconscious meanings, which have texts or practices. In this sense, ideology resembles a hegemonic attempt to restrict certain associations to establish new and to generate new connotations, according to Barthes. Texts, as ideological forms, often carry a 'latent consciousness', a hidden ideology, as they present the world with a particular image (Storey 1993: 2–6).

As mentioned before, the analysis in this paper focuses on posters of SYRIZA, having in common, paradigmatic axis of social values. In fact, the discussion of the analysis of the term social values in an exemplary axis means that there is a debate opposite meanings, but the visual comparison of different producers of posters. This means that ideology (party) and its lin-

¹ *Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras*, Coalition of the radical left.

guistic realization reflect one another, so that each partisan statement arises primarily 'social', namely a reflection of society and not just a disciplined manipulation of significance (Iedema 1995:22–36). The term social value appears as a concept to deal with an ideological agreement – in this case the selected posters. The choices at the level of words or codes will likely support or disprove the above terms based on the analysis.

The question that arises in the context of an analysis is *why the analysis is done*. The answer to this question relates to the reminder that the texts selected for analysis did not differ ideologically, culturally, socio-economically and politically, by a clear framework within which it is embedded, namely, 'bear', values and ideas, because of the fact that are produced for a particular party in an election campaign. It is known that language is not "socially innocent", while words have a second memory and are lined with associative loadings. Language carries numerous information and ideological messages (Barthes 1971). Texts namely are studied as cultural texts in their current socio-political context (Iedema 1995).

2. Analysis

The analysis of twenty four (24) posters is based on a linguistic content analysis in the context of structural semantics to reveal apparent mechanisms of the production of meaning (Barthes 1977; Greimas 2005², Kress et al 1996; Lagopoulos & Boklund-Lagopoulou 1992; Randviir & Copley 2010). The analysis is not confined to a formalistic approach of texts, but scrutinizes them as an integral part of a material, with socioeconomic and political context.

Structural semantics is a method of analyzing not only natural languages but every semiotic system. Principal of structural semantics is that the basic semantic structures and the elements of a culture permeate all the semiotic systems of this culture. It assumes that the basic structures of the text are 'hidden'. The aim of the structural semantics is to identify the main structures of significance of the text and to make clear their internal relationship. Basic concept of structural semantics is the isotope, namely all units ratio (references) according to their semantic content (semantic code).

The analysis revealed 15 semantic codes, covering the semantic content of the responses to the level of detail of interest, that is, reports concerning to values or demerits in an individual and social level. These are the following semantic codes: reversal, resistance, of values, arise, national, leisure, electoral, political, historical, temporal, monumental, traffic, people, humorous, literary.

Taking advantage of the specificity of this campaign – which was designed by ordinary members of the party and not by an advertising company- we seek the non-linguistic communication of left ideology and how it is represented in visual material. The visual semiotic perspective in our case discloses that it is a social research process, thus we proceed from "language" to the "semiotic" mode. By this point of view, new forms and modes of communication are revealed and integrated through political posters and representations. We apply this methodology in order to determine the messages ideology in relation to the world of left-orientated politics.

The question that arises: how a form of expression, which in this case is the poster, we arrive to a form of co-emphasis is ideology? By which way the literal level is building the prime associative level of ideology (signifiers-rhetorical/ideological signifieds). How is this made virtually?

In a poster analysis we can focus into two main axes, (a) to the poster itself (production) and (b) how people receive the message (consumption). In our research we focus in the production of the posters (figure 1).

² As it was used by Lagopoulos and Boklund-Lagopoulou (1992), Boklund-Lagopoulou (1980), Christodoulou (2003, 2007, 2014).



Fig. 1

Every poster is constructed by the same way, in tree zones: (α) The non-verbal message/ Iconogramm, (β) A steady message in three parts. For example: *They decided without us/We are moving without them, Overturn in Greece/ Message to EU*, (c) Syriza’s brand name (figure 2).



Fig. 2

The method of analysis of the 24 posters followed structurally the same mode as shown in Table 1 below. On the left the poster and on the right information about (a) the linguistic message, (b) the virtual message (persons and objects) and (c) the dominant codes of the language and virtual message, respectively (see table 1).

Poster	Verbal	Iconic		Codes
		Persons	Objects	
	we are crossing the most critical period before democracy (<i>ironic message</i>)	three political persons from (Pasok ³ , ND, IMF) wearing army uniforms	Phoenix (junta symbol)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political (army/junta) Historic

Table 1: Example of Analysis.

From the analysis of the posters we have fifteen (15) codes that are involved in the interpretive process for the production of meaning without defining the concepts of text, but they tend to limit their function as communicative conventions (Chandler, 1994). The results shown that from the total twenty four (24) posters, fifteen (15) of them have linguistic messages (62%). The linguistic message concerns on the following codes:

a) Code of Values: *health, peace, solidarity, dignity, freedom, education, culture, justice, democracy, popular power, resistance*

b) Political Code: *for real democracy and popular power, vote to the left, the attached us memorandum, loans, debts, bipartisanship sets – Greece rises, golden dawn.*

³ PASOK – Panhellenic Socialistic Movement, ND – New Democracy, IMF – International Monetary Fund.

c) Resistance code: *resistance, disobedience, we can overthrow them, to deport them, we are moving on, we have the power in our hands, go away.*

d) Literary Code: *poetry.*

e) Code of Waking up: *attention, danger, death, think, no.*

f) Humorous: *Bennito, Karatzaphurrer, you will bite again?*

g) Saluting: *goodbye, Like (facebook).*

h) Temporal: *6-5-2012, time is over.*

i) Electoral: *Here we present "solutions", through them Syriza.*

We observe that, regarding to the linguistic message on the posters, it works either auxiliary or supplementary to the operation of the "anchor" and "broadcast" of the linguistic message (Barthes 1988). By the process of anchoring, the linguistic message helps on choosing the right perceptual level, in other words attracts the gaze and the perception of the receiver on the projected image of the shapes and the messages which make use (Kress 2010). The anchorage offers us a declaration or otherwise a meta-language for certain parts of the virtual message.

Persons appear in eight (8) posters (33,3%) and are:

a) Six (6) persons with a red star heart

b) a young man.

c) three persons/politicians with military outfit (members of other parties).

d) three persons with suits and hoods.

e) the devil in blue and green background.

f) crowd.

g) the Monopoly guy.

h) German soldiers.

We observe that persons belong to politics, to religion (devil), to history (Germans), to economy and leisure games (Monopoly) and to society in general (youth, crowd). Concerning the objects, which in their majority are symbolic, they are correlated with the following codes:

a) Political: party flag, Phoenix (junta), red signs of left turns, clepsydra (blue-green), party symbols, nazi flags, *Greece.*

b) Social: jail cells.

c) Resistance: two fists on a red background (compound), punch, two fists in blue and green background (dec), Trotskyist fist.

d) Electoral: voting envelope, lobby hat (capitalism), ballot, election records.

Miscellaneous items: crook, hook, TV, lightning, backgammon, blue and green dice, nails resulting from blue and green holes, money, citadel, a theater, feet.

3. Results/Discussion

From the above analysis of 24 posters, as carriers of values of SYRIZA, raises a number of general conclusions. These findings relate to the achievement of this objective, ie, how the political ideology of the left party SYRIZA is structured. Posters, as articulated semantic sets which are 'carrying' an ideological load, were analyzed on their structural elements based on the theory of A. Greimas, i.e. codes.

The analysis led to a series of important data referring to the structuring of the verbal and iconic message of the posters and how these messages and signs are connected with "new forms" of politics, which are reproduced by Syriza Party followers. Although semiotics can analyze systems of meanings, cannot go further without interdisciplinary collaborations. It is well known that in every social and financial crisis, international community is focused firstly on education. Semiotic analysis of political posters (and not only) can contribute in citizenship education, giving deconstruction tools to citizens – pupils to raise their political awareness and also it can be

useful to citizens in order to understand the difference between ideology and propaganda.

Posters are hinged so as to be read in a particular way – reading, which hides messages. The analysis, showed to us that the structure of meanings of posters is made by a relation between two poles: “Us” Vs “Them”. This is the semiotic mechanism of meanings. Regarding the semantic charge of the “US”, we observe that they are correlated with codes as: values, democracy, popular power, resistance, history and literature. In regard to “THEM”, we observe that producers select to represent the *others* as demerits. E.g. skulls, troika bombs, devils, memoranda. So, the relationship between these two poles of “we” and “they”, shows the possible “overthrow” through our participation in elections by voting in order to give a strong signal to Europe.

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(Footnotes)

1 PASOK – Panhellenic Socialistic Movement, ND – New Democracy, IMF – International Monetary Fund.

GRAMSCI'S PRISION NOTEBOOKS: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO CULTURE?

Pietro Restaneo
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
pietro.restaneo@gmail.com

Abstract

The present paper will discuss the relationship between culture and language in Gramsci's *Prision Notebooks*. The aim will be to determine whether Gramsci's approach to the topic of culture can be defined as "semiotic". To guide us through the discussion, and to better understand the meaning of a "semiotic approach to culture", we will take as a reference the theory of Yuri Lotman, whose methodological and conceptual framework we will compare to Gramsci's reflections on language and culture not only to determine whether Gramsci's approach to culture could be defined "semiotic" (in Lotman's sense), but also to better understand his use of the word "culture", and its complex, dynamic relationship with language.

1. A semiotic approach

The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between culture and language in Gramsci's *Prision Notebooks*, through a critical comparison with Lotman's cultural semiotics and to determine whether it is possible to speak of a "semiotic approach to culture" in Gramsci. Given the vastity and complexity of Gramsci's meditations, in this paper, for simplicity's sake, we will take into consideration only two of the four poles that, according to T. De Mauro, within the *Notebooks* the author considers as the main, different aspects of individual and collective experience: "(1) the economic-productive element pole; (2) [...] the cultural pole; (3) the pole of politics [called elsewhere 'the operative pole'], and; (4) the linguistic and communicative pole" (De Mauro 2010: 258).

For the sake of the analysis, also, our definition of a "semiotic approach to culture", among the many possible, will be tailored around the specific conception of semiotics of culture in Yuri M. Lotman.

Lotman's cultural semiotics see culture as "hierarchy of semiotic systems" (languages), struc-

turally isomorphic to each other and constant interaction (Salupere, Torop and Kull 2013: 71).

The main function of culture is the production of new meanings, which is achieved through an act of translation of material from the ‘outside’ in a language of the ‘inside’. An act of translation is therefore also a creative act: new texts and meanings are produced, and external reality is reshaped and organised. We could go as far as to describe culture as a mechanism of creative “*smysloporozhdenie*” [meaning-generation] (Lotman 2010: 640).

The meaning-generation function can be carried out by culture only within specific conditions: new meanings can be produced only through the dialogue (translation) between two non-identical, or asymmetric, structures. Therefore one of the fundamental characteristics of culture is its “*vnutrennej neravnomernost*” [internal irregularity] (Lotman 1984: 11); this also implies that no system of signs (language), or text, could exist in isolation, since it immediately implies other languages, through which can sustain its meaning-generation function: “the ensemble of semiotic formations precedes (not heuristically but functionally) the singular isolated language and becomes a condition for the existence of the latter” (Lotman 1984: 19).

Finally we can define the “cultural semiotic approach” (in Lotman’s sense) as an approach: (1) that regards culture as a hierarchically organised sign system; (2) whose object is “the functional correlation of different sign systems” (Torop 2009: xxvii); (3) and whose “fundamental problem” is the “meaning generation” (Lotman 2010: 640).

2. Culture

Throughout the *Prison Notebooks*, the term “culture” is employed in a very wide array of contexts, with different meanings. Sometimes it is employed as ‘intellectual activity’, sometimes as ‘conception of the world’, sometimes as ‘intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development of a certain individual or nation’. As the anthropologist Kate Crehan points out, “given these complex and sometimes contradictory clusters of meaning, it is important to resist the temptation to fix on one of them as the ‘correct’ one. [...] It is precisely this complex argument that is at the heart of Gramsci’s explorations of culture” (Crehan 2002: 41–42).

Culture intended as “conception of the world” can be explicit and critical, in which case Gramsci defines it as a “philosophy”; or it can be unconscious and incoherent, in which case the author refers to it as “*senso comune*” [common sense]: “*ogni strato sociale ha il suo «senso comune» che è in fondo la concezione della vita e la morale più diffusa. Ogni corrente filosofica lascia una sedimentazione di «senso comune»*” [every social layer has his own “common sense”, which is, in the end, the most widespread moral and conception of life. Every philosophy leaves a sedimentation of common sense] (Q1 §65)¹. “*Il senso comune è un aggregato incomposto di concezioni filosofiche*” [common sense is a fragmented aggregate of philosophical conceptions] (Q8 §173).

The deep connection between language and culture is explicitly stated by Gramsci in many passages of his *Notebooks*: “*ogni linguaggio contiene gli elementi di una concezione del mondo e di una cultura*” [every language contains elements of a conception of the world and of a culture] (Q11 §12), “*linguaggio significa anche cultura e filosofia (sia pure nel grado di senso comune)*” [language also means culture and philosophy (be it at the level of common sense)] (Q10 §44).

3. Language

Save for a few exceptions (see for example Rosiello 1970), the theme of language in Gramsci was often overlooked by traditional Gramscian studies. In last three decades, instead, the importance of author’s linguistics studies, and their influence on his theory of hegemony, has been extensively acknowledged, and a vast bibliography has been produced on this topic².

Gramsci studied linguistics in Turin, under professor Bartoli, a prominent member of the

so-called neolinguistic school. In one of his letters to Tania (Gramsci 1971: 19th March 1927), Gramsci confesses that one of his deepest regrets was to have disappointed his master (Bartoli), who saw in him “the arch-angel destined to annihilate the Neogrammarians once and for all”. Neolinguistics was in fact created to oppose the Neogrammarian School, the dominant trend in linguistics at the time.

The Neogrammarian School was movement in linguistics that sought to explain language only by means of natural laws and physiological mechanism, therefore excluding social factors and semantics. Bartoli and the Neolinguistics (deeply influenced by authors such as M. Bréal and G. I. Ascoli), in Gramsci's words, *della linguistica, concepita grettamente come scienza naturale, ha fatto una scienza storica, le cui radici sono da cercare «nello spazio e nel tempo»* [made of linguistics, narrow-mindedly conceived as a natural science, an historical science, whose roots are to be found in «space and time»] (Q3 §74).

It's already clear, and should become clearer on a closer inspection, that Gramsci's notion of language seems to anticipate in many ways the structuralist movement (e.g. Rosiello 1970, Ives 2004a), despite the fact that he had no knowledge of Saussure's theories, as far as we know.

Gramsci distinguishes between *linguaggio*, language, and *lingua*, a specific historical language (e.g. German, English, etc.). Language, for Gramsci, is not a “single thing [...], neither in time nor space”, but rather a “collective term (*nome collettivo*), [...] a multiplicity of facts more or less organically coherent and coordinated” (*Pare si possa dire che «linguaggio» è essenzialmente un nome collettivo, [...] una molteplicità di fatti più o meno organicamente coerenti e coordinati*). (Q10 §44).

To better understand what the author means by “collective term”, we can refer to another passage of the *Notebooks*, where Gramsci analyses an article by Italian writer Leo Ferrero. In the article, the author refers to the “*ammirazione*” (*admiration*) of the public as the main factor for the flourishing of a national literature. Gramsci points out that Ferrero is oversimplifying, and the term “*ammirazione*” is “*una metafora e un «nome collettivo» per indicare il complesso sistema di rapporti*” [a metaphor and a collective term to indicate a complex system of relations] (Q21 §4). If we were to generalise, we could say that language, being a collective term as well, is also a ‘complex system of relations’.

In the *Notebooks* Gramsci constantly refers to different specific languages, e.g. to the “French military language” (Q26 §11), the “language of German classical philosophy” (Q11 §48), or the “language of physics” (Q10b §11). The reason, and also the relation between *linguaggio* and *lingua*, is clearly explained by Gramsci himself:

ogni corrente culturale crea un suo linguaggio, cioè partecipa allo sviluppo generale di una determinata lingua nazionale, introducendo termini nuovi, arricchendo di contenuto nuovo termini già in uso, creando metafore, servendosi di nomi storici per facilitare la comprensione e il giudizio su determinate situazioni attuali ecc. ecc.

[every cultural trend creates his own language (*linguaggio*), that takes part in the general development of a specific language (*lingua*), introducing new terms, enriching it with new contents terms already in use, creating metaphors, using historical names to ease the understanding and the judgement on specific contemporary situations, etc. etc.] (Q24 §3).

The passage should be understood bearing in mind the particular notion that Gramsci has of the term “metaphor”, which he intends not (or not only) as a rhetorical device but as a “*mutazione semantica*” [semantic shift] (Q11 §24): “*quando da una concezione si passa ad un'altra,*

il linguaggio precedente rimane, ma viene usato metaforicamente. Tutto il linguaggio è diventato una metafora e la storia della semantica è anche un aspetto della storia della cultura [when from a conception [of the world] we move to another, the previous language remains, but is used metaphorically. All the language has become a metaphor, and history of semantics is also an aspect of history of culture] (Q4 §17).

A conception of the world therefore determines the meanings of our language, so that “ogni lingua è una concezione del mondo integrale, e non solo un vestito che faccia indifferentemente da forma a ogni contenuto” [each language (*lingua*) is a whole conception of the world, not only a dress which can indifferently form any content] (Q5 §123). This last passage shows how, for Gramsci, *linguaggio* as well as *lingua* are not mere instruments, tools to be freely applied; every philosophy, every culture, “every intellectual activity” needs his own language to “manifest” itself (Q11 §12), and through this language becomes able influence the common sense by shaping the language (*lingua*) of a nation.

In this way the authors seems to be establishing a sort of privileged relation between the cultural pole and the linguistic and communicative pole.

4. A cultural semiotic approach?

Despite the author never openly defining it as such, culture as well could be regarded as a “collective term”, a “complex system of relations”, more than a stable and defined concept.

It is not possible to conclude that in the *Notebooks* culture is considered as system of signs, at least not in the sense of Lotman’s cultural semiotics. Nevertheless, Gramsci puts the problem of the generation of meaning at the core of it’s investigation, going as far as subsuming the study of semantics under the study of culture, as one of it’s aspects. This could be regarded as the first, strong analogy between Gramsci’s and Lotman’s theories of culture.

The analogies also are not limited to the aim of the study, but further extend to it’s methodology: in the *Notebooks* the study of culture concerns mainly the functional correlation of different sign systems, i.e. the different languages (*linguaggi*), that comprise it. The study of literary texts, theater, folklore, newspaper magazines, etc. as expressions of a certain cultural system (with all it’s contradictions and heterogeneity) is one of the main foci of Gramsci’s investigation. Seven out of sixteen main research tasks that he sets to himself at the beginning of the first notebook, are dedicate to language and literature, including a study on “*romanzi d’appendice*” (or “*Feuilleton*”, popular, mass oriented serial novels, published on newspapers), a typology of “*riviste di divulgazione*” [mass educational journals] and on folklore (Q1, §*Note e appunti*). The author also sets on investigating the “implicit conception of the world of Pirandello’s dramas”, and his influence on popular culture (see for example Q5 §40, Q6 §26, Q9 §134).

A similar methodology is followed by Lotman’s cultural semiotics: “from a researcher point of view it is more correct to speak of culture as a mechanism generating an ensemble of texts, and of text as the realisation of a culture” (Lotman and Uspenskij 1971: 152). The text is the “fundamental concept of modern semiotics” (Salupere, Torop and Kull 2013: 57), and it is always considered “as the realisation of some system, as its material embodiment [*voploshhenie*]” (Lotman 1970: 67). This entails that the semiotic study of culture is always *applied* to some texts, which are studied through the relation with the culture they are expression of. For example, the study on the *Slovo o polku Igoreve* in the light of the opposition between “*chest*” [honour] and “*slava*” [glory] in Slavic medieval culture (Lotman 1967b), or the study of Dante’s *Divine Comedy* in the light of the medieval conception of space (Lotman 1990: 177–184).

5. Translation

In many paragraphs of his *Notebooks* Gramsci seems to sketch the dynamics of meaning generation in a manner very similar to Lotman’s cultural semiotics.

According G. I. Ascoli, an Italian linguist who had a deep influence on the Neolinguistic School, the main device of linguistic (and semantic) change, rather than laws internal to each language, is the reciprocal influence among different languages. Employing a biological analogy, linguistic change through internal laws could be defined as a parthenogenic process, while Ascoli's description could be described as a non-parthenogenic process.

Gramsci retains Ascoli's explanation, and expands it to his own cultural and political theory (Ives 2004a: 55). Cultural change seems to be treated as an act of translation³ between different levels of cultural space: from philosophy to common sense, from common sense to philosophy, and from one philosophy to the other.

It has been argued that Gramsci's notion of "translation" has a double meaning: one one hand it is close to the modern concept of (linguistic) translation, one which "aims at changing both the languages involved, both the source language and the target language" (Ives 2004a: 133); on the other hand, it could be seen as a "metaphor for non-parthenogenic processes" (Ives 2004b: 99).

In the former, linguistic, meaning, "translation" for Gramsci does not mean a mechanical conversion of the signifiers of one language in those of another language (Q1 §152). Since each language is the expression of a culture, each act of translation implies a dialogue between two cultures, and two semantic histories, hence a process of reciprocal acquisition and reframing.

In the latter case, translation would be responsible for the creation of new philosophies or conceptions of the world, as for example the philosophy of praxis would be the result of the translation of the concept of "immanence", offered by classical German philosophy, into historicist form, through French politics and classical English economy (Q10 §9).

Another consequence of translation in the latter sense would be the possibility of reciprocal influence between the different aspects of human experience (culture/language, politics and economy), through the reciprocal translation of their own languages (Q11 §65), making it the main device for their development.

In both cases, we can observe an analogy between Gramsci's and Lotman's approaches to culture. In the works of both Lotman and Gramsci the text is considered to be the expression of a certain language, therefore translating a text means to try to translate said language, and the whole conception of the world it is a manifestation of, into one's own. Moreover, an isolated text could be used in the attempt to reconstruct the language it originated in ("reconstructing the semiotic whole through its parts") (Lotman 2005: 215). In this sense, for both authors text and culture have not only the function of meaning generation, but also serve as the structural memory of a whole culture: "*il linguaggio è una cosa vivente e nello stesso tempo è un museo di fossili della vita passata*" [language is a living thing, and at the same time it is a museum, full of fossils of the life past.] (Q4 §17) It is interesting to note that the metaphor of the "museum" is also employed by Lotman in his description of the semiosphere (Lotman 2005: 213).

Even more interesting is the common conception, between the two authors, of a "non-parthenogenic" mode of cultural development. The reasons for this similarity, in our opinion, connects to their philosophical and epistemological background, and especially to the epistemological fundamentals of Marxism and Hegelianism, which they both shared: "the fundamental principle of structuralism is dialectic" (Lotman 1967a: 93); and especially in Marxist dialectic, "the main engine of history was contradiction [*protivorechie*]" (Gasparov 1996).

6. Structure and superstructure

As we said in the premise, in this paper we will avoid to discuss about the political and economic-productive poles, and focus only on the cultural and the linguistic aspects of Gramsci's research.

Despite this, we feel necessary, as the final part of this paper, to briefly mention the relation

between the cultural and the economic-productive aspects of experience in Gramsci, and the possibility to find analogies, or strong differences, with Lotman.

The relationship between the cultural and the economical or, in marxist terminology, between superstructure and structure, is one of the most complex and debated topics of the whole *Notebooks*. It pertains mostly the epistemological position of “*filosofia della praxis*” (philosophy of praxis, the way Gramsci called marxism), which for the author is one of the most critical points of his enquiry (Q4 §38).

Some authors argue that in this respect Gramsci would fall in the trap of the so-called “naturalist prejudice”, where the economy, or what he calls “*condizioni [oggettive] di vita*” ([objective conditions of life] Q10 §48), is seen “as a homogeneous space unified by necessary laws” (Laclau and Moffe 2001: 89). If such were the case, the cultural and linguistic poles of life (as well as the political one) would be determined by the economic-productive pole; any semiotic activity would have its origin in a non-semiotic space, and a “semiotic approach” would have its foundation on a non-semiotic science, i.e. economy, and could be ultimately reduced to it. We argue that this is not the case for Gramsci. The notion of class in the *Notebooks* certainly has its foundation in the “economic” pole, but economy, as well as philosophy and politics, are all elements of a conception of the world (Q4 §46), and they do not belong to different realms. Even if Gramsci admits that economy, the “material element”, is “the less variable element of social development”, susceptible to quantitative measuring, it is still regarded as a “human relation”, socially and historically (and culturally) organised, as is the science that studies it (Q4 §25). Therefore, even if it’s debatable whether in Gramsci culture is the foundation of economics, we think that the opposite is definitely not the case, and that economic laws are not different, in their nature, to the so-called “social laws”.

In this sense we could make an analogy with the notion of “reality” in Lotman: what we call “reality” is an already semiotised world (Lotman 1993: 30), since for man nothing exists which was not translated in one of its languages.

7. Conclusions

Insofar as Gramsci did not possess the modern, and ultimately Saussurean, notion of “sign”, the approach to culture and language in the *Notebooks* can be regarded, in our opinion, as “semiotic”, and as such bears strong resemblance with Lotman’s approach.

The attribution to Gramsci of the term “semiotic”, as it was for the term “structuralism”, is certainly anachronistic, but in our opinion appropriate. In this regard, we would like to quote a passage from Luigi Rosiello:

Queste intuizioni gramsciane, che possono apparire precorritrici delle moderne tesi strutturalistiche e istituzionalistiche, non devono però far pensare a meravigliose capacità intuitive di intelligenza preveggenze; esse sono né più né meno lo sviluppo coerente dei presupposti oggettivistici di una considerazione sociologica dei fatti linguistici.

[Those gramscian intuitions, which might appear as forerunners of the modern structuralist and institutionalist theses, should not lead to think of some wonderful intuitive capacities of foreseeing intelligence; they are none other than the coherent development of the objectivist premises of a sociological consideration of linguistic facts] (Rosiello 1970: 358).

In our opinion this entails the possibility for that branch of semiotics called “political semiotics” to go back to the study of Gramsci, seen as a fundamental author whose reflection on power and culture from a semiotic point of view could offer an effective conceptual framework.

Notes

1. In the present paper all the quotes from Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* are author's translations from the critical edition by the Gramsci Institute (Gramsci 1975), and will use the standard reference notation, where Q# is the notebook and §# is the paragraph number (e.g. Q1 §12 means twelfth paragraph of the first notebook).

2. The first influential work Gramsci's linguistics is definitely (Lo Piparo 1979). A very important English-speaking scholar in Gramscian linguistics is Peter Ives (e.g. Ives 2004a); for a collection of essays in English on Gramsci and language by international scholars see (Ives and Lacorte 2010).

3. For an overview on the concept of "translation" in Gramsci, see Part III of (Ives and R. Lacorte 2010).

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SEMIOTICS APPLIED TO MARKETING COMMUNICATION

ADVERTISING TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES APPROPRIATED TO CONSTRUCT THE GLOBAL BRAND MR. CLEAN

Carl W. Jones
Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
carlwj1@mac.com

“Advertising is the greatest art form of the 20th century.”
Marshall McLuhan. Ad.age. Sep. 3, 1976.

Abstract

As a knowledge worker for over twenty-five years in the advertising system, I created branded communications on behalf of corporations. Using my marketing experience coupled with research into techniques and methods appropriated by the advertising industry I will demonstrate how the creators of brand messaging use advertising tools & techniques to express branded concepts.

In this paper I will examine how and why brand meaning is constructed and shared through the appropriation of advertising tools and techniques in contemporary messaging. First, I will define the concept of “brand”, and its significance. Here, I intend to measure significance in light of the capitalist system (in which it is regulated) characteristic elements. Then I will describe semiotic theory to demonstrate how it can be applied to branded advertising messages. After presenting a history of the *Proctor and Gamble* manufactured *Mr. Clean* brand, I will expound the tools and techniques applied to create this global commodity, and how these delivery systems provide the product brand meaning, through signs broadcast to consumers by way of: logos, packaging and advertising messages transmitted through mass media. Thus leading to an increase of sales, that is integral for corporations to grow within the capitalist system.

1. Introduction

As a knowledge worker for over twenty-five years in the advertising system, I created branded communications on behalf of corporations. Using my marketing experience coupled with research into techniques and methods appropriated by the advertising industry I will demonstrate

how the creators of brand messaging use advertising tools & techniques to express branded concepts.

In this paper I will examine how and why brand meaning is constructed and shared through the appropriation of advertising tools and techniques in contemporary messaging. First, I will define the concept of “brand”, and its significance. Here, I intend to measure significance in light of the capitalist system (in which it is regulated) characteristic elements. Then I will describe semiotic theory to demonstrate how it can be applied to branded advertising messages. After presenting a history of the *Proctor and Gamble* manufactured *Mr. Clean* brand, I will expound the tools and techniques applied to create this global commodity, and how these delivery systems provide the product brand meaning, through signs broadcast to consumers by way of: logos, packaging and advertising messages transmitted through mass media. Thus leading to an increase of sales, that is integral for corporations to grow within the capitalist system.

1.1 The brand

In their 1988 dictionary of marketing terms the American Marketing Association (AMA) defined the concept of a brand “a name, term, sign, symbol, design or some combination of these elements, intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or group of sellers to differentiate them from those of competitors”(Bennett, 1988). Contemporaneously a *brand* is seen as more than just an identity system. A brand can also be a complex system of interrelated management decisions and consumer reactions that create awareness, visibility and meaning of a commodity product. The process of branding may include the look of the packaging, the typeface of the package and advertising, packaging and advertising design concept and language, as well as the content and form of the product itself.

Brands are effectively created and used by way of the application of various theories in the creation of a symbol or trademark to represent the brand and its brand personality to the consumer. Some theories appropriated in the creation of a brand logo or wordmark are Carl Dare’s seven contrasts of type; colour theory, and visual hierarchy. A technique applied after the wordmark is created is the creation of a brand character. Where a personality is developed for the brand by appropriating human characteristics, so that the consumer will consider the brand as a friend with whom they trust. The personality is expressed by the following tools: wordmark, logo, advertising and shopper marketing. So that, every time the consumer comes in contact with the brand through any media or environment, the personality of the brand will be experienced. These *brand marketing* techniques are practiced in the developed, and developing world, assisting corporations in capturing consumers through the narrative of storytelling. Expressing a story around a brand is a tool used in advertising in order to build consumer allegiance, leading to the customer constantly purchasing a specific brand. This marketing trend repeats the deeply rooted need of all humans to be entertained (Lury, 2004). Later on in this paper I will define and expand on the role of the narrative as an advertising tool, using Greimas’ actantial model.

Brands are measured in sales and in earning potential. A chart is created by global consultancy corporation *Interbrand*, who publish every year a brand’s perceived value. In 2013 Apple was the most world’s valuable brand, with a value of \$98,316 m, and Pampers owned by Proctor & Gamble was in 29th place, this same company owns the household multipurpose cleaner: Mr. Clean (*Interbrand*). This perceived brand value is created through advertising tools and techniques such as: brand character, textuality, logo, typography, slogans, mnemonic devices, narratives, and can be analyzed using semiotic theory.

1.2 Semiotics

Semiotician Umberto Eco states that “semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign” (Eco, 1979, p.7) and also suggests that signs are everywhere, and they consist of: slogans, typography, body language, clothes, images, colour etc.

Semiotics is an important area of study, and its theories can be applied to communication. With many media channels broadcasting over 5,000 messages a day to the typical urban consumer (Walker-Smith), the studies and observations of theorist Roland Barthes are very important when applied to messaging that is broadcast through mass media. As discussed in his book *Mythologies*, Barthes’ application of *signifier + signified = sign* to advertising can bring insights into symbolic messaging applied to global brands such as Marlborough and Coca Cola. Barthes demonstrates how these are instrumental in exporting capitalism to non-western nation states through globalization (Barthes, 1972, p.115).

Furthermore Marcel Danesi explains that a sign can consist of symbols, words, images and “the word sign is used in semiotics to encompass anything that stands for something other than itself” (Danesi, 2013, p.590). Danesi, a Professor of Semiotics at the University of Toronto is a leading semiotician believes that “brands are one of the most important modes of communication in the modern media environment” (Danesi, 2006, p.3). I will be applying both Barthes’ and Danesi’s semiotic observations to the advertising tools and techniques applied to the brand Mr. Clean.

1.3 History of Mr. Clean

As depicted in the AMC television cable show *MAD MEN*, the 1950’s and 1960’s were known as the golden age of advertising. Corporations had been performing an “aggressive use of research and development in the postwar period to devise new and often quite useful consumer products; and the advent of television, which the advertising industry latched onto as a powerful mass-marketing Tool” (Schnakenberg, 2000, p.2).

In 1958 the American consumer product giant, Procter & Gamble - known as P&G – decided to enter a growing “all purpose cleaner market” infusing the market with it’s own version, by first approaching a medium-sized Chicago based advertising agency: Tatham-Laird. The shop’s creative director, Tom Cadden, was asked to come up with a brand name and a song, known in the advertising business as a *jingle*. These are typical tools used by advertising agencies to create messages for mass media in the 1950’s and 60’s. In 1958 P&G launched “the product—and the character—(that) were unveiled to American consumers as Mr. Clean”. This brand name and advertising were designed to appeal to the target market of “married women who did not work outside the home” as it was discovered in research that “most husbands at the time rarely performed household chores” (Schnakenberg, 2000).

Richard Schnakenberg who wrote about Mr. Clean in the *Encyclopaedia of Major Marketing Campaigns*, observed that towards the end of the 1990s the Mr. Clean brand was used by “8.5 million households in the United States alone” and was distributed in 18 nation states. The brand character was recognized by other brand names where sold around the world; Mr. Propre (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, and Belgium); Maestro Lindo (Italy and Greece); Maestro Limpio (Mexico); Don Limpio (Spain and Portugal); and M. Net (French speaking Canada).

2. Tools & techniques

I will now define the tools & techniques that were appropriated by advertisers to give meaning to the brand Mr. Clean. This branded commodity is available in various cultures, and has one brand meaning expressed through different linguistic and visual signs. The advertising tools applied to semiotic theory are: Brand name, Brand character, Typography, Logo, Textuality, and the techniques are; Illustration, Mnemonic devices, Narratives, and Hero.

2.1. Advertising tools

Brand name.

In order for a brand to be marketed, a symbol or trademark is created to represent the uniqueness of the commodity product to the consumer, so that it is differentiated from other similar products. Once a brand has a self-identity expressed through its packaging, tools and techniques from the advertising industry are applied. This is to give meaning to individual branded commodities distributed within the capitalist system. The brand meaning is expressed through the agency of contemporary messaging that is broadcast by way of mass media, to reach a specific target market. So that every time the targeted consumer comes in contact with the brand through any media or environment, the personality of the brand will be experienced, through messaging created and produced through advertising and design agencies.

During the 1950's research was performed on American housewives by P&G for the creation of an all-purpose household cleanser, and it was decided to position the household cleaner "as the perfect helper for harried homemakers." To project this strategy it was decided to construct a linguistic solution by creating a name for the product, so the advertising agency studied mid century popular culture and noticed the widespread "Mister" trend. In the 1950s it was commonly used to personify a distinct attribute; "Milton Berle was known to be 'Mr. Television'"; Stan Musial was "Mr. Baseball"; and Senator Robert Taft was "Mr. Republican." So it followed that the master of household cleaning should be "Mr. Clean" (Schnakenberg, 2000, p.3). Brand naming is a strategy "designed to convey conceptual images associated with products through a suggestive name" (Danesi 2013, p.82). Therefore the prefix *Mr.* evokes images of: male, power, respect, safe and status. The word *clean* evokes the concepts: hygienic, tidy, pure, unsullied, the colour white. Therefore the name Mr. Clean conveys the linguistic signs of: male, power, status, respect, safe, pure, hygienic, and the colour white.

2.2. Brand Character.

Once the household-cleaning product acquired a brand name, the linguistic solution to an advertising problem has to be interpreted into a visual sign, in order to link the brand name with the products attributes of "power and strength" (Schnakenberg, 2000, p.4), and give a meaning to the brand name that cannot be misinterpreted by the consumer. Leading advertising practitioner, Rita Clifton describes in her book *Brands and Branding* that a brand character is a "visual symbol that has artistic quality while representing a clear commercial articulation of business strategy" (Clifton, 2003, p.119).

It was decided between Proctor & Gamble and Tatham-Laird to "create an association in consumers' minds between Mr. Clean and power and strength, the agency chose to depict him as a versatile muscle man" (Schnakenberg, 2000, p.4). It is very important in advertising to create a brand character for a product that is unique from its competition, and we use visual devices because "people can picture faces and images much more accurately and quickly than they can recall words" (Danesi, 2006, p.82). In the case of Mr. Clean the agency created an image of a brawny male and "the early drawings were loosely based on actor Yul Brynner and the genie character Djinn from 'Aladdin's Lamp' " (Schnakenberg 2000, p.4). Yul Brynner was one of the most public figures during the mid 1950's who had performed in *The King and I* on Broadway and won a Tony award, and then an Oscar in 1957 for reprising the same role in the filmed version (fig 1). Russian-born, American-based film and stage actor of Eurasian background, he was considered attractive, with his shaved head, that created a memorable image (Capua). He was in his mid-thirties while on performing on Broadway In *The king and I* and in the film version, Yul Brynner wore a ring in his left ear. This symbol was associated with genies that appeared in American culture and projected a magical exoticism, which was non-threatening to an Ameri-

can public. The 1940 British film *The thief of Baghdad* has a genie who grants wishes, and in the 1945 film *A thousand and One nights* a genie comes out of the bottle and helps win love.




Figure 1.



Figure 2.

Brynner had a muscular body in *The King and I*, and this attribute was appropriated in the visual construction of the pictorial representation of the Mr. Clean Character. This was demonstrated through the hyper maleness that appeared on DC and Marvel comic superhero characters as demonstrated through emphasis on thick neck and large muscular arms. The fact that biceps are used to move the cleaning product around the surface to be cleaned, would demonstrate power in the act of cleaning, or, that Mr. Clean performed a lot of cleaning. Therefore displaying Mr. Clean with muscular arms (fig 2) would emphasize the product benefit to the viewer, and accomplish what the agency wanted of having the brand character perceived as an “all-time cleaning champ” a cleaning superhero for American house wives.

The agency then researched clothing, and explored a white garment that “represented an ex-sailor” (Schankenber, 2000, p.4). It was perceived in US popular culture, that a sailor travels the world and visits many different ports. America had recently finished WWII and the imagery of the navy was seen in popular culture in *South Pacific*, both on Broadway in 1949, and on film during 1957 (IMB), also women were wearing sailor inspired clothing on the streets (Vintage). The United States media broadcast that it had won in its war against parts of Asia in WWII, bringing democracy to this troubled region. Mr. Clean represented the mixture of America and the exotic, which created a tension that made the character interesting to housewives.

The ad agency had to decide how to use clothing to emphasize the concept of power through the brand character. A long sleeved, white shirt would cover the muscular arms that conveyed strength, while a short, white t-shirt would enhance the strong arms, and still reflect the sign of the sailor that they were exploring during this design process. The colour white reflects purity and will display any speck of dirt on its surface, therefore if the t-shirt is white it has no dirt and is pure and hygienic. The visual device of a brawny male dressed in white clothing helped re-enforce the brand name Mr. Clean, who was a respectable male, strong, pure, hygienic, and presented the products attributes of power and strength to the targeted housewife.

As finally rendered, “Mr. Clean was a strapping bald man with slightly Asiatic features and a large hoop earring in his left ear” (Schankenber, 2000, p.4). When the product was launched, the advertising down played the sailor story, and in research conducted after the launch, the consumer interpreted the visual brand character (fig 3) as “some sort of genie” (Schankenber, 2000, p.4) without mentioning the sailor sign.



Fig 3. TV commercial late 1950's. USA.

2.3. Typography

After a product has a brand name, and the brand character is visualized through a visual device, the next tool used by advertisers is Typography, to assist the brand name in projecting an image that the consumer will not confuse with another. The same effort placed into creating the brand image will now go into creating the Mr. Clean logotype, which is formed through; typeface selection; the arrangement of the letters M R C L E A N; and then applying two of Carl Dair's (2012) theories; contrast of size; and contrast of colour.



Fig 4.

Brides love Mr. Clean

because he's the next best thing to a full-time maid. Procter and Gamble's new all-purpose liquid cleaner is the all-time champ at all kinds of cleaning!



Fig 5.

The font selected in the original packaging (see fig 4) for the words Mr. Clean is a *Sans Serif* meaning without serifs in English. A serif is a short line that is added to the main strokes of typefaces. This style of typeface used on the packaging is called *Franklin Gothic Extra Condensed*, and was a very popular font in the 1950's. Its lack of serifs creates a clean line around the font, it appears uncomplicated without any thick or thin strokes. The typeface would have appeared very contemporary in the 1950's, which re-enforces the launch of a new product that was the lat-

est in home cleaning technology. Selecting a font that is not associated to another brand is very important, so that the brand name can have its own unique visual appeal. Applying Dair's theory "Contrast of size", one can notice how all of the letters on *MR. CLEAN* packaging are upper case, and the first letters M and C are slightly larger than R. L E A N, and they're also "letter spaced" apart. The size difference re-enforces the hierarchy that the word CLEAN is more important than MR, and the first letters of each word have slightly more power than the rest. The largest letter is C, which "creates a focal point around which it is easy to organize the subordinate material" (Dair, 2012, p.55).

With Dair's "Contrast of colour" (Dair, 2012, p.69-73), the letters are coloured in the warm spectrum that visually "move towards" the consumer, bringing the brand name directly at the consumers eye, and the "use of a second colour for contrast" which is yellow on the Mr. Clean packaging, complements the red lettering making it the main focal point on the package. The typography together with the red colour on a yellow background for the Mr. Clean brand is called a wordmark, which is a logo without a pictorial image.

2.4. Logo

For the last 100 years, marketing departments aim to give a branded product a meaning through the creation of visual and linguistic signs. It's difficult to create a personality for a brand if it doesn't have a name or logo. The Marketing division's objective has always been "to get people to react to brands in ways that parallel how people respond to art and religious symbolism" (Danesi, 2006, p.60).

This can be accomplished through wordmarks and logos, which are "visual signs steeped in symbolism" (Danesi, 2006, p.54) and can be defined as "true symbols in the semiotic sense – signs standing for referents in culturally specific and historically meaningful ways" (Kress, 1996).

The wordmark of Mr. Clean is combined with the visual device of a bald, muscular, male character created for the brand, producing a logo that can be interpreted as a sign. Applying Barthes' theory of "signifier + signified = sign" (Barthes, 1972, p.115) to this logo, can bring insights into the symbolic messaging. Therefore: Mr. Clean (signifier) + power (signified) = Mr. Clean is power (sign), and this is part of the strategic messaging that P&G wanted to transmit to the consumer.

The logo can also be considered a mini "text". In semiotic terms the phrase text is the "putting together of signifying elements (words, sounds, images etc.) to produce a meaningful message" (Danesi, 1972, p.69). The text created in the Mr. Clean logo reflects the brand positioning of all-purpose cleaner that is the housewife's perfect helper because of its power and strength. This is reflected through the combination of: typography; colour; male; shaven head; muscular arms; white shirt; and the addition of a golden earring that brings in the tension of American/exotic.

2.5. Textuality

As defined by Danesi in his book *Brands* "signification systems... are established through brand names and logos... constitute the 'referential system' upon which advertisers create ad texts to display them in various media (print, radio, television etc.). The form they are given in advertising campaigns can be called their 'textuality'" (Danesi, 2006, p.70). I will now focus on how textuality was created for Mr. Clean in a 1958 TV commercial created the year the commodity was launched in the United States. (TV 1958).

The black and white TV ad opens with the words Mr. Clean written in dirt, which is removed to reveal the muscular, brand character, who is wiping the screen clean. Followed by images of soiled appliances and areas around a house, that are transformed "*clean*" by the animated char-

acter of Mr. Clean. The textuality of the commercial presents a white, muscular, male, removing all dirt, helping the housewife, whose face transmits the emotion of awe. The verbal part of the texts lists all of the surfaces he can clean including; walls, doors, windows, and kitchen appliances, which are demonstrated; six times in 60 seconds. The phrase “clean” is repeated verbally twenty times in 60 seconds. The housewife follows the brand character around the house, and by cleaning a mirror, he makes her beautiful reflection appear, inferring that by using Mr. Clean a housewife will be as beautiful as her clean home. (TV 1958) The cleanliness reflected through the verbal and non-verbal signs manufactures a tangible impression in the viewer’s consciousness, producing “indirect stimulation of a sensation (which) is known as ‘synesthesia’ ” (Danesi, 2006, p.71). “Synesthetic textuality” allows viewers to participate in the commercial as it stimulates neurological feelings to what they are seeing presented in the advertising. Semiotician Barthes in his 1977 book *Image-Music-Text* mentions that since synesthetic textuality permits viewers to become a “voyeur,” it arouses the senses by watching. It also transmits emotions through sensations that the brand activates in the brain in a believable manner (Barthes, 1977). The synthetic textuality of eliminating dirt with power, is turned into love as the housewife observes the muscular bald male annihilating grime, and stands enamoured next to him in the 1958 TV spot. Also Love is the outcome presented in the film *The King and I* starring Yul Bryner, where the female schoolteacher falls in love with the powerful, bald, king, who is fighting for his country.

3. Advertising techniques

I will now expand on the interpretations of the following advertising techniques applied to ‘signs’ presented in the Mr. Clean messaging, broadcast through the mass media.

3.1 Illustration

After the Mr. Clean Logo had been conceptualized in 1957, the ad agency, Tatham-Laird’s art director had to decide how the brand character would be expressed as a visual device. There are many options available to an agency art director, who is responsible for the visual imagery that appears on packaging and advertising. In the case of Mr. Clean, the muscles, eyebrows, neck, and facial emotional state, can be manipulated to reproduce and broadcast the message in a clear undistorted form. This also allows for freedom in placing Mr. Clean in a variety of positions and situations, such as holding a happy baby (fig 6). Cameras and babies are a difficult match for an advertising photo shoot that cost thousands of dollars, and by illustrating the situation, the art director is guaranteed the results. The agency hired artist Richard Black to interpret the character in the technique of realistic illustration. Reproducing the brand character to appear on low-resolution analogue television, was solved by creating a simplified version of Black’s illustration style. This translated version consisted of a heavy black outline of the body, and a thinner black line presenting the facial characteristics such as the smile, eyes and eyebrows of a 38-year-old man (fig 3).

The illustration technique also allowed for layered images where the brand character can be expressed as non-threatening to the target market, by being placed with babies or wearing feminine articles. (Fig 5, 6)



Fig 6. 1958 print ad.



Fig 7. 2012 US logo.

The basic illustration style has been kept since Mr. Clean's launch, and updated for today's consumer, however the basic elements of the highlight on the right side of the face, earring on left, white t-shirt, bushy eyebrows have been consistent over the last 57 years (fig 7). The highlight on the left hand side of the face emphasises brightness caused by the brand's cleaning power. The artist who illustrated the original Mr. Clean, Richard Black, died April 1st 2014 in Ohio (Black).

3.2 Mnemonic devices

In the advertising field mnemonic devices are intended to assist the memory in remembering a brand and its benefits. They are part of an ad's textuality, and are composed of verbal and non-verbal devices that can appear in any mass medium (Danesi, 2006, p.75). In Mr. Clean there are a number of devices the brand has appropriated and called its own, so that when the consumer is put in contact with these mnemonic signs, they will think of Mr. Clean. The brand's verbal and non-verbal devices are: baldhead, muscular man, colour white, folded arms, lyrics, jingle, wordmark, and gleaming star.

The Yul Brynner reference became a mnemonic device for the household cleaner, after he became less popular with the general public. The only time the public would see a baldhead was when Mr. Clean was broadcast through mass media. During the 1970's and 80's mass media created icons such as Kojak, or Mr. T that have entered the public consciousness, but faded from public view after their popularity waned. However constant reminders through branded advertising messaging Mr. Clean has stayed top of mind. As it became fashionable among males in the 90's to shave their heads, the public associated it first with Mr. Clean. This I know, as I have shaved my head since the early 1990's and have heard references, numerous times.

During the 1958 launch TV commercial, (TV 1958) every time an appliance was wiped or touched by the brand character Mr. Clean, a white star would gleam, this device appeared to represent cleanliness to the consumer. By having the star appear on everything Mr. Clean touches, emphasising that the product is a multipurpose cleaner, and works on any surface. Then towards the end of the commercial the stars appear by themselves, leaving the viewer to assume that Mr. Clean had been there. The viewer is being visually educated on their journey through the TV commercial. This non-verbal device was used to bring attention to the appliance's surface, and was accented by a verbal device comprised of one high note, "ting" as if played on the musical instrument called a triangle. It would sound every time a star appeared, signifying clean.

A jingle consists of words and music, that when put together create a mnemonic device, and “put the brand into words” (Danesi, 2006, p.75). The jingle in the commercial is a verbal device, and is part of the verbal strategy of *Mr. Clean*. Procter & Gamble’s, advertising agency, creative director, “Tom Cadden, was charged with coming up with ... a jingle to sell the product” (Schnakenberg 2). The lyrics he wrote for the song that appeared on television and radio are: “Mr. Clean gets rid of dirt and grime and grease in just a minute / Mr. Clean will clean your whole house / And everything that’s in it. / Floors, doors, walls, halls / White sidewall tires and old golf balls / Sinks, stoves, bathtubs he’ll do / He’ll even help clean laundry too!” This was repeated twice during the 60-second ad that ended with “Mr. Clean, Mr. Clean, Mr. Clean” (TV 1958).

The writer used what Danesi calls *poetic devices* to create a memorable slogan in the form of a jingle. This technique is used so that it can “increase the likelihood that the brand will be remembered” through the fact that it conveys the message through “rhyme, rhythm, and repetition” (Danesi, 2006, p.78-79). The rhyme is created by the lyrics; “minute,” “in it,” “halls,” “balls,” “he’ll do,” “laundry too.” The rhythm is reflected by the music that accompanies the song and the songs written structure, the word “clean” is repeated 20 times in 60 seconds. The lyrics also establish an enemy for Mr. Clean to eliminate: dirt and grime, this is mentioned twice.

Together, the verbal and non-verbal devices, created a memorable commercial, that assisted in Mr. Clean’s successful launch “In the first nine months after its introduction, 35 million bottles of the all-purpose liquid detergent were sold. The product soon became the top selling all-purpose cleaner in the United States” (Schnakenberg, 2000, p.5).

3.3. Narratives

As the brand character of Mr. Clean evolved over 57 years, the narratives created around his need to eliminate grime had to advance in order to contribute to the brand’s longevity. Mr. Clean’s story is expressed through advertising transmitted by way of mass and digital media. In his book *The Quest for Semiotic Meaning 2007* Danesi defines a narrative as a “story that is put together to portray reality in a specific way. It is a representation of human events as they are perceived to be related to the passage of time [...] It is often difficult [...] to determine the boundary line between narrative fact and fiction” (p88).

Algerian born, French structuralist, Algirdas Greimas 1917-1992 contributed greatly to the study of semiotics by writing about the narrative, and he also created the actantial model. The model is based on Propp’s theories (1968) and can be applied theoretically to analyze stories or narratives by breaking it down into six components called actants, and these components make up Greiman’s Actantial model (Hebert, 2006). Greiman explored how narratives are constructed, and provided their structural skeleton into components or actants.

Mr. Clean although a hero, requires additional context. Stories imagined by viewers may complicate unnecessarily the hero. To organize this the message creators made their own narrative and provided it to the viewers through the medium of television. Moving image through the medium of television has been used consistently for Mr. Clean since its launch in the mid 1950’s to present day. In October 2013 Procter and Gamble released a 30 and a 60 second commercial in the United States titled *Mr. Clean, Origin*, which explains the genesis of the brand character. For this analysis I will focus on the 60-second version. (Fig 8-TV 2013)



Fig 8. TV 2013. 60 sec Mr. Clean Origin. 3D animation.

The colour, 3D animated, television commercial, explains the life history and purpose of Mr. Clean, from when he was a small child to present day. The viewer is taken on a journey, which I will breakdown in a simplified way, using the Greiman's actantial model (Danesi, 2007, p.108): (1) The subject: Mr. Clean (2) desires: cleanliness (3) he encounters the opponent: dirt and grime, while the (4) receiver: consumer (targeted viewer, consumers family), benefits from Mr. Clean's desire (5) the consumer, by using the household cleaner Mr. Clean, helps to accomplish the *cleansing* action, while (6) the opponent; dirt and grime, attempt to hinder his cleaning. Actants are "the same ones found in ancient myths" and according to Danesi "Myths constitute 'metaphysical knowledge texts' for explaining human origins and actions" (Danesi, 2007, p.108). Greiman was able to deconstruct narratives from various cultures and time periods, and discovered a common structure. This theory was appropriated to create the myth of Mr. Clean as explained in the 2013 TV spot, and the conflict between cleanliness and dirt was first set up in the first TV commercial that aired in 1958. This myth has been the basis of P&G's message to Mr. Clean's target market for nearly 60 years and shows no signs of failing, as global sales are up.

3.4. Hero

Hero theory, as written by Thomas Carlyle appropriated the concept of *Visuality* to create and justify the hero, and this is done to maintain power over the population, and maintain the status quo (Mirzoeff, 2006). Carlyle's concept of creating a hero by appropriating visuality, has been a technique used by advertisers for many years. Either the consumer is turned into a hero by buying a product, as is the case with iPhones, be the envy of your friends, or the actual product is a hero that the consumer wants to be part of, such as Harry Potter merchandise.

The visual device of Mr. Clean is quite unique in the product category of household cleansers, where the consumer uses a particular household product, and becomes a hero in their families/friends eyes. In the case of Mr. Clean, the product is the actual hero with the consumer admiring or even loving him.

One technique used to create the hero in the advertising is seen in fig 3, in one of the first Mr. Clean TV commercials. The brand character stands, in a pose, as if he is a statue, and is admired by the housewife looking up at him. In Fig 9, it is 57 years later, and the camera angle is lower, looking up at Mr. Clean, he is presented as heroic, standing with his hands on his hips, in a pose

reminiscent of the work of Nazi propaganda filmmaker *Leni Riefenstahl* in the film *Triumph of Will*. The technique of low camera angles and statuesque poses of the subject has been appropriated in popular culture to create a noble subject and appears on album covers, comics and graffiti art. American superheroes such as Superman are drawn from a low camera angle, after they have completed a successful action, and Mr Clean is presented in this way at the end of the 2013 commercial (Fig 9).



Fig 9. TV 2013. End Frame. 60 sec Mr. Clean Origin. 3D animation. USA.

In his book *Mythologies*, Roland Barthes explains the concept of connotative and denotative, where myth occurs when the consumer reads connotative meanings as denotative. This concept applied to the Mr. Clean visual device as seen in the two television commercials in fig 3 and fig 9, produces the following connotative meaning in the consumer: that the household cleaner named Mr. Clean is actually a male hero, a superhero. What this signifies is that a plastic bottle, filled with yellow liquid, is actually a male human, who is also a hero. This meaning is socially and culturally specific and not a natural association.

As I have argued and demonstrated in this paper, when advertising tools and techniques are applied to a consumer product, brand meaning is constructed, and can also be deconstructed by applying this method.

4. Conclusion

The result of the "super hero-izing" of Mr. Clean, who battles the enemy of dirt & grime raised the status of the *housewife*. In the 1950's, American society was being reconstructed after the great depression and 2 world wars, the creation of a middle class, that in some cases couldn't afford maid service, forced the new role of housewife to take on the cleaning. She was being judged in the new classless society being watched by her neighbours, friends, and family. The housewife became the observed. McCarthyism was everywhere, even in the home. The responsibility of the mother was to provide a good home for the family, above all cleanliness. In order to accomplish that, an enemy was created out of dirt and grime. American culture thrives on enemies: good vs. evil, black vs. white, dirty vs. clean. A myth was created about *being dirty*, grime was *un-American*.

It wasn't good enough to be clean, it had to be a clean that shined. Cleanliness meant, sterile, clean mind, pro-America. Housewives were shamed into cleanliness. Not any type of cleanliness, but the cleanliness only obtained with the assistance of a new American male superhero that came in a plastic bottle called Mr. Clean. The battle was fought in the home, where we don't

see actual death, what we see are the positive results from using the brand. A white male superhero who raised the status of a housewife in the eyes of everyone who was watching her.

Since 1958 the western world has evolved, and so has Mr. Clean. Recently P&G updated his brand image by demonstrating Mr. Clean helping males clean (TV 2013), however this reboot was not soon enough. The European parliament voted in September 2008 to warn companies who use “sexual stereotyping” in advertising. American blogger and newspaper columnist Albert Mohler (2008) reported, “The (European) Parliamentary report argued that Mr. Clean, whose image dates from the 1950s, is an example of sexual stereotyping. Mr. Clean’s “muscular physique,” The [New York] Times reports, “might imply that only a strong man is powerful enough to tackle dirt” (Mohler 2008) (Carvajal 2008). This action by the parliament signifies that the brand has not been updated sufficiently for contemporary European ideology, and in my mind this warning creates questions regarding advertising messaging, should a white male be considered a hero by coming to the housewife’s rescue? If Mr. Clean was a person of African descent, what signs would be appropriated to create their story, and would they be connotatively interpreted as a hero? Is it correct for corporations to use Hero theory to promote commodity products that give corporations power through money, or should the hero only be kept for governmental/political use? Is it demeaning the concept of the hero -- as created in the bible and 18th century -- when it is reduced to marketing techniques to sell a commodity?

By applying advertising tools and techniques to analysis brands, we can observe the how and why brand meaning is constructed. These observations and learnings can then be applied to other forms of communication to deliver information to advance society, they do not only have to be applied to brands and corporations to sell products. I ask: Can doctors take learnings from advertising messaging construction to change behaviors in patients? Can advertising tools and techniques be applied to the Ebola crisis in order to deliver the correct information to the populace in a format that will not be rejected?

It is very easy to be negative about marketing by focusing on manipulation. We need to understand how advertising is created by its practitioners, and apply this knowledge to advance communication methods to benefit humankind. This method of breaking down successful branding through the analysis of the advertising tools and techniques, gives us the how’s and why of creating meaning. These learning’s and observations can then be applied to un-branded communications in areas where advertising methods are not even considered.

For example the Colombian government appropriated advertising tools & techniques to convince the guerillas to put down their weapons and come home for Christmas. The government went into the jungle and placed trip wires, that when activated, lit up a Christmas tree, with a message that said, “put down your weapons and come home to your family this Christmas” (Operation Christmas, 2011). I ask, can war be stopped through the application of advertising tools & techniques?

Also this paper raises doubts regarding my actions of merging advertising practise, and academic studies: should the practise of advertising learn from semiotic analysis? Is it worthwhile providing creative practitioners with various theories, to justify their design decisions?

Only time will tell.

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Fig 1: Yul Brynner King and I. [Online image]: <http://harlowgold.tripod.com/yulreviews.html>. (Accessed: February 20 2015).

Fig 2: TV Commercial (Late 1950's). Then and now. [Online image] www.Mrclean.com (Accessed: April 10 2014).

Fig 3: TV Commercial (Late 1950's). media.mrclean.ca. [Online image] (Accessed: April 05 2014).

Fig 4: Mr. Clean Package. (late 1950's). [Online image] <http://galleryhip.com/mr-clean-vintage.html> (Accessed: December 31 2014).

Fig 5: Magazine advertisement. (Late 1950's early 1960's). media.mrclean.ca [Online image] (Accessed: April 6 2014).

Fig 6: Magazine advertisement. (Mid to late 20th century) Then and now [Online image] www.Mrclean.com (Accessed: December 31 2014).

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Fig 8: Important Looking Pirates. (2013):second 07 [Online film] <https://vimeo.com/77231333> (Accessed: February 26 2015).

Fig 9: Important Looking Pirates. (2013):second 57 [Online film] <https://vimeo.com/77231333> (Accessed: March 2 2015).

SEMIOTICS AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: THE CASE OF FOOD TRENDS

Giacomo Festi
Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti, Milano, Italy
giacomo.festi@gmail.com

Abstract

Being in the position of both teaching Semiotics and doing research inside the academic domain and working as a consultant for an agency of communication (see Festi 2012), I would like to show how the internal development of the semiotic discipline, in term of methodology and concepts, could enhance the contribution of semiotics in the qualitative marketing research. As a case of study I will present the frame of a huge research about food trends, aimed at constituting a big platform, mapping the transformations in the food domain that could be used with different brands as a ground of reflection for marketing strategic planning.

Instead of being the first to detect new possible trends inside the social life, the semiotician could help, on the contrary, to better interpret the different dimensions involved inside an already recognized trend, in order to display the potentiality of the trend itself. A food trend, actually, can be referred to single figures (in the hjelmslevian meaning) like colors (in 2009, the purple foods were trendy...), to ingredients (for instance the trend of aloe), to specific dishes, to technologies of preparation of food (accessible sous-vide machines), to strategies of consumption or even to national cuisines (just to quote some of the most common topics in food trends). The different “aboutness” of the trend call for more interpretation about not only the values involved, but mainly the forms of connections among the different levels of organization of meaning (following the Fontanille model, 2008).

Presenting this general frame for the trend analysis, I will also question the dynamic of transformation of some trend, like the food trucks in US or the sharing of food photos at the place of consumption.

This contribution aims finally to show how to pass from a trend, as reconfigured in a semiotic modeling, to a brand strategy, in term of managing of identity dynamics.

1. Introduction

Keeping together academic research and consultant activity in the field of communication, it could lead to explore the consequences of the elaboration of a semiotics of cultures and identities for marketing practices. The expression “semiotics of cultures and identities” has to be referred here to the development in Italy and mainly in France of a semiotic approach that try to dialogue with traditionally sociological and anthropological questions, namely with the problem of characterizing meanings inside practices. One major reference is the book *Pratiques sémiotiques* by Jacques Fontanille (2008), where the author sketches a whole project of research layering different semiotics-objects (from signs, to text, objects, practices, strategies and forms of life) inside the complex dynamics of the social dimension, also articulating the forms of interaction (as a rhetoric functioning) among the multiple levels. This contribution can be accompanied by many other authors, for the purposes of this research being relevant the work of Pierluigi Basso Fossali. In Basso Fossali (2009, ch. 8), particularly, a seminal theoretical reflection about trends is present, which is the main topic of our discourse, as applied to the food domain. We are actually going to show a way to approach the quite traditional marketing topic of the trend from a specific semiotic perspective, moving through three different steps: first of all, we will look at the ways trends are becoming part of a public widespread discourse, characterizing three different regimes of discourse of the trend. Secondly, we will display the three major models of interpretation of trends, also proposing a semiotic insight. Finally, we will discuss more in depth an example of trend analysis, opening a comparative dimension involving different social phenomena and discussing the role of the semiotic sight.

2. Three discursive regimes for the trend

The topic of the trend is not only a relevant concept for marketing, since it fully became part of a public discourse, in this metasemiotic activities of human groups that constantly monitor and interpret themselves. We could say that trends are forms of re-valorization of something since they are granting a differential power. Being trendy means having chance to be perceived, since not so many share the trend yet. When something passes from being trendy to being mainstream, the high diffusion coexists with a low intensity in the perception of this social form, i.e. no one will notice it. We are just suggesting a semantic tensive background to introduce us to the topic of trend¹. First of all, however, we would like to characterize three different ways, three regimes of discourse of the trend, three ways of presence of this concept inside the social life, in this nearly foucaultian survey. The first regime is the one identified by the daily newspapers, where the trends are generally anchored to a specific social phenomenon, explicitly tagged as “trendy”. Typically, the trend is characterized as an attractor of interest in a reflexive interpretation of the social. After the presentation of the phenomenon, there is not the necessity to build an interpretative frame of it, but some suggestions can eventually appear. I had occasion to work on a corpus of news articles about different trends, trying to discover the common aspects of the discourses. To sum up, we can find a phenomenological attestation of the trend, with a narrative counterpart since the trend needs to be made perceptible for the reader. The power of the figurative dimension, supporting the narrative one, is exactly offering a perceivable access to the trend. What follows, is the discussion about the eventual process of diffusion of the trend and finally some elements of interpretation can or not be present, in this quite canonical syntactic organization. The world of journalism, then, amplifies something that someone else already qualified or

¹ For a tensive schema representing different positions in a coherent semantic space, confronting the “trendy” with the usual and the *demodé*, see again Basso Fossali (2009, ch. 8).

labeled as trendy, supposing a kind of iconisation or stabilization of the phenomenon, at least sufficient to transform it into something that can become a news. It is worth to point out again that trends are already part of the reflexive dimension of the culture, they witness a cognitive need that is also nourishing a passion for monitoring. Post-modern societies are strongly cultivating this kind of passion². Once a trend appears, we need some reason about its plausibility and its potentiality to be individually assumed. The journalism is interested in following these movements of continuous variation inside the social, especially in their inedited or innovative character. Nevertheless, in daily journalism, the trend is not interpreted in the frame of a wider system of relationships, which is not the aim of that kind of discourse.

Beyond the newspaper, we find a second regime of discourse, the one witnessed by the specialized press about food, on paper or, especially, on the web, that starts to treat in a slightly different way the tendencies. The widespread attention about food made grow what is now a kind of ritual appointment, a sort of multimedia genre: at the end of each year, a competition in publishing the food trends for the year incoming is largely present, with long lists of expected or already attested tendencies. Is the web that is mainly devoted to this exercise, since websites can display also a lot of images inside a gallery, as evidences of the presented trend. Websites like Epicurious, Foodlovers, but also the food section of The Huffington Post or The Guardian witness the growing number of virtual spaces making place to food social dynamics. We move in this case from the single and isolated phenomenon, to a plurality of social transformations. In these lists, there are two point that is worth to underline: from one side, the phenomena that can be qualified as trendy are very different, what means that there is a semantic heterogeneity in their constitution. Adopting the aforementioned Fontanille model, proposing different layers of immanence, we move from simple *signs*, like a color that can become the topic of the trend (in 2011, it was the moment of the purple food for instance³), to ingredients (their materiality makes relevant the level of immanence of the *object*), to specific dishes (to be read as *texts*, since they display a grammar of combinations), to *practices* of consumption, to specific cuisines (more directly readable in term of *form of life* that are present inside the approach of that cuisine), etc. The “what is trendy”, in a trend, is attributed to configurations that are very distant one from the other. On another side, what is the trendy aspect in the trend, what is justifying the trend movement, remains an open question, calling for further interpretation. If you take a very simple example, the trend of the food trucks that exploded in US in the last years of the last decade⁴, it is not immediately evident which aspects were trendy. To quote some of the features that has been read as trendy, we move from the mobile consumption, to the use of social media like Twitter to find out where was parking your preferred truck; or we switch from the kind of new fusion cuisines that started to be proposed, to the kind of new consumption on the go. As a consequence, what is trendy in a trend has clearly to be interpreted.

Coming back to these lists, sometimes the accumulations of social phenomena are so precise and articulated that – we could argue – are doing concurrency to the communication agencies or research institutes, that social actors that represent the third regime of discourse. It has to be added that they are also part of a social public world, since, often, some section of their researches about trends can be presented or published, online or offline, making these lasts become more visible and not just hiding them as invisible tools for marketing practices.

In the case of qualitative research, the attempt to treat the multiplicity of the trends detected with an homogeneous methodology, creating some forms of structuration of the materials, is

² See again Basso Fossali (2009, ch. 8) for a discussion about the passion of monitoring.

³ See Martens (2010).

⁴ See for instance Chang (2009).

what specifies this further regime. The point here is the integration of the identity pole: under the diversity of the manifestations of trends, at some point they participate to the redefinition of the social identities. In that way, inside the marketing research, a methodological and epistemological jump can be noticed: trends thematize identities or lifestyles. A second typical operation made by the most interesting approaches consists in abstracting, from actual trends, some system of relationships (involving values) that could be generalized, in order to project that patterns into other domains, what explains the immediate strategic valence of this option. Such a way to work is exemplar in the approach of the Italian FutureLab, ruled by the sociologist Francesco Morace (see 2011), who implicitly is adopting a configurational paradigm. In this model, it's about configuring a pattern of quite abstract relationships that become a kind of wildcard to be played inside different cultural spheres, after having of course been sufficiently original and creative in denominating the trend in a smart way.

It is quite a paradox, but this work of the agencies about trends is not supported by a consistent literature. One of the few important references is the work of the sociologist Vejlgaard, who wrote *Anatomy of a Trend* in 2007. In that book, he tries to let certain invariants in different social processes of changing emerge. Even if the perspective is a sociological one, it can be considered a good premise to a possible semiotization of the trends, since he is interested in the shape of the process and in the way the transformations involve certain kind of identities, modifying their relationships during the process. He discusses different historical cases of big international change (the introduction of the jeans, the launch of the I-pod, the spread of the motorcycle, the explosion of beer consumption in some countries) and arrive to determine a general syntax of the trend, from *incubation* in specific places (typically the big metropolis all around the world), to *explosion*, to *mediatization*, to a progressive *diffusion* until the trend becomes mainstream. After this last transition, the trendy character is no more perceived.

He also sketches a portrait of the social identities that are distributed inside a set where the different attitudes toward the trend are manifested. As a consequence, the role of the trendsetter, the follower, the early mainstreamer and the conservative appear. The relevant point is that these forms of life are determined only by the degree of assumption of the trend, composing this restricted set of possibilities. As a further element, Vejlgaard distinguishes trend from short fashion, using as differential traits the temporal extension (restricted in the case of the short fashion) and the capability of a change to become engine of markets, to the level of production and not only of consumption (one of the main feature of the trend). His approach, finally, generalizes the process of the trend that makes it indifferent to any eventual specificity of the social and meaningful phenomena involved during the process itself. We could say that he, at the end, reduces the trend process to a fashion system. An already given paradigm of identities, a given syntax of the process: only the social substance that is invested by this shape is changing.

3. Interpretative models of trends

After the presentation of the three discursive regimes of the trend, it is worth noting that we could map how the trends are interpreted and supposed to work, generating three other models. The simplest case is the *pure fashion system*. An example can be the aforementioned thematization of the purple color of food for Food-Network. It is about a pure fashion system because the range of variability is already given, it's only about passing from a dominant position to another one, in a play of substitutions and *repechage*. Who is representing the trend in this way, can try, in some case, to find out a form of rooting (in the quoted case, the author opens on the website an historical parenthesis about the symbolic valences of purple) but this is only a rhetorical operation, since it is just masking the merely differential functioning of the trend. The purple was an option, potentially trendy, because was a disposable choice inside the paradigm of the usable

colors.

A second model works on the extension of the paradigm: the trend lets appear new cases that immediately can be re-embedded inside a relatively closed system. The novelty effect is what counts in this case. For instance, following the point of view of the culinary practices of preparation of food, the technological innovation (take the trend of the “accessible sous-vide” as an example⁵) extends the possibilities of cooking and is then part of this second modality of innovation.

The third and last case concerns innovation and experimentation, which involves a kind of exit from already known paradigms and require to follow the phenomenon in the way is interpreted by the social actors that are part of it. It is as if we were in presence of a live semiotic production, a kind of social laboratory. If a genealogy of this type of trends is still and always possible (and even wished), their destiny is not. The experimental character is immanent to the trend: we don't know what that process will socially generate and the only chance is to follow the progressive determinations that it will eventually produce, its capability to be articulated with other practices and above all its capacity to intercept alternative forms of file. Following again the suggestions of Basso Fossali, the trend, in this case, presents a constitutive play, being assumed by the social actors in many different ways. Trends of this type let explode their semiotic complexity, given by the way the different levels of constitution of meanings are combined or re-combined. They are meanings conglomerates or formations that require an interpretative effort in order to grasp the internal tensions and the modalities of articulations. The “what is trendy” in a trend, the phenomenon pointed at, is exactly an open question. At that moment, finally, the semiotic skill can operate and propose its contribution.

The lesson we take from this transition through different models about trends is first of all that there is no need to find out or invent new original trends: not only semiotics is not a statistical discipline like could be sociology, but the trends that are already thematized as such in one of the three discursive spaces present inside the social, are implicitly asking for an effort of articulation and interpretation, emphasizing the semiotic possibility to follow and describe the mechanisms of meaning. Once you decide to work on a specific trend, the relevant point is the decision about the strategy of analysis, especially observing which entry level (in the Fontanille model) could be the most interesting from a methodological point of view. If we are analyzing an app, as in our following case, the main problem is articulating the object properties, the interface, with the practices and the strategies of use. The further step is the attempt to consider how identities are involved and if some “form of life effect” is present. The last step, finally, is the extraction of some core feature of the trend, in order to see if they can be exported.

4. Analyzing trends: the case of Foodspotting

Let's arrive to discuss more in depth an example of trend without presenting here, more in general, the frame of the transformations inside the food domain, i.e. the values that became dominant, mainstream or trendy⁶. The only aspect we would like to recall is that inside the food domain contradictory trends take place at the same moment, stressing, as a consequence, contradictory valorizations. This is just to reveal the living character of a culture that is not a fixed monument. These paradoxical pushes can be seen for instance in the opposition between trends that insist on the affective body (the comfort or the soul food, as is typically labeled) and others that evocate more the pragmatic body (the functional food); furthermore, we can observe trends that work on transitive valorizations (the ethical aim of sustainability) and other on reflexive

⁵ See the link to the The Huffington Post gallery of trends (2011).

⁶ For a general presentation of food trends inside a moving food landscape, see the work of Aegis Media and Deepblue (2009).

ones (the search for new testing experience), just to quote the most visible ones.

One macrotrend inside the food domain has to do with the changing forms of sharing meals and food experiences, especially thanks to new technologies and media, that are clearly splitting the actual experience of food (eating) from the projected linguistic and discursive existence on a digital platform (the participation to a virtual community).

We will focus now on the example of an app that became quite popular in US after its introduction in 2010, recording 800.000 downloads in a few months, with a lot of following initiatives connected with the world created around the app⁷. Its name is Foodspotting, an app dedicated to photograph food all around the world. The app contains a big database collecting users photos restricted to the dishes (not people, not the places), a database that can obviously be consulted by the users. How this app is participating to the changing world of food, becoming trendy? How is redetermining food identities or the identity of the user/consumer?

This is not the place to discuss the first methodological step of the analysis, the deconstruction of the interface of the app⁸, so, we prefer to consider how the app participate to promote specific practices. In the first release of the app, it was clear that each user could become a potential cataloger, which did not seem an intriguing perspective. You could “spot” a dish and photograph it, maybe being the first to record that dish in that specific place. The photo become part of the community where it can be appreciated or commented by others with a set of pre-determined possibilities (three buttons: “like it”, “want it”, “tried it”). When you take the photo, the social dimension of the community is only virtualized, since the others are not necessarily connected and the app is supposed to work in a desynchronized modality. One main point is that Foodspotting, initially, promoted a kind of pioneer being part of the enterprise of creating a unique database containing all the dishes of the world. The user had the chance to be the first to document a specific dish, feeling himself like a kind of explorer that could refresh his/her own relationship with the nondomestic consumption. Such a pioneering dimension is crucial in the key of the experimentation of the identities inside the trend. Indeed, Foodspotting intended to bypass the more traditional and institutional forms of the gastronomic guide, highly engaging in this explicit polemics. In short, no more discursive mediations that tell you something about the identity of the place (the restaurant) or of the chef, on the contrary, you are immediately put in the straight presence of the dish. The technology is introduced in the most intimate contact with food, the moment just before the consumption. Taking into consideration the life of the app, it is possible to argue that the transition to the 3.0 version of the interface was the moment of conversion of Foodspotting from being trendy to being mainstream (also after the arrival of Instagram). Not surprisingly, they changed the relationship between the two main actions inscribed into the interface, taking photos or consulting the database. They equalized the two, changing also the logo, suggesting that the taking of photos could be just an option, not the main goal of the app, like it was in the first version of the app. What happened, actually, is that people started to use Foodspotting exactly like a substitute of a guide, being less interested in taking photos during the meal.

There are many aspects in this phenomenon that should be considered for our purposes. One is that the *remediation* of the dish⁹, let's say, monumentalize it without debating it. The photo fixes an idealtype and exclude the taste from the relationship with the dishes. There is a complete vanishing of a critical gastronomical dimension and the photographic act replicate a standard solution, under the sign of a “having-to-do”.

⁷ For a thematization of Foodspotting like a trend, see Fulco (2011).

⁸ See Festi (2014).

⁹ We refer here to Bolter & Grusin (1999).

A further step in the trend deconstruction is the extraction of the core structural elements. In this case, where are they? I would say that the crucial pattern is the remediation of a previously non mediated moment (the effective consumption of food) and the enhancing of the coalescence between the digital life and the actual experience. The first point is what justified this pioneer form of life of the foodspotter, the *tabula rasa* of the gastronomic knowledge and the recreation of a photographic community of food enthusiasts. A kind of verification of this feature extraction is the development of a countertrend, the resistance to the over-mediatization of the restaurant experience. Some restaurants (starting in NY City) decided to display, on the entrance window, the poster “deinstagrammed restaurant”.

Once we get the general features of the trend, we can develop unusual comparisons looking for similar or dissimilar patterns inside different social phenomena. For instance, another trendy social transformation, connected again with the new media, has been related to the launch and development of the website “fridge watcher”. The main idea is to take a photo of one’s own fridge in order to witness some aspects of a personal identity (a kind of transposition of the motto “tell me what you eat and I will say who you are”). In this case, in analogy with Foodspotting, the remediation has been introduced in an intimate and original space, before consumption, with the idea of a direct contact with an identity, a revelation effect of a very personal place. Here again, a community aspect is involved, and the photographic act is the proactive element aggregating people. This is to say that the core feature of a trend, quite abstract in their relational pattern, can be embedded inside apparently very different or distant social phenomena.

Again, let’s consider the trend, inside the restaurant world, that had to do with the introduction of massive quantity of technology in the space of the table. Screens could appear under the dish, where you could “spy” the chef preparing your dish, live, inside the kitchen, monitored by a camera, like in a realty show. Inedited remediation, again, of a moment anticipating the consumption, again. The same features are then recurrent and make probably evident that the gastronomic world is exploring – is the laboratorial dimension of the social evoked before – new ways of mediatization of the practices linked to the acquisition, the preparation and the consumption of food. In the last case mentioned, on the contrary, a dissimilar aspect in relation to the two other cases is the access to the social dimension that is not relevant here. The community, indeed, is supposed to be already present around the table. This trend is more about offering new topic occasions, while watching at what happen in the kitchen.

5. Conclusion

In this article, we explored the possible contribution of semiotics for treating the marketing concept of trend. Analyzing a trend and not just recognizing it, involves an articulation of different layers of meanings, as we tried to demonstrate in the discussion of the Foodspotting case. Following the transformations in the social practices, observing how the identities and their values are redefined by the trend, elaborating a set of core semiotic feature of the trend, are the main operations of analysis that can be proposed by a semiotician. Once the core features that make a trend interesting to think and interpret are extracted, the analyst can start all kind of reflections with the eventual client, in order to strategically re-assume a trend inside a marketing perspective. This is the topic of another research work to come: how to pass from the trend to the brand.

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INTERACTIONS AND BEAUTY ADVERTISING

Jean Henaff
Henaff Marketing Office, France
jkhenaff@yahoo.fr

Abstract

Dans le domaine de la communication publicitaire, le modèle d'analyse souvent utilisé est celui de la sémiotique narrative faisant appel à la *jonction*. Dans le monde réel, tout d'abord, l'objectif du fabricant (énonciateur publicitaire et destinataire) est de manipuler le consommateur (destinataire qui se constitue en sujet) pour qu'il achète le produit (se *conjoigne* au produit). Dans un film publicitaire, la transposition fictionnelle du schéma ci-dessus conduit à représenter un consommateur (destinataire qui devient sujet) qui se « *conjoint* » à un produit (une voiture, un shampoing, un rouge à lèvres...), et à l'ensemble de « valeurs de consommations » (pratiques, ludiques, utopiques, critiques, pour reprendre la terminologie de JM Floch) que concentre ce produit.

L'observation de nombreuses publicités dans le domaine de la beauté montre cependant une grande variété de types de récits. Certains films ne présentent que le produit, le destinataire n'étant que suggéré : le récit principal est dans ce cas celui d'un produit-sujet qui se « *conjoint* » à des valeurs (bénéfiques) destinées à une consommatrice-destinataire. D'autres présentent la consommatrice-destinataire comme un personnage majeur, qui se constitue en sujet d'une transformation (un embellissement), et le produit est lui-même évoqué seulement comme un adjuvant. D'autres enfin donnent aux deux types de récits une importance assez similaire. De plus, on observe suivant les publicités deux types de destinataires : la marque qui fixe les bénéfices beauté valorisés, ou la consommatrice qui fixe elle-même les objectifs beauté à atteindre. Nous présenterons différentes publicités pour illustrer ces points. Un des enjeux plus généraux est finalement la représentation de la femme dans ces publicités : sujet actif de leur embellissement (maître de sa beauté), ou destinataire passif d'une forme de beauté fixée par la marque et apportée par le produit (et à qui on impose une forme de beauté)

Ensuite nous aimerions voir si le *modèle interactionnel et le concept d'union* (au lieu de la jonction) de E Landowski pourrait permettre de rendre compte d'une manière plus subtile des enjeux de communication publicitaire dans le domaine de la beauté et d'ouvrir des possibilités d'évolution de cette communication. A ce propos, nous présenterons une récente communication de marque qui a pris le parti de proposer la « *beauté idéale* » (et non la « *beauté parfaite* ») comme valeur de marque. La beauté idéale se définit en effet comme ce qui est « *la perfection pour soi-même* » (à chacune sa beauté idéale): les finalités de l'interaction entre la marque et la consommatrice ne sont pas décidées par la marque a priori mais se définissent dans l'évolution des rapports entre la marque et chaque consommatrice. Il s'agirait ici d'un régime *d'ajustement* qui permettrait un véritable *accomplissement* des deux partenaires, et donc également de la consommatrice.

The intention of a beauty product brand is that its consumers will feel more beautiful, and this accession to beauty is largely depicted in advertising. The purpose of this communication is to share some thoughts on how this accession to beauty can be semiotically described. To do so, we will consider two levels, and the way they relate to each other.

	Addresser	Subject of doing	Subject of being	Object	Addressee
Case 1	Brand	Product	Consumer	Beauty	Consumer
Case 2	Consumer	Product	Consumer	Beauty	Consumer
Case 3	Brand	Consumer	Consumer	Beauty	Consumer
Case 4	Consumer	Consumer	Consumer	Beauty	Consumer

Table 1: Different actualizations of addresser and subject of doing in beauty advertising.

Case 1 can be illustrated by a recent skin care advertisement: “*Lancôme’s new vision for the perfect skin. Advanced Skin Corrector Visionnaire LR 2412 supports wrinkles, pores, and skin texture improvements to change the skin towards perfection. Visionnaire Lancôme*”

The brand (“*Lancôme*”) is setting (“*new vision*”) what is the goal (beauty, defined here as “*the perfect skin*”). The product (subject of doing) is like a hero whose mission is to bring perfect skin and who is empowered by the Lancôme technology (“*LR 2412*”) and therefore able to eliminate defects and change the skin. The women represented in the advertisement are the addressee and the passive subject of transformation (subject of being), transformed by the product into a perfect skin state.

Case 2 is when the woman-consumer (represented woman in the advertisement) is acting as the addresser setting what is the beauty goal and launching the product action. It can be illustrated by another skin care television advertisement where the woman-consumer is represented in the first scene as aiming at a target with a bow and arrow and saying: “*what I am aiming at: less wrinkles, more firmness*”. She then launches the arrow, as a symbol of the product action released by the woman. The second scene is showing the arrow transforming into a schematic representation of active ingredients penetrating into a skin close up section and visibly improving the surface of the woman’s facial skin. The represented woman is also in this advertisement the addressee and the passive subject of transformation (subject of being). In the end of the advertisement she is also validating the performance (“*objective is reached!*”).

Case 3 can be illustrated by a Japanese magazine advertisement for a make-up removing product that “*instantly resets into a bare skin beauty*”. The advertisement is showing two photos of the same woman: on the left she is perfectly made up, on the right she is represented without any make up, “bare skin”, and she is looking much happier than on the left. The advertisement is introduced by the sentence: “*and you, can you become a bare skin beauty too?*” In this advertisement the brand is the addresser setting the desirable beauty goal as “*bare skin beauty*” and manipulating the consumer (subject of doing) by challenging her to transform herself from artificial “made up beauty” into “bare skin” (natural) beauty thanks to the help of the product. The woman-consumer is in this case the subject of doing, the subject of being and the addressee.

Case 4 is when the represented woman-consumer is acting as four of the key actants: addresser, subject of doing, subject of being and addressee. In a Revlon lipstick television advertisement for example, the woman-consumer is represented by the celebrity Emma Stone who is speaking throughout the commercial. The advertisement is starting by Emma Stone saying “*don’t hide behind your lipstick, use it to share with the world how you feel*”. Then she selects a lipstick color among many and applies it on her lips. In the end she leaves her home saying: “*today I feel daring*”. The represented consumer is acting as the addresser as she is setting up the goal and the challenge to accomplish for herself (and for the women who are watching the advertisement): to use lipstick to create an expressive beauty. It is a case of self-manipulation into acting for the beauty transformation (the addresser manipulating the subject of doing and the subject of doing are represented by the same person).

The greimassian approach is efficient in describing and categorizing the different types of narratives of beauty advertising. However, this model can also appear as a simplification of phenomena that are in fact more subtle. This can be felt already when we consider beauty advertising, but it is even more so when we consider the way women relate to beauty brands and products in real life to beautify themselves.

For example, one could consider that the setting of the beauty goal is in fact not done by the brand or the woman-consumer alone. It could be considered as the result of an interaction between two addressers: the beauty a woman wants to achieve can be influenced by the models promoted by the brand but fine-tuned also by herself to her own taste. Furthermore, one could also consider that when the woman-consumer is using a lipstick for example, the beauty result that is achieved is the result of the interaction of two subjects of doing: the woman who is using the lipstick with more or less dexterity and the lipstick itself that is transforming the color of the woman’s lips. Also, there is also a possible interaction between the beauty object and the consumer: beauty is not only a standard object that one can put on one’s face like a mask, it is something that is changing the woman’s appearance, experience and identity.

These limitations of the greimassian model have been pointed out by Eric Landowski who has developed a model of interactions between actants that could help to describe those different types of interactive situations as we are going to see in the next section.

2. Eric Landowski’s model of interactions and its application to analyze the different types of access to beauty in everyday life

Eric Landowski (2005) has developed a model of four types of interactions, where the manipulation (defined as the cognitive manipulation of the other’s will) is only one specific case among the four. The four types of interactions are the following:

	Programming	Manipulation	Adjustment
Brand/consumer	Enforcement of a beauty stereotype that has to be followed by the consumer	Presentation of a valuable beauty objective that consumers are challenged to follow	Beauty objective is constantly negotiated as a common goal (depending on how the brand feels the consumer needs and how the consumer feels the beauty promise)
Consumer/consumer	Decision on the beauty objective and installation of a beauty routine (programming of a routine to follow)	Decision on the beauty objective and self-motivation to do the actions to reach it	Beauty objective is constantly redefined according to the beauty results as felt personally
Consumer/product	Decision on the beauty objective and “tuning” of the product, for precise control of beauty effects	Decision on the beauty objective and “motivation” of the product to achieve it (magic thinking)	Beauty objective is constantly redefined according to the product action as it is felt
Brand/product	Definition of the beauty objective and programming of the physical/ chemical capacities of the product in order to make it able to act precisely	Decision on the beauty objective and “motivation” of the product to achieve it (magic thinking)	Beauty objective and product capacity to act are constantly redefined according to the product action as it is felt

Table 2: Interaction addresser/subject of doing.

The interactions between the subject of doing and the subject of being can cover the interactions between product and consumer and those between the consumer and herself. The different interactions are summarized in table 3.

In the case of product/consumer interaction, a programming interaction is when the product operates on a consumer’s body that is supposed to react in a completely, or at least statistically predictable way. It is like a perfectly programmed medical treatment. But if we consider this interaction as a manipulation that means that we think that the consumer’s body is an entity with its own will that needs to be motivated. We can see some advertisements that are following this way of thinking, for example those which explain that the active ingredients will stimulate the skin mother cells in order that they produce more new cells. If the interaction between product

and consumer is an adjustment, which means that the product has to continuously adapt its action to the situation of each consumer and to the reactions of the body. For example, some moisturizing cream advertisement claims that “*may your age be 18, 30 or 45, may your skin be dry, normal or oily, this cream adapts its effectiveness*”. We can also imagine a product which action is adapting day after day to the changes in the skin needs.

In the second case, the interaction between the consumer and herself, programming is the situation where the consumer considers her own body as a passive object that can be repaired, decorated, sculpted... Manipulation is when the consumer considers that she can motivate her own body to do the transformation, for example when she is using massages to wake up her inner energy in order that new fresh cells are produced and her skin tone is improved. Adjustment is when the consumer thinks that she has to continuously adapt her actions to the reactions of her body, for example by fine tuning the quantity of cream applied according to the variations of the observed absorption speed of cream in order to keep an optimal level of moisture.

	Programming	Manipulation	Adjustment
Product/ consumer	Product is like a medicine, operating on the body with predictable results	Consumer's body is an entity with its own will, that needs to be motivated, or stimulated by the product, into acting by itself	Product has to continuously adapt its action to the reactions of the body
Consumer/ consumer	Consumer's body is like an object that the consumer can repair, decorate, sculpt...	Consumer can motivate her own body to act by itself	Consumer has to continuously adapt her actions to the reactions of the body

Table 3: Interaction subject of doing/subject of being.

With the concepts of programming, manipulation and adjustment, we have been able to describe in a much more complete way the interactions between addresser and subject of doing and the interactions between subject of doing and subject of being in the representations of everyday life. The interactions between the subject of being and the object have also been studied by Eric Landowski, with the introduction of the distinction between conjunction and union (Landowski, 2004), and this is also opening up ways to describe those types of interactions more in details:

The conjunction (“*conjonction*” in French) is when the subject is coming in possession of an object that is rather abstract, that can be acquired or discarded, exchanged. Its value is standard and fixed. The object stays in fact exterior to the subject and the very identity of the subject is not changed by its possession. The key word relating to the concept of conjunction is “to have”.

The union (“*union*” in French) is when the subject and the object are considered in their materiality that allows experiencing the sensorial characteristics of the object. Its value is coming from the personal and existential experience that the subject can have with it. The experience of the object is able to alter the very identity of the subject. The key word relating to the concept of union is “to be”.

The two concepts are also of high interest to describe the interactions between the subject of being (consumer) and the object (beauty) in the field of beauty. Conjunction is when beauty is considered as something quite standardized that has a social fixed value and can be acquired and possessed mainly for its functional properties (the seduction power that it brings): beauty is like a standard mask that one can buy and apply on one's face. Union is when beauty is considered as a concrete object (the embellished body) that can be experienced by the subject through her senses: the experience of her embellished body is creating the unique value of it for the woman-consumer and transforming her identity in depth.

In the last section, we will see through an example how these concepts can help to better understand the values promoted by a beauty brand and help to develop concretely the way the brand has to interact with its customers.

3. Implications for a beauty brand that is promising to reach “*your ideal skin*” in its slogan

A skin care brand introduced a few years ago “*your ideal skin*” as a brand slogan in all its advertisements. If we refer to the definitions of “ideal” in the dictionary we can find:

1. Satisfying one's conception of what is perfect; most suitable.
2. Existing only in the imagination; desirable or perfect but not likely to become a reality.

That means that “ideal” is close to perfect, but the two words are not completely the same. Perfect means “the best” and is universal, while ideal focuses on “the most suitable”, that is to say, it is “the best” on a personal level, it has to reflect each woman's personal aspirations at any moment and it has therefore to be changing, flexible, adjustable.

This means that to be able to provide “*your ideal skin*” to each woman-consumer, the brand will have to consider the various interactions as adjustments. The promise of beauty is not an imposed program, nor a dream that women are seduced (manipulated) into pursuing. This has implications in the way the brand is considering its interactions with consumers (interaction between addresser and subject of doing) and the way the product is supposed to interact with the consumer (interaction between subject of doing and subject of being). Furthermore, the beauty transformation is not to be considered as a conjunction with a standardized beauty object but as a union between consumer and beauty that could be able to transform the identity of the consumer.

If we consider the interaction between brand and consumer as an adjustment, this means, as seen in the previous section (table 2) that the beauty objective will have to be constantly negotiated as a common goal between the brand and the consumer. The brand will have to go beyond the traditional approach of consumer understanding, that is usually based on a cognitive perception of the consumer needs mainly by statistically gathering facts and figures. The brand will have to develop a real feeling for the consumer: the points of contacts between the brand and the consumer will need to be personal and human (for example, through beauty advisors in stores who are trained to interact with consumers in a way that goes beyond rationality and will allow them to really feel and not only understand what each consumer needs, without using standardized diagnostic methods).

If we consider the interaction between product and consumer as an adjustment, that means that the product will have to be adjustable to each woman's skin, whatever its reactions and changes through time. The different products proposed by the brand will have to provide an action that will change according to the situation of the skin and the way the skin reacts.

Finally if the beauty transformation is considered as a union that changes the identity of each consumer, this will have radical implications in the way the brand is communicating through advertising: presenting a photo of an attractive woman as a standard beauty model will not be

enough.

The way to represent adjustment and union in brand advertising is a challenge that will need further investigations.

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LA PRESENCE DU SILENCE. LE SILENCE COMME OBJET DE VALEUR DANS LES ESPACES DE PRODUCTION, DE CONSOMMATION.

Zeinab Goudarzi

Université de Limoges, France

lida_gou@yahoo.com ; zeinab.goudarzi@etu.unilim.fr

Abstract

In the general theme of sensory marketing point of sale, we present an introduction to the reality of the sonic environment, especially the various forms of tackling to nuisances and valuing of silent atmospheres. This is a priority for research on phenomena of sonic environment in order to increase the quality of a point of sale.

The hypothesis is to allow customers to pause in our environment from incessant advertising solicitations conveyed in all media, including mobile technologies, to benefit from tranquility area in a Zen space, which becomes a form of fun shopping with the objective of increasing the sale.

We live in a world characterized by the constant increase in the number and volume of sound signals, which end up being perceived as intrusive messages. Silence is a certified value in a society of noise, it not only turns into commercial value, but also moral, aesthetic and ecological. In semiotic terms, it becomes a valuable object: its rarity gives it the status of "object" luxury emerges from storyboarding and set specific discourse.

Résumé

Dans la thématique générale du marketing sensoriel du point de vente, nous proposons une introduction sur la réalité de l'environnement sonore, plus particulièrement les différentes formes de lutte contre les nuisances et la valorisation d'ambiances silencieuses. C'est un préalable nécessaire à la recherche de phénomènes d'ambiances sonores pouvant augmenter la qualité perçue d'un point de vente.

L'hypothèse est de permettre à la clientèle de faire une pause dans notre environnement de sollicitations publicitaires incessantes véhiculées sur tous les supports, y compris les technologies nomades, pour bénéficier d'une zone de quiétude dans un espace Zen, qui devient une

modalité de *fun shopping*. L'objectif est une augmentation des ventes.

Nous vivons dans un monde caractérisé par l'augmentation incessante du nombre et du volume des signaux sonores, qui finissent par être perçus comme autant de messages intrusifs. Si le silence est une valeur attestée dans une société du bruit, il se transforme en valeur commerciale, mais aussi morale, esthétique, écologique. En termes sémiotiques, il devient un objet de valeur : sa rareté lui assure le statut d' « objet » de luxe qui émerge de scénarisations et de mises en discours spécifiques.

Introduction

Avec la progression technologique, le monde moderne est devenu le lieu de la profusion sonore : bruits de machines, de transports, de métro... Le bruit envahit notre environnement, gêne une majorité de gens et diminue la santé et la qualité de vie. Robert Koch¹ disait il y a 100 ans: « *Le jour viendra où l'homme devra combattre le bruit comme la peste.* » (CONCORDIA 2014 n.d.)

De ce fait, nous vivons dans un monde bruyant, dans le contexte sonore de la modernité, le silence est devenu l'exception, du coup, nous sommes en recherche constante du silence. Pour cette raison, le silence est une vraie valeur dans une société du bruit.

Aujourd'hui, le confort sonore est un grand enjeu de la qualité de vie. Nous avons le goût d'acheter le silence. Par conséquent, les comportements liés à nos activités quotidiennes peuvent se trouver en partie influencés par la valeur-silence. Il en va ainsi de nos comportements d'achat. Du coup, le silence se transforme en valeur commerciale. Dans ces dernières années, l'industrie de l'isolation s'est largement développée. Les maisons, les bureaux, les ateliers, les machines sont isolées ; les bruits inévitables sont réduits. Le silence est devenu, depuis les dernières décennies, et surtout depuis les années quatre-vingt, une référence commerciale dans la promotion touristique d'une ville, d'un séjour, Les agences publicitaires ont aussi perçu la valorisation nécessaire du silence dans une vie quotidienne. Les industriels du design sonore accentuent sur le silence du moteur d'une automobile, des appareils ménagers, etc.

L'objectif principal de cette recherche est de célébrer le pouvoir du silence. Pour comprendre mieux le terme du silence, nous étudions la notion contraire : le bruit qui est un son perçu comme investi d'une valeur négative, une agression contre le silence. Grâce au carré sémiotique, nous pourrions établir la relation de contrariété entre les notions du silence et du bruit :

Silence	Bruit
Non-bruit	Non-silence

1. Le Silence

« Le silence est la matière signifiante par excellence, un continuum de signification. Le réel de la signification est le silence. » (Orlandi 1996 : 29)

La linguiste brésilienne Eni Orlandi, dans son livre «*Les formes du silence: dans le mouvement du sens* » déclare que le silence est un lieu de mouvement du sens. Pour elle, le silence est l'indice d'une totalité signification au contraire de l'idée du silence vide de sens. Le silence produit du sens relativement par rapport au mot attendu ou mot manquant. En fait, le silence n'est pas signi-

¹ Robert Koch (1843–1910), Prix Nobel de médecine, a découvert le bacille de la tuberculose.

fié en soi, mais par rapport à un autre signifiant. Son contenu dessine dans le fil du discours des effets de sens : ouverture, clôture, interrogation, attente, complicité, admiration, étonnement, tristesse, soumission, etc.

Le silence n'est jamais une réalité en soi, mais il est toujours en relation avec le monde humain et son rapport au monde. Le silence est parfois si intense qu'il sonne comme la signature d'un lieu.

Scientifiquement, le silence est un son à zéro décibel que nous ne pouvons pas trouver en dehors des chambres acoustiques. Même dans la nature, le degré zéro du son n'existe pas. Tout milieu résonne de sons particuliers. Les hautes montagnes ou les déserts ne sont pas tout à fait muettes. Un souffle d'air imperceptible fait monter les décibels à dix.

Le silence se détermine comme un rapport au temps. Les figures de silence représentent la durée de l'interruption entre les sons. La durée du silence remplace le temps du bruit.

Le silence en marketing sensoriel a souvent une influence négative sur le comportement d'achat. Il apparaît que s'il n'y a pas de musique, les clients passent moins de temps dans le magasin, dépensent moins, sont de moins bonne humeur, discutent moins avec le personnel de vente et sont plus stressés. (Jallais & Rieunier 2013 : 62)

Dans la suite de l'idée de silence dans les espaces commerciaux, nous pouvons nous référer à des résultats d'une étude qualitative de Sophie Rieunier auprès de 24 vendeurs des magasins de vêtements: les vendeurs décrivent ces espaces dans l'absence de musique :

« *Glaciale, sans âme, sans vie, triste, vide, bizarre, désagréable, fade, froid, maussade, monotone, mou* ». (Jallais & Rieunier 2013 : 61)

La question du silence a été abordée par une dizaine de chercheurs de manière quantitative. D'après les résultats des recherches, nous pouvons retenir que la présence de silence influence :

- de manière négative le temps passé (Yalch et Spangenberg, 1993) ;
- de manière négative la vitesse de consommation (Roballay et al, 1985) ;
- de manière positive l'attitude à l'égard de l'attente (Cameron, 1996) ;
- de manière négative l'humeur (vs. de la musique gaie ; Alpert et Alpert, 1990) ;
- de manière positive le stress de l'individu (Tansik et Routhieaux, 1996) ;
- de manière positive l'agrément ressenti vis-à-vis de l'atmosphère (North et Hargreaves, 1996).

En résumé, les recherches ont montré que le silence est négatif si le distributeur souhaite que les clients passent plus de temps en magasin, qu'ils soient de bonne humeur et déstressés. Par contre, les clients semblent être plus positifs à l'égard de l'attente et préférer l'atmosphère d'un magasin sans musique. Ces résultats vont nous confirmer de réaliser de plus amples recherches sur ce sujet afin de pouvoir caractériser l'influence du silence de manière positive ou négative. (Rieunier 2000 : 66-69)

2. Le Bruit

« *C'est au dix-neuvième siècle seulement, avec l'invention des machines, que naquit le Bruit. Aujourd'hui le bruit domine en souverain sur la sensibilité des hommes. Durant plusieurs siècles la vie se déroula en silence. Les bruits les plus retentissants n'étaient ni intenses, ni prolongés, ni variés. En effet, la nature est normalement silencieuse, sauf les tempêtes, les ouragans, les avalanches, les cascades...* » (Russolo 2003 : 9)

Cet extrait de *L'art des bruits, Manifeste futuriste* de Luigi Russello décrit le bruit comme un des critères de la modernité. La sensation de bruit s'est diffusée surtout avec la naissance de la société industrielle et la modernité. Nous sommes accoutumés à une civilisation bruyante qui ne nous rend pas sensibles aux évolutions des sons qui nous entourent. Le bruit est partout et

d'abord dans les villes.

Le bruit est partout et nous accompagne depuis notre réveil jusqu'à notre sommeil. Raymond Murray Schafer, le compositeur canadien, dans son livre affirme :

Aujourd'hui, le monde souffre d'une surpopulation sonore. L'information acoustique est si abondante que seule une part infime en est perçue de façon distincte. Dans le paysage sonore lo-fi poussé à son extrême, le rapport signal/bruit est égal à un ; à ce stade, il devient impossible de savoir, lorsqu'il y a message, ce qu'il faut écouter. (Schafer 2010 :107)

Le bruit est un phénomène complexe qui renvoie à l'idée de sensation désagréable, indésirable et insupportable. Cette perception négative est largement confirmée par les multiples dictionnaires et encyclopédies françaises. A titre d'exemple, le dictionnaire Larousse le définit comme « *un ensemble de sons sans harmonie* (Larousse 2008) ».

L'association française de normalisation (AFNOR) le présente comme la définition la plus complète : « *Le bruit est un phénomène acoustique produisant une sensation auditive, considéré comme désagréable ou gênante.* » (TDC 2000 : 6)

Le bruit, premier facteur perturbateur du sommeil, provoque difficultés d'endormissement et réveils nocturnes. L'influence des bruits sur le comportement et sur la santé des individus, des facteurs de stress tels que le bruit, la pollution sonore. Pour exemple, les niveaux de bruit élevés peuvent provoquer l'augmentation de la pression du sang, des ulcères et d'autres maladies liées au stress. (Siberil 1994 : 13)

Selon le rapport 2011 sur l'état de santé de la population en France, 11% des Français rencontrent des difficultés d'audition. (TDC 2012 : 16)

En fait, le bruit dans notre société est responsable de :

- 11% des accidents du travail ;
- 15% des journées de travail perdues ;
- 20% des internements psychiatriques.
- En France, parmi les habitants de ville :
- 43% sont gênés par le bruit ;
- 87% considèrent le bruit comme une nuisance insupportable ;
- 39% le jugent responsable du stress. (Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Énergie n.d.)

Il est important de préciser également que la sensibilité aux bruits est différente selon les individus. En effet cette dernière peut dépendre du milieu de vie de la personne. Aussi, les personnes qui habitent près des routes ou des lieux bruyants, vont entendre certains bruits différemment. Par exemple, les circulations des voitures, les klaxons, au fur et à mesure du temps, vont être intégrés comme des bruits du quotidien et ne seront plus jugés comme des nuisances.

Enfin, nous pouvons faire part d'un autre élément qui joue sur cette sensibilité de l'individu : la régularité sonore. Contrairement à ce que l'on peut penser, nous supportons plus facilement des sons avec des décibels élevés si ces derniers sont continus, que des sons dont nous pouvons contrôler leur régularité.

Quelquefois la musique se transforme en bruit, en nuisance. Le volume élevé inciterait les gens à rester moins longtemps dans le lieu de vente (Assadi, Djamshid 2008 : 38). Dans ce cas, l'ambiance musicale agresse les consommateurs et les empêche au plaisir d'achat (Siberil 1994 : 13).

3. Non-bruit :

Tous les bruits ne doivent pas être considérés comme des pollutions sonores. En effet, lorsqu'ils font partie de l'environnement sonore de notre vie quotidienne, nous nous habitons à ces derniers et ils deviennent parfois synonymes de confort. Murray Schafer explique que le bruit des véhicules à moteurs est un « *son sacré* » (Schafer et al. 2010 : 267) contemporain. Il précise que le bruit est symbole de la vie et que par exemple les bruits des véhicules sont entrés dans la culture des habitants de la ville. De nombreuses sociétés paraissent particulièrement accueillantes à des productions sonores qui seraient classées comme bruits. La télévision, la radio en haut niveau sonore, le vacarme du trafic dans les rues etc., sont des expériences communes dans les grandes villes orientales.

En général, le son est une sensation auditive qui véhicule des informations nécessaires pour le cerveau. Il transmet des informations sur la source. Les objets produisent des bruits et nous les recevons. Notre cerveau les reconnaît grâce à nos expériences et à notre mémoire. Le son et le bruit d'un objet sont concernés par son usage et sa fonctionnalité comme le moteur d'un aspirateur et le bruit de claquement de portière de voiture, etc. Les industriels du design sonore sont intéressés par cette capacité. Ils ont bien compris que le bruit des objets peut transmettre des informations et de la valeur et à certains moments, des qualités du produit. Dans ce cas-là, le bruit peut devenir un argument marketing sonore.

Le designer sonore utilise le son de l'usage du produit comme un évocateur de certaines valeurs du produit. Ainsi, le son est une dimension de l'objet que le designer élabore pour améliorer la qualité sonore du produit.

4. Non-silence :

Il est vrai que, dans la vie quotidienne, la plupart des gens n'est intéressent pas par le silence. Ils écoutent de la musique pour remplir le silence de leur quotidien. Les gens veulent du silence mais ils ne peuvent éviter le bruit pour rappeler qu'ils ne sont pas seuls.

Dans la société occidentale, le silence est négatif. Il représente le vide (Schafer et al. 2010: 365). De ce point de vue, l'homme moderne craint l'absence de son, car il craint l'absence de vie. Certains artistes cherchent à donner une « présence » à l'absence, au vide du silence. Cette vision est influencée par la conception extrême-orientale du silence : le vide n'est pas un sens négatif et ne signifie pas toujours l'absence. Le silence n'est pas comme un manque, mais comme l'ouverture d'un espace, comme une réelle présence. Mais comme un lieu de mouvement – mouvement des sons, mouvement du sens -, le silence devient alors un degré de perception

Dans cette perspective, John Cage, compositeur, poète et peintre américain, propose en 1952, sa pièce *4'33"* (*4'33"* de silence). Dans cette pièce, il nous prouve que le silence n'existe pas puisqu'on entend toujours des sons : « Les auditeurs se sont mis à parler à voix basse, certains ont quitté la salle, d'autres se sont énervés quand ils ont réalisé qu'il n'allait rien se passer et ils ne l'ont pas oublié trente ans après. Ils sont encore fâchés. [...] » (Kostelanetz et al. 2000 : 105–106). Dans cette pièce, il nous montre une autre manière d'écouter le son, les bruits ; il réveille en nous la sensation du son. Le silence, ici, est un silence plein de bruits.

En fait, l'idée de cette pièce est venue chez Cage, au moment de visiter une chambre anéchoïque² dans l'université de Harvard en 1951. Il souhaitait alors entendre ce qui se passait dans un lieu totalement privé de sons et avait été surpris de percevoir en réalité deux phénomènes acoustiques, l'un aigu et l'autre grave qu'il ne parvenait pas à identifier. Il écrit plus tard : « j'entendis deux bruits, un aigu et un grave. Quand j'en ai discuté avec l'ingénieur en charge, il

² Une chambre anéchoïque est une salle d'expérimentation dont les murs et le plafond sont totalement absorbants aux ondes sonores ou électromagnétiques, donc ne provoquent aucun *écho* venant perturber les mesures.

m'informa que le son aigu était celui de l'activité de mon système nerveux et que le grave était le sang qui circulait dans mon corps ». (Kostelanetz et al. 2000 : 119) Cette expérience aboutit l'affirmation suivante : « le silence n'existe pas. Il y a toujours quelque chose pour produire un son ». (Cage 2003 : 191) Parce que nous sommes toujours entourés de son. Ce que révèle l'expérience de Cage, c'est que personne ne pourra jamais faire l'expérience du silence absolu. Nous pouvons considérer donc le silence comme une absence du son. Cette expérience nous montre que cette absence n'est jamais absolue.

En somme, chez John Cage, le concept de silence est « la présence d'une absence », le silence oscille entre une absence sonore et une présence de bruitage. Il veut changer la définition classique du silence. Ainsi nous avons vu que le silence n'est pas vraiment l'absence de bruit, mais plutôt un niveau de perception des sons.

Dans chaque contexte sonore, il existe un seuil de bruit en deçà duquel le silence règne, c'est-à-dire en deçà duquel le son est inaudible. L'oreille aurait pu l'entendre, mais elle n'y pas porté attention. La mémoire l'a oublié, il n'a pas fait trace. Il n'a, pour l'auditeur, jamais existé en tant que son, mais en tant que silence. Un tel silence, parfois, se nomme *bruit de fond*. (Bonnet & Szendy 2012: 45)

Le bruit de fond est identifié comme un son qui n'est pas présent mais pas il est tout à fait absent. C'est pourquoi Schaefer exprime à la fin de son livre comme un résumé : « toutes les recherches sur les sons ne peuvent se conclure que par le silence- pas le silence vide et négatif, mais le silence positif de la perfection et de la plénitude. Ainsi, de même que l'homme aspire à la perfection, tout son tend vers le silence et la vie éternelle de la musique des sphères. » (Schaefer et al. 2010 : 373)

Il y a plus de quarante ans que les chercheurs ont commencé à s'intéresser à l'influence de la musique d'ambiance sur les comportements des clients. En 1966, pour la première fois en France, les résultats de la première expérimentation sur l'influence de la musique sur le comportement des clients sont publiés. (Rieunier 2000 : 20)

Il y a des effets directs de la musique d'ambiance sur les comportements de l'acheteur. La diffusion de la musique influence les comportements d'achats des clients dans les différents contextes commerciaux comme : supermarché, restaurant, magasin de vêtements, banque, ... La musique est un stimulus qui peut influencer les réponses des clients. Le marketing musical désigne donc l'ensemble des techniques et des stratégies qui utilisent la musique comme outil d'attribution, d'évocation, de différenciation, de mémorisation et de promotion d'un produit ou d'une marque. (Delassus 2011 : 6)

En se référant aux résultats des recherches précédentes, dans les magasins silencieux et sans musique, le temps de visite des clients diminue. Ainsi, la musique d'ambiance est un principal stimulus pour le politique marketing. Mais il faut savoir quel type de musique diffuser pour chaque ambiance commerciale. Si nous avons bien choisi la musique d'ambiance, les clients restent plus longtemps et achètent un plus nombre d'articles. Avec cette ambiance agréable, le plaisir d'achat augmente.

Conclusion

Pour conclure, nous nous référons à un entretien électronique que nous avons passé avec le directeur marketing du Bon Marché, M. Guillaume Gellusseau sur cette question du "silence" au politique marketing du Bon Marché :

« Une des particularités du Bon Marché est de proposer une expérience d'achat différente des autres magasins, basée, entre autres, sur une sélection de marques et de produits particulier, un lien avec les arts et la culture, et un confort d'achat et de découverte auquel nous tenons beau-

coup.

C'est pour cette raison que nous maintenons dans le magasin des zones de pause qui permettent à nos clients de profiter du lieu et de ponctuer leur visite de respirations.

C'est aussi pour cette raison que l'ambiance musicale et sonore reste relativement discrète, soutenue par des partis-pris musicaux classiques (piano, musique orchestrale, jazz, pas ou très peu de musique de variété, rock, pop, etc).

L'ambiance musicale est aussi travaillée pour nos expositions temporaires, expositions culturelles notamment, le choix du silence étant parfois fait pour que les œuvres exposées prennent toute leur place.

Cette approche bienveillante et « non agressive » est pour nous un point de différenciation par rapport aux autres grands magasins afin que chaque visite soit pour nos clients un moment agréable et de détente. »

De fait, par ces mots soulignés, nous pouvons se présenter l'articulation des différentes notions qui nous permettent de définir notre carré sémiotique :

Bruit vs silence

Tension vs détente

Energie mobilisée vs économie d'énergie

Et pour étudier deux notions, nous avons deux dimensions : quantité (acoustique) et qualité (perception)

silence bruit

Acoustique : intensité nulle intensité forte


Perception : ambivalence réactionnelle = ou > au seuil** de refus, d'intolérance
(acceptation ou refus)*

non bruit non silence

Acoustique : intensité faible intensité perceptible

Perception : = au seuil d'acceptation, = au seuil de perception
de tolérance (si le signal est < au seuil de perception=silence)

* le silence absolu est en général angoissant.



** le « seuil », mesuré en dB, peut varier selon les individus et selon les cultures.

Le champ auditif humain (Centre Auditif de la Riviera :2014 n.d.)

Sur ce graphe, la courbe inférieure représente les seuils de perception de l'oreille humaine en parfait état (seuil d'audibilité). Pour chaque fréquence, le seuil de perception est différent. La courbe supérieure représente la limite des intensités perceptibles : au-delà, il y a douleur et/ou destruction cellulaire dans l'oreille (seuil de la douleur). La zone jaune présente sonore minimale, c'est le silence, mais cette zone, ça change par rapport à l'individu. Donc, le silence est une réalité relative pas absolue.

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**MUSICAL
SEMIOTICS**

NEW MUSICAL SEMIOTICS? INNOVATION THROUGH TRADITION

Gabriele Marino
University of Turin, Italy
gaber.en@libero.it

Abstract

The essay addresses the problematic development of musical semiotics within general semiotics and in comparison with other applied semiotics. It is suggested that it is possible to recover key notions and analytical tools from the tradition of the discipline in order to develop Greimas' project further; namely, that the seed of innovation may be grounded in routes that have already been explored by the discipline, not outside of its domain. In particular, by referring to the proposal by Jacoviello, it is suggested to recover the semiotics of plastic arts or plastic semiotics, as elaborated by the Paris School with regard to visual texts such as non-figurative or abstract paintings, in order to deal with such an "ineffable" matter as sound and music.

0. Intro

In the capacity of the co-chair of the Musical Semiotics session of the 12th World Congress of Semiotics, along with Prof. Eero Tarasti (the session was held on Sept. 16, 2014, at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria), by the present paper I would like to propose just some brief notes upon the topic of the symposium itself; namely, the dialectics between tradition and innovation within semiotics and, in particular, musical semiotics.

1. Rehearsing in the garage: Music as a semiotic *impasse*

As you all know, music is a problem – A big one. A *semiotic* problem and, at the same time, a problem *to semiotics*, as a discipline. Philosophers, musicologists, linguists, and semioticians have struggled for decades trying to identify the semiotic status of music: is it a *language* or not and, in case, is it analyzable like natural language (structuralist "annexationism"); is it a *sign* and which type of sign (index, icon, symbol); does it carry *meanings* and are these meanings im-

manent (autonomy, endosemantic hypothesis, introversive analysis) or not (heteronomy, exosemantic hypothesis, extroversive analysis); are these meanings *translatable* into words (verbalizability) or are they ineffable (iconic, anti-reductionist hypothesis)?

In opposition to the infamous glottocentricism of the discipline (namely, its preference for the verbal language), some authors (Ponzio and Lomuto, Kramer, Tagg and Clarida) have suggested to consider music – not verbal language – as a model of how meaning works in general, precisely due to the blurry and problematic semiotic status of such matter – Why should meaning be such an easy business? Both Goitre and Lidov, independently got to ask themselves: “Is language a music?”

The lexicon of semiotics, and its epistemological perspective, in the first place, were intimately contradictory, whereas not obscure at all, with regard to the musical domain. Benveniste claimed music was semantic, but non-semiotic. Lévi-Strauss was profoundly inspired by music, but still he claimed it had no actual meaning. Most of these issues, debates, and theoretical positions were actually pseudo-problems, but still they managed to slowing down the development of a dedicated branch of the discipline. Moreover, the peculiarity of the matter led to a semiotics which is very different from the other so-called applied semiotics.

2. Side one: The relationships with general and other applied semiotics

Musical semiotics grew by following a parallel course compared with so-called general semiotics, constituting, *de facto*, an independent, extremely specialized, and minority field, whose exchanges with the other so-called applied semiotics have always been scarce. As Tarasti maintains, “oddly enough, few of the great semioticians have said anything about music as sign” (2002: 4). Hjelmlev, Greimas, Lotman, and Eco, for instance, didn’t talk much about music. Barthes’ reflections on the topic were extremely fertile – think of the famous “grain of the voice” or to the notion of “somatheme” (the smallest somatic unit of meaning) – but still they were far from being systematic. Apparently, music was not worth a dedicated entry in the *Dictionary* edited by Greimas and Courtés; or, to be more precise, albeit a “Music” entry was originally featured in the 1986 volume (Castellana 1986), it was later expounded from the canonical version of the book.

As a matter of fact, as Monelle maintains, “the chief enterprise of music semiotics remains unfulfilled” (1992: 327), since there is no shared methodology among those who practice the discipline and their results are partial (they overlap with established musicological findings and they can be applied just to a small canon of works, critics maintain).

In fact, there is no such a thing as “musical semiotics”, but rather different musical semiotics projects (nearly as many as their proponents): there is the paradigmatic-stylistic analysis of the neuter level elaborated by Nattiez (in the footsteps of his masters Ruwet and Molino); there is a group of scholars and theories stressing the narrative component of music (Tarasti, Grabòcz, Samuels, Almèn); others focusing on music as gesture and embodied metaphor (Lidov, Hatten); others on the notion of “topic” (Monelle, Agawu); others developing a cognitive-interpretative perspective (Martinez, Cumming); there is the pragmatic, musical competence model elaborated by Stefani; and there is the inter-objective comparison elaborated by Tagg (based upon the notion of “museme”, coined by Seeger on the model of “morpheme”).

Most of these approaches do not even speak the same semiotic jargon; so that, great is the confusion under the sky of musical semiotics.

3. Side two: The intrusive influence of musicology

Musical semiotics has always been strongly tied to musicology, to its terminology, analytical tools, and ideology. We have to bear in mind that this branch of the discipline had started off with Ruwet, in the Sixties, as a method modelled upon structural linguistics to make the criteria

of musicological analysis explicit and, therefore, properly scientific. As a consequence, most of musical semiotics is prominently musicological (and it is often more musicological, rather than semiotic), and score-centric; namely, it is based on the analysis of the score, it reduces music, *de facto*, to its notated – or transcribed, *ex post* – form. But the score is no more the chief way to store music (we have had analogue recordings and now we have digital ones) and today we perfectly know that notation, as the grammar, and the score, as the medium, are to music what a screenplay is to the moving images – Just a partial summary.

Once, it may have been possible to claim that “even the best equipment and the most perfect record cannot give us nothing but music ‘in a box.’ The record is an important means of knowledge, but still it is a surrogate, which cannot replace the direct listening of music” (Maselli 1972: XI; my trans.). But, after the invention of the phonograph, namely after the development of a whole new sonic and musical aesthetics – which we may call timbric-acousmatic-phonographic (think of the Futurists, Varèse, Schaeffer, Chion etc.) – can we still analyze the score *on behalf of music*? Can we still be so *incredibly unprepared* to exploring the sonic richness of contemporary media?

4. Best of: The recovery of innovation (The plastic turn)

If we got an “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger), we have to be able to imagine a “recovery of innovation”; that is, we should be able to recovering notions and tools from our history in order to develop it further – To complete the routes. We can continue, and revive, tradition; we can still develop Greimas’ semiotic project, by extending the assumptions he has elaborated to new fields of inquiry. That would be an internal, disciplinary *bricolage*; using the – semiotic – available means to build up new – semiotic – ones. Our problem is the more or less “abstract” meaning of music; let’s try to recover the best available semiotic means to deal with this issue.

Structural-generative semiotics has provided a powerful tool to deal with those visual texts that seemed to question the disciplinary capability to translate them into words and analyze them. This tool is the semiotics of the plastic arts or plastic semiotics, as outlined by Greimas (1989; or. ed. 1984) and his research group within the Paris School (Thürlemann, Floch) with regard to non-figurative or abstract paintings. The plastic language emerges by analyzing a visual text with no regards to the recognition of the objects of the world (figurative language), but to its internal structure as a set of pure visible elements: shapes (the *eidetic* dimension), tones (the *chromatic* dimension), and relationships (the *topological* one, the disposition of the elements) – A conception strongly indebted to the phenomenological notion of “pure-visibility” (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty); namely, the conception of the visual matter of a given work of art as something completely autonomous from the visual dimension of the tangible reality.

The plastic dimension displays a “semi-symbolic” mode of signification, ascribable to “partial correlations between the two levels of signifier and signified”; which means that the “conformity between their two levels of language [...] is recognized not between isolated elements, as with symbolic semiotics, but between categories” (Greimas 1989: 645). In Western cultures, for instance, the colour black does not stand for “death” on its own, but because the whole chromatic category – “dark vs. light” – is being invested of such an oppositional connotation; black stands for “death” because white stands for “life”, and *vice versa*.

Since the plastic is a transversal dimension, applicable to any matter of expression (including the domain of food and taste, cf. Marrone 2013), it is possible to identify a series of sound-specific plastic categories, as an equivalent to those identified with regard to the visual texts (cf. Ferraro 2007).

Such perspective has been employed as the theoretical foundation to two – very – different

semiotic projects, both brilliant and, unfortunately, available in Italian only, at the moment: Valle's (2004) and Jacoviello's (2012). I will briefly discuss the latter case.

Jacoviello's model is highly refined and articulated, being exquisitely consistent with the epistemic perspective of structuralism, and it is impossible to me here to resume it without – literally – mutilating it. But, in short: the sonic contrasts established at the plastic level of sound (e.g., low vs. high, quite vs. loud, short vs. long, percussive vs. friction, bright vs. dark), which are identified not via the score, but via direct listening (Jacoviello chooses a *sonic ontology* of the musical work), are both syntactic and semantic (they are meaningless, but still they already establish differences of *potential meaning*). Such contrasts (Fig. 1) constitute the basis of an autonomous mechanism of signification, which is not static, since it does not convey a meaning which is given “for once and for all” to the listener, but dynamic, processual, and autopoietic – The meaning *in-the-listening*. At the heart of Jacoviello's model we find the “figural device” or “figural knot” (my trans.; *plesso figurale* in It.), namely the semiotic place wherein the plastic elements get their first traces of figurativity, yet without being substantialized, still being synergetic, synaesthetic, and multimodal – Intersemiotic, in just one word.




Figure 1. Jacoviello's model for the plan of musical expression: the plastic level (2012: 220; my trans. and brackets).

Here you can find an attempt of a synthesis of the model:

A. Plastic level: Selection of the categorical traits (phonic, rhythmic, timbric) and of the configurations of possible traits (phrases, rhythmic configurations, synchronic harmonic configurations – namely chords –, and diachronic ones – namely modes –) on the plan of expression. The contrasts between traits and configurations constitute the plastic level proper of the musical text.

B. Figural level: The differential relationships between traits and configurations define a grammar and, at the same time, a syntax of potential forms of the content, of forms of the content-to-be. Thus, a “transparent” syntactic-semantic structure is being established: the figural knot.

C. Discursive level: The figural knot is a syncretic and synaesthetic collector, being connect-

ed to the diverse semiotic domains at play (e.g., voice and music, in the genre of Opera). Such domains can be synergic or polemic one to the other; namely, they do not necessarily convey the very same meaning (e.g., the case with a song featuring a “happy” music, but “sad” lyrics). The objects of the external world start to emerge from the figural knot before and beyond their precise, specific iconic content. The investment of value of figural density is a process which is all internal to the differential and processual logic of the musical text, without any reference to any external, pre-constituted musical nor cultural form.

To one who is familiar with the structural-generative tradition, and who has already experienced the efficacy of plastic semiotics with regard to visual texts, Jacoviello’s model sounds like a Columbus’ egg: A very refreshing, logical, and “natural” solution to many epistemological and theoretical problems affecting the discipline in its confrontation with sound and music (although it is not an easy job to be accomplished at all, as regards the concrete analysis of a single piece of music).

5. Bonus track: Sampling, remixing, and remaking semiotics itself

With a focus on the – actual or potential – mediated nature of any post-1877 music (the year Edison invented the phonograph), I myself have tried to develop the model further (Marino 2015). I have added a proper topological *category* to the paradigm of the sonic plastic ones indicated by Jacoviello (recovering it from the original Greimassian proposal); I have elaborated a basic theory for the *phonographic enunciation* (which I will briefly, and partially, discuss here); a model for the *musical figures* (recovering the Taggian notion of “museme”, and connecting it to Gibson’s “affordance”); and a theory for the *musical competence* (heavily drawing inspiration from Stefani’s).

I recovered the enunciation theory as re-elaborated by Metz with regard to film (1991), and the consequent semiotic debate (Fontanille, Odin, Casetti, Eugeni), integrating it with the narratological categories proposed by Genette (1972; Eng. trans. 1980). By recovering Metz’s “impersonal enunciation” (an enunciation meant not to be anthropomorphic nor deictic, but meta-discursive and self-referencing), it is possible to consider the acousmatic sound as producing a kind of “phonographic shot”, within which it is possible to employ the narratological categories elaborated with regard to literature and films – Not only the category of *voice* (time of narration, diegetic level, and persona), but also that of *mode* (the *distance*, or the issue of “playing vs. making-you-listen”, and the *perspective*, or the issue of the “point of listening” or “aural focalization”, in our case).

I have recovered from Metz’s filmic theory also the distinction between “prosonic materials” (natural sound, which can be recorded and manipulated) and “phonographic language” (sound effects and manipulated sound). It is possible to distinguish between an “aesthetics of recorded sound” (a past sonic event has been recorded and is being re-presentified – made present again – via the recording) and an “aesthetics of acousmatic sound” (a kind of music that does not want to be perceived as the account of something already happened, but that occurs, that happens, live, just when the sound comes out from the speakers or through the headphones). By adapting a typology elaborated by Casetti (1986), originally concerning filmic language, I ended up in proposing a four-folded typology of enunciation modes for mediated or phonographic music:

A. Objective shot: I – the phonographic shot – present myself to you, listener, as the account of sonic events that have occurred in a past moment (pretending to be a transparent glass, I am the faithful recording of that thing). This fits the aesthetics of recorded music, with a strong prominence of prosonic materials.

B. Direct interpellation: I – the phonographic shot – present myself to you, listener, “through the looking glass”, and I “talk” to you (just like in the “apostrophe to the Reader” or in a voice-

over segment of a movie) thanks to the lyrics or “telling you about some other music” (all the degrees of intertextuality). This is a kind of enunciated enunciation on the plan of prosonic materials (typically, within a “recorded music” situation).

C. Subjective shot: I – the phonographic shot – present myself “on this side of the mirror”, being a sonic event that occurs, that happens here and now, admitting you, listener, in the world of sounds *as such*. This fits the aesthetics of acousmatic music (prominence of phonographic material; so-called Schaefferian “reduced listening”). As regards the passages of concrete music inserted into Pink Floyd’s *Alan’s Pyschedelic Breakfast (Atom Heart Mother, 1970)*, Spaziante (2009: 288) talks of a kind of “sonic subjective shot” (my trans.).

D. Unreal objective shot: I – the phonographic shot – present myself to you, listener, as the result of a process of recording, as acousmatic music *in-the-making*; namely, I show you myself “in the mirror”, displaying all my internal mechanisms of functioning, the difference, the friction between prosonic (natural sounds, recorded) and phonographic (manipulated sounds). This is a form of enunciated enunciation on the plan of phonographic materials. As regards the “radio-switch” effects featured in the songs produced by Uwe Schimidt/Atom Heart under the moniker Señor Coconut y su Conjunto (with particular reference to the record *El Baile Alemàn, 2000*), Spaziante (2007: 57-58) talks of “meta-music”, “sonic mise en abyme”, and “trompe-l’oreille”.

The typology is highly perfectible but, still, it is a good starting point. And it just came out from a *bricoleuse* scrutiny of our generous literature.

6. Outro

In this short essay, I just wanted to show that our tradition, the tradition of semiotics, is so rich to the extent that it has not been fully explored and employed yet, being fertile and up-to-date. On the one hand, we do have to be always “scientifically awake” but, on the other, we do not need to constantly be in the wake of the latest scientific discovery. We do not need, say, to import “mirror neurons” from neo-cognitive, positivist, and ontological approaches into our field, squeezing them into our epistemology, in order to go further with our job as semioticians. The fact that we know how our brain works (at least, better than some years ago, and constantly getting a more and more precise picture) does not exhaust our horizon of research and our search for meaning at all – It may be just a point of departure, not our final destination.

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ARTICULATION AS MUSICAL DIMENSION OF TEXT. THE RELATION BETWEEN WORD AND MUSIC IN SALVATORE SCIARRINO'S WORK

Julia Ponzio

University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy
juliaponzio@hotmail.com

Abstract

I will start from the definition of Rhythm given by Benveniste in *Problems in general linguistics*, when he links the etymology of the word *rythmos* with the Greek word *Rein*, which has not to do with the division of time or with the scansion of time in equal parts, but rather with the concept of schema, of form. But *Rythmos*, says Benveniste, means the form in a particular sense because it does not mean the form as something fixed, realized. *Rythmos* means the form in the moment of its formation, that is to say the form in the moment in which it takes form. The image with which Benveniste explains this particular way to intend the form, is the one of waves: their form is inconstant, always in change, always different in itself. I will use this idea of rhythm in order to elaborate a semiotic analysis of "madrigalism". Madrigalism is an interesting case of interweaving between music, word and writing, because by madrigalisms musical writing tries to graphically mime or describe the meaning of words. Madrigalism is semiotically very complex: in it the relation between music and word cannot be thought as a classical relation between signifier and signified because madrigalism does not work *in absentia*, it does not mean word if the word is not there, present, visible near it. If in a musical text which contains madrigalisms the singed text is erased or lost, madrigalism disappears, it does not remain as signifier which makes reference to an absent signified. Madrigalism works in presence, in the moment of the encounter between word and music. It can be described as a grafting, as a montage. I will try to reflect on this operation of grating, on this particular encounter between music writing and word, through Benveniste's idea of rhythm, starting from a piece that in the contemporaneity uses and problematizes the idea of madrigalism, which is Sciarrino's *12 madrigali per voci a cappella su haiku giapponesi*.

Musical form of Madrigal is a very good starting point for an analysis of the complex relation between musical sign and verbal sign.

In this paper I try to analyse this relation, in order to highlight, starting from it, an idea of *rhythm* which displaces the pivot of semiotic analysis from a semantic ground to a merely syntactic ground.

In this text I will speak of madrigal starting from a contemporary work, which is Salvatore Sciarrino's *12 madrigali per voci a cappella su haiku giapponesi (twelve madrigal for voice a cappella on Japanese haikus)*, presented to the Salzburg festival in 2008.

The use of the musical form of madrigal and the poetic form of haiku is not new in the work of this composer, but Sciarrino uses this two forms together for the first time in this work.

Sciarrino explains in 2008 that his interest in madrigal is linked to a particular relation between word and music it inaugurates in Western music history (Sciarrino 2008). This relation has to do with the abandonment of the strophic structure of music, that is to say, with the abandonment of a composition practice of a musical text, which is indifferently adaptable to every stanza of a poetic text, or even to every poetic text with a certain metric structure. "Arie per cantar sonetti" or "arie per cantar stanze di canzone", for example, are texts adaptable to every sonnet or every canzone. Madrigal represents, therefore, the end of an indifferent relation between text and music. The musical text of a madrigal is indissolubly linked with a verbal text: it establishes between text and music a relation in which no substitution is possible. In a madrigal, every single part of the text has its own proper musical phrase. Madrigal, therefore, situates the place of the relation between musical and verbal text, in the sense of the "proper", but in such a particular way that this relation deeply changes the sense of this proper, the sense of belonging, the sense of property.

Answering the question why he calls Madrigals some pieces which have not the formal structure of the madrigal as a form historically codified, Sciarrino says:

Because they are for ensemble of voices, because they have some links, though weak, with that world. And they have even some madrigalism, that is to say they express the will to represent a precise concept by a melodic figuration or by other types of figurations. Something like this also appears in this work. For example in one of the madrigals something rhythmically very clear appears when the word "rhythm" is sung. Madrigalism is a technique linked with the voice because it is linked with the meaning of words (Sciarrino 2008).

In his answer Sciarrino speaks about madrigalism, which is a composition procedure in which music follows words not only from the point of view of expressivity, but also from a graphic point of view. In other words, in a madrigalism the graphic notation of music mimes the meaning of the word linked with it (as for example the word "eyes" represented from two whole notes, or the correspondence between the word "see" with a graphic movement of the notes on the pentagram, which recalls the movement of waves).

How can we semiotically define the relation established between word and music by madrigalism? What sort of link is the one, which connects, for instance, two whole notes with the word "eyes"? It is very difficult to frame the relation established by madrigalism between word and music, in the terms of a classic relation between signifier and signified. It is difficult because madrigalism does not work in absentia. Madrigalism doesn't work as a sign which stands for a word, if the word is absent: its iconic relation with word appears only if the word

is present, only in the moment in which the presence of the word establishes and marks a relation with the music. If in a musical text, which contains madrigalisms, we erase the line of the voice, madrigalisms disappear. The verbal text cannot be reconstructed starting from the graphic resemblance with the musical text of madrigalism. In a madrigalism, once the verbal text is erased, does not remain any signified, any reference to an absent signifier. The musical text in the case of madrigalism, far from verbal text, does not work as a code whose system of codification is lost. Madrigalism works in presence, in the moment of the encounter between word and music: it is a graft, an assembling operation, a montage.

It is very interesting that Sciarrino quotes in the interview of 2008, as example of a madrigalism used in *Dodici madrigali*, the madrigalism on the word Rhythm: “something rhythmically very clear appears when the word rhythm is singed” (Sciarrino 2008). I will connect here this madrigalism on the word rhythm, quoted by Sciarrino, with the definition of rhythm given by Benveniste in an appendix of *Problems of general linguistics* (Benveniste 1971: 281-288). In its ancient meaning, according to Benveniste, the word *rythmos* did not mean an ordered sequence in the duration of events or movements, the scansion of the march that controls time dividing it in equal and countable parts. The etymology of *rythmos* comes from rein, which means to flow (as a river). In its ancient meaning, Benveniste says, *rythmos* has something to do with the concept of schema, of form. But while schema is defined as a fixed, realised form, as something posed as an object, *rythmos* defines the form in the moment in which it is assumed: it is the mobile, fluid form, it is the improvised, momentary, modifiable form. This idea of rhythm configures an idea of time totally different from the one of a simple series of instants on a line. Rhythm is a relation, is the moment of the encounter in which nothing remains the same. Rhythm means a not originally relation, a relation which does not come from a past, which is not ratified by a convention, which does not come from a process of recognition. Rhythmos defines a relation, an encounter between elements which, coming in contact, begin to belong to each other, without any possibility to justify their relation. It defines a relation that does not unify. For these reasons, the text that enters in this relation can work otherwise if this relation is interrupted. Far from its verbal text, a musical text which contained madrigalisms, played with instrument, for example, continues to fully work, as if nothing is missing: it continues to signify otherwise. Madrigalism establishes a relation between world and music in which the concept itself of property, of belonging, is deeply modified. In this relation “proper” and appropriate does not coincide, like in Heidegger’s idea of *Eigentlichkeit*. This alteration of the idea of proper, makes the relation unstable and always about to change. The elements which constitute the form of madrigalism, once separated, does not refer to each other in absence, but begin to signify otherwise. Rhythmos in Benveniste’s sense, indicates therefore both a relation and a fissure, that is to say it indicates a relation, which does not close a circle but which, on the contrary, opens a space. Rhythm is in this sense articulation. The relation between word and music which madrigal constitutes, implies therefore this alteration of the idea of proper which let us think rhythm as *articulation*. Articulation is a fundamental element in the execution of musical text, it is what let the musical text to breath, what differentiates human musical execution from the one of an electronic device.

To the interviewer who asks why in *Dodici madrigali* he uses so a historically codified form as the madrigal, Sciarrino answers: “Actually I’m not looking for a relation with tradition, but for a new form of creation” (Sciarrino, 2008).

The reference to the *form* of madrigal, in Sciarrino’s work, is therefore a reference not to the form as *schema*, that is the form once immobilized from tradition and history, but a reference to the *form* as rhythm, to the form as *figure*. Differently from madrigal, in a strophic musical composition, what is important is the metre of poetical composition. Therefore in a strophic

musical composition, rhythm is intended in the sense of the schema. Rhythm in the sense of schema is linked with the traditional idea of a linear time, the time of *distension animi* which is the time of narration: Augustine, for example, in *Confessions* uses a metric structure, that is to say a schema of alternation between short and long syllables in a verse (*Deus creator omnium*) in order to build his idea of time.

On the contrary, rhythm in the sense of *form in the instant of its formation*, does not have a horizontal direction, as the classic idea of time, but it has rather a vertical direction. This idea of time has more to do with the instant of the encounter than with a narration of the encounter, which justifies the encounter itself, analysing the reasons of the being together.

The form of madrigal to which Sciarrino makes reference, is therefore the form of a relation between word and music, which is not justified by a schematic correspondence. This relation does not allow any possibility of substitution, but, at the same time, it establishes a link which counts for the encounter, and that therefore does not work in absence, thereby opening the possibility of new encounters, as in the case in which the verbal text is set to music again, or the musical text transcribed otherwise.

The madrigalism on the word rhythm, produces therefore a double madrigalism: the music graphically mimes a word, but doing so it graphically also mimes the form itself of madrigal, that is to say the structure, the form of the rhythmic relation it introduces between word and music. Rhythmic relation is a fissured, articulated relation, in which there is always the space for a breath, for an embellishment, for a fioritura, for a diminution.

The core of Sciarrino's work on madrigal is the question of the space between musical and verbal text, and in particular the question of the strange temporality and the strange property relation that madrigal constitutes.

Madrigalism, which reveals the rhythmic structure constituted by madrigal between text and music, also lets emerge the place in which this rhythmic structure is constituted. Madrigalism is a graphic mimesis in which musical writing mimes the meaning of the word to which it corresponds. It is totally not important, if this mimesis, this resemblance, is perceptible for a listener who listens to the music without the score.

Madrigalism lets appear, therefore, a relation between text and music at the level of writing. The vertical or instantaneous temporality, the rhythmic relation, concerns musical *writing*.

Sciarrino writes in *Le figure della musica*

[Writing music] means to use symbolic-graphic systems, that is to say to use systems developed and ordered in the space. This implies the use of logical and spatial structures. Musical writing offers the possibility to *fix*, to control, to project in a simultaneous reading what in the time we hear, on the contrary, as a succession". (Sciarrino 1998: 123)".

Musical writing, Sciarrino says, confers to the music an architectural sense. What happens to the poetic text, to its temporality when it comes in contact with this architectural structure? If musical text is a fissured, articulated time, where the spaces between sounds always open the possibility for breath and fioritura, the insertion of the verbal text multiplies the spaces, thereby projecting the text in a tridimensional structure. The rhythmic relation which madrigal establishes between music and word, as is evident in limit case of madrigalism, is also projected inside verbal text, deeply changing it. In this projection, the syntactic dimension exceeds the semantic dimension, and the vertical instantaneous temporality gets the upper hand over the time of narration.

This complex process by which the encounter between music and verbal text modifies the

temporal structure of verbal text is very clear, for example, in Sciarrino's musical theatre. The wiring of opera, of melodrama is traditionally linked to the narration of a tale. In Sciarrino's musical theatre, on the contrary, time never flows because all happens in only one instant. As for example in *Lohengrin*, composed in 1983, which is significantly subtitled: *invisible action in a prologue, four scenes and one epilogue*. This text, presents an apparent action –the love story between Elsa and Lohengrin- apparent because at the end it is revealed to be only a dream, or a delirium of Elsa, confined in a psychiatric hospital. The time of the action, therefore, is at the end contracted in the closed and narrow space of a hospital's room.

This contraction of the narrative aspect of the text, this passage from a horizontal-narrative temporality to a vertical-instantaneous temporality, is what conducts Sciarrino toward a particular type of poetic text, which is Japanese haiku. In *12 madrigali*, Sciarrino produces an interesting encounter between the form –the rhythm- of madrigal and the form –the rhythm- of haiku.

With reference to another of his works, *Quaderno di strada* (2005), Sciarrino describes very precisely how he works on a verbal text before setting it to music. Verbal text, Sciarrino says, has to be adapted in order to be set in music. This adaptation process is described as an operation that has to do with cuts, with eliminations of parts of the text. In *Quaderno di strada*, Sciarrino sets to music some fragments, as for example graffiti read on cities walls, part of letters or articles or poem's lines, collected in different moments and places on a notebook. For each text is indicated the author, or the original collocation, but they result profoundly modified because parts of them are cut. Sciarrino describes this modification of the text as a process, which reduces the text to something that is very similar to the structure of haiku.

Sciarrino writes:

The verbal flash of haiku, inserted in longer musical piece, let the verses rotate on themselves, so that the sense is subverted. Every word enters in contact with another one, also if it is very far, thereby creating new images, short-circuits (Sciarrino, 2008a: 26).

Roland Barthes, in the last years of his life, in *La preparation du roman* (Barthes 2011), deeply works on Japanese haikus.

In this text Barthes describes haiku as exemplar act of annotation of present that is to say as writing of the instant, of the event (Barthes 2011: 23 and following). Annotation, of which haiku is an exemplar act, consists in the extrapolation of a single experience from the whole flowing of experiences. In this notation practice, writing gives to the experience a *form* –form in the sense of rhythm and not in the sense of schema. This form is the form of the event. Haiku is an annotation that shares with musical notation the fact it determines a vertical relation between the lines of the text, rather than a horizontal narrative structure. A “good” haiku, Barthes says, does not tell a story and does not *express* a concept. The space between the lines of a haiku, according to Barthes, is empty: in it we can't find any logical or temporal connection, but nevertheless these lines are not indifferent to each other. The lines are at the same time both linked and separated by white spaces that constitute a relation that both Barthes and Sciarrino describe as a *short-circuit*, or a *tilt*. What Barthes describes as short-circuit or tilt is a double rhythmic relation: the first between the subject and the object of writing, and the second between the lines of the poem. A haiku is in this sense the result of an encounter, which does not happen to a transcendental subject, to a subject in general: a haiku is the result of an encounter between singularities. What happens in this encounter, according to Barthes, is an individuation event (Barthes, 2011:

39). Individuation is the event of an encounter, it is a window opened between two universes, which determines what Barthes, with a very musical word, calls *nuance*. *Nuance* is what makes something or someone irreplaceable in a relation. Nuance is an encounter between singularities whose link is circumstantial: it realizes a montage of universes which give sense to each other also if they are not made for each other. Nuance realises a link that cannot justify itself, in other words it realises a not schematic form, a fluid form, a rhythm. For these reasons, this link, as in the case of madrigalism, does not work in absentia. It is lost once the encounter is finished. And this loss is an irreparable loss.

The space between the three lines of a haiku is empty, it is a silence, as the space between two notes of a musical composition, or the space of the two lines of a counterpoint, or the space between the line which indicates the melody to sing and the line which indicates the word to pronounce.

To reduce a text to a haiku means therefore to dig in it spaces in order to make articulation emerge. Articulation is according to Sciarrino what makes possible to set a verbal text to music. Articulation is therefore, in Sciarrino, the place of the encounter between word and music.

Sciarrino writes:

The mysterious and powerful link between sound and word. Word and sound, sound and word: this is singing. To invent a song does not mean only composing for a voice. Is necessary before composing, to clean our minds, to make transparent the intervals which have been crossed by all the music of the world, by mountains of songs, and by what constitutes the gigantic rubbish dump in which we live. Ecology is the birth of a consciousness in order to act and to find again ourselves. Therefore ecology of sound means coming back to silence, but above all to find again an expression without dryness and without rhetoric. When the voice trusts to silence, it remains only mouth, hole, saliva. Slightly opened lips, border of a obscure void, border of thirst and hunger (Sciarrino 2008: 27).

In order to compose for voice is necessary, according to Sciarrino, to find silence, or better a particular form of silence. When Sciarrino speaks about silence as the possibility of the mysterious and powerful link between word and sound, he is not speaking of an absolute silence but rather of the silence opened between the sounds and the words that is the silence which articulates creating a relation and making transparent the intervals. When voice trusts to silence, Sciarrino says, it remains only mouth: not a mouth closed in an absolute silence, but on the contrary a mouth with disclosed lips, as the lips of someone who is about to speak or to sing. This silence with disclosed lips is already articulating a form. This particular sense of articulation is described by Sciarrino in *Le figure della musica*, by what he calls *window forms* (Sciarrino 1998: 97), where again "form" has to be intended as rhythm and not as schema. In window forms, a rip opens an universe on another universe, breaking continuity. Exactly as it happens in *Lohengrin*: in the narrow space of a hospital room a window is opened on a dream. The prologue of this work is titled: *prologue through an opened window*. A universe is opened on another universe without a narrative link: between Elsa's real situation and her dream, there is no coherence, no narrative flow, no linear time. Is exactly as, Sciarrino says, when we open more than a window on our computer desktop.

The window form, Sciarrino says, is a montage, a seam whose scar remains evident, made of two universes that, on one hand, are not made to be together and, on the other hand, from the moment of their encounter on, are not indifferent to each other. It is an instantaneous montage,

as the one of photography. Windows, Sciarrino says, are two spatial forms cut in time. What Sciarrino calls window form, is a relation between two universes, which lean toward each other in a reciprocal donation of sense. This relation of sewing, of montage, determines, according to Sciarrino, a totally discontinuous time, an articulated time. In this articulation realized by window forms, music is already in relation with word, also if the text is still not been set to music.

Sciarrino experiments this idea of a relation between music and text, which goes beyond the simple act to set a text to music, in many pieces, for example in *Alfabeto oscuro*, composed in 1993 which is a part of *Musiche per Dante*. This piece, written for a little orchestra, therefore without voices, has at its beginning, as indication for its execution: “come parlando” which means “like speaking”. The effect of *come parlando*, is obtained, in this piece, by the pronunciation in the instruments of the consonants of the *Divina commedia*’s first verse. Consonants produce a cut, an articulation effect, an effect of continuous traumatic interruption. Therefore the *come parlando* mimes articulation, the syntactic relation, the rhythmic relation of words. In this rhythmic relation Sciarrino finds an eloquence before word which is the link which connects word and music before the operation to set to music a text: the eloquence of instruments in *Alfabeto oscuro*, Sciarrino says, is given precisely from the impossibility to speak.

Musical dimension of text, that is to say what makes possible the encounter between word and music, is therefore this articulation, in which writing goes beyond narration and becomes position of signifiers. In this writing as position of signifiers, which constitutes the musical dimension of text, the link between signifiers has no more to do with the semantic reference to their signified, but it has rather to do with rhythm, that is to say with the circumstantial movement in which signifiers enter in relation, through silence spaces, opened as windows on other interpretative universes.

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ANDREI TARKOVSKY'S *MUSICAL OFFERING*: THE LAW OF QUOTATION

Julia Shpinitskaya
University of Helsinki, Finland
Julia.Shpinitskaya@helsinki.fi

Abstract

The article explores meaning and function of musical quotations in the films of Andrei Tarkovsky, the context of their appearance in a particular film space and their relationships with the visual images and onscreen situations. Quotation forms a vastly significant part of the new cinematic sound language that Tarkovsky was creating in his work, relating its function to the mechanisms of the *poetic logic*. Holding a multiple and variable meanings, the quotation is an open semantic space that produces a series of senses. Current observations departure from the original ideas concerning approach to the historical musical material from Tarkovsky's own notes in *Sculpturing in Time* and the interviews of his musical collaborators (composer Eduard Artemiev and sound-mixer Owe Svensson), which are extended by findings made in case studies.

1. The law of quotation

Starting from his third film, *Solaris*, Andrei Tarkovsky practically expelled regular film music from cinema and did not make a film featuring a regular music track. Instead, he aimed at exploring new relationship of sound and image and foundation of new expressive senses as if the new genre has not created its own visual and audio language as he thought of cinema. Ideally he was thinking about a film with no music at all. The sounding was purposed to reach a realistic soundscape: absence of film music was compensated for by electronic music, a new sound in 1970s, often disguised as organic sounds, purified of their origins on the director's demand, as well as by natural sounds and urban noises. And even his ideal model of a composer was a "sound-mixer with composer's hearing", an expert in rustles, rumbles and echoes, as mentioned by Eduard Artemiev (Petrov 1996), the composer whom he worked with on majority of his

films. On this path of achieving natural sounding Tarkovsky escaped into another music realm – quotations, which appear almost in every film¹, even in abundance. Andrei Tarkovsky's only *Musical Offering* is exclusively musical quotations, and they become a rule of a film.

Emergence of a real musical piece, a quotation, in the context of natural and electronic sounds and noises within a film, is justified by its semantic value. It takes music to the symbolical level, calling to the particularity of the moment. Some quotations serve as refrains, repeated in a film, and besides sometimes they are transferred from film to film. However, not only art-music of classical heritage can be taken as quotations in Tarkovsky's films, but a pre-existent musical material in a broad sense serves as quotation as well whether it is a Russian folk song, forest herding calls from Sweden, or a traditional Japanese flute performance. The function of this musical material in the films is identical with the function of classical quotations: it marks film episodes as key points. After *Solaris* Tarkovsky applies the newly discovered strategy of quotation again and again, on a regular basis, and in the meantime he approaches entrance of the quotations in divergent modes, attempting to mask them in a film and blend with other sound content. Above all, the appearance of the quotations in general in the film space is greatly intriguing, not to say that the case of emergence of one or another specific quotation in particular is arresting, and therefore, a film moment shared and highlighted by a musical quotation is inviting to understand the strategy of quoting, the meaning and function of quotation, or the aspects of quotation that become activated for interaction with the film body.

2. Levitation scene

I would like to start with a quotation confluence in *The Sacrifice*: two musical quotations that are solved as a polyphonic sound space². There is a series of images that depart from a real event, but followed by surreal episodes until it ends in awakening from sleep. Both audio and visual channels support ambiguity of the event and leave unresolved whether it is a dream, vision or reality. This is a central scene of the film, the sacrifice per se. The course of events suggests that Alexander comes to Maria for a sacrifice, a love ritual. Before, Otto reveals to him that Maria is a witch and that Alexander must go and persuade her to love him: it is likely the only way to rescue the world from the upcoming war.

There are two musical elements involved into this series of episodes as a pre-existent material: Japanese bamboo flute *hotchiku* played by Zen master Watazumido Shuso and traditional Swedish forest calls to call home livestock, a recording by Swedish Radio in the countryside. They start during Alexander's visit to Maria and interweave over a series of images. The sounds enter during the levitation, which represents love and make a counterpoint. Correspondence of the quotations is well determined. The flute defines personality of Alexander, while the calls are a token of Maria. Sound works as a representation of a personage. The calls and flute appear in the film many times but before the levitation they do not come together. The *hotchiku* sound is bound to the image of Alexander, fascinated by Japan: planting a Japanese tree, listening to Japanese music, wearing a kimono, and supposing that in his previous life he and his little son were Japanese. The calls are, most likely, the only representation of mysteriousness of Maria. These are not only typical sounds of Swedish countryside but they obtain real sense of signals and their true destination is to call. Owe Svensson, the Sound Mixer, who worked in *The Sacrifice* interprets this sound in its relation to Maria:

The important thing was that there was this woman and she comes into the film quite early and then she enters the dream and that represents a connection with human emotions, which of course a contrast to the threat of war. Both Otto – the actor Allan Edwall – and

Alexander are in contact with her. Otto seems to receive her call when he suddenly collapses on the floor while walking through the house telling strange tales (Sundström).

The scene preceding Alexander's visit to Maria drops a clue about the calls, too. Otto tells about Maria's magic power insisting that Alexander must go to her. In this moment a single call is heard and both of them receive the signal:

Otto: Have you heard?

Alexander: What?

Otto: What is it?

Alexander: I don't know. I seemed that there was music.

Then Alexander escapes to Maria's dwelling³ – the sequence starts as an actual event. The interaction of the flute and calls endures through next scenes and after that Alexander wakes up at home. Thus, the matter is resolved in favour of a dream but the question remains open: it is unclear whether everything was a dream or dream was only a part of the sequence, and when the reality deviated into a dream.

3. List of quotations

Before venturing into a discussion on the meaning and function of quotation, let us overview the long list of works explored in Tarkovsky's films.

- *Ivan's Childhood*:
A Russian folk song⁴ anticipating the quotation strategy.
- There is an only quotation in *Solaris* but it returns four times.
Bach's Choral prelude in f-minor, *Ich ruf' zu Dir, Herr Jesu Christ* (*I call to you, Lord Jesus Christ*) BWV Anh. 73-2.58, a variant of the famous prelude BWV 639 from the *Little Organ Book* of W. F. Bach.
- Five quotations in *The Mirror*:
J. S. Bach, *Das alte Jahre vergangen ist* (*The Old Year...*), from *Orgelbüchlein* BWV 614. Refrain, sounds twice.
G. B. Pergolesi, *Quando corpus* (*When the Body...*) from *Stabat Mater*.
H. Purcell, song *They Tell Us That Your Mighty Powers* from the opera *Indian Queen*, Act 4. Refrain, sounds twice.
J. S. Bach, Recitative of Evangelist *Und siehe da, der Vorhang im Tempel* (*And Behold, the Veil of the Temple...*) from *Johannespassion* BWV 245.
J. S. Bach, Choir *Herr, unser Herrscher, dessen Ruhm* (*Lord, Our Redeemer, Thou Whose Name [in All the World is Glorious...]*) from *Johannespassion* BWV 245.
- Four quotations in *Stalker*, with a distinct technique of setting them in film:
J. S. Bach, Aria of alto *Erbarme dich, mein Gott* (*Have Mercy, My God, [for My Tears' Sake...]*) from *Matthäuspasion* BWV 244, Part two. Appears in a short whistling.
R. Wagner, theme of sacred love from the *Overture to Tannhäuser*.
M. Ravel, *Boléro*.
L. van Beethoven, *Ode to Joy* from *The 9th Symphony*. The three latter quotations come out of train noise. The theme of the *Ode* also sounds in *Nostalghia*, twice.

- Three quotations in *Nostalghia*, two of them sound twice:
G. Verdi, *Libera me* from *Requiem Aeternam, Requiem*. Refrain, sounds twice.
L. van Beethoven, *Finale of The 9th Symphony*: Refrain, it sounds twice. (And in *Stalker* once).
A Russian folk song sang by the Writer (*There Somebody Walked down the Hill*).
- Four quotations in *The Sacrifice*:
J. S. Bach, Aria of alto *Erbarme dich, mein Gott* (*Have Mercy, My God, [for My Tears' Sake...]*) from *Matthäuspasion* BWV 244, Part two. Refrain, it sounds twice. And it also sounds in *Stalker* as a short motive.
Traditional calls, chants from Swedish forests to call home livestock. It sounds many times.
Japanese bamboo flute hotchiku performed by Watazumido Shuso. It sounds many times.
J. S. Bach, *Prelude* from *Praeludium et Fuga in d* BWV 539. The beginning of the *Prelude* is performed on organ by the main character.

There one would reveal a large tribute to Bach and Baroque music and a portion of Romanticism in later *Stalker* and *Nostalghia*, including application of quotations from Verdi and Beethoven as refrains. He retains a short Bach's motive together with the romantic quotations in *Stalker*, but the mode of quoting Bach differs from quoting other music in this film. *Stalker* is quite unique in Tarkovsky's filmic sound technique, being the closest to his declaration of not having music. The mode of quoting has passed a strong modification: quotations are well-concealed, masked from being evident: the Bach's motive appears in passing, in a whistling, while other quotations reach one's ears from behind the train noise. Later he returns to a straighter quoting and a more open appearance of historical music.

4. The meaning of quotation

Attempting to approach the meaning and function of musical quotation one would inevitably find oneself wandering about in a labyrinth of sense. The meaning of quotations is unresolved, and while there is much to think that quotations function as metaphors, Tarkovsky himself rejected this meaning. Therefore, to investigate the function of quotation is to explore his reasons to quote. And the starting point on this path could be the meaning of the key notion in Tarkovsky's film aesthetics, the *poetic logic*.

4.1. Poetic logic

In *Sculpturing in Time* the film director introduces his strategy of quotation and relations between quotations and filmed images as poetic logic and poetic links (Tarkovsky 2002: 111–114, 123–125). Poetry for him is a specific attitude to reality, a way of life, and the poetic links bring emotionality to what is seen on screen. The poetic logic is an art of associations that shift from one object to another. It is the building principle of memories and dreams, however it also represents patterns of thinking and thus the ordinary reception of reality. The link between quotation and another object – a filmed image, quotation, or visualisation – opens by association.

Tarkovsky thought that the poetic logic is an approach to a more realistic cinema: he relates it to the attributes of human memory and distinguishes that some phenomena, like dreams and recollections, could not be represented otherwise than by means of the *poetry*. He applies the associative thinking to represent man's personality through memories and dreams: once he refers to Proust's idea of reviving "a huge building of recollections" (Tarkovsky 2002: 158). Another time he says: "I wanted to demonstrate possibilities of cinema observing life, sort of, without gross apparent interference in its course. Because this is the way I see the authentic *poetic* essence of the cinematography" (Tarkovsky 2002: 315–316)⁵.

4.2. Building emotional ties

While emotionality is mentioned as one of the effects resulted from the poetic logic, it may be one of the clues to read the essence of quotation. Musical quotation is tied to the filmed image by emotion: thus, once, Tarkovsky determines that the western tradition speaks from the emotional and personal viewpoint, full of subjectivity and a strong self:

Compare eastern and western music. West shouts 'It is I! Look at me! Listen how I suffer, how I love! How unhappy I am, how fidgety! I! My! To me! Me!' East keeps quiet about itself! A total dissolution in God, Nature, Time. To find yourself in everything! To hide everything in you! The Taoist music. China of 600 years before Christ (Tarkovsky 2002: 348).

The quotation is an emotion that a viewer may share when at the same time observing an image. Also that emotion may be connected to the inner state of a character since Tarkovsky clearly recognises that he wants to show the inner world of a man:

I was not interested in surface movement, intrigue, content of events – from film to film I needed them less and less. I have always been interested in the inner world of a man – and it was far natural for me to make a trip inside his psychology, feeding it philosophy, those literary and cultural traditions, on which his spiritual fundamentals are rested (Tarkovsky 2002: 324).

4.3. Establishing identity: historical roots and belongingness

One more clue is pointed out when discovering that by his search of the cinema language Tarkovsky wanted to establish historical roots of cinema and to demonstrate continuity of arts and connection of times, as mentioned by Artemiev and implied by Tarkovsky himself: "Andrei told me that he needs Baroque music and paintings of old masters in order to create an illusion of roots of this new (only a hundred years!) genre, the cinema. This is because, when a man hears Bach or sees painting of Michelangelo or Leonardo da Vinci, the 'connection of times' springs up in him subconsciously" (Petrov 1996)⁶.

In *The Mirror* I sought for communicating the feeling that Bach, and Pergolesi, and letter of Pushkin, and soldiers forcing a crossing over Sivash, and home quite small-scale events – all these in some sense are equal for human experience. It may be equally important for a man's spiritual experience what happened with him yesterday and what happened with the humankind a century ago... (Tarkovsky 2002: 314).

Besides the general timeless aspect of the cinema as a stage in the art continuum, given by the use of historical quotations, an art object quoted in a film refers to one's personal roots and creates the aspect of belonging of a man, or a character, speaking also of his personal background: "In all motion pictures that I made, the topic of roots, of connections with ancestral home, with childhood, with motherland, with Earth, has always been very important for me. It has always

been very important for me to establish one's belongingness to a tradition, culture, range of people or ideas" (Tarkovsky 2002: 314).

Quotation enters as a part of a man's universe. It speaks of a man, his community and personal world: "I am interested in the man, in whom the entire Universe is enclosed, — and in order to express the idea, the sense of man's life, it is little necessary to build some storyline on to this idea" (Tarkovsky 2002: 324).

4.4. Metaphor versus poetic logic

There was an exception once, when Tarkovsky recognised the sense of quotation as a metaphor, speaking of a particular case in *Nostalghia*:

Perhaps, I can agree that the final shot of *Nostalghia* is partially metaphorical, when I place a Russian house into the walls of an Italian cathedral. This constructed image contains a too much touch of literary effects. This is a modelled inner state of the hero, his division into two that does not let him to live as before. Or, if you will, on the contrary, his new integrity, organically including into itself, in one and indivisible sense of home and blood, hills of Tuscany and a Russian village, which the reality commands to divide on returning to Russia. [...] This is a result, as it seems to me, quite complex and ambiguous, figuratively expressing what was going on with the hero but still symbolising nothing more, extraneous, needing a solution (Tarkovsky 2002: 333–334).

On the same pages he excuses his inconsistency by saying that an artist devises a principle but also breaks it.

Nevertheless, despite Tarkovsky's theoretical constructions against the metaphorical sense of quotations, it is impossible to completely negate their metaphorical sense. The abundance of associations, references and symbolic representations supports work of metaphorisation but the sense of metaphor does not depart far from the sense of the poetic logic. It is not that the mechanism of metaphor does not belong in there. The dilemma is the borders of the notion and precision of a definition. The poetic logic covers the meaning of metaphorisation but exceeds it, richer in signification. Tarkovsky did not want his images or sounds to work in the mode of metaphors, as objects with an exact ultimate sense.

4.5. The sense of *haiku* (polysemanticism and observation)

With the poetic logic approach, in which the meaning of quotation multiplies, becoming ambiguous and polysemantic, Tarkovsky interprets the meaning of quotations akin to the principles of *haiku*, Zen or Japanese music that were points of his interests and aesthetic reference: representation of everything or nothing, either endless series of senses or nothing more than pure images in observation. The poetic logic becomes a method of *observing* an image. "What does mean, for instance, Leonardo or Bach in the functional sense? Just nothing but what they mean per se, — that much they are independent. They see the world as if for the first time, as if they were not burdened with any experience. Their independent gaze becomes similar to the gaze of newcomers" (Tarkovsky 2002: 223).

Tarkovsky's idea suggests that observing is a basic principle of the cinematographic image, and that the image is an art of posing your own sense of an object as observing the object (Tarkovsky 2002: 214–215). In the episode of weightlessness in *Solaris*, when, during Bach's *Prelude* one loses sense of temporal frames, the historical quotation represented out of actions and dialogues brings the viewer to a state of contemplation. It activates the function of the observer

that makes the viewer stand still and provokes a sort of meditation on a subject. In it there is no eventual sense of an image that could be deciphered like a charade:

Haiku grows its images in the way that they do not mean anything but themselves, at the same time expressing so much that it is impossible to catch the ultimate meaning. I.e.: the less possible fits the image of it [haiku] into a conceptual speculative formula, the more accurately the image corresponds to its destination. A man reading haiku must vanish into it like into nature, immerse in it, and be lost in its depth like in cosmos, where there is neither top nor bottom (Tarkovsky 2002: 213).

4.6. The interplay of contexts

In the labyrinth of sense signified by use of quotation it is relevant to determine that although Tarkovsky defends independency of quotations from experience, however, it is not only pure music that co-operates with the image emotionally or by means of the poetic logic and poly-semantic expression, but it is the original context of music that provides signification for the screen situation – and this is a strategy by which a quotation enters the film body. It is relevant to list a number of examples to demonstrate how this correspondence is created between the musical context and the visual context.

- Wagner's theme that introduces spiritual ideal love in *Tannhäuser*⁷, in *Stalker* is a token of feelings that connect Stalker and his wife⁸. In the opera this theme also becomes the theme of a pilgrim's choir (I act II part). The topic of pilgrimage finely refers to Stalker himself: a devotee, with a vocation to guide the unhappiest people to the Zone, he has to live ascetic life in poverty, to suffer a lot of oppression⁹, and to remain pure and unsullied.
- The quotation from *Mathew Passion* in *Stalker* is distinguished by its ironic use. *Have Mercy My God* is a cynical excuse whistled by the Writer, a disbeliever, walking through the dangerous Zone, a sacred place, with disrespect.
- However, the same theme in *The Sacrifice – Have Mercy My God* – turns to be a prayer of forgiveness that corresponds to the entire topic of sacrifice and to the circumstances of Alexander. The quotation frames the film and though it does not attend the image of Alexander, it correlates to his asking forgiveness for sins of the world and to the vow to sacrifice everything he possesses for rescuing the world from the catastrophe of the last war.
- Ravel's *Bolero* is employed in the long last scene in the Zone from *Stalker*, where three personages, Stalker, Writer and Professor, are sitting in the floor through the day before returning to the world, after the bomb to destroy the Zone has been disarmed. The link of this quotation is the topic of technical progress: as it is known, on composing *Bolero*, Ravel imagined a factory. He left enthusiastic impressions out of gigantic urban creatures associated with metal, fire, crash and rumble.
- Beethoven's *Ode to Joy* accompanies Stalker's disabled daughter when she reveals a gift of telekinesis: the triumph of spirit.
- Two cases of the same theme in *Nostalghia* may be considered as one quotation, interrupted but continued in other part of the film. They are both related to Domenico, obsessed by ideas of unity and rescue of mankind. The first sounds in a dialogue with Andrei, whom Domenico is conveying to rescue the mankind. The second marks the episode of Domenico's self-immolation preceded by his propagation on the Capitol in Rome. Both times Beethoven is played by Domenico himself for demonstration of his ideas. This musical representation restores cultural and historical reference of Domenico's statements:

“One drop and one more drop make one big drop, not two”, “At first I was an egoist. I wanted to rescue my family. But one needs to rescue all. All world”, “People have to come back to unity and not to remain separate”.

- The sense of Verdi's *Requiem* during Andrei's flashback in the beginning of the film, when he sees his family and house in Russia, is obtained in the final shots in return of the quotation at his passing away: thus, his opening memories are disclosed as a farewell.
- One of the quotations in *The Mirror* is used as a musical portrait. Purcell's song from *Indian Queen* implies the power (*They Tell Us that Your Mighty Power*) that a red-haired girl had for Alexei, back in his childhood. In both of the girl's episodic appearances Purcell's theme follows her. It reminds of the strategy of female images in his visual quotations serving a mirror of a personage.

5. Open semantic space

Musical quotation is one of Tarkovsky's sound forms used among natural sounds, noises and electronic sounding that shape the soundscape of his films; sometimes mixed or blended into those other sound forms. Whether it is historical art music of a pre-existent musical material, quotation forms a significant part of the new cinematic sound language that Tarkovsky was creating in his work and is the only part that brings conventional music into his films starting from *Solaris*.

Tracing connections between musical quotations and onscreen situations and images in the films exposes a framework of relations between them that work on several semantic levels and aim at emergence of diverse effects. The very use of quotation seems an exploration of its creative senses for the film director. Quotation represents a multifunctional strategy, holding a variable and mobile semantic space, while the meaning of quotation multiplies, producing series of senses and is not meant to be defined by precise boundaries or ultimate meaning.

The functions of quotation shift between creating identity, linking to an emotion, bringing in a metaphoric reference, entering the state of observation (as a extended moment when time freezes up), and suggesting an interplay of contexts (as the original context of the quotation and the onscreen context). The aesthetics of the poetic logic is not only responsible for emergence of quotations on screen but it is what governs the series of senses and functions produced by quotation, supporting semantic field of quotation as an active open space. Connections between the filmed reality and quotation or between quotation and quotation open by association in the likeness of memories evoked by smell of madeleine for Proust. However, despite of the contextual links between quotation and film reality that can be found, the meaning of quotation is not fixed and oversteps the meaning of metaphor, forming a wider sense and allowing polysemanticism.

The strategy of quotation becomes a looking glass. Poetic logic and the moments it marks by quotation are gateways to an alternative reality related to dreams, memories, visions and meditative states, just to remind of the analysed above episode of levitation from *The Sacrifice* departing from reality and heading for the realm of surreal, while leaving the viewer with unanswered ambiguity. And yet, according to Tarkovsky, this endless series of senses, in which the viewer must vanish, is the most natural device the most likely embodying reality of life.

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(Endnotes)

¹ Except for *Andrei Rublev*.

² Though there were other sounds interfering with a quotation, like rumble of jet fighters flying overhead and ship horns. This technique of blending other sounds into a quotation is quite typical, just to remind of natural sounds (steps on the snow and bird's singing) and the electronic sound of *Solaris* intermingling with Bach's tune in *Solaris* and train noise in *Stalker*, overlapping Wagner's, Ravel's and Beethoven's pieces.

³ During the conversation with Maria Alexander sketchily plays an excerpt from Bach's *Prelude (Praeludium et Fuga in d BWV 539)*, telling about his mother (the *Prelude* was her favourite) – one more quotation located near other elements of the collage.

⁴ *They Don't Permit Masha Going beyond the River*.

⁵ Here and forth translation from Andrei Tarkovsky's *Sculpturing in Time* is mine.

⁶ Here and forth translation from Arkady Petrov's interview with Edward Artemiev is mine.

⁷ In the opera it contrasts with the theme that represents sensual love.

⁸ The nature of their feelings is understood far in the end of the film, while the quotation sounds in the beginning: in this moment the wife has a fit of hysterics after *Stalker* has left to the Zone again and she cast reproaches upon him.

⁹ *Stalker* has been arrested for being a guide to the Zone, and his only child was born disabled.

FRANZ LISZT – A DILEMMA OF STYLISTIC INTERFERENCES

Mihaela-Georgiana Balan
University of Arts “George Enescu”, Iași, Romania
mihaela.balan87@yahoo.com

Abstract

Considered both as a national and a universal artist, Franz Liszt has inflamed a deep process of continuous progress and radical changes in music, on every level he has undertaken: piano playing, composition, conducting and writing about music. He remained in the history as a complex musician, with a rich activity, maybe the most visionary composer at that time, because his personality was so controversial, that he literally shocked his contemporaries in every parameter of his art. There are numberless books, biographies, treatises, studies, dissertations about his activity, written in different manners and using various analysis techniques. The purpose of this paper is to go beyond some texts where Franz Liszt was approached as one-sided figure, in order to outline his personality as a whole, by pointing some key-elements in his artistic psychology, some deep resorts of his composing principles. In this regard, I have chosen some well-known authors who wrote about Liszt and have kept the most representative elements of their works to describe him, trying to ‘catch’ the essence of the great Franz Liszt.

1. Introduction – Franz Liszt’s position among the 19th composers in the History of Music

Tradition, especially innovation, elevating idealism and revolutionary spirit - in one word, we are speaking about genius. These are some terms that might summarize the aesthetics of the 19th century, with reference to that great artist considered the soul of Romanticism, a man completely devoted to his generation and its ideals. His name was Franz Liszt.

Equally considered a national and universal artist, Franz Liszt has inflamed a deep process of continuous progress and radical changes in music, on every level he has undertaken: piano playing, composition, conducting and writing about music. He remained in the history as a complex musician, with a rich activity, maybe the most visionary composer at that time, because his personality was so controversial, that he literally shocked his contemporaries in everything he did.

Because of the nature of this work, we can't raise an innovative, unheard or spectacular point of view on Franz Liszt's personality. He became, in time, a true legend in the history of music. He was approached in countless books, biographies and studies from different angles, in order to be described with respect to his amazing life, his polyvalent activity, or his romantic psychology - which was considered to be a controversial spirit.

He was described in different manners: technically, analytically, metaphorically, philosophically and so on. We will offer some examples: 'magnetism' and 'electricity' by Heinrich Heine, 'a gifted joker' by conductor Hermann Levi, 'nice and generous, arrogant and whimsical', with a 'kinetic music, meant to amaze, to astonish' – as wrote Harold Schonberg, 'apparent humbleness' – in the famous caricature and cartoon magazine from Paris *Le Charivari*¹, 'gallantry of a knight', 'tendency towards splendour and declamation'² – by Romanian musicologist Eugeniu Speranția, 'a piano sorcerer'³ – by Ioana Ștefănescu, 'sulphurous greatness' – by Charles Rosen, etc. All these attributes reflect the malicious curiosity of his contemporaries and also the attempt of the generations to come to 'catch' his being. He was envied, discussed and he became the subject of many intrigues, polemics around his existence. Unlike his older music colleague Niccolò Paganini, whose destiny gave birth to different Mephistophelian legends (fed by the violinist himself), Liszt chose a clear, rational way of being, organized according to his native impulses and to his huge responsibility for his artistic gift. Beyond every calumny and gossip about him, Liszt had a precocious wisdom, being conscious of the high meaning of his endowment. This is why he has invested a great quantity of physical and inner energy in order to promote the young gifted players, composers, writers, but with no financial resources or wealthy connections.

The spreading of his talent and his music, his European success are due to his career developed in the main artistic centres, because Liszt was, at a high level, a 'vagrant' musician, a passionate traveller, always wanting to meet new people. We would like to quote some observations made by a famous radio and TV producer, referring to Liszt's permanent willing to meet and conquer the unknown: 'artist having the great delight of travelling', 'a musician who knew that all the roads towards us pass around the globe', 'a seismometer of his century, a musical guide of Europe.'⁴

2. Franz Liszt approached by musicologists

Among the few musicologists who have emphasized the nature of Liszt's genius were Béla Bartók and Emil Haraszti. If Bartók is notorious in the history of music, Haraszti must be introduced as a Hungarian historian and critic of the first half of the 20th century, interested in composers such as Chopin, Liszt and Bartók. Haraszti has written many studies and specialised papers focused on biographic elements essential for their evolution, specific language features shaped on the background of national conscience belonging to the native place. Bartók has found the palliating circumstances for the frequently called 'exaggerated Romantic pathos' in the context of the period that reached its pinnacle, while Haraszti has emphasized the influences assimilated by Liszt during his studies and journeys through the entire Europe. Thus, the German School (represented by Robert Schumann, Richard Wagner, Johannes Brahms), the French Culture (Hector Berlioz, Frederic Chopin, César Franck, Camille Saint-Saëns), the Ital-

¹ Phrases quoted from Harold Schonberg, *The Lives of the Great Composers*, Lider Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, pages 189-201.

² Eugeniu Speranția, *Musical Medallions*, Musical Publishing House of the Composers Union from Romania, Bucharest 1966, page 81.

³ Ioana Ștefănescu, *A History of the Universal Music*, The Publishing House of the Cultural Romanian Foundation, Bucharest, 1998, page 340.

⁴ Iosif Sava, *The joys of Music*, Musical Publishing House, Bucharest, 1985, pages 380-381.

ian School (with its main composers representing the specific *bel-canto*: Gioacchino Rossini, Gaetano Donizetti, Vincenzo Bellini, Giuseppe Verdi) and the Russian School (to whom he had some connections, yet more distant and formal), all these cultures have determined the evolution of the Hungarian composer. Thus, Liszt has developed himself by constantly relating his ideas and principles to the romantic context of his contemporaries.

A very important musicologist of the 20th and 21st centuries is Serge Gut, author of many important works, studies, papers focused on musical language from the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century. He is well known for his particular concern in Franz Liszt's personality, considering that his stylistic influences can be divided into two categories: general and musical. One has to take into consideration the fact some **interference**⁵ didn't have a major impact on his aesthetic orientation, but offered him some reference points in order to find his own path among his predecessors and contemporaries, in the general context of the history of music. There are many contradictory perspectives on Franz Liszt's origin, because of his birth place, his studies in different musical centres, his settlement on short or long term in different places, which led to the claiming of different European countries regarding his stylistic affiliation. As Serge Gut concludes, this fact has a less significance than the entire variety of the mentioned interferences.

From this point of view, it is important to mention the influence (and not only the interference) of the Hungarian Gypsies. This matter also raised many polemics about the priority of gypsy elements compared to the Hungarian, national things, or the opposite. Liszt has been particularly attracted to the gypsy music from Hungary, even if he got into contact with many other national contexts of gypsies from abroad. In his book *Des Bohémiens et de leur musique en Hongrie*, Liszt explains three main ideas:

1. The musical art common to gypsies and Hungarians, related to their Asian origin.
2. The anteriority of the gypsy music
3. The superiority of the gypsy music⁶

Serge Gut used some quotes from Liszt's ideas referring to his Hungarian Rhapsodies, which were named after the 'epic' element inside the melody inspired by Hungarian folk songs, leading to the unity and the coherence of all works entitled similarly. 'Hungarian people adopted gypsies, who became national musicians. Thus, Hungary might claim with good reason the paternity of this art, nourished with its own wheat and vineyard, raised under the sun and close to the shadow of Hungarian trees. Their music is related to the most glorious historical events of their homeland and to the most intimate memories of every Hungarian inhabitant.'⁷

From the purely musical point of view, one can find elements specific to gypsy music which can be observed in Franz Liszt's work:

- the gypsy scale (having two augmented seconds)
- the rhythm, originated from a gypsy dance named *verbunkos*, usually played during Napoleon's campaigns;
- melisma and different ornaments, frequently overloaded (leaning notes/ *appoggiaturas*, grace notes, *échappé* notes, repeating chords on great rhythmic values or very short durations.

⁵ Serge Gut, *Franz Liszt – les éléments du langage musical*, avec un préface de Jacques Chailley, Ed. Armoniz ZurfluH, Paris, 2008, page 1.

⁶ Serge Gut, *op.cit.*, page 266.

⁷ Franz Liszt, *Des Bohémiens et de leur musique en Hongrie*, apud. Serge Gut, *op. cit.*, page 266.

Example 1 – Franz Liszt – *Hungarian Rhapsody* no. 2, ms. 1-8

3. Liszt – pianist and composer

The first feature that assessed Liszt in the glorious height of European culture was his pianistic virtuosity. Among his predecessors, W. A. Mozart was firstly a musician and secondly pianist, unlike Muzio Clementi who was in the converse situation; among his contemporaries, Robert Schumann wished to become a great pianist, but the circumstances of his life led his career towards composition and musical critics, while Frédéric Chopin was an exceptional pianist, a very appreciated pedagogue, but all these activities had an ordinary function – to ensure his daily income, because his deepest aspirations were focused on musical composition. Franz Liszt is a particular case among the virtuosos of the 18th and 19th centuries, being considered unanimously a genius of piano playing. While playing, he proved to be a very talented interpreter of the musical meanings, a creator of new significations and a gifted pianist. ‘Liszt was the first to understand the dramatic and emotional meaning of new instrumental techniques (around 1830), accomplishing one of the greatest revolutions in the music created for keyboards until that moment of the history. He configured what would later become pianistic romantic sonority.’⁸

There were also many discussions concerning Franz Liszt and Niccolò Paganini as similar cases from the artistic point of view. Even if the pianist was inspired by the fascinating violin technique mastered by Paganini, who cultivated in him the strong desire of transposing the principles of ‘acrobatic’ virtuosity in the pianistic art field, this influence did not expand to the level of compositional general principles. Compared to Paganini, Liszt had a much larger amount of works and personal strivings that had nothing to do with his purpose of remaining in history as a victim (or winner?) of a Mephistophelian pact. Liszt used his talent in different manners and for different purposes: in the first part of his life, he aimed towards becoming famous, searching for success, recognition in the entire Europe of his brilliant talent, and later, after reaching a certain level of artistic maturity, he focused his energy on helping others and devoted himself to altruistic principles.

Franz Liszt also had some personal qualities concerning his social attitude, which brought him in the centre of the political scene, becoming in some of his European tours, a potential

⁸ Valentina Sandu-Dediu, *Choices, attitudes, affects. About style and rhetoric elements in music*, Didactic and Pedagogical Publishing House, Bucharest 2010, pages 145-146.

risk factor for the imperial doctrine. The public all over Europe became part of a transcendental musical experience while seeing him playing in his innovative eccentric manner. Even if Liszt hasn't expressed himself directly upon political views or perspectives, he inspired his audience towards freedom and independence only by his way of being, playing and composing. Anyway, he became a political man after the middle of the 19th century, and he became a point of interest for Austrian governmental authorities, who supervised/watched him closely during his entire tour in Hungary in 1846.

Freedom, the symbol of many romantic ideals, was suggested to his public on many ways and levels:

1) Franz Liszt had a particular attitude on the stage, characterized by bravery, gallantry, natural exteriorising of his artistic feelings expressed by large gestures, which involved not only hands and forearms, but also shoulders, feet and centre of gravity. Liszt entitled his apparitions 'musical soliloquims' and he characterized himself as it follows: 'Bored by the war and unable to conceive a programme to make sense, I have dared to plan concerts by myself, making fun of his famous quotation, as an artistic parody: "Le concert, c'est moi!"...'⁹

2) Another way of expressing freedom was the content of his works: Liszt transposed into music literary ideas, poetic feelings, promoting programme music. The freedom to choose a certain literary resource of inspiration allowed him a boundless imagination, where the musical programme had a suggestive function. Unlike Berlioz, who followed the narrative stages in all his works, Liszt was interested in 'catching' the essence of his initial idea, using a generalizing programmatism. He didn't evoke either narrative details or complex features of depicted characters, but he rather emphasized the essential line of the dramatic conflicts. In other words, he evoked the general in particular images.

3) The artistic freedom is obvious on the structural level: on one hand, in traditional forms, inherited from previous centuries and later transformed according to expressive needs of the work (examples: sonata as a macro-form of the genre, programmatic symphony, concerto-poem conceived as a continuous movement, unified through cyclic themes); on the other hand, there were new musical genres and architectures freely structured, according to individual composing criteria (symphonic poem, rhapsody, ballade).

A direct consequence of expressing freedom was the narrative style. In Liszt's opinion, the function of Music is not to traduce in sound abstract concepts, but to express what equivocates to the limited transposition of emotional states on the verbal level. This idea was named by Carl Dahlhaus 'the *topos* of ineffable', and he thought that 'music is the access path towards truths that only 'she' can express and which can't be expressed in 'her' deepest essence by verbal communication (even if it's poetic).'¹⁰ This is similar to the literary field, where writers had as basic condition the fight against the formal rhetoric aesthetics of Classicism in order to develop the romantic drama and other new genres. This aspect partially explains the decline of the classical sonata (as a genre) in the first decades of the 20th century, because of the interest showed by composers in innovative directions. Jean Pierre Bartoli explains the way that narrative style of the content influences the structure, generating a specific practice largely used during the Romanticism – '**aesthetics of fragment and sketch**', initiated by Schlegel¹¹, then used in literature by

⁹ Liszt, quoted by Harold Schonberg in *Lives of the great composers*, Lider Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, pages 192-193.

¹⁰ Jean-Pierre Bartoli, article/ chapter 'Rhétorique et narativité musicales au XIXe siècle', en *Musiques: une encyclopédie pour le XXIe siècle*. 4th vol.: *Histoires des musiques européennes*, under the direction of Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Paris, 2006, page 1026.

¹¹ In Charles Rosen's volume, *La génération romantique (Chopin, Schumann, Liszt et leurs contemporains)*, Gallimard Editions, 2002, page 81, one can find quoted the definition given by Friedrich Schlegel to the notion of 'fragment' in the 19th century: 'Similarly to an artistic work in miniature, a fragment has to be completely detached by the surrounding world and

Hoffman and in music by Schumann (in his piano suites), Liszt (in *Années de pèlerinage*). Therefore, Diderot stated that art needs ‘more life and less structure.’ The most efficient technique to develop musical narrative style is to gather the musical figures in a single unitary work and represent a certain character or idea by means of a specific theme. The ‘fix idea’ used by Berlioz has been transformed by Liszt into a rhetoric principle of structural construction. It has been named the concept of ‘**thematic transformation**’¹², which allows the evolution of an entire work according to a certain narrative development. This technique has been approached firstly, in *Vallée d’Obermann* and *Les cloches de Genève*, and after that, Liszt would extend its usage in most of his works. Another narrative principle is the ‘**continuous development**’ present in *Sonata in B minor*, whose architecture is a synthesis of all techniques and principles of form introduced by classic composers: the principle of exposition in sonata and fugue forms (the recapitulation of the main theme in this work is a great *fugato*), the variation principle (which is used in order to create a series of metamorphosis and transformations of themes, by free variation), the strophic principle, based on juxtaposition, by inserting a strophic form inside the middle section of the sonata structure (section which is in contrast with the other moments, from the point of view of the tonal, agogic expression. I must point out again the fact that these principles are used freely and naturally, so as the lead to a cursive, fluent musical discourse.

Despite the open structures, Liszt has manifested the need for unity, and he has accomplished it in many ways. Another well-known concept in the romantic period, in all fields of art, is *co-incidentia oppositorum* (the unity of contraries), which can be found, for example, in *Faust* Symphony; here, one can find specific musical themes ascribed to particular characters (such as Faust, Margarita, Mephisto). Margarita’s simple features are in deep contrast with Faust’s complicated personality. Mephisto, who is looking for the negative influence and the destruction of mankind, is musically represented by Faust’s theme and motives in a caricature-like manner. Margarita’s theme is the only one that remains untouched and victorious. Therefore, it can be said that another way of accomplishing the whole unity, the coherence of the entire work, is the technique of associating musical themes to different characters, situations, feelings, symbols, using them as circulating musical ideas (‘**cyclic themes**’) in all movements, leading to programme music.

From the ‘architectural’ point of view, Liszt has gone beyond the inherited structures, traditional forms and largely used patterns. He has always created his own structures, becoming a genuine inventor in this field.

The **sound parameters** are also treated as innovative elements, receiving from Liszt new appearances, influences and ‘colours’.

a) **Melody** – in Liszt’s way of creating, it has a magnetic attraction power, a certain impetus, enthusiasm and a deep restlessness specific to him. Melodic structures are based either on traditional items or on new, original elements.

- medieval modalism, in a Gregorian manner (in works such as *Chapelle de Guillaume Tell*, from the first book of *Années de pèlerinage*, or in *Ballade no. 2 in B minor*, *Totentanz (Danse Macabre)* and many others;

sufficient to itself, like a hedgehog.’ The hedgehog, as Charles Rosen continues, ‘is an agreeable creature, which rolls like a snowball when feeling in danger. His shape is well-defined, but his outlines and edges are vague. The metaphor of the hedgehog is spherical, built after a perfectly geometrical pattern, and this is why it is adequate to symbolise the romantic way of thinking, beginning with the attractive image of a body which is protecting himself on the outside using his own body features. Similarly, the fragment is broken from the outside context. In fact, its isolation is aggressive: it gets detached from the world as much as the hedgehog feels protected.’ (page 82)


¹² Jean-Pierre Bartoli, article/ chapter ‘Rhétorique et narativité musicales au XIXe siècle’, en *Musiques : une encyclopédie pour le XXIe siècle*. 4th vol.: *Histoires des musiques européennes*, under the heading of Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Paris, 2006, page 1034.

Example 2 – Franz Liszt – *Totentanz*, ms. 13-21, tuba > Theme *Dies irae* is exposed in the Dorian mode on D and harmonised using elliptical chords (without third)




- pentatonic scale – in *Au lac de Wallenstadt* and *Églogue* from the first book of *Années de pèlerinage*;

Example 3 – Franz Liszt – *Au lac de Wallenstadt*, ms. 1-8



- the musical symbol of the cross – is the result of ascribing a religious semantic meaning to a pentatonic structure. This scale is based on five sounds – C, D, F, G, A.

Example 4 – Franz Liszt – *Sonata in B minor*, ms. 363-368 the pentatonic structure is transposed on D, E, G, A, B.



- the gypsy scale – used by Liszt in many works, in different melodic hypostasis and harmonic contexts.

Example 5 – Hungarian Rhapsody nr.17, ms. 7-10

• the tone-scale – used by Liszt and other Russian composers before Debussy, who imposed it definitely in the European music as a new structure (the hexatone scale, consisting in six tones, without any specific gravitational centre), leading to attractive exotic sonorities.

Example 6 – Franz Liszt – *The Great Chromatic Gallop*, ms. 230-238

b) **The rhythmic parameter** is a result of Liszt's interest in discovering and using folklore items, which enrich the musical discourse and offer its national sonority, original accents and a specific energy. Thus, rhapsodies acquire a very rhythmic personality, with Hungarian and gypsy influences.

c) **Harmonic structures in Liszt's works** are based, similarly to melodic ones, on traditional elements, extending itself even more than the so-called 'enlarged tonality'. There are chords composed of fourths, fifths, horizontal lines consisting in fourths, fifths, parallel un-functional sixths, chords mixtures, chords with Dominant function ninths, chromatic unsolved chords and so on. Examples are redundant in these cases, because Liszt work is abundant in this kind of exceptional situations, which are quite natural to him. In the same category of vertical structures can be included pedals and cadences.

The pedals used by Liszt can be organized in: fix pedals (like in the beginning of his *Ballade no. 2*), mobile pedals (simple or enriched with other notes), and *accompaniment*-like pedals (which can be double or triple).

Example 7 – Franz Liszt – *Sonata in B minor*, ms. 727-735 – melodic pedal in the grave register, represented by an obsessive *ostinato* of the β motive.

Allegro moderato.

The image shows two systems of musical notation for a piano piece. The first system is marked "Allegro moderato." and "p sotto voce". It features a treble clef with a key signature of two sharps (F# and C#) and a common time signature (C). The bass line contains a repetitive melodic pattern of eighth notes, with the first few measures highlighted by a red rectangular box. The second system is marked "poco crescendo" and "pp", and includes the instruction "un poco rall." at the end. The bass line continues with the same repetitive pattern.

Liszt's cadences are perhaps the most spectacular when compared not only with his contemporaries, but also with the generations of composers from the following decades after his death. Focusing on the ending harmonic successions from his piano works, one can notice a great variety of chords chains, *ajoutées* elements, superposed structures which could hardly find harmonic explanations, unusual degrees to end musical phrases or even entire works.

For example, in the ending of the well-known work *Vallée d'Obermann*, Liszt inserted a confusing chain of chords: descending second degree, which is used as base for the major chord F-A-C, adding an augmented sixth (D sharp as an *ajouté* element, being the seventh chromatinized degree of E minor). D sharp is preceded by a superior semitone, generating a very dissonant chord, searching its resolution in a descending line towards D sharp, then natural C, B, A and G sharp. The final solving chord of this chain has an unexpected auditory effect; the listener is not aware of the next dissonant element which would appear, the appoggiatura represented by C on the major chord E-G sharp-B (the resolution of C).

Example 8 – Franz Liszt – *Vallée d'Obermann*, final harmonic chords chain:

The image shows a short musical passage in a piano score. The key signature has two sharps (F# and C#) and the time signature is common time (C). The passage is marked "ff rit." and features a descending line of chords. The notation includes various fingerings and articulations, such as slurs and accents, indicating a complex harmonic progression.

The beauty of these harmonic paradoxes does not have to be expressively searched in the way of chaining chords or in the very surprising modulations, because they emerge from the

spontaneous and limitless phantasy of Liszt. He had directed the practise of modulation towards enlarged tonality, before Wagner did the same thing at a higher scale, reaching moments which could be characterised by future concepts like suspended harmony, multiple centres, sonorous scales without tonal-functional laws or Arnold Schönberg's dodecaphonism. Thus, the Hungarian composer proved an unprecedented courage in constructing final harmonic formulas, but he never gave up to 'gravitational centres' imposed by tonal or modal systems. From this point of view, he proved to be a composer endowed with a special originality, avoiding the replacement of an automatism with other similar structures and trying to find in each case a proper, but personal solution.

d) Dynamics and agogic are fields having already been emancipated by previous Romantic composers. Franz Liszt did not make any particular improvements of these elements, but his way of conceiving the dynamic and agogic processes had a significant role in designing new structures. The main reason for highlighting this point is the free succession of intensities and tempos, which leads to strong contrasts, sometimes aggressive. Thus, he focused on creating musical colours and spatiality impression. 'Aspects such as texture, sonorous intensity, violence and delicacy in gestures can replace the function of pitch and rhythm in musical organisation process.'¹³

4. Liszt – conductor and essayist

Beyond the two previously described sides (pianist and composer), Liszt has played a significant role in the history of music as a **conductor**. In 1842, he was given the title of Great Ducal Director of Weimar Court, where he used to come regularly until 1849, when he definitively settled down here, turning Schiller's and Goethe's town into a genuine centre of European musical culture. This is how Liszt began his conducting career. As an artist of the baton, he brought on stage many elements of his previous pianistic thinking and musical philosophy. Unlike the strictness of traditional conducting, the attitude promoted by Liszt was based on orchestral effects suggested by personal gestures, intensively expressed symphonic dramatic character, sonorous colour created by emphasizing certain melodic lines in the score or certain instruments (or groups of instruments). Neglecting the metrical accents, he was more interested in obtaining the sense of general, of unified wholeness, similarly to his younger contemporary, Richard Wagner. We can't deduce any mutual influence between them or any inspiration source in their musical practice, but the history of music has focused on their co-operation, professional support and some friendly interaction between them. Liszt and Wagner had a series of common principles, the most important being the freedom of tempo, the elastic movement of musical discourse, in which every detail was adapted to musical, general needs.

Another hypostasis of Liszt is the writer, namely the musical critic. His literary work, written in French, has been organized in six volumes. Some texts were published during his life time in different magazines of the 19th century, such as *Musical Journal*, published in Paris. The most renowned work written by Liszt seems to be the monographic volume dedicated to Frederic Chopin, in which he proves a deep admiration for the Polish composer; here, he presents relevant details about his personality, about the genesis of certain works and relates different interesting events of their artistic life in aristocratic salons in Paris. Thus, his book achieves the quality of a historical document of a high value. Liszt was aware of the importance of the entire Romantic phenomenon, implying artists from different fields, leading to great works of the 19th century. Even if Chopin was the opposite of his artistic style, they were both major figures among the entire constellation of Romantic artists.

¹³ Valentina Sandu-Dediu, *op.cit.*, page 146.

Other literary works signed by Franz Liszt are: *About artists' situation and their place in society*, *The letter of a wanderer towards George Sand*, *The letters of a bachelor in music*, *Paganini (obituary notice)*. The amplitude and certain stylistic subtleties of Liszt's literary work generated many discussions concerning the authentic signature of the Hungarian composer from his writings. The most important equivocal source is the chronologic structure of his writings, divided in two categories: the first between 1835 and 1841, and the second between 1849 and 1859. The two periods coincide with two important relationships, in their climax, with a significant influence on Liszt's existence. In 1841, his connection with countess Marie d'Agoult gets more and more deteriorated, and that year is also significant when speaking about ceasing his essays to musical critics. The second series of articles belongs to the period of cohabitation with Princess Carolyne Sayn-Wittgenstein, which is not just a simple coincidence. The relation between Liszt's literary publications and the two famous women who had won his interest and appreciation is obvious, but one can't establish exactly how much they contributed to his writings. The most part of information has been provided by Liszt's correspondence with the countess, the princess and other close friends. There are musicologists who had access to those letters, thus revealing intimate details of the writing process while being connected with the two ladies. Emil Haraszti, Peter Raabe, Alan Walker have written about these aspects in their monographic works. Lina Ramann is known to be the first author of a complete biography of Franz Liszt, written under the attentive supervision of Princess Wittgenstein. Based on the sketches found among his manuscripts, it has been concluded that Liszt wrote entirely some of his essays, while other had a writing process which involved the inspiration or contribution of the two women. Researchers think that Liszt used to write down his ideas, to organize and reinforce them, leaving the developing process, the literary polishing and final artistic 'touch' to countess d'Agoult and later to Princess Wittgenstein, who were endowed with a literary gift. Musicologist Serge Gut has concluded that 'Liszt's co-operation with Marie d'Agoult proved to be useful and positive, because her help was graceful, well balanced and intelligent; his collaboration with Carolyne de Sayn-Wittgenstein was rather misfortunate, due to a certain overflowing verbal exuberance, that led to invasive stylistic print. His works from the first period are naturally written, pleasant to read and coherent from the stylistic point of view; those from the second period are quite awkward, bombastic and hard to read, but they can offer precious information if they are read carefully, with the necessary patience.'¹⁴

Beyond these details about writing, one has to mention the most significant literary and critical work accomplished by Liszt: *Des Bohémiens et de leur musique en Hongrie (About gypsies and their music in Hungary)*. Finished in 1859, this work shows some special research qualities in a field which hadn't been theorized yet at that time. His way of expressing ideas and arguing them in a complex research work has some Romantic features, such as declamation, metaphorical phrases and excessive enthusiasm, which were probably effects of the same outside intrusion in his individual activity. Despite these things, the lack of unaffectedness and naturalness does not affect the quality of the content. Maybe Liszt hasn't had a clearly established method to gather information and to organize his ideas, which weren't always very well sustained, but his work is placed among the most important documents in the history of Hungarian folkloric research field.

5. Conclusions

With his multiple artistic personality touched by the glowing spark of the genius, Franz Liszt has worked on many levels, dedicating his life to those fields which made their call from an early

¹⁴ Serge Gut, *op.cit.*, page 24.

age: piano playing, composition, conducting, also being interested in writing about his time and contemporaries. He tried to compose one single opera (*Don Sacho*, or *The Castle of Love*), but he focused his artistic energy towards those musical genres where his gifts were consciously turned into great musical masterpieces. Speaking from the perspective of temporal evolution, one can make a difference between Liszt the young artist – virtuoso, extremely energetic pianist, who was able to compose and play *Chromatic Gallop*, *Transcendental Études*, countless transcriptions, paraphrases and reductions of great symphonic works for piano, turning his instrument into a real orchestra, and Liszt the older man, a brilliant symphonist, a true ‘inventor’ in music (author of symphonic poem, recital, innovative free structures), promoter of classical programmatic genres (symphony, sonata), creator of depictive ‘musical paintings’, but also author of religious genres (masses, oratorios, chorales). In his late years, virtuosity is not a purpose any longer; it merely became a mean to express the poetical meditation and intimate spiritual beliefs.

As for his impact on the 20th century’s musicians and on those from nowadays, one can make an interesting inversion of Liszt’s ages. His hypostasis as a mature artist could be perceived as a face of his refreshing youth, characterised by deeply vibrating feelings and thoughts, rich inspiration, great delight of living and enjoying all his experiences, despite the years that added to his existence.

In the end, we find it proper to remember his famous funny action, ‘committed’ by Liszt in one of his European tours, when he had to fill in the accommodation paper of a hotel from Geneva. Common questions were answered unusually, with a great sense of humour:

Occupation: Philosophic Musician

Born in: Parnas

Coming from: Doubt

Travelling to: Truth

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MUSIC AS A METAPHOR OF LIFE

Sandro Santos da Rosa
Faculdades EST, São Leopoldo, RS, Brazil
sandromusik@hotmail.com

Abstract

The paper looks at the nuances that make music a way of representing the world, relating to it and concretizing new worlds. It verifies how music is a metaphor of life, of our Self, of the Other, of Us, and how these relationships are metaphorically present in the musical structure rhythmic, melodic, contrapuntal and harmonically. Methodologically, the literature review will show how music became a means of symbolizing, signify and re-signify human existence through sound and its organization by the human being, as a means of communication that gives and attributes meaning to life. Thus, it will draw some considerations that show the idiosyncrasies of human behavior with music and their interaction with life and with its creation. The paper concludes that music is a way of trans-signifying the real, of communicating something, of informing, of going beyond what has already been set, of symbolizing existence as a whole.

1.1. Initial considerations.

This article is about the importance of music for the human existence. There will be three topics. The first one presents the conception of some scholars that reflect about the function of music. The second one glimpses the subtleties that make music a language that cannot be compared to the word. The third and last one analyses the significance of music. Methodologically, this article restricts itself to precisely gathering important information that determines music as one of the most important experiences lived by the human being.

1.2. Music in the human existence.

There are countless and controversial opinions and theories about the origin of music. The first theories are connected to Greek mythology figures and biblical characters. However, nowadays it is already known that its origin is much older with sounds already produced by the

ancestral human being.¹ About music, the only consensus there is between scholars is that its vital part is formed by two elements: rhythm and sound; and that the human being, with its prodigious intelligence and creative power, joined them into a marvelous symbiosis, making the music the only language that can be comprehended by all the peoples.^{2 3}

It's important to ratify the intelligibility of music concerned to the human life and the human rational relationship with art. The exclusivity of perceiving, producing and searching for the beauty distinguishes the human being from other living creatures. Music doesn't need to be clarified or called upon any kind of statement. It is essentially organized rhythmically, melodically, harmonically from chosen sounds by humans, who are the only able to establish the intermediation or relation between art and the world as a whole. In conclusion, music comes from the human rational intervention and is diffused by the human intellectual action of production, interpretation and appreciation.

The ethnic musical production of a people, that creates and appreciates musical elements instead of other characteristics present in other cultures, has been studied since Darwin by musicologists, musicians, neuroscientists, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, music therapists, etc. Darwin himself believed music was developed by natural selection, integrating human and paleo human mating rituals. Steve Pinker, a reputed cognitive scientist, said that "language, with all evidence, is an evolutionary adaptation."⁴ However, since music is a kind of language/significance through signs and meanings that may be considered a language, it is part of all human processes of evolution and rationality, developing in each cultural sphere together, with other languages, ethnic particularities that are defined by the time and space each people live in.

Throughout history, many thinkers of a variety of fields have expressed their worship for music. Martin Lutero, 1483—1546, eternalized his comprehension about music in the following way: "it's a gift from the gods and not from the men. [...] With it you forget all the anger and addictions. So I'm not afraid to claim that, after theology, no art can be compared to music."^{5 6}

For Nietzsche⁷, 1844—1900, while words reproduce a phenomenon, music reproduces reality. Music comes before the word metaphysically^{8 9} and has primacy over it.

Susanne Langer, a music philosopher, who studies reflections about signs, the significance, the meaning and their esthetic transmutation¹⁰, explains that: "the artistic activity [...] is an expression of primitive dynamism and unconscious desires and uses represented objects and scenes for solidifying the artist's secret fantasies"¹¹. From this, the author considers that "music is preeminently nonrepresentative [...]. It presents its pure form not to beautify"¹², but to show

¹ Carvalho, Any Raquel. 2006. *CONTRAPONTO MODAL: MANUAL PRÁTICO 2*. 14 Porto Alegre: Evangraf.

² Leinig, Clotilde Espínola. 2008. *A MÚSICA E A CIÊNCIA SE ENCONTRAM*. 31. Curitiba: Juruá.

³ It is presented in this article opinions that oppose other opinions that say music is a universal language.

⁴ Levitin, Daniel J. 2010. *A MÚSICA NO SEU CÉREBRO: A CIÊNCIA DE UMA OBSESSÃO HUMANA*. Translated by Clóvis Marques. Original title: *THIS IS YOUR BRAIN ON MUSIC: THE SCIENCE OF A HUMAN OBSESSION*. 279. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

⁵ This Lutero's quote is largely used in academic works that discourse about music. However it is not known the work where you can find it. The next note shows the work that supports this idea.

⁶ Moraes, J. Jota de. 1986. *O QUE É MÚSICA*. 44. São Paulo: Nova Cultural: Brasiliense.

⁷ Dias, Rosa Maria. 2005. *NIEZSCHE E A MÚSICA*. 48. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial; Ijuí: Editora UNIJUÍ.

⁸ Metaphysics: treat the fundamental nature and reality of the beings. Metaphysical: transcending the nature of the things. Metaphysically: Treat the nature transcendently.

⁹ 2008. *MICHAELIS. DICIONÁRIO PRÁTICO DA LÍNGUA PORTUGUESA "Portuguese Language dictionary"*. São Paulo: Editora Melhoramentos.

¹⁰ This article does not expose or analyze the semiological functions of the signs and symbols, but it analyzes the symbolic function of the music in the life of the human beings.

¹¹ Langer, Susanne K. 2004. *FILOSOFIA EM NOVA CHAVE*. Translated by Janete Meiches e J. Guinsburg. Original Title: *PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY*. 207. São Paulo: Perspectiva.

¹² Langer, Susanne K. 2004. 210.

the real essence of the human being. In the same way, Nietzsche relates music to life. For the philosopher, life is (or should be) “will to power”¹³. Music related to the will to have power, that is, about the living beings, influences the most intimate elements that constitute them, the cells, the tissues and the organs.¹⁴

J. de Moraes, important Brazilian writer, songwriter and researcher in the field of music, says: “Music is, among other things, a way of representing the world, relating to it and materializing new worlds, [...]. In music, what we call past is existent, [...] fluid meeting point that sends us to what we still don’t know. Simultaneity – since the interlacing of temporal planes, spaces, ideas, memories, feelings, structures – transforms the present that indicates the first category: fantastic field full of possibilities to come.”¹⁵

The author alerts that there is a series of misunderstandings about the statement that says that music is a universal language that can be comprehended by everyone. Moraes questions: “universal phenomenon – it sure is; but universal language – to what extend?”¹⁶

However, the next topic discusses how music can or cannot be comprehended as language.

1.3. Music and language

All the peoples in the world have developed musical manifestations, sound with some type of rhythmic organization. Different from the oral language, which can be translated and adapted to other cultures without excessive damage, “the musical manifestation of a certain people, [...] loses its fundamental characteristics when translated to other community’s conception”. This can be included in the following question: What meaning does an Islamic/Moslem song – that is religiously sung at a certain time, on a certain solar day, with a certain Arabian melodic scale – have when played in a Catholic church in Brazil at a Christmas celebration?

According to Nietzsche:

“Music is not an universal language that goes beyond time, as was told many times in its honor, it’s exactly a measurement of feeling, heat, and the condition it brings within itself, like an inner law, a culture perfectly determined, bound to time and space”¹⁷.

In a similar way, the Brazilian musician and researcher J. de Moraes made an intriguing question: Can the orchestra Balinese music, that used to be part of an ancient warriors’ dance, and now has become a ritual dance presented in temples, be understood by a Brazilian person that doesn’t belong to the *Javaé* tribe?¹⁸

The point of the question is in the word understood. The problematic of the word to understand in relation to the communicative agents of the language, the sign, the significant, the experiencing, the signifier, is part of the semiological tangle, which is a lot discussed and controverted by the scholars of semiology, language and music.

If we consider that the simple comprehension of something stated is characterized as language, we could say the musical language is exclusive for musicians with solid formation since they would perceive, understand and comprehend the Balinese music and its rhythmic, melodic and harmonic structures, even not being part of that culture. However, the ethnic/cultural

¹³ This term was developed by the author largely and mostly in the second half of his work. In general, the will to power is not only the essence of life, but also the need of it.

¹⁴ Dias. 2005. 60.

¹⁵ Moraes. 1986. 44.

¹⁶ Moraes. 1986. 12.

¹⁷ Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *MISCELÂNIA DE OPINIÕES E SENTENÇAS*. 78. Translated by Antônio Carlos Braga e Ciro Mioranza. Original: *VERMISCHTE MEINUNGEN UND SPRÜCHE*. São Paulo: Editora Escala.

¹⁸ Moraes. 1986. 15.

meaning would be missed. A layman in music that is not part of that culture could really say that wasn't affected by any communicative agents. They only noticed the sounds with the vibration felt by their eardrums, which only enabled them to realize that that was a piece of music. But what does that mean? On the other hand, to a layman in music that is part of the Balinese culture, the song would mean, in its cultural measurement, according to Nietzsche, something that is already part of their *éthos* (costume, religious ritual, dance food, celebration, love, wedding, death, etc.)¹⁹.

According to Abbagnano, in his Philosophy Dictionary, language is the use of intersubjective signs, which are the ones that make communication possible, but the signs can only be part of a linguistic speech with a certain function: they can combine in a limited and recognizable way, meaning something to a certain code interlocutors. It's possible to see through the optic of the musical language that are levels of language (oral and written) and, therefore, levels of communication²⁰.

It's questioned what the perceiving, the understanding, the comprehending and the meaning have in common and what their relation is in the ability of the music to mean.

The oral language constitution by humans was built by aspects that are part of the musical language structure, that is, a word (a syllabic combination/a specific phonetics) only expresses something when the rhythm, melody, height, intensity and voice timbre are agreed in certain contexts determined by each culture. In some time, before humans started to speak, they babbled sounds, made faces and informed without words. These information, related to specific contexts, organized the language that, with the creation of codes and words, started to express limitedly the phenomena of the existence.²¹

It can be thought that the (written) phrase "I am sad", despite informing the sentimental state of a person, does not communicate anything for being below the sonorous sense that it has for the informed person. E.g. What is the convincing/communication power of a person who, in laughter, claims to be sad? What is the convincing/communication power of a person who, in tears, claims to be happy? A person stumbles on a stone, breaks their toe, cries and says: What a happiness!

As follows, the classical saussurean distinction between language and word.

"It is due to language, social part of speech external to the individual, that the ability of building up sentences is elaborated. [...] It is noticed that words produced due to language can be of two types: the words of communication/intercommunication and those of written material, [letters, poems, plays, books, etc].²²"

It is less absurd the perspective that music is a language, a way to communicate, to mean something, if we think through the saussurean view that goes towards to Nietzsche's proposal: "while word reproduce the phenomenon, music represents reality, which, being metaphysically prior to word^{23 24}, has primacy over it."²⁵

From this perspective, it was due to the musical structure (rhythm, melody, height intensity

¹⁹ Nietzsche. 78.

²⁰ This examination is about the previous pondering in which a musician is able to understand the content, the form and the musical structure of any culture, but he is not able to understand the cultural meaning of the songs that are part of the everyday life of different ethnicities because he does not belong to them. On the other hand, for a layman, a piece of music that accompanies a religious act or a dance may have a cultural and ethnical meaning that does not move anyone except the ones who belong to that people.

²¹ Díaz Bordenave, Juan E. 1986. *O QUE É COMUNICAÇÃO*. 77. São Paulo: Nova Cultural: Brasiliense.

²² Nattiez, Jean-Jacques. *SEMIOLOGIA DA MÚSICA*. 32 Lisboa: Veja.

²³ Metaphysics: treat the fundamental nature and reality of the beings. Metaphysical: transcending the nature of the things. Metaphysically: Treat the nature transcendently.

²⁴ *MICHAELIS*. 2008.

²⁵ Dias. 2005. 48.

and voice timbre) that speech, language and consequently words were produced and established as sonorous codes organized by each culture.

1.4. Music as the significance and representation of existence.

Considering music as a language that cannot be compared to the word, but an intensifier of the language, Claude Lévi-Strauss says that in the language “we have a sound and the sound has a meaning and there is no meaning without the sound to carry it. The music is the sound element that communicates”. However the author doesn’t consider music as a language since both music and word lack the same aspects.

To Lévi-Strauss:

“The basic elements of the language are the phonemes – that is, those sounds we incorrectly represent with letters – that doesn’t have any meaning alone, but are combined to distinguish the meanings. We could say the same about musical notes. A note [...] doesn’t mean anything alone; it’s just a note.²⁶”

Lévi-Strauss also says:

“In the next level of the language, we see that phonemes combine in a way to form words; and words, then, combine to form sentences. But in music there are no words. The basic elements – the notes – combine and immediately form a sentence, a melodic sentence²⁷.”

Now some considerations based on the conceptions offer by Lévi-Strauss: 1) The phonemes combine in a way they form words; 2) Comparing the phonemes to the musical notes, the latter combine in a way they form non-defined harmonic principles²⁷. Harmonic principles (two combined notes) combined to other notes (the placement of notes on the score, for instance) would correspond to the word in language. The difference would be in the formation of the sign because while the words are formed by syllables visually combined in the horizontal, the chord – which, in music, corresponds to the word in this approach – is formed by sound combinations that are written vertically in the score. The harmony between the phonemes makes up the words in which the phonemes are executed successively. The harmony between the sounds makes up chords in which the sounds are executed simultaneously.

Just like the words, already formed by syllables, *school, is, today, the, open* can be organized to form, among others, the sentence “Today the school is open”, the chords A minor, C major, F major, D minor, C major and E major can be combined to form, among others, the musical discourse C major – A minor – F major – D minor – E major – C major. When played in a polysemic way, considering the qualities of the sound, which are height, intensity, duration and tone, this sequence can be recognized by people who are part of the culture that song belongs to, informing, communicating, creating and recreating meanings to sad or happy moments, creating and establishing sentimental motives related to the cultures of the peoples. Example: Funeral march and/or wedding march. No words are said, but when they are played, at least the occidental culture knows what it is about, what the significant-sound presents, represents and means to each listener and, finally, it’s made clear what words couldn’t express.

Through this optic, music is language because it informs, communicates, means through signs and signifier the ineffable of a culture.²⁸ However, it’s a language that can’t be compared to the word. For example, in music there isn’t anything similar to the word ball. This way, the

²⁶ Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *MITO E SIGNIFICADO*. 74. Lisboa: Edições 70.

²⁷ Lévi-Strauss. 74.

²⁸ Alves, Rubem. 2007. *O ENIGMA DA RELIGIÃO*. 144. Campinas: Papirus.

virtue of the musical language is its ability to evoke and transmit feelings through the sound-musical expression. Feelings that words aren't capable of transmitting. "Communication [...] would be impossible without the signifying, that is, the social production of the meaning."²⁹ This is the key of the conception that assures that music is a language, since it's a way of communicating something, informing something, going beyond what there is. Go beyond that words want to say, be it in the religious worship, the play, the soccer game, the therapy, etc.

The English researcher John Blaking, as J de Moraes ascertained said:

"The Vedas (African Indigenous people) taught me that music can never be something by itself, and that all the songs are popular in the way that no song can be transmitted or have a meaning if there is no association between the individuals."³⁰

1.5. Final considerations

This way, this project gives a glimpse and proposes that the communication established by the musical language, structured by rhythm, melody, counterpoint and harmony, represents the association between the individuals and, so, it's a metaphor of life. Metaphor, in Charles Peirce's conception, is what represents the representative character of a *representamen* or sign³¹.

With this, in a semiotic proposal, music is the metaphor of life because time can only be noticed with the relativity between the events. The rhythm is movement, continuity in defined times and spaces. The rhythm accentuates the events, qualifies the spaces and, consequently, locates in time. Without rhythm, there is no life – there is no becoming. The melody is the subject and, in its individuality, meets in the counterpoint – in the coexistence – in the voice of the Other – the meeting with the Other - its only way to become Subject – to become *communitas*. The counterpoint is the relation between the subject and the other – the alterity. The harmony is the relation between the individuals in a society, with all the agreements and disagreements that are part of the becoming of the existence. The harmony is the constant tension and rest where the societies, their ethical and moral principles, beliefs, costumes and values change and transform.

Music as a metaphor of life is an idea in the place of other idea. Music reproduces the idealization of a reality. In the complexity of the human musical experience, music, as physical matter and event, acts as a fact in the place of other fact, enabling the making of music in a music therapeutic session or a religious ritual to be the rigorous reproduction of maximum demands of what the intellectual, sentimental, perceptual and cognitive faculties of the human being can do.

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²⁹ Díaz Bordenave. 1986. 62.

³⁰ MORAES. 1986.18.

³¹ Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1972. *SEMIÓTICA E FILOSOFIA*. 126. São Paulo: Editora Cultrix.

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**SEMIOTICS OF
CULTURAL HERITAGES**

THE LITHUANIAN SINGING REVOLUTION AS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND SOURCE OF SOFT POWER

Dario Martinelli
International Semiotics Institute &
Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania
dario.martinelli@ktu.lt; dariomartinelli.eu

Abstract

The present paper aims to look at the phenomenon known as Singing Revolution, in Lithuania, mostly within the frameworks of semiotics, cultural and political studies. After a short socio-historical introduction to the topic, the paper will focus on the way Lithuania has contextualized and handled the Singing Revolution at cultural and institutional level, particularly in the perspective of what, after Joseph Nye (1990 and, more specifically, 2004), has been called *Soft Power*. Indeed, despite the absolute centrality of the Singing Revolution in the Lithuanian struggle for independence (a centrality that becomes even more relevant when we think that, unlike the other Baltic States, several Lithuanian intellectuals and opinion-leaders were in fact musicians or musicologists), the Lithuanian academic and political institutions have devoted only a minor effort to analyse these phenomena and repertoires. Moreover, very timid were the attempts to academically promote them at international level, often resulting in international ignorance and misunderstandings (e.g., the Canadian documentary “Cultures in conflict” presents the Singing Revolution as an Estonian-only phenomenon, disowning Lithuania –and Latvia – of their historical roles).

What is the role of the Singing Revolution in the current Lithuanian intellectual and institutional discourses? Could the phenomenon become an important tool for cultural and diplomatic promotion of Lithuania abroad? Is Lithuania missing an important opportunity to reinforce its soft power?

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1. Introduction

The present article looks at the social phenomenon known as Singing Revolution, occurred in the Baltic states during the last years of Soviet domination, focusing on the case of Lithuania, particularly in the perspective of what, after Joseph Nye (1990 and 2004), has been called *Soft Power*. Despite the absolute centrality of the Singing Revolution in the Lithuanian struggle for independence, the Lithuanian academic and political institutions have devoted only a minor effort to analyse these phenomena and repertoires. Moreover, very timid were the attempts to academically promote them at international level, often resulting in international ignorance and misunderstandings.

What is the position of the Singing Revolution in the current Lithuanian intellectual and institutional discourses? Could the phenomenon become an important tool for cultural and diplomatic promotion of Lithuania abroad? Is Lithuania missing an important opportunity to reinforce its soft power?

2. The concept of soft power

Originally formulated in Nye 1990, soft power (SP, from now on) became a fully-defined concept in Nye 2004, where it is defined as

(...) the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. (...) When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive. (...) But attraction can turn to repulsion if we act in an arrogant manner and destroy the real message of our deeper values (Nye 2004: x)

By extension, "SP" is an expression we can use also in relation a) to smaller communities, and b) to the processes that occur within them. In the first case, we can basically trace an axis that goes from single individuals to the largest communities, and detect SP in all the steps that go from one extreme to another. Of course, single persons can exercise endless forms of SP over other people: their charm, elegance, job, social/geographical origins, ideas, and so forth.

Secondly, SP is not just a form of communication, that goes from an A source to a B destination, A and B being members of two different groups. A and B can also belong to one single group, with SP operating with specific dynamics that encourage that group to progress in a given direction. This characteristic, too, covers the whole spectrum of communities, even including the special, proprioceptive, case of single individuals, who are certainly inspired by their successful features to develop them even further (e.g., career achievements, body fitness...).

Essentially, when SP goes from one group to another, it basically serves as promoter of the values of the former group, it builds a reputation, it attracts and persuades people, etc. When SP goes from one group to the *same* group, it mostly works as a reminder of the values of that group, it builds self-confidence, sense of commitment, etc.

Naturally, SP, as an expression, acquires particular sense when placed in opposition with "hard" power (Nye 2004: 7). Command, coercion and inducement are the three typical forms of behaviour of hard power, while agenda setting, attraction and co-option are the typical ones of SP. Then, Nye continues (2004: 8), when it comes to resources, hard power will likely use force,

sanctions, payments and bribes, while SP will mostly operate through institutions, values, culture and policies.

Needless to say, SP does not only work “in positive”. Attention towards a certain individual/community/country can also occur in terms of negative associations with the SP resources. Such effect can be generated by at least four conditions: absence of resources, bad reputation, lack of reputation, loss of reputation. If we take the example “universities”, we can see that these three conditions can all have their negative impact on a given group (say, a city). When a city has no university (absence), it may provoke such comments like: “Lousy city! There is not even a university here”. When a university exists but it does not have a good reputation, the effect may be something like: “Imagine! They have one of the country’s worst universities, here”. Thirdly, a lack of reputation may be expressed with comments like: “Really? I didn’t even know they had a university, here!”, which is not necessarily better. Finally, a loss of reputation can be expressed with sentences like “Poor devils! They even had a university here, and look at them now!”

Suffering from this effect may be both small communities (which pay the price of under-exposure – and this, we shall see, is one problem with Lithuania) and big/central communities (which pay the price of over-exposure – as in the obvious case of USA, which gathers both positive and negative SP inputs in great quantities).

Since I am not particularly interested in problematizing the issue, but rather applying it in its essential nature, I will not mention the various debates that followed Nye’s establishment of the concept: obviously – like nearly every theoretical formulation in human knowledge – SP too is subject to a fair share of criticism and controversies, but for the purposes of this article we can take Nye’s reflections as the main point of reference. In any case, one must be at least aware of the fact that SP was criticized in its general theoretical usefulness (e.g., Ferguson 2004), in its interaction with (as opposed to “difference from”) hard power (e.g., Gallarotti 2010) and in the presence (as opposed to absence) of coercive and manipulative aspects in its action (e.g., Bially Mattern 2005).

2.1. Soft power and popular music

There is no doubt that popular music is an important component of a country’s SP. Some of them have pop music as their main source: it is possibly the case with Iceland and Björk, Argentina and tango (Maradona being the main contender here), Jamaica and reggae (or, straight away, Bob Marley), and so forth. Not to mention that specific cities, otherwise not really at the centre of the world, so to speak, may become it as the result of a popular music act or event: see the cases of Liverpool with The Beatles or Woodstock with the 1969 festival (incidentally: one may say that the SP of the Finnish town of Imatra has relied for about 25 years on the fact that the International Semiotics Institute, and relative Summer School, were there).

The incidence of popular music on SP calculations can be in fact rather strong. The Institute for Government in London, UK, is actively committed in measuring this concept at global level, by using the so-called “Soft Power metrics”, which are fully explained in McClory 2012, but which basically consist of: International Purpose/Role, Cultural Output, Global Leadership, SP Icons (meaning, world-famous VIP’s who bring a positive image of their own country, like – say – Jose Mujica for Uruguay), Cuisine, National Airline/Major Airport, Commercial Brands. A great example of the centrality of popular music in such calculations is the comparison between the 2011 and 2012 charts (published in McClory 2012, in various web sources and also in the November issues of *The Monocle* monthly magazine). At the end of 2011 the first 12 countries were the following:

- 1) USA
- 2) UK
- 3) France
- 4) Germany
- 5) Australia
- 6) Sweden
- 7) Japan
- 8) Switzerland
- 9) Canada
- 10) Netherlands
- 11) Norway
- 12) Denmark

One year later, the result was this:

- 1) UK
- 2) USA
- 3) Germany
- 4) France
- 5) Sweden
- 6) Japan
- 7) Denmark
- 8) Switzerland
- 9) Australia
- 10) Canada
- 11) South Korea
- 12) Norway

Among the interesting changes, arguably the most outstanding ones are the first place of UK (against the virtually unbeatable USA), and the appearance, at the 11th place, of South Korea, not exactly the most predictable country, in charts of this kind (for the record, it was 14th, in 2011).

UK's first place was entirely due to the massive display of popular culture occurred during the Queen's Diamond Jubilee and, more importantly, the Olympic Games, with that impressive opening ceremony, which reminded the world of Britain's achievements and influence. When looking back at that ceremony, the importance of popular music in the process is plain to see: how many countries, in arranging a ceremony of that type, could count on a soundtrack composed of "Satisfaction", "Bohemian Rhapsody", "Imagine", "Heroes", dozens of others, and wrap it all up with Paul McCartney (in flesh and blood) singing "Hey Jude" to the whole world?

When it comes to Korea, if any of the readers is now thinking "No, it can't be *that!*", the explanation can be read on the same report: "South Korea made a significant jump up the rankings after a very good 2012. Korea hosted a number of global summits, historically outperformed at the Olympics, and – of course – gave the world Gangnam" (McClory 2012: 12).

Emphasis on "of course": a global one-hit-wonder is indeed able, almost single-handedly, to produce a three-place leap in a world chart of SP. In other words: the role of popular music in the determination of a country's SP is very difficult to underestimate. Matthew Fraser provides an interesting application of Nye's concept to the specific environment of popular music (Fraser 2005: 170-221), and – what matters in the present article – there is a specific passage about musical forms of protest within the Iron Curtain (Fraser 2005: 183-184). Mentioned here are the notorious access to Western pop music via the frequencies of Radio Luxembourg and Radio Free Europe, the boomerang effect of banning rock in East Germany (granting it the very attractive

status of “forbidden fruit”), the protest punk songs in Hungary during the 1970’s, and... and just when the Singing Revolution would appear as the most obvious example of the list, the book turns to a (laudable, incidentally) critique to Adorno’s inadequacy to speak of popular music (Fraser 2005: 184-185). Lithuania, the whole Baltic area and the Singing Revolution are totally missing in the picture, replaced by examples that, though very significant, were not representative of a structured, organized movement.

This, we shall see, is exactly the problem.

3. The Singing Revolution

“Singing Revolution” is a conventional name for a series of events (often, but not only, related to music) occurring between 1987 and 1991, during (and most of all as a support of) the independence movements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The term was coined by the Estonian artist Heinz Valk, who employed this expression for the first time while commenting the spontaneous mass singing of Estonian traditional songs during the Tallinn Song Festival Grounds, in 1988. Music became during those years the main expressive vehicle for conveying independentist and nationalist messages, in at least three ways: 1) specific new music was written with a distinctive (or metaphoric) political significance; 2) Traditional national music was performed for the sole fact of being “national” (as opposed to “Soviet”, or “Russian”), regardless of its contents; 3) Forbidden music, no matter what, was sung and performed as an intrinsic act of insubordination (e.g., rock genres, so despised by Soviet authorities).

The phenomenon did not take a coherent shape across the three Baltic states, and that possibly adds to the charm of it: there was no specific agreement among the three countries, but rather times were mature for a phenomenon like this to emerge spontaneously in more than one place with a similar cultural background and political condition. Nevertheless, a few events (directly or indirectly related with the Singing Revolution) were organized as a common action. Certainly, the so-called Baltic Way (another event that would deserve a clipart, to my mind), occupies a special position, here: a chain of about two million people holding hands for 675.5 km uninterruptedly from Vilnius to Tallinn, during August 23, 1989, in the occasion of the the 50th anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

The Lithuanian part of the Singing Revolution revolved around the so-called Sajūdis (“movement”), a group of 35 intellectuals and artists established in 1988 to support the perestroika and glasnost processes. Conceived as a way to modernize USSR and soften its policies, these policies had for many Soviet countries the effect of re-awakening the national consciences, and became the main catalyst for the various independence movements throughout the Union. Indeed, after the initial support to perestroika and glasnost, Sajūdis soon replaced its action with specific claims on national independence (restoring Lithuanian language, conducting campaigns of environmental protection, revealing facts and documents about Stalinism, disclosing the secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet pact, etc.). In the turning of few months, Sajūdis had become the locomotive of the independence movement in Lithuania (for more, see Lieven 1993, Donskis 2002 and Miniotaite 2002).

Within all this process, music was an exceptionally central force. Like the other Baltic states, Lithuania had manifestations of spontaneous singing of old national songs, and composition of new (even more pinpointed) ones. Moreover, specific events, such as the so-called Rock March, took place: organized three years in a row, from 1987 and 1989 (and then in the mid 1990’s, after the independence), Rock March was a travelling show around the main cities of Lithuania, with different pop bands performing. As mentioned, one main point was not just the performance of “protest” or “national” songs (or anyway songs whose themes may have been unwelcome by Soviet authorities): it was the idea itself of performing “forbidden (that is, typically western) gen-

res” to be used as vehicle of protest. On the stages of the Rock March, Lithuanian audience could be exposed to heavy metal (through the band Katedra), punk (through the band Bix), straight rock (through the band Foje, which included the rising star and by now “spiritual leader” of modern Lithuanian rock, Andrius Mamontovas), not to mention the very peculiar case of Antis (on which I shall return in few lines). Bands from Latvia and Estonia would also appear, and that – too – was a sign: the three Baltic states were “together” in this enterprise.

The uniqueness of music, within the Lithuanian Sąjūdis, becomes even more evident when we consider that its acknowledged leader, and first president of the independent Lithuania, was Prof. Vytautas Landsbergis, a pianist and musicologist, and member of the artistic movement Fluxus (born in America, and usually known because of Yoko Ono’s and John Lennon’s involvement, but in fact founded and animated by Lithuanian artists like Jurgis “George” Mačiūnas and Jonas Mekas). Landsbergis has now become a rather controversial figure, often criticized for his aggressive and distinctive anti-Russian attitude, but in those days he was undoubtedly the most active and representative figure of the independence movement. As a musician and musicologist, one should not underrate his strong interest (in both performance and research) for Čiurlionis, himself a symbol of Lithuanian patriotism.

The list of Sąjūdis members involved in music does not end with Landsbergis: there were the composer Julius Juzeliūnas, the opera singer Vaclovas Daunoras, and most of all Algirdas Kaušpėdas, an architect-turned-to-singer, author and leader of the very influential band Antis. A true opinion leader, Kaušpėdas was behind four important stages of the Singing Revolution:

1) He was a co-founder of Sąjūdis, and one of its most proactive members.

2) He helped out resurrecting pre-Soviet Lithuanian tunes (including the national anthem, which is the one currently used), by touring Lithuania and literally asking local inhabitants (particularly elderly people) to sing them (there is a very nice sequence from Giedrė Žickytė’s documentary *How we played revolution*, which portrays him in this particular activity).

3) He co-organized and headlined the Rock March event (1987–1989); and finally.

4) He was the leader of this particular band, Antis.

Born almost as a joke, during a Christmas party, Antis became quickly a local musical sensation, one that provided the independence movement with several effective original compositions. An embodiment of post-modernism in music, Antis managed to build a powerful anti-Soviet farce through songs abounding in metaphors, allusions, double senses, parody and satire, all packaged in a very theatrical outfit, dominated by masks and costumes (themselves a metaphor of the Soviet people, forced to “appear” socially in a certain way, and having totally different needs and aspirations privately). The name itself, Antis, is a double-entendre. The word, in Lithuanian, means both “duck” and “media sensation”. So, officially the band was called “Duck”, but everybody knew that the real name referred to freedom of speech, censorship, media manipulation. Also, when directly addressed on the contents of their music (for instance, by the hosts of some Soviet musical program), the band would wear their “mask” and deliver answers such as that they were perfectly fine as every Soviet person should be. Once again: people would get the joke, and enjoy that sarcastic frontal attack to the authorities, gaining increasing confidence that independence was not anymore a utopia.

During the years of the Singing Revolution, Antis produced four albums, and nearly every song in them referred to some aspect of the Soviet oppression and “life”. As independence finally occurred, the band felt they had no longer a purpose, and amicably disbanded. Except that the demand for their music was so high (coupled with a desire, from many people’s side, to keep the memory of those feelings and values alive), that the band shortly reunited in two isolated occasions (in 1996 and 2003), and finally, in 2007, became fully-operative again, remaining still active as these lines are written (in fact, a new album was just released in 2013).

3.1. The soft power of the Singing Revolution: success of an obvious connection

There is no doubt, to my mind, that a band like Antis managed to survive without particular problems only because the perestroika was fully operating. In other times, we would be speaking of Antis as a group of heroic patriots tortured and sent to Siberia for life. Nevertheless, the ability of catching the wave of those significant historical changes is by all means a merit, and the three Baltic States were certainly in the frontline, among all Soviet countries, in these activities.

Also, there is no doubt that it was also (perhaps mostly) thanks to all the pacific and/or artistic initiatives promoted by the three independence movements that the international community became increasingly aware of the national claims of these countries, ultimately acknowledging their right to exist as independent States. Iceland, notoriously, was the first one (in February 11, 1991), then in September, USA, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, Malta, San Marino, Portugal, Romania, Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia followed in domino effect. On September 17, Lithuania was welcomed as a member of the United Nations along with Estonia and Latvia.

The Singing Revolution was one of the most relevant SP sources for Lithuania, in its classic sense (from one group to another), promoting the country as such (and not as a Soviet Republic), with all its values, characteristics, customs and choices. Being what it was (that is, a musical phenomenon), it certainly was particularly effective in raising international sympathies. To paraphrase Žickytė's documentary, the revolution was not made, fought, organized or else. The revolution was "played". Few other strategies could have been as powerful as this one, once we are comparing a 3-million-people country against a country 260 times bigger and 50 times more populated.

On the other hand, even more decisive in the independence process was the other important function of SP we mentioned above, that is, the one that operates on the same community it is generated within. Possibly more than any other action taken during the Sajūdis, the Singing Revolution was for Lithuanians the strongest reminder of what they used to and wanted to be: an independent country, with those values, that flag, that language, that identity. And those songs, of course. Leonidas Donskis goes as far as to define the Singing Revolution (and Sajūdis in general) as the ultimate Lithuanian embodiment of the "generous and noble-spirited traditions of the Romantic ethos of liberal nationalism" (2002: 2), up to become the actual highlight of Lithuanian recent history.

3.2. ...and failure of an obvious opportunity

Given such "epic" value of the phenomenon, it is sadly remarkable to notice that neither Lithuanian authorities nor specific scholars have devoted anything more than a minor effort to study, analyze and promote the events and repertoires of the Singing Revolution. The whole phenomenon, as such, is very seldom mentioned in books and essays dealing with "protest songs" or generally the relation between arts and politics. No Lithuanian singer or songwriter does ever appear as the "Lithuanian Pete Seeger" or the "Woody Guthrie of the Baltics". No edition of the Rock March is ever presented to the international readership as a "Lithuanian Woodstock".

Certainly, it is not irrelevant that the entire movement (Antis, first and foremost) was animated by a rightist-conservative intelligentsia. The studies on protest songs (and, to say it all, the whole area of popular music studies) is literally dominated by leftist scholarship, most members of which still having one or two issues in admitting that also Soviet Union was a dictatorship, and that – therefore – a democratic protest can also originate from the right side of the political spectrum. Let alone music *per se*, where the notion of "protest" seems to be possible only if a songwriter plays a guitar with the inscription "This machine kills fascists".

The second problem is that popular music studies are no less alien to ethnic and cultural biases than traditional musicology. If studies on classical music are infamously euro- and male-

centric, popular music studies are glamorously Western- and particularly Anglo-American-centric. To make a specific example related to protest songs, Phull 2008, analyzes 52 supposedly historically-crucial protest songs, with the suspicious result that only two of them are not from either UK or USA: The Wailers' "Get Up, Stand Up" (Jamaica) and Nena's "99 Luftballons" (Germany). Let alone the Baltic States, but the fact that songs like "Senzeni Na?" (a sheer anti-apartheid anthem in South Africa) or Inti Illimani's "El Pueblo Unido" have to be ignored to give room to Michael and Janet Jackson's "Scream" or Pulp's "Common People" (no disrespect meant: I am only pointing out the historical relevance of these songs within any movement of political protest), is only another confirmation that before criticizing the (many) biases of traditional musicology, popular music studies should take a serious look at their own.

Having said that, the rest of the responsibilities falls entirely on Lithuanian cultural policies and their operators. At national level, there are a few (not even many) studies written in Lithuanian: then, as we move into the field of international exposure of such an important phenomenon, emptiness dominates. No Lithuanian scholar has ever bothered to write a history (or an analysis) of the Singing Revolution in English. Other cultural objects, too, are generally missing from the picture. Two Lithuanian movies (the mentioned documentary *How we played the revolution*, and a fiction film called *The Children from the Hotel America*) address the topic of the Singing Revolution, and they were also presented in film festivals abroad (therefore, English subtitles do exist!): but when the DVDs were released, no English subtitles were anymore featured, preventing the items to have any impact whatsoever on the international market (in other words: taking for granted that they will not).

Moreover, very timid were the attempts to academically promote the Singing Revolution at international level, resulting in international ignorance and misunderstandings. Thomson 1992 (not exactly a Lithuanian surname, as one can notice) remains the most evident international exposure of the phenomenon, otherwise the only Baltic country that really took proper care of this enormous cultural heritage was Estonia (in particular through such studies as Vesilind 2008). In Estonian cultural policies and scholarship, the Singing Revolution is seen as a major event, one that not only contributed to the country's independence, but which in fact typifies it. Research and promotion of the phenomenon take special care in making it internationally visibly, with publications and documentaries in English, plus – what is more significant – the inclusion of the Singing Revolution as a founding historical event in nearly any general treatise of Estonian history and/or culture. There is a far cry between two similarly-titled and similarly-intended books like the mentioned Donskis 2002 (*Identity and Freedom: Mapping Nationalism and Social Criticism in Twentieth-Century Lithuania*) and Subrenat 2004 (*Estonia: Identity and Independence*). Lithuanian "identity", for Donskis, results in one single mention to the Singing Revolution (the one quoted above, which ironically celebrates its importance); Estonian "identity", for Subrenat, is an entire chapter called "The 'Singing Revolution' and Independence Regained".

Finally, if this (lack of) literature review was an award, the winner in the category "best missed opportunity to talk about the Singing Revolution" would probably be Miniotaite 2002. The amazing fact, here, is that this book is programmatically written to talk about the "nonviolent resistance" in Lithuania:

This monograph seeks to highlight the important role that nonviolent action has played in Lithuania, especially in the reassertion of independence in the 1980s and 1990s. [...] I seek (...) to draw attention to an often ignored strand of the Lithuanian experience, one that – given greater understanding and development – could help diminish the prospect of a recurrence of such destructive national and communal violence. (Miniotaite 2002: 7).

The book that has the perfect historical and thematic frame to discuss the Lithuanian Singing Revolution, devotes no more than five (!) lines in the whole text (pp. 30 and 31) to any topic related to the Singing Revolution: the organization of the first “Rock March” (erroneously called “Rock’n’Roll March”, among other things: as if Bix and Katedra came to play “Tutti Frutti” and “Blue Suede Shoes” instead of punk and metal).

As a result, little by little, the Singing Revolution is turning from a Baltic into an Estonian-only phenomenon, and, needless to say, this is also what the international community, by reflex perceives (e.g., the Canadian documentary *Cultures in conflict* focuses entirely on the Estonian Singing Revolution, with basically no mention to Lithuania and Latvia). Latvia has recently made a significant step, with the publication of *Smidchens 2013*: by now, thus, Lithuania remains the only country not to have properly presented its contribution to the Singing Revolution to the international community.

Lithuania therefore experiences at least three of the above-mentioned boomerang-effects of this potentially-outstanding SP resource. In international communication (“from one group to another”), we witness a clear “lack of reputation”: quite simply, most people ignore that such a thing like the Singing Revolution ever happened in Lithuania. In internal communication (within Lithuania), we witness at the same time an “absence of the resource” and a “loss of reputation”: respectively, the Singing Revolution is underrated or even overlooked in its SP potential, and – more and more often – a general feeling of “those glorious days of true national spirit are over” is spreading among the Lithuanian community, in response to a perceived crisis of cultural and moral values.

The present article, and the whole work of the research project mentioned in the first footnote, are meant as a small contribution to fill this gap.

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ETUDE SEMIO-CULTURELLE DE LA DANSE QACHQA'I PRATIQUEE EN IRAN

Arsalan Golfam
Université Tarbiat Modares, Tehran, Iran
Golfamr@yahoo.com

Ferdows Aghagolzadeh
Université Tarbiat Modares, Tehran, Iran
Aghagolz@modares.ac.ir

Hamid Reza Shairi
Université Tarbiat Modares, Tehran, Iran
Shairi@modares.ac.com

Reza Rezaei
Université Tarbiat Modares, Tehran, Iran
rezarezaei93@yahoo.com

Abstract

La danse constitue l'un des rites le plus important des ethnies Irlandaises. Cette tradition culturelle et rituelle en tant que l'héritage national du peuple iranien bénéficie de nombreux aspects qu'on peut les analyser de différents points de vue. Face à cette activité socioculturelle qui témoigne d'une présence mythique, le danseur et la danseuse présentent un parcours historico-culturel relatif au vécu, aux mythes, aux croyances et aux principes rituels et ethniques. En effet l'ethnie Qachqâ'i, située au sud de l'Iran, profite de la danse pour donner un caractère esthético-affectif aux pratiques dures de la vie quotidienne. Ainsi, cette danse s'attribue une fonction discursive qui réconcilie le faire et l'être. Comme objet culturel, la danse contribue à la production d'un métalangage qui redistribue les tensions mise en place lors des pratiques journalières à partir d'une énonciation pluridimensionnelle : ce qui donne lieu à une synesthésie du sens. Tout

en prenant source dans des motifs divers, la danse Qachqâ'i nous met devant un univers figuratif à travers le corps et le geste. Elle devient alors la source de la signification à travers des pratiques de la vie quotidienne comme les rites, la tonte des moutons, les activités agricoles, l'équitation, les combats et la résistance face à des tributs envahisseurs. Une telle danse a donc la capacité de souffrir des propriétés existentielles comme autant de possibilités de sens.

Dans cet essai, notre objectif consistera à rendre compte du caractère perceptivo-somatique du discours de la danse Qachqâ'i en tant que l'espace de la transformation des tensions quotidiennes en interaction trans-narrative. Nous nous intéresserons ainsi à examiner le caractère sémio-culturel de la danse Qachqâ'i afin de nous rendre compte du passage des pratiques quotidiennes au discours méta-narratif comme un héritage culturel.

Mots clés: la danse Qachqâ'i, le faire et l'être, le corps, la trans-narrativité, héritage culturel

1. Introduction

Face à cet élément socio-culturel dans lequel on peut trouver beaucoup d'aspects mythiques ; le danseur et la danseuse présentent un ensemble historique relatif aux mythes ; aux croyances et aux principes rituels et ethniques. De plus la danse à côté de la musique et du à son caractères divertissant ; gai et réjouissant qui vivifie la vie dure de clan ; se considère comme objet d'art exprimant l'état d'âme. Donc la danse se prend une fonction discursive qui montre les passions et les sentiments des membres de clan.

Aucune étude n'a jamais été consacré à l'analyse sémiotique de la danse Qachqâ'i en tant qu'une sorte de danse folklorique iranienne ; ce qui exige le problématique de recherche. Comme le point de départ ; nous avons déjà choisi un parcours anthropologique afin qu'on puisse poursuivre la vie et les coutumes des clans Qachqâ'i tout au long de l'histoire. Donc, à l'aide d'une méthodologie analytique-descriptive ; on a essayé de présenter un panorama historico-culturel de la vie des nomades Qachqâ'is. Après avoir introduit les différents aspects de cadre théorique, nous allons analyser la danse Qachqâ'is dans toutes ses dimensions sémiotiques qui montre comment ce type de danse avec toutes ses propriétés sémioculturelles se lie aux pratiques journalières de cette ethnie iranienne. Nous nous intéressons donc à répondre à deux questions principales de cette étude. Premièrement, on va répondre à cette question que la danse Qachqâ'i appartient –elle à quel genre discursive ? Et deuxièmement, La danse Qachqâ'i comme objet et identité culturelle, contribue de quelle manière à la production des sémio sphères qui témoignent des propriétés culturelles?

2. Contexte théorique

2.1. Les figure du corps (La figurativité, la gestualité) de la danse

Les premières études sur la gestualité de de point de vue sémiotique résultent de la notion de corps propre de Merleau Ponty et aussi la théorie de l'énonciation fondée par Jakobson et Benveniste. Dans le sens le plus général du terme ; la danse est certainement une affaire de signification. Comme on le sait ; la mission de la sémiotique n'est donc pas de dire ce que quelque choses signifient mais la manière dont les choses signifient. Dans ce sens, la danse ; elle-même, elle s'agit de découvrir quelle est la manière spécifique dont celle – ci organisent significations. Judith Hanna (1977: 215) insiste sur ce fait que la danse s'articule doublement. En fait , la différence entre les unités porteuses de signification et celles qui servent seulement à les séparer, n'existe plus dans la danse que dans l'image .Pour l'image, ce n'est que l'ensemble de la figure qui a une signification et que celle- ci redistribue aux composants , en tant que la figure , pour la danse c'est le geste ou la gestualité qui a la signification .

Comme le système de la langue formé à la base des unités d'expression et de contenu, les figures du corps aussi sont les ressources sémiotiques dans le cas de la danse. Le geste et le mou-

vement font partie du contenu de la danse (Ekman 1969 : 87). Pour la danse Qachqâ'i, Le mouvement des pieds et des bras qui se croisent sont les gestes significatifs. Les bras qui se croisent et leurs mouvements itératifs qui sont liés aux pratiques et à la monotonie de la vie des nomades Qachqâ'i ne font pas aussi l'exception de cette affaire. Ce sont ces gestes et ses mouvements qui sont comparable dans ce respect aux signes linguistiques ; à savoir des signes dont l'expression et le contenu ont été seulement réunis parce que nous savons qu'ils doivent aller ensemble et non pas à cause d'une proximité ou la similarité.

En émettant l'hypothèse que la danse se constitue comme plus pertinente parmi tous les autres éléments possibles de clan Qachqâ'i, c'est par une définition très générale que nous amorcerons un travail réflexif sur le geste et le sens dont il est potentiellement porteur. Ce travail relevant essentiellement d'une approche sémio -culturel. Renvoyons à ce qui peut être qualifié de geste, tout phénomène sensible (visible, audible, etc.) manifesté par le corps humain - tout ou parties (segments) - qui se déplace ou non dans l'espace. Ce phénomène est signifiant pour celui qui le perçoit. Le corps qui manifeste un geste peut être virtuel (iconographie, vidéo...) ou réel. (Genette, 1994 : 27).

Greimas (1970: 56 [Fontanille ,2004:82) affirme que de nombreux mouvements prenant leurs origines dans le corps humains ont pour but de changer le monde d'une façon ou autre ou de réorganiser la réalité de telle façon que la réorganisation peut être utilisé à l'avantage du sujet – opérateur ; c'est ce qu'on peut aisément trouver dans le cas des croisements des pieds et des bras et la gestualité lors de danse chez les nomades Qachqâ'is . Ici le cercle des danseurs est coupé en deux dans le prolongement du torse vers le coté séparant l'espace intérieur devant de l'espace extérieur. Or si ce discours continu de la gestualité nous accompagne dans les pratiques quotidiennes des nomades Qachqâ'is , on comprend plus facilement comment libéré de ce contexte ; il peut devenir un type de danse qui a ses propres valeurs culturelles qui ne le partage jamais avec les tribus qui l'ont entourés.

2.2. Les différent gestes et figures du corps de point de vue sémiotique

Tout d'abord en parlant de la gestualité et du geste comme Rastier insiste-t-il , il faut distinguer entre un comportement humain significatif et un comportement humain non significatif, en posant les conditions préalables selon lesquelles « un comportement peut être considéré comme porteur de signification ». Suivant Hjelmslev, pour Rastier un comportement est significatif s'il peut être interprété comme le plan d'expression d'un langage (articulé) qui se pose en une relation de présupposition réciproque avec un plan du contenu (a son tour articulé). Etudier la signification du comportement humain veut dire identifier ses unités d'expression et ses unités du contenu, mais aussi, surtout, leur relation nécessaire. Tout ce qui ne correspond pas à ces caractéristiques n'est pas signifiant, et il ne pas être l'objet d'étude d'une sémiotique des gestes. Cette délimitation ne repose pas sur des critères externes au champ d'analyse (communication intentionnelle vs mouvements involontaires du corps ; gestes vs pratiques), ou sur des présupposés implicites cachés au moment de l'analyse même (signes artificiels vs signes naturels ; comportement mythique vs praxis quotidienne), mais sur des conditions scientifiques explicites, communs à tous les langages. De cela dérive que le comportement non significatif « comprend le comportement pratique et le comportement réflexe, c'est-à-dire tous les comportements non symboliques (Greimas , 1968 : 81-82).

L'enjeu d'une sémiotique générale visant à considérer le rôle des gestes dans l'action humaine signifiante serait, au contraire, de sortir de cette tradition, en affirmant l'importance fondamentale de la production, de la praxis, pour la constitution des cultures. Au-delà de ces questions philosophiques plus générales, cette approche comporte de conséquences théoriques d'une certaine importance : l'idée d'une irréductibilité du geste au langage verbal (ce qui est en contraste

avec la tradition pensant les gestes comme simple support de la verbalité) et celle, encore plus fondamentale, d'un élargissement de la notion même du langage, compris non plus comme communication, mais comme production (s'opposant à la vision fonctionnelle des langues comme des simples instruments pour la transmission des informations). Loin d'être considérée comme un accompagnement inessentiel à la communication verbale, la gestualité acquiert le rôle d'une activité antérieure au message représenté et représentable, un travail qui précède la constitution même du signe et des mots, une activité qui fonde la possibilité même de désignation qui sera propre aux mots. En définitive : toute gestualité est une pratique.

Pour répondre à toutes ces questions Greimas pose la sémiotique du monde naturel. Chez lui ; La langue est une forme – ou mieux, l'enchevêtrement de deux formes – indifférente à la substance dans laquelle elle se trouve manifestée ; si la substance est une variable et la forme une constante, toutes les substances (en tant que formées sémiotiquement) peuvent être chargées de manifester des expressions et des contenus ; pas seulement la substance sonore (celle manifestée dans l'oralité) ou la substance graphique (manifestée dans l'écriture), mais toutes les substances du monde, c'est-à-dire toutes les façons sensibles par lesquelles le monde se manifeste à nous par notre appareil sensoriel (par notre corps) : des façons visuelles, tactiles, sonores, olfactives, sensorimotrices etc. (Greimas, 1970 : 99-100).

En d'autres mots, le monde est 'naturel' à la même manière des langues dites naturelles : constructions culturelles par lesquelles des formes d'expression se posent en présupposition réciproque avec des formes de contenu. La différence entre les langues ('naturelles') et le monde ('naturel') est une question de substance, pas de forme ; une question donc indifférente à la production, culturellement et historiquement déterminée, de la signification humaine. 'Naturel' veut dire donc, en ce contexte théorique, quelque chose comme 'habituel', déjà donné le sens commun quelque chose que l'individu se retrouve au moment de son appréhension subjective de ce qui l'entoure (Greimas et Courtés 1979: 233).

Comme on lira dans l'entrée « Monde naturel » du Dictionnaire de Greimas et Courtés : "Nous entendons par monde naturel le paraître selon lequel l'univers se présente à l'homme comme un ensemble de qualités sensibles, doté d'une certaine organisation qui le fait parfois désigner comme 'le monde du sens commun'. Par rapport à la structure 'profonde' de l'univers, qui est d'ordre physique, chimique, biologique, etc., le monde naturel correspond, pour ainsi dire, à sa structure 'de surface' ; c'est, d'autre part, une structure 'discursive' car il se présente dans le cadre de la relation sujet/objet, il est 'l'énoncé' construit par le sujet humain et déchiffirable par lui."

En reprenant certains passages de la philosophie phénoménologique de M. Merleau-Ponty et de l'anthropologie structurale de Cl. Lévi-Strauss, et en s'accordant aux propositions sur la typologie des cultures avancées dans les mêmes années par I. Lotman, pour Greimas la différence entre nature et culture doit être pensée comme une construction humaine différente selon les cultures, une délimitation orientée entre ce qui est *dedans* chaque culture et qui ne l'est pas, qui reste *au dehors* d'elle. Voulant utiliser les catégories explicatives du carré sémiotique (proposées aussi dans *Du sens*), on pourrait dire que, avant d'être une Nature, cette entité doit passer par le stade de la Non-Culture (d'une négation qui précède – comme toujours – l'affirmation). Nature et Culture, sorte de universaux sémantiques collectifs, construisent une opposition de base à l'intérieur de chaque culture, variable dans l'espace et dans le temps, par laquelle chaque culture peut articuler ses signes, ses langages, ses attitudes signifiantes, ses codes. (Marrone 2006 : 7)

On comprend pourquoi la notion Greimassienne de monde naturel dérive justement d'une enquête sur la gestualité. Les gestes, au moment où se bâtissent en systèmes de communication parmi les hommes, articulent les parties et les mouvements du corps dans un espace qui l'entoure. Mais la sélection de ces parties et ces mouvements (en tant que substances d'expression de la communication gestuelle) n'est pas totalement autonome : elle se base, précisément comme

le feu vert de Lévi-Strauss, sur des morceaux de significations pr existantes, sur des signes déjà faits, sur des figures chargées de sens possibles. Par ex. l'opposition lourd/léger que la danse utilise pour produire ses significations, a déjà des valeurs dans le monde naturel, la légèreté étant euphorique et la lourdeur dysphorique (ou vice versa).

Pour cette raison, dit Greimas, il ne faut pas confondre la praxis somatique (qui est un affaire de pratiques énoncées par des sujets d'actions, des corps en mouvement) avec la communication gestuelle (qui est, au contraire, un fait d'énonciation produite par des corps-émetteurs pour des destinataires qui l'interprètent). Dans le premier cas, c'est un problème de sens comme direction : la signification des actions corporelles. Pour Greimas il faut remarquer que le corps peut signifier à deux niveaux différents, celui de l'énoncé et celui de l'énonciation : « dans la praxis gestuelle, l'homme est sujet de l'énoncé, tout en étant un 'il' pour nous, il est le 'je' agent de l'énoncé, le sujet des fonctions qui constituent son comportement; dans la gestualité communicative, l'homme est le sujet de l'énonciation : il est un 'tu' pour nous, mais un 'je' pour lui-même, dans la mesure où il cherche désespérément à produire et à transmettre des énoncés(Fontanille, 2004 :239) .

Denis Bertrand (2000: 159) a montré pourquoi la synesthésie pouvait être interprétée comme une incomplétude éprouvée conduit à la synesthésie. Dès lors ; celle-ci est d'emblée décrite comme un mouvement à travers les diverses sensations composant une expérience : l'incomplétude suscite une tension qui demande résolution et cette résolution consiste à traverser tous les flux sensoriels pour y trouver réponse au manque qui existe. La synesthésie n'est plus alors qu'un cas particulier du se mouvoir ; le mouvement perçu réflexivement ; c'est – à dire la sensorimotricité devenant quant à elle le prototype de toute intentionnalité. Le support de toutes les visées de complétude ; le principe mémé de toute liquidation d'un manque figuratif.

3. L'espatialité

D'après Fontanille(2004: 80) , on peut discuter de deux espaces dites figuratif et figural. Tandis que le premier met l'accent sur la discontinuité des espaces où les sujets se situent et qu'ils trouvent leur significations d'après deux éléments qui s'appellent la contiguïté et la coordination ; le deuxième est un espace continu et dynamique étant indépendant des sujets et leur effets sur les distances spatiales significatives. Ici l'être ou bien la présence ou co-présence des sujets cause de passer de l'espace continu à celui de discontinu. De plus comme Tarasti (2009 : 36) insiste, la transcendance d'espace cause le dynamisme de l'espace .Nous pouvons simplement voir la réconciliation de faire et de l'être ; ce que nous oriente vers les propriétés existentielles comme autant de possibilité de sens. Comme on le sait tous ; chaque espace dépend à son tour de l'identité de sujet, chaque espace forme une identité spatiale / significative / affective/ ontologique et perceptivo- affective.

4. Analyse sémiotique de la danse Qashqâ'i

Dans cette partie à l'aide de photos qui témoignent la scène de la danse Qashqâ'i, nous avons partagé la scène de danse à quatre espaces ou dimensions ayant beaucoup de possibilité sémiotique qui sont liés aux pratiques journalières de cette ethnie connu iranienne. D'après Shairi et Fontanille (2001: 87), si le discours verbal est capable de nous conduire partiellement et indirectement de l'énoncé vers l'observé et la chose vue ; l'énoncé visuelle ne se donne à saisir qu'en tant que l'observé. La sélection ; le point de vue, la lumière, le cadre, la distance sont tous significatifs pour la correspondance de photo avec la chose vue. De point de vue sémiotique, la photo est l'empreinte de quelque chose qui est resté sur la surface (Floch 1986). L'empreinte nous oriente vers la présence de quelque chose que lui – même est absente. Le regard par intermédiaire de présence absente donne une présence existentielle et dynamique. Tel type de regard obéit non seulement des valeurs culturelles mais aussi obéit des valeurs dont chacun s'occupe dans sa

propre culture.

Les photos qui montrent une scène de la danse Qachqâ'i sont de type référentielles et photo-témoin. Elles essayent de montrer la réalité existante de la danse chez cette ethnie. Alors on peut aussi les considérer en tant qu'une sorte de documentation. Elles seraient aussi les photos artistiques ; car pour leur production, on ne peut jamais nier le rôle de la lumière/ la perspective et le cadre (Zilberberg , 2006 :34). A côté d'avoir la fonction référentielle, les photos qui représentent une scène de la danse Qachqâ'i ne sont pas seulement au service de documentation avec la fonction référentielle. Ces types de photos peuvent créer un discours visuel. Elle peut attirer l'attention de l'énonciateur. Ici la relation établie entre le sujet et la scène se fait importante. Donc la réalité de photo n'a pas autant de valeur ; à l'inverse, la vision de sujet ou de l'énonciateur qui est dirigée vers le monde a de préférence.

4.1. Dimension narrative

Cette entrée linéaire dans un ordre observable correspond à une situation aspectuelle inchoative qui signifie un début de pratique quotidienne. Cette pratique représentée ici par un gestuel esthétique – éthique correspond à une stabilisation métaphorique des situations et des scènes de la vie.



Figure 8 : Entrée linéaire sur la scène correspond aux pratiques journalières de clan

4.2. Dimension éthique

L'étape suivante est le passage à une explosion de l'ordre où les danseuses se dispersent et s'occupent tous les points de l'espace. Cette explosion somatique est en rapport avec une forme de vie particulière chez les nomades qu'on peut appeler le soi ou soi tout en appartenant à l'autre. En fait le corps nomade est un corps situé d'une part entre les autres corps et signifie par ces autres corps .Et de l'autre ; le corps tout en existant pour l'autre existe pour soi dans l'exacte mesure où il donne à son propre parcours une situation actualisée ça veut dire, le passage à une extension spatiale avant de faire l'expérience d'une situation d'intensité où il se place dans une interaction contracté.



Figure 9 : Explosion somatique sur la scène

Toute action sur la scène de danse Qachqâ'i pratiquées de la part des nomades est une action pour l'autre et qu'elle s'accomplit en présence de l'autre et dans un mot la scène nous présente la co- présence des corps. La continuité de la vie des nomades dépend des actions collectives où l'autre devient un figure symbolique ; ce qui garantit l'existence collective ; ici nous voyons que la scène de la danse Qachqâ'i profite des aspects éthiques.

4.3. Dimension existentielle

La culture des nomades Qachqâ'i connaît des moments de durcissement dans les espaces contractés ainsi que des moments décontractés où le corps vit une liberté existentielle .Le suivi des corps témoigne d'une situation de partage des tâches journalières ; ainsi que d'une interrelation effective et pragmatique. En plus, le parcours linéaire au début est repris à la fin. Cette sortie linéaire fait part d'abord du résultat et de la terminativité de la scène et de l'autre ; du recommencement et reprise des pratiques.



Figure 10 : Contraction spatiale (le regroupement des corps)



Figure 11 : Décontraction et dispersion des corps

4.4. Dimension phénoménale

La symbolisation et la métaphorisation des pratiques de la vie à partir des gestuels scéniques et théâtraux montrent que la vie nomade vit une continuité pratique d'ordre esthétique et artistique à fin d'honorer une existence qui débute dans l'action journalière et qui se verse dans une représentation phénoménale. On pense que ces danses ont leur origine dans l'imitation des actions des femmes au cours de leur vie quotidienne, telles que le tissage, le filage et d'autres activités.

4.5. L'espatialité et la contribution de la danse dans la production des sémio- sphères culturelles.


L'espace de la danse Qachqâ'i est continu. La danse Qachqâ'i forme à son tour un espace narratif et continu avec les propriétés pragmatiques qui sont liés aux pratiques journalières de cette ethnie : ce parcours ou bien ce programme narratif trouve sa signification en présence des sujets collectifs. De plus ; la danse dans la nature est parfois transformée à une méta- narration ou trans-narration dans laquelle les sujets ne sont pas obligés d'obéir une logique actionnelle ; ce qui constitue d'après (Landowski 2010). Les espaces pragmatiques sont exigeants et obligatoires car le sujet ne peut jamais les changer ; ou les passer ; il se trouve en conflit avec eux volontairement. Ici nous pouvons parler d'un espace embrayé. Dès que le sujet se situe dans cet espace ; avec sa présence ; il cause une sorte de distinction en comparaison avec les autres. L'espace de la danse Qachqâ'i nous présente une organisation spatiale spirale ; ceux que Landowski les définissent en tant que les espaces qui sont en constante interaction avec le monde ou la nature qui les entourent. Ici ; La multiplicité de l'espace s'avère significative. La danse accompagnée de musique rend aussi l'espace poétique. Donc ; la nature où les nomades Qachqâ'is vivent se fait un espace en devenir. Ce qui était présent devient encore présent .Celui – ci donne un caractère étatique à l'espace. Il se situe à l'intersection des mouvements ; ça veut dire l'ensemble des gestes et des mouvements qui se forment et qui vivifient l'espace. (Lotman1999: 64). A partir de cette étape chaque élément spatial peut se déplacer dans la sémio-sphère concernée. Il est à noter que la production de signification de la part de la danse des nomades Qachqâ'is n'est pas exclusivement limitée au temps actuel ; mais on doit la chercher dans toute l'histoire de cette ethnie.

La danse Qachqâ'i appartient à la mémoire historico- culturelles du patrimoine iranien toute en s'attribuant une fonction esthétique. La scène de la danse Qachqâ'i s'inscrit ainsi son identité

par rapport à d'autres ethnies. Telle scène pourrait réserver sa fonction pragmatique. Dans ce sens ; l'espace se multiplie et son identité historique et diachronique devient synchronique. (Lotman 1999: 15). ça suffit de voir les danseurs Qachqâ'is sur le plateau d'un festival international des danses ethniques. Ce fait est tout à fait conforme à la notion posée de la part de Lotman ; la sémio- sphère, car la narration réalisée des pratiques journalières est transformée à l'espace de la danse avec toutes les propriétés sémiotiques ; ou bien l'empreinte d'une narration dans d'autres narrations : ce qui est connu en tant que la trans- narrativité.

5. Conclusion

En termes de conclusion, il est à noter que comme un objet culturel ; la danse Qashqai, elle-même ; contribue à la production des sémio- sphères qui témoignent de la propriété culturelles des uns et des autres ; ce qui se justifie par rapport à l'intégration de soi par soi dans le discours de la danse afin de dialoguer avec d'autres types de danse et de s'inscrire dans son espace. Donc ; tout au long de cette recherche, nous avons essayé d'examiner les propriétés sémioculturelles de cette danse dans son propre espace ethnoculturel. A la fin de cette recherche on a déjà schématisé la structure de ce discours artistique.



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LE TAPIS PERSAN : FIGURE, MATIERE, PRATIQUE DISPOSES A FAIRE SENS

Hamid Reza Shairi, Université Tarbiat Modares, Iran
Shairi@modares.ac.ir ; shairih@gmail.com

Résumé

Les tapis persans sont des objets sémiotiques dont la signification dépend de leur capacité de la discursivité. Tout au long de cet essai nous nous occuperons de deux types de tapis : tapis en soie et tapis en laine. Nous traiterons ces tapis comme des objets qui animent d'une manière ou autre nos demeures. Comme objets du design, ils participent à organiser notre espace et à remédier notre rapport au monde. Comme objets domestique, ils s'inscrivent dans la loi de la transitivité et s'appêtent à devenir des objets pratique ou esthétique. Comme objets d'art, ils prennent leur distance par rapport à l'observateur, s'imposent de loin, nous envahissent, font autorité sur nous, mais ils n'hésitent pas en même temps, à provoquer notre contact direct et corps à corps. Comme objets culturels, ils contribuent à la production des espaces partagés ou discrets. Et enfin comme objets socio-éthiques, les tapis deviennent le lieu de la mise en place des rapports de force : il s'agit d'une tension entre le survenir et le parvenir.

Ainsi, relevant d'un caractère tridimensionnel, les tapis persans constituent un univers de sens très compliqué et partagé entre la figure, la matière et la pratique. Contenant pour certains des textures très fines et pour d'autres des textures moins fines et même épaisses, les tapis font sens à partir de leur matériau en soie ou en laine. Or, le matériau est responsable d'une partie de la signification. Et enfin, se prêtant à des pratiques diverses selon les cultures, à des manières de vivre et aux expériences perceptivo-affectives des usagers, les tapis deviennent source de significations et tendent à s'offrir des formes de vie comme autant de possibilité de sens. Cet essai aura donc pour objectif de rendre compte du caractère multidimensionnel du discours de tapis persan afin d'examiner et de voir de quelle manière il affecte notre rapport à nous-mêmes et au monde.

1. Introduction

Le tapis persan se caractérise par deux sortes de force : immanentiste et transcendantaliste. Ces forces proviennent elles-mêmes des formes de vie qui dépendent du matériau et de la figure déterminant les manières de vivre des tapis. Pour le tapis en soie, nous avons affaire à une forme de vie en retrait, mais esthétique ; et pour le tapis en laine, nous sommes en présence d'une forme de vie partagée et mise en pratique. Cependant, est-il possible de voir un changement concernant le mode d'existence du tapis-soie ? Nous avançons l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'intervention du matériau peut modifier la présence du tapis-soie : par une projection dans notre monde, il abandonne son univers discret et autosuffisant et réajuste sa position. Mais, il est aussi important de savoir par quelle procédure, le tapis-laine - privé de la brillance et caractérisé par une figure mate et en retrait - peut se doter d'une forme de vie partagée. Ainsi notre deuxième hypothèse est centrée sur le fait que le tapis en laine bénéficie du domaine du toucher et invite donc l'utilisateur à devenir son partenaire à partir d'une interaction somatique. Ce qui signifie que les deux corps s'inscrivent dans une activité interrelationnelle changeant la profondeur matérielle en profondeur humaine.

2. Valeur d'usage et valeur de base dans les tapis persans

Le tapis persan est un objet pluridimensionnel par ses aspects pratiques, esthétiques et éthiques. Il est d'abord un objet fonctionnel par le simple fait qu'il s'inscrit dans une relation d'usage quotidien. Son intrusion dans nos demeures renvoie à un certain rapport de fonctionnalité : pour couvrir une surface, pour s'asseoir ou pour faire la prière là-dessus. Mais cette valeur d'usage confronte rapidement à un autre type de valeur que J. M. Floch considère à juste titre comme « utopique » (Floch, 1986 : 16-17). En effet, le tapis persan entre d'une part dans une dimension esthétique qui consiste à décorer nos maisons, à nous conduire de la nature à la culture ou même de nous faire rêver par un certain rapport de force esthétique, et il se dote de l'autre, d'une qualité mythique qui témoigne de son caractère sacré. Il faudrait en outre ajouter à ces deux dimensions de force de tapis une troisième interprétable comme un aspect esthético-éthique : la capacité de transformer nos intérieurs en un lieu d'exposition. C'est ce qui nous conduit à attribuer aux tapis deux valeurs d'usage et de base. Tout ceci offre à cet objet de signification une certaine épaisseur qui l'élève au rang d'un objet s'inscrivant dans un plan de la praxis énonciative. A croire Greimas :

La chose devient un objet de valeur syncrétique. Doté de mémoire, collective et individuelle, porteur de signification à facettes multiples qui tressent les réseaux de complicité avec d'autres objets, pragmatiques ou cognitifs, l'objet s'insère dans la vie de tous les jours en lui ajoutant de l'épaisseur. (1987 : 91).

Tout au long des parties qui suivent, nous allons essayer de nous concentrer sur ces diverses dimensions dont bénéficie le tapis afin de montrer de quelle manière un objet d'usage peut s'élever au rang d'un objet utopique investi des valeurs esthétique et en devenir.

2.1. Usage et temps créent une valeur-temps pour le tapis

L'une des particularités du tapis persan consiste dans le fait d'assigner à l'usage un contenu temps qui change le rapport à la fonctionnalité. A ce sujet deux temporalités s'avèrent importantes : la première appartient au niveau de la production et la seconde s'approprie le niveau de la consommation. C'est ce qui nous introduit dans une valeur-temps.

La valeur-temps transforme le tapis de consommation considéré comme objet de valeur d'usage en un objet de valeur de base, puisqu'elle lui assigne un contenu : ancienneté. Ce qui signifie que l'usage lui-même est producteur d'une valeur-signe qui s'intègre au fur et à mesure dans l'objet jusqu'à ce que celui-ci devienne le lieu d'investissement d'un contenu-temps qui modifie le rapport du propriétaire du tapis à lui-même et au monde. Tout en se servant du tapis, son propriétaire sait que le passage du temps est un facteur positif qui fait évoluer l'axiologie première grâce à laquelle on reconnaît le pouvoir représentatif du tapis en une axiologie seconde fondée sur l'ancienneté. Ainsi, une nouvelle force s'ajoute à la présence de cet objet et nous conduit à le désigner désormais comme objet-temps. Autrement dit, le plan temporel selon lequel se définit la valeur d'un tapis est double : il appartient au présent et au passé. C'est justement ce qui distingue l'univers du tapis de celui de la mode. Pour la mode il y a un passé qui s'interprète comme la mort. Tandis que pour le tapis le passage du temps est un renforcement de la vie. Les remarques de Landowski sur la mode permettent de mieux saisir la particularité du tapis qui ne se soumet jamais au tragique de l'absence comme la mort. Le tapis n'est jamais dominé par le démodé.

[La confrontation avec le démodé, forme de nous-mêmes devenue pur souvenir, partage de ce point de vue quelque chose de commun avec une autre modalité, plus tragique, de notre face-à-face avec ce qui « n'est plus » : celle qu'occasionne la disparition – la mort – de l'autre pour peu que les relations qui nous liaient à lui aient fait précédemment de sa présence, toute proche ou plus lointaine, chère ou même détestée, peu importe à la limite, une part déterminante de notre vie.] (Landowski, 1997 : 130)

Cette citation montre bien que contrairement aux objets de la mode, le présent dans lequel s'inscrit le tapis relève d'un présent éternel et en même temps en devenir. De cette façon à la temporalité longue de l'usage du tapis correspond une intensité forte qui prend source dans l'ancienneté. Plus cette temporalité est longue, plus la valeur devient importante. En d'autres termes, cette valeur tire son existence de la lenteur qui offre au tapis un tempo que l'on peut définir comme une forme de vie.

Le temps de l'usage participe à une lenteur qui suggère un contenu ancienneté au tapis. Ce qui nous fait rentrer de cette façon dans un rapport de force : plus il y a de l'ancienneté plus nous avons affaire à une présence d'objet d'art menant à une relation esthétique :

temps de l'usage = la lenteur = le contenu ancienneté = la valeur rajoutée = l'objet d'art = la relation esthétique.

Avec une temporalité longue et un tempo lent, le tapis rentre dans le rang des objets de valeurs à négocier dont le prix dépend toujours de la qualité liée au contenu-temps. En somme, en tant que contenu-temps, le tapis réclame une épaisseur historique. Ce qui signifie que le temps rajoute à l'existant (au tapis), composé d'un matériel et d'une forme engagée, une valeur en devenir qui insère le tapis dans un rapport de force. Ce qui fait constater que le tapis peut s'attribuer une narrativité qui va de la production à l'appropriation et de l'appropriation à des négociations pour de nouvelles réappropriations. Ainsi, le tapis nous introduit dans une co-énonciation qui peut nous engager dans une narrativité depuis la production jusqu'à la distribution, en passant par des usagers qui sont susceptibles de redevenir des vendeurs ou des acheteurs pouvant se transformer en des collectionneurs.

3. Matérialité du tapis: de la fonctionnalité à l'utopie



Fig. 1 : Tapis en soie de Kashan.



Fig. 2 : Tapis en laine.



Fig. 3 : Tapis en coton.

Nos demeures peuvent être décorés par deux types de tapis : le vertical et l'horizontal. Le tapis vertical renvoie à une matérialité beaucoup plus souple et plus fine : de la soie. Alors que le tapis horizontal qui couvre nos sols correspond à une matérialité plus épaisse et plus solide : de la laine ou du coton. Le tapis horizontal répond à des besoins immédiats d'ordre fonctionnel et plutôt pratique. Alors que par sa brillance, sa finesse et une main d'œuvre très sophistiquée, le tapis en soie s'approprie une temporalité plus longue du point de vue de la production. Celui-ci change la fonction de nos intérieurs et leur assigne une nouvelle mission qui relève plutôt de l'esthétique : la verticalité en soie transforme nos maisons en un lieu d'exposition d'art. Le tapis en soie devient ainsi un tapis-tableau qui réorganise nos relations avec l'espace : notre salle peut-elle se substituer à un musée d'art ? Si la réponse est positive, c'est parce que l'objet domestique peut se doter d'une dimension utopique qui nie son aspect fonctionnel pour se rapprocher de l'objet du design. C'est ce qui théâtralise le tapis et change de même notre intérieur en une scène artistique. A ce sujet, on peut se référer à A. Beyaert-Geslin :

[L'objet de design emprunte à la distanciation théâtrale dans la mesure où il se donne en spectacle et se destine à lui-même un spectateur, une instance d'observation conviée à assister à la requalification de la pratique ordinaire dans la mesure où, associant de même le faire et l'être (le faire permettant de comprendre l'être), il en réunit les prérequis sémiotique : un horizon, un noyau et des actants. S'il diffère pourtant de la vie quotidienne, c'est en raison d'une requalification de son horizon par la finalité sans fin de l'art. Cette différence de finalité jette une lumière nouvelle sur la définition de la scène prédictive qui ressortit désormais au domaine du théâtre et non de la vraie vie]. (2012 : 122)

Le tapis théâtral crée donc une certaine distance entre le tapis et les usagers. Tout se passe comme si le tapis en soie restait distant de nous, nous refusant son aspect tactile au profit du seul trait visuel pour nous dominer. Le tapis-musée devient ainsi envahissant. C'est lui qui re-métaphorise notre espace. C'est lui qui nous domine. C'est lui qui nous maîtrise. Il s'agit donc du tapis qui réorganise notre espace par son caractère d'objet esthétique et distant.

L'espace familier *devient* ainsi l'espace du partage. Un espace social avec des traits de collectivité. Le particulier change en divers et en multiple.

4. Espace de distribution et de réinsertion

S'oppose ainsi au tapis vertical le tapis couché sur le plancher ou sur le sol de notre intérieur. La matérialité du tapis change. D'une matérialité très fine et très légère, on passe à une matérialité plus épaisse et moins fine.

Il s'agit des tapis de consommation et d'usage. De cette façon, le rapport humain change. C'est la réalité pratique qui prend le dessus sur l'aspect utopique. Nous n'avons pas l'intention de dire que le niveau pratique mise en jeu par une relation du corps à corps amoindrit la valeur significative des relations que nous entretenons avec le tapis. Nous voudrions tout simplement dire que le tapis horizontal se caractérise par l'agencement de nos actions qui changent les scènes théâtrales en des valeurs suscitées par le déroulement de nos actions quotidiennes (faire la prière sur un tapis est une action qui réajuste la signification de ce tapis). Selon J. Fontanille :

...le cours même de la pratique est un agencement d'actions qui construit, dans son mouvement même, la signification d'une situation et de sa transformation. Le cours d'action

transforme en somme le sens visé par une pratique en signification de cette pratique.
(2008 : 3)

Il s'agit cette fois d'un rapport tactile. On s'assoit sur le tapis et on marche là-dessus, ce qui le rapproche d'une réalité pratique. En effet, d'un contenu métaphorique, imaginée, asserté, mais non assumée du tapis-musée, nous passons à un contenu pratique, assumé et maîtrisé de tapis. Autrement dit, d'un mode existentiel de virtualisation, nous passons à un mode existentiel d'actualisation et puis de réalisation. Notre corps devient donc contigu au corps du tapis. Les deux corps se touchent. Mais contrairement au tapis vertical, nous sommes cette fois sur le tapis; ce qui rend compte de l'état de notre dominance. Les deux corps se trouvent cette fois dans une position d'interaction. Le tapis accueille notre corps et lui donne un statu de solidité, d'assurance et d'intimité : poser les pieds sur, s'asseoir, se coucher sur un tapis, sont autant de pratique régulatrices de notre rapport aux choses.

4.1. Tapis en laine et tapis en soie : deux univers qui se contredisent

Le tapis en laine couché sur sol nous introduit dans une relation perceptive d'ordre tactile. Le contact quotidien que nous établissons avec ce genre de tapis change la position sujet/objet en une position d'échange et d'interaction. Tout se passe comme si quelque chose de la propriété du tapis nous était transmis. Nous nous plions, nous nous allongeons, nous nous couchons sur le tapis. Ces pratiques sont autant de positions qui ressemblent à des propriétés des tapis horizontaux. Mais elles renvoient en même temps à des contenus mythiques comme repos, détente, évasion, attachement et etc. Ainsi, le tapis qui était considéré dans un premier temps comme un simple objet d'usage, devient dans un deuxième temps un objet de savoir-être. C'est ce qui nous rapproche d'ailleurs de « l'émotion esthétique ». Nous passons donc d'une expérience toute naturelle du tapis à une expérience esthétique d'ordre émotionnel. Le fonctionnel cède la place à l'événementiel.

L'émotion esthétique provient de cette union instituée au sein d'une chose créée par l'homme, donc aussi virtuellement par le spectateur qui en découvre la possibilité à travers l'œuvre d'art, entre l'ordre de la structure et l'ordre de l'événement. (Lévi-Strauss, 1962 : 37).

Le tapis en laine et horizontal remplit de cette manière deux fonctions différentes. Dans un premier temps, il ramène notre corps de la culture à la nature. Et dans un second temps, il rallie notre corps à l'événement esthétique et émotionnel. En ce qui concerne le contact naturel avec le monde, il nous fait passer de la position sociale du sujet debout, à la position naturelle du sujet allongé ou assis. Et en rapport avec le contact sensible, il nous fait vivre une expérience émotive appartenant à l'univers mythico-esthétique.

5. Immanence et transcendance du tapis

Donc nous avons affaire à deux types de tapis. Le premier c'est le tapis-tableau qui fonctionne d'une part comme objet esthétique, et de l'autre comme sujet qui remodèle notre espace tout en nous autorisant le placement ou l'intégration d'autres objets dans sa proximité. Il ouvre ainsi des champs de possibles. Il devient en fait le délégué de notre vision du monde. Il représente notre espace et idéalise notre identité. Il nous ramène donc de la nature à la culture. Le tapis en soie contient un matériau qui est responsable de sa forme de vie. En effet si son destin est celui de


maintenir une certaine distance par rapport à l'observateur, c'est parce qu'il est fait d'un matériau qui le rend fragile et lui inflige donc une picturalité réservée. La forme de vie de ce genre de tapis est due au choix du matériau qui renvoie à une position à distance esthétique et au culte de la vue.

Le deuxième c'est le tapis-pratique qui nous prête ses propriétés matérielles tout en nous ramenant de la culture à la nature. Ce genre de tapis fait d'un matériau plus résistant et plus épais nous invite à le toucher et se caractérise par le toucher. C'est pourquoi il nous fait passer d'une conception idéalisée du tapis à une sensation de notre propre chair.

Se pose ainsi la question de l'immanence et de la transcendance du tapis. Le tapis-tableau ou vertical se positionne comme immanent. Distant de nous, dans une autonomie suffisante, il bénéficie d'une position de force intégrée dans sa profondeur et son épaisseur esthétique. Mais le tapis-pratique entre dans une interaction avec l'autre. Ses forces dépendent de la présence de l'autre en tant que corps en interaction avec lui. Il ne peut pas exister seulement pour lui-même; son espace devient l'espace de l'autre. C'est un tapis partagé dans tous les sens du terme. Il signifie par rapport au corps de l'autre qu'il intègre et s'il a un corps, c'est grâce au corps de l'autre qu'il remodèle et repositionne dans son propre espace. De cette façon, il donne sens et sensibilité à notre corps et au corps de l'autre. En d'autres termes, son sens dépend aussi de sa capacité de transmettre à l'autre toutes ses propriétés inhérentes. Les sentiments de chaleur, de douceur, d'intimité et d'appartenance à un lieu proviennent tous du corps du tapis-pratique. J.M. Floch parle à juste titre de deux types de style : clos et ouvert.

[Le style est le plus souvent défini comme un écart ou comme une déviance. Dans une telle approche, le style est conçu comme une ouverture, une sorte de prise de liberté par rapport à une norme extérieure à l'œuvre. Cette approche est essentiellement paradigmatique et normative (...). Mais dans une approche plus soucieuse de l'œuvre elle-même, centrée sur le texte et non plus sur le contexte, le style va être défini cette fois comme une clôture. Une clôture liée à la dimension syntagmatique de l'œuvre. De plus, cette approche, attentive aux récurrences et aux constances internes à l'œuvre (...) n'est en aucune façon normative ; c'est celle des stylisations les plus proches de la sémiotique, qui se veut purement descriptive et s'attache d'abord et avant tout aux relations internes à l'œuvre.] (Floch, 1995 : 173)

Ainsi le tapis-musée renvoie à un style clôt que nous avons identifié comme une instance immanente ; alors que le tapis-pratique fait figure d'une dimension de style ouvert qui prend sens dans le rapport avec l'autre. C'est ce fait de style que nous avons homologué à une relation transcendantale. Le schéma ci-dessous peut montrer deux styles et deux formes de vie différentes pour les tapis persans.



En comparant les deux modalités de l'objet, la vue et le toucher, A. Beyaert-Geslin met l'accent sur le fait que la mise en pratique de l'objet est capable de faire remonter la profondeur du matériau à la surface.

[Entre les dimensions de l'objet et celle de la pratique se joue une séparation entre la vue et le toucher lequel, au lieu de compléter les informations visuelles par des correspondances synesthésiques, s'impose par la manifestation. Toutes les propriétés concernées par le toucher entrent alors en jeu. Celles qui mobilisent la main (...) – comme celles qui sollicitent le corps tout entier : les propriétés thermiques, la résistance et de l'élasticité de l'objet, etc. La mise en pratique de l'objet révèle ainsi la profondeur de la modalité du toucher. Au-delà des propriétés de surface auxquelles on limite généralement la compréhension de la texture, elle dévoile la compréhension des données texturales qui font pour ainsi dire remonter la profondeur du matériau à la surface ...] (2012 : 89).

Ces tapis-tableaux en soie correspondent donc à un luxe et renvoient à une conception aristocratique de l'objet d'art qui n'autorise pas, du point de vu de la pratique, l'usager à une interaction corps à corps. Une distance est mise en œuvre. C'est pourquoi, nous nous trouvons dans l'immanence de tapis. En ce qui concerne le tapis pratique, tout se passe comme si le matériau utilisé garantissait la vie des signes au-delà des rapports symboliques et esthétique. Alors que le tapis-tableau devient une métaphore du monde et de l'histoire (une révélation des vécus historiques et des courants d'art), le tapis-pratique rend compte d'une intimité des corps en partage ainsi que des expériences affectives sollicitées par les effets thermiques.

6. Tapis comme une figure-fond

Une fois installé dans nos demeures, la figure-tapis change notre maison en lieu de divertissement. Rien que par leurs figures, leurs motifs et leurs ornements, les tapis qui décorent nos intérieurs nous introduisent à tout moment dans une illusion esthétique. Cette dernière corres-

pond à des rêves éveillés et aux désirs toujours aiguisés. Ainsi, par sa qualité figurative, le tapis nous emmène très loin. Nous pouvons à chaque moment abandonner des réalités dures de la vie quotidienne afin de nous rallier à des mondes fantastiques. En imitant soit les figures du monde naturel, soit celles du monde artistique, le tapis crée un univers fantastique et sert à modifier notre rapport aux choses et au monde. En étudiant l'univers de Disneyland, U. Eco attire notre attention sur l'importance du faux qui peut être pris pour une réalité magique plus importante que la réalité réelle.

“Le plaisir de l'imitation, les Anciens le savaient déjà, est l'un des plus inhérents à l'âme humaine, mais ici, outre le fait de jouir d'une imitation parfaite, on jouit de la persuasion que l'imitation a rejoint son apogée et que maintenant, la réalité sera toujours inférieure.”
(1985 : 70)

Mais il ne faut pas oublier que les figures qui ornent les tapis sont dépendants du matériau dans l'exacte mesure où la substance-soie donne de la brillance et de l'exubérance ; alors que la substance-laine correspond plutôt à des figures mates et même ternies. Dans le tapis, l'implication de la substance modifie la vie des figures et intervient dans la réorganisation du sens du tapis. Autrement dit, la substance-soie garantit la brillance des formes ; de même que la substance-laine participe à la mise en place d'une présence des formes mates et foncées. Nous avons ainsi affaire à deux sortes de projection : une extériorisation du côté de la soie qui transforme le tapis en tapis-exposition ; ce dernier se projette vers nous, nous atteint et nous empêche de rester indifférent vis-à-vis de sa présence ; Tandis que le tapis en laine est plutôt timide et c'est nous qui nous introduisons dans son espace.

La brillance est une qualité intrinsèque de la substance-soie. La soie fait obtenir une légèreté des formes et des signifiants tout prêts à déborder leur espace et de s'inscrire donc dans le survenir.

Avec le changement de la substance, nous nous confrontons à un nouvel engagement des signifiants. Les tapis en laine et en substance épaisse rendent les formes moins brillantes, plus timides et plus discrètes.

Ainsi, à un désir d'extériorisation (la soie) se substitue un désir de retrait (la laine). Ceci vient de l'effet de la substance qui détermine le mode d'existence de la forme. Mais, c'est la pratique qui change la signification engagée par la substance. Notre présence et notre contact direct avec le tapis horizontal le fait sortir de ses réserves et change les modes d'existence du tapis-laine.

Ainsi, condamnés par l'épaisseur historico-humaine à une conception pratique et une interaction corps à corps, ces tapis-laine s'inscrivent dans un parvenir qui les fait entrer dans une narrativité quotidienne. Ils font donc partie de tout un parcours qui aboutit soit à une dimension jonctive et axiologique, soit à une similitude et ajustement avec le corps humain.

De cette façon, avec une substance plus épaisse, nous passons d'un désir de retrait à un désir de co-énonciation, co-présence et co-sensibilité rien que par la pratique qui engage l'homme et le tapis dans une interaction corps à corps.

On peut en déduire qu'avec le tapis-laine, nous passons d'une conception immanentiste (retrait, limite et autosuffisance), à une conception transcendantaliste d'interaction, d'intersection et d'assimilation.

Nous pouvons maintenant rectifier ce que nous avons constaté à propos du tapis-soie. Nous avons précisé plus haut que le tapis-tableau cultive la distance, ramène de la nature à la culture, joue une théâtralisation et se tient en retrait vis-à-vis de l'utilisateur. Cependant, nous devons ajou-

ter maintenant que la substance-soie vient inscrire le tapis dans une tentative de briser cette distance à tout moment et à transformer ainsi sa force de l'immanence due à la distance et à la théâtralisation en une force de transcendance. Cette modification est due à la figure de la brillance du tapis qui dépend elle-même de la force du matériau-soie. La soie épouse le survenir et se projette dans l'espace de l'observateur. La substance est donc responsable de cette réinsertion du tapis dans l'espace de l'autre.

7. En guise de conclusion

Tout au long de cet essai, nous nous sommes efforcé de montrer en quoi le tapis domestique est capable de redonner sens et signification à nos maisons. Nous avons examiné deux types de tapis donnant lieu à deux styles différents : le tapis-soie que nous avons considéré dans un premier temps comme un tapis en retrait. Et le tapis en laine que nous avons identifié à un mode de pratique soumis à l'interaction. Mais dans un deuxième temps, à partir d'une analyse de la différence de la figure caractérisée par des couleurs brillante et mate, nous avons pu remarquer que le tapis en soie sort de sa réserve par une projection d'ordre du survenir et n'hésite pas à gagner le monde des observateurs. De même, nous avons pu montrer que le tapis en laine qui était voué à un retrait par sa figure foncée et mate devient un tapis pratique par une interaction corps à corps avec l'être humain. Ce qui prouve que dans tous les cas, les deux tapis en soie et en laine sont susceptibles de modifier notre mode d'existence : la soie nous transforme en des êtres soumis au survenir. La laine nous situe au rang des êtres dominés par le parvenir.

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**SEMIÓTICA DE LA MARCA /
SEMIOTICS OF BRAND**

LES MARQUES DE CONSOMMATION ET LES FORMES DE VIE SEMIOTIQUES QUELLES FONCTIONS, QUELLES RELATIONS, QUELLES DEFINITIONS ?

Alain Perusset

Université de Neuchâtel, Suisse & Université de Bourgogne, France
alain.work@live.com

Abstract

A consumer society is characterized by specific discourses, objects and practices as well as semiotic entities hard to describe: brands. With the help of the semiotic concept of form of living, this paper precisely aims to lift the veil on what a brand is. Our reasoning will lead us to compare its symbolic logic to Barthes' *Mythologies* and finally to define it as a device which promotes and naturalizes forms of living in the social space. Overall, this article may further the conceptualization of a brand management model of sociosemiotic inspiration.

Résumé

Une société de consommation se caractérise par des discours, des objets et des pratiques spécifiques, ainsi que par des instances sémiotiques difficilement qualifiables : les marques. En nous appuyant sur le concept sémiotique de la forme de vie, l'objectif de ce travail visera justement à lever le voile sur ce qu'est une marque de consommation. Le parcours que nous emprunterons nous amènera à rapprocher sa logique symbolique de celle des *Mythologies* de Barthes et finalement à la définir comme un dispositif de promotion et de naturalisation des formes de vie dans l'espace social. Plus globalement, cet article pourrait favoriser la conceptualisation d'un modèle de brand management d'inspiration sociosémiotique, et non plus uniquement sémiotique comme c'est généralement le cas.

1. Introduction

« Une marque est un nom, un terme, un signe, un symbole, un dessin ou toute combinaison de ces éléments servant à identifier les biens ou services d'un vendeur ou d'un groupe de vendeurs et à les différencier des concurrents. » Cette définition de Kotler et Dubois (2004 : 455) sélectionnée parmi d'autres dans l'introduction de *Branding management* (2007 : 8) nous semble

emblématique de la difficulté que rencontrent les spécialistes du marketing à définir précisément leur objet d'étude. Elle illustre plus largement, à notre avis, leur difficulté à appréhender les aspects sensibles et intangibles inhérents au phénomène des marques. Car si une marque est tout à la fois « un nom, un terme, un signe [...] », elle ne l'est qu'à titre de *dispositif sémiotique formalisé au plan du contenu*.

Il s'agit en tout cas de notre hypothèse, celle que nous développerons dans ce travail en commençant par nous intéresser au sujet social et à la façon qu'il a de gérer son identité au quotidien, car c'est seulement en précisant d'abord ce qu'est une identité que nous pourrions en dernier lieu déterminer ce qu'est une marque d'un point de vue sociosémiotique. Au travers de l'étude de cas Abercrombie & Fitch, nous verrons en particulier que la fonction fondamentale d'une marque est d'optimiser et de pérenniser le positionnement social des sujets sociaux qui la consomment. Et finalement, en rapprochant cette logique de celle des *Mythologies* de Barthes (1959), nous montrerons que les marques ne font ni plus ni moins que promouvoir et naturaliser des formes de vie dans la sémiosphère. Cette dernière observation nous amènera alors à construire un schéma articulante ensemble le mythe et la forme de vie ainsi que réorganisant par la même occasion l'ordre des niveaux d'immanence du plan de l'expression tel que proposé par Fontanille (2008 : 34).

2. Questions d'identités

2.1. Une sphère de sens peuplée d'altérités

Dans *Fondements pour une sémiotique existentielle*, Tarasti décrit admirablement la façon dont le sens se construit à partir de la relation fondamentale liant le sujet à son environnement et rappelle que cette relation est loin d'être stable, car « l'une des facultés fondamentales de l'homme [est] sa capacité à transcender, [...] à s'extraire en esprit de la *deixis* présente, à dépasser son ego *hic et nunc* » (2009 : 277). En effet, si l'environnement du sujet est évidemment d'abord sensible, puisqu'il est le lieu où se nouent sans cesse diverses tensions physiques et psychiques (sensations et émotions), il est également, et de façon tout aussi prépondérante, un environnement intelligible, fait de milliers de significations inscrites sur les objets et dans les textes culturels, eux-mêmes manipulés dans des pratiques déjà porteuses de sens. Pour cette raison, et à la suite de la proposition de Lotman (1999), nous devons envisager l'environnement dans lequel évolue l'esprit humain comme une sémiosphère. Et pour compléter cette prémisse, il nous paraît tout aussi important de souligner que dans cette sémiosphère le sujet n'est jamais seul ; il est toujours entouré d'autres sujets auxquels il peut tantôt s'identifier tantôt se distancier. Ces autres sujets, c'est ce que l'on appelle l'*altérité*, la figure générale à partir de laquelle le sujet façonne son identité.

2.2. Un sujet, mais plusieurs identités

En se basant sur les travaux de Prieto (1991), Basso Fossali explique dans *La promozione dei valori* (2008) qu'il existe deux types d'identités fondamentales : l'identité numérique et l'identité spécifique. Avec l'identité numérique, c'est d'abord la relation (physique ou biologique) qu'entretient une entité à elle-même qui est circonscrite : c'est l'identité qui fonde la relation entre un vieillard et l'enfant qu'il était 80 ans auparavant, ainsi qu'entre un papillon et une chenille. À l'inverse, l'identité spécifique met en relation plusieurs entités distinctes à partir de caractéristiques qualitatives communes. Cette identité, foncièrement culturelle, c'est celle qui fédère les individus appartenant aux mêmes communautés, pratiquant les mêmes activités, partageant les mêmes goûts...

Ainsi, au-delà du fait que « l'identità specifica è riproducibile (copie, contraffazioni ecc.), mentre l'identità numerica è storica e non surrogabile » (Basso Fossali 2008 : 111), on observe

surtout que c'est autour de ces deux identités, indistinctement, que le sujet social gère son individuation dans la sémiotique. Mais si l'individuation produite par l'identité numérique est effectivement non négociable (« non surrogable »), il en va tout autrement pour l'identité spécifique qui offre au sujet la possibilité de se démarquer en investissant d'autres individualités, privées ou collectives (2008 : 112).

Maintenant, par rapport à cette identité spécifique, soyons plus précis. Il faut premièrement dire qu'elle peut être subie, à savoir que l'on peut, par exemple, paraître autoritaire ou jaloux, alors même que nous n'avons pas l'impression de l'être, encore moins la volonté de manifester ces traits de caractère. C'est une possibilité, mais la plupart du temps, cette identité est surtout visée comme lorsque, à dessein, nous faisons tout pour être élégants et polis, ou, à l'inverse, insolents et offensants. Dans ces circonstances, comme l'a proposé Ricoeur (1990), deux types de gestion de l'identité se font jour : soit on va chercher à cultiver ce pour quoi on est déjà reconnu (identité-*idem*) soit on va chercher à devenir ce que l'on n'est pas encore : ce à quoi on aspire (identité-*ipsé*). Une personne reconnue pour sa courtoisie et qui persévère dans cette bienséance renforcera son identité-*idem*. À l'opposé, une personne à qui aucune fibre artistique n'est reconnue, mais qui se sentirait profondément artiste, fera tout pour révéler son identité-*ipsé*, en commençant, par exemple, par peindre des toiles.

2.3. Les valeurs éthiques au fondement de l'identité spécifique

Les deux derniers exemples nous aident à voir que finalement une identité spécifique répond aux mêmes exigences structurelles que n'importe quelle instance sémiotique, à savoir qu'elle peut se laisser diviser en deux plans : un plan du contenu et un plan de l'expression.

Au plan de l'expression – qui, rappelons-le, est le plan des perceptions sensibles – l'identité spécifique du sujet se manifestera par des attitudes et plus généralement par un *ethos* ; l'*ethos* étant l'« ensemble des propriétés figuratives et sensibles formant un tout reconnaissable », la « signature d'un comportement éthique collectif ou individuel » (Fontanille 2008 : 266). Au plan du contenu – le plan des investissements sémantiques et thématiques, ainsi que des jugements axiologiques –, l'identité spécifique se définira par des valeurs éthiques, dont la combinaison formera une *idéologie* ; l'idéologie étant cette « articulation syntagmatique de valeurs [...] qui n'étaient que virtuelles au niveau de l'axiologie » (Floch 1995 : 148).

Ces précisions faites, il faut maintenant expliquer un autre point, à savoir qu'une identité, et encore plus une identité spécifique, n'a de sens qu'à partir du moment où elle fait partie d'un système, en l'occurrence dès lors qu'elle est mise en rapport avec une *doxa*¹ (des principes, des mœurs, des bienséances sociales...²). En somme, c'est l'observation d'écarts entre la *doxa* sociale et l'*ethos* des individus qui fonde les identités spécifiques évoluant dans la sémiotique. Ainsi, quand on entreprend d'analyser des identités spécifiques, c'est pour l'essentiel à une comparaison entre valeurs éthiques que nous procédons. Et si nous employons ici l'adjectif *éthique*, c'est parce qu'on peut dire que l'éthique est ce *sens* qui motive les actions pratiques et surtout la façon dont celles-ci sont conduites du point de vue comportemental.

[Au] *plan du contenu*, [l'éthique] est une axiologie spécifique à l'action, à son utilité, à la place de l'Autre, une axiologie projective, susceptible de capter le sens qui déborde l'action, c'est-à-dire une *téléologie* (cette *téléologie* se dédouble en « idéologie » – l'Idéal comme *telos* – et en « altérologie » – l'Autre comme *telos* – de l'action ») (Fontanille 2008 : 239).

Le tableau ci-dessous rend compte des différentes éthiques susceptibles d'être manifestées

dans la sémiotique. Il s'agit d'un carré sémiotique démultiplié que nous avons produit dans un précédent écrit (« Quelles valeurs éthiques pour les formes de vie promues par les marques de consommation ? ») à partir de l'axiologie de la consommation de Floch et des thèses sociosémiotiques développées par Landowski depuis la fin des années 1990.




Fig. 1 : Les valeurs et valorisations éthiques.

Pour aller à l'essentiel³, nous dirons premièrement à propos de ce schéma que les valeurs éthiques peuvent être réparties dans quatre valorisations distinctes, chacune définissant un type de relation à l'autre spécifique : l'éthique corporelle explicite la manière d'*être au monde* du sujet, l'éthique positionnelle s'intéresse à son *agir en commun*, l'éthique situationnelle décrit sa façon de *vivre la règle*, enfin, l'éthique culturelle traduit l'attitude qu'il adopte pour *construire du sens*. Secondement, nous dirons qu'à l'intérieur d'une même valorisation, les valeurs s'excluent, mais qu'entre valorisations, elles se combinent. C'est grâce à ces deux propositions que nous avons ensuite pu dire, en conclusion de notre article, qu'une identité spécifique se compose, au niveau profond, de quatre valeurs articulées syntagmatiquement entre elles pour former, comme suggéré précédemment, une idéologie.

Afin de pouvoir embrayer avec la problématique des marques et des formes de vie, nous nous limiterons à décrire, dans le chapitre suivant, une seule de ces valeurs (la licence), tout en rappelant qu'un système idéologique n'est véritablement complet, et ne fait véritablement sens, que lorsque toutes les valeurs éthiques sont prises en compte.

3. La licence productrice de sens

3.1. Une valeur paradoxale

Comme c'est généralement le cas avec les notions dont le sémantisme est intrinsèquement éthique, la *licence* est diversement appréciée et valorisée. La définition qu'en propose le *Trésor de la langue française* peut expliquer ces jugements ambivalents, puisque la licence y est décrite comme une « liberté généralement excessive que se donne une personne, parfois un groupe de personnes.⁴ » En effet, le caractère excessif de la licence peut être envisagé comme le pivot tensif qui fait basculer la notion vers une évaluation tantôt positive (la libération) tantôt négative (le libertinage).

En 2013, Landowski avait en partie défini ce qu'est la licence au travers d'une autre notion, l'insolence. Malheureusement, en s'intéressant à l'insolence, l'auteur n'avait décrit que le versant négatif de la licence ainsi que l'attestent ces différents extraits : « [l'insolence, c'est] *ne pas* manifester de respect (ou, plus grave, manifester de l'irrespect) à l'égard de qui (ou de ce qui) est considéré comme en étant digne », elle est une « forme vicieuse de l'irrespect », une « simple excentricité, acte de provocation gratuite, recherche d'une « originalité » et d'un « insolite » qui ne mènent à rien [...] tout au plus à épater à bon compte le bourgeois ou à scandaliser l'académie, l'insolence vise la gloire » (2013 : n.p.).

Cette connotation dépréciative se retrouve également dans l'une des définitions de la licence, lorsqu'elle est comparée à un « état de dérèglement moral dans lequel vit une personne ou une collectivité » (*Trésor de la langue française*). Néanmoins, à l'inverse de l'insolence, la licence peut aussi être socialement tolérée, voire admirée : c'est le cas lorsqu'elle est associée à une inventivité, certes gratuite, souvent idiosyncrasique et généralement irréfléchie, mais tout de même productrice d'un sens. La *licence poétique* caractérise assez bien cette attitude dont la valeur ne réside que par les apports stylistiques qu'elle permet, à savoir créer un sens qui ne vaut que par sa vanité, sa singularité et son esthétique. A partir de là, c'est donc plus généralement la *doxa* qui va faire pencher la licence vers une insolence condamnable ou une performance admirable.

3.2. De différentes manières d'exprimer la licence

Comme nous l'avons dit, une attitude éthique peut se cultiver (identité-*idem*) ou se poursuivre (identité-*ipsé*). On peut donc dire qu'elle est vécue par choix, mais de façon tout aussi vraie on doit dire qu'elle est vécue malgré soi, en ce sens que le jugement de cet *ethos* par une altérité est toujours susceptible de s'écarter de l'intention première du sujet qui l'adopte. Cette dialectique entre production et réception est constante.

Enfin, il est aussi important de dire que, en principe, une éthique est une inclination naturelle – un tropisme – et que, en ce sens, elle ne résulte pas d'une posture. On pourra alors objecter qu'un individu timide qui désirerait montrer davantage d'assurance est obligatoirement dans le simulacre. Mais il n'en est rien, car c'est précisément parce que quelque chose le pousse à agir, en l'occurrence à devenir autre (identité-*ipsé*), qu'il ne tient pas de posture. Adopter une posture, ce n'est en fait rien d'autre qu'exprimer une nécessité éthique profonde.

En ayant cela en tête, nous pouvons à présent nous demander quels sont les différents moyens à notre disposition pour exprimer une identité, en l'occurrence une identité véhiculant une dimension licencieuse. Tout d'abord, pour l'avoir vécu, vu ou entendu dans la sémiotique, on saura que l'on peut manifester une identité licencieuse verbalement, par exemple en étant rustre, impoli ou intrusif. Certains gestes ainsi que d'autres attitudes corporelles pourront aussi participer de cette licence, comme le doigt d'honneur, le fait de roter, de manger la bouche ouverte...

À côté de ces expressions puisant du côté des ressources corporelles, on aura aussi appris qu'il est possible de manifester une identité licencieuse grâce à la médiation, dans certaines situations et en présence de certains individus, d'artefacts spécifiques : le maquillage excessif au travail pour les femmes qui exerceraient une profession sociale auprès de personnes vivant dans la précarité ; la cigarette fumée dans les préaux d'écoles pour les professeurs et les surveillants d'établissements ; les lunettes de soleil en boîte de nuit pour les fêtards.

3.3. Un Objet de valeur aux multiples facettes

La présentation de ces deux langages licencieux (le corps et les artefacts) nous amène à faire l'observation et la conclusion suivantes : dans la sémiotique, le sujet social fait l'expérience de manifestations licencieuses diverses et variées, ce qui a pour conséquence d'instituer la /licence/ comme un Objet de valeur, au sens de la sémiotique narrative. Et, en fait, elle le devient à double

titre.

D'abord, l'Objet de valeur /licence/ est ce que la sémiosphère comme Destinateur communique au sujet social, ici dans le rôle du Destinataire. Dans cette conjoncture, le sujet est simple observateur des modes d'expression licencieux, mais aussi Sujet narratif potentiel dans la mesure où, s'il le décide, il peut chercher à se conjoindre avec ces manifestations pour devenir ou demeurer lui-même licencieux. Deux types de quêtes narratives se présentent alors à lui : soit une quête visant l'acquisition d'un artefact licencieux (l'appréhension) soit une quête visant l'apprentissage d'une manière d'être licencieuse (l'imitation). Comme théorisé dans un précédent article (« La *praxis narrative* comme modèle sémiotique pour interpréter les pratiques sociales »), cette conjoncture, dite délibérative⁵, se caractérise par la production d'un *faire-savoir* conduisant à un *faire-vouloir*.

Ensuite, si l'on part du principe que le sujet social est parvenu à s'approprier, puis à vivre la /licence/ dans une pratique, on verra qu'une nouvelle fois la licence devient Objet de valeur. Mais cette fois-ci, les rôles s'inversent, puisque c'est le sujet social qui devient le Destinateur et la sémiosphère qui devient le Destinataire (en sa qualité de figure englobant toutes les altérités). Dans cette conjoncture expressive⁶, la /licence/ est une seconde fois Objet de valeur.

À travers l'exposition de ces deux moments narratifs, ce que nous souhaitons montrer, c'est que la /licence/ comme valeur éthique peut s'incarner dans divers types d'actants. La catégorie des « figures actantielles » proposée par Fontanille dans *Séma et Soma* (2004 : 115) nous aidera à y voir plus clair :




Fig. 2 : Les figures actantielles selon Fontanille.

Nous avons précédemment montré que la licence pouvait s'incarner dans des *formes* (actants ayant une masse, mais aucune énergie propre) comme des lunettes de soleil ou une cigarette. Nous avons aussi indirectement montré qu'un *acteur*, c'est-à-dire un individu (actant doté d'une masse et d'une énergie propre), pouvait aussi exprimer à lui seul la licence. Désormais, nous pouvons donc dire que la licence, et plus largement n'importe quelle valeur éthique, n'a pas de consistance prédéterminée. Pour la sémiotique, ce constat est une lapalissade toutefois, puisque, rappelons-le, une valeur éthique se situe toujours au plan du contenu, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne se définit pas en rapport à sa masse ou à son expression, mais par rapport à son intensité, à l'éclat qu'elle dégage. De fait, la véritable question qui se pose à présent, en rapport au schéma de Fontanille, est de savoir si une valeur éthique est une force ou une aura.

4. La marque dans tous ses états

4.1. De l'aura à la force, et vice-versa

Imaginons deux amis discutant tranquillement à la terrasse d'un café. En les observant superficiellement aucun indice ne nous paraîtra marquer, chez l'un comme chez l'autre, une identité particulière, si ce n'est une certaine forme de *normalité*. Mais si l'on décidait de procéder à une analyse plus minutieuse, nous verrions une particularité vestimentaire caractérisant chacun des amis. Nous découvririons sur le pull du premier l'inscription « Abercrombie & Fitch » et sur le sweater du second un logo – au niveau de la poitrine, côté cœur – dessinant la silhouette d'un élan.

À partir de là, deux cas de figure sont à envisager : soit la marque Abercrombie & Fitch nous est familière, soit elle nous est inconnue. Dans le cas où nous connaîtrions la marque et la reconnâtrions sur les habits des deux compères, les valeurs qu'elle promeut seraient en principe manifestes. C'est-à-dire que l'expérience sémiotique de ces manifestations, à savoir la vision du nom et du logo de l'élan, devrait en principe activer les valeurs éthiques que l'on associe conventionnellement à la marque et que l'on peut formaliser ainsi : {/maintien/, /distinction/, /narcissisme/, /licence/}⁷. Dans cette situation, nous pourrions alors dire que la licence, mais plus largement l'ensemble de l'idéologie ici décrite, tient lieu de *force*. Parce qu'elle parvient à attirer l'attention, par le biais d'une médiation sensible comme un logo, la valeur licencieuse peut en effet être décrite comme un actant certes sans masse, mais qui dégage néanmoins une véritable énergie, une vraie force d'attraction, qui non seulement *marque* les sujets sociaux qui la portent, mais également qui interpelle par son éclat les altérités alentour.

À l'inverse, si l'on s'était mis dans la peau d'un observateur qui ne connaissait pas Abercrombie & Fitch, la valeur licencieuse de la marque serait demeurée latente, pure potentialité non actualisée. Ici, c'est l'*aura* comme actant sans masse ni énergie qui aurait le mieux décrit la valeur /licence/. Au final, on voit donc surtout qu'une valeur éthique (ou une idéologie) est toujours une aura sauf lorsqu'elle est saisie dans une pratique, auquel cas elle devient force d'assomption.

4.2. Le dispositif économique de la marque

Voyons à présent ce que la marque a apporté aux deux amis. D'abord, par l'intermédiaire de signes propres, elle leur a permis d'économiser des efforts. En effet, il est évident que vouloir manifester une éthique licencieuse autrement qu'à travers des artefacts ou des insignes présage une entreprise particulièrement épuisante : il s'agirait de parler et de se comporter de façon provocante, et ce, constamment. En portant des habits de marque, l'effort devient en revanche nettement moindre et l'effet peut être tout aussi, voire plus fort. Ainsi, d'un point de vue socio-sémiotique, on peut déjà dire qu'une marque est un dispositif économique et expressif qui vise à marquer un positionnement social. Et c'est nécessairement en mettant en circulation des produits, sortes de marqueurs identitaires manifestes, que l'entreprise propriétaire de la marque rend cela possible.

Mais il faut tout de suite préciser une chose : le produit en tant que tel ne suffit généralement pas à caractériser une marque⁸. En effet, il est peu probable qu'un observateur qui connaîtrait pourtant la marque à l'élan soit capable de reconnaître un sweater Abercrombie & Fitch dépouillé de tout signe extérieur (nom ou logo). Outre le nom, on voit ainsi que c'est surtout le logo sur le produit qui permet de la façon la plus économique – une fois de plus – de révéler une marque et *in fine* une idéologie. Mais le problème qui se pose encore ici, c'est qu'un logo est un signe arbitraire qui, en principe, n'entretient aucune relation motivée avec les valeurs promues par la marque : en d'autres mots, une idéologie ne réfère à aucune réalité matériellement déterminée.

Par conséquent, pour les entreprises et les agences de communication qui les conseillent, promouvoir une marque, c'est prioritairement élaborer un *faire-savoir* : d'abord *faire-savoir* que

la marque est associée à telle idéologie, ensuite *faire-savoir* que le logo est associé à cette marque. En ce sens, la communication publicitaire de marque vise davantage la diffusion d'associations qu'une incitation à l'achat. Aussi, la réussite d'une communication de marque devrait-elle toujours se mesurer à la lumière des scores de visibilité et de notoriété réalisés non seulement auprès du public cible, mais surtout auprès de l'ensemble de la population, car c'est tout le corps social qui participe, par ses jugements et ses opinions, à façonner chacune des idéologies qui traversent la sémiosphère.

Il est alors aussi nécessaire d'observer que si c'est bien l'entreprise qui crée la marque et qui, originellement, choisit son idéologie, ce n'est ensuite plus elle qui décide seule du positionnement que la marque exprime. Une fois que la marque est installée et manipulée dans la sémiosphère, l'opinion publique et les médias participent aussi, par leurs discours, à renforcer ou modifier l'idéologie initialement fondée par l'entreprise. C'est donc pour éviter des écarts de jugements indésirables que l'entreprise doit continuellement communiquer sur sa marque, de la façon la plus cohérente et en sélectionnant dans sa communication les codes et les *topoi* qui expliciteront de la manière la moins ambiguë possible les valeurs éthiques qu'elle désire promouvoir.

4.3. Mythique par nature

Au terme de ce travail, nous pouvons dire que la marque est un *dispositif sémiotique dont le but est d'exprimer de la façon la plus économique possible une forme de vie*⁹. Cette définition résume les différents points abordés jusqu'à présent, mais surtout laisse entrevoir la raison pour laquelle la marque est un phénomène profondément marchand. En effet, la marque permet au sujet social d'épargner du temps et de l'énergie ; un temps et une énergie qu'il aurait été contraint de *gaspiller* s'il avait voulu exprimer sa forme de vie ou son identité visée autrement qu'avec une marque. Plus particulièrement, on voit maintenant que c'est en s'appuyant sur l'efficacité des trois fondamentaux de la marque – le produit, le logo et la communication – que l'entreprise parvient à *mâcher le travail* d'expressivité existentielle au sujet social. Mais évidemment ce travail a un coût en temps, en argent et en énergie pour l'entreprise et ce serait dès lors ces différents investissements que le sujet-consommateur gratifierait au moment de l'achat d'une marque¹⁰.

Par ce travail constant de diffusion d'associations symboliques, l'entreprise en vient finalement à élever la marque au rang de mythe. Et si nous disons cela, c'est parce que, comme le glosait Barthes à propos des différents mythes contemporains (1959), la marque *naturalise* la relation (la sémiose) entre l'idéologie, le logo et les produits que l'entreprise a choisis pour elle. À force de campagnes de communication, l'entreprise transforme en effet des associations arbitraires (fondées sur une histoire) en systèmes motivés (laissant croire à des relations naturelles). Les deux extraits suivants, tirés des *Mythologies* rendent compte de cette « prestidigitation » (1959 : 217) :

Là où il n'y a qu'une équivalence, il [le mythe] voit une sorte de procès causal : le signifiant et le signifié ont, à ses yeux, des rapports de nature. [...] tout système sémiologique est un système de valeurs ; or le consommateur du mythe prend la signification comme un système de faits (1959 : 204).

En passant de l'histoire à la nature, il [le mythe] fait une économie : il abolit la complexité des actes humains, leur donne la simplicité des essences, il supprime toute dialectique, toute remontée au-delà du visible immédiat, il organise un monde sans contradictions parce que sans profondeur, un monde étalé dans l'évidence (1959 : 217).

5. Conclusion

Nous avons parlé d'identités, d'idéologies et de valeurs éthiques sans nous arrêter sur la notion de forme de vie. À dessein, nous voulions d'abord présenter certains de ces termes pour ensuite mieux circonscrire ce dernier concept.

Comme l'ont très bien fait remarquer Fontanille (2008) et Basso Fossali (2012), les formes de vie sont les instances sémiotiques les plus globalisantes d'une culture. Ce sont elles qui « imposent des orientations sur plusieurs catégories de contenus (et donc sur plusieurs niveaux du *parcours génératif de la signification*), ainsi que sur plusieurs types expressifs (et donc sur plusieurs *plans d'immanence de l'expression*) » (Fontanille 2012 : n.p.). Cette omnipotence et -présence de la forme de vie pose plus profondément la question de son statut sémiotique ; soit comme instance du plan de l'expression comme le propose Fontanille avec ses « plans d'immanence de l'expression » (2008 : 34), soit comme instance du plan du contenu comme le suggère paradoxalement aussi Fontanille de façon cependant moins explicite (2008 : 33). Cette ambivalence est aussi discutée par Badir qui estime que l'« on est en droit de se demander si leur pertinence [aux formes de vie] ne relève pas davantage de ce plan [le plan du contenu] que du plan de l'expression proprement dit » (2009) ainsi que par Basso Fossali qui « doute qu'on puisse retrouver enfin une *forme* et pas au contraire une *force* d'assomption pure [avec la forme de vie] » (2012).

Les observations que nous avons faites sur la capacité des valeurs éthiques à investir n'importe quelle figure actantielle (actant, acteur, aura, force) nous semblent pouvoir éclairer le débat, car, en fait, ce ne sont pas tant ces valeurs éthiques qui prennent en charge ces figures actantielles – comme nous l'avons postulé dans un premier temps –, mais bien plutôt la forme de vie qui les subsume. Le schéma ci-dessous rend compte de cette hypothèse où c'est la forme de vie qui régit l'ensemble du dispositif sémiotique. L'arborescence que nous utilisons est empruntée à Floch (2002 : 106) qui s'était lui-même inspiré du schématisme de Hjelmslev. En outre, au plan de l'expression (système dénотatif), nous avons ajouté les niveaux d'immanence du plan de l'expression de Fontanille¹¹ (2008 : 34) tels que nous pensons qu'ils s'articulent dans cet ensemble.




Fig. 3 : La modélisation de la forme de vie.

Comme *configuration* où une idéologie est mythifiée sur l'ensemble des niveaux d'immanence du plan de l'expression¹², la forme de vie peut également être définie métonymiquement selon

différentes perspectives. Du point de vue de l'idéologie, elle sera une aura de valeurs éthiques flottant dans la sémiosphère. Du point de vue du mythe, elle sera une force d'assomption éthique. Enfin, pour le sujet social qui la vit ou la vise, la forme de vie représentera une « enveloppe expérientielle » (Basso Fossali 2012 : 12) qui stabilise et pérennise nécessairement son identité, et qui peut être saisie ou cultivée plus ou moins facilement.

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(Endnotes)

¹ Cette exigence n'en est en fait pas vraiment une, car ce lien existe déjà : un sujet évolue nécessairement dans une sémiotique déjà normée et codifiée.

² En règle générale, la *doxa* est intériorisée. Elle se manifeste dans des discours institutionnalisés (lois, préceptes religieux...), mais est aussi très souvent tacite (habitudes, traitements médiatiques...).

³ Les étapes du développement de ce système éthique font l'objet de notre article « Quelles valeurs éthiques pour les formes de vie promues par les marques de consommation ? ».

⁴ Trésor de la langue française. (2014) <http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/licence> (consulté le 26 décembre 2014).

⁵ La conjoncture délibérative correspondrait dans le cadre de la sémiotique des cultures au programme de la manipulation de la sémiotique narrative.

⁶ La conjoncture expressive serait la reformulation sociosémiotique du programme narratif de la sanction.

⁷ Nous proposons ces valeurs éthiques sous bénéfice d'inventaire, car pour pouvoir véritablement asserter l'idéologie suggérée, il faudrait pouvoir s'appuyer sur des études qualitatives et quantitatives.

⁸ Il faut bien avouer qu'il existe quand même des designs, des packagings et des expériences qui caractérisent à eux seuls une marque. Pensons à la forme de la bouteille Coca-Cola ou à la fragrance d'un Chanel N°5.

⁹ Dans cette définition, nous aurions pu substituer le concept d'*identité*, déjà glosé, à celui de *forme de vie* que nous ne définirons qu'en conclusion. Mais si nous avons choisi de déjà introduire la forme de vie, c'est parce que l'identité est une dynamique, un processus, qui n'est analysable que si nous la réduisons, la stabilisons, dans une forme. En l'espèce, la forme de vie serait cette identité formalisée.

¹⁰ Précisons encore que c'est sur les enjeux éthiques de la marque que nous nous penchons, car il est bien clair qu'un consommateur peut acheter une marque uniquement pour tirer profit des performances fonctionnelles du produit.

¹¹ Les raisons qui nous amènent à intégrer les niveaux d'immanence du plan de l'expression dans cette structure sémiotique sont discutées dans notre article « De l'émotion gustative à la forme de vie ».

¹² Nous nous inspirons de la définition inaugurale des formes de vie formulée par Fontanille en 1993 dans laquelle celles-ci étaient assimilées à des « configurations où une "philosophie de la vie" s'exprimerait par une déformation cohérente de l'ensemble des structures définissant un projet de vie » (1993 : 5).

LA MARCA COMO SIGNO¹

Antonio Caro
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España
antcaro@outlook.es, antcaro@ono.com

Resumen

La presente ponencia, planteada como introducción a la mesa redonda “Semiótica de la marca” que tuvo lugar en el seno del presente Congreso, tiene por objeto abarcar en un panorama de conjunto las investigaciones que se han realizado hasta el momento en torno a la materia, señalando sus aportaciones y carencias, y ello como punto de partida del enfoque socio-semiótico o global que aquí se defiende; enfoque este que nos permite penetrar en el seno de la *producción semiótica* donde, dentro del vigente semiocapitalismo, la marca se condimenta y que ha sustituido a la producción material como núcleo del proceso productivo. A su vez, dicha constatación nos permitirá poner de relieve la *expropiación* del producto material, y con ello de las necesidades del consumidor, que la marca implica como resultado directo de aquella producción semiótica; expropiación con arreglo a la cual la marca se constituye en la principal fuente de valorización del capital, y consiguiente extracción de plusvalía, en el marco del semiocapitalismo hoy vigente.

En primer lugar, quiero agradecer a todos los participantes, en nombre de Dimitar Trendafilov y el mío propio como coordinadores de esta mesa redonda sobre Semiótica de la Marca, la gran acogida que han dispensado a nuestra convocatoria. Somos una de las mesas redondas con mayor participación en el presente 12º Congreso Mundial de la IASS/AIS, lo cual pone de relieve el gran interés que hoy despierta un tema que hasta hace poco apenas superaba el círculo de los especialistas. Y ello en cuanto reflejo tanto de la importancia que ha adquirido la marca en la vida diaria de todos nosotros como del hecho irrefutable de que la marca es un constructo semiótico. De modo que no hay disciplina en principio más adecuada que la semiótica para tratar de desentrañar los secretos de la marca.

¹ Ponencia de introducción a la mesa redonda Semiótica de la Marca/Brand Semiotics.

En segundo lugar, y yendo ya al tema de mi ponencia, me gustaría comenzar por clasificar las ya numerosas investigaciones que se han hecho utilizando las herramientas semióticas en torno a la marca en tres grandes grupos: 1) las que aplican tales instrumentos semióticos a la *construcción* de una determinada marca, o bien a diseñar modelos que contribuyan a dicha construcción; 2) las que analizan, valiéndose de tales instrumentos, la naturaleza semiótica de la marca, diferenciándola de otras entidades del mismo género y tratando de desvelar algo así como su «esencia»; y 3) las que, siguiendo la tradición de Roland Barthes y Jean Baudrillard entre otros, trascienden el punto de vista estrictamente semiótico con objeto de situar la naturaleza semiótica de la marca en el conjunto de la formación social donde esta actúa y desde el propósito de abarcar los efectos globales que se derivan de la misma.

¿Qué sucede con las investigaciones del primer grupo? Que sus aportaciones al conocimiento científico de la marca suelen ser escasas, lo cual no impide que su practicidad resulte cada vez más notoria, como lo evidencian los siempre más numerosos gabinetes especializados en semiótica de la marca que prestan sus servicios a las empresas en todo el mundo. ¿Qué sucede con las investigaciones pertenecientes al segundo grupo? Que, como es propio de todas las disciplinas especializadas, tienden a caer en un reduccionismo que genera de un modo prácticamente automático su cortejo de escuelas enfrentadas y de ortodoxias y heterodoxias, con el efecto de que su rendimiento científico sea igualmente cuestionable; mientras sus practicantes terminan por confluír en muchas ocasiones con los del primer grupo, tal y como ponen de relieve numerosos casos conocidos por todos. ¿Y cuál es el peligro que amenaza a las investigaciones del tercer grupo? Que su falta de adscripción a una determinada escuela, disciplina especializada u ortodoxia puede conducir a sus practicantes al amateurismo, en función de una cierta ingenuidad epistemológica que los caracteriza y que tiende a magnificar ante sus propios ojos sus descubrimientos. Pero, en el lado positivo, se trata, como ya he mencionado, de la única perspectiva capaz de situar la investigación semiótica en el contexto de la formación social donde esta actúa – como ya pusieron de relieve las aportaciones pioneras de Barthes (1957) y Baudrillard (1970) – y, por tanto, de *aplicar* dicha investigación a favor de un entendimiento de la sociedad en su conjunto. Pues bien: este es el punto de vista *sociosemiótico* que, más allá de lo que se entiende habitualmente por dicho término en el círculo de la disciplina que responde a dicha denominación, adopta la presente ponencia; prosiguiendo la línea de investigación que vengo sosteniendo desde hace años (Caro 2008, 2011a) y que parte de considerar la semiótica como la metodología más adecuada para desentrañar las *significaciones sociales* en las que plasman, como sabemos al menos desde la obra capital de Cornelius Castoriadis (1975), los imaginarios que todas y todos, sin ser conscientes de ello en la inmensa mayoría de los casos, compartimos y en virtud de los cuales nos socializamos.

¿De qué es signo la marca?

Pues bien, es desde esta perspectiva desde donde se plantea el título de la presente ponencia: *la marca como signo*. Porque, bien mirado, ¿de qué es signo la marca? Tal vez alguno de ustedes se pregunte: ¿dónde está el problema? Para responderme a continuación más o menos de la siguiente forma: la marca, en su sentido comercial u originario, es el signo del producto o servicio que constituye su objeto y al que significa. Y si queremos apoyar esta opinión con un argumento de autoridad, ahí está lo que uno de los *maîtres à penser* en semiótica de la marca, Andrea Semprini, escribe al respecto: «Nosotros hemos identificado ese sustrato esencial de la marca en su naturaleza semiótica, en su capacidad de conferir significado a los objetos, en su capacidad de construir mundos posibles y dotarlos de sentido» (Semprini, 1992: 223, subr. orig.). Pero ¿qué sucede con esta definición evidentemente ortodoxa y que, en principio, ningún investigador

especializado en semiótica de la marca se atrevería a poner en duda? En primer lugar, que parte de una proximidad entre objeto y significado – en mi opinión, y como planteé en mi tesis doctoral, habría que hablar con más propiedad de *significancia* (Caro, 2002) –; proximidad esta que se ha ido perdiendo con el tiempo. La definición de Semprini era, efectivamente, válida cuando la marca *seguía* al objeto que significaba – partiendo del antecedente óptico de este último – y lo dotaba de un determinado sentido con relación a un «mundo posible» – aunque coincido con Vanni Codeluppi en su crítica a este último concepto (Codeluppi, 2001: 30-33) – el cual venía a ser la expresión en el plano semiótico de aquel objeto. Pero ¿qué sucede cuando la marca se va alejando progresivamente del producto, para significar primero servicios, luego empresas y más tarde cualquier entidad, hasta el punto de que hoy se habla con entero desparpajo en mi país de *marca España* (de modo que la proximidad entre objeto y marca se va desvaneciendo conforme dicho objeto se va haciendo más abstracto)? Y más todavía, ¿qué sucede cuando, según una práctica cada vez más frecuente en el mundo del marketing, *la marca es concebida y diseñada antes que el producto* (de modo que este pasa a ser una especie de *añadido insustancial* que, por esta misma razón, puede ser fabricado en cualquier taller inmundo del *invisible* Bangladesh), con lo cual se rompe la relación tradicional existente entre objeto y marca? Y la respuesta es que, en este caso concreto, ya no puede hablarse de que la marca signifique a algo que ha pasado a ser la mera *expresión* o plasmación material del significado o significancia de la marca. Más bien habría que decir que *la marca se significa a sí misma*, mientras que sus constructores diseñan a posteriori el objeto material que mejor responde a esa significación previamente decidida. Ahora bien, como sabe cualquier experto en semiótica de la marca que trabaje en el ámbito del marketing, este es exactamente el camino que recorren en la actualidad la gran mayoría de las marcas de productos de gran consumo: primero se crea la marca inmaterial –es decir, se decide el *significado* o *significancia* que se considere más idóneo para tener éxito en el mercado – y luego se diseña un producto material que sea la expresión de aquel constructo semiótico. Y el resultado es que, para cualquier adolescente del mundo entero, las zapatillas Nike son definitivamente incomparables con las de cualquier otra marca, por mucho que sus características materiales sean prácticamente idénticas. Y cerca de mi domicilio en Madrid, en el Estadio Bernabéu, hay una tienda de productos deportivos donde niños y adultos se disputan el terreno con tal de adquirir una camiseta con el nombre de Cristiano Ronaldo, y no precisamente por la calidad del algodón de la susodicha prenda.

Así pues, el problema se plantea en la actualidad del siguiente modo: *la marca ya no se limita a significar un producto antecedente al que dota de significación, sino que ella constituye el verdadero objeto de la producción* –que es ahora primordialmente *producción semiótica* y no mera producción material (cf. Berardi, 2001; Caro, 2009 y 2011) – *y del que el producto es una especie de eco*. Y el problema adquiere su verdadera dimensión cuando sucede que *los mercados mundiales de productos de gran consumo están dominados en la actualidad por un conjunto limitado de marcas globales de las cuales los correspondientes productos constituyen su sustrato material*, cuya función consiste en hacer posible que a través de ellos *viva* la significación imaginaria de la respectiva marca. Con la secuela de toda una cohorte de *productos falsificados* que buscan su hueco en el mercado apropiándose de los signos que remiten a la significación imaginaria de la marca que imitan. Lo cual hace de tales productos falsificados la manifestación fehaciente de que la significación de la marca precede, en los mercados globalizados que vivimos, al objeto significado.

Ahora bien, si la marca solo se significa a sí misma en las condiciones del vigente capitalismo globalizado, la pregunta vuelve a plantearse: ¿de qué es signo la marca? Porque no nos vale la respuesta tautológica de que la marca se significa a sí misma. Y si planteamos la pregunta en términos sociosemióticos, la respuesta que encontramos es: *la marca significa* – en el sentido

más primario de la palabra significar, esto es, *señalar- la expropiación que la marca ha llevado a cabo del producto desde el momento en que éste se ha convertido en un epifenómeno de aquélla*. La marca nos indica en las condiciones actuales a nosotros, los consumidores, que cuando creemos estar eligiendo un producto en función de nuestras necesidades, en realidad lo que estamos haciendo es *adherirnos* a la *significación construida* con relación a la marca que marca al producto y que ha terminado por ocupar su lugar. No compramos, con arreglo a la lógica del sistema, unas zapatillas Nike con objeto de practicar el deporte al que en principio están destinadas. Compramos tales zapatillas para *significarnos* ante los demás en la medida que participamos del *imaginario* que Nike ha construido en torno a su marca y con objeto de experimentarnos a nosotros mismos como personas deportistas, proclamando ante quien quiera observarnos el hecho de estar *à la page*, de ser modernos, agresivos, espontáneos...Y así, en virtud de esta expropiación, *la marca ha ocupado por completo el lugar del producto*. Este pasa a ser un mero sucedáneo, una excusa para adherirnos a través de él al imaginario de la marca, a la significación imaginaria que se ha construido en torno a la misma como resultado de la producción semiótica desenvuelta en su caso.

De la semiótica de la marca al semiocapitalismo

Ahora bien, el hecho de que la marca haya expropiado al producto significa, pura y simplemente, que la marca – la significación imaginaria que se ha construido con relación a la misma – ha expropiado a su vez la relación del usuario-consumidor con sus necesidades, a través de la utilidad que los productos le proporcionan. Adiós, definitivamente, al *valor de uso*, tan exaltado por Marx y el marxismo en general, y del que Jean Baudrillard puso bien de relieve en su momento su dimensión cultural (Baudrillard, 1969). Nada de consideraciones de utilidad cuando se trata de reemplazar un *smartphone* por la sencilla razón de que un nuevo modelo ha eliminado el atributo de moda de que estaba revestido el modelo anterior. Se trata, repito una vez más, de significarnos a través de las marcas cuya significación ha expropiado a su vez al producto que está en su base en lo que éste tiene de utilidad o valor de uso. Y *exhibimos* ante los demás nuestro rutilante *smartphone*, no porque queramos proclamar nuestra cualidad de expertos en su uso, sino porque de esta manera nos sentimos significados a nosotros mismos por mediación del *mundo imaginario* construido en torno a la marca que ostenta el respectivo producto y cuyas cualidades materiales han pasado a ser un mero envoltorio. Y así, la expropiación del producto por la marca es también la expropiación de los consumidores de sus necesidades, cuya satisfacción depende estrictamente de la *utilidad* –ahora expropiada– de los productos.

¿Y a dónde conduce esta doble expropiación? La respuesta es bien sencilla: *la expropiación de la utilidad del producto por la significación imaginaria de la marca constituye el procedimiento por el que el capitalismo globalizado despoja o intenta despojar de sentido a nuestras actividades de consumo, replanteándolas como un mero instrumento al servicio de la valorización del capital*.

La diferencia que de ello resulta con relación a la situación precedente es clara: cuando la significación está entrañada, como antes sucedía, con la materia del producto, solo consumiremos aquello que contribuye a satisfacer nuestras necesidades. Cuando la significación, como sucede en la actualidad, antecede al producto y hace de éste un mero apéndice material para que se exhiba a través de él el mundo imaginario construido en torno a la marca, el individuo ha perdido cualquier dominio sobre sus actividades de consumo. Y estas pasan a ser el vehículo, en principio infalible, para que el capital trabaje para sí mismo. ¿En qué sentido? Transformando estos sencillos y aparentemente inofensivos actos de consumo que experimentamos a diario en otras tantas fuentes de valorización del capital, en virtud de esta doble expropiación a la que acabo de referirme: del producto por la marca y de las necesidades de los consumidores por las significaciones imaginarias construidas en torno a las marcas.

La conclusión que se desprende de todo lo anterior es lo que por mi parte denomino *capitalismo del signo/mercancía*, también conocido con el término de *semiocapitalismo*: un nuevo género de capitalismo cuyo centro lo ocupa la *producción semiótica* cuyo objeto es la marca – con el consiguiente desplazamiento de la producción material cuyo objeto es el producto – y cuya principal fuente de valorización ya no es el excedente de valor que generan los trabajadores en el seno del proceso productivo, sino la expropiación que lleva a cabo el capital en prácticamente cada acto de consumo cuando el valor de cada transacción, especialmente en el ámbito de los mercados de productos de gran consumo, se ve inflado por la *significación imaginaria* construida en torno a la marca.

Y desentrañar la lógica que preside este capitalismo del signo/mercancía o *semiocapitalismo* constituye, en mi opinión, la principal contribución que puede prestar a la sociedad una semiótica de la marca que trate de profundizar en sus raíces, ayudando así a la comprensión – y consiguiente transformación- de las sociedades capitalistas globalizadas que vivimos.

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SEMIÓTICA DE LA IRRADIACIÓN

Fernando R. Contreras
Universidad de Sevilla, España
fmedina@us.es

Pedro A. Hellín Ortuño
Universidad de Murcia, España
phellin@um.es

Abstract

Este estudio de la marca consiste en un análisis comparativo entre las tesis de los teóricos de la recepción estética y la nueva epistemología visual de la posmodernidad. Desde la perspectiva estética de la obra de arte al entrecruzamiento interdisciplinario entre la semiótica visual y la teoría del arte, la pintura o la imagen funcional irradia significados a partir de la lectura de un espectador activo en el tiempo. La comprensión de esta encrucijada entre la mirada del arte y la mirada del consumidor de marcas se asemeja a la diferencia entre la modernidad de Descartes y la posmodernidad de Heidegger. Mientras que la pintura moderna todavía permite pensar que la subjetividad parte del interior del individuo (“pienso, luego existo”), la visualidad de la marca sólo puede admitirse desde la relación entre el sujeto y el mundo (dasein). El espectador de la marca posee una conciencia que va más allá de sí mismo, y que ya no nace de la interioridad del sujeto. En la posmodernidad, existen cosas fuera de nosotros sobre las que el hombre se proyecta. No pensamos que están ahí y ahora sólo porque le atribuimos la categoría de existencia desde nuestra subjetividad. Nuestra tesis sobre la lógica de la creación de lo visual en la posmodernidad comienza en la intencionalidad. Fue Husserl quien pensaba que la conciencia es intencional. El hombre le pone intención a las cosas externas, incluidas las imágenes.

La marca depende de su realidad como cosa exterior, de su artefactualidad estética y de aquello con lo que responde a su espectador. El valor de la marca encaja con la idea existencial de que el hombre no es una realidad estática, sino una proyección en el futuro, es decir, una posibilidad. El discurso funcional de una marca ofrece al consumidor alcanzar cómodamente esa posibilidad de ser. Esta es la propuesta estética de la nueva epistemología visual, que acaba dividiendo el espíritu en dos circunscripciones, el materialista y el idealista. Literalmente Hans Robert Jaus

(en “Las transformaciones de lo moderno. Estudios sobre las etapas de la modernidad estética”) reconoce esta división a partir del debate de finales de siglo entre la crítica de la ideología, el problema del arte y la sociedad. En la posmodernidad, la marca todavía trabaja en el empeño hegeliano de comunicar lo divino con lo humano, lo espiritual con lo material. En nuestro caso, esto último se logra mediante la lógica mercantil del consumo. Lo imaginario se convierte en objetivo del mundo alienado, de la producción, de la industrialización aceptado desde su paulatina extrañeza a partir de su comunicación. En conclusión, la marca reúne en su creación una teoría de la realidad (su estructura), la complejidad de los juegos del lenguaje (cómo nos referimos y cómo la interpretamos) y una teoría epistémica, que nos enfrenta al modo que tenemos ahora de conocer nuestro mundo desde la significación de estos discursos. En esto consiste para nosotros, una semiótica de la irradiación.

Argumentación.

Habitamos un mundo fuera del mundo real creado de lenguaje, códigos, símbolos y textos. Nos preguntamos si realmente hemos abandonado ese logocentrismo cristiano que imperó durante la Edad Media; o dicho de otro modo, nos preguntamos cuando rompimos con la adoración a la palabra y lo que encerramos en ella. *Dios, Apple, Rolex, Libertad, Solidaridad, Socialismo, BMW, Oxford, Princeton, Harvard, The MIT, Coca-Cola, Chanel, Doce & Gabbana*, son algunos objetos de deseo del héroe de la ficción de la vida posmoderna vista desde una semiótica posestructuralista greimasiana. Los textos alcanzan otra categoría a su función original descriptiva e informativa. La ruptura filosófica provocada por Heidegger con la fenomenología de su maestro Edmond Husserl nos condujo al abismo de las expectativas del futuro, esperando cambiar la cosas para que lleguen otras a partir de un ciclo interminable de ruptura. Con la nivelación entre la esencia de las cosas y la ficción de las mismas cosas, Heidegger vira el sentido de la cultura contemporánea hacia el eclecticismo y el relativismo. No comprenderíamos la necesidad del estudio de los lenguajes funcionales¹ de nuestra cultura, si la filosofía contemporánea de Heidegger no hubiese insistido en el valor de las experiencias diarias que los hombres corrientes poseemos del mundo. En el núcleo de nuestro objeto de estudio, encontramos la pregunta sencilla de qué significa *ser*. Esta cuestión, pensada en la obra central del filósofo alemán, también se encuentra aquí, cuando hablamos de identidad; aunque sea la identidad marca de una empresa anónima en la que parece que construimos nuestra existencia. Tras la crisis de los metarrelatos, quedan sólo los escenarios vacuos de la sociedad industrial y del consumo para ser rellenados de reflexiones humanas. Así que crear identidades sobre los objetos de la producción industrial es una consecuencia que hemos afianzado en la era de la tecnología inteligente con cyborgs, cerebros artificiales e identidades virtuales.

Para Heidegger, no existe una esencia humana contenida, y el tiempo, es la única dimensión importante (a diferencia de Kant que sostenía que la humanidad evoluciona en tiempo y espacio). Eliminando el espacio, la esencia del ser consiste en “llegar a ser”. Curiosamente, no habría desacuerdo si pensamos que es la filosofía oculta de numerosos discursos políticos, publicitarios o sociales. Parece que en la publicidad contemporánea, o en otras producciones de ficción de nuestra era digital, nos referimos por ejemplo a los videojuegos, se encierra el debate sobre el destino del hombre, quizás de un modo más prosaico, pero no por ello, menos interesante.

En la superficie flotando en un mar sin esquinas, la creación o el interés baudelaireano de fundamentar una teoría racional e histórica de lo bello que reemplace la teoría opresiva de lo

¹ Consideramos lenguajes funcionales aquellos que desarrollan el sentido del hombre a través de los nuevos usos comunicativos de las competencias lingüísticas de los discursos sociales, incluido el discurso de la identidad o de la marca.

bello único y absoluto. No obstante, en las profundidades hallamos el éxito de las formas ciegas que triunfa en un cosmos arrollador que se expande y se desarrolla bajo un impulso irracional que nos empuja hacia el vacío nihilista. La creación contemporánea de formas artísticas o de la cultura de la industria, del consumo, de la masa o de lo *on demand*, gira entorno al recuerdo evocado, a la tradición recuperada, a la ruptura con un pasado canonizado, a la creatividad forzada en cualquier actividad humana, a la singularidad *ex nihilo*, a la imitación de la imitación, al plagio consentido, a la recreación en la hipertextualidad, a la traducción en la metatextualidad, a la interpretación en la paratextualidad, o finalmente, a la construcción en la intertextualidad mediante la cita o la alusión (Aparicio Maydeu 2013). Ya incluso el propio Schopenhauer escribía acerca de la angustia de un ciclo en el que todo se repite, todo vuelve, viviendo el padecimiento de las desgracias pasadas, de los mismos deseos y anhelos. Posteriormente, su más ferviente continuador Nietzsche, reconocía en su “eterno retorno” que no era solo un curso de infortunios, sino que el tiempo que regresa confinaba también alegrías y pasiones por la superación individual en la vida que logra perfeccionarnos (hasta alcanzar lo que él llamó el superhombre). Nietzsche legará a la posmodernidad una visión parcelaria de la verdad basada en nuestras competencias para la interpretación y la argumentación sobre el mundo. La verdad será a partir de este pensador, más un ejercicio del poder del lenguaje y de la comunicación, que permita dominar una perspectiva sobre otras.

Además también su influencia sobre nuestra cultura tiene una relevante referencia cuando Nietzsche conoce a Richard Wagner y cambia su concepción del arte como se observa en la filosofía de su obra “El origen de la tragedia”. Para Nietzsche existe un equilibrio entre dos fuerzas en toda representación; un principio apolíneo que rige las formas y la apariencia de las cosas y un principio dionisiaco que acopia la propia vida o la auténtica base de la realidad, además del mundo de las pasiones. Esta ordenación de la obra llegará a nuestra cultura contemporánea, cuyas formas artísticas inquirirán esta relación comunicativa del modo más provechoso para el éxito de la producción industrial en el mercado.

Hasta ahora hemos presentado varias reflexiones filosóficas que nos inducen a pensar la existencia de una fundamentación lógica para construir otras identidades diferentes a la nuestra. Nuestra tesis de la semiótica de la irradiación no puede avanzar si no pensamos en la confabulación de una clase dominante en la historia contemporánea empeñada en la creación de otras identidades alternativas a la propia. Ya demostró Fredric Jameson una dependencia entre la configuración de la cultura y el sistema económico capitalista en el mundo contemporáneo. Esta tesis sostenida por Jameson, nos permite entender que conocemos por identidad de un ser vivo o de una cosa, y su inexistencia fuera de nuestra cultura. Antes fue el verbo, la palabra que representaba la esencia del mundo o su lógica. Los límites del mundo estaban situados a principios del siglo pasado en los límites del lenguaje, es decir, de la lógica. No había en el universo algo que fuera ilógico. Así lo expuso con rotundidad el primer Wittgenstein. De este modo, la misma lógica puesta al servicio de aquello para lo se creó, para dominar el universo, se ha empleado para la construcción de la existencia de aquello que en otro tiempo no lo poseía. Y es que las cosas comienzan a tener existencia en la modernidad, como describía el filósofo austríaco, por la relación con otras cosas. Es decir, la marca o la identidad adquiere visibilidad desde que las estrategias comunicativas del mercado crean redes de conexión para dar sentido a lo que no lo tiene. No es necesario insistir que la inflación discursiva de la identidad diferencia entre sexos, animales y objetos. La cultura contemporánea ha exaltado los discursos de igualdad (entre sexos, razas, etnias) desde la crítica de la misma noción de identidad. Y asistimos a una nivelación de las identidades de lo humano y lo animal, desde un viraje antropocéntrico hacia un paradigma biocéntrico, que pone en el centro del mundo a la vida sin discriminación de su naturaleza.

Más allá, la identidad colectiva o la que en su función está la recreación de un grupo, tam-

bién abusa de las posibilidades lógicas de nuestro tiempo. Todo esto nos conduce a un mundo con agentes irradiadores de una multiplicidad de identidades en la que reconocemos el sentido de nuestra realidad. Es en esto, que Baudrillard acabará concluyendo que los objetos expresan otro sentido distinto a la razón por la que fueron creados. Los objetos significan en el hombre desde poder a sumisión, acaso de modo tan esperpéntico como poseer un coche grande y un coche pequeño. La vida humana, en la cultura posmoderna, se sostiene sobre el dilema de ser o tener, como escribía Erich Fromm. No obstante, en el mercado de las marcas y en su consumo, adquiere sentido el ser a través de las proyecciones sobre el futuro que la conciencia fanatiza sobre estos falsos trucos tramoyistas de la publicidad. Nuestro universo se organiza alrededor de identidades irradiadoras de un *publicismo* o de un idealismo irreverente venido tras la crisis del humanismo. En una sociedad con la lógica invertida, denunciada por Guy Debord², la virtualidad de las imágenes provoca la virtualidad de la realidad, dejando el mundo en proyecciones futuribles de “lo que va a ser”, como las que tiene un artesano en su mente antes de comenzar la realización de su vasija. La modernidad, como escribió Baudelaire (2013, p.22), “es lo transitorio, lo fugaz, lo contingente, la mitad del arte, cuya otra mitad es lo eterno e inmutable”. La marca crece en ese elemento transitorio, fugaz que se puede desechar y que llena de indefinición su bella virtualidad cargada de vano contrasentido y mojiganga moda.

En la posmodernidad, el arte extenuado del esfuerzo por liberarse de este sentido espeso parece lamentablemente bajo el yugo de una cultura visual democrática. La libertad del arte, es decir su politización, también transfiguró su esencia inmutable. Esa misma libertad política se revolvió en nuestra cultura contra el mismo dios Apolo inspirador de artistas, músicos y escritores, y la maquinaria de la industria trituró toda esperanza de recuperación del único reducto humanista de la posmodernidad. El arte mantenía todavía un aura de sacralidad que la preservaba de las torcidas pretensiones de un industrialismo reductor: “En vano la Fatuidad moderna enrojecerá, eructará las ventosidades de su rotunda persona, vomitará los sofismas indigestos con que la ha empapuzado la filosofía reciente: cae de maduro que la industria, al irrumpir en el arte, se vuelve su enemigo mortal, y que la confusión de funciones impide que ninguna se cumpla como es debido” (Baudelaire 2013, p.110). La imagen de la identidad es la exaltación de la racionalidad visual de la industria. Es el mismo ciclo de continuidad y ruptura que requiere el régimen de lo nuevo. A través de la razón, hacemos aparecer o desaparecer, descubrir o encubrir, mostrar u ocultar por el provecho. La imagen posmoderna de la identidad es la verdolaga de las marismas del sur, soportando las inundaciones de las mareas y las extremas condiciones de salinidad de la tierra fertiliza un paisaje sin altura, exiguo de color, de política áspera y menesteroso en su vida social, ya que es incapaz de ofrecer el auténtico sentido al hombre. El hombre marcado es enterrado en un jardín de mesmedades, donde apenas nace nada y en el que la sobrevivencia en ilusiones parece ser todo lo que podemos encontrar. La marca nunca ha supuesto una revolución, pero si ha virtualizado la evolución de los nuevos deseos. ¿Por qué no platicar un discurso serio de marca? Ya reconocíamos en nuestro trabajo (Contreras 2013), la ideologización del discurso publicitario (*el publicismo*) y de las competencias de concienciación que las estrategias comunicativas de la publicidad justa activan dentro de cada uno. Lo prominente es el lenguaje, y encontrar el mundo que nos llega a través de ese lenguaje, ya sea pictórico, publicitario, literario o periodístico. Apartando las específicas cualidades de los lenguajes que utilizamos diariamente con más o menos torpeza, lo relevante es el núcleo de estos lenguajes de carácter místico o secreto y que nos aproxima al mundo, como también nos permite el lenguaje

² Véase sobre esto nuestro trabajo Contreras, Fernando R. 2013, “La Cultura Errabunda: Arte, Publicidad y Posmodernidad”, en *Por uma Publicidade Livre Sempre* (pp. 124-143), Clotilde Perez e Eneus Trindade (org.), INMOD /ABP2, São Paulo.

de la marca (o el lenguaje específico de un área de la publicidad) que se convierte en reflejo del mundo, o así lo cree, a quien le alcanza su discurso y lo hace importante. Para ello, el lenguaje deja de ser una cuestión privativa, y se convierte en una actividad social que se desarrolla en la comunicación. Los lenguajes privados no significan, porque significar implica que otro comparte nuestro lenguaje, es decir, nuestro mundo. Por otro lado, es ilógico un lenguaje con significados privados que sólo lo entienda un ser. Así que el lenguaje sólo puede ser una actividad que desentrañe su sentido en un entorno social. En una colectividad puede generarse los juegos del lenguaje (lo llamaba Wittgenstein) cuando hablamos.

En la posmodernidad, la filosofía toma conciencia de su actividad reparadora de los trabazones que nos hacemos con el lenguaje y pierde su finalidad milenaria de indagar sobre los misterios de lo absoluto y las esencias ocultas del universo. Esos enredos de los hombres con el lenguaje son causados por las recreaciones que las distintas comunidades producen cuando comparten sus visiones del mundo. Lo social se estructura alrededor de grupos con una misma perspectiva de la realidad. De este modo, podemos ver la marca como la sustancialidad de algunos grupos alrededor de sus perspectivas del mundo, compartiendo un mismo lenguaje real que es descubierto por el nuevo ingeniero humanista de la comunicación publicitaria. En nuestra cultura sólo adquieren valor los lenguajes reales, los que utilizamos a diario en nuestros juegos de intercambio de símbolos.

Estos lenguajes funcionales, como el que aquí nos ocupa, son los escenarios de las nuevas ideas (los nuevos nudos de la filosofía). La misma marca en el discurso publicitario tenemos que comprenderla no sólo como representaciones de hechos del mundo, sino que también sirven para mostrar nuestros deseos, anhelos, esperanzas e incluso, nuestras continuas preguntas. Las marcas no deben reducirse a su función comunicativa, informativa o descriptiva. El uso semiótico que hacemos de la marca es estudiar una forma de vida social. Comprender su discurso es pensar un juego del lenguaje que abarca también las distintas relaciones interpersonales que se dan en la comunidad.

Todos sabemos que la construcción de una marca, entiéndase de la identidad, no es un juego del lenguaje de lo absoluto, como bien podría pretender un artista o un filósofo, sino más bien un lenguaje de lo ordinario, que es donde ahora encarnamos los acontecimientos reales. En este sentido, la comunicación se hizo objeto de la filosofía desde Wittgenstein a Habermas, en su obra "Teoría de la Acción Comunicativa". Con ellos, la filosofía abandona su empeño de ser doctrina y adquiere la categoría de actividad y vigila las distintas concepciones derivadas de lo público.

Hacia una conclusión inconclusa.

Mientras que las ciencias sociales parecen ocuparse de la descripción y del conocimiento de la realidad extralingüística, consideramos que la semiótica contemporánea debe ocuparse del lenguaje, especialmente de los lenguajes funcionales que irradian el sentido como uso. No es original nuestra tesis, es la misma concepción de la filosofía del segundo Wittgenstein³, pero

³ El segundo Wittgenstein rompe con el paradigma referencial de la significación. Ésta ocupa el corazón mismo del *Tractatus* y reina, como es evidente, en el positivismo lógico. Pero también vale para el idealismo que asimila la significación a un objeto ideal (un universal) que el pensamiento aprehende y que la palabra expresa. Desde este punto de vista no hay prácticamente diferencias entre Platón, Descartes, Husserl, Frege o Carnap: todos anclan la significación en una relación que refiere los elementos del lenguaje a elementos no verbales estables y que el hombre es capaz de aprehender. Desde la primera página, las *Investigaciones filosóficas* denuncian esta concepción, que no sólo cultiva la filosofía, sino también el sentido común. La significación no depende de la referencia, ni, menos aún, es la referencia. El sentido de una expresión depende por completo de su uso, que *eventualmente* puede ser un uso referencial, es decir, que apunte a designar una cosa o un acontecimiento extralingüístico. (Hottois 1999, p. 341)

acomodado a nuestro caso.

El uso de los lenguajes funcionales nos permitirá comprender las nuevas realidades humanas, como es fácilmente observable en las manifestaciones artísticas de finales del siglo pasado. El arte se ha politizado⁴, adquiriendo otro valor distinto en la posmodernidad a través de su uso para otra finalidad, en la denuncia social y política. Los lenguajes funcionales de la posmodernidad, como es el caso que estudiamos, conquistan el sentido común a través de las irradiaciones generadas por su utilización. La actividad con estos lenguajes está basada en la mutabilidad de la referencia y en un contexto de relativismo epistémico. Con ello no se logra tanto la enunciación de “proposiciones” como la interpretación abierta de “proposiciones”. Podremos sostener esta tesis siempre que aceptemos que no existen referencias transcendentales, ni lenguajes transcendentales, sólo tenemos juegos del lenguaje, de los cuales no hay ninguno que sobresalga privilegiado.

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⁴ Ya tratamos esta cuestión en Contreras (2013).

BRANDOLOGY – NEW GENERATION OF MARKET(ING) KNOWLEDGE

Dimitar Trendafilov, PhD

Assist. prof. at New Bulgarian University – Sofia
trendafilov.dim@gmail.com, dtrendafilov@nbu.bg

Abstract

The paper argues for the need, at least theoretical, of “brandology” as detached knowledge in the marketing field. The idea is based on the observations and research in brand management practice in recent years which have demonstrated the increasing social life of brands, especially those with high level of brand equity. What is knowledge as a whole, scientific method and discipline is discussed, in the first place, and what are the advantages of brand knowledge, in the second. Together with distinguishing marketing and branding, semiotics is introduced as powerful enough tool in branding and brand equity’s examination and explanation. The “angel share” is an analogy suggested for better understanding the brand as social phenomenon. Finally, some suggestions are made for further development on how this “discipline” ought to be taught before the students, in order to create better understanding about the brand “nature”, and which looks at culture, marketing communications as well as social and consuming practices from different perspective. It needs intensive project-based and on-field research educational approach, counting on social and cultural studies more than on the conventional business, profit-based thinking.

1 INTRODUCTION

The brand discourse exceeded the corporations’ boardrooms and business schools auditoria about late 80’s or early 90’s and entered the agenda of sociology, anthropology, linguistics and media studies. This fact demonstrates two fundamental issues – first, brands are not discussion topic only for marketers any more, since obviously it is rather **a socio-cultural phenomenon** than strictly commercial one, and, second, at the same time marketers and the new generation

of managers should be ten times more careful for and much more prepared dealing with the brand matter than they have been ever before.

What is more, this paper claims that brand as a communication format and branding as real business activities are quite important for achieving success in contemporary complicated business conditions, dominated by globalization, intensified communications and strong consumer influence (Arvidsson 2006). Also, since brand is a core of greatly interdisciplinary realm there is a real need for science dedicated exclusively to it which we could simply name “*brandology*”. This is neither newly born buzz nor yet convenient academic mix of management, modern social media theories and applied semiotics. Rather it is something more and different. Thus, despite of its a little bit pretentious “-ology” ending, such a science or at least ‘discipline’ deserves more attention because it offers different knowledge beyond the sum of the well-known marketing and communication theories that have been involved in the topic so far. So, above all I’d like to avoid any misapprehensions since my goal is not to invent another “fancy” word including with “-ology”. My only claim is that as a discipline “brandology” has already existed no matter what name or tag we are trying to put on it and the paper is dedicated to short – and hopefully convincing – argumentation in this direction. In last 20-30 years market researchers, marketers and scholars in various areas have been approaching the topic step by step and from different perspectives and have been arriving to some crucial common conclusions about a brand. For instance, it is a phenomenon with commercial roots but with social crown – with all positive and negative effects which it has brought (Klein 2000, Chevalier and Mazzalovo 2004, Lury 2004, Arvidsson 2006, Manning 2010).

2 “BRAND” AND “BRANDING”.

This paper was inspired by the experience I have had so far in teaching and researching different topics in the realm of brand and branding in the light of marketing management, communication and social studies and last but not last – semiotics. As a lecturer I have asked myself a couple of times which element of the marketing mix actually brand has arisen from? I have had no plain answer to that question yet and I suppose that no one has succeeded to respond accurately where is the origin of the brand in terms of the well-known mix, but only more P’s have to be included in the equation in search for a reasonable explanation.

Where actually brand came from? Classical marketing theory can’t answer this question easily. Historically brand is highly bonded up with Product since, first and foremost, a brand should stand **on** something and, secondly, **for** something. Properly speaking, communication in the broad sense (i.e. not only in terms of Promotion, but Placement, which organizes points-of-contact, and Price, which most often is a tool for quality indication) is what fills up the simple “name” with associations, motivation, images, and eventually added value. Hence, brands speak to us and we speak to and through them in an endless and intensive process. Consumer culture, in fact, supported by global media and growing trade connections worldwide, provided the infrastructure needed for the “brandelution” that burst approximately in late 80’s.




Fig.1 – Brand Points-of-Performance both virtual and physical (Author: D.T.)

The definition of “brand” and “branding” made by the reputable American Marketing Association is: “A brand is a customer experience represented by a collection of images and ideas; often, it refers to a symbol such as a name, logo, slogan, and design scheme. Brand recognition and other reactions are created by the accumulation of experiences with the specific product or service, both directly relating to its use, and through the influence of advertising, design, and media commentary.” (AMA 2014). Hence, the contemporary notion encompasses brand as a concept, the aggregation of virtual and real contact with it, and the crucial role of media (fig. 1). But put in semiotic terms, we are talking about a collection or combination of signs and intensive symbolic exchange (Mick 1986) that presents brand in several dimensions as follows:

- Business format (managerial strategic approach to the segment/s and competition).
- Product (attributes, benefits, innovations).
- Medium (something to speak for, company’s communication platform).
- Cultural leader (communities, symbolism, rituals, values).
- Social mediator (identification, events, interpersonal messages).
- Experience provider (as usually including all the dimensions just listed).

From top to bottom consumers have at their disposal more and more ways to “meet” brands and to decide their fates by participation both in their production process and social life. The more communication means the more consumption of signs, images, myths, lifestyles, etc. (see fig.1 and 2).

3 BRAND KNOWLEDGE IS ON THE STAGE.

Let us continue with what is available in the students’ most favourite source of knowledge and wisdom – Wikipedia. It says that “science” (Latin: “scientia”) literally means “knowledge” and it is a systematic enterprise that builds and organizes knowledge in the form of testable explanations and predictions about the universe. In an older and closely related meaning, “science” also refers to a body of knowledge itself, of the type that can be rationally explained and reliably applied (Wiki 2014b; see also Polanyi 1946). A “discipline” (or specialism), on its turn, is knowledge or a concentration in one academic field of study or profession. A discipline incorporates expertise, people, projects, communities, challenges, studies, inquiry, and research areas that are strongly associated with academic areas of study or areas of professional practice. An academic

discipline, or field of study, is a branch of knowledge that is taught and researched at the college or university level. They tend to co-evolve with systems of professions. These may be said to have the knowledge and the privilege of authorizing new learnings in particular disciplinary areas. For example, the branches of science are commonly referred to as the scientific disciplines (Wiki 2014a).

The scientific method yet is a body of techniques for investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous knowledge. To be termed “scientific”, a method of inquiry must be based on empirical and measurable evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning (Wiki 2014d).

Kevin Keller’s explanation provides important but from the inside outwards point of view: “From the perspective of the CBBE model, brand knowledge is the key to creating brand equity, because it creates the differential effect that drives brand equity. What marketers need, then, is an insightful way to represent how brand knowledge exists in consumer memory” (Keller *et al.* 2012: 58). Just like it, brand equity is the mystic result of active, consistent and marketing efforts which every quarter or just a year (Aaker 1991 and 1996, Keller *et al.* 2012). Each management should invest some tangible capital in order to receive intangible power in the consumers mind as high level of awareness, preference and commitment. Thus, “equity” turns to be the share of market, mind and wallet which the consumer gives to particular brand but, paradoxically enough, just to take his/her share from it. In this case it is not strange that managers can’t sleep realizing that they don’t really own their brands (Bullmore 2001).

In the first place, manager has to have knowledge on brand on his/her part, in order to be able to create brand equity (as a knowledge for given brand) as a specific relation with consumers. Prof. Keller’s definition and bulk of examples he gives are highly useful to understand how brand equity (i.e. inimitable value of particular brand) could work successfully, considering consumer’s psychological and economical characteristics, but not what is it “by nature”. The management perspective is at least as much important as the consumer’s one, thus, the statement is that semiotics was the key that opened the gates for new knowledge on brand and branding. The real power of science is in examining the objects and phenomena in various points of view and to fix objective laws. Semiotics is known with its focus on sign systems, their social use and life (precisely) as well as on knowledge creation and sharing. Since it maintains that we are not able to know our world without signs mediation, consequently, it is natural semiotics to be powerful and useful enough tool helping managers to understand and control their brand in better way (Mick 1986).




Fig.2 – “Meaning” should be considered as “producing/perceived coordinated-meaning”, i.e. meaning as “process”, since it is not fixed and needs context and interpretation in action. The diagram maps the levels of brand meaning generation in current business and communication environment (Author – D.T).

Brand meaning definitely means “Consumer Based Brand Equity” (Keller *et al.* 2012). Everything **valuable** in life and in market is **meaningful** in one way or another, personally or socially, and this principle is in force especially for consumer-oriented brands, no matter in which sector (FMCG, luxury, sports goods etc.) they usually operate (see Mick and Oswald 2006, Batey 2008). Nigel Piercy calls our attention to the important insight that in contemporary markets traditional brand-based marketing that has been stressing the image but not the value for its consumers, actually, has been losing the loyalty of the upcoming wave of more sophisticated consumers who look for constant improvement in the things that matter for them (2009: 110 ff).

Meaning gives one stable reason to consumer to buy many times, to prefer given brand, to have positive attitude, to seek and to share information and his/her interest/s with other consumers (fig. 2). As Mark Batey puts it in his very prominent work, meaning “refers to the semantic and symbolic features of the brand, the sum of the fundamental conscious and unconscious elements that compose the consumer’s mental representation of the brand” (2008: 111 ff). In other words, brand is multidimensional entity (again) since it embraces public and personal, rational and emotional, prominent and hidden layers but somehow consistent. Just like our brain which reflects and tidy up the experience we have every day.

4 WHAT BRAND SEMIOTICS ACTUALLY STUDIES?

Russian semiotician Yuri Lotman wrote that analogy is far for being just a figure of speech but a useful scientific method which allow us to draw out the deepest specificities and characteristics of the object under study (usually by making appropriate parallel). This tool allows us to use the familiar notion or notions to construct newly born and/or unfamiliar object or phenomenon which probably could not be cognoscible by any other way. Analogy, therefore, is a highly semiotic process presupposing serious cognitive responsibility. So, what analogy we could apply for describing and underling “brand equity” features in terms of brand semiotics? If we imagine market as a cellar full with brands put in barrels, then, brand semiotics studies the “angel’s share”. This describes the phenomena of waste of about 2% of alcohol because of the evaporation process during the maturation period, which wine and whiskey industries experience every year. But this process also makes them of high quality, if only does not turn them in vinegar, instead.

In this perspective brand equity is neither a company’s property nor shareholders’, but stakeholders’. But don’t get this wrong though! In fact, there are no “angels” in the market and semiotics deals with real people but they are true angels that make our brand/s strong and resisting against the competition despite of all their whims and continuously changing moods. The “spirit” our brand/s lose/s from its/their products year after year transforms itself in spirit (“human” as Kotler *et al.* put it, 2010), displaying itself in a form of loyalty and commitment that constructs meaningful/long-lasting brand/s.

Could be helpful with respect both with every single element or act of brand/ing and with the whole entity (i.e. single sign and entire sign system of a given brand) (fig. 2). Nowadays a brand is loaded with more symbols – social, cultural and personal, it is the new dominant entity in supply side since in most cases it is the only bearer of added value promises and messages for shared values (Mick and Oswald 2006). That’s why it is not accidental that brand’s special feature of bearing information makes it central object of semiotic analysis. In her efforts to explain such a market and social phenomena, Marcela Cimatti point out that brand is “a transport vehicle by which product – and the aspects it embraces – takes a dynamic and emotional place in the everyday life of the mass consumption in the context of his/her system of socio-cultural values” (2006: 3). In her opinion, the meaning a brand has in the consumer’s mind is its image that is a mental picture of multitude impressions, a complex notion which includes certain myths (semi-truths that highly stimulate communication with given brand), fictions (an elaboration of the

image by means of made-up fact and stories) and dreams (personal desires and quests that lead consumer in its behavior).

The multisided substance of brand as a sign system, build by many other existing sign systems available for consumers, presupposes that it could be examine in various levels and from different perspectives. As reputable authors in brand semiotics like Laura Oswald and Giampaolo Fabris assert, various interdependent structures provide a basis of the brand discourse (Oswald 2012: 50-51; Fabris and Minestrone 2004: 135). These structures even form a certain hierarchy because sense perception of a given brand presupposes **material** dimension availability either only in form of signs composing the brand visual identity (logo, type, colors, distinctive package and other elements) or in other kinds of artifacts as advertisements, images, styles, shapes, etc. Further, there is **convention**, i.e. the code system which represents the established socio-cultural rules, norms and traditions, by which brand meaning could be comprehended, shared and distributed among consumers. Hence, in terms of research, a brand is a subject of semiotic deconstruction. In other words, semiotic could be seen as meta-language (description/deconstruction) of brand and branding activities which goes beyond the usual market/ing discourse.

5 BRAND KNOWLEDGE IN EDUCATION PRACTICE.

Part of the argumentation here is in making some suggestions. Therefore, I'll be trying to put brandology, semiotics included, in the today's education agenda. Bearing in mind all what has been said so far, new look on the topic and new approach in teaching in branding and brand management should be adopt, no matter if we consider higher education or companies' inner training, which in most of the Western economies has already been in practice to a certain extend. Branding, in the first place, should be considered as another/next/new level of doing marketing at least because of the era of the consumer dominance, quest for authenticity, shorter product life cycle and power of the social media (Kotler *et al.* 2010; Keller *et al.* 2012; Piercy 2009). Product itself is just a platform for starting relationship between producer and consumer, image exceeds function, traditional advertising is not as powerful as it was, brand communities are reality, experience is a base of the developed economies but not only a tool in marketing, and so on and so forth. All these make classical business and marketing education to look out of date (even though still unavoidable, I'm sure about that) but in order to make the next step the education system needs wider, interdisciplinary approach leading student in the heterogeneous and complex sources of human-based and culturally determined brand equity (Batey 2008; Keller *et al.* 2012).

More knowledge in humanities, cultural and social sciences should be put in management courses' curricula to enrich and widen the market picture in branding. Moreover, a lot of people overlook the fact that, by its very essence, markets are culturally constructed and marketing is not a mathematical but social discipline, dealing with resources/products allocation (put simply). Also, case studies, especially cross-cultural and consumer behaviour, could make the matter more clear and human-oriented than tables and figures actually do.

6 CONCLUSION.

The inspiration behind this paper is my practice in last 5-6 years teaching brand management as well as researching opportunities that semiotics has been giving and possibly would give to the marketers and market researchers. But as it appears, semiotics is still far from the boardrooms and managers mindset. This situation could be corrected by introducing it more persistently into the business and marketing education curriculum. Contemporary students in the disciplines in question and a lot of actual managers are in fact maimed because of the lack of knowledge in social science and humanities. However, brands should be brought back to

the people who eventually put meaning in them and in such a way they make brands valuable and successful. Having in mind that brand is a non-material, socio-culture entity which lives because of creating and sharing meaning among the consumers, we could easily point out the need of detached knowledge on brand, on the one hand, and the role of semiotics in it, on the other (Mick 1986, Mick and Oswald 2006, Piercy 2009: 83). Brand knowledge itself covers all the requirements put in the notion of “knowledge”, since it offers new knowledge and integrates (and corrects) the previous one, gives different perspectives for market researcher as well as new/fresh explanations and predictions, it represents and connects particular academic and professional field (brand building and management), and, finally, provides for a wider audience theoretical and practical understanding of a given subject. In this context we should remind that in conjunction with semiotics brand knowledge discusses and addresses the future more than the present (trends observation, meaning management, ads pre-testing, etc.).

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POSICIONAMIENTO VISUAL EN EL CONTEXTO DE UNA ECONOMÍA GLOBAL- LOCAL: EL CASO DE LOS BANCOS EN CHILE

Erika Cortés Bazaes
Universidad Autónoma de Chile
eacortes2005@gmail.com

Resumen

Según la teoría semiótica publicitaria clásica (George Péninou: “Semiótica de la Publicidad”, Ed. Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1976: 99) el posicionamiento es referido a los procesos de identificación, que significa la denominación, el nombre propio; y los procesos de predicación que consisten en darle un carácter, una personalidad al producto. La denominación remite al reconocimiento o notoriedad de la marca, y la predicación a la imagen de ella. Estos procesos deben ser distintivos, diferentes a la competencia, y se plantean en un plano visual como lingüístico. La producción de estos procesos operan a nivel de la visualización y de las estructuras simbólicas, independientemente de donde situemos lo simbólico, ya sea como un nivel de estructura profunda (o nivel axiológico), como Andrea Semprini (“Marche e Mondi Possibili”, Ed. FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1993) o como un nivel situado en varios niveles sin hegemonía, el proceso adquiere una complejización en el marco de la distintividad del posicionamiento, pues los mercados globales se ligan a la memoria histórica de archivos mentales visuales distintivos de los mercados locales, configurándose, entonces, un desafío analítico a las teorías clásicas del posicionamiento visual. En mi comunicación expondré el caso del posicionamiento visual de los bancos, describiendo los procesos de posicionamientos imaginarios y/o simbólicos construidos antes de la globalización económica plena de la realidad chilena, y los actuales, en función de poder enfrentar los nuevos desafíos del posicionamiento hoy.

1. Introducción

El objetivo de la comunicación es describir el caso del posicionamiento visual de los bancos, describiendo los procesos de posicionamiento imaginarios y/o simbólicos (Metz (1979),

Aumont (1987), Kristeva (1974), González-Ortiz (1999), Lacan (1973)) construidos antes de la globalización económica plena de la realidad chilena, y los actuales.

2. Consideraciones Teóricas

Ya la primera semiótica de la publicidad (Péninou, 1972–1976) describía la organización distintiva del discurso publicitario como la organización de dos grandes ejes: la identidad (nombre) y una predicación ligada a dicha identidad (atributo). Péninou establecía tipos de predicación: la sola exposición del producto, la implicación a través de una persona (o fragmentos de ella), y la atribución de un valor o predicación propiamente tal (esencia, metáfora, sinécdoque, y metonimia).

Obviamente que los protocolos descriptivos de Péninou correspondían a la descripción de una época, la que ha variado significativamente, tal como lo describe Calabrese (1994), la estética postmoderna o neobarroca no corresponde a la realidad delimitada por Péninou, baste decir que la publicidad imaginaria no existía.

Floch (1995) plantea la existencia de dos tipos de construcciones de identidades visuales: la tradicional, basada en un solo principio central creativo, y la emergencia de identidades visuales que se construyen como un bricoleur que cristalizan varios principios. Del Villar (1997, 2004, 2012) en la misma línea plantea, al interior de una pragmática semiótica publicitaria, la necesidad de un posicionamiento plural, lo que iría en correlación con la hipersegmentación de los consumidores pues habría que implicar a varios a la vez. De allí, la construcción teórica de un posicionamiento plural que interconecta dicho concepto con el saber de las ciencias cognitivas, en sus corrientes más actuales, conexionistas y enactivas, planteadas por Francisco Varela (1992, 1996, 2004). Se detecta que la cognición opera desde la memoria visual de los consumidores: el cerebro no puede captar la totalidad de lo real, sólo el 20% de lo que nuestros ojos perciben es real, el 80% es construido a partir de la experiencia previa, de la realidad no puedo retener más que seis o siete dígitos, una frase; etc. Más información borra lo detectado, luego debo abstraer: conceptual/visual/musical, donde opera nuestra propia memoria sociocultural, como ordenador. Investigadores contemporáneos agregan nuevos descriptores a los ejes precedentes. Jesús González y Amaya Ortiz (1999), establecen siguiendo, en definitiva, a Metz, Kristeva y Aumont, dos tipos de atribución de una predicación: su grado cero, donde no se argumenta, y el spot es el todo de lo que se ofrece, es lo que los autores citados llaman “publicidad seductora”, y que corresponde al imaginario teorizado por Lacan; y la “publicidad retórica”, donde el nudo sería la argumentación lógica, la propiamente predicación, el establecimiento de una atribución de valor al producto, sería la descripción realizada por Péninou hace más de 30 años; y correspondería a lo que Lacan, Metz, Kristeva y Aumont llamaron información y/o identificación simbólica, e incluso el producto puede asumir un rol, leíble por el Modelo Actancial de Greimas (Greimas, Cortés, 1979:3–5). En la publicidad seductora el producto no es un deseo de objeto (a) es la ensoñación misma.

Esto es, existen varias vías en el desarrollo de un posicionamiento publicitario (retórico/imaginario; único/plural); pero, siempre se trata de reiterar una imagen del producto distintiva, tanto a nivel de su denominación, como a nivel de la predicación ligada a dicha identidad, y ese posicionamiento debe ser distintivo, diferente a la competencia, por lo cual, incluso sea único o plural, imaginario (seductor) o retórico (simbólico) debe tener una coherencia, para que el producto tenga una imagen (una posición) en la mente de los consumidores, una distintividad y es ella la que debe reiterarse, y la que debe manifestarse coherentemente en la totalidad de los múltiples soportes en qué consiste la campaña.

La necesidad de la coherencia de múltiples soportes, desde el punto de vista de la galaxia significativa que instauran, es una necesidad en publicidad pues lo que sabemos de la cognición es

que el proceso interpretativo ocurre en un 80% en la memoria sociocultural, luego es primordial que aunque la imagen visual sea compleja, ella debe mantener su coherencia por su reiterar los mismos principios que la constituyen. Un ejemplo de una práctica analítica semiótica en esa línea ha sido dada por Cortés, Erika (2004; 2005) aplicada al posicionamiento visual de Telediaros, Diarios, Revistas, Grandes Tiendas, y Bancos.

3. Análisis del Posicionamiento Visual de los Bancos entre 1998 y 2002

3.1. Logos, Imagen de los Locales, y Distintividad.



Gráfica 1: Logos Bancos al 2003.

Es evidente, según el saber acumulado tanto de la semiótica (el sentido no es dado por un elemento sino que por la relación con todos los otros) como de las ciencias cognitivas conexionistas y enactivas (no se interpreta aisladamente un fragmento de lo real sino que en conexiones múltiples con todo el saber desarrollado en la historia de vida sociocultural) que no se interpreta un logo aislado sino que en función de todos los otros logos, incluida la competencia y la memoria existente respecto al producto. Un ejemplo del rol de la memoria visual histórica con que se interpretan afiches y spot es dado en el análisis de la campaña publicitaria de Michelle Bachelet en el 2005 (Del Villar, R. 2012: 301–316).

Luego, si analizamos los logos y su distintividad no es para pensar que en si mismos sean distintivos y ese sea todo el problema semiótico publicitario al respecto, sino que más bien, plantear si lo son o no es un grano de arena para poder ver qué relación tienen con todo el posicionamiento visual del banco en cuestión.

En ese contexto, de los logos de los bancos del 2003 es posible deducir que 3 tienen los mismos colores azules corporativos, y su mismo brillo y saturación de color: Banco de Chile, Banco Bice y Banco BHIF- BBVA, en la primera línea de la gráfica 1. Y respecto al tratamiento de las le-

tras sólo es distintivo el tipo de letra de Banco de Chile, opuesto a la letra usada en BBVA-BHIF y BICE, por lo que podemos detectar una no diferenciabilidad clara entre los dos bancos BBVA y BICE, lo que es distintivo a los tres bancos que utilizan logos azules es la letra de Banco de Chile.

Por otra parte, el frontis de los locales de los bancos referidos son azules el Banco de Chile y BBVA, BICE inserta al Azul el Gris, lo que complejiza la distintividad.

Los logos de la segunda línea de la Gráfica 1 tampoco son claramente diferentes según el tratamiento del color, emplean el Banco Boston y el Banco Edwards el verde turquesa, aunque se diferencian por el lugar asignado al verde (mayor en Edwards y en Boston no hegemónico y combinado con azul), y la mayor saturación del Banco Edwards.

Sin embargo si analizamos el frontis de los locales, tanto Boston como Edwards son Verde.

En la misma segunda línea de la Gráfica No 1 vemos el Logo de Banco del Desarrollo y Banco BCI, ambos con cromas grises. Sin embargo, son distintivos pues el Banco del Desarrollo es hegemónicamente gris con azul y el BCI inserta Azul Oscuro Amarillo y Rojo, lo que los hace diferente. Debemos decir, que a nivel del Frontis del local, ambos son Grises.

También es gris los Frontis de los locales Citibank. Hay entre 1978 y el 2002 dos logos de Citibank, como se observa en la tercera línea de la Gráfica 1. El primero con cromas próximos a Banco de Chile, BICE y BBVA, en azul oscuro y desde 2002 cambia la tipografía y el tono del azul, alejándose de ellos, y aproximándose más al gris de su frontis.

Observando la cuarta línea de la Gráfica No 1, vemos dos Logos del Banco Sudamericano, usados indistintamente y el de CorpBanca, ambos azul con amarillo muy saturado. La diferencia está en la figura desarrollada por el tratamiento lineal del barco del Banco Sudamericano, y las Banderas que se insertan en el frontis del Local de CorpBanca, que tiene la misma imagen del logo. Luego, hay una clara distintividad entre ambos.

Si nos detenemos en la quinta línea del Gráfico No 1, vemos la presencia fuerte del Rojo en tres bancos: En Banco del Estado de Chile, el fondo es rojo; en Santander la figura de la llama es roja, y el fondo negro, y las letras blancas. El Banco Santander es de frontis rojo en sus locales, y el Banco del Estado de Chile también. El Banco de Santiago es gris con un leve matiz a verde en su Frontis, sus letras son grises, pero inserta una imagen roja.

De partida no hay distintividad cromática radical reconocible respecto a los colores de los logos, como si sucedía en el caso de las Grandes Tiendas en el mismo período del año 2002, donde se detecta una diferenciabilidad cromática radical: Falabella Verde/París Azul/Ripley Negro/La Polar Azul-Rojo. Logo e Imagen del Local de las Grandes Tiendas se correspondía, no así sus sitios Web y Afiches. (Cortés, E. 2004).

Según la Superintendencia de Bancos Chilena, en 1998, los bancos más importantes eran en esa fecha: Santiago, Santander, Estado, Chile, Citibank, BHIF, Edwards, BCI, Sudamericano y Corpbanca, bancos que son objeto de este estudio. No se estudiaron: Chase Manhattan Bank, HSC (ex Banco de New York), Banco Sudameris, Banco Internacional, Banco Security, Banco do Brasil, Banco Dresden, y Banco de Tokio.

Los bancos estudiados del 2003 son distintivos, lo que es dado por el tratamiento cromático (cromas, combinación de cromas, saturación y brillo), el tratamiento de las líneas conducentes a figuras (como el barco, como la llama, etc.) y el tratamiento de la tipografía. Incluso es evidente la diferencia Banco Chile/Banco Edwards/Banco Estado de Chile/Sudamericano/Corpbanca/Santander.

Sin embargo, como decíamos la distintividad no es sólo el logo en si mismo, sino cómo se relaciona con los otros soportes, en este nivel de análisis, lo relacionaremos al frontis de cada uno de sus locales. Debemos decir que para cada banco sus frontis de cada uno de sus locales son similares. Si insertamos la imagen del "local" manifestado en sus frontis, la distintividad clara de los logos se atenúa. Son azules BBVA-BHIF y Banco de Chile. Son verdes Boston, Edwards.

Son grises BCI, Banco del Desarrollo y Banco de Santiago. Al tener “imagen del local similar”, la diferencia radica en el Logo, y es ahí, donde BBVA-BHIF y Banco Chile se aproximan, como Boston a Edward, la diferencia es el tipo de letra del Logo. Luego, para un paseante urbano que busca desde lejos a su banco, Boston- Edwards-BBVA (BHIF)- Chile, tal como lo son BICE-BCI-Citybank. Banco Santiago es un croma gris en una mezcla con verde tenue. Luego, la regla es acercarse, y poder leer el Logo para tener acceso a la distintividad, como decíamos situación distinta a la de los logos e imagen del local que son distintivas en las grandes tiendas.

Por otra parte, en la economía chilena del 2003, se desarrolla ya una inserción a una economía global a nivel del capital financiero, lo que se deja ver en dos casos: Banco BHIF es comprado por BBVV, coincidiendo los campos cromáticos de ambas instituciones, y al mismo tiempo Banco Sudamericano es comprado por Scotiabank, que nivel corporativo tiene el color rojo, lo que implica acercarse a Santander, y hacer desaparecer la identidad del Banco Sudamericano. También se desarrolla un cambio en el posicionamiento del Banco del Estado, cambia su posicionamiento de un banco de ayuda a los pequeños empresarios y el único de cobertura nacional en pequeñas ciudades al de ser un banco moderno, tan competitivo y eficiente como los otros.

Para seguir el análisis se hace necesario insertar todos los otros soportes vehiculizadores del posicionamiento visual de cada banco, concretamente el sitio web, para describir el tipo de posicionamiento y su coherencia.

3.2. Logos, Imagen del Local, y Web.

3.2.1. Banco de Chile

Hay una correspondencia entre el logo del banco, la imagen de los locales, y la construcción de la página web desde el punto de vista cromático, destacando el color azul como color corporativo. El posicionamiento visual del banco en sus afiches, y spot publicitarios plantea una publicidad de índole simbólica (en el sentido de González-Ortiz), donde se argumenta la modernidad y eficiencia tecnológica del banco, a través de una predicación de atributos como un modo de vida de profesiones de éxito, mostrando ejecutivos (mujeres y hombres, adultos jóvenes) en un entorno bello y exitoso, más moderno que sofisticado. Luego de deduce una correspondencia entre web y posicionamiento visual ya descrito

3.2.2. Banco BCI

Hay una correspondencia entre el logo del banco, la imagen de los locales, y la construcción de la página web desde el punto de vista cromático, destacando el color azul gris, rojo, verde y amarillo, como colores corporativos, y el logo del banco. Desde el punto de vista del posicionamiento visual del banco, él se plantea como “*un banco que se pone en el lugar de su cliente*”, donde lo más importante es la relación usuario – banco; estableciéndose una publicidad simbólica (González-Ortiz), y de predicación de atributos de ser un banco que se pone en el lugar del otro. Luego, existe una correspondencia entre Web y Posicionamiento Visual del Banco.

3.2.3. Banco Estado

Por una parte, se produce un cambio en la imagen corporativa del Banco Estado, alejándose del concepto de ser del estado; esto es, un organismo público, para acercarse a los bancos privados y dar fuerza a la idea de modernidad y eficiencia. Ello implicará un cambio de Logo.



Gráfica 2: cambio logo Banco Estado

Si analizamos el Local y el Sitio Web, vemos que hay una correspondencia entre el logo del banco, la imagen de los locales, y la construcción de la página web desde el punto de vista cromático, destacando el color rojo y gris acerado como color corporativo. La nueva propuesta es ser un banco seguro (es del Estado de Chile), pero al mismo tiempo eficiente y tecnológicamente moderno, lo que se refleja en su web, manteniendo también la idea de ser un banco para profesionales, medianos empresarios y trabajadores. Se trata de un posicionamiento visual simbólico (González-Ortiz), y de atribución de una predicación (Péninou). Luego existe una correspondencia entre la Web y el Nuevo Posicionamiento visual del Banco.

3.2.4. Banco Santander

Hay una correspondencia entre el logo del banco, la imagen de los locales, y la construcción de la página web desde el punto de vista cromático, destacando el color rojo como color corporativo. El posicionamiento visual del banco es simbólico, y concretamente una atribución del valor de ser el banco que se preocupa de las necesidades de la familia. Luego, hay una correspondencia entre Web y Posicionamiento visual del banco.

3.2.5. Banco Boston

Hay una correspondencia entre el logo del banco, la imagen de los locales, y la construcción de la página web desde el punto de vista cromático, destacando el color verde como color corporativo. El posicionamiento visual del Banco Boston es de un “*banco que se debe aspirar*”; esto es, se trata de la atribución del valor del alto status social y exclusividad que se logra siendo cliente del banco; esto es, se trata de un posicionamiento simbólico de atribución de un valor.

3.2.6. Banco BHIF

Hay una correspondencia entre el logo del banco, la imagen de los locales, y la construcción de la página web desde el punto de vista cromático, destacando el color azul como color corporativo, lo que implica dos procesos paralelos: por una parte la asimilación no problemática del antiguo BHIF a BBVV, por tener los mismo cromas corporativos en azul, pero establece una similitud radical respecto al Banco de Chile, perdiendo su identidad. Si antes era el banco que tenía el atributo de acceso a la vivienda, al ser vendido al Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (España) fue cambiando su imagen corporativa. Su posicionamiento visual implicó la inserción de BBVA al logo del banco, lo que también se expresó en su imagen del local. El nuevo posicionamiento del banco es simbólico, atribución de valor de vincularse con las personas por medio de una tecnología de punta, ejecutivos adultos jóvenes, estatus social. Existiendo una correspondencia entre web y posicionamiento visual existente del banco.

3.2.7. Banco de A. Edwards

Hay una correspondencia entre el logo del banco, la imagen de los locales, y la construcción de la página web desde el punto de vista cromático, pues aparece el color verde como color corporativo. El posicionamiento visual es simbólico, se plantea la atribución de valor del status: viajes, mundo, deportes como el golf y el polo (que no son de gusto masivo). Es similar al Boston.

3.2.8. Banco Sudamericano

Hay una correspondencia hasta antes del 2003 entre el logo del banco y la imagen de los locales, pues en ambos aparece el azul con el amarillo anaranjado y la figura del barco; pero ya, en el 2003 el sitio web toma el rojo como posicionamiento visual dominante: antes era “*el banco amigo*” su principio central creativo, entendiendo por amigo, un banco que permitía acceder a créditos personales y de inversión con facilidad. El 2003, al ser ya comprado por Scotiabank, de Canadá; trata de fusionar ambas imágenes corporativas visuales, poniéndose énfasis a lo canadiense del banco. Luego el posicionamiento visual es simbólico, pero no clara el atributo concreto que estaría ligado el banco. No existe, entonces, una correspondencia entre web y posicionamiento visual. Es similar a Santander.

3.2.9. Banco de Santiago

No hay correspondencia entre el logo de la web y el logo del edificio, destacándose las tonalidades azules en la construcción de la página, y las grises verdoso en el local. El posicionamiento lingüístico en afiches y spot dice relación con ser “*un banco de personas*”, pero visualmente implica una atribución de valor de elegancia, no hay diferencias de contenido con Banco Chile, Banco Edwards, Banco Boston, y Banco BBVA. El posicionamiento sería Simbólico.

3.2.10. Banco del Desarrollo

No hay correspondencia entre los colores del logo del banco y los colores del logo de la web (aunque sí en la forma del logo). El amarillo que se inserta en la web a la derecha nada tiene que ver con afiches y spot del banco. Tampoco tiene relación con el logo en forma coherente. El posicionamiento visual del banco, en afiches y spot es simbólico, en el sentido que se le atribuye un valor de estar ligado al desarrollo de los pequeños comerciantes, empresarios medianos y pequeños, y profesionales, pero ello no argumenta en forma visual clara.

3.2.11. Banco CorpBanca

Se debe tener en cuenta que en casi todas sus sedes se colocan banderas amarillas con el logo del banco, lo que va en correspondencia con logos del banco en que aparece el color amarillo, con azul y gris. Sin embargo, en la Web nos encontramos con el mismo logo de la Casa Matriz, desapareciendo las banderas, que como impacto visual identifican al banco desde lejos. Hay, evidentemente, entonces, una no coherencia del posicionamiento de este banco respecto a sus colores e imagen corporativa. Por otra parte, sus spot publicitarios y afiches son simbólico abstractas, muchas veces oníricas. Lo que reitera que este banco no tiene un posicionamiento visual claro.

3.2.12. Banco BICE

El posicionamiento visual no es distintivo salvo a nivel de los contenidos ligados a grandes empresas exportadoras. Sus cromas son los del Banco de Chile a nivel de Logo, y Grises su Frontis de Locales como CITIBANK, Santiago, BCI. El sitio web es celeste y tonos azules de más brillo, muy similar a BBVA.

3.3. Desequilibrios en el Posicionamiento Visual de los Bancos al año 2013

Luego, del análisis precedente se detecta que tienen un posicionamiento visual coherente entre sitio Web, Afiches y Logos los bancos: Chile, Estado, Santander, Boston, BHIF-BBVA, Edwards, y BICE; y no son coherentes: BCI, Santiago; Del Desarrollo; BICE, Corpbanca.

Por otra parte, entre aquellos coherentes no es claro su posicionamiento visual distintivo, diferente al de la competencia; pero, para entender esto, es necesario insertar otro eje en el análisis del posicionamiento, los contenidos puestos en actos en cada una de las propuestas de posicionamiento.

Si nos situamos a nivel de los contenidos, es claro que hay distintos consumidores a los que se focaliza cada banco, su consumidor objetivo prefigurado tiende a ser distinto, pero no se expresa siempre claramente a nivel visual y algunos de ellos tienen el mismo consumidor prefigurado.

Respecto a los contenidos y los consumidores objetivos prefigurados tenemos: a) pequeñas empresas BancoEstado y Banco del Desarrollo, sólo Banco Estado tiene n posicionamiento visual coherente; b) grandes empresas exportadoras BICE, no tiene un posicionamiento visual coherente; c) segmento socioeconómico que le interesa el Estatus Social, Exclusividad (actividades recreativas vinculadas al polo, golf, etc.): Boston, Edwards, Citybank. Boston y Edwards no tienen distintividad visual (frontis verde, solo logo diferente), aunque los contenidos a quienes se dirigen están en sus páginas, dicen lo mismo que las de sus competidores; d) estatus social alto adulto joven: Chile, BBVA, Santiago, los dos primeros similares a nivel cromas logo y frontis local, a diferencia del gris de Santiago, pero los contenidos de la imagen son los mismos, sien-

do el posicionamiento visual de Banco Santiago No coherente entre sus distintos soportes; e) consumidor medio y medio alto adulto joven: Santander, posicionamiento visual coherente; f) un tratamiento personal diferente, se pone en lugar del cliente: BCI, pero no se manifiesta claramente en la imagen; g) ninguna claridad respecto a un consumidor objetivo a lo menos en su posicionamiento puesto en acto: Sudamericano-Scotianbank y CorpBanca.

Luego es claro, que a lo menos en Chile, las agencias publicitarias que generan la publicidad de los bancos ponen más énfasis en los contenidos de la imagen en si mismo que su argumentación visual distintiva.

4. Análisis del Posicionamiento Visual de los Bancos 2014

Un rasgo distintivo de la economía global son las fusiones entre empresas y el problema que se plantea a la teoría semiótica del posicionamiento publicitario no es menor. En el Sistema Financiero Chileno han desaparecido bancos, ya en el 2003, como se ha visto la compra de Scotianbank del banco chileno Sudamericano, y la de BBVA quien compra BHIF, pero en la historia reciente se ha complejizado más la situación. Se fusionan Banco Edwards-CITIBANK (por compra de CITIBANK Chile realizada por Banco de Chile, quien a su vez es propietario de Edwards). Por otra parte, bancos internacionales compran bancos locales, como Scotianbank que compra Banco Sudamericano, y Santander que compra Banco de Santiago.

Ahora bien, ¿qué hacen las estrategias de posicionamiento ante dicha problemática? Recordemos lo que sabemos de las ciencias cognitivas: se interpreta por conexiones entre variables, el cerebro no opera por representaciones sino que por conexiones múltiples, lo que significa decir que hay una memoria histórica de los consumidores respecto a lo asociado a cada producto, en este caso los bancos.

La memoria histórica, los modelos cognitivos son enactivos, diría Francisco Varela, luego, la percepción tiene un saber acumulado respecto a la promesa simbólica o la ensoñación ligada a cada producto banco.

¿Qué significa, entonces la fusión de CITIBANK con Edwards?

Significa, simplemente que Banco CITIBANK ha desaparecido, asimilado a la imagen corporativa de banco Edwards: alto status, sofisticación, pero de CITIBANK no queda nada, es una pérdida. El posicionamiento sigue siendo simbólico, pero es el mismo de Banco Edwards.

Se inserta en los locales verdes de banco Edwards los cromas grises de Citibank, pero nada se articula en un posicionamiento complejo y plural a nivel visual, más bien opera la lógica de sustitución que la de fusión.

Por otra parte, cabe hacer notar que el Banco Bostón que tenía los cromas corporativos del verde es comprada por la Empresa Brasileña Itaú, conformando el Banco Itaú. Boston desaparece, y es reemplazado por Banco Itaú, empresa brasileña, donde sigue teniendo el mismo consumidor prefigurado de Bostón.

La compra de Banco Sudamericano por Scotianbank significó la desaparición de este último y la puesta en marcha de un posicionamiento visual y de contenidos similar a Santander, con incluso los mismo cromas de frontis de local y de sitio Web, sin plantearse la distintividad visual en el mercado local.

Hoy podemos decir, que en la acumulación del saber chilena sigue sin problematizarse visualmente la fusión y/o inserción de una multinacional en otra región. Se opta por obviar o forcluir el problema, pero de ninguna manera se produce visualmente una complejidad cognitiva que abarque un abanico de lecturas posibles, se continúa pensando en un sistema cerrado no conexionista no enactivo sino que en representaciones de la escuela cognitiva de la década de los cincuenta del siglo pasado. El posicionamiento real planteado está lejos de ser un trabajo de

la ambigüedad del texto para plantear un posicionamiento plural que pudiese ser una respuesta práctica a la fusión (Del Villar, 2012); sino que es la ambigüedad misma.

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ROLE NARRATIF DU JINGLE DANS LE RECIT AUTOUR DE LA MARQUE

Mona Ansari
Université de Limoges, France
mona.ansari5298@gmail.com

Abstract

Le positionnement d'une marque dans le marché implique une scénarisation qui se réalise par l'entreprise. En science de gestion, cette mission est baptisée « la nar-action », qui se donne pour tâche d'explicitier la stratégie de l'entreprise pour changer le statut du consommateur. La naraction nous amène à penser à la notion de narrativité qui introduit le couple « Performance/ Changement ». L'entreprise essaie de faire basculer la situation stable du consommateur à travers ses campagnes publicitaires qui puisent leur force dans les enjeux narratifs. Pour ce faire, les publicités télévisuelles rentrent en scène en présentant un produit ou un service par le biais d'une double entrée : Icône + Musique.

Dans le travail présent, on se focalise sur la signature musicale des flashes publicitaires. Elle se constitue de la musique composée pour le spot et aussi du jingle. Cette étude porte donc comme sujet l'identification du rôle narratif du jingle dans le récit que l'entreprise crée pour présenter sa marque. Mais l'essentiel c'est de savoir sur quelle hypothèse pencher pour explorer cette problématique : on va s'appuyer sur l'idée que le jingle, en tant que morceau musical juxtaposé à l'image, prend en charge le degré de l'attitude affective et cognitive de l'auditeur. Il serait de ce fait un adjuvant au service de la marque, et pourrait équiper la marque des compétences de « pouvoir-faire » et de « savoir-faire ». On vérifiera cette hypothèse à travers une méthodologie comprenant trois approches : psychoacoustique, comparative, et fonctionnelle. Quant à la première, on étudiera l'effet des variables permanentes et transitoires du jingle sur les émotions du consommateur par rapport à la marque. La deuxième approche s'attarde sur la priorité que le cerveau attribue au logo visuel de la marque par la comparaison à son jingle dont l'analyse cérébrale est faite au second plan. Via la troisième approche, on analysera l'aspect communica-

tionnel du jingle à l'appui du schéma de communication de Jakobson.

Ce travail abordera l'analyse en trois parties. Premièrement, en s'appuyant sur la théorie de la musique, on s'attaquera à l'aspect acoustique des variables constitutives d'un morceau musical pour identifier leur effet psychologique sur le consommateur. Puis en seconde partie, on verra la modalité du procès de l'analyse des informations par le cerveau qui explore comment le jingle est perçu quand il est synchronisé avec l'image. Enfin, en dernière partie, on étudiera les fonctions du schéma de communication de Jakobson qui définissent le rôle narratif du jingle.

Introduction

La présentation d'une idée consiste à faire une communication qui se situe sur l'axe de transmission ou sur celui de savoir (Greimas 1966). Au cours de chaque communication, il existe un état initial et un état final favorisant la formation d'une histoire autour d'un thème. "*Histoire*" se définit comme

récit d'événements mémorables, et la connaissance ou relation des événements du passé, des faits relatifs à l'évolution de l'humanité, d'un groupe sociale, d'une activité humaine, etc., et qui sont dignes et jugées dignes de mémoire "(Rey 1986)."

Parmi différents types d'histoire, par ce travail présent, on va se pencher vers les discours qui se créent afin de transmettre une valeur au destinataire. Ces discours ont trouvé leur place dans la narration en marketing "(Lewi et Lacoeylle 2012)", comme le souligne Kapferer

Une marque qui resterait trop longtemps muette [...] serait déçue. Si la marque est discours [...], elle peut donc être analysée comme discours.

L'objectif principal de chaque entreprise consiste à satisfaire le consommateur. Pour qu'une marque soit en mesure d'atteindre le comportement idéal du consommateur, elle est obligée de recourir aux innovations afin de se distinguer de ses adversaires. Ces innovations proviennent des méthodes variables dont chacune produit un nouveau récit. En existant dans un monde concurrentiel, la marque est obligée de scénariser à chaque fois ses valeurs d'une différente manière dans le but de dépasser ses concurrents. Cela veut dire que l'entreprise doit introduire un récit au marché en tant qu'instrument d'action pour agir sur les attitudes des consommateurs. Récemment, ce qui avait beaucoup d'efficacité au niveau de création du récit autour de la marque était le marketing sensoriel. Il ouvre la possibilité de capter l'attention du destinataire d'une manière innovante, parce qu'il s'attache aux expériences vécues par le client qui ont des dimensions sensorielles, émotionnelles, cognitives, comportementales et relationnelles et fonctionnelles "(Rieunier 2002)". Parmi les cinq types de marketing sensoriel, on se focalise, dans cette étude, sur le marketing musical. Ce dernier vise à créer et à gérer la musique pour l'image et les valeurs que souhaite transmettre l'entreprise auprès des clients visés "(Assadi et al. 2012)".

La musique, par exemple une symphonie de Beethoven, est un récit. Elle introduit une narrativité, elle se définit comme une expression comportant un état initial, une intrigue et un état final "(S. Hatten 1994)". Mais, dès qu'elle se juxtapose à l'image, elle perd cette forme narrative, et elle se transforme en un actant d'un récit à l'origine de la combinaison de l'image et de la musique.

Dans le cadre d'un flash publicitaire, la signature musicale se constitue de la musique composée pour le spot et aussi du jingle. Ces deux signatures ont un même rôle narratif précis dans le récit créé pour la marque. Entre ces deux signatures, notre travail se focalise sur le jingle, et il porte comme sujet « vérifier le rôle narratif du jingle » dans un récit que l'entreprise crée pour présenter sa marque et son produit. En s'appuyant sur cette problématique, on pourrait proposer cette hypothèse :

La musique transmet le sens, on pourrait donc définir le jingle comme une mélodie prenant en charge le degré de l'attitude affective et cognitive de l'auditeur. Du point de vue sémiotique dans la perspective narrative, cette mission s'accomplit par l'adjuvant, on pourrait considérer donc le jingle comme l'adjuvant dans le parcours de la narration. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, on va aborder d'une part la narrativité du point de vue sémiotique et d'autre part du point de vue marketing. De plus, ce rôle narratif du jingle va être justifié par l'intermédiaire d'une approche comparative concernant la situation du son par rapport à l'image. Selon Lehu J. M.

le marketing est une science qui consiste à **concevoir l'offre d'un produit en fonction de l'analyse des attentes des consommateurs.**

La science de marketing consiste à optimiser les conditions nécessaires pour faire connaître le produit au consommateur. Afin d'arriver à ce but, l'entreprise entreprend de changer la situation du consommateur. Cette modification est une tentative à bouleverser l'état actuel du consommateur, et à innover un nouvel état. En science de gestion, une notion particulière a été attribuée à ce changement. Cette notion, "*nar-action*", relate ce qui constitue la démarche de l'entreprise "(Kahane 2005)". Nar-action (narration par et pour l'action) montre l'ancrage du récit dans l'action. Elle est comme processus descriptif du cheminement itératif entre un réel existant et une fiction destinée à progresser vers l'un des réels futurs possibles. D'un côté, la narration permet d'incorporer en un même ensemble la réalité de l'existant, et la fiction sur ce qui sera. De l'autre, l'action permet à partir d'une fiction proposée, d'enclencher la transformation du réel et confronte les propositions fictionnelles "(Kahane 2005)". Cette définition explique bien la stratégie de l'entreprise à entreprendre de changer l'état du consommateur. L'évolution et la transformation de ce dernier à un nouvel état se réalise au moment où le consommateur ne connaît aucunement le nouveau produit. A ce stade, l'entreprise se met à changer les habitudes du consommateur, et à lui faire connaître son produit. Elle essaie de lui suggérer une nouvelle expérience différente de celle qu'il vit. Dans le cadre de "*nar-action*", cela veut dire qu'elle essaie d'éloigner le consommateur de sa réalité, les produits dont il se sert quotidiennement, et de lui inciter une autre réalité, une réalité fictionnelle. Cette dernière a été appliquée dans la définition de "*nar-action*", car au but de séduire le consommateur, l'entreprise s'efforce de faire apparaître son produit comme un rêve.

1. Narrativité en marketing et en sémiotique

La nar-action réalisée par l'entreprise se compte comme une stratégie qui nous a fait penser à la narrativité en sémiotique. Selon Micu et al. (2005)

Ce mot nous fait croire l'existence du rapport entre la narration au sens sémiotique et la stratégie de l'entreprise à présenter la marque.

Dans la perspective de la sémiotique, la notion de la narrativité résulte de l'opposition cou-

rante Permanence/Changement,

c'est grâce à cette distinction fondamentale entre ce qui est stable et ce qui est modifié ou transformé, que déjà nous donnons sens à tout ce qui constitue notre univers sémantique. "(Courtés 1991)".

Du point de vue de la sémiotique, la notion de l'action qui a été insérée dans le terme "narration" se forme selon l'opposition "Performance/Changement" déjà cité. L'entreprise se met à connaître les besoins potentiels du consommateur. Une fois connus ces derniers, elle essaie de les provoquer en présentant le produit à travers les campagnes publicitaires. D'après la narrativité en marketing, ces derniers peuvent être considérés comme un récit autour de la marque afin d'inciter le consommateur à acheter le produit.

Dans la perspective du marketing, les six actants de la narrativité s'approprient un équivalent :

- Le destinataire : le responsable de la marque
- Le destinataire : le public
- Le sujet : la marque
- L'objet : le meilleur positionnement de la marque
- L'opposant : les marques adversaires
- L'adjuvant : tout ce qui est efficace à transposer les valeurs de la marque, et à lui permettre de posséder un positionnement agréable au marché.

Concernant l'objet d'étude de cet article, on se focalise sur l'adjuvant.

2. Adjuvant en sémiotique et en marketing

En se référant à la sémantique structurelle de Greimas, on trouve l'adjuvant comme un actant aidant à la réalisation de la jonction entre le sujet et l'objet, sur un axe de pouvoir. Concernant un récit mis en place autour de la marque, il faut bien admettre que la marque est toujours le sujet "(Lewi 2009)" qui exprime un prédicat "(Fontanille 2007)", et que la fonction de l'adjuvant, un élément intégré dans la scène prédictive, est accomplie par l'attribution géographique, l'histoire de la naissance de la marque, la biographie de son créateur, les personnages du récit publicitaire, le nom, le logo visuel, le jingle et le slogan publicitaire. Parmi ces derniers ce qui nous intéresse est le jingle. Ce dernier est l'élément le plus courant et le plus principal de l'identité sonore qui fait apparaître l'image de la marque dans le cerveau. Cela étant dit l'hypothèse de ce travail consiste à définir le jingle comme un adjuvant au sein du récit créé propre à la marque, il nous faut donc préciser la notion du jingle, et son rôle concernant la marque.

3. Jingle

La marque est un signe servant à distinguer les produits ou les services d'une entreprise de ceux d'autres entreprises. Aujourd'hui le capital des entreprises réside dans les marques qu'elles possèdent. Il apparaît désormais que la valeur d'une entreprise résulte d'abord de l'intérêt que lui portent ses acheteurs potentiels "(Kapferer 1999)". La marque véhicule l'image et les valeurs de l'entreprise à sa clientèle. Elle est la signature de l'entreprise, et sa principale garantie.

Toutes les marques se positionnent sur marché avec deux faces complètement différentes : visuelle et musicale. L'image visuelle de la marque existait depuis longtemps, et l'image musicale lui a été juxtaposée comme une valeur ajoutée. Intitulée le jingle, cette image musicale est une mélodie courte systématiquement associée à la marque. Elle est un petit morceau musical comprenant 4 ou 6 notes qui dure à peu près 10 secondes. Un jingle se produit exprès avec la courte durée, pour qu'il puisse agir immédiatement sur destinataire. Dans les campagnes télévisées,

cette signature se diffuse à la fin d'un spot publicitaire en même temps que le logo visuel.

Le premier rôle du logo musical est de délivrer un message non-verbal central représentant la marque "(Zoghaib et Goudy 2003)", mais ce message accomplit une fonction d'injection, c'est-à-dire qu'il incite à agir et à acheter. Un logo, soit visuel soit musical, est l'image de la marque et de l'entreprise, et il essaie de faire mémoriser la marque au destinataire. D'après le glossaire illustré du marketing, le logo musical ou le jingle

est un son ou un ensemble de sons que les individus associent spontanément à une marque.

Et selon la définition de Goudy :

Un jingle est un morceau musical, un mouvement mélodique qui se commence avec une attaque, et il se finit avec une cadence. Le jingle se veut être la signature strictement musicale de la marque. Son utilisation se fait de manière systématique à l'instar du logo graphique. L'identité musicale permet ainsi d'illustrer des valeurs de marque et de soutenir les autres éléments de communication afin de faciliter la compréhension de l'identité de la marque.

Michel Chion, dans son livre

Le son, *Traité d'acoulogie*", explique que "le jingle peut être un son caractéristique de métier, ou un son familier auquel on s'est attaché et auquel on prête une valeur symbolique et affective comme "le gong rouillé d'une vieille porte, une vieille machine à coudre, etc.

Le jingle est un ensemble de sons esthétiquement organisés et structurés, disposant tous les caractères du son. Contrairement à l'image qui est fixe et ponctuelle, et occupant un seul espace, le jingle est entendu partout et nulle part en même temps. Il remplit l'espace, et personne ne peut l'ignorer et s'échapper de lui. Cette caractéristique omniprésente du jingle consiste à porter sur l'effet d'ubiquité du son. Cet effet aide au jingle à informer sur lui-même que "J'existe".

3.1. Missions du jingle

3.1.1. Agrément

Les annonceurs cherchent à développer autour des marques une rhétorique qui permet au consommateur de percevoir les éléments affectifs, esthétiques et symboliques qu'elles véhiculent "(Reynolds et Gutman 1984)". Les éléments non verbaux sont privilégiés par les publicitaires parce que les images, la musique ou les couleurs sont plus efficaces que les mots pour communiquer des valeurs abstraites "(Scott 1990)". Pour certains auteurs, la musique constitue un message périphérique ayant un effet essentiellement émotionnel "(Alpert et Alpert 1990)", mesuré le plus souvent à l'aide du modèle PAD (Plaisir, Activation, Domination) élaboré par Mehrabian et Russel.

La plaisance et l'esthétique, l'objet de l'approche psychoacoustique assument un rôle persuasif. L'esthétique est tout ce qui pénètre l'individu par les sens sous la forme d'un agrément ou d'un

désagrément immédiats “(Bouveresse 1998)”. La question de l'esthétique nous amène à la notion de préférence. Dans cette perspective, la musique participe à la formation de la préférence envers le produit “(Gorne 1982)”. Un morceau musical est un phénomène qui peut être préféré pour quelqu'un, et non préféré pour quelqu'un d'autre. Cette préférence est subjective, et elle dépend de facteurs liés à la musique, et ceux liés aux conditions psychologiques et sociologiques de l'auditeur “(Day 1985)”. La préférence musicale comme l'acte de choisir, estimer ou donner l'avantage à une chose plutôt qu'à une autre “(Price 1986)”. Ces explications introduisent que la musique est un élément de persuasion influençant l'attitude affective et cognitive envers la marque “(Galan 2003)”. Il est indispensable d'ajouter que pour la diffusion d'un flash publicitaire sur le support télévisuel, la musique s'accompagne toujours avec l'image ou le logo visuel. Ce serait donc impossible d'expliquer l'influence de la musique sur l'attitude du destinataire sans révéler son rapport avec l'image.

3.1.2. Sonorité et visualité

Longtemps l'identité d'une marque se présentait sous la forme visuelle, mais récemment, la plupart des marques se dotent d'un logo musical exprimant l'idée et l'identité propre à la marque. Le fait que le logo musical se met en second plan, émane du processus de l'analyse que le cerveau réalise pendant la perception d'un phénomène audio-visuel. Dès le quatrième mois avant la naissance, on perçoit les stimuli par le toucher et l'ouïe, et ce n'est qu'à partir du quatrième mois après la naissance qu'on est capable de connaître le monde par la vision. On perçoit les stimuli par la vision, car le cerveau donne la priorité absolue à l'analyse des données issues de la vision, et ensuite il analyse celles provenant de l'ouïe “(Deshays 2010)”. Notre compréhension d'un phénomène audio-visuel est le résultat de l'association du son et de l'image, et notre cerveau perçoit une image sonore de ce phénomène, cela veut dire que lorsque l'œil saisit un événement, le cerveau lui attribue un son. Cela prouve que le son accompagne l'image, et il est donc un phénomène consécutif à un événement “(Deshays 2010)”.

Tout ce qui a été remarqué dans le paragraphe précédent relève de la dominance de l'œil sur l'oreille. Bien que l'image l'emporte sur le son, rien ne nous empêche de croire au lien indéfectible d'image/son. Bien avant l'année 1929, le synchronisme d'image/son est né. Ce synchronisme se fait au but de créer le sens. En effet, bien que l'image en mouvement essaie d'enregistrer le réel, sur les supports audio-visuels, elle n'arrive pas à transmettre toute la réalité, et ce n'est que la synchronisation avec le son qui resserre la distance de l'image et la réalité. La naissance du sens provient de la synchronisation de l'image et du son “(Deshays 2010)”. Autrement dit, la combinaison de l'image et du son produit un récit qui donne le sens à l'objet audio-visuel. En fait, chaque son transmet des sensations par lesquelles on se fait attraper. En provoquant des sensations déjà expérimentées chez l'auditeur, le son participe à transmettre le sens du récit créé par l'assemblage image/son. Michel Chion (1990) présente la musique comme la valeur ajoutée de l'image. En effet, l'image est le reflet d'une réalité, et la musique d'une part elle n'en est qu'une évocation toujours approximative, et d'autre part, dans le cadre de la communication, elle est considérée comme un élément complémentaire qui consiste à répéter l'image.

En recourant au statut du son relativement à celui de l'image dans le cadre audio-visuel, on pourrait justifier le rôle narratif du jingle dans l'action de marque. De façon redondante, la signature musicale de la marque fait disposer à la marque des compétences propres à proposer lui-même au consommateur, à faire croire au consommateur que c'est elle qui est la meilleure. Le jingle, juxtaposé au logo visuel de la marque, le répète de façon musicale, et vu que la boîte noire du cerveau le perçoit comme le deuxième élément d'un phénomène audio-visuel, il peut donc être considéré en tant qu'une force facilitant l'accomplissement de l'action de la marque.

Ce qu'on a jusqu'ici relaté de la place du son dans un phénomène audio-visuel rapportait la

primauté de l'image au son, alors qu'évidemment le côté sonore aura la même influence que le côté visuel. Notre prétention se garantit par la citation de Deshays :

la part sonore dans ce qu'on appelle l'audio-visuel est au moins aussi important que la part visuelle.

Bien que le cerveau analyse le son comme le deuxième élément par rapport à l'image, la perception de cet élément issue de l'analyse a la même influence sur le destinataire que l'image. Concernant la vérification de l'importance du jingle dans le récit de la marque, en plus de la référence à Chion, on a profité d'une enquête basée sur la découverte de l'identité de marque à travers le logo sonore, accomplie par une étudiante en M2 "Sémiotique et Stratégies de communication" à l'université de Limoges. Cette investigation a relevé que la majorité des gens (94%) connaissent le logo sonore et seulement 6% des gens lui étaient étrangers. De plus, 44% affirment que les logos sonores ont plus d'impact que les logos visuels, pour 37% le logo sonore a autant d'impact, et pour 19% il a moins d'impact que le visuel. La majorité a donc déclaré que les logos sonores ont plus d'impact, voire autant d'impact qu'un logo visuel. Ils sont donc aussi importants l'un que l'autre "(Coronne 2012)".

Malgré le primat de l'image sur la musique, celle-ci crée des images permettant son intégration dans des stratégies communicationnelles. La communication du sens est une autre mission que le jingle porte.

3.1.3. Mémorisation du message central de la marque

La mémorisation du message central par la médiation de la musique est un fait que certains chercheurs confirment, et certains d'autres rejettent. L'idée de ceux qui refusent ce caractère de la musique tels qu'Anand et Sternthal (1991), que Brooker et Wheatley (1994), se réfère à l'approche cognitive. En fait, selon eux, la musique, en tant qu'un stimulus émet beaucoup de ressources de traitement au cerveau, et ce dernier n'arrive pas à les traiter, il est distrait et il oublie donc le message central. D'autres comme Stout et Leckenby (1988), bien qu'ils s'accordent avec d'autres chercheurs au niveau de la capacité du cerveau pour le traitement de l'information musicale, en s'appuyant sur l'approche analytique de la musique, ils suggèrent que certains éléments musicaux sont plus capables à faire mémoriser le message au destinataire que d'autres. Par exemple, selon Wansink (1992) le mode majeur contient moins d'informations que le mode mineur, alors le mode majeur émet au cerveau moins de ressources de traitement, le cerveau pourrait donc mieux traiter ces informations et mieux mémoriser le message. Les chercheurs qui insistent sur la mémorisation du message central grâce à la musique, ils s'appuient sur la congruence entre la musique et le thème de la communication. Kellaris et al. (1993) ont examiné la congruence des sentiments évoqués par une musique instrumentale et le message publicitaire. Leurs résultats montrent que le concept de congruence est utile pour expliquer les résultats contradictoires au sujet de la mémorisation. En effet, il apparaît que plus la congruence est élevée, plus la mémorisation est réussie, et inversement "(Kellaris et Mantel 1996)".

La mémorisation d'un jingle s'assujettit à des règles indispensables à respecter durant sa composition. Vu les conditions citées au-dessus, il est à noter que la mémorisation du jingle se réalise au moment où le cerveau reçoit peu d'informations, et quand elles sont congruentes à la valeur de la marque. Une fois que le jingle est mémorisé, la marque est équipée de la compétence de mieux transmettre la valeur du produit, et elle obtiendra le savoir-faire à véhiculer son sens. Afin de réussir à mémoriser un jingle, la bonne solution est de créer une mélodie au maximum de

6 notes pour qu'il puisse être chanté. Munir l'auditeur de la compétence de chanter le jingle se réalise par la répétition d'une même cellule identique dans le schéma mélodique. En fait, quand notre cerveau perçoit cette répétition, il est plus facile pour lui de mémoriser la mélodie, et d'enrichir sa connaissance de la marque.

4. Etude modale et actantielle du jingle

Dans la perspective du schéma narratif canonique et du modèle actantiel, les rôles assumés par la musique nous permettent d'allouer au jingle les modalités actualisantes de la compétence. En partant de la définition que la compétence équivaut à ce qui est nécessaire à la performance "(Courtés 1991)" ou en d'autres termes que la performance présuppose la compétence, cela revient à dire que la marque considérée ici comme le héros ou le sujet d'état a besoin d'une force pour qu'elle puisse se transformer en sujet de faire, et qu'elle réalise l'action. Cette force est mise en œuvre par le destinataire (l'entreprise). L'entreprise demande à la marque de présenter les valeurs et l'identité du produit. Pour ce faire, la marque a besoin de compétences positives et actualisantes afin qu'elle se transforme au sujet de faire. Ainsi, la marque doit se doter de la modalité du pouvoir-faire et celle du savoir-faire, au but de réaliser son action. Selon Greimas (1966), le sujet d'état se munit de ces deux dernières modalités, par l'adjuvant, car celui-ci considéré comme un élément auxiliaire se situe dans la compétence "(Hébert 2009)". Un adjuvant peut être défini alors comme un sujet de faire dans un programme narratif de maintien ou d'acquisition de la compétence, comme l'épée magique en possession du prince "(Hébert 2009)".

Vu les missions du jingle déjà citées, quant à lui, il est une force considéré comme une compétence positive qui fait passer la marque de l'absence de pouvoir-faire et de savoir-faire à la disposition de ces dernières. Le jingle disposant la fonction poétique, implicative et décorative répond au rôle d'adjuvant dans la perspective narrative. Il ajoute à l'image une identité esthétique de la nature musicale qui l'enrichit. Cette identité esthétique consiste aussi en répéter la valeur du produit sous une autre forme que visuelle, et en la renforcer de plus en plus. Il dote la marque d'une possibilité qu'elle n'avait pas auparavant. En effet, il contribue à l'aider à actualiser son but, c'est-à-dire transmettre des valeurs de la marque. En se référant à deux citations de Goudy et Zoghaib (2009) :

Le premier rôle de logo musical est de délivrer un message non-verbal central représentant la marque.

L'identité musicale permet d'illustrer des valeurs de marques et de soutenir les autres éléments de communication afin de faciliter la compréhension de l'identité de la marque.

parallèlement à trois missions du jingle, on affirme la nature auxiliaire du jingle et ses modalités de "*faire pouvoir*" et "*faire savoir*". Il renforce la capacité de marque à transposer ses valeurs, et il assume le rôle de "l'épée magique" du prince pour réussir à faire sa mission.

5. Conclusion

La présentation mi-marketing mi-sémiotique du jingle qu'on a réalisée dans ce travail, reflète l'application de la narrativité en science de gestion. Il a été bien précisé qu'une marque est un actant-sujet devant pouvoir réaliser l'action demandée par le destinataire qui est l'entreprise. La réalisation idéale, pour l'entreprise, est un bon positionnement au marché par rapport à d'autres entreprises et leurs marques. Ce positionnement présuppose des outils auxquels la marque re-

court pour réaliser son action. On a souligné que, dans les années récentes, l'un de ces outils est le marketing sonore qui aide la marque à transmettre les valeurs du produit, de l'entreprise ou du point de vente à travers la musique. Dans le cadre du marketing sonore, la musique, selon beaucoup de chercheurs, influence les attitudes affective, cognitive et conative du destinataire. Dans cette étude, on a étudié le jingle comme un morceau musical qui effectue cette influence.

D'une part l'étude du schéma narratif et du modèle actantiel en sémiotique, et d'autre part l'étude des missions que la musique accomplit par rapport à la communication du sens, à la mémorisation, et à la plaisance, nous ont permis de stabiliser un rôle auxiliaire pour le jingle dans le parcours narratif. Car il munit la marque des modalités "pouvoir-faire" et "savoir-faire" dans le but d'accomplir son action.

Finalement, les études faites sur la narrativité en marketing ouvrent des horizons intéressants pour développer l'application de la sémiotique dans les entreprises et surtout dans les secteurs de la création de la marque.

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SHIFTING FROM CHANNELS AND CODES TO MODES: A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF BRAND COMMUNICATION VIA MULTIMODALITY

Oana Culache
University of Iasi, Romania
oanaculache@gmail.com

Abstract

The aim of this theoretical paper is to propose a new perspective on the brand communication process, by using the social semiotic methodology in order to refer to the following two elements: the channel and the code that are used to convey a message. We build our argument on the diagram of signification based on Jakobson's work (1960) and we briefly address its main elements: sender, receiver, message, code, contact, and context. Next, we use in our study a qualitative research method, namely multimodality, which has its origins in social semiotics (Kress 2010). In our paper, we treat the two elements of the communication model: the channel (contact) and the code. There are studies in the literature that analyze these two elements separately in the conceptualization of the communication process, as distinct parts that exert an influence on each other, together with other four elements indicated by Jakobson. Nonetheless, we identify in social semiotics a more recent perspective, multimodality, and we argue that this implies a particular relationship between these two elements – channel and code, that merge and define a more complex entity – the semiotic mode. Multimodality, whose object is represented by modes, brings into the frame an issue that has been overlooked, namely the fact that the mode refers both to the nature of the physical support and to the socially developed codes, which means that the interaction between channels and codes should be considered from a higher-ranked perspective – the semiotic multimodality. Drawing from Pauwels' definition of multimodality – the case when, within a message, "... at least two input (senses) or output (medium/device) modes (or sub-modes) are involved" (2012: 250), we make a distinction between three sets of terms: modes/sub-modes, input/output modes, multimodality/multimedia. According to these distinctions, we define the way modes' interaction generates meaning in the

process of brand communication. Then, we briefly discuss the multimodal and multisemiotic mechanisms (O'Halloran 2005) involved in brand communication – intrasemiosis and intersemiosis (with an emphasis on transduction) and finally, we discuss limitations of our study and directions for future research. The contribution of our paper is to shift the focus from the distinction code – channel (medium) to modes, in order to reconceptualize brand communication as a multimodal situation of communication.

1. Introduction

Recent studies in communication focused on developing models meant to help practitioners improve brand communication effectiveness. For specialists interested in the way brands communicate, many communication models are available in fields, such as: advertising, public relations, marketing communication or brand management (Duncan and Moriarty, 1998; Fuertes-Olivera, Velasco-Sacristán, Arribas-Baño, and Samaniego-Fernández 2001; Duncan 2005; Kliatchko 2008; Kapferer 2012) and rely on previous semiotic studies that aimed to define the elements of a genuine communication act, irrespective of the agents it involved.

According to the main communication models, the communication process implies at least 3 elements: (1) an agent who creates meaningful signs and whose intention is to convey a particular idea, (2) a set of signs that bear the intended meaning, and (3) an agent who receives the message. The first known communication model belongs to Aristotle (in Narula 2006: 136), who created it to illustrate the situation of a speech held in front of an audience. In most of the communication models that followed it, scholars (Wiener 1948; Lasswell 1948; Shannon and Weaver 1949; Schramm 1955; Berlo 1960; DeFleur [1970] 1975) changed the names of elements in order to better serve the specific area of interest, for example: the speaker became a communicator, sender, transmitter or encoder; the auditor or recipient is also known as a decoder, interpreter, destination; the speech became message, utterance or signal.

Apart from this terminological adaptation, we consider that the most interesting changes operated on the communication models are represented by the new elements scholars proposed, such as: context, code, channel, noise, and feedback. Researchers understood that the communication process is not influenced exclusively by the communicators and the signs they operate with, but also by other elements that interfere. For example, a receiver can make a distinction between a denotative and a connotative meaning of a sign by taking into consideration the context of communication or some ideas are better expressed in words than images.

2. Starting point - Jakobson's communication diagram

One of the scholars that noticed this was the Russian linguist Roman Jakobson (1960), who argued that a communication act would imply 6 elements: addresser, message, context, contact, addressee, to whom he attached 6 functions: emotive/expressive, conative, referential, phatic, metalingual, poetic. Jakobson's communication elements (1960) are often represented in the literature as a diagram or model.



Fig. 1: Jakobson's diagram of signification

Although there were several critics against this linear, one-way act of communication, Jakobson's diagram of signification proves the complexity of meaning-making, a process one could not reduce to signs, because it also comprises other components that interact and influence the final meaning. The communication between the addresser and the addressee implies not only the agents and the message. The message is a meaningful set of signs that elicits the receiver's response in a context indicating whether the intended meaning is a denotative or connotative one. Also, the addresser needs to convey specific ideas, in consequence, the medium he chooses may vary based on the features of communication. In order to assure communication, the addresser uses a code limited by its own meaning potential and presumably shared by both interacting agents in the communication process.

Jakobson's work inspired researchers to propose communication models for various areas of interest, including areas related to brand communication. Fuertes-Olivera and his co-authors (2001) applied Jakobson's diagram of signification in advertising and proposed the following structure: (1) advertiser as the addresser; (2) product or service as reality (context); (3) advertisements as messages; (4) a written, spoken or digital channel as contact; (5) advertising language, images, sound etc. as code; and (6) target audience as addressee.

The diversity of communication models developed for different fields, such as: advertising, public relations, and marketing communications can be used separately for each act of brand communication. Nonetheless, we should consider that brand communication is a complex process, where all the instruments and techniques (public relations, advertising, personal selling, direct marketing, Internet marketing) are integrated into a singular strategy of branding. When planning strategic brand communication, specialists should take into consideration the way their messages get to the stakeholders. That is why a singular communication model from a semiotic perspective might be more appropriate, especially because in branding, any contact between brands (by their representatives) and stakeholders generates a message about the brand and contributes to brand's public image.

Irrespective of the communication techniques selected to convey messages, the communication specialist should always consider that any communication act highly depends on the channels and codes he uses. In our paper, we address the channel and the code by using Jakobson's diagram of signification, a model where both elements are included. However, any other model that comprises codes and channels might be adapted in consequence, as we believe that they exert a powerful influence on the way brands succeed to communicate an idea to their stakeholders. There are studies in the literature (Jakobson 1960; Berlo 1960) that treat these two elements separately when defining or analyzing the communication process, like they were distinct parts that exerted an influence on each other and performed specific functions, together with the other four elements indicated in Jakobson's diagram of signification. Nonetheless, we identify in social semiotics a more recent perspective, multimodality, and we argue that it implies a particular relationship between channels and codes, that merge and define a more complex entity – the semiotic mode.

3. Towards a social semiotic perspective – the multimodal method

In the last decades scholars tried to better understand the communication process and proposed new theories in semiotics. Halliday's (1978) studies in linguistics inspired contemporary semioticians to define a new concept – multimodality – that could explain the way meanings are created. Multimodality is a semiotic method that set the foundations of a relatively new area of study, as it has been developed in the twentieth century by scholars in an attempt to extend and deepen research in the field of communication (Kress 2010; Bateman 2008; Kress and van Leeuwen 2006; O'Halloran 2004; Lim 2004; Lemke 1998; Schriver 1997). Multimodality refers to the

cultural technologies of representation (Kress 2010: 30–31) in the communication process and implies various sets of signs, also referred to as modes, that co-work within a message in order to create an integrated meaning.

Modes are defined by their social-cultural nature and meaning potential. Kress (2010: 79) emphasized that modes are “... socially shaped and culturally given semiotic resources”. The nature of the relationship between modes and the social-cultural factors can be understood as a relationship between codes and context. As for modes’ meaning potential, it represents their capacity of expressing and representing an object, a characteristic referred to as modes’ “affordances” (Gibson 1997). The extent to which a mode can express and represent its object is limited, and implies that addressers get to select and combine a repertory of modes, or semiotic resources, in order to create a “modal ensemble” (Kress 2010; López Rodríguez, Prieto Velasco, and Tercedor Sánchez 2013) consistent with their communication interests. Developing on Kress’ ideas (2010), we consider that any act of brand communication is a dynamic and complex process of signs creation in which the encoder shapes an idea that materializes through a plurality of modes of communication, so that the message could be compelling to the receiver.

4. The relationship between channels, codes, and modes

As scholars have already agreed (Kress, Jewitt, Ogborn, and Tsatsarelis 2001: 2), every communication is multimodal and every mode has its own characteristics. As a result, in order to reach the communication goals, brands should find the right combination of modes that can convey the intended ideas to the stakeholders. In our paper, we argue that the multimodal method presents modes as entities that refer both to the nature of the physical support of the message and to the socially shaped and culturally developed codes, that is two elements of the communication process. This perspective is better identified if we consider Pauwels’ approach, that defines multimodality as the situation when, within a message, “... at least two input (senses) or output (medium/device) modes (or sub-modes) are involved” (2012: 250).

4.1. The dichotomy “modes” and “sub-modes”

Pauwels’ definition of multimodality generates a better understanding of the way modes refer both to channels and codes. According to Pauwels, there is a distinction that can be made between modes: a higher-ranked mode, which we will refer to as “mode” or “supermode” (2012) and a lower class of modes, which we will refer to as “sub-modes”. This approach reveals modalities as more general concepts, with a direct link to the five perceptual senses: visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory. Any communication process that implies two supermodes, for example the auditory and the visual mode, is multimodal. In Pauwels’ terms, supermodes give more details concerning the medium of communication, represented by the very channel that appears in the communication process.

As we have emphasized, the five perceptual senses are considered to be supermodes, whereas the literature often refers to modalities as sets of codes: image, writing, layout, music, gesture, speech, moving image, soundtrack, colours, and 3D objects (Kress 2010: 28). Codes are sets of semiotic resources that permit encoding messages by using signs whose meanings are shared both by the sender and the receiver. In Pauwels’ terms, sub-modes represent a lower-ranked type of modes that give more details concerning the codes used in the communication process.

4.2. The dichotomy “input modes” and “output modes”

After we have clarified that the distinction between modes and sub-modes, in Pauwels’ terms, refers to channels and codes, we can proceed to the second relevant distinction, between input and output modes. The input modes, corresponding to the five senses, represent the set of resources the recipient uses in order to receive the message. The input modes refer to the psychological processes of perception that take place on the part of the receiver when he gets the

message he has to decode. In this respect, multimodality implies that whenever a receiver uses at least two senses in order to get and decode a message, it is the case of a multimodal message.

The output modes, represented by the device or medium of communication, refer to the set of resources necessary to assure the expression and representation of the object. Output modes, used by the sender of the message during the encoding stage, are presumably known by both communicators, so that meaningful outputs to become understandable inputs. As a result, the distinction input modes – output modes is meant to separate the resources used by the agents in order to assure communication and it refers on the one hand to the supermodes linked to the transmission channel, and on the other hand, to the sub-modes linked to the codes.

4.3. The dichotomy “multimodal” and “multimedia”

As we stated before, multimodality implies a repertory of modes. At this point, in order to avoid confusion, it is important to mention that the multimodality is not particularly the case of multimedia. As Kress (2010: 30–31) pointed out, there is a difference between these two concepts. Multimodality implies the use of multiple semiotic resources that permit the *representation* of objects, whereas multimedia represents the use of technologies for *disseminating* messages (television, radio, World Wide Web, outdoor media, press). In fact, the concept of “multimedia” is considered to have a more restricted meaning, as it refers exclusively to technical characteristics of devices, without any connection to the human communicative or perceptive act (Pauwels 2012).

5. Proposed communication model based on Jakobson’s diagram

The arguments we have presented above regarding the alternative way of using channels and codes in the communication process lead us to modify Jakobson’s communication model. As depicted in the figure below, the proposed model in this paper implies a transformation: we suggest replacing the channel and code with a higher-ranked element: the modality that covers both the channel and the codes, as we have already proved.



Fig. 2: Proposed communication model based on Jakobson’s diagram.

In what follows, we will discuss the implications of the revised model in the situation of brand communication, by presenting arguments for generating meaning via multimodality.

5.1. Generating meaning by interacting modes

From a brand communication perspective, after analyzing the message support types, we can notice that all the channels require at least two perceptive modes, for example: advertising usually implies the visual and auditory mode, personal selling may imply auditory, visual, tactile, gustatory and olfactory mode, public relations mostly imply auditory and visual mode, Internet marketing implies visual and auditory mode. As we can see, although it is a very popular brand communication tool, advertising is the least permissive in matter of multimodality: television only permits auditory and visual mode, radio only permits auditory mode, the press only permits visual mode, outdoor media only permits visual and auditory modes, even digital technologies are restricted to two modes: visual and auditory. The lack of flexibility in advertising, from a multimodal perspective, represents a great disadvantage, because multimodality can

offer brands the opportunity to create and convey multisensory messages, capable of having a greater impact on consumers.

When selecting a modality, for example an image, we can easily think of the possible channels that permit using images to convey a message: television, websites, outdoor media, or press. In fact, there is a more elaborate connection we can build between supermodes, sub-modes and the technical support of the message. There is a causal link between these, as one channel may or may not permit a supermode and, furthermore, a sub-mode. In brand communication, the selected channel (or channels mix) should serve the communication goals, that is to permit conveying the intended meaning by using the most appropriate modes.

From another point of view, sub-modes also indicate the type of codes used in the message. If we think about a specific sub-mode, we automatically identify the subsequent codes, considered as sets of semiotic resources that bear a meaning established in a cultural context. For example, image as mode includes colors and shapes, gestures include nonverbal language as intrinsic code, and layouts include distances.

5.2. Multimodal and multisemiotic mechanisms

The problem of mode must be analyzed also by taking into consideration two multisemiotic processes that take place: intrasemiosis and intersemiosis. Intrasemiosis concerns the meaning within different semiotic resources (O'Halloran 2004), whereas intersemiosis refers to the interaction of the various semiotic resources, in order to engender a new meaning or set of meanings in the context of a connectedness and interweaving between modes (Lim 2004: 239; Kress et al. 2001:25). The multisemiotic mechanisms, implying the use of multiple semiotic resources, are strongly connected to multimodality, that uses various modes to convey a message. In the multimodal frame, there are two processes linked to intrasemiosis and intersemiosis: transformation and transduction. These two refer to the translation of modes within a mode (transformation) or between modes (transduction), as Kress (2010: 43) pointed out.

In branding, advertisers usually use several channels of communication – for example, an advertising campaign may imply television and radio commercials, outdoor media and press advertorials – adapting the unitary message to each channel, as multimodality permits translation of modes. Translation can occur by shifting from one mode to another – writing into speaking (the case of transduction) or by shifting elements within a mode – formal to colloquial tone, hard-rock to classical soundtrack (the case of transformation). As a result, transduction permits the translation of meanings originally conveyed through a particular mode into meanings conveyed through a different mode. Transformation only implies an internal change, without changing the modes of expression. Both transduction and transformation encourage creativity in branding, by searching alternatives to convey the intended meanings to stakeholders. Modes' translation, and especially transduction, has been a subject of interest for semioticians in the field of multimodality, who identified it as an intersemiotic process determined by shifts between semiotic codes, also known as “resemioticization” (Iedema 2003) or “semantic reconstruals” (O'Halloran 1999a, 1999b). Multimodality provides the means to create a diversity of coherent messages by using transduction to build a cluster of meanings that improve the information assimilation process by using various modes that rearticulate each other and generate ratification (Kress, 2010: 169). We should also consider that, by ratification, a mode's role is to confirm another mode's meaning, so that to help the receiver to have a more accurate understanding of the intended meaning.

6. Conclusion and limitations of our study

According to the arguments we have presented in this paper, we consider there is a strong connection between modes, codes, and channels. The multimodal messages imply using output

modes and input modes in the communication process. In order to better represent an object or an entity, the various supermodes and their subsequent sub-modes could be used by semioticians and be strategically combined in a “semiotic harmony” (Kress 2010: 157).

In our opinion, when planning brand communication, for example an advertising campaign, instead of creating a media plan and then the advertisements, we could proceed differently: considering the message a brand wishes to convey to its stakeholders, the meaning-making process should start with the best combination of modalities that could represent the ideas. According to Kress’ (2010: 169) idea of ratification, the modes do not act as duplicates – on the contrary, they complement each other. The concept of “intersemiosis” designates the unitary coordination of semiosis created across multiple sign systems (Ravelli 2008: 30) so that they are not perceived to be isolated, but as having a unitary meaning. As Thibault (2000: 321) and Baldry (2004: 87) noted, the meaning of a multimodal message is a composite product/process involving the way in which different resources are co-deployed. Consequently, it should not be divided into a number of separate “channels” or “codes”. Also, Lemke (1998) introduces the concept of “multiplication of meaning”, as an orchestrated combination of meanings, different from redundancy, which brings something new while selecting codes to adapt messages to each channel.

We are arguing that multimodality can help brand specialists to plan the communication strategy, so that it would better serve the communication goals. Considering multimodality as a method that combines semiotic resources to express the intended message in the most loyal way, the use of modes could be more effective than the traditional way.

In this context, we consider that multimodality might prove itself to be a useful tool in the field of brand communication, and that this integrative perspective would help brand specialists improve their communication techniques and instruments. It is important to mention that, in addition to the other elements that compose the communication process, this alternative way of planning a communication strategy should definitely take into consideration not only the best modes that would guide brand specialists’ choices regarding the communication channels and codes, but also the social-cultural aspects, such as the most effective channels to reach the stakeholders and the possible connotations of codes.

The contribution of our paper is to shift the focus from the distinction code – channel (and medium) to modes, in order to reconceptualize brand communication as a multimodal situation of communication, drawing from recent studies in social semiotics. Despite its originality, this proposition also has limitations. Our study focused on the structure of Jakobson’s model and we did not analyze the impact of the structural changes on the functions attached to the diagram of signification. Also, by replacing two structural elements of Jakobson’s model, future research should also take into consideration studying any possible implication in terms of functions attached to the model, especially concerning the phatic and metalingual functions linked to channels and codes.

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SEMIOTICS OF BRAND OF PROCTER & GAMBLE PRODUCTS IN A BRAZILIAN MOVIE

Pablo Moreno Fernandes Viana
Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
pablomoreno@gmail.com

Abstract

The American cinema is characterized by its industrial character and a broad productive chain as their logic. Advertising is part of this chain and is increasingly rare, but improbable, an American movie without product and brands integrated in narratives. These actions represent major investments and is usual the consumers to have a better reaction to advertising when they are integrated into entertainment as branded content.

Brazilian cinema passes, since the mid-90s, for a period of recovery and growth, arriving in 2000's with a significant presence in the national culture. Year after year, Brazilian films stand out among the most watched in the country. That has contributed to starts the organization of cinema as industry, as in the case of movies made by Globo Filmes, for example.

With a Brazilian film industry in formation, has been increasingly frequent integration of products, brands and advertising in the content of national films. An example is "Minha mãe é uma peça", most watched domestic film in Brazil in 2013. The movie had audience of 4.6 million viewers, according to the National Film Agency (Ancine).

This study aims to analyze the product integrations (Donaton, 2007) that stand out in "Minha mãe é uma peça", using as analytical instrument the Peirce's semiotics. It is intended to verify the contribution of this strategy in expressivity of brand (Perez, 2004), in the construction of symbolic values to consumers.

"Minha mãe é uma peça" is sponsored by the brands Eletrobras, Procter & Gamble and Grupo Protege. In the category of support are brands BB DTVM, TAESA, Multishow, Quanta Estúdios, Teleimage and FINEP. Of all the brands sponsoring/supporters of the film, the one that stands out is Procter & Gamble, through three products of its portfolio: liquid soap for washing

clothes Ariel, Pantene shampoo and fabric softener Downy. Products are inserted into the narrative in four times: their names are mentioned by characters and its brands are displayed for a long period of time in the foreground.

Front of the more recurrence, it cuts as empirical object of analysis the insertions of Procter & Gamble products. The research analyzes with the semiotics of brand, the signs built for products under the aspect of the sign itself, the sign in relation to the object and the sign in relation to the interpretant (Santaella, 2002) in the entertainment narrative. The intention is to check the values constructed and then compare them to the brand positioning, checking whether the inserts are made consistent with the expressivity of the brand. In addition, we intend to further check how the message is presented as entertainment and the kind of thinking that calls the viewer, yet according to Peirce: abduction, deduction or induction.

1. Introduction

Brazilian cinema passes, since the mid 90's by a period of recovery and growth, coming in 2000 with significant representation in the halls. With a Brazilian film industry in formation has been increasingly frequent integration of products, brands and advertising on the content of national films. An example is *Minha mãe é uma peça*, most watched domestic film in Brazil in 2013. The movie had audience of 4.6 million viewers, according to the National Cinema Agency (*Ancine*).

This paper proposes to analyze the branded content (Donaton 2007) that stand out in *Minha Mãe é uma peça*, using as an analytical tool the Peirce's semiotics. The aim is to verify the contribution of this strategy to the brand expression (Perez 2004), in the construction of symbolic values to consumers.

Of all the sponsoring/supporters brands of the film, the one that stands out is Procter & Gamble, through three of its portfolio products: liquid soap to wash clothes Ariel, Pantene shampoo and Downy softener. The research analyzes the signs constructed for the products under the aspect of the sign itself, the sign in relation to the object and the sign in relation to the interpretant (Santaella 2002) in the entertainment narrative. The intention is to check the values built and then compare them to the institutional positioning, checking if the inserts made are consistent with the brand expression.

2. Entertainment as brand expression place

In contemporary times, forms of consumption are characterized by speed. "Advertising is something inherent to societies operating in economic models of intensive production. (...) In this context, is the result of the same processes that were structured by markets over the centuries, and today is an essential step in the composition of the production model of modern organizations." (Santos 2005: 24). Thus, the volume of products and brands on offer nowadays grew, requiring ship production faster.

Changing the way we consume, so do the arguments of the advertising message. They sophisticate up and no longer are mere instruments interrupting the experience of the subjects with the mass media. It starts to dispute the viewer's attention, approaching more and more of an entertainment speech.

In this new perspective, advertising inserts your message within entertainment communication products, aimed to increase public attention to what is broadcasted. "More and more advertising messages take turns to become unknown to the recipient the reason of what is advertised. He recognizes that this is advertising, but not being influenced" (Luhmann 2005: 84). This form of advertising, combining line items with entertainment content is known as Madison and Vine,

Advertainment, Branded Content, Product Placement and other names.

Donaton (2007) gives an overview of technological revolutions and changes in consumption habits of American society that led the subject to a new logic, in which the viewer gains hegemony as a decisive element in media consumption process and that demand new contact forms between advertising and the consumer. On this, Netto, states “the product supply function of traditional advertising the exchange of fun for positive image towards the brand, we have a major change in the communicative bias established in the individual’s relationship with advertising” (Netto 2008: 7).

Advertising expands its operations beyond the placeholders for magazine ads, the commercial breaks and finds new spaces to be consumed at any time, for how long and how often the viewer sees fit, called by Madison and Vine.

This paper focuses specifically on the Product Placements in movies, very popular in the United States, as they are one of the few countries in the world that has an established the cinema as industry. The author explains “product placement in movies is a common practice since the early days of cinema, but partnerships between fiction and film products have become today significantly deeper. To advertisers is given a voice in the development of the script long before filming began.” (Donaton 2007: 32).

Product Placement is something done masterfully in American cinema. The United States has the peculiarity of having transformed his cinema in industry a bit after the movie consolidation, which makes the American films a commercial and profitable product. “The product placement in movies is a common practice since the early days of cinema, but partnerships between fiction and film products have become today significantly deeper. To advertisers is given a voice in the development of the script well before the start of filming.” (Donaton 2007: p. 33)

The Product Placement in movies becomes more sophisticated over time. This aroused the curiosity of researchers, which were held on the topic to investigate them and rank them. It should be noted that the format we want to investigate in this study corresponds to the integration of products in films in the sense that advertising is, in fact, inserted into the narrative, and not about the commercials shown in movie theaters before the movies.

2.1. And in Brazilian cinema?

Throughout history, Brazilian cinema had a tuned production to the most important times of world cinema. The national cinema has undergone a regional and experimental phase with Humberto Mauro, in the early twentieth century; underwent industrialization attempts, between the years 1930 and 1950; threw open the social problems in the search for their own identity with the *Cinema Novo*, faced censorship of the military dictatorship and the lack of resources to *Cinema Marginal* and *Pornochanchadas*, but its death was almost enacted in 1980 with the ill-fated economic plans of the time, among other factors.

The 1990s signaled a rebirth in the period named of *Retomada*, just by the return of investment policies in film, encouraging the audiovisual and were productive years for the national cinema. A film industry, appropriate to the proportion of Brazilian cinema, began to take shape and, particularly, the public began to take an interest in films, winning prejudices consolidated on the productions made in the country.

Every passing year, more and more Brazilian films became box office hits and were pursued by the public. The interest of the audience attracts advertisers, investing in movies and want to insert their brands in the stories. This gave rise, too, product integration in national films as follows examines whether.

2.2. *Minha Mãe é uma peça* (2013)

Minha Mãe é uma peça was the most watched national movie in Brazilian theaters in 2013. According to an *Ancine* report, 4,600,145 viewers watched the film. It is a comedy adaptation of a play and it has a significant number of sponsorship and support, which are shown in the opening credits. Among the sponsors appear *Elektrobras*, Procter & Gamble and *Grupo Protege*. In the category of support come the *BB DTVM* (Bank of Brazil Division administers securities and securities), *TAESA* (Privately Held the power transmission segment), *Multishow* TV channel, *Quanta* studio, the producer *Teleimage* and *Finep*.

3. Brand Expression and Procter & Gamble

The information available on the brand's positioning in the P&G site or brand own website provided the basis for the analysis performed for these Product Placement in *Minha Mãe é uma peça*. The organization uses a management strategy of its corporate products uses individual brands. According to Perez, this strategy has the advantage of "flexibility and less rigid in choosing the name that best suits the characteristics, attributes, the public receiver, the context, the time and/or the positioning of the product. (...) Enables greater footprint in the points of sale. Greater optimization of market segmentation provides a sense of innovation and modernity to the consumer." (Perez 2004: 20–21).

This strategy is used by Procter & Gamble in their products. Each product has an individual brand, an independent communication strategy and the leading brand in some cases, comes to be known by the consumer. The Procter & Gamble products integrate an extensive portfolio of personal care products. According to the organization's website, its purpose is to "offer products and superior services that improve the lives of consumers around the world, now and for future generations. As a result, consumers will reward us with market leadership, profits and value creation, allowing our people, our shareholders and the communities where we live and work to prosper." (Procter & Gamble 2014)

The organization's values are "Integrity, Leadership, Property, Passion to Win, Trust" (Procter & Gamble, 2014). The principles set out on the website are: "We show respect for all individuals; The company's interests and the individual are inseparable; We have strategic focus on our work; Our success is based on innovation; We value personal responsibility; We aim to be the best; We have external focus; The mutual interdependence is a lifestyle". (Procter & Gamble 2014)

On the official P&G website you can get information about the products or be redirected to the official brands websites (when available). In case of brands inserted into *Minha Mãe é uma peça*, only Downy does not have an official website.

In Ariel presentation text, at the official P&G website, said: "In the late 60s, Ariel was released worldwide. It was a time when people believed they could make a huge difference in the world, a time of challenges and idealism, vision translated into action. For Ariel, it was imagination, determination and technological empowerment freeing women from their traditional domestic role". (Procter & Gamble 2014)

On the official site of Ariel products, there is no further information on the brand positioning (Mission, Vision and Values). There is only description of the products, an advertising video of the current campaign, usage tips, products and an area reserved for contact.

About Pantene, the presentation text on the official P&G website states:

For over 60 years, Pantene has offered consumers unsurpassed quality in high-tech products have reflected a serious and effective approach to providing healthy and beautiful hair. (...) Today in Brazil Pantene has 8 different product lines with Shampoo and Condi-

tioner, plus a full line of treatments that offers protection and restoration to the threads. Its unique formula of pro-vitamin acts as a true protective shield against damage while repairing wires deeply through advanced technology that operates where the wire needs most, keeping the beautiful and healthy hair. (Procter & Gamble 2014)

The official website as well as in the case of products Ariel has no further information on the brand positioning, as Mission, Vision and Values. But it is more complete and offers specialized consulting services on hair, presents products, hairstyles, and talks about the Pantene Institute and tells the story of the brand from its origin to its arrival in Brazil. We highlight the section that displays the model Gisele Bündchen as the brand ambassador in 2007. Since then, the Brazilian model shall illustrate all images in the timeline of the brand.

The brand more TOP of Brazil TOP joins biggest TOP of the world: In 2007, for the re-launch of Pantene in Brazil with new formulas and packaging, branding hires *über* model Gisele Bündchen as the official ambassador. Since then, the successful partnership is becoming more solid and Pantene is synonymous with superior performance and Allied Gisele for health care of the most beautiful and inspiring locks the country. (Procter & Gamble 2014)

The three brands present in *Minha Mãe é uma peça*, Downy is the one that does not have its own website. The only information available about the brand are in P&G's own website.

Downy believes that emotions come to life at the touch of tissues.
Are simple moments, like when you wear a good clean and fragrant clothes and feel beautiful, ready to face the day.
Or, when you come back, and engages in the freshness of your sheets for a night's sleep.
It is then that Downy makes all the difference. Because when you use Downy in their tissues, they become more than tissues, they become more meaningful experiences. With the scent of Downy, you revive your emotions. (Procter & Gamble 2014)

As we can see, each brand is presented specifically for the public and aims to be recognized in accordance with the consumption profile of those who purchase the product. The way each of these brands communicates with your audience is what Perez defines as brand expression. The author states that:

The brands are expressed, are given to do, show themselves in different ways, in order to enhance their sense effects. (...) The goal is to establish a connection – and if this is emotional, the better. (...) The marks are expressed through the name they present, logo, shape and design of the products that embody, packaging and label, color, slogan, jingle, the personality, the character that represents a mascot, and other resources and the organizational context, involving employees and partners and their relations with the social environment. (Perez 2004: 47)

So, in any situation the brand is in contact with customers (and potential customers), it is building sense, a perception. Perez continues, “the perceptual space of the brand can be used as a mirror that reflects the lifestyle and values of current or potential consumption” (Perez, 2004, p. 48). The corporate identity, advertising, sales promotion, sponsorship, internal communication, among others, are moments of brand expression. This is one of the justifications for brands to sponsor movies, performing their products inserts, in an entertainment context, establishing contact with the consumer in the context of diverse communication to advertising.

4. Analysis: Product Placement descriptions

The insertion of brand Ariel lasts approximately 20 seconds. The product name is not mentioned and the scene takes place in a supermarket, on an island made by packages of Ariel liquid soap. Marcelina, the daughter of the protagonist, Mrs. Herminia, follows the mother in grocery shopping and coming up in products, dropping some packages. Almost at the same moment that the young drops the products, a supermarket employee appears to reorganize the island. The foreground framework allows the reading of the Ariel brand and also the phrase: Remove 3 times more stains without fade as washing powder. The two characters appear in the background and in third plane appear other products displayed on the shelves, but you can't identify them. The product is not even mentioned in the dialogue and the mother apologizes to the employee who collects the fallen products at the same time that the daughter swears by his carelessness.

The insertion of Pantene begins immediately after the products Ariel, also at the supermarket. Starts at 15 minutes and 13 seconds and goes up to 15 minutes and 27 seconds. Mrs. Herminia and Marcelina walk through the supermarket, when the daughter stops on a shelf with Pantene products and a promotional piece of Point of Sale illustrated with the model (and brand ambassador) Gisele Bündchen. Marcelina, who is her mother's side, stops on the shelf, take a pack of Pantene shampoo and exclaims: “Oh, mother, I want to buy this shampoo!”. Mrs. Herminia says, “You will not buy any shampoo. Returns!”. Marcelina replies: “Oh, but I want to be just like Gisele Bündchen...”, being interpellated by Mrs. Herminia, “Marcelina, my daughter, you have other priorities, come here ... (and return the shampoo to the shelf). I will not buy anything. “The girl complains to her mother and insists, when Mrs. Herminia decrees: “Marcelina you can't just have hair of Gisele Bündchen and that body. You need is diet, I will make you a soup, yes!”. And the two leave the scene.

To 1 hour, 12 minutes and 10 seconds film is an insert with Ariel and Downy brands. The hard insert up to 1 hour, 12 minutes and 32 seconds is a simulation of Product Placement common in talk shows on Brazilian TV. In the history, Mrs. Herminia became host of a TV show and is commenting on daily life with their children. The insertion begins with Mrs. Herminia looking at the camera and talking about how to eliminate the dirt on clothes, drawing a parallel between hitting the children in order to educate them and hit the dirt to eliminate it. To remove dirt, recommends Ariel and Downy. The products are brought by a stagehand, described by Mrs. Herminia – during insertion – as the rabble of the TV Show.

4.1. Peirce Semiotics and Semiotics of Brand

Semiotics can be applied to analyze diverse manifestations, such as advertising, for example. Over the large Peirce production about Semiotics, this work is dedicated to the speculative grammar (Santaella 2002), from the categories of the sign ordered by Peirce to understand the Madison & Vine. From the theory of signs and semiosis process that begin on the relation between sign, object and interpretant, was conceived the brand expression semiotics.

In this model, the object resides in “Marketing Mix, the product in its concreteness and aspects of distribution, price, design, among others” (Perez 2004: 152). However, the object should

not be considered simply something material, but can also be simply a logical position in the triad, a dynamic object. Thus, the author goes on to explain that the object is not limited to the product, “takes into account the complexity of the organization, its mission, vision and values its relations with society and its leaders, expanding the immediate referentiality reduced to a tangible product” (Perez 2004: 152).

The sign is understood as the “elements that give expressiveness and visibility to the brand” (Perez 2004: 153), which Lancaster quoted by Perez (2004) defines as Identity Mix.

The interpretant will match the effects generated by the sign in the of production of meaning process. These effects, according to Perez, can be emotional/affective (of firstness), energetic when they represent functionality (of secondness) and logical (of thirdness) when correspond to habits.

Based on this model, starts, so the sign of the manifestation in himself, ie the Identity Mix. The brand comes as a sponsor of the film and invites writers to conceive situations in which the products were inserted into the narrative, with expressive capability. According to Perez, “this first level of analysis, the sign is pure qualitative possibility. It is observed in their domestic property, that is, in their qualitative aspects, sensory (...) etc.”. (Perez 2004: 155)

Peirce classifies this first division of the sign into three divisions: qualisign, sinsign or legisign. “A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign” (Peirce 2010: CP-2.244); “A sinsign is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign a thing or existing and actual event that is a sign” (Peirce 2010: CP-2.245); “A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by men. [...] Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it. [...] The Replica is a Sinsign. Thus, every Legisign requires Sinsigns”. (Peirce 2010: CP-2.246). The three divisions will be useful for understanding the signs represented.

Continuing the interpretation, there is “messages toward the object they are representing” (Perez 2004: 156). In this second classification, Peirce, classifying the signs as icon, index and symbol, proposes another division.

“An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not” (Peirce 2010: CP-2.247), while an index “is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object.” (Peirce 2010: CP-2.248). Since the symbol “is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object” (Peirce 2010: CP-2.249).

In relation to the generated effects, analytic third level of meaning production process, it is understood, citing Perez, who refers to the types of interpretation that signs have the potential to awaken in its members, in the minds who play them (Perez 2004: 157).

For Peirce, in the third interpretative level, the signs are divided into Rheme, Dicsign and Argument (Peirce 2010: CP-2.250). Perez, names such signs from its effects, classifying them into emotional, for values translate as “beauty, status, glamor, social acceptance, power” (Perez, 2004: 157); rational/functional when they produce sense from an action or use; logical, when the interpretation is dependent on “a certain habit of consumption” (Perez 2004: 158).

4.2. Semiotic Analysis

With regard to the sign itself in all inserts, the locations at which actions take place are sinsign. In the first two inserts, the supermarket appears as private space for the insertion of products in the narrative without clash of context, since the mother cites a situation with her daughter, in the place where that happens is fundamental to the understanding of what is passes. The scenario becomes natural, even the display of other levels of brand expression, as advertising

slogans, the poster girl (in the case of Pantene), and promotional pieces.

In the third insertion, the location is *sin*sign but also *legis*ign. The TV Show is stopped to the host advertise sponsors is a recurrent situation in Brazilian television, so the inclusion in the film does not generate estrangement, however, is natural because of the recurrence in the national media. I.e., is *sin*sign because the particularity of the situation represented is recognized by the audience as a TV show, and *legis*ign by the fact that the interruption is naturally understood by anyone who has the habit of watching television in Brazil.

Both the supermarket, as the television program scenario seems popular venues, with a supermarket frequented by a family of upper-middle class (like the family portrayed in the film). The insertion therefore contributes to a representation of the public consumer product potential. This leads to the sign of the analysis toward the object it represents.

In the first insertion, the two characters do not comment the product name. The product package is displayed as well as the phrase of the advertising campaign aired at the time of film production. The iconic representation of the product through the package without mentioning its attributes is reinforced by the *indicial* slogan that says the product characteristics with common soaps, leaving the viewer's perception of the message conveyed.

In the second insertion, the relationship is more direct. The daughter of the protagonist asks his mother to buy Pantene shampoo, inserting the brand and its attributes as a symbol. At the beginning of insertion, the proposed relationship of the sign with the object is *indexical*, since the girl mentions the reason why she wants to buy the product, while the model appear in the foreground. After the mother negative of the acquisition, the character itself makes the relation of benefit of the product with the poster girl, stating that if you use the shampoo will have the hair of Gisele. This relationship is *indexical*, but also *symbolic*, since it is not necessary to explain who is the brand ambassador. The model is a symbol of beauty and her hair is just one of its many attributes that are coveted by other women. This is possibly the reason that the play point-of-sale displays do not present a text or even make mention of the name of the model, known around the world.

The third insertion, is the most 'advertising' of all displayed in the film. Thus, all the talk is iconic, by playing a popular format of Brazilian television and is also *indicial*, while establishing direct referentiality with the object represented (and it's fun rightfully so). The reproduction also uses symbols (the cliché of the inserts in talk shows on Brazilian TV) to produce laugh. The recognition of sign in relation to the object is therefore crucial. In the message, Mrs. Herminia mention the name of the products and their packaging displays, while speaking of the competitive advantages of each.

Regarding to the effects generated in the first insertion, although there is no mention or direct relationship of the product with the event recorded, the intended effect by the sign next to the interpreter is functional origin, since the foreground displayed message approaches an attribute of the product (the ability to remove stains three times faster than a traditional soap), one *dici*sign therefore.

In the second insertion, the effect is a *Rheme*, since the suggested value is related to the status. The girl wants to use the shampoo to have hair like Gisele Bundchen. Despite being notorious recognition of the beauty of the hair of the model, the desire for other women by the hair similar to it is not functional order. Desire provides a lot more by the glamor and status related to the mythical figure of the model. The status is reinforced by mother's speech, which deconstructs the desire of the shampoo girl claiming that the girl needs is diet, to be more appropriate to the beauty standard.

The third insertion, also calls for the production of meaning from *dici*signs, appealing to the functional aspects with the consumer. The show's host makes brief mention of the name of the

product and its competitive advantages, not to mention other issues and interpellating directly to the housewife who would be watching the program, talking about the benefits directly to her.

5. Conclusions

Analyzes finished, we present some considerations about the inserts from the values defended by Procter & Gamble in each moment of *Minha Mãe é uma peça*.

The main values of the organization, as mentioned, integrity, leadership, passion for winning and confidence are always present in the first insertion, although the product name is not mentioned in the sentence that exposes the product advantage (strengthening its quality), not to mention refers to the organization's mission with respect to improving the lives of consumers. The concern of replenishing in replacing products on the island so they fall signal as the brand values the care with their products from conception to the organization at point of sale.

In the second set, the brand P&G values also make themselves present, more than the girl in her mother. In fact, she states the desire to consume the Pantene product. The site of Pantene highlights the issue of hair care with regard to restoration, but the difference is not explored in the insert. However, to demonstrate the desire of the daughter by the hair brand ambassador, the insert goes against the passage of history text of the brand on the site that says "Pantene is synonymous with superior performance and ally of Gisele to take care of the health of most beautiful and inspiring tresses of the country" (Procter & Gamble 2014).

As a final balance, it is observed that the three inserts reaffirm what is proposed in Identity Mix products of P & G and, although the combination of Advertising and Entertainment in Brazilian cinema still taking its first steps towards professionalization. Product Placement, in case of the analyzed film, is still quite rudimentary, but his analysis contributes to the understanding of a present moment of Brazilian cinema and understanding of integration between advertising and entertainment in Cinema.

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SEMIOTICS OF COLOR

COLOUR AS INTERSEMIOTIC TRANSLATION IN EVERYDAY COMMUNICATION: A SOCIOSEMIOTIC APPROACH

Evangelos Kourdis
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
ekourdis@frl.auth.gr

Abstract

Intersemiosis characterises the whole semiotic phenomenon, which is based on what Jakobson (2001 [1959]) calls *intersemiotic translation* or *transmutation*, that is the interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of non-verbal systems. Jakobson did not give examples of transmutation between language and colour, a semiotic system which is usually included within the iconic sign system. The autonomy of the semiotic system of colour was underlined by the Belgian semioticians, known as Groupe μ (1992) who elaborated on Barthes' (1964) classification of semiotic signs, criticising linguistic imperialism and emphasising the specificity of the visual sign. For Groupe μ (1995), there is evidence that the plastic element (colour, form, texture) is autonomous from the iconic representation, and in fact plastic and iconic elements complement each other. This autonomy allows for colour to serve as one of the two poles in intersemiotic translation. In my study, I will present cases of everyday communication (commercial signs, advertisements, course books, etc.) where this intersemiosis between language and colour is realized, and I will examine also the reasons intersemiosis was chosen.

1. Culture and Translation

The fact that translation is a cultural product, a semiotic product, has been explained in detail by translation semioticians and especially by the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics. Thus, views such as Toporov's (1992: 30), "that [culture] is not only the place where meanings are born, but the space in which they are being exchanged, 'transmitted' and seek to be translated from one cultural language into another", or Torop's (2008: 257), that "[t]he ontology of translation semiotics rests on the recognition that culture works in many respects as a translation

mechanism [...]”, aren’t surprising. Instead, they enhance the view that translation and culture are two aspects of the same message.

Culture and translation are interdependent and go hand in hand (see Torop 2002: 603). It therefore makes sense why Eco approached the translation process central to cultural communication. In the framework of cultural communication, semiotic systems coexist, cooperate and are then translated, since “[c]ulture continuously translates signs into signs, and definitions into definitions, words into icons, icons into ostensive signs, ostensive signs into new definitions, new definitions into propositional functions, propositional functions into exemplifying sentences, and so on; in this way it proposes to its members an uninterrupted chain of cultural units, and thus translating and explaining them” (Eco 1979: 71).

Fabbri (2008 [1998]: 112) aptly remarks that when translating a linguistic sign into a non-linguistic sign there may be some informational loss, since non-verbal semiotic systems that are different from language may speak for themselves, may be self-interpreting, and may also interpret other sign systems through expression substances that translate, *in part*, the meaning contained in the original sign. As Fabbri points out, the true limit of translation lies in the difference between the materials of expression.

Translation and its corresponding informational loss had been studied in semiotic and translation terms, especially in the context of intersemiotic translation between verbal and visual semiotic systems. The purpose of this study is to examine translation, *transduction* as Fabbri (2008 [1998]: 161) mentions at the end of his book, between the verbal and colour semiotic systems. It is a field which has not been probed into by semioticians. But before we examine the translatability of colour, we will focus on its communication function as a non-verbal semiotic system.

2. Colour as a vehicle of sociosemiotic communication

Some years ago, van Leeuwen (2011: 12) mentioned that “[...] in the twentieth century, after a rather ‘monochrome’ period, colour began to extend its semiotic reach [...] began to play a more important role in the everyday expression of ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings, while at the same time retaining its sensual attraction, so investing social communication with pleasure and sensuality”. I am in agreement with van Leeuwen’s observation, adding that contemporary culture, as we will see later, is increasingly based on the pleasure and sensuality of colour in everyday communication, which has passed onto the level of intersemiotic communication. In addition, as Deely (2002: 68) mentions, “[...] human understanding finds its operational existence initially in terms of intersemiosis which perception makes possible as developing around a sensory core”.

Besides the feature of sensuality, colour, as a carrier of meaning, is one of the dominant systems of non-verbal communication. For Kress and van Leeuwen (2002) and van Leeuwen (2011), colour is also used to convey ‘interpersonal’ meaning. Just as language allows us to realize speech acts, colour also allows us to realize *colour acts*. This induction permits me to support that since speech acts are translatable, colour acts must also be translatable.

Edeline (2010: 218), one of the founding members of Groupe μ , a *group of Belgian* 20th-century *semioticians*, divides colour, in terms of its associations, into two categories: *sociochrome*, which evolves with society, its religious symbols, its trends, and has the resultant conventional associations; and *idiochrome*, which evolves based on personal experiences that commit to memory pleasant, warm, anxiety-ridden, frightening and other situations that provide metonymic or synaesthetic effect associations.

In December 12th, 2006, when, for example, Chilean Defence Minister Vivianne Blanlot attended the funeral of General Augusto Pinochet at the Military Academy in Santiago wearing a white suit (figure 1), there was uproar among those present, since her attire was thought to be

offensive and to show lack of respect towards the deceased. It is worth noting that members of the leftist government at the time, such as the country's president, Michelle Bachelet, had been tortured during Pinochet's military dictatorship and a number of her relatives had died from the torture they suffered. As Stern (2010: 353) mentions, "Blanlot added her own symbolism. Her formal white suit contrasted with the traditional black of grieving; she attended as an institutional superior not as a personal friend and mourner".



Fig. 1: Chilean Minister of Defence at the funeral of General Augusto Pinochet.

Obviously in this case, the colour of the minister's attire was a thunderous non-verbal message not only to the Chilean society, but also to most societies around the world for whom black is the colour of mourning. The colour black worn at funerals seems to function as a *sociochrome*, since it is a common code indicating support for those in mourning. Thus, although "[b]lack [...] has not only developed to express severity and seriousness in the context of early Protestantism, it has also been used as the colour of death and misadventure ('a black day'), of sin and dishonesty ('black market'), of provocation, hate and aggression ('blackskirts', 'black flags'), of sadness ('black mood'), of film (e.g. in 'film noir'), of authority (policemen, guards, etc.) and of elegance, opulence or modernity (black tuxedo, the little black dress, the art-house film, the program of a classical concert)" (van Leeuwen, 2010: 2), the interpretation resulting from its use is linked to social situations and specific cultural enactments or customs.

However, even if the communication act isn't socially defined, colour can share in the message. In the advertisement of the Italian shoe brand Superga below, which was widely circulated in Italy in 2012, at times accompanied by a verbal message and at times without one (figure 2), the visual message can function independently because of the colours used on the shoe, which are the colours making up a symbol, namely that of the Italian flag. The entire visual message makes the peruser of the advertisement think of the utterance *Italian shoe*. In fact, at a second level of analysis, the same utterance is interpreted as *quality shoe* in some societies, the Greek society being one of them.



Fig. 2: Advertisement of the shoe company Superga.

3. Colour as the second part in intersemiotic translation

From the above examples we see that colour can be interpreted, thus also translated, even in the absence of a verbal message. What we therefore want to see is whether the colour semiotic system can serve as a secondary system or a pole in an intersemiotic translation in which the primary semiotic system is language. In my opinion, this is feasible, since the colour semiotic system has, based on the literature, the following characteristics: it functions as a code, thus as a text with structure; it has autonomy and is usually part of a multimodal text.

If we take into account that Jakobson (2004 [1959]: 139) characterises *translation* as a “form of indirect discourse, since it involves two equivalent messages in two different codes” and *intersemiotic translation* or *transmutation* as “interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems”, then we can positively affirm that the semiotic system of colour is indeed translatable. In fact, colour is a *coded iconic message*, according to Barthes (1964: 42), and definitely a nonverbal sign system.

When discussing intersemiotic translation, Jakobson (2004 [159]: 143) was delving upon a version of a verbal text in another semiotic system, and provided examples, such as “[...] from verbal art into music, dance, cinema, or painting”. Jakobson doesn’t make direct reference to colour as a semiotic system, but perhaps he does so indirectly when talking about painting. Of course, there is nothing to stop us from seeing colour as the other pole in an intersemiotic translation, since it is one of the most important visual semiotic systems and is, in semiotic terms, a *text*¹ of particular complexity² that has a specific function³. As Torop (2014: 57) mentions, from the methodological point of view, the concept of text is important in Cultural Semiotics for the definition of the subject of analysis, since it denotes both *natural textual objects* (a book, picture, symphony) and *textualisable objects* (culture as text, everyday behavior or biography, an era, an event).

Furthermore, according to Pastoureau (2001: 10), “colour is a social phenomenon. It is soci-

¹ As Sonesson (1998: 83) states “[the text] may also be described as that which is (should or could be) subject to interpretation”.

² Van Leeuwen (2011: 49) mentions that “[...] colour has a range of dimensions, not just value and saturation, but also luminosity and luminescence, luster, transparency and temperature—even aspects of texture such as roughness or smoothness, or wetness and dryness can directly influence the way colours are understood and named”.

³ Lotman (2009 [1992]: 115) mentions that “[c]ontemporary semiotic study also considers text as one of the basic research concepts, but text itself is considered as a functional rather than a stable object with constant properties”.

ety that ‘makes’ colour, defines it, gives it its meaning, constructs its codes and values [...]”. But if colour is a *code*⁴, meaning that it is at least a first-order semiotic system (having a signifier and signified), or a *value*, a more complicated sign since value is ideology (a second-order semiotic system according to Barthes [1964b: 130–131]), it can be translated⁵. Also contributing to this end are intention in the construction of the code and standardization, at least in some cultural environments. For this reason, Caivano and López (2006: 13) mention that “[c]olour works a true code in the context of an institutional image. The existence of a chromatic code presupposes an intention in its aspects of production and the possibility of being recognized by the readers or users, i.e. it shows some degree of standardization”.

Contrasting Saint-Martin’s (1990) view that “[...] colour, the most obvious of all facts in sensory experience, cannot serve as a reference in the recognition or the description of constant or regular events” are those put forward by many other researchers that talk about the colour’s autonomy as a semiotic system and consequently, also, in my opinion, about its translatability. More specifically, Groupe μ (1995: 597) mentions that “[...] the plastic element (colour, form, texture) is autonomous from the iconic representation. In fact, plastic and iconic elements complement each other”. This view doesn’t question colour’s iconic dimension; it emphasises its autonomy as a semiotic system, as a text that can be translated, since a message can be considered a text when it is “open to later translations and interpretations” (Lotman and Pjatigorskij 1969: 211).

If we want to overlook the above inferences, all we have to do is take note of what Kress and van Leeuwen think about colour as a semiotic system. For them, “[...] maybe colour is a characteristic mode for the age of multimodality. It combines freely with many other modes [...] but doesn’t exist on its own. It can survive only in a multimodal environment” (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2002: 351). Therefore, even if we ignored all the above claims concerning the autonomy of colour as a semiotic system, the utilization of multimodality only would make intersemiotic translation possible as long as there is another semiotic system. In our case, it is the verbal system, as we will see below.

4. Intersemiotic translation in everyday communication

In this section we present cases of intersemiotic translation between the verbal and chromatic messages found in everyday communication, such as in shop signs, leaflets, textbooks and film posters, in an effort to determine a) to what extent this communication choice is based on a colour’s function as an *idiochrome*, *sociochrome* or another type, and, b) what the informational loss is in the particular case of intersemiotic translation.

4.1. Intersemiotic translation based on idiochrome

The Greek shop sign *Παιδικά Kinder Land* ‘Kinder Land Children’s Wear’ photographed in figure 3 below belongs to a children’s clothes shop in Thessaloniki, Greece. What is interesting about this sign are the colours used, and which are the ones that make up the well-known children’s milk chocolate brand *Kinder* (figure 4) and connote this brand. *Kinder Chocolate* is a confectionery product of [Italian](#) origin and is produced by a multinational company called [Ferrero SpA](#). On the other hand ‘Kinder’ is the [German](#) word for ‘child’. It is true that the word ‘Kinder’ on the shop sign is not written in exactly the same colours as the word on the chocolate wrap-

⁴ Klinkenberg interestingly approaches the matter from the *perspective of redundancy*. For Klinkenberg (1996: 59), redundancy may be created through different codes (intercodic) and different channels. He mentions the notion of ‘a hundred francs’ as an example, which can be expressed with the references /a hundred/ and /francs/ on the banknote or with colour.

⁵ Thus, for Klinkenberg (1996: 290), colour is articulated in minor units which he names *chromèmes* characterised by chromatic dominance, luminosity and saturation.

per. More specifically, on the shop sign the letters ‘K’ and ‘d’ are blue and the rest red, whereas on the chocolate wrappers the ‘k’ is black and the rest of the letters red⁶, which we could say is the dominant colour in this commercial product. However, *Kinder Chocolate* also uses blue on its wrappers and the background on which the verbal message is written is white in both cases.



Fig. 3: Shop sign in Thessaloniki: ‘Kinder Land’.



Fig. 4: Kinder milk chocolate.

The above shop sign is an intersemiotic translation between the verbal utterance *kinder* and the colours in which it is written, but we shouldn’t forget the interlingual translation between the Greek utterance *Παιδικά* ‘children’s wear’ and the German *kinder*. However, for it to be considered an intersemiotic translation, the shop sign’s reader must be personally aware of the particular brand of chocolate and the colours that represent it (*idiochrome*), or else they will simply think it is a colour combination chosen by the graphic designer. In my opinion, this particular chromatic and intertextual choice was made with the *idiochrome* of parents as the target, since they are the buying public, but also that of children’s, since they would also be able to urge their parents to make particular shopping choices.

4.2. Intersemiotic translation based on sociochrome

In the following example of a flyer advertising a foreign language tuition centre in Thessaloniki (figure 5), we notice that the three languages taught there, English, French and German, are written in the colours that make up the flag of each respective country. This is an intersemiotic translation between the verbal system and the colour system, which functions as a *sociochrome* since the colours used are common cultural knowledge, given that the flags function as symbols. We know from previous studies that colour can function as an index, symbol or icon⁷. As Caivano (1996: 685, 687) writes, colour can function in various ways, since “[...] color works as icons [...] but there are many other cases in which colors work as symbols [...] color, when acting as a substitute for visible radiation, works as an index [...]”. It is worth mentioning that for Nöth (2012: 284) “[s]trictly speaking, only symbols are fully translatable”.

⁶ For Caivano and López (2006: 16), “[...] red is the preferred colour for products of massive consumption, because it is regarded as a “declassifier”, i.e., a colour that does not contain markers of class. Another similar phenomenon is the case of McDonalds”.

⁷ Almalech (2011: 21) seems to stress the importance of the symbolic rather than the indexical meaning of colour.



Fig. 5: Flyer distributed in Thessaloniki, Greece.

Similarly, in the French language coursebook *C'est clair. Méthode de français* by Apartien & Bertin (2003: 80) (figure 6) we note -just as in many other textbooks that familiarize students with the colours in a foreign language- intersemiotic translations between the verbal message in French, e.g. *rouge*, and the corresponding colour. Here, too, knowledge of the colour comes under *sociochrome*, since the colour is immediately recognizable and will in turn lead, through the cognitive process, to the foreign verbal utterance's interpretation and translation into the corresponding Greek.



Fig. 6: Extract from French language course book edited in Greece.

4.3. Intersemiotic translation based on *rhetochrome*

The term *rhetochrome* has not been proposed by Edeline (2010), but by this author, since knowledge about colour may in fact be constructed or directed, functioning on a rhetorical level. Thus, in the *Ad for White & Black Coffee Brand: Coffee Inn* (figure 7) we see two people, a black man and white woman forming, with their bodies, the shape of a mug, evidently for drinking coffee. With his dark skin, the man connotes the coffee, while the woman stands for the milk or froth. Analysing it further, we could even say that the man was chosen to connote the coffee since coffee is a strong and stimulating beverage, while the woman connotes the milk or froth not only because of her ability to breastfeed, but also because milk is thought of as a light and relaxing drink.



Fig. 7: Ad for White & Black Coffee Brand: Coffee Inn.

But what is especially obvious is that while the black man's skin colour reflects the colour of that particular race, the woman's white colour appears extremely pale, resembling the colour of milk; we most definitely cannot claim that the woman's skin colour is representative of the white race. We can therefore state with certainty that there is an intersemiotic translation between the verbal message 'black and white coffee' and the man and woman's black and white skin, which have a rhetorical function as metonymies of the black and white races. We can therefore also mention that precisely because of this metonymic relationship, the utterance *white* directs the advertisement's reader to read the icon as *white* rather than *extremely white* or *not really human-like white*. As Kress and van Leeuwen (1996: 163) observe, "[...] images, including photographs, can be expressed as 'hyperreal', as showing 'too much detail', 'too much depth', 'too much colour to be true' [...]. We judge an image as real when, for instance, its colours are approximately as saturated as those in 35mm photographs. When they are more saturated, we judge them exaggerated, 'more than real', excessive".

The intersemiotic translation on a shop sign in Thessaloniki (figure 8) also seems to have a rhetorical function, with its verbal message *το χρυσό κουμπι* 'the gold button' translated intersemiotically with a yellow button. It is interesting to see that the sign's message is understood, since in social practice "[...] the usual chromatic representative of 'gold' is the yellow colour" (Almalech, 2011: 141). In fact, Almalech goes on to say that "[g]enerally, this representation has chromatic similarity without the meanings". Whitbread (2009: 32) also informs us that "[y]ellow and white represent gold and silver respectively and, therefore, the metals never appeared beside each other but separated by grounds of other colours".



Fig. 8: Shop sign in Thessaloniki: 'The gold button'.

It is worth mentioning that rhetochrome could also be used as intersemiotic translation to environments that are not immediately associated with advertisement and visual communication in general. Thus, in the case of the cover of the well known literary work of Charles Pierre Baudelaire *Les fleurs du mal* (figure 9), the extend use of black colour could easily be interpreted as the intersemiotic translation of the French utterance “mal”. As it has already been said, black colour has a series of negative associations/connotations in western culture, such as death, misadventure, sin, dishonesty, provocation, hate, aggression, sadness, according to van Leeuwen (2010: 2), or darkness, night, underground world and, of course, death, according to Pastoureau (2009: 30).




Fig. 9: Cover of the work of literature: ‘*Les fleurs du mal*’.

In the cases I have examined, colour, as a rhetochrome and as a second part in an intersemiotic translation, increases language’s informational content working as a redundant sign, and more specifically, a socio-cultural redundant sign. Its rhetoric function is an example of *increasing semiosis*, a semiosis that is constructed very carefully, since colour has a series of associations/connotations. Thus, we have to exclude many of these connotations to arrive in that/these required to produce intersemiotic translation.

5. Key findings

Kress and van Leeuwen (2001: 72) suggest that colour meanings come about through connotation and metaphor. I am in agreement with this view, while at the same time I should point out that there is nothing to stop us from seeing that *idiochrome* is based on the connotation of the colour’s use for each person, *sociochrome* is based on a collective connotation, and *rhetochrome* on the rhetorical use of colour as a metaphor, as well as a synecdoche and metonymy. The mediation of cultural knowledge and of its components in the intersemiotic translation between language and colour is presented in the following schema.



Schema 1: Schema of the intersemiotic translation between language and colour and the influence of cultural knowledge.

I believe that intersemiotic translation between the verbal and chromatic semiotic systems is feasible when colour has been defined as knowledge in cultural terms (idiochrome, sociochrome, rhetochrome), but first and foremost because colour is a text with a structure and function. I agree with Flosch's and Thürlemann's observation that it exists a double layer of signification in picture, and more precisely that "[o]n the *iconic* level, the picture is supposed to stand for some object recognizable from the ordinary perceptual Lifeworld; while concurrently on the *plastic* level, simple qualities of the pictorial Expression serve to convey abstract concepts" (Sonesson 1993: 325). However, I feel that this problem of conveying abstract concepts can be overcome since in intersemiotic translation, the other semiotic system involved, in our case language, leads the translation onto safer paths. We have to remember that "[l]anguage is an evolutionary latecomer that functions as an economizing grid which cultures have superimposed on nonverbal semiosis for communicative efficiency" and that "[t]ranslation is one of the fields of study where the fault lines between these signification systems become visible" (Ruthrof 2003: 79).

The informational loss may be greater if in an intersemiotic translation with language, colour functions as an *idiochrome*, although I could claim the same if its function is that of a *sociochrome*, since cultural knowledge may be recorded but not widespread in everyday communication. The informational loss seems to be minimised when the intersemiotic translation between language and colour is at the rhetorical level, colour in this case functions as a *rhetochrome*.

6. Conclusions

The intersemiotic translation between language and colour seems to be possible under two main restrictions. The first one is that *it is not an ambidextrous process*. While starting from the language, the dominant semiotic system for many semioticians, the social interpretation and identification of colour is possible, but it seems very difficult for a codified iconic system (as colour is) to be the source text, and to be translated to natural language (target text), due to the great number of associations which a colour has. The relation is that of the general to the particular, it is that of the many over the one.

The second one is that the degree of socio-cultural knowledge for the colour, since, as Greimas and Courtés (1993: 77) mention that "[f]rom a semiotic point of view, the concept of culture could be approached as coexisting with that of the semantic universe, in relation to a given sociosemiotic community". This mention to *a given sociosemiotic community* also justifies the role of the translator, who is not just a mediator, but a cultural mediator, that does not have a limited access, but ample socio-cultural knowledge which is also necessary for any intersemiotic translation, much more when the target text is in colour.

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SEMIOTICS OF COLOUR

Mony Almalech
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
almalech@abv.bg

Abstract

This study contains a brief overview and comments on some basic texts on the semiotics and semantics of colour. It presents my view on the basic semiotic status of colour as a communication system and on the grammar features of colour language.

1. Achievements and lacuna

Umberto Eco (1985) defines colour as a *cultural unit*, which means that as a sign it combines both the individual and the social. The problem is that he stops there. Miroslav Dachev (1997) used the cultural unit of Eco in introducing his reflections on colour in Bulgarian symbolist poetry of the late 19th and early 20th century in a monograph. Dachev introduces the concept of *coloureme* (before Kress & van Leeuwen 2002: 352, and Leone's 2007: 164 *cromemi* but with a partially different content). Dachev's *coloureme* serves to summarize the meanings of colour for ideas and feelings, as well as the means by which they are derived – from different versions of the semiotic triangle through the role of context to determine the meaning of the Basic Colour Terms, by the cultural traditions and innovations of the national and international character, to the linguistic features during this period.

Kress & van Leeuwen (2002) deal with the visual colour by analyzing the colour speech and visual rhetoric, but not colour language. They achieve results within the adopted methodology of systemic linguistics. According to the authors the colour is metafunctional in terms of Halliday (1978; 1993) with *ideational*, *interpersonal*, *textual* functions. In some cases colour fulfils these three metafunctions simultaneously, but (346) colour does not always fulfil all three of these functions. (350)

Kress & van Leeuwen recognize that there are two ways to produce meaning of colours. The first is psychological – by associations that come from the culture and the past, but also from present current advertising and brands. An important element is the context in which an association operates. The second way is to accept the visual qualities of colour – *hue, saturation, purity, modulation, differentiation* – as semantic distinguishing features. They are placed within the ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. Visual quality ‘is not systematized, as in phonology (in terms of Halle & Jakobson), as structural oppositions but as values on a range of scales. One such scale is the scale that runs from light to dark, another the scale that runs from saturated to desaturated. We see these features not as merely distinctive, as merely serving to distinguish different colours from each other, but also as meaning potentials. Any specific instance of a colour can be analyzed as a combination of specific values on each of these scales – and hence also as a complex and composite meaning potential, as we now demonstrate.’ (355)

This is a very accurate observation, but we are faced with colour idiolects, dialects, with national and regional languages of colour. Thus, we enter by the physical properties of colour, once – in the territory of natural language, and secondly – into the social and individual culture and tastes. This means that we can hardly find any specific colour grammar to the whole socium.

The position of van Leeuwen is that ‘looking at the colour as semiotic resource means, first of all, focusing on its materialities and technologies.’ (2011:1). This means, in my terms, to focus on the ‘speech apparatus’ of mankind with respect to producing colour-signs. But van Leeuwen declares that ‘looking at colour as a semiotic resource not only means looking at colour technologies, it also means looking at the way colour *meanings* are developed.’ (2011: 2).

Van Leeuwen is concerned about the possibility that colours may indicate ideas and feelings, which I consider essential in the semiotics of colour.

An important semiotic case study is the motivation of the colour sign. Van Leeuwen stated this case, although not in comparison with natural language where the linguistic sign is arbitrary, except for a small number of onomatopoeic words. Along with this are given many important features of the motivation and the ability to completely subjective interpretations of colour idiolect, colour dialect positions (2011: 2). In the examples of van Leeuwen, and from my corpus, there are facts that I treat as important features in the colour language (Almalech 2001; 2011):

- One and the same colour can have opposite meanings. I call this intra-colour antonymy.
- Many colours can mean the same feeling or idea. This is the inter-colour synonymy.
- Both effects are due to the small number of tokens in the colour language – visual and verbal.

In van Leeuwen’s book (2011), albeit briefly, are included the paradigm for basic colour terms, the colour theory for designers, the colour wheel and the colour models (RGB, CMY, RYB), the contrasts in Bauhaus art school. There still prevails an occupation with visual colour. It is kind of strange that in his book and in an article with Kress as co-author van Leeuwen never used the theory of prototypes (Rosch 1972a; b; 1975; 1977; 1978).

An important conclusion:

There has never been a single language of colour. Colour codes with a restricted semantic reach have always proliferated, and sometimes contradicted each other. But there are also broader, longer lasting, and more widely distributed trends, such as the reign of ‘puritan black’ or the ascendance of blue (van Leeuwen 2011: 97)

The works of Ugo Volli and Massimo Leone are of special interest. Volli (2004) deals with

the colours in fashion, which shows that semiotic change is the basic rule. Leone (2007) tries to review different semiotic instruments for the analysis of colour. He proposes the idea that the qualities of the visual colour – hue, saturation, purity – are an array of distinguishing features. This opinion is similar to that of Kress & Van Leeuwen's (2002) but with certain differences, as far as he does not use systemic linguistics. For understanding the language of colours it is necessary to analyze the semantic function of these three elements and the combinations of all of them in the common sense of what it means simply by “tint”, “shade” or even by the synecdoche “colour” (164). Leone leaves ‘retorica strutturale’ of Groupeµ and Greimas’ school to be discussed elsewhere.

It seems inevitable that the physical properties of the visual colour hue, saturation, purity etc. should be understood as distinguishing features in terms of phonology – in the structural version of Leone's semiotics, and in the systemic linguistics methodology of Kress & van Leeuwen. Due to lack of space and time I will comment on this case elsewhere.

Semioticians are dealing with the translation of colours. Kourdis (in print) speaks of inter-semiotic translation between language and colour in advertisements. Leone (2009) presents a semiotic interpretation of the art of Marc Chagall on *Moses while receiving from God the Tablets of the Law*. He indicates how the visual colour matches the biblical text.

Caivano (1996; 2010) is an architect and active participant in the international semiotic events. He is engaged in the rhetoric of colours. Caivano is intent on making ‘semioticians interested in visual semiotics better acquainted with the very elaborate aspects of colour theory, from which they could take models to develop other aspects of visual semiotics, and to make colour theorists more familiar with general semiotics’ (1998).

Over the past fifty years, the main objects of the research were Basic Colour Terms. For me, this impoverished the semiotics of colour. However, the development of these studies is important. Here are its most important points:

- The book of Berlin & Kay (1969) triggered the discussions. Basic colour terms are given technical definitions.
- The evolutionary sequence of basic colour terms is presented as an universal phenomenon: I Dark and light; II Red; III Green or yellow; IV yellow and green; V Blue; VI Brown; VII Purple, pink, orange, or gray.
- It is proposed that the categories of colour are presented by the basic colour terms.
- The Prototype theory proposes the idea that there are prototypes, a focus or “the most typical examples” of colours. (Rosch 1972a; 1972b; 1975; 1977; 1978)
- Colour concepts are *embodied* in that focal colours are partly determined by human biology. Colour categorization makes use of human biology, but colour categories are more than merely a consequence of the nature of the world plus human biology. Colour categories result from the world plus human biology plus a cognitive mechanism that has some of the characteristics of fuzzy set theory plus a culture-specific choice. (Lakoff 1987: 29)
- A macro-category of colour is presented by basic colour terms. (Witkowski & Brown 1977; 1978). Macro-colour is a “composite category” – a category may be represented by different basic colour terms, and vice versa – a basic colour term may represent two different macro-categories (Witkowski & Brown 1977: 50).
- These categories are related to the primary colours in human biology, as in the Opponent colour theory (Karl Hering 1834-1918).
- The macro-categories are macro-light, macro-dark, macro-red, macro-green-blue (GRUE), macro-green-yellow. (Witkowski & Brown 1977; Kay & Maffi 1999).
- Each macro-colour has different prototypes that are both intra-social and cross-social.
- Wierzbicka (1990) presents a scheme, which combines the evolutionary sequence, the

prototype theory, the macro-categories and the fuzzy sets. Her understanding is that prototypes are natural objects, rather than Rosch's salient colour areas. Wierzbicka points to specific objects: red – blood and fire; white – light; black – darkness, night; blue – sea and sky; green – all plants; yellow – the sun at noon.

- Wierzbicka (2008) does not accept the universality of the evolutionary sequence of the basic colour terms. She points to the fact that many languages have no words equivalent to the English word “colour” [hue], and therefore there can be no such thing as “colour” [hue] universals. Wierzbicka does not accept colour categories, which as biological phenomena are presented by basic colour terms. (1990: 102-103).
- Saunders (1992, 1993, 1995) & van Brakel, (1997, 1988, eds. 2002) are the most serious and persistent critics of the idea of universals in the evolutionary sequence of Berlin & Kay's paradigm.
- Using Munsell chips leads to anglocentrism, expressed in the fact that the English system of colour terms is superimposed on languages that have two or three English-type colour terms. Munsell's array and the chips based on it, as used in the interviews, discredit the quality of the linguistic data because colour impressions consist of more than hue, saturation and brightness. These chips display only hue, saturation and brightness whereas scholars need a greater number of features of colour, e.g. softness, size, glossiness, because they may influence the production of colour terms. (Biggam 2012: 87)
- Wierzbicka solves the problem of anglocentrism by using the semantic primitives (atoms, molecules) and the prototypes (2008).
- The Vantage theory of MacLaury (2002) has an anti-anglocentric element. It is ‘a theory of cognitive categorization in terms of point of view or ‘vantage.’ [...] MacLaury found the prototype theory and fuzzy-set logic inadequate. [...] A vantage is a point of view constructed by analogy to physical experience as though it were one or more ‘space–motion coordinates’ on a spatial terrain.’ (Allan 2006: 252–253).
- Borg surveys the colour categorization and colour terminology among the *Negev Bedouin* (1999) and the colour usage in the modern Arabic colloquials (2007). He uses the macro-colour categories to demonstrate the richness of colour expressions that stand outside the set of basic colour terms.
- Saunders (2009) puts to use the *habit* – one of the three key concepts of Charles Peirce. ‘Colour’ for Peirce is *not* deterministic, but fluid and variant, in the flux of perpetual change. [...] he proposes *the structuring of ‘habit,’* since the character of the sensory core is determined by the generative functioning of habit. [...] Peirce's arguments thereby assert colour, colour naming and categorisation to be *socially generated historical prostheses* – the production of an *exosomatic organ*. Thus colour has no ‘immediacy’ or predetermined givenness, as colour science asserts, but evolves as part of a historic, dynamic, complex ‘sign- system.’ (2009: 370).
- Biggam (2004, 2012) is an excellent expert on the discussion of the semantics of basic colour terms. She is interested in diachrony.
- Sutrop (2001) operates in the pattern of Lotman's modelling framework – ‘one can analyze the BCTs (i.e., basic colour terms) using the formula “language = code + history” and abandon the technical definition of a BCT. We can paraphrase Lotman's formula in the following way: “colour language = BCTs and non-BCTs + history of language and culture”. (46–47).
- Sutrop is right that ‘focusing research only on the BCTs minimizes the linguistic, semantic and semiotic richness of a colour language.’ (47). It is because ‘BCTs form the absolute minority (maximally 0.5 to 5 percent) of the colour terms in a language.’ (47).

Sutrop insists on language axes to organize and model the linguistic colour space – ‘static vs. dynamic, syntagmatic vs. paradigmatic, synchronic vs. diachronic, semasiologic vs. onomasiologic, and logical vs. mythological.’ (46–47).

2. Proposals and realizations

Not a little has been done so far in the field of semiotics of colour, but I have not met anyone explicitly indicating the basic semiotic parameters of colour. In my opinion, this is necessary, because it would bring a little more clarity to the complex and controversial problem of the symbolism of colour.

2.1. Visual and verbal colour

The big problem is that colour is both a visual and a verbal sign. All researches, in one degree or another, have mixed colour words with visual perception and sensation.

2.2. Signifier and signified

It is worth distinguishing these two areas from a basic standpoint. In terms of Saussure they should look like this:

Verbal colour – basic colour terms

signifier	sound wave (articulate sounds)
signified	1. idea 2. concept/notion 3. the real object

Number of signifiers – 11-12 basic colour terms + about 50 non basic colour terms – words for prototypes (light, darkness, fire, blood, sea, sky, plants, the noonday sun), and rivals of prototypes (cherry, strawberry, lemon, cocoa, ruby, sapphire, yolk, egg, rose + NP – Paris blue, etc.)

Visual colour in the passage rites of wedding and funeral

signifier	Light/colours – electromagnetic wave + elementary particle photon
signified	1. Apotropeic (preserving and reproduction) for Red; spirit and physical purity, immaculate for White; life, fertility, eternity, health for Green (Almalech 1996) 2. The actual objects, coloured according to the ritual norm

Number of signifiers – thousand shades of basic colours, among which are preferred the most typical (focal) and few versions of mixing colours (RGB, CMY, RYB).

2.3. The number of characters-tokens in natural and in colour languages

Together with the lack of speech apparatus for colours in humans, there is another difficulty for the study of colours as a sign system. The total number of natural language has up to 200,000 characters-tokens (words), while the language of colours has a much smaller number of tokens – in verbal colour 80-100, in the visual – significant for communication up to 30 shades of primary colours. This implies a greater ambiguity of colour signs.

2.4. Communication with verbal and visual colour

This area outlines another problem – how to communicate with verbal and visual colour. Humans have each a biological antenna (acoustic apparatus) to broadcast verbal tokens, and a

biological antenna (auditory perception) for receiving audio signals. For the visual signs each human has a biological antenna only for receiving visual signs (perception and sensation) but no biological antenna to broadcast (speech apparatus) any visual colour characters. A human's "speech apparatus" is a technology for colouring, painting objects.

2.5. Visual colour

Mixing the visual and the verbal is inevitable in the hypotheses, theories and studies of colour.

2.5.1. The symbolism of colour in anthropology

The studies of colour in the culture of the South African tribe Ndembu (Turner 1966), the Muslims of the Jordan Valley (Granquist 1965) of the Bedouins of the desert Negev (Borg 1999) present relevant information about the symbolism of visual and verbal language of colour. The data they provide should be used in the semiotic approach.

2.5.2. Reduplication as a semiotic machine for natural/motivated signs.

As noted by Robert Yelle (2012), reduplication is not only a proven mechanism for the production of onomatopoeia in natural language. It is also an important element in religious ritual space. Yelle raises the issue of motivation of the signs in the religious understanding in different folklore and religious systems and practices. The natural sign has special importance in the Indian mantras, being regarded as a healer and connector of the human world with the Hereafter or the ideal world in a direct way. Thus, in the unscientific, religious understanding of sound and colours in the world traditions the sounds of natural language and the colours are motivated/natural signs. This is an anti-structuralist understanding, but it is a fact in all the world folklore and religious practices. If anthropological researches make it clear that the colours have meanings for non-colours (i.e. symbolism of colours), this should be part of the semiotics of visual colours. In the light of sacred ritual function of the text of the Bible, the Hebrew language and its translations have the status of a recurring ritual.

2.5.3. Colours at rites of passage – universality and relativity

The presence of a red veil, red and white clothes, bouquet (green) and gold in all traditional weddings through the ages – regardless of religion, the type of social order and technological level – is a universal four-syntagmatic encoding of the traditional wedding. (Almalech 1996).

2.5.3.1. Synchrony and diachrony at the wedding

The change of the age-old, universal code in the late 19th and early 20th century is revolutionary. It can be explained only with the arrival of many people from rural areas to cities. The city lifestyle prevents the direct relationship with nature thus opening the way to a new mentality – independence from nature. This leads to a gradual forgetting of the meanings of ancient colours and replacing them with another combination – white (dress, veil, shoes), green (bouquet) and gold (wedding rings). Apotropaic red disappears, and red is the colour of protection power for the bride – "from which all life fled." Now, it is the city environment that protects and provides a reproduction of the family (Almalech 1996).

2.6. Grammar of visual colours

2.6.1. In rites of passage

Visual and verbal colours must be clearly distinguished in a grammar of the language of colours. Typical rites of passage are the folklore wedding and burial. Rituals are an example of

the visual language of colours. In these rituals the main personages (bride, groom, deceased, mourners) undergo a transition from one state to another. They need help and protection, because the transition is dangerous. This presupposes a strategy and structure of the whole ritual, including colours. Strategy and structure are bound by the ultimate goal, which affects not only the participants but serves society by guaranteeing the preservation of the family and the continuation of the Clan. This drastically differentiates the ritual use of colours from its daily use, the fashion, and the architectural use of colours.

In this context, the approach is to find the basic grammar categories we know in the grammar of natural language. For example, the language of visual colours has no parts of speech. The category of Time can be traced only with a view to motivating meanings of colours in traditional rituals in terms of the magical effect of the colours at the time of the ritual, and afterwards, in the future. We can think of the narrative, declarative and narrative-declarative meaning of the ritual colours. For example, the white of the modern bride is narrative, if she is a virgin (physical and spiritual purity). If a modern bride is not a virgin, but wears the white dress of the modern bride, apparently meaning virginity, purity is declarative, i.e. false. Physical and spiritual purity has been a universal signified of white for centuries across many cultures. With the same lexical meaning, *purity*, white is used at funerals – in Ancient Greece, in modern Japan, etc.

It follows that there is a lexical meaning that fits in with the contextual, depending on the structure and strategy of the ritual. For example, white is a sign of mourning in ancient Greece with well-motivated reasons (Goodenough 1964: 165–167; Abrachams 1964: 101; Ferguson 1989: 128), but its meaning is declarative of ‘spiritual, mental and physical purity’, which mourners and the deceased ‘present in the most appropriate way before the gods’ (Goodenough 1964: 166).

Clothes of priests are subordinate to the doctrine as well as the ideas of the calendar holidays in a particular religion.

2.6.2. In the visual arts, design and daily use

Obviously, in this field it is impossible to seek universal and permanent meanings of the colours. What is possible is to stay within the scope of Colour science – theories of contrasts, the colour wheel, models for additive and subtractive mixing of colours – RGB, CMY, RYB.

2.7. Verbal colour

There is no doubt, that research on the semantics of the basic colour terms] is essential for the semiotics of colour. Regarding the imposition trend, not only basic but non-basic colour terms should be considered. Both types of terms are examined systematically in all of my books on colour in the Bible (Almalech, 2010, 2013, 2014). And what is more, non-basic colour terms have been analyzed in a number of publications (Almalech, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013, 2014 etc.).

2.8. My hypothesis and conclusions

There is a very small number of universal meanings of the colours associated with the prototypes of colours. The method of proof is by an associative experiment. The methodology is presented in Almalech 2001. The verbal meanings were compared to the meanings from rites of passage, i.e. by a comparison between verbal and visual colour meanings.

Here are its most important points:

a) A Compilation of Norm for verbal associations of Bulgarians to basic colour terms. The norm is derived from two experiments – Norm for verbal associations (Gerganov 1984) and an experiment in 1995-1996 (Almalech 2001).

The comparison shows that there are sustainable associations of the basic colour terms. Sustainable associations are found in both experiments. These are the words of prototypes, basic properties of the prototypes (for fire hot, warm and blood; expanse, space, limitlessness for sky, sea etc.), as well as semantisation of the basic properties (love, hate for red; freedom for blue, life, eternity for green etc.). Thus, per word-stimulus red sustainably occur fire, flame, blood, heat, hot, and all extreme feelings – love, hate, etc.; per green – grass, tree, shrub, lettuce, lawn, leaf, freshness, life, eternity, vitality, poison, malice, etc. (Almalech, 2001, 2011) These are of the highest statistical frequency. This sustainable set of associations is the Core norm. There is a Periphery norm, in which the associations are different. They reflect the personal and social meanings of the colours that represent the capacity of the colours be varied in its symbolism.

The results of the associative experiments are relevant of language consciousness and subconscious. Svitlana Martinek postulated a stronger significance of this method: ‘The associative network is not arbitrary but to some degree is predetermined by hierarchical conceptual structures in the consciousness of speakers. The responses evoked by a certain stimulus can be seen as the reflection of corresponding conceptual structures.’ (Martinek 2004: 497)

b) The Norm shows some universal features of verbal colour language:

Visual colours (traditional marriage and burial and secret Religious-Mystic Knowledge)	Colour	Verbal colours
fertility – Balkan folklore	GREEN	nature, fertility, vegetation
freshness of nature – Balkan folklore, Islam	GREEN	fresh, freshness
fertility – Balkan folklore, Islam	GREEN	nature, growth
freshness, growth – marriage meaning that is signed over the bride and groom – Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, freshness of nature	GREEN	fresh, nature, freshness, vegetation, growth
vegetation on the Earth – Jewish Kabbalah	GREEN	planet, vegetation

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THE SEMIOTIC ABSTRACTION

Russell Daylight
Charles Sturt University, Australia
rdaylight@csu.edu.au

Abstract

When we press the “a” key on our computer keyboard, an “a” appears on our screen almost instantaneously. In between those two points there are a number of layers of computer program which communicate with each other: the keyboard controller sends a message to the operating system which is interpreted by a word processor, which then returns a message to the operating system, which communicates with the video controller and the video board sends a message that it needs an “a” and this is mapped as a group of pixels which light up on the screen. Except that none of this actually happens. At the level of physical reality, all that happens is the shifting of magnetic fields and the passing of electrons. The electrons orbiting atoms slide from one atom to the next along wires, among silicon and metal. Entities like computer programs and operating systems are *abstractions*, layers of abstractions in fact, on top of a brute reality. In this paper I argue that this is the appropriate starting point for understanding the role of semiotics in negotiating reality. Taking examples from computer science, visual perception and language, this inquiry considers what kind of abstraction we want semiotics to be. It is found that “the semiotic abstraction” allows us to understand semiotic systems as *machines for creating differences*, and semiotics itself as the primordial science of meaning.

Preamble

I wrote a book, called *What if Derrida was wrong about Saussure?* (2011), in which I tried to discover what was at stake in Derrida’s writings on Saussure, and hence, what was at stake between structuralism and post-structuralism. In an interview with Henri Ronse, Derrida declared that he found it necessary, strategically, to risk saying nothing (1982b: 14). Right to the

end of my work on Derrida I found that a puzzling and even disturbing idea. However, if I am somewhat anxious about the proposal contained in this paper, then it's because I also want to risk saying nothing. What I will propose here concerns the role of "abstraction" in semiotics, where abstraction is defined as "considering an object or group of objects from *one* viewpoint while disregarding all other properties of the object" (Shaumyan 1998: 17). As we shall see, this viewpoint will allow us to understand semiotic systems as *machines for creating differences*, and semiotics itself as the primordial science of meaning.

Like Derrida also, as he does in "Différance" (1982a: 3), I want to begin with a letter.

The Letter A

I want you to imagine pressing the A key on a computer keyboard and observing the letter "a" which appears on the screen. In between those two points, of course, exist many layers and domains of software and hardware, across which this communication must travel. The kinetic energy of your finger depresses the key, which makes contact with a matrix of electrical receptors underneath the keyboard. This point of contact is registered by the keyboard controller which sends the key number to the operating system. The operating system checks with its window manager, and sends an ASCII keystroke to the open program – let's say a word processor – which updates both its file structure in memory, as well as its bitmap view of the display. Finally, the operating system then sends a message from its graphics driver to the monitor to change the colour of certain pixels in a certain area of the screen. This chain of communication is simple enough to understand. The only problem is that none of it actually happens.

At the level of brute reality, all that happens is the movement of electrons flowing through metal being controlled by magnetic fields. In other words, that the electrons orbiting, say, copper atoms shift from one atom to the next along wires from the keyboard to the computer to the monitor. Everything can be explained in the physical world as the shift of magnetic fields and the flow of electrons. Entities like files, programs and operating systems are abstractions. They don't exist in brute reality; they are only a particular conceptualisation of that reality.

Abstraction is a term used in many fields, from philosophy to art history; it is also used by Peirce. However, my semiotic project in general asks us to go back to that moment *prior* to Peirce and Saussure, when the field of inquiry was still open with possibility. As such, it is helpful to free ourselves of all preceding definitions, even if they share certain themes. The one usage of the term that helps to make this concept distinct is that used by computer science. In computer science, abstraction is explained as the elimination of low-level physical properties in order to isolate only those functions under study. This allows programmers to assume the details of complex physical environments in order to focus on the meaning of those details from a particular perspective. In their (1999) text *Concrete Abstractions*, Hailperin, Kaiser and Knight ask us to:

Consider, for example, a word processor. When you use a word processor, you probably think that you have really entered a document into the computer and that the computer is a machine which physically manipulates the words in the document. But in actuality, when you "enter" the document, there is nothing new inside the computer – there are just different patterns of activity of electrical charges bouncing back and forth. ... Even the program that you call a "word processor" is an abstraction – it's the way we humans choose to talk about what is, in reality, yet more electrical charges. (1999: ix)

Typically, abstraction in computer science operates in distinct layers. Each layer allows us to

assume, and ignore, the physical details in lower levels of abstraction. For example, programs assume the work done by programming languages, programming languages assume the work done by machine languages, machine languages assume binary, and binary assumes electronic circuitry.




Fig. 1: Stacked abstractions in computing.

At the core of a computer, at the simplest or lowest level of abstraction, are electronic circuits. In physical reality, a circuit is a microscopic arrangement of metal within a silicon platform holding two different voltage potentials in place with magnetic fields; but conceptually, it is a binary decision maker: what's called a logic gate. And from a logic gate, you can build anything, from calculators and word processors to movies and climate models.

Computer abstraction is a fascinating topic in itself – well, fascinating to me as an English Lecturer – but what is important here is thinking about how abstraction can help us understand the properties of semiotic systems. But first, and in less detail, I want to briefly suggest how the neurological processes of perception are analogous to these computer processes.

Abstraction in General

One of the simplest and most common examples of semiosis occurs when we see a tree. Indeed, it was the first example Ferdinand de Saussure could think of (1983: 65). We, the viewer, being of sound mind and body, and of unitary consciousness, observe the shape and colour of a singular, discrete, object. That information is sent for visual processing, looked up in memory, cross-checked with language, and we emerge with the concept and name of a tree. But once again, of course, at the level of brute reality, none of that happens. In the same way as a computer, a physical process – in this case, electromagnetic waves striking our retinas – is converted into electrical signals by the photoreceptor cells, and sent as information along neurons. Just as with the word processor, nothing new is entered into the brain: the neurological data is transmitted in the form of changes in electrical potential, and is absolutely indistinguishable from other sensory, cognitive or physiological instructions.

It is impossible, however, to solve any problems in perception, cognition, signs and language if we continually have to refer to electrical charges leaping across synapses, and so we abstract

out lower levels of information to concentrate on the issue at hand. According to Bear, Connors and Paradiso, in their (2007) text *Neuroscience*, the layers of abstraction on top of this basic reality move from the molecular to the cellular to the behavioural to the cognitive (2007: 13–14).




Fig. 2: Abstraction in *Neuroscience* (Bear, Connors and Paradiso).

Interestingly enough, they also talk of “voltage potential” (2007: 60) and “gates” (2007: 59) as the basic material of brain functioning. And in the same way as the abstractions of computer science, cognitive neuroscience (which studies consciousness and language) assumes the work done by behavioural neuroscience, behaviour assumes systems, systems assume cells, and cellular models assume and ignore the details of molecular functioning.

We need to ask an essential question at this point: if each of these layers defines a *useful* level of abstraction to make discoveries about the brain in total, then which is the appropriate level of abstraction for thinking about communication, information, and signs? Information is most obviously an abstraction which ignores the physical details of a chemical-electrical flow in order to focus on the *meaning* of that flow as data or code. So that kind of abstraction might sit between the systems and behavioural layers, or perhaps between the behavioural and cognitive layers. On the contrary, the answer is that semiotic work is being done at *every* level of abstraction, whenever we eliminate physical properties in order to focus on the meaning of those properties within a system. With visual perception, for example, we could focus on information at a low level – such as the work of rods and cones in colour perception – or at a very high level – like the aesthetic pleasure of autumn leaf colours. It’s important to remember, however, that *every* layer of abstraction will be built on top of the *same* neurological reality.

Clearly there is a great difference between thinking about the semiotics of seeing a tree, the semiotics of colour perception, and the semiotics of voltage potential leaping across synapses. Most often, though, in this field of study called semiotics, we begin at the very top layer of abstraction, with unitary consciousness and discrete objects. Let’s say a tick smells the warm blood of a mammal and falls onto its prey. That’s already at a very high level of abstraction, perhaps already at the highest *possible* level of abstraction, making it impossible to understand what language and signs actually do. Such a starting point neglects, and takes for granted, the great majority of abstractions – indeed a stack of abstractions – that could potentially be semiotic systems. My view, then, would be that abstraction is currently insufficiently explored in the study

of meaningful systems. The question is: what kind of abstraction should semiotics be? In other words, what are the essential characteristics of a semiotic abstraction?

To answer that, let's return to logic gates and to language.

Semiotic Abstraction

The only linguist I have discovered to be interested in this idea of abstraction is Sebastian Shaumyan – the Armenian-American structuralist (1916–2007) – who defined abstraction as: “considering an object or group of objects from *one* viewpoint while disregarding all other properties of the object” (1998: 17). This much is consistent with the view of abstraction I have presented so far, and indeed, Shaumyan understands abstraction in the same layered sense as with computer science and neuroscience.




Fig. 3: Linguistic abstraction according to Shaumyan.

For Shaumyan, the infinite complexity of human sounds are abstracted to form phonemes, phonemes are abstracted to form words, and so on (1998: 15). Each layer can make its own unique discoveries about language by taking for granted the mechanisms at lower levels of abstraction.

Shaumyan’s task is to discover the semiotic properties of language. In order to do that, he states that: “Our problem is to consider human language under the one viewpoint of its semiotic properties, while disregarding all its other properties. ... Singling out the semiotic properties of language I call semiotic abstraction” (1998: 17). So this would be the guiding principle of my argument in this paper: that isolating the semiotic properties of some system or phenomenon is what we should call “semiotic abstraction”.

Now, in between the molecular layer – where ions are transferred between atoms – and the cognitive layer – in which “I” “see” “a tree” – or between the infinite complexity of human sounds and their abstraction as arguments, are many possible layers and types and purposes of abstraction. And if we are dealing with multiple layers then it gives us a chance to think about which layers – if any or all – are semiotic in character, or conversely, which properties would need to be isolated in a semiotic abstraction.

To answer that, I’m going to return to computer science for a moment. Because I have an intuition, let’s call it, that studying perception, experience and language is such muddy ground for

us all – it has been so trampled underfoot by philosophical inquiry – that it becomes far more fruitful in the first instance to deal with something at some remove from those familiar questions. And so returning to the example of computer science, we may as well start from the most elementary level of abstraction, which is the logic gate, and which, reassuringly, does actually feel like a semiotic system *par excellence*. Saussure, and indeed Shaumyan, describe language as the most representative of all semiotic systems; but I think that the logical, or binary, gate is a much more likely candidate. It's a system of only two possible states of energy: the minimum number to create a distinction, which we can abstract to being yes/no, black or white, zero or one. In other words, a computer is a distinction machine: a machine for creating differences. And this is what I believe we should think of a semiotic system as: a machine for creating differences. With the ability to create differences, we can create anything.

Can we say that the “zero state” or the “one state” of voltage potential has no meaning at all outside of its binary opposition, that is, its semiotic system? Well, in most senses, *no*: it is a flow of electrons and it has an impact on the world, it exists, it can't be nothing. But my point would be that it is not semiotic; the two states, taken together, is semiotic. For a state to carry that special property we call meaning – even if it is perceived by a non-intelligent being like a transistor – it must be able to be different from something else.

The semiotic abstraction, then, is to filter out all details except for meaningful differences within a system, i.e., for *value*. It's not much, but it's something: a single criterion. Which to me is reassuring, as I'm uncomfortable with that particular discourse of semiotics that wants to include every field of inquiry within a semiotic purview: to gather developmental psychology, evolutionary biology, quantum physics, under one overarching theory. In a sense this might be true, that everything in the universe – both living and non-living – is available for semiotic analysis. But if semiotics is to be anything at all, it has to be the universe viewed from a *particular* point of view, and that is the view produced by the semiotic abstraction.

Implications

I want to end not with a conclusion but with a series of implications, and I apologise if some of these rely on ideas and arguments from other works of mine, particularly my (2012) essay “The Difference Between Semiotics and Semiology.”

The first implication is that abstraction in general allows us to see that all scientific inquiry is built upon the same basic reality.




Fig. 4: Abstraction of the sciences

Physics, chemistry and biology, for example, do not study different objects; they are simply specialised, and stacked, views of the same object. Biological systems come into view only when we abstract chemical information, chemical systems come into view only when we abstract physical information, and physics appears only by making abstractions of physical reality.

This understanding is important in determining the boundary of semiotic inquiry. Because, from this point of view, there is no possible distinction between living and non-living systems. Indeed, they are the same objects, simply observed from different points of view. It would be controversial to say that biology *creates* cells, or that chemistry *creates* molecules, or that physics *creates* atomic forces. But it *is* necessary to abstract physical information to allow molecules to appear. In the same way, it might be controversial to say that semiotics *creates* signs. But the semiotic abstraction *is* necessary for us to *see* signs. More prosaically, and at the risk of saying nothing, it's only in looking for signs that we find them.

A number of implications arise from the fact that the semiotic abstraction produces a set of meaningful differences within a system. The first is that it is a mechanism which is incapable of comparing the sameness of entities, their essences or qualities. It is incapable of addressing habits or patterns which form over time. These differences, or *values* in the Saussurean sense, are taken at a single moment in time, and hence are systematic, not temporal. Furthermore, the relationship between, say, visual perception and emotional response, is one of multiple ways of conceptualising the same basic phenomenal or neuroscientific reality, and hence is best understood simultaneous layers of abstraction, rather than as a temporal chain of semiosis. Indeed, if physical properties are abstracted for meaning within a system, then the essential partnership of semiotics is not the stand-for relation but the abstracted-as relation. The full set of potential electromagnetic waves do not *stand for* short, medium and long wavelengths, but are *abstracted as* short, medium and long wavelengths.

A further implication is that the best and most characteristic semiotic systems will be finite and complete systems. In a logic gate, we know the entire set of possible outcomes, and we know all of the individual elements. You can't know the system until you know all the elements and you can't know the value of the individual elements until you know the entire system. This is something that could never be perfectly achieved with natural languages, which are open and indistinct. In other words, the precision and reliability of meanings are dependent upon the precision of *both* the frame *and* the distinctions within it. So we can add that the second ideal characteristic of a semiotic system would be the precision of the distinctions, or commutations. With a logic gate, the distinction between the zero and one values is perfectly clear and consistent: either the connection between the two circuit points is made, or it isn't. With languages and other communicative systems, the set of values varies between individuals and the commutations are variable and approximate.

However, the most important implication of defining semiotics as a machine for creating differences is that it establishes semiotics as an originary or primordial science. Difference is the source, the prerequisite, of logic, of mathematics, of the natural sciences. It is a primary science, the foundation of all others. For Peirce, semiotics is logic. But in the same way that Derrida showed that the difference involved in signs is the source and constitution of Husserlian phenomenology, we would say that difference is the source and constitution of Peircean logic.

My final point is that I believe that semiotic abstraction has the potential to unite theoretical and applied semiotics. Applied semiotics might well be the Frankenstein's monster of semiotics – throwing together whatever pieces of Peirce, Saussure, Eco and Sebeok lie to hand, but it has the distinct advantage of being useful: of providing undergraduates with a better sense of how we make meaning in the world. Theoretical semiotics, on the other hand, retains its conceptual purity only by studying imaginary objects, and hence, at the great cost of abandoning the real

world. Semiotic abstraction is capable, perhaps, of bridging the two domains. It is true that some systems are simple, like a logic gate with only two possible values. Many systems in the natural world, like photoreceptor cells, produce results with a manageable level of complexity. Language is very much more complicated, and a traffic intersection more complicated still. But the relationship between theory and practice remains sound; it is non-contradictory. Like the relationship between Newtonian Physics and the real-world movement of weights down a slope: simple laws can produce physical complexity beyond the scope of the greatest supercomputers. The same relationship would pertain to the laws of semiotics and the situation at a busy intersection, when you decide if it safe to cross the street. It's a massively complex semiotic system, but one that is based on simple and self-contained laws.

In summary, semiotics is increasingly interested in bridging the gap between the word and the world, or between brute reality and some representation of it. But this is the oldest task of philosophy, and is caught up in long standing questions of mind and representation. Caught up, also, in the scientific inquiry into living and non-living matter. As a self-contained field of inquiry, semiotics should not depend on *a priori* notions of logic or scientific method, but create its own rules from the ground up. I would encourage humility in the face of this task, but suggest that abstraction offers a unique perspective, and a powerful analytical tool, in developing semiotics as the science of meaning.

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SEMIOTICS OF RELIGION

PERFORMATIVES IN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Borislav Gueorguiev
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
gueorguiev.borislav@gmail.com

Abstract

What has been happening in the human society since the Renaissance usually is being described through the following standard *clichés*: during the Renaissance human becomes the center of the attention – not God; since the Renaissance man begins to align himself with God. Since the beginning of the history, until nowadays, the intellectuals have been working over one giant project to repeat what God (whatever may be hiding behind this name) has once managed to do according to the different Holy Scripts: to spell by series of performatives a world alternative to the already existing one (i.e. to the one which has been created by God) with all its characteristics: with its own cosmogony, cosmology, theogony, theology and eschatology. Expressions like “Newton’s picture of the world”, “Einstein’s picture of the world” and so on and so on; the scientific figure of the psychoanalytic who duplicates the trust spent figure of the confessor; the scientific figure of the doctor who duplicates the mythical and sometimes terrifying figure of the quack, of the fortune teller (e.g. the late Vanga created respect and through her terrifying appearance) proved this thesis.

The statement about the resemblance between the mathematical model of the Big Bang and the beginning of the Genesis is not new. It is far more interesting to point that one and the same, in its essence, cosmogony is being described with the tools of two languages –of the universal through the use of a number of performative utterances and of a ‘language for special purposes’ containing a lot of terms. In order to understand the second description one must have specific knowledge. For the first one – this knowledge is not needed: it is understandable by itself.

Of course there were times when even the Old Scripture’s description was esoteric: in those times when the official Biblical languages (Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Old-Bulgarian) were strictly

defined and non-understandable for those who don't have the knowledge how to use them.

And so once more we get to the primary Old Scripture performative, an analogy of the Big Bang theory that created everything that follows and which we described from a certain point of view.

This is the moment to answer the question why did I take John Austin and "How to do things with words" as a symbol of all that I lay down here. In my opinion, as an artifact, John Austin's lectures in Harvard conjoined under this title have a foundational meaning but not in the sense which usually is being put in such statement. According to me the Austin's theory is the bottom which the profanation that began about 200 years ago could reach, because it reveals the main mechanism of the Creation throughout the words inherent according to the tradition in God and God's Son.

John Austin's speculations on the performative utterance begin from speech events that don't describe anything, don't say anything, don't claim anything, that are neither "true", nor "false" and in which, as he says, exists an ordinary verb in present tense, first person, singular, active, indicative mood. And which represent realization of an action, or some part of it, which cannot be described in natural way as speech.

The "How to do things with words" project in some intellectual circles becomes as famous as, let's say, Aristotle's "Poetics" and "Rhetorics", or at least Ferdinand de Saussure's "Cours de linguistique générale".

John Austin's lectures publisher, John Urmson, is a prominent Aristotle's expert and an active figure in the Aristotle Society. And, as it's known, John Austin himself is an English logician, professor in Moral Philosophy in Oxford during the period of 1952–1960, who, while he is alive, publishes only a few articles and becomes famous after his death as a founder of the Oxford school, which worked on the philosophy through analysis of the everyday language (so called "Analytical Philosophy").

All these facts eloquently lead to the thought that John Austin – being a British, a philosopher and logician, – and his publisher couldn't be unfamiliar with the Holy Scripture of Jewish and Christians, and not to be aware of the fact that the beginning of the Old Testament contains circumstantial description of the performative theory (for which, by consensus, John Austin is being considered a founder,) but not the anonymous observer and narrator in the book of Genesis.

What do I mean? Through the whole First and in the beginning of the Second chapter of the book of Genesis somebody describes how God, using performatives, has created the life on the Earth (and not in the Universe, as it is wrongly stated) because for its creation is said:

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.

In both Bulgarian and English texts of the Holy Scripture the performative verb is in the Past Tense and according to Austin's theory for true performative utterance it is only possible when the statement is in present tense, 1p., sg., active, indicative mood (or at least concerning Bulgarian grammar).

Why do I say "describe", but not "report in CNN style, for instance" how God creates the life on Earth?

Then God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light.

Why do I say "full synopsis"?

Then God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light. And God saw the light that it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness.

According to the original Austin's theory about the performative it can't be either "true" or "false" but can instead be deemed "felicitous" or "infelicitous" according to a set of conditions. In this case apparently felicity performatives have been described because the positive result has been demonstrated. Therefore, all the conditions for felicity of the performative utterance one of which (in this case) is too important are fulfilled: concrete persons and circumstances must be eligible for implementation of the concrete procedure, which we use through the performative. Apparently in this case the eligible one to create a new world through performative statements is God himself.

In the first chapter of Genesis ideas are also contained which we can compare not only to John Austin's ideas. Thus for example in it we could find the idea of constitutional rules as rules which create [and also regulate] activity which existence is logically dependent on these rules, and I shall remind the following statement of Searle: the language semantics could be seen as systematic series of constitutional rules:

In "The Great Code: The Bible and Literature" Northrop Frye points on this occasion that the myth of the Creation in the Bible is a myth about artificial creation in which the world is being made by one heavenly father in opposition of the sexual myths about the Creation where the life is created (more often) by a mother-earth; in Genesis the forms of life are being talked into existence so that while they were being made or created they have not been made of something else.

Out of the range of the speech act theorists not only the Holy Scripture remains but also the religion perceived as a certain kind of discourse (in this case through the term "discourse" we name a reality which is created by the language or through another sign system existing in parallel with the daily one, i.e. discourse is equal to possible world). Thus for example nowhere in the Standard Theory of the Speech Acts is mentioned the fact that the Eucharist sacrament during the Divine Liturgy is performed without excesses through a special kind of speech act which according to John Searle's classification we are able to define as a "declaration" (and which from another point of view we are able to define as a manifestation of this which Roman Jakobson calls "magical function of the language" understood as a conversion of the absent or the inanimate third person towards a receiver of a conative message), reproducing the words of the Savior during the Last Supper (when he inaugurates the Eucharist) and from this moment on truly religious people do believe that the bread and the wine are transformed into the body and the blood of Christ (according to what Searle has written a single criteria for successness of the declaration).

The institution of the Lord's Supper is recorded in the three Synoptic Gospels and in St. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians. The words of institution differ slightly in each account, reflecting a Marcan tradition (upon which Matthew is based) and a Pauline tradition (upon which Luke is based). In addition, Luke 22:19b-20 is a disputed text, which does not appear in some of the early manuscripts of Luke.

A comparison of the accounts given in the Gospels and 1 Corinthians is shown in the table below. The performative declarations are in italic:

Mark 14:22-24	And as they were eating, he took bread, and when he had blessed, he brake it, and gave to them, <i>and said, 'Take ye: this is my body.'</i>	And he took a cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave to them: and they all drank of it. And <i>he said unto them, 'This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many.'</i>
Matthew 26:26-28	And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake it; and he gave to the disciples, <i>and said, 'Take, eat; this is my body.'</i>	And he took a cup, and gave thanks, and gave to them, <i>saying, 'Drink ye all of it; for this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many unto remission of sins.'</i>
1 Corinthians 11:23-25	For I received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, that the Lord Jesus in the night in which he was betrayed took bread; and when he had given thanks, <i>he brake it, and said, 'This is my body, which is for you: this do in remembrance of me.'</i>	In like manner also the cup, after supper, <i>saying, 'This cup is the new covenant in my blood: this do, as often as ye drink it, in remembrance of me.'</i>
Luke 22:19-20	And he took bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and gave to them, <i>saying, 'This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me.'</i>	And the cup in like manner after supper, <i>saying, 'This cup is the new covenant in my blood, even that which is poured out for you.'</i>

In the explanatory notes of the John Chrysostom's Devine Liturgy on this occasion is said: in the holy Eucharist therefore the Son of God becomes Son of Man and the sons of men uniting with Holy Sacrament gain the opportunity to become sons of God. And in the quality of being "sons of God" after completing the Sacrament the people (this way in the liturgical "scenario" are called the laity participating in the Diving Service) kneeling pronounce the following series of explicit performatives:

*We praise thee, O God:
we acknowledge thee to be the Lord.*

The more interesting question is why so consciously the creators of the Theory of the Speech Act ignore texts which are founding for the human race.

Now I am going to make a confession – the idea of the parallel which I have been making until now came to me when I was reading "Logic and Conversation" by Herbert Paul Grice. The Cooperative Principle and its maxims sounded so much like The Ten Commandments that the analogy was just too obvious.

After that Geoffrey Leech' statement came that the linguistic semantics is ruled by rules and his pragmatics is ruled by principles. The key word in this case is of course "ruled". Finally comes a philosophical essay "The Aquarius Conspiracy" by Marilyn Ferguson (1991) in which the idea of the old and new paradigms in the world amazingly reminds of an Old and New Testament made between God and men.

Of course it is impossible to give away non-mentioning such as this to ignorance. For my part the reasons are of a totally different kind and the things actually are deeper than it looks at first sight.

In one of Isaac Asimov's stories a computer engineer proudly declares: "We've managed to create such a positron brain which can make decisions, can rule, and so on." His interlocutor ironically corrects him: "You are the second ones. First has been God."

What has been happening in the human society since the Renaissance usually is being described through the following standard clichés: during the Renaissance human becomes the center of the attention – not God; since the Renaissance man begins to align himself with God, look for example at the Statue of David by Michelangelo and so on. The statements of course are true but in my opinion they don't represent an adequate point of view over the things. When we are talking about the Statue of David we must have in mind that it represents the optimistic view over this development of the things. The pessimistic view appears later and perhaps the strongest antonym of the Michelangelo's David is Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, which actually is in Michelangelo's position and not in David's (the monster created by Dr. Frankenstein is the grotesque analogue of David).

Since the beginning of the history, until nowadays, the intellectuals have been working over one giant project to repeat what God (whatever may be hiding behind this name) has once managed to do according to the different Holy Scripts: to create a world alternative to the already existing one (i.e. to the one which has been created by God) with all its characteristics: with its own cosmogony, cosmology, Theogony, theology and eschatology. Expressions like "Newton's picture of the world", "Einstein's picture of the world" and so on and so on; the scientific figure of the psychoanalytic who duplicates the trust spent figure of the confessor; the scientific figure of the doctor who duplicates the mythical and sometimes terrifying figure of the quack, of the fortune teller (e.g. the late Vanga created respect and through her terrifying appearance).

The idea of the science as secular religion of the 20th century has of course many supporters. But is important for us to realize that we are talking about religion but not faith. Or in other words we are talking about secular institutionalized faith presented as institutionalized knowledge. In George Lucas' and Steven Spielberg's Indiana Jones (archeology professor) Saga this view is presented through the two hypostasis in which this most charming archeologist of all times is presented to the public: once as a university professor who claims that 90% of the archeologist's work is being done in the library and secondly as working archeologist whose actions completely deny his academic thesis about the essence of the archeologist profession. It is remarkable that exactly in his second hypostasis Indiana Jones finds the Lost Arc, the Holy Grail but with the purpose of these artifacts becoming elements of the religious world of science.

Because of the sense of the science as a kind of religion and the dangers which result from it, truly qualified scientists (such as the French linguist André Martinet) in the beginning of their important treatises agree on that the science must have only descriptive and not prescriptive function. The conclusion of André Martinet in most cases sadly remains only a beautiful wish. The intellectuals creating and developing special and 'for special purposes' languages have always strived for the approbation of their theories in practice including the management of the society.

The statement about the resemblance between the mathematical model of the Big Bang and the beginning of the Genesis is not new. It is far more interesting to point that one and the same, in its essence, cosmogony is being described with the tools of two languages –of the universal through the use of a number of performative utterances and of a 'language for special purposes' containing a lot of terms. In order to understand the second description one must have specific knowledge. For the first one – this knowledge is not needed: it is understandable by itself.

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Of course we could measure the time of the profanation from a significantly earlier starting point: from the moment when the profaned Brahmanism emerges – Buddhism; or from the time when different profaned variants of Judaism emerge: the Christianity, the Islam. If we take for example the Christianity as a kind of profaned Judaism we will find out that the Christianity itself could be subjected to further profanation: Orthodoxy and Catholicism, Protestantism and why not Rationalism. The worldly intellectual is a profaned cleric. The university institution is organized as the religious one i. e. it is secularized and self-profaning. The names "rector", "dean", "cathedra" and so on and so on, are primary names which serve the religious establishment.

Meanwhile "How to do things with words" is also a little light at the end of the tunnel because it has for its object the daily universal language which according to Charles Morris is "contradictory" and "inconvenient" for certain "specific purposes". And the daily language is the natural human language: the language of him who has been created by God's image and likeness.

Usually the researches on linguistic pragmatics are presented as an antithesis of the systematic, structural approaches to language, as an antithesis of the Chomsky's theory (who proved the anarchistic essence of the science, declaring himself as a political anarchist). Our statement about the essence of the "How to do things with words" contradicts to a statement such as this because the two trends are originated and developed in one and the same macro frame. It is also interesting to point the limits which the two theories reach in their development reach. The performative theory – pre-mystic and locative power of utterance which highly reminds of the mystical power which the Jedi own in the George Lucas' epos "Star Wars" and the generative-transformative linguistics – up to the idea of the innatism according to the English tradition or the inneism – according to the French tradition (and in Bulgarian) – the innatism – as mystical in its essence.

The fact that this project exactly made it possible for the postmodern situation (as Lyotard says) to be explained, that he let the knowledge to be explained as a kind of discourse and to perceive the things around us which are artifacts as certain discourses, says that "How to do things with words" is the end of one and the beginning of another stage in the rational thinking. The offered point of view on the essence of science actually comes down to one of the many discourses as the relations between these discourses are in no way hierarchized.

What can a man who has decided to devote himself to science do in this case i.e. decided to study, to use and to control the reality through the scientific discourses, through the 'meta-languages of control and innovations' (Basil Bernstein)? Unified recipe for this does not exist. But the man who has devoted himself to semiotics, discourse analysis, to linguistics can begin to study the different scientific discourses by emphasizing on the fact that the argumentation used in these discourses is mainly pragmatical and not logical, i. e. that the purpose of these

discourses is to form a certain opinion, because after Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper is obvious that the idea of authentic knowledge doesn't stand criticism.

Actually the big challenge for the science has just began.

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TRANSPERSONAL POETIC COMMUNICATION

Emilia Parpală
University of Craiova, Romania
parpala_afana@yahoo.com

Abstract

On the whole, the linear or orchestral models of communication failed to integrate the sacred, vertical dimension of human communication. Transpersonal communication (TC) designates the interaction with divine entities, with ancestors or spirits beyond man's contingent existence and knowledge. TC could also be seen as the expansion and unification of the self through archetypal symbolic structures. The forms of metaphysical experience (the prayer, the meditation, the religious rituals, the mystic visions and representations) express the subjective need for transcendency, which is an immanent dimension of the self.

Understanding God is, according to Solomon Marcus (2009: 59), a mediating process which involves metaphor and self-reference. The semiotics of God implies the ternary relation: Nothingness, Infinity and Self-referentiality. Robert C. Neville (2002) remarked the dynamic character of the interpreters, as the religious signs are not static, but engaged in vivid symbolic interactions. Massimo Leone (2009: 190) noted the semiotic paradox of representation specific to TC: through iconic presentification, an absent entity is signaled by signs of visibility and vice versa. The visual representations of the sacred, following specific conventions and interdictions, illustrate the style a society or a certain creator confer to non-representable entities an iconic presence.

The artistic experience testifies to the affinity between TC and poetry – “a religious state of our spirit which gently affirms and lovingly receives the presence of God in the suave beauties of existence.” (Arghezi). In the present paper, we offer an inventory of the most representative strategies of TC in modern Romanian poetry: the endo- / exophoric reference, the dramatic address, the semantic-syntactic models of mediated communication, the deictic system, the “fig-

ure and ground” stylization etc. Accordingly our approach is semiotic, communicational, and cognitive.

For the direct TC, our starting point is the teophany narrated in *Jacob wrestling with the angel* (*Genesis* 32: 22-32), reinterpreted in two neomodern parodic pheno-texts, viz. *Lupta lui Iacov cu îngerul sau ideea de „tu”* (*Jacob wrestling with the angel or the idea of “you”*) by Nichita Stănescu and *Minunea* (*Miracle*) by Marin Sorescu. The concept of “type scene” (Savran 2005) is useful in this comparative analysis. We will identify in Ioan Alexandru’s hymns the values of foregrounding generated by the figure – ground disposition (Stockwell 2003). The figuration process is centered on the attractor “light”, a symbolic metaphor specific to the Byzantine imagery. The figure overwhelms the ground, abolishes the perspective and imposes the omnipresent light, a sign (icon, index, symbol) of the sacred Logos. The principles of iconicity, the emphasis on the liturgical discourse, the esoteric symbols, the celebration of primitivism characterize the hymnographic poetry of the neo-modern Ioan Alexandru.

1. Introduction

In the present paper, we offer an inventory of the most representative strategies of transpersonal communication (TC) in (neo)modern Romanian poetry: the endo-/ exophoric reference, the parodic intertextuality, the dramatic address, the semantic-syntactic models of mediated communication, the deictic system, and the “figure and ground” stylization. We intend to correct thus the non-specific discussions on poets’ “religiosity”, common in Romanian literature studies.¹ For the (in)direct TC, Tudor Arghezi’s psalms offer the most complex semiotic system, transcoded in images of impressive sensoriality (Parpală 1984; 2009).

Accordingly, our approach is semiotic, communicational, and cognitive:

a) Peircean semiotics is particularly adequate to the dynamic approach of Eastern Orthodoxy, which concentrates on experiencing, living God. By considering the pragmatic contexts, the semiotic theory of theology amends the Christian tradition, which builds symbols of deity as static and universal.

b) Communicational criticism elaborated by Roger D. Sell (2000; 2011; 2013) suggests useful concepts: “endophoric / exophoric reference”, “community making”, “mediation”, “genuineness” etc. This “idealistic pragmatism” is a response to the post-postmodern condition, for which literature is a universal way of communication.

c) Cognitive poetics / stylistics turns to account the texture of perspectivism (*figure and ground theory*). Cognitive poetics / stylistics explored, among other new topics, the perspectivism of the text (*figure and ground theory*).

2. Transpersonal communication and symbolic archetypes

Transpersonal communication designates the interaction with divine entities, with ancestors or spirits beyond man’s contingent existence and knowledge. It is considered, alongside interpersonal, intrapersonal, media and group communication, as a level or a type of human interaction.

Linear or orchestral models of communication failed to integrate the metaphysical experience of individuals.² The essence of communication cannot be fully grasped unless it is considered, along with the horizontal dimension of socialization, “the vertical dimension of the human connection to the hierarchies of the spirit.” (Dinu 2007: 31). The double meaning, the sacred and the profane, is part of the double etymology of the term “communication”.

From a psychoanalytic perspective, TC could also be seen as the integration, unification and expansion of the self through archetypal symbolic structures. Carl Gustav Jung (1990) noted that each of the major structures of personality (the self, the ego, the shadow, the animus and

anima) is an archetype. The self is an archetype of the totality, as the ego is the center of consciousness. The unconscious expresses itself through archetypal symbols, both individual and collective; God-Father, Jesus, Mohammed, Buddha are symbols of the self, of dynamic balance, opposed to disharmony and antagonisms.

As an interaction that takes place in a person's spiritual area, TC is carried out in conjunction with the intrapersonal area. The forms of metaphysical experience (the prayer, the meditation, the religious rituals, the mystic visions and representations) express the subjective need for transcendence, which is an immanent dimension of the self.

The artistic experience attests the affinity between TC and poetry – “a religious state of our spirit which gently affirms and lovingly receives the presence of God in the suave beauties of existence.” (Arghezi 1976: 14).

3. Transcendancy – a universal concept

Though transcendancy is usually understood as referring to God – an entity which transcends our universe, the concept of transcendancy is more extensive than the concept of Divinity. Understanding God is a mediating process which involves metaphor, myth, allegory or drama. The semiotics of God implies, according to Solomon Marcus (2009: 59), the ternary relation between Nothingness, Infinity and Self-reference. Infinity is the common denominator of transcendancy in theology, philosophy, and mathematics. It contrasts with the finitude of our lives and, because we do not have a direct perception of these entities, there is a process of mediation conducted by signs that open an infinite semiosis. God is “the last indeterminate significant”, remarks a character of David Lodge's novel *Nice Work!* (1997: 209).

Robert C. Neville (2002) observed the dynamic character of the interpreters, as the religious signs are not static, but engaged in vivid symbolic interactions. Thus, we can take the life of Jesus as an iconic, indexical or symbolic sign of the divine presence. Solomon Marcus (ibid.: 60) distinguishes between the metaphorical, indexical, symbolic, and iterative representations of the coreferent terms (God, the Almighty, the Creator etc).

The representation of the nonrepresentable is a semiotic paradox specific to TC. In a study about the veil in the Jewish culture of the invisible, Massimo Leone (2009: 190) noted that, through “iconic presentification”, an absent entity is signaled by signs of visibility and vice versa.

4. Direct transpersonal communication: the theophany experience

For the direct TC, our starting point is the theophany narrated in *Jacob wrestling with the angel* (*Genesis 32: 22-32*), reinterpreted in two neomodern parodic pheno-texts, viz. *Lupta lui Iacov cu îngerul sau ideea de „tu”* [*Jacob wrestling with the angel or the idea of “you”*] by Nichita Stănescu and *Minunea* [*Miracle*] by Marin Sorescu. The concept of “type scene” is useful in this comparative analysis. We will identify in Ioan Alexandru's hymns the values of foregrounding generated by the figure-ground disposition.

4.1. The type-scene: *Jacob wrestling with the angel*

Allegorical story, legend or myth, *Jacob wrestling with the angel* concisely narrates an enigmatic event: the patriarch Jacob³ confronting an ambiguous being, which is successively attributed a double nature: of man and God.⁴ In the verses 24-27 the term *man* is used, which could be interpreted as Jesus foreshadowing, in the cataphatic way of God's embodiment. After the verse 28, which displays the performative act of changing the name of Jacob in Israel, the designation is made by the term *God*.

In this agonistic theophany, TC involves both the initiation in the human-deity partnership and the perlocutionary force of blessing in the form of a symbolic name (Israel) – the full realization

of the self. The revelation of divine names, central in the *Old Testament*, is interpreted by Ugo Volli as an “inaugural act of knowledge”⁵.

The revelation of God, repeatedly narrated in the *Old Testament*, evidences a common scenario described by George W. Savran (2005) as a type-scene structured in the following moments (alluding to Propp’s “functions”):

- the preparations for the theophany – the separation of the protagonist from the community, at night;
- the visual and verbal revelation of the Divinity;
- the human reaction to the asymmetric interaction;
- the transformation and the externalization, namely sharing the experience in a larger societal context.

4.2. Nichita Stănescu, *Jacob wrestling with the angel or about the idea of “you”*

Stănescu’s neomodern poem, published in the volume *Necuvintele [The unwords]*, (1969), thematizes the identity – otherness opposition, which unfolds in two types of dialogic sequences:

a) on the one hand, there is the intrapersonal communication eu – tu [I – you], shaped in the dispute between the name (sign of identity) and the body / soul (signs of otherness): “Numai numelui meu nu-i spun tu; / în rest însuși sufletul meu / este tu, / tu, suflete.” [“Only my name I don’t call ‘you’ / all the rest, my soul itself / is ‘you’ / you, soul.”] (Stănescu 1985: 347). Among the techniques of defamiliarization we note: the endophoric reference, the emphatic addressing and the reported discourse related to personification;

b) on the other hand, there is a transpersonal dialogue with an apathetic *el [he]*, symbolized in the final lines by alluding to the *Bible*: “De ce o fi spus atunci: / te-ai luptat cu însuși cuvântul / și l-ai învins! // Să fi fost el însuși cuvântul?” [“Why be said then: / ‘You’ve battled the word itself / and you defeated it!’ // Would it have been the word itself?”] (ibid.: 349).

The protagonists engaged in the dialogue have no names, but roles designated by personal deixis: I-you-he.⁶ The authorial ethos (“I” and “you”) metaphorically assumes Jacob’s experience of redefining personal identity.

The name dispute (an empty but essential sign), placed at the break of the day, highlights the romantic (Platonian) idea of Godly inspired poetry and the self consciousness of modern art. The intrapersonal and the transpersonal communication recycle the *exegi monumentum* theme: the idea that the real identity (and eternity) consist in the name the poet builds in his creation. Stănescu decided in favour of the Word / word – a logophatic option which embodies both the Divinity and the poetic creative effort.

4.3. Tudor Arghezi: the sacred in the profane

Arghezi’s psalms⁷ are structured on two axes – identification and communication (Parpală 1984: 104--105) and exhibit an oxymoronic ethos: “Tare sunt singur, Doamne, și pieziș” [“So alone I am, God, and crooked!”] (Arghezi 1980: I, 24); “Ești ca un gând, și ești și nici nu ești / Între puțință și-ntre amintire” [“You are like a thought, you are and you aren’t / Between willingness and memory”] (ibid.: I, 50).

Arghezi rejects the traditional Christian code, its anthropological patterns, product of a vulgar imagination, and emphasizes the contrast between *seeing* and *understanding*.

Pentru că n-au putut să te-nțeleagă / Deșertăciunea lor de vis și lut, / Sfinții-au lăsat cuvânt
că te-au văzut / Și că purtai toiag și barbă-ntreagă. [Because they couldn’t understand you
/ Their nothingness of dream and clay, / The Saints let us know they have seen you / And
that you were carrying a stick and a whole beard.] (ibid.: I, 50).

Undecided and longing for certainty, the poet himself claims material proofs of God's existence: "Vreau să te pipăi și să urlu: 'Este!'" ["I want to touch you and to scream: 'There it is!'" (ibid.: I, 45). The state of *deus absconditus* is best shown in the *Psalm* (*Nu-ți cer un lucru prea cu neputință* [I don't ask of you something very difficult]), where the suffering comes from the absence of God's signs. The poet evokes the sacred time of *Scriptures*, opposed to the profane context of regress concerning the dialogue man-divinity:

De când s-a întocmit Sfânta Scriptură / Tu n-ai mai pus picioru-n bătătură [...] Îngerii tăi grijeau pe vremea ceea / Și pruncul și bărbatul și femeea. // Doar mie, Domnul, veșnicul și bunul, / Nu mi-a trimis, de când mă rog, / niciunul. [Ever since the Holy Bible was written / You hadn't set foot in the yard [...] Your angels used to take care in those days / Of the baby and the man, and the woman. / Only to me, the eternal and good God, / Didn't send, since I've been praying, / any]. (ibid.: I, 39).

In *Cântec mut* [*Dumb song*], God and his angels descend the Ladder of Fire to bring solace to a dying man. It is the only theophany that occurs in the profane world of Arghezi's representations of the sacred in the profane: "La patul vecinului meu / A venit azi noapte Dumnezeu. / Cu toiaș, cu îngeri și sfinți [...] Și odaia cu mușce / A mirosit toată noaptea a rai" ["To my neighbor's bedside / Last night God came / With crook, angels, and saints [...] And the chamber with mildew / Smelled all night of heaven."] (ibid.: I, 138).

4.4. *Minunea* (*Miracle*) – a parodic theophany

Minunea is a parodic type-scene concentrated in the initial generative statement: "Lui Lungu i s-a arătat Dumnezeu azi-noapte" [God has been shown up to Lungu last night] (Sorescu 1986: 19). The vision reproduces the antropomorphic representations common to the naive surrealist icons. Community making with listeners generates comic effects based on distrust, curiosity and ambiguity:

Și-odată, fâș! foșnea ceva în pătuiag. / Când se uită în sus – Dumnezeu! / Sta așa în capul oaselor. / L-a întrebat: 'Ce mai faci?' / Și asta fusese totul. [...] // Dar tot Lungu susținea și altminterea, adică Dumnezeu / Îl întrebuse, / Blând și așezat de-acolo din pătuiag, parcă-ar fi fost pe tronul / Lui de aur, / Că sclipea totul în jur. [At once, fâș! something rustled in the haystack. / When looking above - God! / Just stands upright. / He asked: 'How are you?' / And that was it. [...] // But Lungu claimed otherwise, that God / asked him, / Gentle and settled there in the haystack as if it were on his golden throne / As everything around was shining.] (ibid.: 19–20).

In TC, a special emphasis is placed on affects, for proximity of incompatible ontological registers releases paroxysmic emotions, euphoric or dysphoric. Discourse deconstruction takes place under the pressure of two emotions: astonishment and confusion. Emotions are expressed by metonymy and graduation:

1) by metonymy. The physiological effects substitute the emotion: "simt o-mpăcare mare" ["I feel great placation"] (ibid.: 22). In verbal enunciation, the state of dizziness is expressed by:
a) a confusion and contradiction. Lungu doesn't know to explain who asked whom – God

asked him or vice versa: “Păi, eu l-am întrebat...adică...m-a întrebat...” [“Well, I asked him ... I mean ... he asked me...”] (ibid. 22).

b) modal marks of suspension and questioning, following the intrusion of the enunciation in the utterance: “Eu nu știu acum...ce-o să se întâmple cu mine?” [“I do not know now ... what will happen to me?”] (ibid. 23).

c) “annihilation of the subject” (Greimas, Fontanille 1997: 259): “A prins un fel de transparență” [“He caught a kind of transparency”] (ibid. 23). The public invests the protagonist with the role of a saint: “Și-a pus coroană de măracini de roșcov în jurul gâtului / Și-a plecat să propovăduiască în pustiu” [“He put a wreath of carob brambles around his neck / and went to preach in the wilderness”] (ibid. 23). Or, holiness is one of the most elusive phenomena thought by humanity (Visser, Wilcox 2006: x).

2) by gradation. As excitement mounts, the protagonist loses the competence to verbalize his feelings. He cannot say anything intelligible; the crushed discourse reaches its lower point – the interjection. Invited by the crowd to preach, the saint articulates but “E-ei!”. Sorescu exploits this paradox: the peak of emotion correlates with the annihilation of the discourse. Interjection, a morphological class valued in emotional speech, connotes the limit of expression (Aijmer: 2004).

Sorescu wrote *Minunea* with a detached involvement. From one point of view, we notice the dramatic strategies generating the illusion and the comic of the situation; on the other hand, he ironically compromises the simulacrum.

5. Indirect transpersonal communication: the rhetoric of mediated transcendence

For this paradigm, the relevant samples have been excerpted from Tudor Arghezi's psalms, displaying a communication mediated by metonymic signs of the Sign and from Ioan Alexandru's expressionist hymns, displaying a “figure and ground” strategy of pantheistic revelation.

5.1. Tudor Arghezi: the metonymic signs of the Sign

The performance model of *Psalms* is simple: a human paradigm (“I”) addressing a divine paradigm (“you”), while the rhetoric of TC is complex due to the deterioration of the referential transparency. At both levels, it's easy to remark the doubling of “I” and the opaqueness of “you”. God is the *Lord*, the *Father*; *Somebody*, *Someone*, *Nobody*, *Who knows who* – indefinite pronouns, because the concept of “God” has an opaque referent. The texts offer arguments for a type of semiotic reference through which the referent is signaled, not signified (Valesio 1971: 155--185).

As an abstract construct, divinity is not represented by following rational principles, but mythological-baroque ones (Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 220). In his pathetic hunting, the psalmist meets only indexicality of the Sign. Arghezi amends God's referential opacity derived from its abstract, fictional characteristics, by using “metonymic signs of the Sign” (Parpală 1985: 93—109). Signs of revelation and interdiction are:

- a) material signs: the light, the angels, the Creation vs. locks, stone relics;
- b) psychic signs: love, devotion vs. fear;
- c) linguistic signs in reported speech: “Ți-am auzit cuvântul spunând că *nu se poate*” [“I heard your word saying that is not allowed”] (Arghezi 1980: I, 17).

The Divine does not reveal as itself, hence the disappointment induced by cryptic signs: “Dar semnele, doar semne, răzlețe și-adunate, / Nu mai mi-ajung, părute, și nici adevărate. / Vreau tâlcul plin să-l capăt și rostul lor întreg.” [“But signs, only signs, scattered and gathered, / Are not enough to me, apparent and not even true. / Their full meaning and whole purpose I want to get.”] (ibid.: II, 167).

5.2. Ioan Alexandru: the *light* as “figure and ground”

“Figure” and “ground” are crucial concepts for distinguishing, in a “texture”⁸, a figure on the background on which it takes shape. In cognitive science, it concerns the theory of linguistic foregrounding, in its variant called “the theory of figure and ground organization” (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 156-204). Peter Verdonk (2005: 241) discusses two scenarios from visual arts: while in Breughel’s painting the figures gain pronounced relief from their opposition to the background, with M.C. Escher the figure can be perceived simultaneously as the ground. In cognitive poetics / cognitive stylistics, our ability to structure mental situations and texts in various ways offers a rational explanation to the figures of speech.

Peter Stockwell (2002: 21) described stylistic prominence with the help of “attractors” – figures that channel the attention of readers or listeners; the figure is a moving trajectory with well-defined edges, while the background is vague, continuous and homogenous. Unlike the surrealist writing analyzed by Stockwell (2003: 13-26), in which the goal is achieved through literal metaphor, the expressionist image is reached through the accumulation and repetition of the generalized figure. In the Romanian neo expressionism of the late 1960s the primitivism and the celebration of the phenomenal have produced highly stylized, contemplative, monochrome visions. The celebration of the Divine, the emphasis on the liturgical discourse, the esoteric symbols and the principles of iconicity characterize Ioan Alexandru’s expressionist hymns.

Masterpieces of the volume *Imnele bucuriei [Hymns of Joy]*, 1973, the poems *Lumină lină [Gentle light]* and *Lumina neapropiată [Unapproachable light]*⁹ glorify the divine dimension of the world. In his hyperbolic and oxymoronic images, the poet quotes the apophatic description of God: “He lives in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6: 16).

Alexandru’s hymnography celebrates the values of foregrounding generated by the figure – ground disposition. The figuration process is centered on the attractor “light”, a symbolic metaphor specific to Byzantine imagery. The figure overwhelms the ground, abolishes the perspective and imposes the omnipresent light, a sign (icon, index, symbol) of the sacred Logos: “Lumină lină, lini lumini / Răsar din codrii mari de crini, / Lumină lină, cuib de ceară, / Scorburi cu miere milenară. // Lumină lină, Logos sfânt” [“Soft light, soft lights / Arise from vast thickets of lilies, / Soft light, nest of wax, / Hollows with ancient honey. // Soft light, holy Logos”] (Alexandru 1973: 122).

The poet relies on the principles of iconicity discussed by Peter Stockwell (2009: 83-85). According to the quantitative principle, the expressionist stylization corresponds to the principle of the incarnated Logos; the game of parallelisms and alliterations, the emphasis on the liquids *l* and *r* figure out the cosmic invasion of light. The reference being exoforic¹⁰, the texture cohesion is not assured by internal references, but through the phonetic syntax: “Lumină lină lini lumini”. According to the sequential principle, the amplitude of the symbolic metaphor of *light*, the ecstatic contemplation, the emphasis on liturgical symbols ensure the endophoric reference and the coherence of the vision. According to the proximity principle, the deictic center of enunciation configures the hyperbolic image of transcendence descending, specific to Orthodox metaphysics.

6. Conclusion

The paper has considered the paradox of God’s representation in (neo)modern Romanian poetry, from a communicational, semiotic and cognitivist perspective. We discussed the (in) direct transpersonal communication in Tudor Arghezi’s psalms, the theophany textualized in Nichita Stănescu’s and Marin Sorescu’s intertextual poems, and Ioan Alexandru’s hymns, relevant to the “figure and ground” neo expressionism. The poetic images emphasize a baroque semiosis.

In religious traditions, the representation of God is canonical; in poetry, the alternatives reveal a hypothetical, rhetorically mediated TC; its humor and dramatic character result from ontological difference and from emotional involvement. We noticed a baroque TC in Arghezi's psalms, a parodic one with Sorescu, a logocentric metaphysics with Stănescu, a cataphatic and expressionistic figuration with Alexandru.

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(Endnotes)

- ¹ Expressions such as “religious poet” or “irreligious poet” are “non-critical, futile.” (Balotă 1977: 152).
- ² A fortunate exception, the final chapter of Mihai Dinu’s book, *Comunicarea. Repere fundamentale*, dedicated to “the metaphysical timbre, refused, unfortunately, by the usual definitions.” (Dinu 2007: 25).
- ³ The direct relationship of Patriarchs with God was aimed at salvaging the world through the revelation of the divinity. In *Psalms*, Arghezi (1980, I: 39) deploras the distance between the sacred and the profane.
- ⁴ Angels cumulate the ambiguous nature of messenger: divine and human (Pleșu 2003; Militaru 2012).
- ⁵ “the theory of true name which evokes the essence of things is applied hundreds of times in the *Bible* text, especially to people and places.” (Volli: 6). The function of the proper name is not therefore to describe but to identify, by adding to the person the extrinsic quality of being called (Kripke 1982; Gouvard 1998).
- ⁶ For the pragmatic values of pronominal system see Benveniste (1966; 1974); for the thesis of dialogic existence see Buber (1937); the pairs *Ich-Du*, *Ich-Es* are the two ways of being through communication: dialogic and monologic, respectively. For Buber, God is an eternal „you”.
- ⁷ Arghezi’s psalms form an unsystematic corpus disseminated throughout his poetic work, from the volume *Cuvinte potrivite*

[*Fitting Words*], 1927, until *Frunzele tale* [*Your Leaves*], 1968.

⁸ “texture is always the experienced quality of textuality” (Stockwell 2009: 15).

⁹ Ioan Alexandru borrowed the phrase from the apophatic (negative) description of God: “he lives in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6: 16).

¹⁰ The reference to the world outside the text is called *exoforic*; the reference to the elements of the text is called *endoforic*. Both are important in creating texture, but only the last one is purely cohesive, acting through anaforic and cataforic mechanisms. For the application of these concepts to the analysis of the poetic texts, see Sell (2013: 21-28).

DEUX NOUVEAUX MODELES DE L'ANALYSE FIGURATIVE ET DE L'ANALYSE ENONCIATIVE APPLIQUES DANS LA PARABOLE DU BON SAMARITAIN

George Vasilakis

Centre d'analyse des discours religieux, Lyon, France
vasilakis.giorgos@hotmail.gr

Abstract

Pendant ces dernières années, les chercheurs du CADIR Lyon (Centre pour l'Analyse du Discours Religieux) sont remontés de l'énoncé à l'énonciation et au lieu de focaliser sur les conditions de la création du texte, ils s'intéressent à la rencontre du texte avec son lecteur et à la description des présuppositions et des effets de l'acte de la lecture.

L'analyse sémiotique observe les différences et les ressemblances des figures qui constituent un système, le texte en vue de la saisie de la signification. La prise en considération de ce système, conduit à l'observation des scènes figuratives – dispositifs des acteurs situés dans un espace et dans un temps – qui sont les unités de base du regard sémiotique. Ainsi on peut représenter les apparences somatiques, le dire et l'entendre par un schéma qui désigne les différents énoncés d'un texte.

Mais par la suite, on peut juxtaposer les différentes scènes successives et observer ce qui est différent et ce qui est en commun. Ainsi se dévoile le cadre des différents plans. L'agencement de l'énoncé comme forme, manifeste une énonciation – non pas celle des conditions historiques, mais une position logique – qui est associée à l'énoncé.

Ces deux analyses différentes, à savoir l'analyse figurative et l'analyse énonciative, sont asser-vies par deux modèles – le Relief et le Vitrail respectivement – qui sont les derniers fruits des recherches au CADIR. Notre participation vise à présenter ces deux modèles et de montrer comment ils se sont appliqués de façon pratique dans un texte précis.

La Parabole du Bon Samaritain est une des plus connues et des plus commentées parmi les paraboles néotestamentaires. Elle aussi très passionnante parce qu'elle propose une description des effets de la lecture qui correspond assez exactement à la façon que la sémiotique comprend la lecture.

Après la première rencontre de la Sémiotique avec la Bible¹, les exégètes Jean DELORME et Jean CALLOUD ont fondé le CADIR (Centre pour l'Analyse du Discours Religieux) dans le cadre de l'Université Catholique de Lyon, quand, en 1979 leurs recherches ont pris une forme plus concrète².

Assez vite, les chercheurs du CADIR ont vu apparaître, dans les textes bibliques, bon nombre d'écarts avec le modèle narratif, notamment sur la question des *figures* et son lien avec l'*énonciation*³.

*En ce qui concerne les figures, elles résultent de la théorie du Hjelmslev⁴. Chez Greimas, elles jouent un rôle assez important, surtout descriptif. A travers un procès synthético-analytique elles construisent le carré sémiotique qui, à son tour, désigne l'organisation sémantique du texte. Jacques Geninasca, a spécifié que les figures ne sont pas isolées dans un texte, mais qu'elles sont identifiées au travers des relations⁵. Il en arrive à attribuer aux figures un statut *figural* qui est le résultat de l'énonciation et qui vide les figures de toute signification préalable en les inscrivant dans les réseaux du discours.*

Quant à l'énonciation, selon Greimas, elle est un espace inaccessible, complètement vide une fois que l'énoncé est produit. La *Schize* provoquée par le *Débrayage* est radicale et irréversible.

Schéma de la parole




Figure 1

Or, la proposition de Geninasca éveille le lien des figures avec le *sujet (l'instance) d'énonciation* et révèle des éléments énonciatifs.

Il devient, donc évident que l'analyse des figures est indispensable pour la sémiotique, science qui examine un texte dans sa forme de contenu, c'est-à-dire, dans le résultat du tissage des figures.

Ainsi, notre article présentera les derniers modèles construits par les chercheurs du CADIR

¹ A l'origine de cette rencontre se trouve une session de trois jours au Grand Séminaire de Versailles en septembre 1968. Greimas et un groupe de ses disciples ont travaillé avec une trentaine des spécialistes de la Bible sur l'analyse structurale de textes bibliques. L'année suivante, Roland Barthes a participé aux travaux du congrès de l'A.C.F.E.B. à Chantilly, ce qui a intrigué les biblistes.

² Jean DELORME. 1993. *La sémiotique greimassienne et les études bibliques*. Nouveaux Actes Sémiotiques 25. 38 ; Jean DELORME. 1992. *Sémiotique*. Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible. col. 283-333. Paris : Letouzey & Ané.

³ Anne PÉNICAUD. 2011. *La sémiotique du CADIR : de l'énoncé à l'énonciation*. Sémiotique et Bible 143.

⁴ Rappelons aux lecteurs que, pour Hjelmslev, les figures sont des éléments constitutifs soit du plan de l'expression soit du plan du contenu, sans correspondant de l'un à l'autre.

⁵ Jacques GENINASCA. 1981. *Place du figuratif*. Bulletin du Groupe de Recherche sémio-linguistiques 20. 5.

qui proposent une méthode en vue de la saisie de la signification à travers une analyse figurative et une analyse énonciative. Nous avons choisi la Parole du Bon Samaritain (*Luc 10, 25-37*) comme exemple pour l'application des modèles puisqu'il s'agit d'un parabole passionnante qui propose une description des effets de la lecture qui correspond assez exactement à la façon dont la sémiotique comprend la lecture.

Les modèles proposés, qui sont fondés sur la base de la théorie de la sémiotique greimasienne et qu'ils utilisent ces notions théoriques fondamentales, ne visent pas à remplacer le *Carre Sémiotique* et le *Programme Narratif* – qui sont d'ailleurs toujours dans le programme d'enseignement du CADIR –, mais ils essaient à répondre aux besoins que l'émergence des nouveaux éléments (figures + énonciation) dont l'analyse narrative ne permettait pas de rendre compte.

Le modèle « Relief ».

Le premier modèle présente une analyse des *scènes figuratives*⁶ qui se produisent dans un texte. La prise en considération des différences conduit à l'observation des scènes figuratives qui sont enchainées dans un texte. Le moindre changement dans un des trois composantes, cause un changement de la scène figurative. Plus les composantes changent, plus le changement est marqué.

Relief phase 1




Figure 2

Lors de la mise en discours d'une scène figurative, on observe un ou des acteurs faisant partie de la réalité du texte, c'est-à-dire, ayant une apparence *somatique* que nous la désignons avec une ligne verticale violet. Cette ligne est parallèle à la ligne bleue qui signifie le texte-énoncé⁷.

Dans le texte biblique en question, au verset 25, cette apparence somatique est signalée avec la phrase : *Et voici qu'un légiste se leva...*

Relief phase 2

⁶ Les scènes figuratives sont des dispositifs des **acteurs** situés dans un **espace** et dans un **temps** et elle constituent les unités de base du regard sémiotique.

⁷ On appelle la première ligne bleue « la voix du texte »




Figure 3

Dés qu'un acteur prend la parole, un débrayage du dire est réalisé et donc, un *énoncé verbal* est créé. Cet acte est désigné avec une flèche rouge qui « sort » de la ligne somatique. Le texte qualifie cet acte ainsi : ...*l'éprouvant disant* :

Relief phase 3




Figure 4

Nous désignons l'énoncé verbal créé par acte du débrayage avec une ligne bleue verticale. Cet énoncé dans le texte est : *Maître, ayant fait quoi j'hériterai la vie éternelle ?*

Relief phase 4




Figure 5

Cela forme les conditions de *l'embrayage*, d'un « entendre » mentionné ou sous-entendu. Dans le cas donné le texte dit : *Celui-ci dit vers lui* :

Donc, il y a un entendre, puisque Jésus s'adresse au légiste, mais cet entendre est sous-entendu parce qu'il n'est pas explicitement mentionné dans le texte. On le désigne avec une flèche verte en pointillé orientée inversement à celle du débrayage.

Relief phase 5




Figure 6

Cet entendre cause, ou peut causer, un nouvel acte somatique comme par exemple dans notre texte qui dit : *Celui-ci dit vers lui* :

Le « vers lui » manifeste explicitement une position somatique.

Ce *schéma de la parole* décrit une représentation en relief, qui désigne les différents énoncés du texte. Les traits verticaux montrent les énoncés (somatiques et verbaux) et les flèches horizontales indiquent l'énonciation (le dire et l'entendre)⁸.

Le schéma peut se répéter successivement tout au long d'un texte et forme ainsi un des deux axes organisateurs, la *Succession*.

Succession




Figure 7

⁸ Des chercheurs du CADIR travaillent actuellement sur d'autres formes possibles de l'énonciation, comme par exemples celle du « voir » ou du « tactile ».

Mais, le modèle peut se répéter en plusieurs niveaux, puisque des nouveaux énoncés verbaux apparaissent au-dedans d'un énoncé verbal. Cela donne le deuxième axe organisateur de l'énoncé, celui de l'*Emboîtement*.

Emboîtement





Figure 8

Voici donc ce que le modèle Relief donne comme représentation du récit de la Parole du Bon Samaritain.






Figure 9

Cette représentation montre que le modèle Relief peut prendre une forme plus compliquée afin d'intégrer toutes les figures et toute forme d'énonciation possible de les présenter de façon plus raffiné.

On distingue deux catégories des figures : les figures *cadres*, les acteurs, espaces et temps et les figures *simples*, qui servent à qualifier les premières. Les figures cadres on les trouve dans un texte enchaînées par les lignes verticales du schéma de la parole, et les figures simples par les lignes horizontales, entrecroisées avec les verticales. Ainsi, on construit la *syntaxe figurative* qui observe les scènes les unes après les autres.

Cette présentation en relief du texte nous permet de mieux repérer les figures, de disposer les différentes scènes de l'énoncé et de les comparer. On peut décrire chaque scène indépendamment et la comparer avec d'autres scènes.

La construction du Relief provoque deux conséquences fondamentales : premièrement, les textes ne sont plus des successions de mots, mais des tissages des figures, et deuxièmement, les textes ne sont plus des représentations d'une réalité, porteurs d'un sens qui leur est extérieur, mais ils deviennent des univers du sens proposé aux lecteurs⁹.

La flexibilité des figures les écarte de toute définition indépendante de leur inscription dans le texte. De cette façon elles se trouvent au nadir de « l'avoir sens » et au zénith du « prendre sens ». Ainsi, un des enjeux de l'analyse figurative est d'examiner comment les figures obtiennent du sens à partir de leur positionnement dans le réseau des relations dans un texte¹⁰.

Ainsi, on pourrait examiner comment le modèle Relief contribue à la lecture d'un texte, ayant comme exemple les deux premiers versets du récit de la Parabole¹¹.

Relief phase 6a




Figure 10

Le tout commence par l'apparition d'un acteur qui est qualifié comme légiste, un connaisseur de la Loi, qui change sa position somatique d'assise à debout et qui met à l'épreuve l'autre acteur,

⁹ Anne PÉNICAUD. 2014. *L'analyse figurative. Syntaxe et sémantique figuratives*. Document inédit des cours.

¹⁰ Anne PÉNICAUD. *ibid.*

¹¹ Le découpage du texte en scènes figuratives commence par un extrait détaché de l'ensemble, qui fera l'objet de l'analyse. Dans un travail sémiotique, le découpage du texte – faute de pouvoir analyser la totalité de la Bible en une seule fois – se réalise selon les critères des acteurs, espace et temps.

qualifié par le texte « le » qui désigne Jésus. Ce positionnement corporel monte que le légiste veut de mettre au moins à une place égale à celle de Jésus – on ne sait pas si Jésus était debout ou assis –. De plus, le fait que la question posée concerne la Loi, dit que le légiste teste Jésus sur sa connaissance de la Loi. L'énonciation du légiste est ici, conforme à sa qualité de « légiste ».

Or, l'énoncé de sa question le place comme un élève envers Jésus, puisqu'il l'appelle « maître » et qu'il de mande de lui une connaissance profondément existentielle.

Relief phase 6b




Figure 11

Le « maître » ne lui répond pas¹², mais il lui adresse une autre question à deux niveaux. Le premier niveau examine la connaissance de la Loi et le deuxième exige sa lecture. On note bien que le légiste se présente comme « maître éprouvant de la Loi » dans son énonciation et comme « élève chercheur de la vie éternelle » dans son énoncé.

Il semble que le légiste est intérieurement partagé entre deux positions différentes.

La double question du « maître » renvoie le légiste à sa juste position du « savant » de la Loi, en répondant dans son énonciation et non pas dans son énoncé. Jésus est montré ici comme un lecteur de l'énonciation que suppose le positionnement somatique du légiste, qui essaie d'ajuster son interlocuteur avec sa propre fonction, celle du « légiste » en l'occurrence.

Pour Jésus, parmi les deux positions du légiste, celle de son énoncé et celle de son énonciation, une seule est correcte – celle de l'énonciation – et l'autre – celle de l'énoncé – est fautive. Et, par conséquent, si la recherche du légiste concerne la vie éternelle, une de ces positions est susceptible à emmener à la vie et l'autre à la mort. La position vivifiante est celle de son énonciation, celle de la bonne connaissance et de la bonne lecture de la Loi.

Dans ce petit exemple on peut observer comment le Relief aide à prendre en conscience le tissage des figures dans le texte et comment elles sont liées avec l'énonciation. L'analyse figurative a montré ce qu'on a mentionné dans la présentation théorique, à savoir que les figures ne sont pas de simples mots puisqu'elles sont susceptibles d'une évolution dans le texte. Cette évolution est déterminée par les autres figures qui, toutes ensemble, acteurs, espaces et temps, tissent le texte. Leur détachement du monde réel et leur inscription dans le texte créent ce micro-univers

¹² Le trait vert en pointillé signifie que le texte ne précise pas si l'énoncé précédent a été entendu, mais on peut le supposer puisque l'énoncé suivant lui est relatif.

du sens et font apparaître l'immanence de la signification. On a ainsi préparé le terrain pour l'étape suivante, celle de l'analyse énonciative.


Le modèle « Vitrail ».

L'étape suivante s'est constituée à la juxtaposition des différentes scènes figurative qui s'enchaînent successivement dans le texte et de souligner leur articulation leurs différences présentées sur un fond commun.

On réalise cela par un jeu de traits sur-imprimés sur le modèle d'avant, le Relief, organisées en plusieurs niveaux.

Le texte choisi étant un peu long pour le présenter en une seule page, on l'a déployé en deux pages en signalant à la fois les deux parties qui distinguent la première *focale*¹³.

Vitrail



¹³ Le terme « focal » on l'a adopté de la photographie, chaque fois on focalise comme un effet de zoom sur des différentes scènes.




Figure 12

Le passage du relief au vitrail se réalise en concentrant l'attention, non pas sur les scènes elles-mêmes, mais sur leur agencement dans le texte. On a déjà mentionné les deux axes de l'organisation de l'énoncé, la succession et l'emboîtement, qui gouvernent le relief et qui rendent compte de l'énonciation en donnant forme à la voix du texte, non de façon directe, mais comme un réfléchissement dans la disposition de l'énoncé.

Le vitrail juxtapose les scènes successives et emboîtées mais pas de la même façon que dans le relief. En effet, les scènes sont distinguées par des traits de couleurs différentes, ce qui manifeste les niveaux d'organisation différents. Ces traits permettent l'observation de ce qui est différent et de ce qui est commun entre les scènes successives. Ainsi se dévoile le cadre des différents plans successifs qu'on appelle « focales ». En passant des focales courtes aux focales plus longues, on affine la précision de l'observation du minimal au maximal.

Le découpage du texte est la formulation d'une hypothèse de construction qui hiérarchise les

différentes scènes et les présente sous la forme des focales.

La lecture du vitrail essaie de répondre à un certain nombre de questions sémiotiques :

La première question concerne l'application rigoureuse des critères du découpage. En effet, les scènes figuratives sont distinguées l'une de l'autre par l'hétérogénéité des acteurs, des espaces ou des temps qui les définissent. Ces critères sont primordiaux puisque chaque prise de parole met en scène les figures des acteurs, espaces et temps et donc leur respect est important. En suite, les scènes sont identifiées et titrées, ce qui constitue un relevé du texte.

La deuxième question remonte à des principes fondamentaux de la sémiotique, à savoir le repère des différences sur un fond commun. Cela impose la comparaison des focales de chaque niveau en notant leurs différences ainsi que leur axe commun qui traverse la focale en question. Ce travail révèle de nouvelles figures par rapport aux figures repérées lors de la construction du relief. Souvent, ces figures ne sont pas nommées par les textes et leur découverte est réalisée uniquement à travers la comparaison des focales.

Une autre forme de visualisation du texte en forme de vitrail est possible, sauf que, cette fois, la présentation du texte-énoncé étant difficile, on attribue à chaque focale un titre qui correspond à la fois à ce qui la distingue par rapport aux focales du même niveau et à ce qui est l'axe commun pour les focales qui la suivent au niveau subséquent.

Vitrail forme 2



Figure 13

Faute de pouvoir analyser notre texte tout entier, on se contentera à la présentation de deux exemples de l'analyse énonciative.

Le premier concerne la première focale (I, II) qui est découpé selon des critères énonciatifs. Il s'agit de deux scènes qui présentent une structure analogue puisqu'elles commencent chacune par une question du légiste et terminent par deux annonces de Jésus. Un dialogue pédagogique s'établit entre Jésus et le légiste, qui s'organise en étapes et en temps différents au fil du récit et son fondement est la réalisation de la part du légiste d'une lecture, c'est-à-dire, d'une interprétation. Jésus invite à lire la Parabole comme il l'a invité de lire la Loi, ce qui donne à la Parabole le statut d'une nouvelle loi. Le développement du dialogue entre Jésus et le légiste est parallèle au déploiement de la Parabole, et les deux histoires ont des éléments très similaires.

Parmi d'autres on note que le légiste est dans une position moitié mort – moitié vivant en termes spirituels, comme on l'a déjà signalé. L'humain de la Parabole, tombé aux brigands est aussi abandonné à moitié-mort (c'est-à-dire aussi à moitié vivant). Et Jésus fait au légiste ce que le Samaritain fait à l'humain à moitié mort de la Parabole. Jésus utilise ceux qui sont à lui, la Loi et la Parabole pour conduire le légiste dans le chemin de la vie, c'est qui lui manque au début, comme le Samaritain utilise ceux qui lui appartiennent, l'huile, le vin et la monture, pour conduire l'humain de la Parabole à un espace où la vie devient possible.

On prend un autre exemple au focale 7 (iii, iv), découpé aussi selon des critères énonciatifs, puisque le Samaritain donne à l'aubergiste un ordre et une promesse. Au niveau de l'énoncé, les deux (l'ordre et la promesse) visent à faire de l'aubergiste un successeur du Samaritain. Au niveau de l'énonciation du texte, on pourrait voir l'aubergiste comme une figure du légiste. Effectivement, la formulation ordre-promesse adressée à l'aubergiste, reflète la formulation adressée au légiste dans les dernières paroles de Jésus à la première partie. En plus, la relation introduite par l'ordre-promesse est donnée en termes d'un « faire et ». Cela montre que la promesse n'est pas une rémunération de l'ordre, ce n'est un « faire pour » que propose le légiste dans sa question initiale. La différence est que la promesse du Samaritain est partiellement réalisée – s'agissant des choses matérielles, donc fractionnables –, tandis que la promesse de Jésus au verset 28 est entièrement déjà réalisée dans le verset 37 – s'agissant de chose non-matérielles, donc non-fractionnables –, d'où le non-besoin de la répéter.

L'observation du système des figures qui tissent le texte et des liaisons des scènes figuratives a fait émerger l'association entre le texte-énoncé et une énonciation qui lui est immanente. Il ne s'agit pas d'une interprétation gratuite mais d'un acte scientifique puisqu'il est dirigé par des règles spécifiques et précises.

Une hypothèse ouverte.

L'article de Jean DELORME, dans le Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible, commence par la phrase :

« En renouvelant la réflexion sur le langage et les signes, la sémiotique reprend une question très ancienne (cf. la théorie des sens de l'Écriture, le *De Doctrina Christiana* de St. Augustin, les débats médiévaux sur les *modi significandi*) »¹⁴.

Dans la suite de l'article il n'y a aucune autre référence à la théorie des sens de l'Écriture.

¹⁴ Jean DELORME. *Sémiotique. Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible*, tome 12. col. 283. Paris : Letouzey & Ané. 1928,

Par ailleurs, l'article de P.-M. BEAUDE, dans le même Dictionnaire, dédié aux Sens de l'Écriture, finit par la phrase :

« Ces quelques remarques conclusives ne sauraient naturellement prétendre à l'exhaustivité. Elles dépassent le cadre de la période étudiée et n'ont pas d'autre but que de rappeler que la réflexion n'en pas fini avec le sens de la Bible. Il faudrait évoquer ici l'intérêt pour l'impact des textes dans la tradition tel qu'on le relève dans les études de type « Wirkungs-geschichte ». Il faut surtout passer le relais à l'article SÉMIOTIQUE de ce DBS qui aidera à poursuivre la réflexion »¹⁵.

Ce renvoi de l'un à l'autre et cette absence de liaison explicative entre les deux articles pourrait éveiller la curiosité scientifique d'un chercheur qui s'intéresse à la question du sens dans (ou de) la Bible. En effet, d'un côté, l'analyse sémiotique a montré un statut des figures, *le figural*, où elles sont complètement vides de toute signification et prêtes à accueillir un sens que le texte pourrait leur attribuer. Tout l'enjeu se centralise sur la question du sens, la sémiotique étant une science qui cherche la clarification des conditions de la production et de la saisie du sens et leur présentation logiquement organisées. D'un autre côté, dans les écrits des Pères de l'Église, bondés de citations bibliques, il n'est question que de l'Écriture. Ce qui explique la concentration sur la Bible est, justement, la question du sens à l'intention des lecteurs ou des auditeurs. C'est un travail herméneutique focalisé à une réflexion sur le sens.

Le cœur d'une nouvelle hypothèse, en ce qui concerne le texte biblique, est que l'herméneutique patristique s'associe avec l'état figural des figures – en tant qu'il permet de passer vers une lecture des structure de sens de l'énonciation – et que la lecture des Pères de l'Église a pu repérer, sans bien sûr la nommée, cette condition de l'être des figures, et par conséquence leur lecture était capable de rendre compte à l'instance de l'énonciation. Une recherche à ce propos ne serait pas sans intérêt, et l'auteur de ces lignes souhaiterait s'engager à sa poursuite.

¹⁵ P.-M. BEAUDE. Sens de l'Écriture. *Supplément...* op.cit. col. 536.

DE LA POLYPHONIE RÛMIENNE A LA TRANSCENDANCE MYSTIQUE DU SAMÂ, CAS D'ETUDE : LE PERROQUET ET LE COMMERÇANT

Marzieh Athari Nikazm
Université Shahid Beheshti, Téhéran, Iran
mani1390@yahoo.com

Résumé

Dans cet article, nous allons analyser les particularités discursives et énonciatives du discours du poète mystique persan du XIII^{ème} siècle, Djal al Din Mohammad Rûmî. L'un des points très importants de ses discours poétiques est la polyphonie. Dans certains vers, les points de vue de l'énonciateur et des actants (par exemple dans le récit intitulé Perroquet et le commerçant, le Perroquet, les perroquets de l'Inde et le commerçant) s'unissent pour exprimer un même point de vue. Ils conduisent également l'énonciateur vers un monde où il n'y a ni temps ni espace précis. Ainsi se met en place une fusion énonciative qui débouche sur un chœur nous conduisant vers une symphonie mystique. Cette chorale énonciative est un débrayage qui rapproche le discours rûmien au Samâ des Derviches.

Défini comme une danse mystique des Derviches tournants, le Samâ constitue une chorale, ou plus précisément un concert spirituel où l'on voit que ces derviches font ensemble des danses spécifiques au son du ney (flûte en roseau) et du tanbur (une sorte de luth). Cette danse nous met en présence d'une sémio-sphère dans laquelle de la pluralité du corps, on arrive à une fusion menant à la transcendance. Le discours de Rûmî devient ainsi le lieu de la pratique de cette fusion sur la base de l'intersection des points de vue et des débrayages pratiqués.

Dans cet essai, notre objectif consiste à montrer en quoi la polyphonie rûmienne constitue une sphère sémiotique où une intersection entre les divers points de vue nous conduit vers une singularité dont le but majeur serait d'atteindre le niveau suprême de l'être, une fusion qui aboutit à la transcendance mystique.

Introduction

Jalâl ud-Dîn Muhammad (1207–1273), surnommé Rûmî, né à Balkh, dans le Khorasân, est l'une des plus brillantes étoiles parmi les constellations de la culture iranienne et de la poésie. Grâce à son savoir, sa maîtrise, son éloquence et l'agilité de sa plume, il atteint le sommet de la gloire dès sa jeunesse. Parmi ses œuvres, *Odes mystiques* (traduit en 1973), *Le livre du dedans* (traduit en 1975), *Rubâiyât* (traduit en 2003), *Lettres* (traduit en 1990), le *Mathnawî* (traduit en 1988), "épopée mystique" est le plus célèbre, il est divisé en six Livres de 50000 vers. Il est difficile de présenter *Mathnawî*, car non seulement c'est un livre de poésie, mais le poète présente dans son œuvre « un système philosophique, un commentaire général de la théologie islamique, une doctrine métaphysique, un exposé de la pensée et de la vision mystique [... c'est] une étude synthétique de tous les principes [mentionnés] ». (De Vitray-Meyerovitch 1990: 9). C'est pourquoi les sujets de ce livre sont très variés, il y a des sujets théologiques, philosophiques, psychologiques et métaphysiques. Le souci du poète est en effet d'arriver à une connaissance, et non pas avec un raisonnement très logique, mais une connaissance intuitive, avec le cœur. Il faut dire que "voie de l'amour" et "voie de la connaissance" se mêlent.

En analysant l'un des poèmes (*Le perroquet et le commerçant*), nous allons montrer que l'énonciation est en rapport avec l'idée philosophique du poète l'Unité de l'Existence, déjà présente dans une sorte de danse mystique *Samâ*. Nous devons souligner que l'un des points très importants de ses discours poétiques est la polyphonie. Dans certains vers, les points de vue de l'énonciateur et des actants s'unissent pour exprimer un même point de vue. Ils conduisent également l'énonciataire vers un monde où il n'y a ni temps ni espace précis. Ainsi se met en place une fusion énonciative pour arriver à un même point de vue, à une seule instance énonciative, l'existence de l'Un. En effet, entre différents embrayages et débrayages énoncifs et énonciatifs, nous arrivons à une sorte de débrayage qui rapproche le discours rûmien au système sémiotique du *Samâ* des Derviches. Le discours de Rûmî devient ainsi le lieu de la pratique de cette fusion, une singularité dont le but majeur serait d'atteindre le niveau suprême de l'être, une transcendance mystique. En effet il y a un lien essentiel entre la danse mystique de *Samâ* et la polyphonie énonciative chez Rûmî et pour comprendre le sens des poésies persanes du XI^{ème} au XVI^{ème} siècle, il faut parler d'une autre dimension, la dimension mystique du discours qui pourrait se définir comme un sous-ensemble de la dimension cognitive propre aux poètes persans et la sémiotique dite iranienne.

1. Rûmî et ses expériences poétiques et philosophiques

La base essentielle de la pensée rûmienne est l'Unité de l'Existence (*wahdat-e-wudjud*) et nous pouvons comprendre une évocation de la pensée néo-platonicienne. (voir De Vitray-Meyerovitch 1990: 10). Comme affirme Chauvin : « La poésie de Rûmî l'éloigne d'Aristote et le démarque des philosophes scolastiques, dont il eut à subir parfois l'hostilité [...]. Rûmî dénonce constamment les limites de la raison charnelle, et celles d'une critique raisonnable de la raison. Il lui oppose la "Raison spirituelle", pure de tout mélange, pré-éternelle et incorruptible, baignant de la Lumière divine d'où elle tire son inspiration, semblable à l'"Intellect" des métaphysiciens. Rûmî se montre ainsi sans doute plus proche de la théosophie des *Ishrâqiyûn* que des "théologiens-philosophes" de son temps ». (Chauvin 2001: 74)

Il faut souligner que Rûmî est non seulement un philosophe mystique mais aussi un soufi. Le soufisme est une secte issue de l'Islam. Il n'inspire que la transcendance de l'âme. Essentiellement dans la pratique de l'ascèse et de la vertu, il s'accomplit de proche en proche dans des structures plus élaborées introduisant des notions comme l'anéantissement (*Fana*), l'union (*ittahâd*), et la liaison (*ittisâl*) entre autres, si bien qu'il atteint le point culminant de son évolution au XI^{ème} siècle. « C'est une philosophie de la vie et son but est de présenter à l'être humain une voie concrète lui permettant d'atteindre une conscience plus haute et de pouvoir comprendre, grâce

à cette conscience élevée, sa relation avec l'Être suprême». (Ali Shah 1998: 9)

Pour les soufis, l'homme doit trouver une joie spirituelle et celui qui désire obtenir la joie de l'union avec le divin doit d'abord percevoir intuitivement l'unicité de l'Existence, non avec les yeux du corps, mais avec l'œil du cœur. Dans la voie d'une telle recherche, ce qui importe, ce ne sont que les règles et les rituels religieux, mais la connaissance mystique (*'irfân*) et les moyens de l'acquérir, tels que la vision, le dévoilement, l'illumination et l'intuition. Pour Rûmî cette connaissance intuitive est importante, le degré ordinaire de la connaissance consiste dans la proclamation de l'Unité divine, la foi dans la parole coranique, et l'accomplissement des devoirs prescrits. Son degré élevé consiste à s'abstenir de tout ce qui ne rapproche pas de Dieu, dans la conscience de Sa grandeur infinie, de Sa puissance, de Sa Science et de Ses bienfaits. Quand cette connaissance est établie solidement dans le cœur, elle est « science de la certitude » (*yaqîn*) (Chauvin 2001: 44). « La connaissance muette du véritable gnostique (*ârif*) ne se trahit pas par de savantes démonstrations, mais par un juste sentiment intérieur, un "état" (*hâl*) incommunicable. Cette connaissance mystique et la foi sont excellentes, par le fait qu'elles sont cachées. Ce qui n'est le cas de la raison, du discours et des œuvres qui en découlent » (Chauvin 2001: 28). Pour la poésie persane durant cinq siècles où la philosophie courante était l'Unité de l'existence et le soufisme, la connaissance mystique et la purification du cœur étaient importantes. Surtout au XIII^{ème} siècle où l'on voit l'apogée du mysticisme avec l'apparition de Sanaï, Attar qui ont inspiré Rûmî. Chez lui, le style devient sens et acquiert une nécessité qui fait du texte un architexte. Rûmî est plongé dans une extase par le récit de ses visions. L'objet de la vision et de la connaissance, c'est l'au-delà, un être transcendantal. Ainsi peut-on voir un rapport entre son discours et sa vision, un rapport entre le texte et l'expérience visionnaire. La vision se mue immédiatement en discours comme si celui-ci absorbait le visible dans sa textualité et le transmutait en parole. Chez Rûmî, si le cœur est le lieu de la vision, c'est l'esprit qui est le vecteur du discours. Et la musique semble être un intermédiaire entre la vision et le discours. Cette musique existe dans la danse "Samâ". Ainsi, le discours rûmien semble renvoyer à un vide à la fois sémiotique et ontologique. C'est le vide et le silence internes de l'énonciateur qui rend possible le discours, mais il est acquis et révélé par l'expérience du visionnaire. C'est le vide de l'anéantissement volontaire de l'énonciateur dans la transcendance. On voit un certain rapprochement entre son discours qui entre dans le débrayage total et le Samâ affirmé toujours par lui. Maintenant nous allons étudier l'énonciation chez ce poète spécialement dans "Le perroquet et le commerçant".

2. L'énonciation et la polyphonie rûmienne dans « Le perroquet et le commerçant »

Tout d'abord, il convient de présenter un petit résumé de son long poème. Un riche commerçant de Perse possédait et chérissait un perroquet : il était unique pour sa beauté et réputé pour son langage et sa voix gracieuse. Un jour, ce commerçant décida de partir en Inde pour ses affaires ; alors il demanda à chaque membre de sa famille quels cadeaux il désirait qu'on lui rapporte. Chacun exprima son désir, le perroquet répondit que ses congénères peuplent une grande forêt en Inde. Il lui demanda de les saluer de sa part et de leur demander des conseils pour sa vie, puisqu'il vivait seul dans sa cage. Le commerçant promit de transmettre le message et partit. En Inde, il récita le message de son perroquet. L'un d'entre eux tomba du haut d'un arbre et meurt. Plein de regrets, le commerçant poursuivit son voyage. Il rentra chez lui et raconta la scène au perroquet. A peine eut-il achevé son récit que le perroquet tomba du haut de son perchoir et resta inerte. Le commerçant pleura longtemps son cher perroquet et puis il décida de le jeter de la cage. Mais dès qu'il ouvrit la porte de la cage, le perroquet s'envole. Il dit à son maître stupéfait : « pour être libre, meurs ». Il le salua et s'envola en direction de l'Inde pour rejoindre les siens.

Ce récit de *Mathnawî* suivent deux structures, primo une structure narrative qui est manifestée par le changement et par le passage d'une phase à une autre logique, secundo une structure

accidentelle, non-narrative, qui arrive tout à coup et qui aboutit à la connaissance normalement intuitive. Ce discours est dynamique et nous voyons que les deux actants principaux sont à la fois le sujet pragmatique, cognitif et passionnel, comme l'affirme D. Bertrand dans son ouvrage *Précis de sémiotique littéraire*. (Bertrand 2000: 37-44). Le sujet pragmatique accomplit un acte, le sujet cognitif acquiert un savoir et le transmet, le sujet passionnel exprime son chagrin, sa douleur et son repentir. Voyant ces différents états, nous sommes face à des actants multiples, à des sujets pluralisés et à la complexité de l'énonciation. L'énonciataire aussi est invité à expérimenter différents points de vue. La présence des actants sous différentes formes nous rappelle la pluralité dans la philosophie du poète qui cherche l'Un, l'existence unique dans cette pluralité.

2.1. Le sujet pragmatique (le commerçant)/ le sujet passionnel (le perroquet)

Le conte commence par un voyage qui constitue une unité du discours et contribue au sens, parce qu'il décrit le changement du sujet d'un état à un autre. Dès le début nous sommes face à un discours dynamique, qui se produit d'une phase à l'autre et la question de l'"être". L'actant est un commerçant et naturellement pour une liquidation du manque il va à l'Inde. Il demande à chaque membre de sa famille quels cadeaux il désirait qu'on lui rapporte. Il ne cherche pas consciemment une nouvelle identité, mais il pense à son travail. En revanche, le perroquet, le sujet passionnel, se plaint de la "séparation". C'est un sujet qui souffre, un sujet du pâtir. Deux actants dans deux mondes différents: le commençant qui pense à son affaire et le perroquet qui pense à ses amis en Inde et demande à son maître de décrire sa situation à ses congénères. Il est non seulement sujet passionnel mais aussi cognitif parce qu'il est conscient de sa situation. Après avoir écouté les plaintes du perroquet, le commerçant, le sujet pragmatique, sans aucune réflexion ni cognition, va en Inde et adresse son salut à d'autres perroquets. Du point de vue de l'énonciation, le commerçant n'est pas le sujet de l'énonciation, mais le sujet de l'énoncé et il veut accomplir une mission pour son oiseau. Et avec ce contrat (saluer d'autres oiseaux) la première phase se termine. Avant ce vers, l'énonciateur en a utilisé plusieurs pour décrire la situation du perroquet et sa douleur. En tant que le premier sujet cognitif, il exprime les ressemblances entre le perroquet et l'âme de l'homme qui se plaint de sa séparation de son origine. En effet l'énonciateur profite de cette occasion et dirige son discours vers d'autres objets et prend une certaine distance vis-à-vis de la logique de narration. Comme J. Fontanille l'explique dans *La Sémiotique du discours*, les dimensions pragmatique, cognitive et passionnelle ne se suivent pas toujours logiquement mais l'une peut être enchâssée dans l'autre. (Fontanille, 1998: 233-236)

Dans ce conte, après que le commerçant annonce son voyage et qu'il accepte de saluer d'autres perroquets en Inde, l'énonciataire entre dans la phase de la cognition : il est face à un discours où il n'est plus question de perroquet et de commerçant. L'énonciateur réalise non pas un débrayage énoncif mais un embrayage énonciatif parce qu'il s'assimile au perroquet : en effet le perroquet et l'énonciateur s'unissent. Ils représentent un parcours hors du temps et de l'espace. Et ainsi le discours sort du cadre de la narration, et ils parlent d'un non-lieu et non-temps et l'énonciateur en est conscient. « Souvenez-vous, ô nobles créatures, de cet oiseau pitoyable et buvez une gorgée matinale au sein des prairies! [...] / Où sont donc, je me le demande, cet accord et ce serment? Où sont les promesses de ta lèvre douce comme le sucre? (Rûmî 1990: v. 1558-1663)

Puis l'énonciateur se sépare du perroquet, et il décrit «l'âme» (une allégorie). Le perroquet n'est plus un simple oiseau, mais un signe transcendantal, qui a une présence cognitive et mystique et rappelle non-lieu et non-temps. Nous pouvons dire que l'énonciateur a une stratégie englobante « qui donne lieu à des points de vue omniscients, dans certains cas, d'une très grande distance, [...] voire de la généralisation; elle a pour principe la domination et la compréhension des états de choses, et n'accorde de la valeur qu'à leur ensemble cohérent, à leur totalité» (Fontanille 1999: 51) Ainsi entre-t-il dans un monde cognitif et se met à distance du discours narratif. Il en est conscient puisqu'il affirme: « Revenons, ô mes amis, à l'oiseau, au marchand et à l'Inde »

(Livre I: 1585). Quand le marchand accepte de saluer les perroquets de l'Inde, un contrat est conclu, la première phase se termine et c'est le commencement d'un autre discours logique et programmé. On peut la résumer de façon suivante:

Action (le commerçant) -> passion (le perroquet) -> cognition (l'énonciateur) -> Action (le commerçant)


2.2. Le sujet passionnel (le commerçant)/le sujet cognitif (le perroquet)

Durant cette phase de son parcours, l'état du commerçant change deux fois et se transforme du sujet pragmatique au sujet passionnel.

1. Quand il arrive en Inde, il salue d'autres perroquets. Mais en l'entendant, l'un des perroquets meurt. Avec sa mort, le commerçant entre dans une autre phase. Il devient un sujet passionnel. Nous sommes face à un «éveil affectif» qui est «l'étape pendant laquelle le sujet est "mis en état" d'éprouver quelque chose: sa sensibilité est éveillée, une présence affective se met en place, dans l'intensité et l'étendue » (Fontanille 1999: 79). Dans ce discours, nous voyons le trouble et la confusion qui aboutissent au remords et au repentir. Ce terme est affirmé au début du discours et se termine avec des questions et des monologues intérieurs. L'énonciateur est face à un discours passionnel parce que le commerçant est entré dans la phase de la passion. Pour montrer l'apogée de la douleur et du remords du commerçant, il le change en un sujet d'un énoncé direct. Et se produit un embrayage énoncif en utilisant la terminaison à la première personne : « Pourquoi ai-je fait cela? Pourquoi ai-je apporté ce message. J'ai détruit cette pauvre créature avec une parole stupide » (v. 1592). Ainsi, le discours perd son extension. Une limite s'y forme et se concentre sur le sujet actionnel. L'actant pragmatique du discours devient un actant passif et passionnel qui ne fait rien, mais il révèle un monde subjectif plein de questions où le remords est caché. Comme s'il fait un certain moment un voyage spirituel à l'intérieur de soi-même. Cet état d'âme se produit à la suite d'un état de choses (Mort du perroquet). Mais l'énonciateur entre en scène et comme la phase précédente, nous voyons des discours enchâssés et il invite l'énonciateur à un discours cognitif plein de conseils et de maximes. Cette fois-ci le discours prend une dimension éthique et de nouveau une extension qui rend le discours dynamique.


Après cette phase, le commerçant retourne à son pays. Il offre à chacun un cadeau. En effet, le programme narratif est terminé et il est entré dans la sanction : Le contrat – compétence et performance – sanction.

Ce qui est encore important, c'est la pluralité de l'identité chez les actants. Deux actants sont en train d'évoluer en même temps. En effet ce qui se produit dans le monde extérieur les affecte. Le commerçant acquiert une expérience avec un «éveil affectif» et en retour, il est un sujet passionnel et il confesse devant son oiseau. (v. 1651–1653) Du point de vue de l'énonciation, le commerçant est le sujet du discours direct et indirect. « J'ai dit tes plaintes, répondit-il, à un groupe de perroquets qui te ressemblaient ». (v. 1655) Dans ce vers et d'autres vers, à un certain moment, nous voyons un embrayage énoncif, car pour montrer l'apogée des sentiments du sujet, l'énonciateur se concentre sur lui et emploie le pronom «je» et n'a d'autre choix que cet embrayage. « Je devins affligé, pensant: «Pourquoi ai-je dit cela?» Mais à quoi bon me repentir après l'avoir dit? » (1657).



Tout de suite, nous voyons un débrayage énoncif dans un discours cognitif. « Sache qu'un mot qui jaillit soudain de la langue est semblable à une flèche lancée par un arc/ Ô mon fils, cette flèche ne retourne pas en route: c'est à sa source qu'il faut barrer un torrent ». (1658–1659) Dans ce vers et d'autres vers suivants, une extension du discours apparaît. L'énonciataire sort du cadre narratif et la stratégie englobante se produit de nouveau (1669–1674). Nous pouvons résumer cette phase de manière suivante: action – passion – cognition

2. Après la phase de cette connaissance, le perroquet meurt: « Quand l'oiseau entendit ce que ce perroquet avait fait, il trembla violemment, tomba et devint froid » (1691). En voyant cette scène, le commerçant atteint l'apogée de ses passions et il se reproche (1692–1694). Avec ce discours, le perroquet acquiert des nouvelles valeurs et il devient un perroquet transcendantal, une allégorie de l'âme. Cette fois-ci le point de vue de l'énonciateur et du commerçant devient le même. C'est une sorte d'embrayage énonciatif. Car au début de l'énonciation, il y avait une distance entre l'énonciateur et le commerçant, le premier était le sujet de l'énonciation et le deuxième le sujet de l'énoncé, mais après nous voyons une fusion. La stratégie globale qui était l'expérience de l'énonciateur, devient celle du commerçant. Ce qui est délicat, c'est que le perroquet tombe et devient froid. Cela montre que pour trouver de nouvelles valeurs, nous devons changer l'état initial.



Pour mettre en relief "le perroquet" qui est un informateur en effet, le point de vue change et la stratégie devient cumulative. L'oiseau acquiert une valence contenant plusieurs valeurs (1695–1715). Par exemple au vers 1715, nous lisons : « Mon perroquet, mon oiseau intelligent, l'interprète de ma pensée la plus intime ». Ainsi, la présence du perroquet s'amplifie, comme s'il est en train de s'envoler. Dans le discours, nous voyons les termes comme «vol» et «s'envoler». C'est la figurativité du discours. Ensuite le débrayage énonciatif se produit de nouveau et l'énonciateur retourne à sa stratégie initiale et après le discours qui contient une dimension plutôt éthique, nous entrons dans la troisième phase où le commerçant acquiert la connaissance. L'énonciateur, conscient de ce débrayage spatio-temporel, dit: « Ceci est très long. Raconte l'histoire du marchand, que nous voyions ce qui arriva à ce brave homme » (1814).

2.3. Le sujet cognitif (le commerçant)/le sujet pragmatique (le perroquet)

Le commerçant, le sujet passionnel, qui croit que son oiseau est mort, le jette. Ainsi, le perroquet, le sujet cognitif dans la phase précédente, devient un sujet pragmatique et il s'envole. Tout à coup, le commerçant comprend le secret des oiseaux et sans raisonnement logique, il arrive à une connaissance intuitive. Il y a une interaction et une relation sensible entre les deux. Le savoir du commerçant est par l'intermédiaire de la réalité qu'il voit: "le vol de l'oiseau". Voir est un acte qui procure une certaine connaissance pour le marchand. C'est une sorte de vision. Cet acte de voir n'est pas un simple acte sans la présence. Voir c'est comprendre les secrets. Il a vu l'invisible. Mais puisqu'il est étonné et stupéfait, il demande au perroquet, comme s'il veut entendre par la bouche de l'oiseau et que l'énonciataire entend. Il arrive à un "hypersavoir". Ainsi le perroquet explique-t-il son expérience de la connaissance intuitive (1830-31). Ici, l'énonciateur s'unit avec le sujet de l'énoncé (le perroquet) et ils aident tous les deux le commerçant à acquérir cette connaissance. Et ensuite, un débrayage au cours duquel l'énonciateur prend distance des actants et s'adresse à l'énonciataire. Nous sommes face à une pluralité qui est produit du cœur d'une singularité "l'oiseau" (1832). On atteint en même temps à une unité de la cognition. Non seulement le discours transfère un savoir mais le commerçant arrive à une connaissance et le perroquet (le deuxième sujet cognitif) et l'énonciateur (le premier sujet cognitif) l'aident et aussi ils aident l'énonciataire. Le monde change également. Du monde matériel, on atteint à un monde spirituel et l'oiseau se compare à l'âme. Le commerçant accepte que l'oiseau s'en aille et ainsi un autre parcours se prépare pour lui:

Nous avons étudié une polyphonie énonciative liée à la théorie de l'embrayage et du débrayage et des instances énonçantes. Il faut dire que le sujet parlant, qui est unique au début, exprime alors son propre point de vue, alors qu'à la fin il s'unit aux autres, exprimant tous un seul point de vue. La situation finale est unique pour tous. Tous atteignent à une cognition qui passe par la dimension passionnelle. C'est une présence sensible. C'est le corps propre des sujets qui crée les rapports sémiotiques. Cette unité dans la pluralité représente l'idée philosophique du poète et sa secte religieuse, le soufisme. Comme dit Rûmî: « J'ai trouvé l'individualité dans la non-individualité; aussi ai-je tissé mon individualité en non-individualité » (1735). Les soufis eux-mêmes font une danse mystique pour montrer leur joie de la connaissance.

3. Le concert spirituel *Samâ* et son rapport avec le discours poétique

Défini comme une danse mystique des Derviches tourneurs, *Samâ* constitue une chorale, ou un concert spirituel, une "danse cosmique" où l'on voit que ces derviches font ensemble des danses spécifiques au son de la flûte de roseau (*nay*) et du tanbur (une sorte de luth). C'est un état spontané qui transporte le soufi dans le ravissement (*wadjd*). Ajoutons qu'il y a un lien indissociable de l'Amour et de la Mort qui se manifeste dans le costume des "derviches tourneurs": la coiffe de feutre symbolise la pierre tombale, la robe blanche, le linceul; le manteau noir, le tombeau, présage d'une renaissance à l'Esprit.

Le mot *Samâ* désigne l'"audition", en concert, musique ou chant; c'est une "écoute" et un "entendement". Le *Samâ* a en effet pour fonction – dans le contexte du soufisme – de faciliter l'actualisation et l'accroissement des potentialités spirituelles des participants. Il s'agit d'une expérience sacrée, à la fois personnelle et communiale. Bien plus qu'un phénomène culturel maniant à merveille l'affectivité et les sentiments, le *Samâ* provoque l'émergence d'"états" de conscience et il dévoile l'Être, ou la Conscience elle-même.

Sémiotiquement parlant, nous devons dire que le *Samâ* est une attitude globalement «passive». L'énonciation d'un Nom apparaît comme une trace symbolique de la Création, et l'invocateur renaît et co-naît en vérité, puisque le Nom d'un être transcendantal est parfaitement plein de la Présence divine. Cela favorise la réceptivité du cœur à l'égard des influences spirituelles. Rûmî

lui-même donne une importance primordiale au silence et à l'ouïe. Devant un être transcendantal, on doit garder le silence.

Cette danse nous met en présence d'une sémiosphère dans laquelle, à partir de la pluralité du corps, on arrive à une fusion menant à une transcendance. Nous savons très bien, comme le note J. Fontanille dans son livre *Corps et sens*, que le corps a fait un retour explicite en sémiotique dans les années quatre-vingt, avec les thématiques passionnelles, l'esthésie et l'ancrage de la sémiose dans l'expérience sensible. Durant cette danse, nous sommes en présence des sujets épistémiques dotés d'un corps qui perçoivent des contenus signifiants et qui projettent les valeurs. Le corps, toutefois, ne réfère pas à une expérience sensible du monde phénoménal, mais à l'expérience intelligible d'un monde transcendantal et des pratiques de l'esprit. Le corps ici n'est pas substance du contenu mais une forme du contenu, forme sémiotique de l'actant énonciatif, et substance n'est pas concevable facilement. C'est une instance énonçante qui exprime son état de conscience. Le corps c'est l'énonciateur, c'est le Moi de l'individu, le Moi que J. Fontanille appelle « le point de repère des coordonnées du discours, et de tous les calculs de rétention et de protension, à la fois référence déictique, centre sensori-moteur, et pure sensibilité » (Fontanille 2011: 13) va vers l'autre, vers le Soi qui se construit par répétition, par recouvrement et confirmation de l'identité de l'actant. Durant cette danse, plusieurs corps sont en train de construire un "Soi", l'autre transcendantal, ce sont les "Moi" qui se déplacent et ils doivent obéir aux règles générales de ce que Fontanille appelle la "figuralité", « la morphologie et la syntaxe figurales sur les différents états et les différentes étapes des interactions entre la matière et l'énergie » (Fontanille 2011: 14).

Ajoutons que le monde des mystiques n'a pas seulement deux dimensions, il a un espace profond avec plusieurs versants: le monde du sensible, le monde intelligible, encore le monde exotérique et le monde ésotérique, *Alfikir* (La raison) doit être avec le *Zikr* (Prière), le monde spirituel. Et l'âme est intermédiaire entre le corps et l'esprit : le domaine «terrestre» correspond au «corps» (*sôma*). L'"âme" est *psyché* et l'"intellect" représente "le passage vers les mystères de l'incréd et du Soi".

Pour *Samâ*, il ne faut pas seulement parler de l'expérience corporelle, bien que le corps soit placé au cœur de la production du sens. Il faut parler d'un "champ sémiotique", c'est le terme de J. Fontanille, qui est « un domaine spatio-temporel que l'instance d'énonciation se donne en prenant position ». (Fontanille 2011: 57). En montrant le corps en mouvement, les derviches offrent un monde spirituel. Par le déplacement d'un corps réel, ils rappellent en même temps un monde virtuel *supra-sensible*.

En effet, l'instance d'énonciation circonscrit ce qui relève du monde de Soi, et plus précisément de la présence à un Soi transcendantal, dans cet état d'extase, c'est la pure présence d'un *non-Moi* à un *Soi transcendantal*. C'est un champ entièrement débrayé par rapport au système sensoriel. Ce débrayage est contrôlé par une vision, qui est une sorte de méditation. Ils entrent en contact avec un monde transcendantal et ils essaient de s'unir avec l'Être suprême. C'est l'unification de la multiplicité.

Conclusion

Durant cette étude, nous avons montré qu'il existe une polyphonie spéciale chez Rûmî avec les différents embrayages et débrayages. Cette polyphonie est en rapport avec la philosophie du poète, l'unité de l'existence et le soufisme qui considère la singularité et l'Être unique dans la pluralité. La révélation de cet être est l'affirmation de l'unicité, d'une telle unité que le mystique n'est rien d'autre que cet être transcendantal dans sa solitude. Il découvre que la véritable distance qui existe entre les créatures et cet être est celle de la connaissance qu'il doit acquérir intuitivement. L'homme incarne, dans son être, deux aspects différents: l'esprit, son côté divin, et le corps

son côté ténébreux et matériel, éphémère et limité. Lors de l'énonciation de Rûmî, nous voyons qu'il y a une pluralité, non seulement des actants mais encore une pluralité spatio-temporelle où apparaît la transcendance, comme un non-lieu et non-temps, impliquant une sorte de saisie *supra-sensible*. Ce modèle d'énonciation se rapproche d'une sorte de pratique chez les soufis, déjà Rûmî lui-même, la danse mystique de *Samâ*. Enfin nous devons dire que pour répondre à cette question : comment le sens apparaît dans la poésie mystique persane, ou plutôt comment en comprend-on le sens, il faut définir une autre dimension, un sous-ensemble de la dimension cognitive: dimension mystique qui est propre à la poésie persane et qui est liée à l'Unité de l'existence et non pas à la phénoménologie.

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THE SEMIOTICS OF RELIGIOUS AMAZEMENT

Massimo Leone
University of Turin, Italy
massimo.leone@unito.it

Abstract

The article posits amazement as definitional dimension of the religious experience. Starting from Hjeltmølle's designation of content, and re-elaborating it in its dialectics with the 'container' (expression), the article proposes that often religions situate believer in a maze whose cognitive and emotional effect is awe. At the same time, paradoxically, religious traditions also often propose a recipe to recompose wonder into a transcendent diagram. The sand drawings of Malekula, studied by abundant anthropological tradition, are reinterpreted from a semiotic perspective, deciphered as 'amazement devices', and compared with similar sacred diagrams.

In Hjeltmølle's version of Saussure's structuralism, the terms "expression" and "content" replace those of "signifier" and "signified". A topological metaphor is introduced in the description of the sign, as though the signified was something that must not only be signified but also "contained". When semiotics is applied to the study of religious texts, languages, and cultures, one is left wondering whether such topological metaphor of containment could not be pushed further, namely, replacing the term "expression" with the term "container". Imagining the sign as a relation between content and container might seem to betray Saussure's belief in the substantial unity of the two faces of signification.

Nevertheless, that is the case mostly if the container is imagined as a sort of box, as a receptacle that human communication fills with semantic items so as to transport them elsewhere. Yet, there is another way of interpreting the 'containment' of signification. The 'container' should be imagined not much as inert box, but as pattern of forces whose aim is, above all, that of containing other forces. In this case, though, "containing" is to be interpreted not only in the sense of "holding", but also in the sense of "restraining".

The restraining action that the signifier/container exerts on the signified / content is best conceived with relation to the French paleontologist André Leroi-Gourhan's philosophy of techniques. In his 1943 *L'Homme et la matière* [Humans and Matters], he developed a philosophical hypothesis on the anthropology of weaving, considered as trans-cultural technique through which human beings manifest the sense and the practice of order that they have attained through evolution. Deleuze and Guattari philosophically fleshed out this line of anthropological reflection in a passage of *Mille plateaux* [A Thousand Plateaux] (1980), where they define the opposition between "espace lisse" [smooth, unrippled space] and "espace strié" [ridged, rippled space]. According to the two philosophers, human techniques that create "rippled space" are essentially techniques of control, centered on the sense of view, whereas the sense of touch is put in relation with unrippled space and haptic phenomenology. Following this hypothesis, Leroi-Gourhan's interpretation of weaving indicates one of the first steps in a long cultural evolution, through which humans have sought to impose a visual order on the disquieting chaos of nature, including their own human nature. The invention of perspective would be another major step in this anthropological evolution.

Taking the lead from Leroi-Gourhan and Deleuze & Guattari, the anthropology of rippling could be generalized, in view of a new definition of the sign as relation between content and container. From this point of view, signification would result from the human attempts at controlling the forces of the environment. That seems to overturn the intuitive conception of signification, which is mostly thought of as a way to give course to communicative intentionality; as positive dynamic. The definition of the sign as containment technique, on the contrary, focuses on signification as elaboration of hindrances; as negative dynamic.

In hindsight, an intuition of this negative dynamic is also in the word "expression", which etymologically refers to a "pressing out", and therefore to the presence of an obstacle, a contrasting force, without which such pressing out could not take place, exactly as a hard object must be pressed against an orange in order to squeeze the juice out of it. This intuition of the negative side of signification is certainly present in Peirce, in the distinction between immediate and dynamic object, but is not absent either in structural definitions of the sign. In structuralism, indeed, the hindrance that enables signification is nothing but the grammar, or the code.

Conceiving signification as constraint, more than as possibility, might be fundamental in the specific but vast field of the semiotics of religion. Being a branch of cultural semiotics, the semiotics of religion works along two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, singling out, describing, and interpreting signs, texts, and languages that develop across religious denominations, so as to understand to what general anthropological or cognitive need they respond. On the other hand, classifying differences, showing how historical and contextual pressure has brought about specific forms. For instance, on the one side, semiotics is interested in the catholic rosary as the cultural-specific token of a broader type, where counting devices belonging to different spiritual traditions are to be subsumed. On the other side, semiotics focuses on the peculiar morphology that this device takes on in Catholic contexts, considered either in their historical evolution or freezing a phase of them into a synchronic section.

Both tasks are complicated, but their difficulty is of different kinds. Whereas the comparative work necessitates systematic perusal of historical and anthropological data, as well as a solid semiotic framework of analysis and interpretation, the generalizing, cross-cultural endeavor cannot escape speculation in the domain of the semiotic philosophy of religion. Semiotics indeed has not only the ambition to provide linguistic, textual, and semiological skills to those who interpret signs in religion; it also cultivates the higher ambition of coming up with a definition of religion *sub specie signi* [from the perspective of the sign].

The latter task is complicated for not only the definition of religion, but also its own semantic

field is culturally biased. What groups of phenomena individuals, cultures, and even scholars and societies of scholars decide to categorize under the label “religion” is not at all a matter of fact, but outcome of complex and not always transparent negotiation. The fact that nowadays Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and New Age might all be classified, and studied, as “religion”, results from this invisible negotiation. Present-day political and legal controversies about whether Scientology or Falung Gong should also fall in the same category show that this negotiation is ongoing, accompanied by power struggles and heavy social consequences.

To this multi-dimensional polyphony, the semiotics of religion adds a fresh voice, unburdened by the influence of theology, history, or anthropology, while looking at them with attention and respect. Faced with the task of determining the quintessence of religion, semiotics must come up with a philosophical hypothesis that rests, nevertheless, on the empirical and intersubjective observation of signification processes. Given the range of cultural phenomena that the current scientific discourse ascribes to the semantic field of “religion”, what semiotic features appear cross-culturally throughout these processes? And what features, on the contrary, make them unique or separate them into groups and families? Moreover, what new rearrangements, both at the cross-cultural and at the comparative level, are made viable by the introduction of the semiotic perspective?

It might be ventured that one of the common denominators of religious phenomena, considered from a semiotic point of view, is amazement. There is something amazing in every religion. Of course, such amazement should not be defined simply as emotional response, but as semiotic process connecting the religious experience, language, and the human cognition. A clue to a better definition of amazement is in the etymology of the word. Semanticists know well that the etymology of a word does not always correspond to its current semantic field. Yet, it provides an indication about what cultural trends have shaped the meaning of the word throughout history, thus turning the word itself into a knot in a culture’s evolution.

In Old English one finds the verb *amasian* [“confuse, surprise”] and its past participle *amarod* [“confused”]. Significantly, 19th-century etymologists referred the word “amaze” to Old High German *meis*, which used to designate “a basket carried on the back”. Later, the Norwegian etymological dictionary by Falk and Torp indicated among the meanings of *mase* “lose consciousness” and “become delirious”.

Two semantic lines, hence, intersect in the etymology of “amazement”: on the one hand, a reference to the patient activity of weaving; on the other hand, a reference to loss of mental control. The former can be related to the constraining dimension of semiosis, already evoked above through Hjelmslev’s meta-linguistic choice of “content”, Leroi-Gourhan’s emphasis on weaving as the technique that models the human conception of orderly cultural patterns, and Deleuze & Guattari’s views on the fabrication of ‘rippled space’. The latter element, that is, loss of mental control, is equally central in the semantics of amazement. That is why the lexeme “maze” has been extracted from the verb “amazement”. A naïve etymology has the verb “amazement” derive from “maze”, but historically the reverse is true. “Maze” in English designates an amazing place, that is, a place whose intricate weaving represents a challenge to mental control.

To this regard, it is interesting to notice that English, unlike other languages, distinguishes between labyrinths and mazes. Although the semantic line separating the two is thin, the first word is usually referred to intricate spatial structures where nevertheless a single path inexorably leads from entrance to goal; the second word, on the opposite, usually designates complex spatial structures that provide a multiplicity of choices. The spatial structure of labyrinths is usually unicursal, meaning that it can be traced in one continuous line; the spatial structure of mazes, instead, is usually multicursal, meaning that it cannot be traced in one continuous line.

Both labyrinths and mazes are designed to prompt a cognitive, emotional, and pragmatic

response, but in different ways. Upon entering a labyrinth, one does not know whether its path will take to the goal; one therefore continues to walk through it, anguished by ignorance, while every twist adds to the feeling of spatial and emotional disorientation. However, finding the exit in a labyrinth is a matter of faith, whereas finding the exit in a maze is a matter of both faith and choice. In a maze too there is no certainty that the path will take to the goal, but the anguish of the labyrinth is increased by necessity of choice; at every turn, one fears that the wrong decision has been taken. That is why maze in German is called *Irrgarten* or *Irrweg* [litt. the garden, the way of erring].

Distinction between labyrinths and mazes helps to more precisely define the semantics of amazement: if maze is the spatial matrix of amazement, then amazement originally is the emotion of feeling lost in front of a vertiginous multiplicity of choices. The current semantics of amazement, though, tends to bear a positive connotation. “Amazing” is what wonders and surprises in a positive way, generating a feeling of euphoria. However, the euphoric tone of amazement should not surprise. After all, both labyrinths and mazes turn often into playful places exactly for they provide narrative potentiality. Complicated as they may be, indeed, they offer human beings the perfect spatial metaphor of faith and will overcoming ignorance and adversity. The vertiginous thrill created by the meandering structure of the maze adds to the existential fulfillment that one attains coming out of it.

On the basis of these considerations, the semiotic definition of religion as the human dimension of amazement can be more analytically explained. Like a maze, religious cultures often present believers with an intricate pattern, which manifests itself through the words of sacred texts, the movements of liturgy, the gestures of prayer, etc. Like in mazes, there is something both anguishing and playful about these patterns. On the one hand, the structure of the religious maze seems to constantly remind believers that they are confronted with vertiginous, overwhelming infinity. On the other hand, the religious maze provides believers with a narrative vade mecum. That does not simply mean that religions show the way out of the maze they construct, which would be a trivial interpretation of their role. More subtly, it can be argued that the religious maze represents the extraordinarily complex simulacrum of a key existential feature of the human species.

Peirce sought to capture it through the concept of unlimited semiosis. The perennial, unstoppable flight of interpretants is not an exception in human cognition, but the rule. Not only human beings cannot stop thinking, but thought most frequently unfolds in apparently chaotic, unsystematic way, exactly like the meandering structure of a maze. Such mental proliferation is indeed at the core of human linguistic ability, and has proved the most effective feature of the human species throughout evolution.

Interestingly, Umberto Eco has labeled “fuga di interpretanti” [litt. “fugue of interpretants”] this erratic burgeoning of interpretants. “Fugue” is both a musical term, designating the contrapuntal composition mastered by Bach, and a psychiatric term, indicating the loss of one’s identity, the sinking of the psyche into anguishing disorientation. These two semantic lines seem to reproduce those that intersect in the etymology of “maze”: on the one hand, the frightening feeling of losing mental control; on the other hand, the playful evocation of infinity as something that can be traveled through, guided by faith and cunningness. Deleuze & Guattari’s critique of ‘rippled space’ was indeed also a complex eulogy of the theoretical virtues of mental derangement, which the style of *Mille Plateaux* embodied against the capitalistic drive to control and its visual devices, from the perspective to the panopticon. As Umberto Eco has underlined in its typology of the labyrinth, the decomposition of its containing structure brings about the rhizome, which is exactly the cognitive model endorsed by Deleuze & Guattari.

However, classifying religions as instances of ‘rippled space’ that seek to canalize the human

inclination to mental erraticism would be reductive. Religions are conglomerates of interpretive habits, but they are not only that. On the contrary, from the semiotic point of view, religions seem to play a double, paradoxical role. They place believers in a maze, but simultaneously they provide them with an aerial view of it. For the believer, the existential experience of being immersed in a complex matrix that elicits an emotional response of disorientation, awe, and even fear is inseparable from a euphoric vision of order, be it the unicursal order of a labyrinth, when religions interpret existence as destiny, or the multicursal order of a maze, when they consider it as choice. Playfulness is germane to religions for play too features this constant shift from two paradoxically co-present dimensions of immersion and detachment, vertigo and control.

Given the human adaptive capacity for burgeoning thinking, religions provide narrative frameworks in which such capacity is both vicariously exalted and tamed. From this point of view, the religious experience is inextricably linked with the linguistic one, for language too is, structurally, infinitude and control, proliferation and grammar, maze and labyrinth. The abstract coincidence of language and religion confirms the need for a semiotic perspective on both, but simultaneously underlines two responsibilities, linked with the two dimensions of semiotic research evoked above.

First, the parallel between religion, language, and mazes must be supported by empirical evidence from the interconnected study of nature and culture. The neurophysiology, cognition, and cultural elaboration of infinitude must be studied in their reciprocal influences. Second, semiotics of religion faces a comparative responsibility: if religion is a maze, semiotics must observe and analyze every turn of it in order to come up with an articulated classification of both patterns and practices. The maze that Judaism proposes to believers is different from that of Christianity. They share a general principle, but they embody different conceptions of infinitude, path, choice, goal, destiny, etc.

Returning to Hjelmslev, the semiotics of religion is after *the form* of each religious maze, as well as after the evolution of this form through history and contexts. But here “form” should be meant according to the Danish linguist’s original conception, not as pattern that has already shaped a certain matter, that is, as substance, but as constraining scheme before any substantiation. For instance, the semiotician of Christianity is interested not as much in the structure of liturgy in 17th-century mass, as in how this structure translates into verbal and gestural codes a more abstract framework, which can be extracted from those codes and identified as the early modern Christian form of religious experience. The difficulty of the operation derives from the fact that Hjelmslev’s cultural forms cannot be perceived as separated from the matters they shape, and must therefore be excerpted from them. Yet, that might be the most important specific contribution of semiotics to the study of religious phenomena: pinpointing how the containment of infinitude is arranged in each religious culture, tradition, period, and context, through which articulatory maze or labyrinth.

The risk of getting lost is even higher in this enterprise than in that of navigating through a medieval maze. Yet, a good point of departure is represented by the explicit diagrammatic representations that often circulate in religions. In several cases, indeed, religions adopt diagrammatic expression in order to communicate the skeleton of their inner form, as though providing a fractal miniature map of the maze they immerse the believer into. What follows is an example of the diagrammatology of the sacred that semiotics should carry on in a comparative and systematic way.

There is no lack of attention in semiotics toward labyrinths and mazes. Umberto Eco devotes paragraph 2.3.5 of his *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language* to “The Encyclopedia as Labyrinth”, proposing a typology of labyrinths, mazes, and rhizomes as well as positing the encyclopedia as model that captures the “flight of interpretants”. The title of one of Eco’s last books on

the semiotic theory of knowledge, *From the Tree to the Labyrinth*, also bears on the topic. Curiously, Peirce too devoted attention to mazes, however not in order to explain them, but in order to construct them. In 1909 he published in *The Monist* an article entitled *Some Amazing Mazes. A Second Curiosity*. The article consists in the thorough description of how mathematics can be used to create sophisticated and ‘amazing’ card tricks. One should not forget either the deep influence that Borges’s *imaginaire*, so replete with labyrinths, exerted on contemporary semiotics.

However, while Eco’s epistemological insights on the gnoseology of labyrinths might remain in the background of an enquiry about mazes in religion, and Peirce’s own mazes provide further evidence of the American semiotician’s exuberant diagrammatics, the primary concern for the semiotics of religion is to analyze the various schemes through which religious cultures represent their own abstract form.

The sand drawings of Malekula are an exemplary case study. Malekula is the second-largest island in the nation of Vanuatu, in the Pacific Ocean region of Melanesia. Male natives traditionally engage in the production of extraordinarily complex and skillful sand drawings. Here follow some examples (figures 1 and 2):




Fig. 1




Fig. 2

These drawings have been a key object of anthropological inquiry at least since 1914, when the British ethnologist John Layard recorded some of them during his visit of the New Hebrids, now Vanuatu. Christian missionaries had already produced sketches of these drawings and sent them to the attention of the British ethnologist Alfred Cort Haddon. One of his students, Bernard Arthur Deacon, first gathered extensive documentation about them during his stay in the island between 1926 and 1927. As Deacon wrote in one of his notes, edited and published after his premature death in 1927 by British anthropologist Camilla H. Wedgwood: “The whole point of the art is to execute the designs perfectly, smoothly, and continuously; to halt in the middle is regarded as an imperfection [...] Each design is regarded rather as a kind of maze, the great thing is to move smoothly and continuously through it from starting-point to starting point.”

In the same notes, Deacon reports a local myth that points at the religious relevance of the drawings. When people from the Seniang district of Malekula die, they must reach Wies, the land of the dead, through a specific road. At a certain point along the way, they come to a rock called Lembwil Song, lying in the sea at the boundary between the Seniang and Mewun districts. The land of the dead is situated behind the rock, surrounded by a high fence. Sitting by the rock is a female ghost, Temes Savsap. On the ground in front of her is drawn the complete pattern known as *Nahal*, “the Path” (figure 3).




Fig. 3

The path that the deceased must go through so as to accede to the land of the dead lies exactly in the middle between the two symmetrical halves of the drawing. But as soon as the dead approaches it, the female ghost hurriedly rubs out one half of the pattern, so that the dead cannot find their way any longer. Only precise knowledge of how to redraw the missing half of the pattern will enable the dead to see the path again. However, if dead people do not know how to complete the pattern, the female guardian of the path eats them, so that they will never reach the land of the dead.

A vast anthropological literature bears on the sand drawings of Malekula, including Layard's 1942 classic *Stone Men of Malekula*. This literature indicates how the complex patterns ritually drawn and redrawn by Malekula natives serve multiple purposes: as graphic mnemotechniques, they transmit traditional knowledge about the mythical history and geography of the island from generation to generation; as pastime, they structure the rhythm of existence in Malekula; as complex craft, they determine a hierarchy of skills and wisdom; as abstract diagrams, they enable a practice of concentration and contemplation; as mythograms, they represent formulae for dealing with the afterlife, as is evident in the myth reported above.

From the semiotic point of view, it can be argued that the visual patterns and the performativity of these drawings embody the essential form of Malekula spirituality, the way in which the local religious culture seeks to both contain and restrain, within a ritual shape, the specific relation that is posited between life and death, immanence and transcendence, infinitude of forms and finitude of drawings. The sand drawings of Malekula are therefore patterns of amazement in the sense that was evoked before: they playfully represent the maze of potentialities that human life implies, and simultaneously transmit ritual knowledge about how this maze can be navigated through. The extraordinary feature of these sand mazes is that they are successfully traversed by the same gesture that create them, as though embodying the inextricable interconnectedness of existence and labyrinth: as soon as the finger touches the sand, it starts creating a maze for itself, but spiritual wisdom will allow the same finger to come out of the sandy maze

without mistakes. The maze therefore functions according to both its etymological roots: it is a place of potential confusion, but it is also weaving, pattern that instructs on how to proceed from the entrance of life to its goal.

Building on existent and copious anthropological literature, the semiotics of religion should pursue multiple aims. First, analytically describing the grammar of these drawings, the way in which their lines, curbs, dots, and passages are articulated, nominated, arranged, and associated with a semantic plane of narratives and a pragmatic level of performativity. Second, pointing out how each of these drawings work as pattern of amazement, playfully situating ritual designers in the middle of a maze while providing them with traditional knowledge about navigating through it. Third, formulating hypothesis on how these visual patterns embody the abstract form of Malekula religiosity, its peculiar way of solving the riddle of relation between life and death, infinity and finitude, thought and language. Fourth, the cultural semiotics of religion should engage in the difficult task of comparing different religious mazes and their diagrammatic expressions.

Several religious cultures adopt complex visual patterns in order to have believers ritually experience the amazement of spatial vertigo while providing them with performative control over them. The yantras of Tantric Buddhism are a good example, as well as the diagrammatic decorations in the icons of Byzantine hesychasm. There is a common denominator in these visual and ritual constructions, a similar way of evoking the core of religious experience through a paradoxical simulacrum. At the same time, each of these patterns, and the performative practice that they entail, inflect the principle of the maze in a peculiar, religion- and context- specific way.

The semiotics of religion should look at both these dimensions of commonality and variety, and engage in its own labyrinth of recognition and surprise.

BIBLICAL DONKEY

Mony Almalech
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
almalech@abv.bg

Abstract

The donkey is charged with a rich, important biblical symbolism. Usually the kings choose a strong and combatant animal for ceremonies – a thoroughbred horse, an imposing elephant or even a camel. David has a “royal she-mule”, Solomon is anointed as king on a “wild donkey”. And what does Solomon’s wild donkey signify? Christ enters Jerusalem on “the foal of a she-ass,” as the king of the Jews. How do we account for the fact that in Hebrew the ass’s foal is not a diminutive of the word ‘donkey’, as well as the fact that the she-ass signifies ‘slow pace’ and has nothing in common with the jackass? The paper replies to these curious questions and to the riddle as to why the king of the Jews rides “the foal of a she-ass” and the king is of the tribe of Judah, of whom Jacob/Israel prophesies that he will untie his donkey, just as the apostles set free the ass’s foal for which Jesus Christ sent them. To decode these biblical symbols I use a linguo-semiotic approach.

1. Messiah’s donkey in Easter story

Why in first century A.D. Jewish population of Jerusalem decode as the king of the Jews and the Messiah a stranger who enters the town “riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a donkey”; and sitting upon an ass, and a colt the foal of an ass (KJV).

John and Matthew use a quote from the Old Testament:

as it is written: “Do not be afraid, daughter of Zion. Look, your king is coming, sitting on a donkey’s colt!” John 12:14-15 (NRS)

to fulfill what had been spoken through the prophet, saying, “Tell the daughter of Zion, Look, your king is coming to you, humble, and mounted on a donkey, and on a colt, the foal of a donkey.” Matthew 21:2-7 (NRS)

People in Christian culture are so accustomed to Easter story that they did not realize how strange and unusual is that act. To understand its cultural significance, we must remember the following facts:

- The New Testament was written by Jews for Jews, first.
- The New Testament is a type of Judaism based on the culture and customs brought from the Old Testament.
- Therefore, we should know well the Old Testament.

Subquestions can help us:

- What are the Hebrew terms for foal, colt, mule, she-ass, he-ass, donkey?
- Why the king of the Jews rides “the foal of a she-ass”?
- What is the symbolism of the royal Jewish animal in case that usually the kings choose a strong and combatant animal for ceremonies – a thoroughbred horse, an imposing elephant or even a camel.

It is impossible to give complete and satisfactory answers to these questions in short text but let me try to start to answer.

2. The Hebrew terms for English Biblical terms *foal, colt, she-ass, he-ass, donkey*

John and Matthew quoted Zechariah 9:9:

Rejoice greatly, O daughter Zion! Shout aloud, O daughter Jerusalem! Lo, your king comes to you; triumphant and victorious is he, humble **and riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a donkey.** (NRS)

Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee: he *is* just, and having salvation; lowly, and **riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass.** (KJV)

2.1. The Old Testament prophecy about the ass’s foal of the Messiah and donkey-terminology

In Zechariah 9:9 the terms are:

male donkey/male ass רוֹמָה [hamòr]
 colt רִיעַ [aìr]
 pl. female donkey/female ass תּוֹנֵת [atonèt]
 donkey’s foal, **lit.** son of female donkey בֶּן תּוֹנֵת [ben atonèt]

The Messiah’s foal is situated in the context of the particularly well-developed terminology in the Old Testament:

male donkey רוֹמָה [hamòr]
 female donkey וְתָא [atòn]

colt/foal רִיעַ [air]
 male mule/he- wild ass/wild donkey דָּרָפַ [pèred]
 (female form) mule/she-wild ass/wild donkey הַדָּרָפַ [pirdà]
 king's she- mule דָּרָפַ תְּדָרַפַּ [pirdàt mèleh]
 wild ass/wild donkey הָרָפַ [père]
 wild ass/wild donkey אָרָפַ [père]
 wild ass/wild donkey דּוֹרָעַ [aròd]

What we see in English terms *ass*, *donkey* and *mule* is that female and male individuals are not in relationship of suppletion. We need to add to the same word the pronouns *she* or *he* as formants in a compound. But in Hebrew *she-donkey* and *he-donkey* are suppletive, i.e. they have different roots. In addition, a *young donkey* is one-word-term derived from a third root and more terms are used by the prophet. Suppletivism (‘adding’, ‘exchange’) is a way of expressing grammatical meanings of a word in which a relevant grammatical word form use another root. In clear words – semantically connected words has different roots. Suppletive forms need special attention – they are seen as “irregular” or even “highly irregular”.

Examples for suppletive facts: *good-better-best*; Bulgarian terms for *мъж* (man) and *жена* (woman) are suppletive.

We needed this definition for better orientation in Hebrew terms. In addition, there are some unknown to Europeans features of the Hebrew language and alphabet: In Hebrew the root consists of consonants and no vocals. In Hebrew Alphabet, there are no letters for vocals. The vocals are written with diacritics – dots and dashes.

3. The male donkey רֹמֶה [hamòr]

3.1. Additional information from the extended semantics of the roots (logic, associations, and contexts)

Definition: The root is morpheme that carries the mutual semantic features among all word-derivates from that root. For example, there is something common between *book*, *booklet*, *book-shop*, *booking* etc., including literal and figurative meanings.

The information for the roots is from BibleWorks4.

Male-donkey *Het-Mem-Reish* רמה
 I. ferment, boil, foam; II. be red רמַה [hamàr]
 III. smear with asphalt (Exo 2:3, only)
 wine רמַה [hèmer]
 bitumen רמַה [hemàr]
 cement, mortar, clay רמַה [hòmer]
 (he)-as רומַה [hamòr]
 roebuck רומַה [iahmùr]

(Bibliography used in BibleWorks4: Cohon, Samuel, “Ass,” in ISBE, I, pp. 287-88. McCullough, W. S., “Ass,” in IDB, II, pp. 260-61. McKenzie, J. L., “Ass” in Dictionary of the Bible, I, Bruce, 1965, pp. 62-63. G.H.L.)
 (BibleWorks4)

From *Het-Mem-Reish* the verb *to be red* [hamàr] is formed, which only appears in Job, 16:16 in the form [hamarmerà], meaning *to be reddish*. Classical (Библия, 1940) and current (Библия, 2001; 2002) protestant Bulgarian versions prefer to render [hamarmerà] as “to bloat”.

Only the orthodox Bulgarian version is true to the original *to become red* (почервения). The Septuagint prefers to render the prototype of macro-red, using the word συγκέκασται, meaning *burning in fire, suddenly set afire*. According to BibleWorks4 this word is translated into Latin as *comburare*, but st. Jerome (347-420) does not use it in the Vulgata, preferring instead the word *intumuit* ('to bloat'). The Slavonic translations in Russian, Polish and Czech keep to *reddening* – RST *побазрвело*, BTP *czerwone*, BKR *oduřavěla*.

It becomes clear that the denotation of the *male donkey* comprises associations with macro-red and this type of macro-red is not loaded with positive semantizations and only with great difficulty could be taken as macro-light version of red. From the root of *male donkey* [hamòr] is also formed the word *roebuck* [iahmùr], where the internal motive clearly follows the line of reddishness.

3.2. The divine commandments and the male donkey רוּמָה [hamòr]

The word [hamòr] is used frequently and every time the divine commandments are verbalized in the Exodus and Deuteronomy. There are more than 10 uses – Exodus 13:13; 20:17; 21:33; 22:4; 22:9; 22:10; 23:4 23:5 23:12 34:20; Deuteronomy 5:14; 5:21; 22:3; 22:4; 22:10; 28:31.

3.3. The other meanings of the root *Het-Mem-Reish*

The meanings *wine, bitumen, asphalt, cement, mortar, clay* of the root of the word for the male donkey, *Het-Mem-Reish*, are derived from the semantic features 'red' and 'material', available in the original semitic root semantics. There are also other roots for these same words in Hebrew, but in Genesis, 11:3; Exodus, 2:3; Job, 4:19; Psalms 40 are used for derivations precisely from this root. Similarly, the non-standard word for *wine*, formed from the same root – *wine* [hèmer]. Hence, in Deuteronomy, 32:14 and Ezra, 6:9 a word from this root stands for the *wine* [hèmer]. According to BibleWorks4, two different roots should be considered here (one with the paradigm, *become red, donkey* and the other with *wine, mud, clay, tar, mortar* and *stole*), despite their complete concurrence.

3.3.1. bitumen/asphalt [hemàr] and mortar [hòmer]

Genesis, 11:3 narrates the building of the tower of Babylon.

They said to one another, "Come, let us make bricks and burn *them* thoroughly." And they used brick for stone, and they used **tar** for **mortar**. (NAU)

Then they said to one another, "Come, let us make bricks and bake *them* thoroughly." They had brick for stone, and they had **asphalt** for **mortar**. (NKJ)

In this Genesis 11:3 *tar/asphalt* translates [hemàr], whereas *mortar* translates [hòmer]. Exodus, 2:3 tells about the basket in which Moses is left to swim on the river – *daubed it with slime* (KJV); *covered it over with tar and pitch* (NAU); *daubed it with bitumen* (RSV); *plastered it with bitumen* (NRS); *daubed it with asphalt* (NKJ). In Exodus, 2:3 from the root of *male donkey* is the verb *daubed it with*; [tahmerà]. Job, 4:19 uses the word [hòmer] in the expression *houses of clay* (Bul. *къщи от кал*) [batèi hòmer].

3.3.2. wine [hèmer]

Deuteronomy 32:14 Curds of cows, and milk of the flock, With fat of lambs, And rams, the breed of Bashan, and goats, With the finest of the wheat-- And of the blood of grapes you drank **wine**. (NAU)

Ezra 6:9 „Whatever is needed, both young bulls, rams, and lambs for a burnt offering to the God of heaven, and wheat, salt, **wine** and anointing oil, as the priests in Jerusalem request, *it* is to be given to them daily without fail, (NAU)

3.4. Red and white donkeys.

The meanings *wine*, *bitumen*, *asphalt*, *mortar* and *clay* indicate the exclusivity of the white donkey, because the usual meanings of the root for the male donkey [hamòr] are realized in the paradigm of the meanings ‘red’ and ‘material’. If the meaning ‘wine’ can be regarded as a denotation of a sacral element, then the meanings of ‘bitumen’, ‘asphalt’, ‘mortar’, ‘clay’ can be considered as an indication of a realization of the root inverse to the sacral – toward ‘dark’, ‘earthly’, ‘low’, ‘material’, ‘transient’ and even ‘hellish’. Precisely these meanings are used when Moses is hidden in the resin basket, so as not to drown in the river of life, full of ‘Nile’s crocodiles’. In a figurative sense, Moses remains hidden under this symbolic cover of resin, symbolizing ‘earthly’, ‘low’ and ‘transient’ until that moment in his life when he leaves the Pharaoh’s family.

3.5. The lexical semantization of the *male donkey* is ‘a symbol of the material’

An important distinctive feature of the word for *male donkey* רוֹמָה [hamòr] is that *male donkey* easily becomes a symbol of the material, because in contemporary Hebrew the word ‘material’ is formed from the root of ‘substance’ חָמַח [hòmer], as well as the word ‘foam’ and the outdated *smear with asphalt* חָמַח [hamàr]. Traditional and contemporary rabbinic thought confirm the idea that “the Judahic Messiah riding a horse, controls the material and physical” (Zohar, Bamidbar, 3:207a). Rabbi Ari Kahn (Kahn), a professor at the Univeristy of Bar-Ilan (Israel) recalls Zohar’s commentary in his popular lectures.

Moreover, in contemporary Israelite society, the idea of the relation ‘material – the Messiah’s donkey’ has various manifestations. For instance, Sefi Rachlevsky, in his book „Messiah’s Donkey” (Rachlevsky 1998) sustains the claim that the national religious movement attempts to replace the democratic Hebrew state by a religious theocracy, using the term “straddling” the institutions of the democratic state. The author shows that the religious Zionist Rav Kuk discusses laic pioneers and politicians who established and built a democratic Hebrew state, as the Messiah’s donkey. “Materialists” (there is a word-play with donkey רוֹמָה [hamòr] and the related words *matter*, *material*, *substance* חָמַח [hòmer]) have done the dirty work, so to speak, so that now the nationalist religious movement is designated by God to take over the state institutions in order to transform them into the nationalist religious ideal – the “essence of the Messiah”. Rachlevsky’s book crystallized secular Israel’s fear of ultra-Orthodox power ... from a religious community bent on destroying Israel’s democracy.

The material is precisely related to the word for male donkey, insofar as *male donkey* and רוֹמָה [hamòr] and *matter*, *material* חָמַח [hòmer] are derivatives of one and the same root. This kind of commentary, however, expresses the general idea based on only one of the three “don-

key” terms used in Zechariah 9:9. This type of commentary omits details such as the element of elevation originating in Zechariah’s use of the word *donkey’s foal* רִיבַע [aìr]. The semantics of ‘elevation’ and ‘soaring’ is carried by the entire semantics of the root of the word *donkey’s foal*. The other omission is Zechariah’s elaboration that the donkey is “the foal of donkeys” (וּבֶן תֶּאֱוֹנוֹת [ben atonòt]). Briefly, this kind of religious nationalist claim (to put it mildly) “conveniently” omits the context of Prophet Zechariah’s words in this verse.

3.6. Denotative and connotative aspects

From word-derivation point of view the he-donkey רוֹמָח [hamòr] expresses the macro-red and macro-black in terms of Witkovski and Brown 1977; 1978; 1982, Wierzbicka 1996, Borg 2007.

From contextual, storyline point of view he-donkey is a marker for decisive moments of the life of tribes of Issachar and Judah (Genesis 49:11), of Abraham (Genesis 22:4); Joseph (Genesis 42:27; 44:13); Moses (Exodus 4:20; Numbers 16:15); The conquest of Jericho (Joshua 15:18); The tribe of Judah takes possession of the Holy Land (Joshua 15:12-20; Judges 1:10-16); One of the first punishments for disobeying the Torah in the Holy Land (Judges 6:15); Gideon and Samson (Judges 15:15-16); The beginning of the end of the epoch of the Judges (Judges 19-21); The beginning of the monarchy (1 Samuel 12:1-3); Death of the nameless prophet (3 Kings 13:13; 23-24; 27); king David (1 Samuel 16:20; 25:18-25; 40-44; 2 Samuel 16, 1-4; 17:23); king Solomon (1 Kings 2:8-10; 36-44); The actions of the prophet Elijah (2 Kings 4:22); The narrator is prophet Jeremiah, Chronicles and Kings (Jeremiah 22:19; 2 Chronicles 36:6; 2 Kings 24:6); The narrator is prophet Nehemiah (Nehemiah 7:65-68), Isaiah.

4. The Female Donkey וְיִתָּא [atòn]

Historically, the female donkey was preferred to the male because of its milk and because it was better for riding. In BibleWorks4 it is shown precisely why the donkey is related to the tradition of pacification and the Messiah, as told already by Jacob. This is said in Genesis, 49:11, where chapter 49 is dedicated to Jacob’s legacy to his twelve sons. Verses 10, 11 and 12 are dedicated to the tribe of Judah, from which David is a descendant. The descendents of Judah are the only tribe which returned from Mesopotamia and the New Testament indicates Jesus Christ as a descendent of King David. In Jacob’s legacy in Genesis, 49:11, for the first time, key terms *ass’s colt, foal* are used which are also inherited by the New Testament:

Binding his foal unto the vine, and his ass’s colt unto the choice vine; he washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood of grapes: Genesis 49:11 (KJV)

foals of a donkey, lit. sons of female donkey יִנְבּ וּבֶן תֶּאֱוֹ [bnèi atonò];

binding his foal וְרִיבַע יָרָס אֵ [osrì irò]

binding his ass’s colt וְרִיבַע יִנְבּ יָרָס אֵ [osrì bnèi irò]

4.1. The prototype of the Messiah’s white donkey

The *white she-donkeys* in Judges 5:10 are a highly significant symbol because it relates to the prophecy that the Messiah will enter Jerusalem on a donkey.

Judges 5:10 „You who ride on **white donkeys**, You who sit on *rich* carpets, And you who

travel on the road – sing! Judges, 5:10 (NAU)

Judges 5:10 Speak, ye that ride on **white asses**, ye that sit in judgment, and walk by the way. (KJV)

The important notion in regard to the New Testament is “binding the ass’s colts”, where it is tacitly understood that there are “tied asses”.

4.1. Lexical and root information.

The root of the word אָתוֹן [atòn] is not mentioned in BibleWorks4. According to Gesenius, however, in Arabic there is a non-developed root *Alef-Tav-Nun* אתן, meaning, ‘to walk with small steps’ which, with a preposition, can also mean ‘stand stable’, ‘stand firm’, ‘sustain’. This verb is close to the arab verb ‘refuse’ and, according to Gesenius, from this common, non-developed root derives the Hebrew word *ass* אָתוֹן [atòn] (Gesenius, 1996, p. 95). In full agreement with Gesenius, the *Easton Bible Dictionary* (EBD) asserts that the *ass* is called אָתוֹן [atòn], because of its slow gait.

According to the *The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia (ISBE)*, the word has a different origin:

‘Athon, Assyrian ‘atanu’ and Aramaic ‘atana’, is derived from ‘atha’ “to come,” “go,” etc. (Furst suggests that it may be derived from ‘athan, Aramaic ‘adhan, “to be slender,” “docile”, etc.) (Ass – ISBE)

Leaving the passage indicated in BibleWorks4 and to conclude, we should note that the donkey expresses the idea of ‘peace’ and ‘ordinariness’, as well as ‘God’s omnipotence who, if he wants to, makes something great of the most ordinary thing’. This is the sense commented in BibleWorks4, in the case of Numbers 22:21-28, where the donkey speaks to Balaam and becomes the carrier of divine providence. Let us recall that the idea of ‘ordinariness’ includes the most popular qualities of that animal – ‘stupidity’, ‘stubbornness’, ‘strong sexuality’.

Gesenius adds the meanings ‘walk with small steps’, as well as ‘refuse’, which have the potential to develop as ‘stand stable’, ‘stand firm’ and ‘sustain’. According to the *ISBE*-interpretation, the function of movement ‘going’, ‘coming’ is confirmed for denoting the female donkey.

We should note the interest in the term “white asses”. Dr. Thomas McDaniel, 2003 dedicates an entire monograph to this topic, including his interpretation. The book shows an impressive erudition in Semitic philology, knowledge of English translations and the Septuagint. The asses are not the focus of attention, but interestingly, McDaniel gives a completely different translation of Judges 5:10, omitting the female gender of the donkey and the “sitting ones” do not sit on rugs but on mules: *Riders on young donkeys, those sitting on mules, and those walking along the way*. The eccentricity of this translation may explain why the book was published by the author himself. In addition, the author has a series of original ideas.

The word *donkeys* אָתוֹנוֹת [atonòt] is in the feminine plural.

The term *white* is not expressed by the standard Hebrew term for white color (לָבָן [lavàn]), but by a word from the root *Tzadi-Het-Reish* רָחַץ. In the English and Bulgarian translations, however, *white donkeys* אָתוֹנוֹת תְּחֹרֵץ [atonòt tzechoròt] and *white wool* תְּחֹמֶר רָחַץ [tzeomer tzehar] are not translated as *reddish-gray*, *tawny*, but consistently result as *white (female) donkeys* (Bul.

бѣли магаруци).

4.1.1. White she-donkeys, the root *Tzadi-Het-Reish* רהצ and the closely related root *Tzadi-He-Reish* רהצ

The Hebrew word for *white* is תֹּהַר [tzehoròt] and the word's root is *Tzadi-Het-Reish* רהצ. The root *Tzadi-Het-Reish* רהצ according BibleWoks4 has following meanings:

reddish-gray, tawny (Ezek 27:18) רָהַצ [tzàhar]
tawny (Jud 5:10) רָהַצ [tzòhar]

The word *white* designated by words formed from that root appears only twice in the entire Old Testament. The first time is in Judges 5:10 and the second – in the word-combination *white wool* in Ezekiel, 27:18. Such a rare usage is significant in itself. In order to orient ourselves in regard to this meaning, we have to examine the full semantics of the root.

According to Gesenius 1996, the origin of רָהַצ [tzàhar] derives from an unextended root in the language, meaning *bedazzle, knock, shine, blinded by bright light*.

The paradigm of such a denotation of white in the Old Testament comprises only two cases – *white she-donkeys* תֹּהַר תֵּצֵר [atonòt tzehoròt] and *white wool* רֶמֶץ רָהַצ [tzèmer tzàhar]. A possible reading of the word *white* is רָהַצ [tzòhar], but here I shall keep to רָהַצ [tzàhar].

Thus, the root relates to active transformations of the idea of light. The singular form of *white*, תֹּהַר [tzehoròt], is רָהַצ [tzahòr] and the main signification of that word is *reddish-gray, tawny*.

Consequently these translations depend on the tradition and on the amalgamation of this root with *Tzadi-He-Reish* רהצ which is close to it. The paradigm of *Tzadi-He-Reish* רהצ provides the *donkeys' color*:

I. noon, midday; II. roof (once, Gen 6:16) רָהַצ [tzòhar]
fresh oil רָהַצ [itzhàr]
press oil רָהַצ [tzàhar]
(TWOT in BibleWords4)

It is important to check whether Bibles in other languages “insist” on the translation of תֹּהַר [tzehoròt] as *white*, Bul. бѣлу, since [tzahòr] denotes *reddish-gray, tawny* and is not the standard Hebrew word for *white*, which is לָבָן [lavàn]).

The Septuagint shows a leveling of two roots that are close, but different:

Tzadi-He-Reish רהצ and *Tzadi-Het-Reish* רהצ, translating the word תֹּהַר [tzehoròt] with the meaning of the paradigm of the word רָהַצ [tzòhar]. Instead of the standard use of the term for white color (λευκός [leukòs]) or the standard word for *light*, Bul. светлина, Gr. φῶς [fos], the Septuagint indicates the word μεσημβρία [mesembrìas], meaning *noon*. Thus the Septuagint differs from the Slavonic and English translations which use the standard term for *white color* — бѣли, бѣлых, biały, white.

The word רָהַצ [tzòhar] is used once as a term for the *window* of Noah's Ark (Genesis 6:16). That which allows the seventy translators to treat the two roots as synonyms, are the semes ‘light’, ‘noon-light, as something positive’ and ‘ritual purity’. This is how the window of Noah's arc and the white donkeys from Judges 5:10 turn out to be in a common paradigm, suggesting ‘light’ and ‘purity’.

The Vulgata uses the word *nitēns*, meaning shiny and not one of the standard words for *white* or *light*.

All translations maintain the whiteness, lightness and shininess of the *donkeys*. In this regard it is particularly significant that the legend of the Septuagint attributes a rabbinic authorship to the Greek translation, and the St. Jerome (347-420) spent much time in the Holy Land, studying Hebrew and advising local Judaic rabbis. The first occurs three centuries before the New era and the second – four centuries after the New era. In this way the tradition consistently confirms this translation.

Of the same order is the riddle why the kings David and Solomon choose foals which are “children of the she-donkey” as the royal animal and not the horse. Judges 5:10 shows that the use of donkeys or foals as animals for riding and expressing abundance, power, influence etc., is a tradition in the Near Eastern Israelite monotheistic culture.

White she-donkeys from Judges 5:10 are related to the Messiah and his foal of a donkey, lit. *sons of female donkey*, from Genesis, 49:11.

5. The colt ריע [air]

BibleWorks4 distinguishes between two different roots *Ayin-Yud-Reish* ry[, which are spelled the same – ‘yr I и ‘yr II. From the first root derives ריע [ur] rouse oneself, awake, incite, as well as ריע [ir] excitement. From the second root derives ריע [air] he-donkey.

Gesenius provides more information, the most valuable of which is the motive of forming the noun *wild donkey* ריע [air] – “The notion of being hot is applied in various ways: 1. to an *ardent rapid course*, or running; a wild ass, so called from its rapid unrestrained running”. Interestingly, Gesenius does not indicate the meaning of the root *rouse oneself, awake, incite*.

From this review of the root in BibleWorks4 and Gesenius, we can draw the following complex conclusion:

The cognitive, sub-consciously flowing relation of the word colt ריע [air] has five aspects, resulting from the colt’s qualities as well as of the extended semantics of the word’s root. The first aspect is that the colt lacks the association with strong sexuality, typical of mature donkeys, i.e. here the ‘lack of strong sexuality’ is at hand. The second aspect is a complete onomatopoeia with *town* ריע [air]. The third aspect relates the colt to ‘flaming’, ‘ardent’, since they form the meanings ‘speed’ + ‘peace’. The fifth aspect is the relation with the verbs rouse oneself, awake, incite ריע [ur]. This last aspect transmits linguistic consciousness and sub-consciousness of a journey to exaltation.

6. The wild donkey הקרפ [pirdà] is the royal animal

In the Hebrew world-view the wild donkey is differentiated from the domestic one with quite different words. There are two denotations for wild ass/wild donkey.

One is קרפ [pèred]/קרפ [pirdà] and the other is קרפ [père]/קרפ [père]. The term for the royal parade animal is king’s she-mule (Bul. царското муле) קרפ תרפ [pirdàt mèleh].

In this context there are several uses – in Jeremiah, 2:24, Job, 11:12, 39:5. Isaiah, 32:14 – where the second word for wild donkey is used for mule, with the textual semantization ‘wild’, ‘natural’, uncivilized’, ‘non-monotheistic’ and ‘absence of people’.

BibleWorks4 indicates the meaning “wild donkey” for the word קרפ [père]/קרפ [père]. The internal form of the term royal donkey/mule קרפ [pèred] is from *run, run fast* קרפ [perà]. On the other hand, the same root, according to Gesenius, comprises the verb *carry weight, support, carry, bear* קרפ [parà]. This word should not be confused with its homophone – קרפ [parà], *meaning young cow*. The verb קרפ [parà] means *carry, give birth quickly, run*. Clearly, the two

verbs אָרַפּ [parà] and הָרַפּ [parà] are close enough – in sound and meaning.

Besides signifying ‘wild’, ‘natural’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘non-monotheistic’, the wild donkey is also a sign for ‘nobleness’ and ‘royalness’. This appears in the different descriptions in 3 Kings of Solomon’s anointment as king, where the word הִקְרַפּ [pirdà] is used.

Zechariah does not use the lexeme אָרַפּ [père], used in Solomon’s anointment as king in 1 Kings:33; 38; 44 (3 Kings, 1:33; 38; 44), yet on the other hand, in the New Testament the apostles indicate that Christ entered Jerusalem as a Jewish king, riding a *mule* (Bul. осле). The founders of the Hebrew monarchy – David and Solomon – prefer the mule as their ceremonial animal. The term is *king’s mule* תִּדְרַפּ רֵלֶמֶךְ [pirdàt mèleh]. Solomon’s anointment as king occurs on a *king’s mule* (Bul. царското муле). The word formation *king’s mule* תִּדְרַפּ רֵלֶמֶךְ [pirdàt mèleh] is a smihut-form which unequivocally indicates that the royal mule is female. The term is used in three verses telling about Solomon’s anointment as king, done while David is still alive – 1 Kings 33; 38; 44.

The king said to them, „Take with you the servants of your lord, and have my son Solomon ride on **my own mule**, and bring him down to Gihon. 1 Kings 1:33 (NAU)

According to the Bulgarian explanatory dictionary, муле (mule) as a general term is a cross between a donkey and a horse. The dictionary distinguishes between the concrete terms – a mule is born of a she-ass and a horse, whereas a hinny is born from a donkey and a mare (BED 1963, p. 423). In the context of the Messiah and his genealogical tree related to King David, the question of the “royal mule”/ “David’s mule” is not without significance, as well as the term “colt, born of an ass”. This term is used both in the Old and the New Testament when it needs to be specified.

All of David’s sons ride she-mules [pirdà]. Solomon’s anointment as king with such a female mule changes the spectrum of semantizations of this word: from the usual animal ridden by the king’s sons in times of peace, this kind of donkey is transformed into a royal animal.

7. The Aramaic *wild donkey* דוֹרֶע [aròd]

The word occurs in Job 39:5.

According to Gesenius, the word colt רֵיעַ [air] has an Aramaic origin, from the root *Ayin-Yud-Reish* and is an element of the paradigm of macro-red – macro-light רֵיעַ [ur] *to be hot, ardent, rouse oneself, awake, incite* רֵיעַ [ur]; *to make hot, to heat* רֵיעָה [heir]; רֵיעַ [ir] *excitement*.

Job’s poetic style is distinctive due to his brilliant command of Hebrew, as well as the large number of loan-words. Thus we can find the Aramaic word next to the Hebrew word in one and the same verse. This is precisely the case with the Aramaic word for *wild donkey* דוֹרֶע [aròd], which is next to the Hebrew word אָרַפּ [père] in Job 39:5.

Usual explanation for the many non-Hebrew words in the Book of Job, including the couple דוֹרֶע [aròd] – אָרַפּ [père] is that the use of non-Hebrew words serves poetic manipulation (Greenstein 2003; Ginsberg 2007).

The Bulgarian translations of this word and the poetical parallelism of the Aramaic and Hebrew words for *wild donkey* are illustrations of the correctness of Greenstein’s claim.

8. Conclusions

— There are five different Hebrew roots for terms for English Biblical *foal*, *coat*, *female donkey*, *he-ass*.

— Logical and associative relations in Hebrew, established by the polysemy of different roots of names for the donkey are untranslatable into Indo-European languages.

— From color point of view the *he-donkey* חמור [hamòr] is in the area of macro-red and macro-black, while the *foal* of the Messiah is macro-white.

— The *white she-donkeys* in Judges 5:10 are a highly significant symbol because it relates to the prophecy that the Messiah will enter Jerusalem on a donkey. In this sense, the word denoting the color of the donkey is significant.

— White donkeys are related to the meanings ‘light’, ‘noon-light as something positive’, ‘ritual purity’, following the derivation of their semantics from the root, as well as from the biblical context. That is why they are the prototype of the Messiah’s donkey.

— Zechariah’s prophecy is incarnate in the gospels of the New Testament, is cited with precision by the apostles and Jesus enters Jerusalem as a Hebrew king, on a white colt, the ass’s foal.

— Kings ride mules with difficulty, but apparently this is not the case of the most important Judaic kings who are not worried to express ‘peace’ by means of this symbol.

— Kings David and Solomon choose colts “the ass’s foals” as royal animal and not the horse. From Judges, 5:10 is clear that the use of donkey or colt as an animal for riding expresses wealth, power, influence etc., but not ‘solidarity with poverty’, ‘simplicity’.

— The analysis of the extended semantics of the proto-image of Christ’s white colt – the white asses from the call to Court by Debora; the lexemes of Zechariah’s prophecy; the symbols of Jacob’s legacy for the tribe of Judah in Genesis 49; the tradition established by David and Solomon that kings should ride mules – show different levels of the relation between the New and Old Testaments.

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NIV – New International Version, 1984. Copyright 1973, 1978, 1984 by International Bible Society.

NKJ – The New King James Version NKJV, Copyright 1982, Thomas Nelson, Inc. All rights reserved.

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RELIGIÓN Y POLÍTICA. EL DISCURSO DE LA IGLESIA (ARGENTINA 2001–2003)

Norma Fatala
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
nfatala_ar@yahoo.com.ar

Abstract

Este trabajo resume el capítulo dedicado al discurso de las jerarquías eclesiásticas en una investigación de mayor aliento, que aborda la construcción discursiva del Estado nación y la comunidad política en manifestaciones mediatizadas por la prensa gráfica de Córdoba, entre setiembre de 2001 y setiembre de 2003, un período marcado por cambios ostensivos en la esfera política. El marco teórico – metodológico se inscribe en una línea de investigación sociosemiótica que toma como puntos de partida la teoría del discurso social de Marc Angenot y la teoría de los discursos sociales de Eliseo Verón.

La mañana del 25 de febrero de 1848 se supo en Chavignolles, por un individuo procedente de Falaise, que París estaba cubierto de barricadas; y al día siguiente se anunció en la alcaldía, con carteles, la proclamación de la república [...]

La alocución del párroco fue como la de los demás sacerdotes en las mismas circunstancias. Después de haber tronado contra los reyes, glorificó a la República. ¿No se dice acaso República de las letras, República cristiana? ¿Qué más inocente que la una? ¿Qué más bello que la otra? Jesucristo formuló nuestra sublime divisa: el árbol del pueblo es el árbol de la cruz. Para que la religión dé sus frutos necesita de la caridad, y en nombre de la caridad el eclesiástico conjuró a sus hermanos a que no cometieran ningún desorden y volvieran a sus casas apaciblemente. (Flaubert [1881] 1946:146-147)

El epígrafe de Flaubert tiene por objeto introducir algunas de las cuestiones que se plantean al investigador cuando intenta el análisis de los discursos eclesiásticos. ¿Qué hace que un texto

de ficción, escrito en Francia a fines del siglo XIX, evoque en un lector argentino de inicios del siglo XXI un rápido reconocimiento? Prueba por empezar que la Iglesia está lejos de desaparecer, pero cabe preguntarse además si confirma la *intemporalidad y universalidad* de la Iglesia, al menos en sus prácticas discursivas.

No se trata de una cuestión menor, ya que estos presupuestos, propios del discurso eclesiástico, han alcanzado un estatuto dóxico tan extendido que subyacen no sólo a las manifestaciones de los clérigos, sino a las de muchos de sus críticos. Sostener, por el contrario, la historicidad de estos discursos no implica desconocer que hay un efecto de “continuidad de la sustancia”, producto del predominio del *espacio* en la articulación simbólica del “cuerpo” de la Iglesia.

En efecto, las categorías *arriba/abajo* y *adentro/afuera* sobredeterminan las estructuras y vínculos institucionales, la distribución del trabajo discursivo y el dispositivo de enunciación, delimitando claramente las posiciones respectivas de jerarquía y clérigos, de consagrados y laicos. Sometidos a esas oposiciones, los ritos y la doctrina escrita (también relacionados, aunque en distinta manera, con la espacialidad) confieren a los sujetos consagrados el monopolio de la interpretación y garantizan la perdurabilidad de ciertos ideogramas que encubren los diminutos pero constantes desplazamientos y adaptaciones de una tradición pretendidamente eterna. En la superficie textual, por último, el recurso a una retórica y a un lenguaje teológicamente marcado ralentiza y absorbe los cambios, abonando el efecto de inmutabilidad.

La morosidad de esta maquinaria no es obstáculo para que, en el siglo, los miembros del clero desplieguen sus competencias en la construcción simbólica del devenir. Si bien el tiempo lineal e irreversible de la historia de la Salvación es la gran aportación judeo-cristiana a la concepción occidental de la temporalidad; en la historia de la Iglesia, esa marcha incesante hacia el fin (a la vez seguro e indeterminado) de los tiempos ha sido frecuentemente manipulada mediante dispositivos de *posposición* y *urgencia*. En tanto la primera de estas operaciones se relaciona con el monopolio del *eschaton* (cf. Koselleck [1979] 1993:25-26), la segunda se enmarca en una manipulación del presente como *umbral*.

El recorrido parabólico de los discursos eclesiásticos es a menudo portador de una polémica encubierta con las disidencias internas. A modo de ilustración, resulta difícil comprender la dureza de ciertas ratificaciones del monopolio de la escatología, si no es a la luz de una estrategia de aniquilación del contradiscurso tercermundista (i.e., la Teología de la Liberación) que, aun si derrotado, subyace fragmentariamente en la doxa estratificada. En Argentina, la crisis social del 2001 agita el fantasma del interpretante antagónico e induce en el discurso de las jerarquías la axiologización enfática de la oposición constitutiva del campo religioso: *moral/magia* (cf. Bourdieu [1971] 2009), vinculada a las escatologías terrenales:

Sobre las elecciones, consideró que “tenemos la convicción de que no tenemos que esperar ningún salvador, ninguna propuesta mágica que vaya a sacarnos adelante o a hacernos cumplir con nuestro verdadero destino. No hay verdadero destino, no hay magia” (Otro duro pronunciamiento de la Iglesia en contra de la dirigencia. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 10 de abril de 2003:4).

En los discursos de menor vuelo, la deprecación de la magia, de los “golpes de suerte”, hace foco en las promesas políticas y tiene como contrapartida una estrategia de posposición: el elogio del esfuerzo, que desalienta las expectativas de soluciones rápidas a los problemas acuciantes. El correlato del *dispositivo de posposición* orientado a las multitudes gobernadas es un *dispositivo de urgencia*, cuyos destinatarios son las dirigencias, fundamentalmente, la política.

No es necesario señalar que entre el “ya” y el “todavía no” de los dispositivos temporales, entre los destinatarios dominantes y dominados, se articula el lugar “intemporal” de la Iglesia y su rol de armonizadora.

Enunciadores religiosos y discursos políticos

La segunda cuestión que el epígrafe inicial evoca es la relación, por demás compleja, entre política y religión. En sintonía con el extendido consenso acerca del carácter de sucesora de la religión de la política moderna, las afinidades entre discurso político y discurso religioso han llevado a Eliseo Verón (1980:92–94) a plantear que el primero ha de ser considerado un heredero directo del segundo.

Ambos son – sostiene – discursos “de efecto ideológico” ya que, al no explicitar las condiciones de producción que los determinan, no producen un “efecto de conocimiento” (un *saber*) sino una *creencia*. Se presentan así como discursos *absolutos*, que excluyen la posibilidad de discursos otros. No obstante, mientras el discurso religioso opta por consolidar su propia universalidad *ignorando* los discursos adversarios, el discurso político reconoce su existencia sólo para *demostrarlos* como absolutamente falsos, de allí su carácter explícitamente polémico.

Conviene aclarar que si bien esta distinción se sostiene con relación a otros discursos religiosos, la Iglesia ha tenido que realizar, a lo largo de la modernidad, ciertas adecuaciones a la participación en el espacio social y esto redundará en la “politización” de sus discursos. Aunque los enunciadores religiosos siguen asumiendo una legitimidad *a priori* y desplazando las bases religiosas de su autoridad para aplicarlas a cuestiones seculares; la argumentación doxológica va ganando espacio en las manifestaciones mediáticas (declaraciones, entrevistas y también documentos destinados a la difusión masiva), lo cual implica un reconocimiento implícito por parte de la Iglesia de que debe *competir por el público* con otros sectores productores de verdad.

La politización del discurso de las jerarquías católicas supone, por cierto, una dimensión agónica, pero es necesario señalar una diferencia específica, relacionada con la *clase de poder* que está en juego. En tanto el discurso político propiamente dicho (el que se relaciona con el ejercicio del poder del Estado) pone en escena la lucha simbólica con el adversario para beneficio de un *auditorio universal* (cf. Angenot 2008: 85–86) (la ciudadanía) que puede otorgar legitimidad gubernativa, electoral, etc., la pragmática del discurso eclesial es bastante más compleja. Colocándose “por fuera” y “por encima” de la política, los enunciadores religiosos se instauran en *portavoces* desinteresados y veraces de la sociedad, que asumen la Destinación final (cf. Greimas y Courtés [1979]1982:118) de las acciones políticas. Por una parte, la manifestación *autorizada* de valoraciones que circulan en la *doxa* se orienta a ratificar el vínculo entre enunciador y auditorio universal (entre portavoz y sociedad); pero, en tanto exhibición de competencias para *la formación de opinión y el control social*, constituye una instancia de manipulación de los otros sectores dirigentes (la clase política, los economistas, los empresarios...), adversarios actuales o potenciales de la Iglesia, para obtener de ellos el reconocimiento de su monopolio territorial y de su condición de guía espiritual de la nación.

De pastores, rebaños y lobos

Si consideramos las manifestaciones de obispos enrolados en distintas corrientes, podemos observar que a pesar de esas diferencias, ninguno de los religiosos renuncia a la distancia pedagógica ni a su estatuto privilegiado de enunciador legitimado por la investidura, lo cual remite a una invariante propia del dispositivo de enunciación religioso: la presuposición de una relación *complementaria y asimétrica* (Bateson, en Verón 1993:142) entre el enunciador y su destinatario, entre el sujeto consagrado y el /los laico/s.

Como correlato de la figura autorizada del enunciador, los discursos eclesiales prefiguran

un destinatario genérico que no puede sino *creer* en la palabra consagrada y *asumir como propia* la modalización deóntica que los enunciados proponen directa o indirectamente. No obstante, pocas veces el destinatario es especificado como “creyente”. Es más frecuente que los discursos eclesiásticos prefiguren un destinatario acorde a la pretensión universal de la Iglesia, un “*todos*” homologable al *nosotros* de máxima extensión, equivalente a *los argentinos*, en el que los enunciadores religiosos se incluyen:

Son horas en que todos, dirigentes y ciudadanos, debemos asumir actitudes de heroica generosidad; saber ser responsables, cumpliendo de forma cabal con nuestros compromisos y deberes. Nuestra Patria debe asentarse sobre cimientos sólidos, firmes, que perduren: verdad, amor, justicia, solidaridad, sentido de fraternidad. (Para la Iglesia, es necesaria otra forma de hacer política. *La Voz del Interior* 26 de diciembre de 2001: A3).

“Estamos acabando de matar la Patria. Parecen palabras muy fuertes y muy retóricas, pero realmente es eso. Ya las instituciones políticas no tienen ninguna credibilidad. Hay que empezar de nuevo, hay que renacer, hay que hacer otra cosa nueva”, dijo Mirás (Sin credibilidad. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 24 de mayo de 2002:3).

Asumiendo la primera persona plural, los enunciadores religiosos toman a cargo los pecados y sufrimientos del colectivo nacional, y se construyen en el mismo gesto como objetos de identificación imaginaria (cf. Žižek [1989]1992:146). Se trata, por lo tanto, de un *nosotros* sesgado por la asimetría, que reproduce “inconcientemente” el ideograma de la *nación católica* y, con él, la relación complementaria entre pastores y grey: en el centro del *nosotros* inclusivo, que refuerza el vínculo “indisoluble” entre nación y religión, habita el *nosotros* exclusivo de los sujetos consagrados.

Íntimos enemigos

Aunque podría postularse un *odium* de larga duración hacia la clase que la desplazó del centro de las decisiones, las prevenciones de la Iglesia hacia los políticos se han objetivado discursivamente de acuerdo a condiciones históricas. En el período que nos ocupa, la dirigencia política es objeto de dos operaciones semióticas cuya interrelación sólo puede considerarse como un intento de reducción a la obediencia. Por una parte, es el sujeto de un reconocimiento negativo (una condena) por su performance y, por otra, destinataria de las prescripciones que los enunciadores religiosos le imponen desde una legitimación moral *a priori*:

“La clase dirigente debe dar ejemplo de compartir los sacrificios del pueblo renunciando a los privilegios que ofenden y empobrecen. Hay que comprender que el ejercicio de la política debe ser un noble, austero y generoso servicio a la comunidad y no un lugar de enriquecimiento personal o sectorial”, advirtieron los prelados (La coima debe desaparecer de la política y la economía. *La Voz del Interior* 14 de diciembre de 2001: A3).

De la construcción de este colectivo degradado, que ha desprestigiado “*el nobilísimo arte de la política*”, los enunciadores religiosos extraen la conclusión de que es necesaria una renovación total, fundamentalmente, de los cargos electivos. Sin embargo, las recurrentes incitaciones a la participación electoral de la ciudadanía tienen como correlato una persistente manipulación so-

bre la clase política para generar espacios extraparlamentarios y corporativos. Paradoja aparente: los discursos de las jerarquías comparten esta estrategia con sus otros adversarios, los economistas neoliberales, y no es ésta la única coincidencia.

El respeto por la Ley, que enfatizan los clérigos, o el clamor por la “seguridad jurídica” de los economistas neoliberales constituyen sin dudas premisas propias de cada campo discursivo, pero tienen poco de republicanas. Aunque antagónicas, ambas se fundan en un lugar común: la subordinación de las leyes de la nación a una legalidad trascendental. Así, mientras unos, parafraseando a monseñor Storni (*La Voz del Interior* 21 de abril de 2003: A2), *divinizan el mercado*; la Ley de los prelados requiere una interpretación anagógica, puesto que “*toda autoridad legítima viene de Dios*” (Mons. Staffolani, *La Voz del Interior* 24 de mayo de 2003: A3).

Iglesia y comunidad nacional

Obligados, a partir de la *Rerum novarum*, a dar un lugar en sus discursos a esos colectivos provenientes de discursos adversos que son la sociedad y la ciudadanía, los clérigos ha preferido generalmente el colectivo *pueblo*, con sus ecos bíblicos. El “pueblo de Dios” se prestaba bien a su secularización como “pueblo de la Nación”, sobre todo si se trataba de una construcción de la nación como unidad culturalmente homogénea, en la que el catolicismo era un componente esencial.

En nuestro período, sin embargo, la construcción discursiva del *pueblo* presenta aristas problemáticas, ya que los enunciadores religiosos aparecen tensionados entre la denegación de las construcciones tercermundistas, que auguraban una liberación hecha por “*los pueblos pobres y los pobres de los pueblos*”, y la necesidad de configurar colectivos que sustenten su propia propuesta refundacional. La estrategia discursiva derivada de estas condiciones de producción consiste entonces en exasperar todos los componentes de la crisis. La *pars destruens* de la argumentación no sólo atañe a la corrupción de la clase política o a la insensibilidad de los economistas neoliberales, sino a la degradación del propio tejido social:

Los obispos [...] advirtieron, asimismo, que en esas jornadas comprobaron que “la crisis de confianza y credibilidad es muy profunda” y que la sociedad está “seriamente fragmentada”.

“El pueblo no se siente representado por sus dirigentes y, a la vez, los sectores desconfían los unos de los otros y buscan en las culpas ajenas la responsabilidad total de lo que ocurre”, describieron a modo de queja (La Iglesia reclama renunciamentos. *La Voz del Interior* 29 de enero de 2002: A2).

“Una sorda guerra se está librando en nuestras calles: la peor de todas, la de los enemigos que conviven y no se ven entre sí, pues sus intereses se entrecruzan manejados por sórdidas organizaciones delincuenciales y sólo Dios sabe qué más, aprovechando el desamparo social, la decadencia de la autoridad, el vacío legal y la impunidad” (“El país está al borde de la disolución”. *La Voz del Interior* 26 de mayo de 2002:A2).

De allí que sea difícil encontrar instancias en que “el pueblo” evoque efectivamente al tercer término de la ecuación republicana (Hobsbawm 1991:28), el *pueblo soberano*, el sujeto supuesto de la vida política. Antes bien, “el pueblo” es un sinónimo de los *gobernados*, los que no participan de las tomas de decisión. Un colectivo cuyas propiedades son del orden negativo de la impotencia, del sufrimiento, de la *pasión*; y con respecto al cual, los enunciadores religiosos se construyen en relación de exterioridad:

[...]El arzobispo de Mendoza, monseñor José María Arancibia, se preguntó si “un pueblo como el nuestro podrá captar la felicidad y vivirla hoy en Argentina, si es un pueblo defraudado, incierto y desconfiado”[...]. Por fin, monseñor Carmelo Juan Gianquinta, arzobispo de Resistencia, afirmó que “la Argentina de hoy huele muy mal” y dijo que “en mis más de setenta años de existencia, nunca el pueblo argentino ha sufrido una experiencia de fracaso como la de hoy” (Los obispos criticaron severamente a los políticos en las homilias de Semana Santa. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 2 de abril de 2002:3).

El discurso eclesiástico viene a coincidir así con los otros discursos del canon en la configuración de un colectivo nacional fragmentado, amenazado, desorientado, confuso y, sobre todo, sin competencia para revertir la situación.

En términos de colectivos estrictamente políticos, la dirigencia es el blanco preferido de la descalificación eclesiástica, pero a la *ciudadanía* no le va mucho mejor. La modalización deóntica que los enunciadores religiosos imprimen a sus discursos permite inferir sus falencias (irresponsabilidad cívica, venalidad, credulidad...) y hace extensivo el reconocimiento negativo a toda la relación de representación.

El lugar de los pobres

Nacido como *Iglesia de los pobres*, el cristianismo los instauró, a la vez, en destinatarios y encarnación del discurso de la resignación terrena y la esperanza soteriológica, transformando su humildad (por oposición a la soberbia del pecado original) en una metáfora de la vía a la santidad (*Bienaventurados los pobres de espíritu...*). Sin embargo, la semiosis de los pobres tiene *objetos e interpretantes dinámicos* (Peirce [1965] 1974:65) que, en los últimos cien años, han producido construcciones tan diversas como la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia y la “opción por los pobres” de la Teología de la Liberación.

A comienzos del tercer milenio, la utopía tercermundista, cuya resemantización radical de la escatología ultramundana conmocionó profundamente al canon eclesiástico, ha sido relegada al limbo de lo indecible; pero la pobreza ha progresado exponencialmente. Podría decirse que el desafío para los discursos eclesiásticos consiste en colonizar ciertas preocupaciones liberacionistas, pero para reconducirlas a la grilla jerárquica y poner así de manifiesto las competencias de la Iglesia para la preservación de la paz social.

En su construcción del conjunto social empobrecido los prelados introducen, con diversos grados de sutileza, ciertos elementos de distinción que van configurando una población de frontera marcada por la exclusión, la carencia extrema y la anomia. Más allá del dramatismo con que se describe su situación, estos pobres de toda pobreza aparecen como sujetos en riesgo y de riesgo, vectores de disolución social. Una construcción simbólica congruente con la previsión del caos, la anarquía y hasta la guerra civil.

[...] “hay pobres que se dejan comprar por dinero para promover el desorden social”. La expresión de la Iglesia corrió por cuenta del obispo de Resistencia, monseñor Carmelo Gianquinta, que se refirió a quienes “promueven el desorden”, en estos términos: “Desprovistos de la natural honradez del pobre, corren el peligro de constituirse en bandas adiestradas en paralizar el país. De allí a la guerra civil hay un solo paso, que no queremos admitir” (La iglesia condena a los violentos. *La Voz del Interior* 14 de marzo de 2002: A2).

La imagen de una sociedad escindida surge así de la correlación isotópica que incluye las categorías posesión/*carencia*, inclusión/*exclusión*, trabajo/*desempleo*, seguridad/*peligro*. Construidos simbólicamente a partir del encadenamiento de los términos (existencialmente) negativos, los pobres aparecen como una alteridad a partir de la cual se configura un colectivo más difuso (los *no pobres*) a los cuales *se habla de los pobres*.

Pero se trata de una producción de sentido *en reconocimiento*, porque la presentación de situaciones de conflicto como series *sin vínculo causal*, constituye un rasgo común de la retórica eclesiástica, que sólo hace relato de la historia de la salvación: desvinculados entre sí, los males sociales sólo pueden tener como común denominador *la pérdida de la gracia*.

No podemos ignorar las dificultades por las que atraviesa nuestra Patria, sus enormes conos de sombras: desde la pobreza de una buena parte de los argentinos, la desnutrición de muchos niños, la falta de trabajo, la inseguridad y la violencia, y el éxodo de muchos argentinos que buscan futuro en otras partes del mundo... Todo esto hace desestabilizar la paz social. (Pro. J. J. Ribone: La Paz: don y tarea. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 8 de enero de 2003: 6).

En efecto, la lectura de conjunto de los enunciados, sus semejanzas y diferencias, sugieren que, más allá de la preocupación social de la Iglesia, *los pobres* constituyen una clave de interpretación de los discursos de las jerarquías. Si se analizan algunos enunciados eclesiásticos “realistas”, se encuentran ciertas redundancias que desdichan de su literalidad. Una de ellas es la esquematización del paradigma de la injusticia a partir de una correlación que vincula una isotopía económica con una existencial:

Finalmente, afirmó que “no se puede matar de hambre a la gente para pagar la deuda externa, porque primero está el hombre y luego los otros bienes” (“Los políticos tocaron fondo”. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 26 de noviembre de 2001:3)

“La triste realidad de la gente que muere de hambre es consecuencia de un plan con una finalidad precisa: que pocos tengan una riqueza cada vez mayor” (Para la Iglesia, es necesaria otra forma de hacer política. *La Voz del Interior* 26 de diciembre de 2001: A 3).

El desdoblamiento de la categoría de la muerte (*morir/matar*) y sus implicancias actanciales (*pasivo/activo*) no sólo configuran, en un sentido greimasiano, los roles (*víctima/victimario*), sino que ponen en tensión el par *individual/social*, ya que son indiciales de la trasgresión de la Ley y la instauración de una culpa. Una culpa, de más está decirlo, para la que siempre se puede profetizar una retribución.

No obstante, para encontrar una puesta en discurso de la interpretación moral, hay que recurrir al publicista:

Es que la fe se separó de la vida y ese divorcio entre fe y vida, que es uno de los pecados más graves de nuestro tiempo, ha generado una ausencia de la ética en la vida pública (Pro. J. J. Ribone: La Patria busca su futuro. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 29 de mayo de 2002, Magazine:3).

No es muy difícil reponer los implícitos de este enunciado lacunario,

fe / [falta de fe]
 [gracia] / *pecado*
Vida / [muerte]

pero hay que llegar al teólogo para encontrar la interpretación anagógica:

El cardenal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, arzobispo de Buenos Aires, se refirió a “nuestro pueblo que hoy, triste, se encuentra frente a una piedra sellada que habla de muerte, corrupción y derrota” (Los obispos criticaron severamente a los políticos en las homilias de Semana Santa. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 2 de abril de 2002:3)

Si para los gnósticos, como dice Agamben ([1978]2001:148), “la resurrección no es algo que deba ser esperado en el tiempo y que ocurrirá en un futuro más o menos lejano, sino que siempre ya ha ocurrido”; para el Cardenal, al parecer, la resurrección *no ha ocurrido, no está ocurriendo* en la Argentina. La lápida sigue sellando el sepulcro y el destino del pueblo es el de la carne no redimida: “*muerte, corrupción y derrota*”. La ausencia espectral que estas palabras evocan – la de la encarnación del Espíritu- viene a completar así una lectura alegórica de la crisis que recupera el *topos* de los pobres como metáfora de la relación con lo sagrado, pero en un registro eminentemente disfórico. Reducidos casi a un estado de naturaleza, vinculados a la violencia y la muerte, los pobres se transforman en metonimias espectrales de una humanidad que se ha alejado de la gracia.

En suma, en la hermenéutica eclesial mediada de este principio de siglo, los desplazamientos por los distintos niveles de interpretación se articulan en torno a una construcción ambivalente de los pobres (víctimas peligrosas), orientada a instalar en el conjunto social la culpa (la “deuda interna”) y el temor a la retribución (el caos, la anarquía o la violencia delictiva), para postular una salida no ya utópica, sino contrafáctica: la *solidaridad* es decir, la *interdependencia* de las clases sociales, *asumida como categoría moral*.

En términos políticos, sin embargo, la solidaridad es un contenido programático endeble. Para dotarla de espesor, los enunciadores religiosos necesitan vincularla a la *unidad nacional*, con un especial énfasis en la territorialidad del Estado.

¿De la nación católica a un Estado cristiano?

El reciclaje de los lugares comunes de las construcciones nacionales tiene, sin embargo, una anclaje contemporáneo, ya que se funda en la axiologización del par *Nación/globalización*. Concurrentemente, en el paradigma temático de la crisis, el recorrido figurativo de la disolución hilvana la fragmentación social, la fragmentación territorial y la destrucción del Estado. De allí que en el recorrido alternativo propuesto, el de la solidaridad, existan los mismos reenvíos entre unidad nacional, soberanía territorial y recreación del Estado nación.

Necesariamente, la revaloración del Estado introduce en los discursos eclesiales ciertos efectos de modernidad temprana. Recuperando las enseñanzas de los discursos adversos, esta secularización posdatada parece retrotraerse a la era del pronóstico racional (Koselleck 1993:33), obturando a su paso las teleologías terrenas (seculares y religiosas) fundadas en el carácter ineluctable del cambio social. Lo *esperable* se desdobra entonces en *previsión* y *deseo*, una categoría generalmente extraña al discurso religioso que, a mi entender, viene a cubrir la

espinosa cuestión de la *esperanza*.

En efecto, si en el discurso religioso canónico la esperanza en la vida eterna abonaba la resignación ante los males y sufrimientos terrenales; el desplazamiento operado por la Teología de la Liberación, al proponer una meta mundana a la esperanza, terminaba por diluir la resignación. Sólo a la luz de esta tensión es posible una secularización de la esperanza que no reenvía a ningún paraíso terrenal, sino a la superación de la crisis, y un “rechazo” de la resignación que, lejos de cualquier contenido revolucionario, tiene que ver con la lógica del esfuerzo y con el “día a día”. Extraño giro de tuerca del discurso eclesiástico que al parecer ha optado por *banalizar* la escatología terrena sometiéndola a la posmoderna serialización de los presentes y aboliendo toda certidumbre de un futuro promisorio: “La situación nacional se recompondrá cuando existan las pequeñas renunciaciones que podemos hacer todos los días, en esas renunciaciones que a la larga hacen a un todo”, dice el obispo de Chubut. (Polémica. *Hoy Día Córdoba* 1 de marzo de 2002:3).

Sin duda, estas resemantizaciones son funcionales al dispositivo de posposición, pero llevan además las marcas de la mediatización y la competencia por el público. Y es allí, en la construcción de un destinatario general, donde el discurso eclesiástico esconde la falla que lo articula: fuera de las paredes de la iglesia (y sin abrir juicio sobre el adentro) el *eschaton* desconocido y la promesa de la vida eterna se han vuelto *indecibles*. Desde este vacío (el *futuro* del alma es el sostén de la creencia) pueden comprenderse los augurios de disolución y anarquía, la deprecación de la magia, el énfasis en la moral y, sobre todo, el esfuerzo del discurso eclesiástico por recrear una totalidad (el estado-nación) que lo contenga.

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LA VOZ DEL INTERIOR

FLESH, METAL, AND VERSE: CULTURES OF VIOLENCE IN BRAHMANICAL SIGN SYSTEMS AND MEANING

Prasheel Anand Banpur
University of Hyderabad, India
prasheelanand@gmail.com

Abstract

Brahmanic mythology is fraught with systemic significations produced as part of the Brahmanic legacy. Through these mediating formulations, mythology has been eventually constructed as history aimed at explaining the universal through symbolic co-optation of elements of nature.

The paper attempts at drawing a schematic analysis of the imagery of three female Brahmanic Gods – Saraswati, Laxmi, Parvati – and arrive at certain interpretation emerging from these symbolic negotiations occurring between the human-like Gods with super human abilities, their adoption of metallic weapons and eventually the use of verse by the priestly Brahmanic class to edify mythology as history.

Infusing elements of nature, the production of imagery of the Brahmanic Gods and Goddesses since the Vedic age has cemented the reception of religious practices extending into the social, cultural, economic, and political realms; the structure of Caste being one such production which extended/extends into all these realms and beyond. This particular imagery and symbolism, signifying ritualistic practices to be conducted by the worshiping humans, has shades of complexity that range from being human to becoming super human, embodying values and virtues corresponding to the very same mythical Brahmanic legacy.

This research paper uses the semiotic framework to argue that the 'Gods and Goddesses' of Brahmanic mythological production embody a signifying ideal laden with elements of nature – the way the human body and in particular the cutaneous layer has been characterized in symbolizing the 'Godly' ideal, the use of various engineered metals to extend the purposiveness of that particular 'Godly' body, and the use of verse at various points in time to extend the combination of the flesh and the metal eventually signifying an ideal which represents the 'Godly' whole to be

venerated, idolized, ritualized, and feared by the consuming Brahmanic and Bahujan subjects.

Using the formulation of Umberto Eco, the s-code, the paper recreates this particular ritualistic pattern of the Brahmanic Gods by enunciating this 'Godly' figurine. In addition to this, the paper also borrows from Kancha Ilaiah's works on the violence perpetrated by the unproductive, patriarchal and violent narratives of the Brahmanic Gods.

This paper argues that the violence signified in Brahmanic mythology needs to be understood as the axis between the institution of Caste, the symbolism embodied by the verbal and visual illustration of the Gods and Goddesses, and the constitutional texts which justify graded castigation of select sections of the populace. Though the consolidation of Brahmanic mythology into Hinduism over generations has undergone multiple revisions and exponential interpretations the central idea here is to introduce facets of the mythology which have been arguably agreed upon as the emergent discourse of Brahmanism. Hence, this broad introduction will focus more on the symbolic cooptation of various signifying elements which, when analysed from a socio-historical perspective, produces a culture of violence. The violence in question is not merely physical, as the attempt is to bring to surface particular nuances of ritual, sexual, and psychological violence. Following the idea of the s-code as propounded by Umberto Eco, the concept of violence is fore-grounded. Brahmanism, popularly known as Hinduism has a mythology spanning over five millennia and the aggregate of these legendary constructions have given rise to Hinduism as it has come to be known today. However, the problem with Brahmanism consolidating into a religion is not as much as Brahmanism projecting Brahmanic mythology as the history of the land. As the paper seeks to address, the purpose of this mythology, gradually edified as history, was one, to co-opt the diverse sections of the populace living in and around the Indian sub-continent, two, to segment the diverse populace into categories of human capability based on the community they were born in, and three, legitimize the socio-political rule of the priestly elite. The analysis is divided into three sections. The first section broadly outlines the institution of Caste which is peculiar to the Indian region. The second section focuses on Brahmanic mythology and is sub-divided into three further sections which dwell on the symbolism of the three most important Hindu Gods & Goddesses. The final section examines certain verses from the literary texts of the Brahmins which serve as guiding principles in holding the religion together.

1. The Institution of Caste

The institution of Caste has been theorized extensively by scholars presenting diverse points of view on its creation, operation, and range of influences in Indian social, political, historical, and economic life in India. While many argue that it is an imperial creation during the reign of the British empire aimed at dividing the Indian populace, there are enough evidences to show that there is mention of Caste in one of the earliest Brahmanical texts called the *Rig Veda*. However, this particular evidence in the form of a hymn only mentions the physical creation of Caste but does not dwell on the nature of creation itself. In the context of this paper, the mention of Caste as an institution which derives legitimacy by dividing people based on their birth in a particular community would suffice for the time being. The Hindu Caste system recognizes *Brahmans* as the priestly Caste, *Kshatriyas* as the warrior and administrative Caste, *Vaishyas* as the business and trading Caste, and *Shudras* as the servile Caste meant to cater to the needs of the above three sections. Apart from this four-fold hierarchy, the Brahmanic thought processes embedded in the Caste system also recognizes *Ati-Shudras* as untouchables who are placed outside of the Caste system and are excluded from social life, needed only when ritually 'polluting'

work was/is required by the Hindu society. Therefore, this institutional creation though termed Hindu has to be read as Brahmanical. The community which lived in a self-sufficient tribal state located in the forests away from the Hindu village dwelling, were/are called *Adivasis*, traditionally regarded by the Brahmanical Castes as demons, murderers, and uncivilized beings.

In his work *Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis, and Development*, Ambedkar points out that the human institution of Caste which is peculiar to the Indian region is a product of the superimposition of endogamy over exogamy by the priestly class, the Brahmans. Over the years this priestly class, by claiming superiority through ritualistic proceedings and linguistic dominance, formulated further canons which closed the doors towards social movement and intermingling with the other classes, thereby creating the institution of Caste (Rodrigues, 2010).

Elucidating on the role of Brahmanism in producing and propagating an anti-social ethos among the Indian populace, Mani says that, "Ideology as an instrument of domination of ensuring that the common people thought and behaved as the ruling elite want them to, finds an archetypical expression in Brahmanism. Named after those at the top of the Caste hierarchy, Brahmanism is the main exploiting system of traditional Indian society. It stands for the aggregate of the sacerdotal literature, social structure and religio-political institutions that have been masterminded by the elite with the primary aim of keeping the masses ignorant, servile and disunited. Brahmanism uses the ideology of Caste as a crucial instrument to dehumanize, divide, and dominate the productive majority" (Mani, 2011). It is this productive majority which is referred to as the Bahujan, a Buddhist term. The Bahujan peoples who have been traditionally called *Shudras*, *Ati-Shudras*, and *Adivasis* by the Brahmanic populace.

2. Brahmanic Mythology

In the pursuit of analysing the mythological production of bodies produced, identified and consumed as Gods and Goddesses, and their embodiment of certain elements of nature, the formulation of s-code as theorized by Umberto Eco is used. Eco says, "S-codes are systems or 'structures' that can also subsist independently of any sort of significant or communicative purpose, and as such may be studied by information theory or by various types of generative grammar. They are made of finite sets of elements oppositionally structured and governed by combinational rules that can generate either finite and infinite strings or chains of these elements... Taken independently of the other systems with which it can be correlated, an s-code is a *structure*; that is, a system (i) in which every value is established by positions and differences and (ii) which appears only when different phenomena are mutually compared with reference to the same set of relations" (Eco, 1979). Going by Eco's formulation Brahmanic mythology can be understood as representing this *structure* with elements signifying contradictory and often incongruous meanings. As the paper will explore further, while the gods signify a holy order and seemingly represent a way of life that is non-violent, respectful, and prosperous the ambiguity arises when the oppositional qualities of the same structure such as violence, oppression, and depravity surface. It is at this juncture that a semiotic analysis becomes necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the Brahmanic religion in relation to its dynamics with the diverse population of the region. While in Christianity and Islam the acceptance of monotheism is across the sub-sects of these faiths, in Brahmanism, the polytheistic tendencies exhibited by the faithful come from a loose argumentative grounding. The position shifts between monotheism and polytheism based on the nature of the addressee and the addresser delivering a particular sermon. It is this inherent nature of Brahmanic mythological sign systems which have been taken up for study. In his exposition of the dominant religion in an Indian context Frykenberg (1993) points out that there have been three constructions of Hinduism which are the Logic of the Brahmanical, or Bio-Social which is based on the concepts of purity-pollution and separa-

tion, the Logic of the Regal or Imperial based on contractual integration, and the Logic of the Constitutional based on Indo-European synthesis. Out of these there, it is worthwhile in the context of this paper to cite Frykenberg's articulation on the 'Logic of the Brahmanical'. He says, "The first structure was Brahmanical in origin. A highly sophisticated system for categorizing all life; it lumped all mankind into a single category and then subdivided this category into a color-coded system of separate species and sub-species, genres and subgenres; and then ranked these hierarchically according to innate (biological, cultural, and ritual) capacities and qualities. The Brahmanical (Sanskritic) name for this ranked ordering, *varnash ramadharm*, was devised so long ago that its roots go back to the *Manu Smriti* (Dharma Shastra) if not to the Rig Veda itself. This term described a single and ordered, albeit highly stratified, hierarchical system that genetically accounted for inherent differences within all forms of life. It was an intellectual rationale for explaining inherently different properties (colors: *varnas*), or inequalities. This system of ranking different birth communities eventually became so dominant, philosophically, and politically, that its rationale and its epistemology came to be regarded as virtually synonymous with Cosmic Law (*Dharma*)." While Frykenberg lays out the schema of Brahmanic conception related to Caste in a broad manner, it is essential to review the means used to propagate the Brahmanic system of thought which primarily aimed at a social hegemony in the guise of spiritual emancipation. An aspect of these means can be found in the literary religious texts of the Brahmanic creation, the Vedas. The Vedas are regarded as those which have not emerged from humans and are infallible and contain in them an all pervading knowledge. It is propagated by the Brahmanic myth that the Vedas were not written but revealed through sound to old sages who later wrote them. The four Vedas of the Brahmans are *Rig Veda* the oldest, followed by *Sama Veda*, *Yajur Veda*, and *Atharva Veda*. The other aspect which this paper mentions is the use of religious iconography of the Godly figurines embodying superhuman-like physical qualities while personifying the abilities of knowledge, justice, and divinity. However, the argument is to substantiate that a close reading of these figurines renders an understanding which leads to the articulation that these Gods are representative of real and symbolic violence - the use of weapons representing real violence, and the threatening verses used in literary texts and notions of Phallocentric heterosexuality representing symbolic violence.

2.1. The Symbolic Canvas: Producing the 'Ideal', Signifying the Phallocentric, Edifying the Heterosexual

The representation of three canonical male gods and their female consorts will be taken for analysis in this section. Eco & Chilton (1972) say that, "The traditional figure of religion was a character of human or divine origin, whose image had immutable characteristics and an irreversible destiny. It was possible that a story as well as a number of traits backed up the character; but the story followed a line of development already established, and it filled in the character's features in a gradual but definitive manner" (Eco & Chilton, 1972). In Brahmanic mythology the characteristics of these three Godly couples were/are of super-human projections as they were/are depicted as embodying more than one head, having four hands, delivering justice to their subjects through calculated violence, and eventually being regarded as the ideal couples. Unlike the Greek mythological figures who had human forms with super-human capabilities, the Brahmanic Gods and Goddesses were projected as those whose form varied a great deal from their Greek or Roman counterparts. The only similarity recurring in the themes of the various geographical mythologies was that the ability of the Gods and Goddesses to take part in the proceedings of their subjects' daily routines and engage them from time to time purely to showcase the superiority of the Gods at the disadvantage of the people.

While there are ritualistic, diverse, conforming and conflicting accounts capturing the origin

and purpose of Brahmanic Gods and Goddesses, there is an overarching tale through which Brahmanic mythology ascribes certain figures responsible for the creation, maintenance, and destruction of the universe including all forms of organic and inorganic entities as we know them – *Trimurti*, which loosely translates to mean the Great Trinity or the Holy Triad. As many scholars, theologians, scientists, among others have argued from different stand-points about the existence and purposiveness of these varied figures of Brahmanic mythology by providing diverse theoretical formulations and have attempted to address the various manifestations of this organization of mythology, mentioning all or even a few of them would be to address the specific without addressing the general. Thus, it is the aim of this paper to include, at one level, address and analyze the generic story rather than the various capillaric constructions which feed into the whole, and at another level, to include, address and analyze the man-woman relationship of these Godly figurines.

The *Trimurti* includes *Brahma*, *Vishnu*, and *Shiva* – the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer respectively. The female consorts of these three canonical Gods are *Saraswati*, *Laxmi*, and *Parvati*, respectively. It is important to note that the three female consorts have emerged from the male Gods themselves and it is thereby significant that they do not have an independent origin but have been created by the *Trimurti*, from time to time, to aid in the functioning of the universe and its subjects. These three couples exhibit behavioural characteristics which signify the ‘ideal’ couple – heterosexuality, devotion to the male, and submission to the self-assigned segregated duties of creation, maintenance, and destruction.

2.1.1. Brahma-Saraswati

The generic Brahmanic myth ascribes the creation of the universe with all its properties, organic and inorganic to the male god Brahma. The depiction of Brahma is one with four heads – three visible and the fourth is placed behind the head which looks at the beholder, thereby rendering it invisible as per the iconography. Brahma’s long, flowing grey beard, his four hands with each holding a specific item, crown on each of his head, seated on a lotus flower, is the prominent representation of this mythological figure. The Brahmanic mythology attributes particular qualities to this depiction and as per the Hindu Holy Scriptures, the Vedas, Brahma uses the mouths of the four heads to recite the four Vedas continuously. In each of his four hands is held a particular thing – an *Aksamala* or garland of eyes, a book, and, a sceptre. Brahma’s consort, wife, and in some myths regarded as daughter, is regarded as the Goddess of knowledge and learning believed to be born out of Brahma’s mouth. In essence, Saraswati is born out of an auto-endogamous intercourse which Brahma has with himself thereby depicting the manifestation of the belief in genetic purity. She is depicted as young woman sitting on a lotus flower having four hands, two of which hold a string musical called *Veena* while each of the other two hold the Vedas and an axe (sometimes one hand is shown holding a lotus flower instead of the axe). Referring to the intrinsic contradictions within Brahmanical texts Ilaiah (2002) asks, “The absurdity of Brahmin patriarchy is clear in these texts. The source of education, Saraswati, did not write any book as the Brahmins never allowed women to write their texts. Nowhere does she speak even about the need to give education to women. How is it that the source of education herself is an illiterate woman?” The Brahmanic correlation and gendered break between the signifiers of Brahma and Saraswati can be drawn as: Brahma is older than Saraswati; Both of them carry a weapon made of metal in one of their hands; He can see all around whereas she can see in one direction only; She is born out him thereby conforming to his order whereas he has an independent emergence and existence. Brahma himself is produced as someone who has more eyes than a human being, where-in eyes serve the function of not just seeing but searching, of looking and surveillance, of scanning and registering. Brahma is claimed to be the one who cre-

ates, and contrastingly, his figurine includes a scepter which could be used for violent physical assertion. Saraswathi is claimed to be the Goddess of education, knowledge and learning and contrastingly, one of her hands has an axe, another indication of a depiction where flesh and metal of the Gods and Goddesses can be unified to perform one specific function of violence, intellectual, physical, and sexual – the Vedas representing intellectual violence, the weapons representing physical violence, and the patriarchal references of heterosexuality representing sexual violence.

2.1.2. Vishnu-Laxmi

The male god Vishnu is regarded as the supreme God in Brahmanic mythology and is given the highest order of importance as he is considered to be the all-powerful and all-knowing. He is depicted as a blue-skinned God (unlike the fair-skinned Brahma) having four hands, wearing a golden crown on his head, and a multi-headed snake rising above his head from behind. In each of his four hands, Vishnu holds a mace made of metal, a rigged sharp-edged discus made of metal, a lotus flower, and a conch. Usually depicted standing with his eyes open, Vishnu is considered to have taken different incarnations in different epochs to preserve justice in the world and uphold Brahmanic values of justice as endorsed by the sacred texts. Hence, he becomes the embodiment of the protection of Brahmanic socio-historical dynamic. The use of metal in various configurations to collaborate with his mutated super-human form, the use of a multi-headed snake rising behind him signifying a protector, and the use of the flower lotus in one of his hands leaves to interpretation the understanding that Brahmanic mythology's successful cooptation of elements of nature finds its ultimate expression in Vishnu – which also is evident from a sect of followers preaching *Vaishnavism*, or the form of religious doctrine that Vishnu propagates. Vishnu's blue color can also be understood as him being a result of intercourse between dark-skinned Kshatriyas and fair-skinned Brahmans. The idea here is not justify that Vishnu existed and was really blue in color but to drive home the point that Vishnu as a production needed to embody certain elements of other Castes apart from features of the Brahmans' only. That's why the blue color and feudal crown on his head. Another reason to support this argument is the holding of a mace in one of his hands which is a symbol of the feudal weapon era which probably existed in India two-three thousand years ago (Ilaiah, 2002). Vishnu's consort Laxmi is regarded as the Goddess of wealth and prosperity. There are many legends regarding her creation where it is believed that she emerged from the water during an epic war between the Gods and Demons, and another that she was born to a great Brahmanical saint called *Bhrigu*, and another version which says she was born to the sun god. She is shown standing on a lotus flower holding two lotuses in two hands and showering gold coins with the remaining two hands. Though her creation is of little importance in this paper, it is the features she embodies which would lead us to a significant understanding of the construction of this Goddess. The *Vaishyas* in the Brahmanical Caste system are the ones engaged with duties of trade and commerce. Their caste-duty is to serve the two upper castes while ensuring profit and prosperity for themselves. The heterosexual pair of Vishnu-Laxmi is the signifying equation leading to the cooptation of the *Kshatriyas* and *Vaishyas* into the Hindu fold by the Brahmanical priests. While Vishnu symbolizes administrator, warrior, and preserver of a particular order, Laxmi symbolizes wealth and riches. This cooptation can be seen as one of the first phases of Brahmanism's consolidation into Hinduism. The contradiction with Laxmi, however, runs deeper. Though she is shown as the one showering riches on her believing subjects, she herself does not have the power to own property and has to follow the whim and fancy of Vishnu while granting boons. She herself is dependent on her male consort for legitimizing her actions involving matters of religious subjects.

2.1.3. Shiva-Parvati

Ilaiah (2002) says that the third most important God in the Brahmanic construction of the *Trimurti* is the male God Shiva. Unlike Brahma and Vishnu, Shiva is depicted as a muscular being with matted hair nesting a half-moon, having two hands, wearing a tiger's skin, holding a trident in his hand, with a snake circling his neck, and usually sitting in a meditative pose with his eyes half-closed. While the Brahmanical meaning originating out of this symbolism describes him as the one who is innocent, is a carefree forest-dwelling ascetic living by himself on his own terms. However, the figurine of Shiva while embodying certain differences from the earlier discussed figurines of Brahma and Vishnu, also has certain elements which can be studied as belonging to the Brahmanical construction of a 'Hindu' God. His use of the trident, his heterosexual nature, and his sitting posture are indicative of his representation conforming to the canon of the Hindu Gods'. It is Shiva's cooptation through symbolic and ritualized means that the tribal populace were gradually brought into the Hindu fold depicting another phase of consolidation from a Brahmanic identity that of a Hindu one. Shiva's female consort is Parvati. Unlike the earlier two Goddesses of Brahmanic origin, Parvati does not have a specific role to play apart from assisting in Shiva's activities and accompanying him in his travels. However, Parvati is also depicted as the effeminate, delicate woman who places her husband over everything else and the purpose of her life is to uphold her husband's ideals, the ideals of the Brahmanic variety. Though she is considered to have many violent forms and incarnations, she is often featured as one who bears Shiva's children and takes care of the family duties. There is also evidence to suggest that she may have been a creation based on the legends of non-Aryan Goddesses who lived in the mountains (Kinsley, 1988).

3. The Constitutional Texts: Verses of Violence

The nature of violence exhibited by the concoction of the social institution of Caste, the iconography of the Gods and Goddesses, and the constitutional texts of the religion work in tandem and cannot be looked at being isolated from each other in the functioning of Brahmanic mythology. The ritual, sexual, physical, and social violence illustrated by these three congruent elements form the basis for the creation of identity and lay bare the rules of conformism or castigation.

A couple of Sanskrit verses from Brahmanical texts such as the Vedas on the creation of Caste:

Braahmanosya mukhamaasidbaahu raajanyo abhavat Madhyam tadasya yad vaishyaha padbhyaam shudro ajaayata.

And

Brahmanosya mukhamaasidbaahu raajanyah krtah| Uru tadasya yadvaishyaha padbhyam shudro ajaayata.

The verses read out that the human civilization sprang out of Brahma's different parts of the body in different configurations: From Brahma's face sprang the priestly class the *Brahmans*, from his arms and chest came forth the warrior and administrator class the *Kshatriyas*, from the central part of the body were born the trading class the *Vaishyas*, and from Brahma's feet emerged the *Shudras*, the servile class. The *Ati-Shudras* or untouchables and the *Adivasis* or forest-dwelling tribes did not find any mention in these verses. The segmentation of individuals found legitimacy in the religious texts which thereby gave strength and fortified the social order in which humans engage with each other and the way they engage with nature around

them. This particular segmented system was so violent that it was only the Brahmans who could decide the fate of a particular individual or community and any transgression would have to be strictly punished as per the ruling of these holy texts. One such verse from a *Manu Smriti*, a Brahmanical Holy text epitomizing Brahmans as the sole authority reads:

Let the king after rising early in the morning worship Brahmans who are well-versed in the threefold sacred sciences and learned in the policy and accept their advice.

And

Brahman is the root of sacred law. By his origin alone he is a deity even for the gods and his word is authoritative for men.

The rules for transgression, restricting movement from one segment to another, disallowing people from practicing the routines of the other were laid out in rules such as:

The tongue of the Sudra who spoke evil about persons in the first three castes should be cut off. A Sudra who dared to assume the position of equality with the first three castes should be flogged.

And

A Sudra who abused a twice-born¹ man or assaulted him with blows should lose the limb with which he offended, if he overheard a recitation of the Vedas molten lac or tin was to be poured into his ears; if he repeated the Vedas his tongue should be cut; and if he remembered Vedic hymns, his body was to be torn to pieces.

The *Manu Smriti* believed to be authored by a great Brahman sage Manu who was the first man on earth was/is capable of producing a nature of violence that can be comparable to Hitlerite proportions, if not worse. As Nietzsche was the spiritual guru for shaping Nazism and his concepts of the superman created foundation for the assertion of the Nazis, *Manu Smriti* in principle and practice is capable of creating forms of violence peculiar to Caste transgression. In fact, Nietzsche in his *Anti Christ* says, "After all, the question is, to what end are falsehoods perpetrated? The fact that, in Christianity, 'holy' ends are entirely absent, constitutes my objection to the means it employs. Its ends are only bad ends; the poisoning, the calumny and the denial of life, the contempt of the body, the degradation and self pollution of man by virtue of the concept of sin, – consequently its means are bad as well. My feelings are quite the reverse, when I read the law book of Manu, an incomparably intellectual and superior work, it would be a sin against the spirit even to mention in the same breath with the Bible. You will guess immediately why; it has a genuine philosophy behind it, in it, not merely an evil-smelling Jewish distillation of Rabbinism and superstition – it gives something to chew even to the most fastidious psychologist. And, not to forget the most important point of all, it is fundamentally different from every kind of Bible: by means of it the noble classes, the philosophers and the warriors guard and guide the masses; it is replete with noble values, it is filled with a feeling of perfection, with saying yea to life, and triumphant sense of well-being in regard to itself and to life, – the Sun shines upon the whole book... I know of no book in which so many delicate and kindly things

¹ Twice-born refers to the Brahmans, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas who were allowed to study the Vedas, conditionally.

are said to woman, as in the Law Book of Manu ; these old grey-beards and saints have a manner of being gallant to woman which, perhaps, cannot be surpassed. “The mouth of a woman”, says Manu on one occasion, “the breast of a maiden, the prayer of a child, and the smoke of the sacrifice, are always pure”... “there is nothing purer than the light of the Sun, the shadow cast by a cow, air water, fire and the breath of a Maiden”. And finally-perhaps this is also a holy lie: – “all the openings of the body above the navel are pure, all those below the navel are impure. Only in a maiden is the whole body pure” (Nietzsche, 2005), (Ambedkar, 1987).

The verses of violence as seen above were restricted to legitimize the Brahmanic rule and keep the Shudras engaged within their sphere of activities. The Shudras consisting primarily of artisans of diverse capacity could make weapons for the twice-born but not use them, they could make clothes for the twice-born but not wear them, they could grow copious amounts food for the twice-born but keep just enough to feed themselves and their families. Such was the line to tow to avoid the ‘sacred’ punishment, in order to win favour of the Gods, and to avoid the wrath of the Brahmanical figurines deposited as all-knowing, all-pervading rulers of the disjointed community. Another verse from one of the Vedas which spells out the schema of the self-appointed Brahman in legitimizing the worship of the Gods through the ritualistic priest is as below, thereby pronouncing the modes of ritual violence to be carried out against the non-believers of this scheme.

We learned persons accept as our ruler, thee, the introducer of new plans for our advancement, the master of loyal subjects, the embodiment of virtue, the most advanced in noble qualities and acts, the queller of the irreligious... (Razvi, 2014).

And

When the glorious Vishnu heard their prayers he emitted from his person an illusory form wliich he gave to the celestials and said, “This illusory form shall so deceive the Daityas, that being led astray from the path of the Vedas, they shall be slain; for all gods, demons and others, who shall transgress the authority of the Veda, shall perish by my prowess which I exercise for the preservation of the universe. Go then; be not afraid; this illusory form shall go before you. celestials, it shall be of great service to you, this day. (Razvi, 2014).

As is evident in the earlier mentioning of the Godly figurines’ violent symbolism and the texts which further legitimize the use of violence against those who tend to resist the Brahmanical hegemony, it can be said that the culture of violence which Brahmanism as a system of thought proposes has transformed, gradually over the centuries, from a purely mythological production to a historical one. The primary reason for constructing mythology as history is to produce a conforming subject from the Bahujan populace through the various manifestations of the caste consciousness. It is to keep Caste at the core of socio-political, religious and cultural realms that the thrust of mythology appears, reappears, and presents itself as history. It is through the embodiment of human-like characteristics and superhuman-like tendencies that the Gods and Goddesses profess the conduct of social life, fervently supported by the religious texts such as the Vedas. It can be seen that a combination of visual and linguistic productions signifies the mythological. Through the dynamics of Caste, this mythology gets constructed as history, thereby signifying the Brahmanical religious ways as natural.

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HOW RELIGIOUS ARE THE MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN PROVERBS: A LINGUOCULTURAL STUDY

Roumyana Petrova
University of Rouse, Bulgaria
roumyana.petrova@yahoo.com

Abstract

The aim of the present study is to examine the corpus of all the modern Anglo-American proverbs excerpted from the first edition of *The Dictionary of Modern Proverbs* (2012, C. C. Doyle, W. Mieder and F. Shapiro, eds.) related to religion. They are religious in three different ways: on both the denotational and connotational planes, on the connotational plane (deep-structure meaning) only, or on the denotational plane (surface-structure meaning) only; the terms deep and surface structures are to be understood not in the Chomskyan sense, but according to Zholkovskiy's application of these concepts in paremiology. This corpus-based study yields answers to a number of questions leading to the basic aim of our enquiry: by revealing the specific type of religiosity stored in the modern Anglo-American proverbs to construct a fragment of the modern American worldview. Proverbs, these "gems of generationally tested wisdom", to use the fitting description of the world-renowned proverb scholar Wolfgang Mieder, surprisingly continue to thrive in our modern world. Linguistic culturology (also: cultural linguistics) studies corpora of axiologically marked linguistic items/texts with a view to explicating their specific cultural semantics. Proverbs, all of which tend to be value-oriented, thus make an ideal object of investigation for scholars in this field. The analysis in the present paper is carried out with the help of a unit known as the cultureme. In our interpretation, the cultureme is the positively or negatively marked verbalized entity, or set of entities, which is stored in and conveyed by a given linguistic item, or the message of a text. The cultureme is a concretization in the idea of semiosphere, in Juri Lotman's sense.

1. Introduction

Proverbs, these gems of generationally tested wisdom, phrased in this fashion by the leading

international proverb scholar Wolfgang Mieder, surprisingly continue to thrive in our modern world. Most of these short traditional texts that are often centuries, even millennia old, can be traced back to the very beginnings of human civilisation. Today they continue to span a bridge across generations of people of the same culture and across the whole world, holding the human race together. Proverbs are the living memory of a people, its most enduring identity and a treasure trove of human wisdom. Their archaic structure, wording and content preserve in a crystallised form the experience of people sharing the same geographical environment, history, customs, beliefs, and worldview over long periods of time, while their lexical content can often serve as a clue to a way of life long forgotten. For example, few people would today be aware that the old English proverb *The cobbler should stick to his last* refers literally to a special implement, called 'last', used by shoemakers in their workshops for repairing or making shoes, although its figurative meaning – 'People should be doing first and foremost what they are qualified for' – is certainly more familiar (cf. Mieder 2004: xi).

The profound changes in today's modern life make many of the old proverbs sound quaint and obsolete. So many are the older texts which have become incomprehensible to the modern reader that some fear this folk genre might well be on the verge of disappearing. But, strangely enough, instead of disappearing, it is undergoing a process of remarkable regeneration: in the USA, arguably the most highly-industrialised modern country in the world today, new proverbs are being coined on an almost daily basis, and this has been going on since the beginning of the twentieth century. These new coinages certainly exhibit some differences from the old traditional proverb, typically in verbal form, but also in the messages conveyed. Another process characterising the spread of proverbs today is the crossing of national boundaries by ever-growing numbers of 'national' proverbs and their subsequent rapid assimilation into other cultures, turning the common phenomenon of proverb dissemination into proverb 'globalisation'. And because the proverb genre mirrors the mentality of large numbers of 'ordinary' people, these processes bear witness to some massive changes that have come to characterise present-day societies at large.

The present study deals with Anglo-American proverbs that have originated over the last one hundred years or so – since 1900, hence the descriptive term 'modern'. The findings of the analysis of the sixty-six texts related to religion in three different ways (on the content and expression plane, on the content plane, and on the expression plane), which were excerpted from *The Dictionary of Modern Proverbs* (Doyle, Mieder, & Shapiro 2012), from now on *the Dictionary*, will be briefly presented and discussed in order for us to gain fresh insight into the prevailing popular attitudes to religion that characterise present-day American society.

Although some aspects of the *Dictionary* have already been addressed by Mieder (2012), Petrova (2013a, 2013b) and other scholars, neither of these studies deals specifically with the religious proverbs. The present paper aims to fill this gap.

2. Research method

From a semiotic perspective, proverbs have been defined as 'signs of situations and relations between things' (Permyakov 1988: 21) and 'texts [having] sign characteristics' (Trendafilova 2014: 8). Proverbs, as demonstrated by the major proponent of the text<=>meaning approach A. Zholkovskiy (1978, exhibit a surface structure and a deep structure in a sense different from that of Chomsky's Transformational Grammar, the surface structure being the propositional meaning of the proverb sentence, and the deep structure being the proverb meaning proper. This distinction is very important, as in the figurative proverbs the latter differs entirely from the propositional meaning the proverb sentence – or, as argued by Michael Dummet (1993: 118), any other sentence in a natural language – stands for. In terms of Hjelmslev's dichotomy, a

proverb is a sign integrating an expression and a content plane, according to Peircean semiotics it is a legisign, i.e., a *representamen* with a specific *interpretant*, while in Lotman's paradigm, a proverb is a culture text – a complex sign – a bearer of a *cultureme*, which is part the *semiosphere* (Lotman 2000: 251). Similarly, from a linguocultural perspective, the proverb is an autosemantic one-sentence *precedent text* (i.e., a representative, traditional, culturally significant text), embodying a certain cultureme and *message*, the cultureme being the positively or negatively 'charged' major entity commented by the proverb, and the message being the direct or implied advice involving this entity (Petrova 2002a: 337, 341–342; 2003: 235; 2010: 250–251, 253–256). It is important to stress that the cultureme and the message can only be formulated after the proper *definition* of the proverb has been found. That is why, in this study, in order to remove all doubt about the meanings of the proverbs texts, the definitions inferred from the illustrations in the entries in the *Dictionary* have been verified with the help of additional information from the Internet about their use in context, variants, counterparts in other languages, and interpretations by native speakers.

Three features of the proverb *per se* can be elicited from the descriptions above: 1) the signifier vs. signified dichotomy, 2) the dichotomy of overt vs. covert meaning, and 3) the cultural salience of proverbs. The first one characterises proverbs as signs, the second attests to their predominantly figurative character, and the third shows why proverbs are an object of study of ethnolinguistics, folklore studies, literary studies and linguoculturology. With 'literal' texts, such as the eighteenth-century American proverb *Three moves are as bad as a fire*, the definition coincides with the propositional meaning of the sentence and can be explicated via a paraphrase (i.e., through applying Roman Jakobson's interlingual translation), e.g., 'if someone moves to a new place and does that three times, this is equal to losing all of one's possessions in a fire'. But the figurative proverbs, which because of their metaphoricity are often grouped together with other similar genres such as riddles, parables, fables, folk tales, fairy tales, myths, and so forth, need first be 'deciphered' in order for the definition to be obtained. Thus, the proverb *The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence*, whose proposition can be rendered in any natural language by translating the English sentence, has indeed nothing to do with grass, gardening, or fences; it is a metaphor interpreted as follows: 'people often see what others possess as much better than their own'.

The view of proverbs as signs of specific ethnic or national cultures is central to linguoculturology – a contemporary scholarly discipline which explores the common ground shared by linguistics and the study of culture. It originated in Russia less than two decades ago and is now a full-grown, rapidly expanding field of research, attracting large numbers of scholars with backgrounds ranging from linguistics to philology to the social sciences. Some of its major representatives include V. V. Vorobyov, Y. S. Stepanov, V. A. Maslova, V. I. Karassik, G. G. Slyshkin, S. G. Vorkachov, V. V. Krasnyh, and N. F. Alefirenko, to name just a few. To its Bulgarian proponents belong Margarita Simeonova, Moni Almalech, Roumyana Petrova, Ivo Panchev, Roussi Roussev, Emilia Nedkova, Petranka Trendafilova, Valentina Avramova, Mariana Vitanova, and others. Linguoculturology shares some common objectives and approaches with its Anglophone counterparts – anthropological linguistics and cultural linguistics (cf. Sharifian & Palmer 2007), which however follow their own entirely independent course of development. Linguoculturology breaks the myth of the 'freedom' of linguistic expression of *homo loquens* and promotes the early nineteenth-century idea of the indivisible integral of language and culture first formulated by Johann Gottfried von Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt and later developed by Franz Boas, Eduard Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf, Leo Weissgerber, Anna Wierzbicka and their numerous followers. Its basic tenet is that in the process of communication, people often find themselves 'at the mercy' of the conceptualisation underlying their native language as a specific

structure of systems and a body of precedent phenomena (names, texts, events, situations). This idea has been explored systematically from diverse perspectives including that of semiotics, which is amply demonstrated in Umberto Eco's series of studies published in the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Eco 1995: 21, 330).

Linguoculturology views the proverb system of a language as a most enduring representation of the way of life and values of the people speaking a common language, i.e., of their *linguoculture*. There no doubt is, and has always been, a lot of give and take among the linguocultures on this planet, including their proverb lore, but while contending that there is indeed common ground shared by all, linguoculturology argues that it does not cancel out the uniqueness of each language and the culture it embodies. As the proverb scholar Richard Honeck (1997: 35) has observed,

[...] proverbs are generated from universal human knowledge about ideals, standards, and norms, which act as reference points in evaluating events. These reference points are intuitive forms of perfection. Cultures develop idiosyncratic linguistic means of expressing the perfection. Thus, proverbs from other cultures may be hard or impossible for a nonnative to interpret, but once the cultural code is broken, the proverbs can be seen to have a species-wide significance.

It follows, then, that although from a cognitive linguistic perspective there seems to exist a common mental core underlying the proverb lore of all people, there are certain specific differences characterising the individual proverb systems and making each one unique. In this sense, we can speak of English, German, Bulgarian, Greek, Finnish etc. linguocultures, whose 'intuitive forms of perfection' can be described more or less fully by studying their proverb systems, where each proverb text is a generalisation (i.e., a sign) of a situation typical of this particular culture, and where the images employed point to typical aspects of the environment and everyday life of a given ethnic or national group of people. Such a view easily explains why there are no proverbs about baseball, business, or computing among the Touareg inhabitants of Sahara and no indigenous English proverbs about camels and deserts.

Linguoculturology lays special stress on the role of semantic density, i.e., the frequency of usage and the degree of semantic and cultural elaborateness of a particular linguistic item, image, concept, or theme within a corpus, a text, or a body of texts, in one or more languages. This approach has been made use of in the works of Wierzbicka (1997: 10–15), Karasik (1996: 4), Almalech (2006: 17, 176), as well as in my own work. Taking into account semantic density by regarding it as an index of cultural significance means interpreting quantity in terms of quality. In the study of proverbs, linguoculturology focuses on the semantic density of special words, structures, or images, but also on that of the proverb culturemes and messages (Petrova 1996, 1997, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c).

3. A procedure for eliciting the proverb cultureme and message

Observations show that as a concrete generalisation of human experience, each proverb focuses almost exclusively on just one entity, most often a human quality or trait, which is presented – overtly or covertly – as positive or negative. For example, Benjamin Franklin's proverb quoted above is a warning against moving house. Likewise, the proverb about other people's beautiful green lawns ridicules envy, evaluating it also negatively. We can 'label' these basic entities with a single noun or noun phrase and a plus or a minus sign attached to it, obtaining the culturemes

‘moving to a new place (-)’ and ‘envy (-)’.

The proverb cultureme, then, can easily be brought to the surface by answering the question ‘What does this proverb affirm or criticise?’ But there is more to proverbs as cultural texts. From a pragmatic perspective, by drawing our attention to certain aspects of reality and evaluating them positively or negatively, the traditional, archetypal proverb ultimately seeks to advise people on how to behave/or how not to behave, what to accept/or what not to accept, or, in general, on what kind of persons to be/or not to be, in the context of their specific linguoculture, should they find themselves in similar situations. The explicitly or implicitly conveyed message of the proverb involving a specific cultureme summarises its moral, lesson, or advice. Examples of explicit messages are *Care not for that which you can never possess* and *Go all the way, or don't go at all*. But if we are dealing with figurative texts, then a different question need be asked to explicate the message – ‘What does this proverb advise us to do/to be, or not to do/not to be?’. Thus, the message of *You can't have an omelette unless you break the egg*, would be: ‘Be prepared to sacrifice something valuable to get something of greater value’. The wording of the message takes the form of a sentence in the imperative, hence, ‘Avoid moving house’, and ‘Do not make yourself ridiculous by envying others’.

It can now be seen that explaining a proverb by providing its definition is not sufficient for fully understanding it as a precedent (or cultural) text. Linguocultrology is equally interested in the proverb message and cultureme as its central characteristics, deriving them from its definition and situational use. Thus we have arrived at the *linguocultural structure of the proverb meaning: an indivisible unity of definition, cultureme, and message*. The analysis section below is based on all these components.

4. Analysis

It is on the basis of the structure proposed above that the sixty-six religion-related modern Anglo-American proverbs have been distributed into the two types – religious texts proper (types A1 and A2), and quasi-religious texts (type B), illustrated with the examples below:

A1: *Only God can make a tree*. **Definition:** ‘God alone has unique powers of creation.’ **Cultureme:** ‘God's unique power to create living things (+)’. **Message:** ‘We should be aware of God's unique power to create living things.’ – The word ‘God’ belongs to the semantic field of religion and so do the cultureme and message of the proverb, therefore it is religious in form and content.

A2: *A criminal (murderer) (always) returns to the scene of his crime*. The proverb is a modern rendition of the Biblical verse *As a dog returneth to his vomit, so a fool returneth to his folly* (Prov. 26: 11, King James Bible). **Definition:** ‘A criminal (murderer) is compelled by his guilty conscience to return to the scene of his crime.’ **Cultureme:** ‘the guilty conscience of a criminal (-)’. **Message:** Detectives should go to the site of the crime and wait for the murderer, who will most probably come back compelled by his guilty conscience. – This text does not contain lexical items pertaining to religion, nevertheless it is religious on the content plane (its definition) and in terms of its cultureme and message.

B: *In heaven an angel is nobody in particular*. **Definition:** ‘One cannot stand out among many others who are equally good.’ **Cultureme:** ‘trying to stand out among others who are equally good (-)’. **Message:** Do not try to stand out among others who are equally good. – On the expression (surface) plane this proverb employs two religious images – ‘heaven’ and ‘angels’, but neither its definition, nor its message or cultureme are religious, so we define it as quasi-religious.

In the two sections below, a few examples of proverbs and their culturemes are listed.

4.1. Type A1. Religious proverbs (27)

Your arms are too short to box with God. – ‘our inability to thwart God’s will/fate/the inevitable (-)’

There are no atheists in foxholes. – ‘the helplessness of an atheist in times of danger (-)’

Courage is fear that has said its prayers. – ‘courage, strengthened by prayer (+)’

If you dance with the devil, you will get burned. – ‘associating with evildoers (-),’ ‘retribution (+)’

When all else fails, pray (try prayer). – ‘surrendering oneself to God in hard times (+)’

The family that prays together stays together. – ‘uniting one’s family in prayers (+)’

When you pray, move your feet. – ‘complementing praying with work (+)’

What goes around comes around. – ‘retribution (+)’

Let go; Let God. – ‘letting God take control (+)’

Only God can make a tree. – ‘God’s unique power to create living things (+)’

To love another person is to see the face of God. – ‘loving one’s neighbour (+),’ etc.

4.2. Type A2. Religious proverbs (2)

There are three sides to every question (argument): my side, your side, and the right side (truth, God’s side). – ‘being objective, fair, honest, and truthful (+)’

A good woman is hard to find. – ‘the intrinsic value of a good woman (-)’

4.3. Type B. Quasi-religious proverbs (37)

No good deed goes unpunished. – ‘ingratitude (-)’

The devil is in the details. – ‘the dangers resulting from overlooking the details (-)’

Do not greet the devil till (before) you meet him. – ‘worrying about hypothetical dangers (-)’

Go to the devil for truth and to a lawyer for a lie. – ‘the lawyers’ propensity for lying (-)’

Forgive (love) your enemies, but remember (never forget) their names. – ‘not bearing one’s enemies malice, but never trusting them (+)’

You can’t put the genie back in the bottle – ‘cultivating prudence and forethought (+)’

Even God gets tired of too much hallelujah. – ‘moderation in praising (+)’

God doesn’t make land anymore. – ‘buying land (+)’

“Take what you want,” says God, “and (but) pay for it.” – ‘taking responsibility for one’s desires or ambitions (+)’

Trust (in) God, but lock your door (your car). – ‘prudence and caution (+)’

Sometimes the good you do does you no good. – ‘the uselessness of doing good for oneself (-)’

Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition. – ‘taking personal control of a critical situation (+)’

Pain is temporary, victory (glory, pride) is forever. – ‘stoicism and endurance in the name of a future reward (+),’ etc.

5. Discussion

In the first group of twenty-nine texts (types A1 and A2), twenty-seven (type A1) are religious in both form and content, while two (type A2) are religious only on the content plane. Their positive culturemes are twenty-one versus only ten negative culturemes. This ratio expresses a predominantly positive outlook on life and its religious aspects. The thirteen proverb themes (with semantic densities ranging from seven to one) all belong to the religious domain:

- God and his various characteristics;
- the devil;
- man’s relationship with God;
- retribution;

- praying;
- atheists, opposing God/fate, cowardice, guilty conscience, patience, objectivity, scarcity of good women, the reason behind the whole of creation – each represented by a single proverb.

But in terms of lexical content, apart from the words ‘God’, ‘devil’, ‘prayer’, ‘conscience’, and several others, many of the other key religious words – ‘angel’, ‘heaven’, ‘hell’, ‘salvation’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘wicked’, ‘evil’, ‘virtue’, ‘sin’, ‘holy’, ‘pure’, ‘righteous(ness)’, ‘love’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘charity’, ‘faith’, ‘church’, ‘religion’, ‘preaching’, ‘sermon’, etc. – are missing. Instead, quite a large number of these words is employed in the quasi-religious group, as shown below.

According to their key word, the thirty-seven quasi-religious proverbs (type B) are grouped as follows:

- ten with the word ‘God (Lord)’;
- three with the word ‘good’;
- two with the words ‘faith’ and ‘heaven’;
- one proverb with any of the following words (or collocations): ‘clear conscience’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘angel’, ‘hell’, ‘honesty’, ‘religion’, ‘love for one’s neighbour’, ‘pain’ (related to martyrdom), ‘prayer’, ‘sins’, ‘zealot’, and ‘convert’.

There are also three texts in group B employing words that pertain to un-Christian religions or cults: ‘genie’, ‘karma’, and ‘sacred cows’, which have obviously entered the Anglo-American lexicon as loan words and have now become regular lexemes.

6. Conclusion

While the group of sixty-six religion-related proverbs account for only 4.6 % of the total number of proverbs in the *Dictionary* – 1,422, the twenty-nine religious ones proper make up an even smaller proportion, namely, just 2%. These figures serve as an indication of the rather modest popular interest in religious matters in contemporary American culture.

In terms of the kind of religion addressed, the twenty-nine religious texts proper are centred mostly on its practical and day-to-day aspects. There are no proverbs about afterlife, God’s majestic power and perfection, or the beauty and grandeur of the divine world. The greater share of positive culturemes points to a prevailing positive outlook on life over negative feelings such as the uncertainty and fatalism typical of the old Puritan preoccupation with the depravity of human nature and the fear of hell, which characterised early American culture with its focus on Predestination. Puritan severity and sternness have been superseded by a more ‘earthly’, pragmatic, ‘sober’, and optimistic view of life. Five of the religious proverbs stand out with the peculiar beauty of their images and greatly uplifting messages: *Only God can make a tree, Let go and let God, The family that prays together stays together, To love another person is to see the face of God, There is never a cross you can’t bear*. They are truly inspirational. There seem to emerge two major ideas from the religious proverbs: the deserving person is bound to succeed in his (earthly) endeavours, and the individual is empowered to take full control of his own life.

In group B, the equal number of positive and negative culturemes – twenty-two for each subtype – signifies an overall balanced outlook on life. But the most peculiar quality of the quasi-religious group is the stark negativism exuded by the subgroup of sixteen texts, whose messages, listed below, reveal very deep pessimism, stemming from a disbelief in the innate goodness of humans, the existence of a Creator, or afterlife:

‘One should know that what looks like an act of clear conscience may well mask a person’s fundamentally selfish motives.’

‘One shouldn’t in the least expect one’s acts of kindness to be appreciated or reciprocated.’

'We should expect lawyers to be greater liars than the devil, the master liar.'

'Always be the first to strike.'

'Do not bear your enemies malice, but watch out they do not harm you again.' 'If you want to succeed in the world, develop critical reasoning and a pragmatic outlook on life rather than 'blind faith' in a God.'

'Be on the look out for identifying ruthless, cruel and cynical persons.' 'If you want to retain your inner integrity and lead a pure life, prepare to be very lonely.' 'Enjoy bodily pleasures.' 'Trust the Lord, but take personal control of critical situations.' 'Discard God and religion.' 'Enjoy an illicit love affair as long as nobody knows.' 'Get busy improving your present circumstances instead of foolishly hoping for an imaginary heavenly reward for your patience.' 'Never expect from a stupid person to improve.'

'Beware of narrow-minded and fanatical persons.'

The words denoting religious concepts in group B do not function with their religious semantics. Instead, they are used as conceptual metaphors to convey purely secular ideas. This fact evidences once more the dynamics of the popular attitude to religion in American culture: from its dominant role in the life of the Puritan society in Early America, down to its modest, subservient role in the materialistic consumer society of today.

The last subgroup of sixteen texts (a quarter of the proverbs under study) confirms the deepening secularisation that has been working in the American linguoculture since the beginning of the 20th century. And because of the powerful role of Americanism today, the pessimistic trend seems likely to continue to spread and affect other individuals, groups, communities, and even nations on our planet.

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PEDAGOGY AND ENUNCIATION IN RELIGIOUS INTRINSICALLY CODED ACTS. THE CASE OF THE PASSOVER SEDER

Ugo Volli

Università di Torino, Italy

Doctor Honoris Causa of New Bulgarian University

volli.ugo@gmail.com

1. Religios signs

Although in the monotheistic faiths God is believed to be eternal, religions¹ live *in the time and through the time*. They often remember their own *beginning* (their first contact with God or *revelation*), and they usually preview also an *end* for the world (hence necessarily also for themselves). In every human society they are among the most important factors of culturally shaping time. They are able to extract from the continuity of time *different, separated*, non-daily (i.e. sacred)² moments often coming again with a regular rhythm (every day, every week, every month, every year or even following longer units, as it is the case of the Jewish and later Christian jubilee, which came again every 50 years). Religions produce this way their *liturgical cycles*, which often mark the rhythm of the entire social life. These *recurrent sacred occasions* can be classified as holidays or fasts, prayers or meditations, social or individual activities, interdictions

¹ In the absence of a better term, I keep in this article the term "religion". But its first meaning ("the belief in a god or in a group of gods" <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion>; "a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code governing the conduct of human affairs; a specific fundamental set of beliefs and practices generally agreed upon by a number of persons or sects" (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/religion>) is clearly derived by the Christian and first of all Pauline idea that faith is what matters more in the spiritual field and it defines "religion" (against the original Latin meaning of the word *religio* as "observance", "scruple", "care"; *cultus deorum*, "the proper performance of rites in veneration of the gods." Cicero *De Natura Deorum*, 2.8, 28, 72; cf Ando 2008:126). This sense is preserved in Islamic and mainly in Jewish "religions" which actually aren't real religions where salvation comes by faith (*sola fide*, as Augustine and then Luther taught), but organized and ruled "forms of life"

² Etymologically "sacred" means in first place *separated*, both in classical Greek (*aigios*) and Latin (*sanctus*, *sacer*) tradition and in the Hebrew one (*kadosh*). Cf. Volli (2012).

or obligations, pilgrimages and retreats. These qualitative distinctions of different kinds of religious activities are very important but not relevant for this paper. What matters here is that all of them are intended to add a *real meaning* to the usually flat and meaningless human life, breaking the unchanging rhythm of daily activities with the insertion of dense signifying moments, or at least to show this sense, to make it more relevant just in these moments. Therefore they *must* be meaningful by themselves.

Therefore, the first requirement for a time to become religiously relevant and so to become a “holy-day” is to have *meaning*. There is no such a thing as a meaningless, random holiday. Using a rather obsolete but effective terminology, one should say that every religious occasion, just because it is religious, must be a *sign*, i.e. it must *refer* to *something other* than its simple place in the pure chronological series, which appears from a secular point of view continuous and endless. In general, every holiday refers to Whom is thought as the absolutely Other One in front of the whole world but at the same time appears to religious mind as being its real sense, i.e. God. But, because from a religious point of view everything (even the regular workdays and the void times and the meaningless things) refer to God, holidays must carry some *further and more particular* significance, hence must refer to some intermediate meaning between world and God: some event, some story, some concept, some duty, some person – of course they must have a religious relevance. In this precise sense, religious occasions have always a *special own content*, a meaning different from their mere recurring and from the universal reference to God.

Often, but not always, this meaning has also an *etiological value*: in these cases the celebration refers to some fact or action which is also the *inaugural circumstance* for it. We do a peculiar ceremony today, with and that this feature, because the same, or something alike, has been done in the occasion that this ceremony is intended remember. Once upon a time God or some His agent made something; this action must be remembered; we make more or less the same today in order to remember the reason why we do it. *The object of the celebration is its institution*; memory and meaning merge together. From a semiotic point of view, this kind of self-reference on the plane of content is very relevant and characteristic. We will see that a similar organization can often be found also for the plane of expression, giving to religious ceremonies a specific semi-symbolic structural arrangement for producing sense in a very effective and *contagious* way.

Of course such ceremonies are addressed in first place to the Divinity, being part of the cult that must be presented to it (Volli 2012). And this enunciation target is for sure the base for one layer of meaning: every religious act refer in first place to the basic relation between humankind and God and every festival says something about it. But often the religious acts take trace of their institution or their origin, hence they are *memories of their own institution* – or rather, they are memory devices for the believers. In one date Christians remember the birth of Jesus; in another the Muslim remember Mohammed’s escape to Medina; in another one Buddhist believer celebrates the day that the historical Buddha experienced enlightenment. In all these cases, beyond *the general meaning ground* which is relevant for that religion (in short: submission in Islam, incarnation in Christianity, fusion with the totality in Buddhism) there is a *memorial meaning* of the specific occasion, a narration about some happening which has also the value of a statement over the same narration: *a metanarrative action*.

The link between the date and the narration can be arbitrary, as are the majority of the days dedications to saints is in the Catholic calendar (for instance, March 1: St. David of Wales; March 2: St. Agnes of Bohemia; March 3: St. Katherine Drexel; March. 4 : St Kasimir, etc.). Or its indexical character can be marked, a time continuity can be claimed – doesn’t matter to us if true or not, mythical or historical. The point is the self-referring motivation given for the ceremony. For instance, in the blessing for the Jewish festival of Chanukah, this clause is included: (be

You blessed, o Lord) “for the miracles you did to our fathers *in those days in this time* [*bayamim ahem, bezman hazeh*]”. Today is the time when, *in the past*, something special happened. There is a clear, declared, intended oxymoron in this phrase: now is then, then is now, identity beyond the time is what matter, everyone taking part to the celebration finds himself (herself) in the position of *being as* those who were present to the original event. It is explicitly stated during the Passover celebration: everyone here must consider himself or herself as taking part in the events we remember today. The cyclical nature of the ritual marks a very concrete but symbolic “eternal return of the same”, that is its meaning. For this reason this time is special (sacred) and we, the believers, have to remember it again and again, because its religious teaching but also just in order not to lose this indexical link, to live our “now” as “then” and make the “then” to keep acting and meaning.

The same idea, with a reverted temporal index, can be read in the Jesus’ prescription during the Last Supper, as narrated by Luke 22:19 “do this in my memory”. This “this” became the mass and in the Christian liturgy has no more special timing, apart the celebration of Good Friday. It recurs always, because all the time is demanding this basic memory. But the interesting thing for us here is the link between *doing* (re-doing, re-enacting) and *remembering* (and then knowing, believing, making the religious message live). Remembering here is renewing the paradox (or the miracle, if you believe in it) of something becoming *other than itself*, while maintaining the same appearance: the bread is body, the wine is blood, because *now is then*.

The religious ceremony becomes this way twofold: an *act of cult* and a *pedagogic process*. Of course, at least since the French Revolution there are “civil holidays” based on the same arrangement, with the obvious difference that worship is not offered to God but to a political more or less abstract entity. In France, July 14 is a holiday because in that day the Bastille was taken, and it remembers this event, renewing at the same time the civil pact of the Republic which was founded with that revolutionary action and what followed to it. The same happens in Italy with the April 25, the date of the Liberation of Milano from nazi-fascist rule at the end of world war two; it is usually called, through an interesting synecdoche, the “Liberation of Italy”. Or in the United States, with the Fourth of July which remembers, with some chronological imprecision, the date of adoption of the Declaration of Independence, which is the programmatic text or the political ground for the identity of the United States: it is the day when the USA celebrates itself through the document of its foundation.

Often the liturgy takes on itself this pedagogic task in explicit way. Cult and pedagogy aren’t separated. Mostly, *the structure of the ceremonies mixes intimately re-enactment and narration*. What happened and gave origin to the celebration is narrated, and *in the same time* an analogy beyond time is performed. This re-enacting is in itself pedagogic because something as the original experience should be perceived; but it has also the power of giving an internal iconic signification of the event. *The reflexive meaning is embodied in a reflexive expression*. This effect is something similar to what Umberto Eco (1976) following Ekman and Friesen (1969), calls “intrinsically coded acts” or “intrinsically coded signs” (which are “not iconic signs” but “a sort of concrete experience” albeit a partial one, “capable of being used as a *sign of itself*” as the hobby horse done with a broomstick in children’s plays studied by Gombrich 1951).

In the Christian tradition, Eucharist is clearly an intrinsically coded sign, as are also the processions where the Passion is re-enacted by some believer carrying the Cross and enduring lashes in the path: he build with his own body an iconic sign of the last path of Jesus but also lives in himself the experience of his suffering, taking part in it according a sort of indexical way. More or less the same is performed by the Shiite Muslim during the festival of Ashura, commemorating the bloody death of Imām al-Husayn ibn Ali by inflicting bloody wounds on their bodies. Two suffering meet here again beyond space and time. The Jewish Shabbat contains an

intrinsically coded signification: God's rest after the Creation is remembered by the believers through a mandatory rest; more exactly what must be avoided during this day are all the "creative" acts or *melakhot*. The same word is used in the Torah (Genesis 2:1–3) for speaking of the God's acts of creation and later (Exodus 31:1–11) for the forbidden actions of Shabbat. The same happens in the festival of Hanukkah which commemorates the miracle of the Temple sacred oil lamp extending its light for a week, well beyond the regular lifespan of the little fuel bottle saved from the defilement performed by Greek soldiers, by lighting ritual lamps exactly for a week. Fire commemorates fire.

Usually the intrinsically coded signs are simply classified as "symbols" (not in the percean meaning of this term as defining arbitrary signs but in the most daily and diffused one of "deeply motivated signs"). But it is useful to *distinguish between the two types of signs*: not all the symbols are intrinsically coded signs, for instance the cross or communist "hammer and sickle" in general are not. Often intrinsically coded signs are used in games, theater, art performance, historical commemorations, expression of sentiments and religion; they can be invented for the occasion and thus can not have the "deeply rooted" character of symbols.

In the religious case, intrinsically coded religious signs are mostly completed and explained by *other metalinguistic signs*, often by some verbal expression able to convey a theological and pedagogical meaning. In a religious ceremony one acts (or sees others acting) and explains (or rather says aloud a fixed verbal text or often listen to such an explanation). What is important here is a semiotic structure where the addressee at enunciation level is strongly invited to *suture* himself or herself to some actor of the narrative (enunciated) level by making or suffering or simply having in front "the same" that was in the narration³

This complex mixing of *experience and narration*, implicit re-enacting and explicit pedagogy, life and text, is very characteristic of religious practice and challenges a semiotic description.

2. Passover seder

One of the Jewish festival where this complex religious discourse is clearer is Passover and specially its "seder". The word *seder* means "order", "disposition" and refers to a ritual dinner which is the main and more characteristic expression of the festival. Passover remembers the liberation of the Jewish people from the Egyptian slavery, which is narrated in the Book of Exodus. It is a collective memory, nevertheless it is celebrated in private form as a dinner. But this dinner has a *strong ritual character* and is ruled by a *very precise structure* in a (complex) foreword and fifteen proceedings, consisting in reciting some benedictions, performing some gestures, singing some hymns, narrating the story, eating some special meaningful food as unleavened bread ("matzot", wick is "the same" eaten by the flying Jews, unleavened because they were obliged to leave in a hurry – hence an intrinsically coded object) or a pink sauce made with different fruits ("haroset", which has "the same colour" of the mortar used by the Jews for building Egyptians monuments during their slavery, thus an iconic object) etc.

It is impossible here even to begin analyzing this complex ritual structure, with all its interconnected pedagogic and enunciation/suture effects. It is important to say that it is codified in a written (and often also illustrated) text, called "Haggadah" (i.e. narration, with a clear *antonomiasia*)⁴. There is also a number of textualized objects, as dishes and table accessories

³ "Suture" is a concept proposed by the feminist film theory (Chaudhuri 2006: 49) in place of the old "identification" of the viewer with the actor. This comes from a Lacan idea, through the collective work of the *Screen* group (cf Heath 1976 and 1977) I suggested its relevance for semiotic theory in Volli 2003. For our theme, *imitatio dei*, which is a important goal of many religious traditions is often pursued with semiotic devices based on suture

⁴ For an english edition Haggada 1993; for an analysis with some semiotic orientation, Segre 2001. There are good reasons to think that the habit of the "seder" is

which resume and make figurative some aspects of the Haggadah. And it is worth stressing that this is the only Jewish traditional text which is often enriched with drawings and illustrations. The ceremony's goal is very explicitly a *pedagogic* one. Everyone in every generation, is explicitly written in The Haggadah, must consider himself or herself as personally taking part in the story narrated by the text. This means that the participation to the ritual dinner must be felt as equivalent to the involvement in the facts to be recalled. The historical abyss of some dozen of centuries is to be bridged through the ritual, an unity must be established beyond time and space.

In order to get this result, different semiotic devices are used. There is a narration, where the most relevant facts are told; this narration is richly commented using a strange (for us) iperbolic rhetoric of numbers and repetitions; but there are many intrinsically coded acts. The most important and mandatory is eating unleavened bread, "bread of affliction", which is presented as *the same* bread eaten by the sons of Israel while flying Egypt. The first sentence of the Haggadah states: "*This is poor man's bread; the bread our forefathers ate when they were enslaved in Egypt*" Of course, it is not *the same* bread, that would be impossible; but it is a bread with the same "poor" character (unleavened, unsalted etc.) and for this proprieties it becomes *a sign for itself*.

This same bread is used also for a number of different "symbolic" preparations; for instance it is eaten together with bitter herbs, signifying (through the sense of taste) the "bitterness" of the slavery condition; but in another point of the seder it is eaten with a pink sweet sauce called "haroset" that remembers (through the sense of sight and a partially iconic signification) to the Jews slavery. The wine is drunk as often used in the Jewish ceremonies as an element of consecration, but at a certain point some drops are dropped into a dish, one for each of the "plagues" of Egypt; and then their red color becomes relevant to, reminiscent of the blood. Almost every element of the seder is on the same time directly signified and quoted, described and acted, explained and used: it is *overdetermined* in Freud (1901) sense.

Another important feature, which acts on the discursive level, is a systematic use of metalinguistic enunciation. For instance, at the beginning of the rite, the younger person on the table must ask some fixed questions, written on the Haggadah and sung with a traditional melody:

Why is this night different from all other nights?

On all other nights we eat leavened products and matzah, and on this night only matzah.

On all other nights we eat all vegetables, and on this night only bitter herbs.

On all other nights, we don't dip our food even once, and on this night we dip twice.

On all other nights we eat sitting or reclining, and on this night we only recline.

These questions are those one *must* ask, after all, mainly by a kid who has no experience of this ceremony. *The text embodies the predictable reactions of whom does not know its meaning*. Or rather, the causality of the seder rules can be seen also *in the reverse direction*: what is actually performed (or will be, because some of the oddities for whom an explanation is asked were not yet performed until this point), is there just *in order to induce such questions*. Again: the young participant, being instructed to ask these questions, *is obliged to note* "the difference". The pedagogic device works on him or her through his or her participation. The seder features are self-qualified as odd *in order to be remarked* and asked for a meaning. More: the simulation of some questions is intended to authorize and encourage more *real* questions. The recitation of a pedagogy should trigger a real pedagogic process, which is exemplified in another point of the Haggadah:

It is told of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Elazar the son of Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon were reclining at the seder service in B'nei Berak, and had spent the whole night telling the story of the Exodus from Egypt, until their pupils came and said to them: "Our masters, it is time to recite the morning Shema!"

One is charged to pretend to be curious in order to arouse real curiosity. Pedagogy and metapredagogy simply melt together in a semiotic self-reference of the text.

This is by no means a case. There is another point where a similar effect is looked for. It is a passage where a typology of young diners is given

The Torah speaks of four children: One is wise, one is wicked, one is simple and one does not know how to ask.


The wise one, what does he say? "What are the testimonies, the statutes and the laws which the L-rd, our G-d, has commanded you?" You, in turn, shall instruct him in the laws of Passover, [up to] 'one is not to eat any dessert after the Passover-lamb.'

The wicked one, what does he say? "What is this service to you?!" He says 'to you,' but not to him! By thus excluding himself from the community he has denied that which is fundamental. You, therefore, blunt his teeth and say to him: "It is because of this that the L-rd did for me when I left Egypt"; 'for me' – but not for him! If he had been there, he would not have been redeemed!"

The simpleton, what does he say? "What is this?" Thus you shall say to him: "With a strong hand the L-rd took us out of Egypt, from the house of slaves."

As for the one who does not know how to ask, you must initiate him, as it is said: "You shall tell your child on that day, 'It is because of this that the L-rd did for me when I left Egypt.'"

This typology proposes a very interesting semiotic square⁵ of the Seder audience, which is also the public or the passive subject of the pedagogical operation – always the young, the new generation to whom the meaning must be transmitted, here interpreted with the pivotal thematic role of the son. The problem is if and how the "children" are able and willing to take the correct enunciation position of receiver of the tradition: someone who takes the message, saves it and transmits it in turn to the next generation.



The sources for the questions and the answers are in different passages of the Torah, but, of course, they are not arranged in order to make a typology. It is interesting the fact that the bet-

⁵ I take this processing of the passage from Segre (2001)

ter (the “wise”) and the worst (the “wicked”) of the children pose essentially the same question: what the ceremony represents and what are its rules. But the first one uses more details and attributes the institution of the ceremony to God. The real point here is about membership. Inclusion and transmission are always among the goals of religious practices. Here they are made explicit through the prevision of the participants’ possible reactions.

As Umberto Eco (1979: 54) stated every text is “a lazy machine that demands the bold cooperation of the reader to fill in a whole series of gaps”; but exactly for this reason, “A text is a product whose interpretive fate must be part of its generative mechanism: Generate a text means carry out a strategy which includes forecasts of the moves of others – as indeed in every strategy.” This is true of every text, but more so for pedagogic, intrinsically coded, “suture” texts, as often the religious ones are.

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SEMIOTICS OF FOOD

A SENSE OF FORCE AND POWER IN BANQUETING ICONOGRAPHY FROM HARD ROCK AND HEAVY METAL LP AND CD COVERS

Adriano Alves Fiore
Pontificia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, Brazil
hardrockingroad@yahoo.com.br

Miguel Luiz Contani
Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Paraná, Brazil
contani@sercomtel.com.br
mcontani@gmail.com

Abstract

The festive meeting (i.e. at which food and drink are served) arranged for amusement and the reaffirmation of religious, civic or social positions is close to one of the most important – and primordial – forms of human culture: the banquet. Offering a banquet is much more than a simple social function since it involves complex questions of human behavior. Our research objective is to analyze images and illustrations of banqueting found on contemporary illustrations of CD covers and other materials of hard rock and heavy metal bands. The Reading of the visual material involves association with ancient murals, Renaissance paintings, historical narrative, photographs and films, the elements from which these visuals are inspired. The analyses are primarily based on and developed according to Jean Baudrillard's and Umberto Eco's work on the concept of hyper-reality, Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of carnivalization and laugh, which was catalogued, developed and analyzed by Georges Minois in *Histoire du rire et de la derision*. The interpretation of the iconography of hard rock and heavy metal LP and CD cover art indicates, semiotically, how all these meanings can be transformed into definitive expressions.

1. Introduction

The act of reveling or spree bingeing and its representation is associated with almost every activity of mankind and the focus on the banquet is due to the fact that, in this universe, principles are found that carry with them the positive hyperbolism of a triumphal jubilation, although they can also contain a solemn, mournful tone. They can, moreover, express situations of magnitude

with demonstrations of force, superiority and power. The link between a show of importance – or of authority – and the festive consumption of food and drink is present throughout History and among all peoples.

Bakhtinian carnivalization deals exhaustively with questions of laughter (and its multiple manifestations and categories), the vocabulary of the public squares (“marketplaces” or heavy metal open air festivals) and freedom of speech, forms of the popular festival, grotesque aspects of the human complexion, lower body functions (“material bodily lower stratum”), hyperbolization/hyperbolism. Bakhtin introduces us to both the joyful, orgiastic and winner aspects of the banquet image (retrieved from the Middle Ages and Renaissance, mainly from the works of François Rabelais) as intimate relations between food and drink with funereal rites (the death theme) and the somber underworld of the unknown.

The iconographic universe of the hard rock and heavy metal musical genres are very close to that of the carnivalization, thanks to the great inter-cognitive affinity between their symbolic representations. The object of this study deals, primarily, with the reading (or contemplation) of images related to a banquet in CDs, LPs and VHSs illustrations from the so-called heavy rock, whose analysis gains more “weight” when compared to classic art.

Food and drink symbolism has survived throughout the centuries, dispersed in a number of meanings such as the considerable mystic value of fixation or the uncontrollable desire to return to a certain place, social and family ties, cultural identification and hierarchical segregation. However, the meaning with greater relevance to this research is that of the display of strength and power which, not only for those who carries it out but also for those who are submitted to it, is intimately connected to the complex of impotence that haunts mortal man before his unmerciful fate.

Eco and Baudrillard demonstrate how hyper-reality constructs the “absolute fraud” that is propagated worldwide by “the industry of the absolute fake”, which is a grand farce, a copy or reproduction that naturally ends up being accepted by the masses in place of what is real. Minois writes a detailed history on the natural phenomenon of laughter since the period of the legendary Homer. Human laughter is one of the main pieces of carnivalization, but, according to the French historian, has arrived to current times not very different from what it was long time ago, i.e., with very little evolution. Ironically, this same laughter is needed for the maintenance of our emotional balance, responsible for the scientific and technological progress, working as an outlet for the inconsolable fear death. Finally, Flusser corroborates with the idea of the man’s creation principle, motivated by laughter and by a “new reality” that can be fabricated by placing it against the stagnant immutability of some religions. Metaphorically, he uses the figure of the Devil in many positive aspects as the Prometheus of the Modern Era that transports the fire of freedom of thinking (reflection) and action (creativity) to humanity, denominated the Flusserian diabolical straightforward progress.

The theoretical underpinnings of this work come from an adjustment between the above mentioned contemporary semiotic systems and the main elements of Bakhtinian carnivalization. As for the methodological approach, it is developed through an interpretative-semiotic analysis (readings) of classic paintings images, murals, book drawings and encyclopedias compared to modern illustrations of record covers, with a line of thinking based on adopted theoretical precepts.

The objective of the study is to reveal that the universal practice of the banquet image as an ostensive mean of force and power is as a matter of fact deeply associated with the human attempt to cover its mortal fragility before existential problems, and, therefore, is almost always connected to laughter and its libertarian aspect. Incidentally, it is the most used collective outlet in the world, adaptable to any event or situation. It presupposes that hard rock *designers*- aware

of man's natural tendency to fatalism – try to highlight, in their illustrations, the figure of a happy, orgiastic and victorious banquet.

2. The Banquet Image

The festivities are associated with the time of their realizations. They are connected to periods of crisis and disorder in the nature's life as well as in the life of society and men. In the Middle Ages, the character of the feasts is inseparably adjusted to higher human existence purposes. Concepts and ideas, such as those of death, resurrection, alternation, the grotesque, games and renovation, constitute everlasting and outstanding aspects of the feast (Bakhtin, 1999, 1984, p. 8). The banquet image allows everything and the hyperbolism generated may manifest itself positively or negatively, and its appeasing function between the human and the divine is also remarkable.

The legendary origin of the Trojan War occurred during a banquet. During the feast in honor of Thetis and Peleus marriage (parents of the hero Achilles), the major Gods gather amidst delicious glasses of nectar and plates and bowls of ambrosia while Eris, the goddess of discord, unexpectedly poses a challenge. She throws on the table (**fig. 1**) a pomme, a golden apple, announcing that it is a gift to the most beautiful of the goddesses and disappears. Juno (Hera), Pallas Athena (Minerva) and Venus (Aphrodite) falls into the tattletale's trap. They ask a Trojan pastor to be the judge. They choose Prince Paris who selects Venus as the winner of the contest of celestial beauty. From this imprudent deadly judgment, he condemns Trojan to the epic raid carried out by the Greek states-cities confederation and magnificently narrated by the blind poet Homer.



Fig. 1 – The Golden Apple of Discord
Source: *Trópico Encyclopaedia*, p. 1271, vol. VIII (Fiore's collection)




Fig. 2 – Phoebus Apollo throws arrows at the Greeks campsite, where the number of deceased pyres increases, until a sacred banquet is offered to control its rage.

Source: *Trópico Encyclopaedia*, p. 1285, vol. VIII (Fiore's collection)

The Iliad, therefore, started in response to a provocation during a banquet. The story of the so-called Trojan War only came to an end thanks to a type of banquet, an offering. All of this took place when Agamemnon insulted the apollonian priest, Crises, thus infuriating the god. "Phoebus descends from the Olympus (**fig.2**). Terrible was the buzzing of his silver bow. First he attacked the animals then he threw his arrows against men, and they all hit the target. For nine days, the god's arrows fell on the campsite (*Iliad*, Book I, p. 12)." A magnificent offer – a banquet

– with fat cuts of bulls, lambs or goats basted with barley placates the wrath of Apollo, ending the killing among the Greeks and leading to the events of the Trojan War.

The banquet is one of the central pieces of the carnivalization universe. Bakhtin includes it among his three great categories (or expression forms) of popular culture: rites and spectacles (carnival festivities, comic works represented in public places, etc.); verbal comic works (including parodies) of oral and written nature, in Latin or in vulgar language; and the several forms and genres of familiar and rude vocabulary (insults, swears, popular blazonries, etc.) (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 5).

2.1. Hyperbolism, ostentation, victory, laughter

Assurnasirpal II (883-859 a.C.), and Assyrian ruler, sponsors the greatest feast of all times, in which sixty-nine thousand and five-hundred subjects are invited to devour, for 10 days, unbelievable amounts of beef, lamb, poultry and fish plus huge quantities of beer and wine. According to Bakhtin's carnivalized understanding, the image of the banquet and the gluttony is strongly connected to man's fight against his surrounding habitat, culminating with the victory of the first. The last victory of work ends up in a huge demonstration of gluttony. This image encompasses a positive hyperbolism of a triumphal and happy tone.

[...] Man's encounter with the world in the act of eating is joyful, triumphant; he triumphs over the world, devours it without being devoured himself. The limits between man and the world are erased, to man's advantage. [...] Collective food as the conclusion of labor's collective process was a social event" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 281).

Splendid meals, however, are not limited to honor collective efforts and conquests but, in many situations, are associated with the purest and banal exhibitionism of the social hierarchical character. It is the classic example of the *Banquet of Trimalchio* described by Petronius in *Satyricon*. In *Satyricon* by Gaius Petronius Arbiter (c. 27- 66 AD) two incorrigible crooks, Encolpius and his fellow student Asciltus start enjoying life falling out over their mutual lust for the young Giton, exhaustively and lasciviously between one feast and another. The objective is to live at fullest in sprees and binges and in all orgies, the Banquet of Trimalchio, an ex-slave, being the most well-known. Extremely wealthy and powerful, Trimalchio begins to show off his new social condition by offering pantagruelic banquets to many guests. During the long festive period, the guests are involved in grotesque and extravagant entertainment situation. This way Trimalchio intends to present himself as a "nouveau riche" by throwing banquets filled with pomposity and power.

Ancient festive representations of Etruscan (**fig.3**) and Roman (**fig.4**) banquets can be included in the same medieval modality – ludic ambiance - which appears in the incipient bourgeois literature. These pantagruelic and hyperbolic events are offered by the wealthy to groups of selected guests, or to the "little people", as a confirmation of their superiority due to their social status. Up until III b.C., before Rome became a great Italian center, the Etruscans were famous for representing Elysian scenes of banquets on their funeral urns and sarcophagus, since, according to them, the deceased goes to a good and happy place despite the somber characteristic of the interior of the Earth, i.e, in Hades.




Fig.3 – Scene of *Banquet and Leopards*, mural painting of the *Leopards Grave*, Tarquinia (Italy), V b.C. (c. 480-470 b.C.). Retrieved from: <<http://umolharsobreaart.blogspot.com.br/2013/08/6-arte-da-antiguidade-classica-arte.html>> In: dec. 2014



Fig. 4 – Silenus and Dionysius, detail of the wall decoration (mural) at Villa of the Mysteries (First Century AD) in Pompeii (Italy). Retrieved from: <<http://rodrigovivas.wordpress.com/2010/01/03/sileno-e-dionisio-detalhe-da-decoracao-parietal-da-vila-dos-misterios-metade-do-seculo-i-d-c-altura-162-cm-pompeia/>> In: dec. 2014

Let us again stress, in conclusion, that banquet images in the popular-festive tradition (and in Rabelais) differ sharply from the images of private eating or private gluttony and drunkenness in bourgeois literature. The latter express the contentment and satiety of the selfish individual, his personal enjoyment, and not the triumph of the people as a whole. Such imagery is torn away from the process of labor and struggle; it is removed from the market place and is confined to the house and the private chamber (abundance in the home); it is no longer the ‘banquet for the whole world’, in which all take part, but an intimate feast with hungry beggars at the door. If this picture of eating and drinking is hyperbolic, it is a picture of gluttony, not an expression of social justice. It is a static way of private life, deprived of any symbolic openings and universal meaning, no matter whether it is represented as satire that is, as purely negative, or as a positive state of well-being. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 301).

Laughter has innumerable functions, including serving as a means to approximate people or to attenuate conflicts in tense moments. “According to Aristotle, laughter is the first human nature, and stupidity is the second!” (Minois, 2003, p.178).

In the illustrations above, consistent with the record covers (fig.5 to 8), the well-deserved moment of relaxation with a meal served with drinks (fig.9) is understood as the pleasure of human victory over material and spiritual adversities. In fact, this rule applies both to the Middle Ages as well as to current times. The explosion of festive happiness, the exaggeration of the grotesque, the metamorphosis (disguise) and the subversive confrontation is clear in fig. 7. The respect for spiritual or religious questions are represented ambiguously by the table in fig. 8, where components considered “reactionary” such as the American flag and the traditional fam-



Fig.5 – Cover art from *Malice in Wonderland* (USA: Vertigo, 1980) by the Scottish hard rock/heavy metal band Nazareth, **Retrieved from:** <<https://www.google.com.br/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=nazareth%20discography>> **In:** dec 2014



Fig.6 – Cover art from *Come and taste the band* (UK: Warner, 1975) by the English hard rock/heavy metal group Deep Purple. **Retrieved from:** <http://www.metal-archives.com/albums/Deep_Purple/Come_Taste_the_Band/340> **In:** dec 2014




Fig.7 – Cover art from *Kings of Beer* (Germany: Century Media, 2000) by the German thrash metal band Tankard. **Retrieved from:** <http://metal-archives.com/albums/Tankard/Kings_of_Beer/1643> **In:** dec 2014



Fig.8 – Cover art from *Kiss My Ass: Classic Kiss Regrooved* (USA: Mercury, 2004), a tribute album to the American hard rock/heavy metal group KISS. **Retrieved from:** <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiss_My_Ass:_Classic_Kiss_Regrooved> **In:** dec 2014



Fig.9 - The black metal banger in *corpse paint* eating lavishly as resting during the Wacken Open Air 2006. **Retrieved from:** <<http://gallery.wacken.com/displayimage.php?album=234&pos=30>> **Photo by** Frank C. Dünnhaupt/Bright eyes Magazine **In:** dec 2014

ily, coexist with the occult mask of the non-conformism and atheism of the rock. The contrast (ambivalence) is also seen in the photograph of a black metal style dilettante (**fig.9**) – considered one of the most radical in the world of heavy metal - when he calmly sits on the ground with a beer mug in an area reserved for the Wacken Open Air German Festival, in 2006, to savor some commercialized food. All these illustrations are submitted to the positive force of the banquet images. They create a free atmosphere and exaggerations, though they are put to a satirical use.




Fig.s 10 and 11 – Cover art (front and back) from *First Big Picnic* by the American hard rock band Laidlaw. **Source:** CD, USA: BMG, 1999




Fig.s 12 and 13 – Cover art (front and back) from *Whatever Turns you On* by the American hard rock group West, Bruce and Laing. **Source:** LP, Germany: RSO, 1973

Two moments of contrast: on the front cover, the image of life within the standards, with the musician in his childhood during a picnic with his father, mother and sister (**fig. 10**). On the back cover, as an adult, the “good boy” image degenerates into a feast transformed in a binge with orgy aspects, together with his musician friends and dedicated fans (**fig. 11**).

In addition, illustrations on the cover (front and back) with the picnic scene that brings out strong allusions to the universal triumph of life over death (or happiness over sadness), promoted by the banquet’s abundance, mainly by the public feast. The inebriating feeling caused by the food and drink depicts, momentarily, the utopic character of the banquet, which satisfies men, helping them forget their actual maladies, interdictions, fears and giving them hope for future fortunes. *Libido* is set free, configuring a rupture of inhibitions, repressions and frustrations,

creating situations of orgy. It is what the illustration on the cover (**fig. 12-13 hard rock group**) of the American hard rock group West, Bruce and Laing shows.

[...] The banquet had the power of liberating the world from the shackles of piousness and fear of God. Everything became open to play and merriment. [...] “The Treatise of Garcia of Toledo”, is typical in this respect [...] The description of this continuous feast, of the gluttony of the Pope and of the other prelates, is full gross exaggeration and long speeches of praise and abuse. [...] Banquet images, like all popular-festive forms, are ambivalent. [...] They create a free atmosphere. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 288; 291).

Comparatively, it can be said that, the comic and vulgar banquet moments depicted, in great part, on hard rock records covers, have inherited the disposition of ancient Etruscans for enjoying life in the *carpe diem* style. This is highly plausible considering that most bands come from industrialized countries of the “First World”, where moral and hierarchical social pressure suffocates collectivity on a daily basis.

Humor is always at the heels of the doubt. It appears whenever human sciences show their weakness and the complexity of the human being [...] Modern laughter is uncertain since it does not know where to fix itself. It is neither affirmation nor negation but interrogation, fluctuating over the abyss in which certainties have drowned [...] Modern laughter exists to mask the loss of the senses [...]. This truth is unbearable, and only laughter can bear the unbearable, disguising it, mocking it and playing with it. Laughter is indispensable since, more than never, we are facing the Empty [...] Without humor, how will the ten billion people living in this world in 2050, falling over their dejects and being suffocated by pollution, survive? (Minois, 2003, p. 632).

To Flusser, the climate of absolute calm and happiness human beings can achieve – at some improbable time in their history – it is a mere product of a hopeful illusion, a terribly sinister peace, rationally faced with an “ironic smile” (FLUSSER, 2006, p. 201).

2.2. Strength, Power, Authority and Brutality

The image of the banquet is not always associated with questions of laughter, ostentation and popular victory. Cannibalism (**fig. 15 and 16**) explains the human instinct for destruction and absorption of the species through the mouth. Men eat other men’s flesh to incorporate more strength and power to arm themselves with their “sacred energy”. “The great *Handbook of South Americans Indians* describes a number of Indians tribes who, at least until recently, were cannibals and preserved the skulls of their enemies as memorials of their exploits (Henschen, 1966, p. 64).”

The banquet images can also express situations of brutality and authority, and the use of beef is associated with the demonstration of strength and power. Exceptionally gloomy is the end of times meal announced in *Apocalypse* (Jo 3, 17-18, *Jerusalem Bible*, p. 2163), when the Vengeful Angel sent by Jesus Christ summons all the birds that fly in the sky for the last supper: “Come, assemble for the great supper of God, so that you may eat the flesh of kings and the flesh of commanders and the flesh of mighty men and the flesh of horses and of those who sit on them and

the flesh of all men, both free men and slaves, and small and great”.



Fig. 14 – Cover art from EP *A Ferro e Fogo* (São Paulo: Baratos Afins, 1985) by the Brazilian hard rock/heavy metal group Harppia.

Retrieved from: <http://www.metal-archives.com/albums/Harppia/A_Ferro_e_Fogo/16063> In: dec 2014



Fig. 15 – Print from the German adventurer Hans Staden (circa 1525-1579) on cannibalism in Brazil while a colony of Portugal. **Retrieved from:** <http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Staden> In: dec 2014



Fig. 16 – Cover art from *Pleasure of the Flesh* (USA: Combat Records, 1987) by the American thrash metal band Exodus. **Retrieved from:** <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pleasures_of_the_Flesh> In: dec 2014

“Phineus had been blinded by the gods for prophesying the future too accurately, and was also plagued by a pair of Harpies; who, at every meal, flew into the palace and snatched victuals from his table, befauling the rest, so that it stank and was inedible (Graves, 1996, p. 537).” The Harpies enforce punishments under the protection of gods, i.e., of those that, in fact, have the higher authority on humanity, using the most brutal means possible. Their extremely grotesque appearance is very different from that in the illustration on the cover of the Brazilian group record (fig. 14), however, what really matters is the idea of strength and power it depicts.

The aborigine “barbecue” from the Great Discoveries era and the “stew” shared by the cannibals and by the Exodus band musicians (fig. 15 and 16) are good examples of the use of meat in banquets as a demonstration of force and power. They denote a display of victory amplified by all the energy and power acquired through a process of total devouring (cannibalism) of the “other”.

3. Hyper-reality

Baudrillard understands that hyperreality refers to the virtual (or unreal) nature of contemporary culture in the mass communication era, where intense consumption is easily controlled by opinion polls, where the simulation is perfect; however, it is also where the ecstasy is provoked by a masked simulation of the reality.

The very definition of the real becomes: that of which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction [...] At the limit of this process of reproduction, the real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced. The hyperreal. [...] The hyperreal transcends representation only because it is entirely in simulation. (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 146).

“Elsewhere the frantic desire for the Almost Real arises only as a neurotic reaction to the vacuum of memories; the Absolute Fake is offspring of the unhappy awareness of a present without depth (Eco, 1995, p. 30).” However, it is clear that societies allow themselves to live in the world of fairy tales, accepting, meekly, anything that the mass communication means impose on them. The most shameless and unwarranted lies are “consumed” and accepted, since the present humanity – uniformly globalized – are not concerned with anything, leaving to the State (or System, the updated term) the responsibility for caring and controlling everything. People, in general, are only satisfied with intense emotions (every time more technologically potent, brutal) offered by the entertainment industry. Everything is perfect and “calm” in the world, provided that everyone “is drowning in excessive consumption to avoid facing reality” (Flusser, 1998, p. 144). No wonder all the myths of modernity are Americans, warns Baudrillard (1986, p. 70).

3.1. Triumphant aspects and apocalyptic funereal

The mouth – an important grotesque image of the Bakhtinian carnival corpus – is the main human anatomic opening in which the frontiers between two bodies are crossed. It reinforces the concept of union between the inner world (hell, death, the underground and occultism) and the outer world (life and current time). Through the mouth, a constant traffic between the mundane and the supernatural is installed.



Fig. 17 - *Saturn* (1821-1823) by Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes (1746-1828), Madrid, Museo del Prado. **Retrieved from:** <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturn_Devouring_His_Son> **In:** [dec 2014](#)>



Fig. 18 - Cover art from *Hell Awaits* by the American thrash metal band Slayer (USA/France: Metal Blade Records/Music For Nations, 1984/1985). **Retrieved from:** <http://www.metal-archives.com/albums/Slayer/Hell_Awaits/208> **In:** [dec 2014](#)




Fig. 19 - Cover art from *Spartan Warrior* (Holland: Rodarunner Records, 1984) by the English hard rock band Spartan Warrior. **Retrieved from:** <http://www.metal-archives.com/albums/Spartan_Warrior/Spartan_Warrior/5195> **In:** [dec 2014](#)

Goya creates *Saturn* (**fig. 17**); a classical scene of a powerful, grotesque and barbarian banquet served with beef and blood. The idea of the brutal – authoritarian – banquet (**fig. 15 to 19**), are generally related to punishments and penance; it's the “*theatrum diabolorum*” spirit which offers not visions of the existing devils but images of the vices of the society we live in” (Eco, 2007, p. 102).

The image of hell becomes an obsession for a large number of artists since the Middle Ages (Eco, 2007, p. 89). One of the creators of the “satanic” heavy metal, Slayer, was never intimidated for designing record covers with hell and the eternal punishment as themes (**fig. 18**). They are intelligent pieces of work – anathematized by the Press around the world – and of rare artistic beauty, as in the traces Hieronymus Bosch (c. 1450-1516). True masterpieces that express the future panorama (post-mortem) of horrible suffering that mankind will be submitted to due to

their vile and unforgivable actions.

The dark and apocalyptic view that the defeat before ruin and destiny can generate is beautifully depicted on the vinyl cover of the group Spartan Warrior (**fig. 19**). It shows the humiliating defeat of arrogance and human superiority, a shameful end surrounded by crows (or other types of rapine birds) – “inferior” creatures, in theory – enjoying themselves around a skull, the symbol of death and wisdom *par excellence*, and, ironically, of immortality.



Fig. 20 - *La Grande Bouffe* film poster (France/Italy, 1973). Retrieved from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Grande_Bouffe>
[In: dec 2014](#)



Fig. 21 – Cover art from *Believe in Me* (Brazil: Geffen/MCA, 1993) by the American hard rock bassist Duff McKagan, ex-Guns ‘N Roses member. [Source: CD, Brazil: Geffen/MCA, 1993](#)

To our relief, however, there is an awareness that, from the caveman until today, human evolution only occurs satisfactorily when conditioned by laughter; in other words, when we abandon ourselves to the final and desperate breath of understanding about questions of life and death. Laughter, food and drink (the banquet images) softens the reality of death, and only scientists and philosophers can bring to bear the necessary understanding and liberty to foster progress, since they do not see themselves as subordinate to officially imposed retrograde models of morality and religion.

The French-Italian movie *La Grande Bouffe* (**fig. 20**) may be the best cinematographic example of the banquet idea as a final and acceptable resource for facing death or, in other words, for developing a less sad relationship with human mortality. In the movie, the middle-aged and already tired of the rotten society characters decide to look for shelter in a house and spend the last moments of their lives binging on food, drink and orgiastic freedom; *carpe diem* taken to its extreme. It suggests a “glorious” and apocalyptically happy and gastronomic death. It is also the theme adopted by the CD cover of Duff McKagan (**fig. 21**).

Final remarks

The motive of the laughter is profusely applied in favor of freedom, and it is the key point used by Bakhtin to associate the positive image of the banquet with the popular carnival festivities of the Middle Ages. In these disturbing binging environments – in which today’s heavy metal open air festivals are included – a welcoming and relaxing environment is created, bringing out an aura of familiarity under the action of the alcohol consumed.

Ambivalence, however, is a prevailing factor in the nature of the hard rock and heavy metal

genre. The iconographic-symbolic showcase of the so-called heavy rock displays a series of heteroclitic and aggressive representations, always suggesting demonstrations loaded with force and power. Symbols constructed over such images – accepted and lived by the fans – have a direct influence on the view of the world and humanity for millions of fans. The hyper-reality introduces an illusory universe to people which is parallel to the real, but that surpasses and even substitutes it. We are in the era of the “authentic copy industry”, the “illusion” and of the “absolutely fake”. It is the degeneration of the human essence by the human being itself. Everything is aggravated whenever we witness the increasing devaluing of everything that is natural in detriment to the virtual (or digital) or artificially produced.

The pace of “serious” scientific progress is fast and “diabolical” – thanks to the motivation of sins – and it occurs in a straight (horizontal) line, as professed by Flusser, and the “industry of the absolutely fake” or the “industry of the lie” benefit from it, increasingly impregnating all the other sectors (cultural, religious, moral, political and scientific) of contemporary society. The term “entertainment” is adopted to justify the mediatic and symbolic illusion that the modern technological industry transforms into something truer than the nature of things itself, with “machiavellian” economic-financial, moral and political purposes.

Banquet illustrations reinforce the idea of strength and power by exposing the libertarian-orgiastic aspect of laughter and immortality. The captivating veil of the feast dionysian happiness hides, at least in real life, the frustration of human impotence before the inevitable. They easily seduce hard rock/heavy metal fans as well as the public in general, thus contributing to the industry of the absolutely fake (of “entertainment”), creating real “illusions” inspired by the hyper-reality.

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FEASTING WITH THE OUTLANDER

Francesco Mangiapane
University of Palermo, Italy
francescom@gmail.com

Abstract

While TV programs tend to acclaim cooks, by testing their ability in showcooking, challenging their skills on special talent shows and even by inviting them as opinion leaders commenting on the current affairs, cinema still prefers celebrating conviviality.

Showing people having a meal together around the table involves celebrating eating as a basic transformative act, more or less orchestrated by a cook who contributes to create actual experiences by means of his services. Through them, he reconstitutes the existence of individuals, of communities or even of entire countries. This means that, in principle, the mission of the cooks on most movies operates on a level at the same time broader and deeper than the mere culinary expertise (which is not always necessary), calling into question what can be traced as eminently human in the individual and political experience of the people involved.

Celebrating the table becomes, then, a way to position the self and the ingroup up to include the whole of humanity in an idea of community which is, at the same time, political (I eat like my community does), ethical (my community eats the right way), and even religious (humanity should eat as my community does).

In order to let such a configuration emerge from the obvious of the everyday life, showing all of its anthropological importance, cinema needs outsiders. They are addressed to look at a particular social group from outside and reveal the arbitrariness of its way of eating while proclaiming the word of the culinary transformation. In movies, countless are the gastronomic foreigners who arise, unexpected, in order to stage the relativity, and at the same time the importance, of cooking and eating habits. And, in general, almost all the characters in this strange genre, foreigners or not, have a problem of inclusion / exclusion with respect to some groups.

My analysis will show how the stories of the culinary movies can be considered as “thought

experiment” of different strategies (and incomes) of a same problem of facing otherness. The result of this work will identify, scanning the stories of the movies, culinary archetypes of different political models of interaction between groups and will also show how specific models of leadership could be recognized in the way the characters address their diners to the change of their diet.

1. Food and Cinema

Food in films, as well as in life, may be approached in various ways. There's the good-tempered bully in a magical Rome of the fifties who pretends to be American but does not resist in front of a plate of macaroni. There is the family meal in which conflicts emerge unexpected at the apparent cordiality of the table. There is a classic wild sex in the kitchen. There is the sad Fanis that uses food as a bulwark of identity after being expelled from the city where he was born. And the list could go on, in a roundup that would embrace the whole history of the seventh art. In recent years, the Culinary Cinema has even become a genre, celebrated in festivals internationally. But what have in common the many dishes cooked and consumed during the countless banquets in the movies?

Putting food in the middle of a story, be it literature or cinema, turns it into a powerful tool of subjective and inter-subjective shift. Eating becomes a basic transformative act, so that, by means of the food, social ties may be reconstructed, relationships reshaped, the entire life of individuals, communities and even entire countries reconstituted. Eating and cooking, in the movies, in short, are not only eating and cooking. They mean much more.

Thanks to the food, the ruthless critic of *Ratatouille* (2007) finds a *perspective*, reconciling himself with his sadness, the Protestant community of *Babette's Feast* (1987) turns out again united, Emma Recchi from *I Am Love* (2009) finds a new bond with the world beyond hypocrisy and bourgeois formalities. It goes without saying that the gratitude of the diners for injecting sense in their own lives may be recognized in their devotion to the cooks, meant as protagonists of the films and responsible for such great blisses. The action of the cooks in the movies operates at a level at the same time wider and deeper than the mere culinary expertise (which, by the way, is not always necessary), calling into question the human rate traceable in the individual and political experience of eating by the subjects involved. Thanks to their exceptional nature, the cooks make people fall in love with them: *Babette's Feast*, *Like Water for Chocolate* (1992), *Chocolat* (2000), *Woman on Top* (2000), *Bella Martha* (2001), *Spanglish* (2004), *Lessons in Chocolate* (2007), *Estomago, Una storia gastronomica* (2007), *No Reservations* (2007), *Mediterranean Food* (2009), *I Am Love* (2009), *Romantics Anonymous* (2010), *The cook of the President* (2012) are just few examples of the multitude of titles which associate food and love stories.

But devotion may also be declined in other directions, for example, towards friendship and mutual respect, or even professional recognition or simply recognition of status led by the appreciation received for having prepared a lunch or a dinner memorable. What need does a mechanism of this kind answer?

Restricting our investigation to the contemporary culinary cinema, an observation arises. The current gastronomic megatrend fits into a broader context of emancipation from the industrial society. In reference to the taste, the industrial approach has given the worst of itself, pursuing what has been called by many an actual “ice age” of food, sacrificed in the name of production needs and standardization.

Already since the seventies, scholars and intellectuals have been thinking over how this industrial model was ultimately dysfunctional, revealing its evil nature. A precise economic structure created to respond to basic needs (education, health etc.) ended up taking the upper hand over the needs themselves, definitely subduing the humanity which was initially called to protect.

Schooling took the place of Education, *Medicalization* of Health, *Transportation* of Movement, and so on. Ivan Illich has proposed, already since then, a metaphor to get out of this subordination: returning to conviviality. By this notion, he meant to refer to a substantial humanization of the relationship between man and environment, replacing the categorical imperative of production (based on a system of deficiency) to the one of conviviality (based on the autonomy of the gift). A step like this would allow the return of liberty lost due to the industrial mechanisms of production. Today we live in the middle of the post-industrial era, in a time of collapse of the organizational structure so sharply criticized by Illich. We witness also to the emergence of new organizational models, characterized by the desire to protect the autonomy of the individuals and to share goods and services until recently sole dominance of the industrial sphere. In this process of de-industrialization does not escape the world of food, which constitutes the central metaphor of Illich: conviviality is celebrating spontaneously the table, is fulfilling biological needs without sacrificing aesthetics, is recognizing nourishment to its most profound nature of cultural act. This is possible as long as nutrition and taste are considered inseparable parts of the gastronomic experience, only *a posteriori* split according to ideological positions made by the various cultures. So we understand how the problem of corporeality and the one of the relationship between body and soul is immediately turned into a political issue. It is starting from these aspects at the same time ethical and aesthetic, social and political that culinary cinema tells its many stories, so different in appearance, yet all focussed – we'll see – on rethinking in depth the act of eating. Celebrating the table becomes a way to position the self in the group up to include the whole of humanity in an idea of community that is, at the same time, political (I eat as in my community), ethical (my community eats the right way) and even religious (humanity should eat as my community). In order to let such a configuration emerge from the obvious of the everyday life, showing all its anthropological importance, culinary cinema needs outsiders, people who, looking from outside at a particular social group, might reveal the arbitrariness of its way of eating and announce the verb of the culinary shift. In the culinary movies countless foreigners burst, unexpected, in societies and communities, couples and families, in order to stage the relativity and, at the same time, the importance of cooking and eating customs. Almost all the characters of this strange genre, foreigners or not, have a problem of inclusion/exclusion with respect to some group.

They are subjects who, for many different reasons, find themselves at the edge. It's from their marginal position that they need to affirm or deny the culinary expertise inherited, up to be integrated into a new social group. To them, considered as outsiders, is ascribed the task of announcing that other ways of eating are possible, and that any stance on food can only be placed in relation to the others' one, equally meaningful and interesting.

That is to say that, for instance, some food may be considered as *good, clean* and *fair*, to resume the famous triad of Petrini, just if someone else, somewhere else, finds it *bad, dirty* and *unfair*. Precisely for this purpose, all culinary films enact subjects in transition. It's all about subjects that, during the canonical hour and a half of the format, are found to change diet or way of cooking, and then group affiliation and identity.

Delivering on this kind of considerations is an attempt to rid the discourse over culinary cinema from the elitist scenario where some critic confined it. Investigating over food in the movies means, from our point of view, to think its role within the various cultures or, reversing the perspective, means studying the cultures through it. In other words, the way we will investigate the subtle bond that links films and food is not going to be the one of the cinema experts. So that the stylistic or aesthetic result of the single film is not the reason of our consideration, nor our consideration follows a logical or historical interest or makes any account of a so called "policy of the author". Similarly, the intent of this survey is not strictly culinary, it doesn't mean propos-

ing a philology of gourmet dishes in the movies or revealing the recipes used in some favourite film. Literature is full of titles of this kind. What to pursue is rather a thought over the culinary narratives circulating in the current media landscape. They consist of stories that most of the times keep a foundation in the movies but that sometimes redeem from them, turning themselves into common sense, currency of the culinary discourse *tout-court*, proliferating in various media. Starting from the fragments that the media constantly rework, the articulation of these narratives may be recomposed, considering them as “thought experiments”. Just for the fact of being tales, narratives, stories, movies bring into play proper “thought experiments”: they pose problems, they test heroes, indicate solutions to the problems themselves. They are therefore able to ‘anticipate the experience’, creating an inventory of general issues and local solutions that everyone can use at his sake. Positioning with respect to these stories is a way to shape identity. In order to face the eventualities of life, everyone appeals, if only to reject them, to this repertoire guarded in the tales. And there’s more. Studying a text with reference to its narrative structure leads to widen the spectrum of analysis to other texts and other narratives.

This is what Jurij Lotman used to call *semiosphere*, meaning the significant horizon that is built in the connection between texts in a continuum that can virtually extend to consider the entire culture but that can be effectively explored by isolating consistent and coherent portions of it. Once adopted such a point of view, new questions arise: what are the contours of the transformations told in the movies? May culinary systems, capable to structure real political ideologies of food, be identified? and are these political ideologies be generalizable up to become existential? Is there a peculiar language through which food operates this kind of shifts? Can it be represented at in the cinema?

2. Political Models

It is possible to draw a typology of the ethnic transitions described in the films, with reference to the different strategies of connection between the self (my group) and the other (the other groups). In the relationship with other people, policies of *exclusion* (willing to mark the difference between the groups, holding them disjoint) or policies of *assimilation* (willing to absorb the other in a defined social model) can be implemented. Still, there are *admission* policies when a group admits new members as long as they are available to soften their prior identity in the name of their new affiliation. And, finally, *segregation* policies where the group does not want to contemplate the other as interlocutor, simply giving him the chance to build a self-sufficient and independent ethnic enclave within itself.

Policies of *assimilation* match a pattern that cancels the identity of the other, while within the policies of *segregation* can be recognized approaches that encourage the establishment of real enclaves willing to isolate the other. If these two regimes are hardly compatible with modern integration policies, the debate of Western democracies is focused on the other two options built, incidentally, by culinary metaphors. We can associate the policies that support the *disjunction* of cultures to the metaphor of *salad bowl*, container in which, despite being all mixed, the ingredients remain distinct. Policies that focus on *admission* may be related to the positions that support the need for cultures to work as a *melting pot*, that is a casserole in which all the elements merge forming a hybrid system in which the primitive elements are no longer recognizable in their original form.

Assimilation	Salad Bowl
<i>Policies of assimilation</i>	<i>Policies of exclusion</i>
Conjunction	Disjunction
Non Disjunction	Non Conjunction
<i>Policies of admission</i>	<i>Policies of segregation</i>
Melting Pot	Segregation

Each of these positions represents a real *form of life*, and *affiliation*, whose features are not, at this point, difficult to discern in the culinary films. Robbie, the protagonist of the film *The Angels' Share*, behaves like a real *snob*: he uses his expertise of whisky taster to divest his signs of affiliation (he used to be a deviant hooligan) and assume other ones, looking forward to be integrated in a upper social environment. Babette, haughty bourgeois communiard, acts as a perfect *dandy*: she only looks for a legitimacy of her diversity, exasperating the signs of it. She squanders her entire fortune to celebrate a dinner capable to explain her identity to the unsuspecting diners. The dishes she prepares and the ingredients that she uses are exactly the same she was using in her Parisian restaurant. In contrast, the rat Rémy of the film *Ratatouille* is a perfect *chameleon*: staunch supporter of the idea that everyone can cook, he prepares a mestizo and innovative ratatouille that permanently changes the perception of the dish: millions of people worldwide are convinced that the ratatouille cooked by the mouse matches the traditional dish and don't even suspect the existence of the vegetable stew that the Frenchs have been preparing for generations. Finally, the poor Primo and Secondo of *Big Night* refuse to hybridize their culinary expertise with that of the new American group that admits them. They act so as *bears* hunted in a hostile environment. Their restaurant will work as an actual enclave, destined to succumb against the power of the scenario in which it operates.

Here's a scheme to sum up:

<i>Robbie</i> The Angels' Share	<i>Babette</i> Babette's Feast
SNOB	DANDY
Inculturation	Salad Bowl
<i>Policies of Assimilation</i>	<i>Policies of Exclusion</i>
Conjunction	Disjunction
Non Disjunction	Non Conjunction
<i>Policies of Admission</i>	<i>Policies of Segregation</i>
Melting Pot	Segregation
CHAMALEON	Bear
<i>Rémy</i> Ratatouille	<i>Primo e Secondo</i> Big Night

The proposed scheme has here been used to position four gastronomic films but it can clearly be applied as a model to screen many other films about food.

The *snob* is someone who has to deny his identity by adhering to policies of assimilation; he is forced to abandon every sign of his previous identity in the name of *acculturation*. This position is often represented in the cinema, featuring characters who want to get rid from an unwell past, changing life with mixed success. There are fortunate cases as, for example, that of Toula, heroine of *My big fat greek wedding* (2002), who succeeds in redeeming from her heavy ethnic heritage by marrying a boy from a good Anglo-Saxon family; or like that of Zinos, greek immigrant in Germany protagonist of *Soul Kitchen* (2009), who succeeds to launch a trendy restaurant despite the many hardships that will come from his family. There are less fortunate cases, like that of *Adua and Her Friends* (1960), in which a group of prostitutes attempts to break free from the degradation of their profession by opening a restaurant: just when the conversion looks complete and the owners transformed in excellent *restaurateurs*, they succumb to their past deviance, falling back into prostitution. There is, moreover, Raimundo Nonato, the protagonist of *Estomago – Una Storia Culinaria* (2007), who manages to make a career in the city thanks to its talent of chef and his kindness that hides a dark side of murderer. The examples could continue.

The *dandy* is instead one that aggravates the signs of difference by implementing policies of *exclusion* against those who do not fit with his identity. He also maintains the necessary distance with those belonging to other groups who he wants not to be confused nor hybridized with. The model derived from such attitude is that of the *salad bowl*, an idea of coexistence that is based on the reciprocal acknowledgement of the diversity and refusal of melting. This way of marking the difference is usually granted in the end of the competition. Most of the times dandies in the culinary film easily succeeds to convert the others who are called to compete with. There are many characters that can be recognized in this position. In *Haute Cuisine* (2012) Hortense Laborie can bend the entire kitchen of the Elysee to her philosophy of food and make even the President Mitterand fall in love with her. Vianne, protagonist of *Chocolat* (2000), whose plot is very similar to *Babette's Feast*, prevails on the bigoted community Lansquenet; Mario, the hero of *Bella Martha* (2001) will, with his flamboyantly eccentric attitude, take over the restaurant in Hamburg where he works under the direction of the the beautiful chef Martha. She will not resist to his charm and will become his wife

The *chameleon* is one who manifests a hybrid identity and is admitted into the group by virtue of his own funambulism: he is not totally assimilated into the group but still deserves to be acknowledged for his mediation effort. His presence helps to dilute the identity of the group that admits it, creating a third Creole one, result of the mix of his culture and that of the group which admits him. It is the *melting pot*, an idea of coexistence that is based on the reconciliation of differences in the name of greater belonging that is created by the fact of widening the circle of membership. If Rémy is the prince of all chameleons, other personalities from the culinary movies can be recognized in this position. In *An American in Rome* (1954), Alberto Sordi embodies a funny hybridization between the American bully subculture along with the good mood which is usually recognized to the Italians. Flor, heroine of the film *Spanglish* (2004), cannot really adjust to life as an immigrant in the United States, until she understands (with the help of a cook) that studying English and opening to her new context does not mean giving up her native culture. Indeed, she might look for a recognition (and an ascendant over men) by not hiding her hybrid identity. The same applies to Fanis, character of the film *A Touch of Spice* (2003). He will be found to make a virtue of necessity: having been expelled from his beloved *Constantinople* and forced to emigrate to Greece, he is indicated as Greek by the Turks and as Turk by the Greeks, embodying an identity of hybrid between the two cultures. Finally, *Mediterranean Diet* (2009)

addresses the issue of gender inequality in the field of professional cookery: Sofia, the protagonist of the film, tries to reconcile her success as chef with her expectations of woman (marriage, children, etc.). She comes up building a far-fetched *ménage à trois* that will be absolutely functional to her success as a chef.

The *bear* is the one who, however, cannot (and doesn't want to) be integrated. He just want to cut out an independent niche in the space of the ethnic group who hosts him. Case in point, in addition to the brothers of *Big Night*, is the one of Slimane, hero of *Couscous*, who, after having worked all his life as a employee of the dockyards, at the age of sixty decides to fulfil his dream of opening an ethnic restaurant. The success of his venture will cost a lot to him but will not represent a pale integration perspective, given that every effort is aimed at building a perfect ethnic staging whose goal is to please the customers rather than treating them as equals.

3. Somatic models

The protagonists of these stories become, then, leaders of their own culinary quest, to convert as many diners as possible to their diet that is to say to their identity. They adopt strategies of pressure on their interlocutors that cross the body image (changing diet) to more general proposals of social behaviour. Here are four other forms of manipulation of the body related to the diet. On the one hand, Babette proceeds with a systematic attitude, explaining the rules of an actual culinary system in order to transform the one adopted by the believers of the Lutheran community. Her proposal implies a judgement of their habits, which she wants to modify to make the pious Lutherans achieve her idea of optimal form in physical and moral terms. On the contrary, Primo e Secondo proceed stigmatizing the behaviour of their culinary diners, accusing them of being "Philistines" while blaming their demands for *deformation* of Italian culinary canon. In turn, Harry, the social worker who is charged to take care of Robbie in the movie *The Angels' Share*, does not act against him as the other people do, that is blaming on him. Harry assumes towards Robbie an attitude of encouragement aimed at ensuring that he comply his lifestyle to that of the majority considered normal. Finally, Rémy acts relieving his diner (Ego) of responsibility, not asking him to engage directly in the venture of change. Rémy just ask Ego to act on his behalf: the ratatouille prepared at the end of the film has exactly this task, realizing the transformation of Anton Ego from outside, despite the initial scepticism and despite the pot presents itself as very ordinary and traditional.

Here therefore a new scheme:

Babette (prescription) FORM	Primo and Secondo (stigma) DEFORMATION
	<i>Body image</i>
Robbie (encouragement) CONFORMATION	Rémy (facultativity) TRANSFORMATION

This model is likewise archetypal and applicable to other culinary films. A leader suggests a *form* when the attitude taken towards the quest for a change is connected to an explicit duty.

What is being done is a change of *form of alimentation*, which implies a reformulation of the statute of what is health and welfare. So does Babette, prescribing her diners a shift in the way they eat. Even though only for a limited time, she radically changes the idea of health and moral correctness of her diners. The idea of *deformation* focuses on the stigma of eating behaviours, which are deemed improper. The other is accused of being deviant, claimed as a warped subject both physically (obesity, disease) and morally. Primo e Secondo think their fellow Americans as individuals without any food culture, stigmatizing their behaviours and accusing them of being sinners. Similarly proceed films like *Super Size Me* (2004). They show the symptom: obesity as a cause of an improper alimentary conduct. The regime of *conformation* may be recognized in case the person who promotes the change proceeds without indicating an obligation but rather encouraging diners to take charge of their diet. In this case we have a reference to exact standards and desired behaviours, converging on which the diner will gain an advantage. This is the case of the attitude that Harry takes towards Robbie in *The Angels' Share* and that Robbie takes towards his fellows: changing behaviour is desired but not mandatory.

Last, there's the *transformation*, which has to do with the attitude of who raises up the diner any liability in the process of changing and delegates the action of change to a drug or a plate. It is the policy of Rémy, who entrusts his culinary, political and existential message, to the rata-touille who will act on his behalf, shaking deep inside the feelings of the critic Anton Ego.

4. Degrees of pleasure

At this point, the existential core which articulates these groups, their competition and the emergence of rival leaderships, must be investigated. Many films, as noticed, face the issue of food as a sensory experience, responding to the problem of its so called "ice age" brought by the industrial society or particularly radical religious regimes. Cinema represents an elegy to the rediscovery of the flavour and loves to tell stories of liberation from a diet meant as too rigid in the name of a culinary gumption disavowed. The level of *æsthesia* everyone would indulge to accept becomes a fundamental parameter of the culinary narrative. Culinary movies are part of the massive movement of revaluation of the body, churning heroes who, just to bring their message to humanity, are not afraid to challenge the authority.

Now, though most of these films – *Babette*, *Chocolat*, *I Am Love* and many others - points to the reconstruction of a right balance between soul (awareness, control) and body (sensory, passion). Other stories meet this same *glaciation*, focusing on the opposite excess indicating two possible solutions: repenting (this is the case of *9 and 1/2 weeks*) or, instead, succumb to the pleasure as in the case of *La Grande Bouffe*. It is worth to note that such framework is also able to include films that make use of food as a device of eroticism. Such a direction is explicable within the macro-movement just described to *æsthesia* from *anæsthesia*.

Schematically:

Alimentary Industry		Cinema culinario	<i>Nove settimane e mezzo</i>	<i>La grande abbuffata</i>
ANÆSTHESIA	IPOÆSTHESIA	ÆSTHESIA	IPERÆSTHESIA	DEFLAGRATION
DISFORIA		EUFORIA	DISFORIA	
				

In very few cases this attitude is reversed: a recent example is *The Great Beauty* (2013) that targets the attitude of Catholic *gourmandise* against the example of holiness of Sister Maria, who

shocks, in her exceptionality, the members of the elite group of the Roman high society protagonist of the story.

<i>The Great Beauty</i>		Culinary Cinema
ANÆSTHESIA	IPOÆSTHESIA	ÆSTHESIA
EUFORIA		DISFORIA
←		

Æsthesia must not be confused with gluttony, to the extent that gluttony is related to *anæsthesia*, direct outcome of the industrial production: if it is true, as Linguini in *Ratatouille* says, that every good gourmand can only be a tad overweight, fatties bear the sign of bulimia, which is functional to the industrial production. Gluttons aren't able to distinguish critically flavours: they just eat everything. Many films take up the issue, including famous works like *Super Size Me* (2004) or the more recent *Cloudy with a Chance of Meatballs* (2009).

There is one last notation, which has to do with culinary heroes hitherto met: the fact of being unexpected, marginal, unpredicted. As if to say that culinary culture transcends everyone, everyone may get a gastronomic training, capitalizing on the network of relationships highly informal yet fully operational handed down in a given domestic culture. This wealth of knowledge is only marginally integrated into the system of formal education. Its transmission comes naturally *convivial*, based on the logic of the gift. *Anyone can cook*, the slogan repeated in the fiction by chef Gusteau means, then, even above all, this: everyone has the background able to activate this heritage but only some will be worthy interpreters of it. When this happens, we add, there's nothing more to do but joining the miracle of the cookery, which includes, affiliates and positions us in the world.

5. Notes on sources

Many are the titles that have been investigating the delicate relationship between cinema and food. See Bouwler (2004), Keller (2006), Cramer et. al. (2011), Frye & Bruner (2012). In Italy, Giorgioni, Pontiggia & Ronconi (2002), Lapertosa (2002), Termine (2009) and Colombo & D'Aloia (2014). Fundamental is, moreover, the contribution of Bragaglia (2002), who proposes a systematization of the historical-anthropological issues raised by the seventh art in relation to food.

The notion of "thought experiment" is derived from the philosophy of science (Kuhn, 1977) which thinks the notion of experiment not only in reference to actual tests done by scientists in the laboratory but also as a preventive moment of validation of any theory. Before proceeding to the laboratory test, every theory must overcome a number of virtual testing, of "thought experiments" that scientists do during their theoretical definition's activities. Such a practice can exclude most of incorrect assumptions, leaving the laboratory test the final say on the theoretical validation. Thanks to the reformulation of Marrone (1995) the notion of "thought experiment" is assimilated in the semiotic theory, identifying the exemplary value that the stories carry with them, useful to position the reader to the problem raised by them ("If I were in the shoes of that character, what would I do?"). Each story, thus, can be considered as a process of articulation of a given problem and its possible outcomes. These outcomes are function of programs of action and passionate reactions, structuring in this way a real narrative "common sense".

The movie *Babette's Feast*, based on a story by Karen Blixen (=Dinesen), has been studied by myself (Mangiapane, 2013), in addition to Appelbaum (2011) and Marrone (2014a). *Big Night*

has been analyzed by Visalli (2010).

The model of analysis of political affiliation in groups is by Landowski (1997), while mine is the recognition of the most popular political theories (Inculturation, Segregation, Melting Pot and Salad Bowl) in the types he identified. The idea of using the mode of “must-do” as a tool for reconstruction of the body image is of Boutaud (2013).

The reference to Conviviality, as revolutionary practice and anti industrial is to the work of Ivan Illich (1973).

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TOWARD A SEMIOTICS OF FOOD QUALITY: PERSPECTIVES AND INTERPRETATIVE CHALLENGES

Giacomo Festi
Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti, Milano, Italy
giacomo.festi@gmail.com)

Abstract

The history of the ways in which food has been valorized finds in the quality one of the most common forms of promotional meaning in modern times (for instance, see Stanzani 2005). If semiotics is interested in exploring questions about food quality, often reduced to a generic synonym of value, it should point out the semantic elasticity of the term. On one side, the quality signified the alliance with the techno-science and its networks of measure (cfr. Callon, Méadel e Rabeharisoa 2000), becoming connected with quantity or performance (constituting an essential pivot in the identity differentiation of food products), on the other side it was always close with the elective values of excellence and absolute singularity, turn away even from the possibility of comparison (cfr. Teil 2004). The quality in the food processing, in an analogous way, oscillate between the qualitative standards (think about the different ISO) and the singularity of certain productions, given by the sum of heterogeneous components (the climate, the local history, the treatments, etc.), as in the case of Slow Food presidia.

In our communication, beyond the mapping of different discursive dynamics of quality, which are rhetorical and then socio-cultural (for a first enquiry, see Festi 2013), we will try to show the way quality has been treated by marketing and promotional communication: the strong asymmetry in the competence between producers and consumers, finds in the quality a particularly relevant evidence, asking for further doses of education of the consumer in order to make more recognizable the different qualities, appreciated and fully valorized, finally reducing the constitutive distance between the world of production and the world of consumption.

1. Approaching quality from a semiotic point of view

In order to introduce a semiotic perspective about quality, it is emblematic to start looking at

the following old print advertisement proposed by Coca Cola in the late 40s (1947). The value “quality” is explicit here and appears along with a representation of the factory and of the assembly line that metaphorically connects the space of production with the external space where the viewer/consumer is supposed to be.



Fig. 1: Cola Cola advertisement (1947).

The industry is the source of quality, and the continuity justifying the quality is the ongoing movement of the assembly line, i.e. the serial production that becomes here a continuous space connecting the two poles of the communication. This print ad is interesting since it displays a specific semantic of quality that dramatically changed over the years. Today quality as a value is still at the center of our world of promotion inside the food domain, but the industry is what need to be hidden, becoming a kind of representational taboo. Nowadays, the same brand Coca Cola is creating a fictive imagery of the factory as a magic place, where each bottle is unique and the result of an adventure full of indetermination which is the very contrary of the serial production. Each conclusion of the process, in an international and popular commercial of 2006 (significantly called the “happiness factory”), recreate an autographic version of the bottle and is celebrated by a parade, charging with exceptionality what can be a daily consumption. The term itself, quality, hardly appears, eventually in the packaging, but transformed in one of the many facets of quality, for instance the information about the quantity of sugar or calories. The quality does not depend explicitly from the serial production, but is more and more immanent to the product itself. Finally, we would like to take seriously our old print advertisement, as a suggestion to reconnect quality to industry, to retrace the threads of a chain of production that is also a chain of meaning production.

This research on quality is part of a wider survey touching the macro-values of food inside communication practices. Along with taste and sustainability, quality is a lasting value inside the food domain and our general and driving questions are: why quality can be interesting for

semiotics and for semiotics of food especially? Which theoretical aspects can be touched when we consider this very general form of valorization?

Quality displays an intrinsic semiotic dimension since is always mediated: we could even say that it perfectly exemplifies the idea of an intangible meaning being elsewhere. Sometimes this invisibility depends on an existential requirement (“something is present inside the product”) that exactly problematizes the conversion into an actual experience: i.e. how to recognize and eventually appreciate that quality? Not surprisingly, quality is often inaccessible to the direct perception of the consumer (like in the case of the chemical qualities of a product). The signs of quality used inside communication point then to other spaces and other social domains¹.

Quality is also part of a general landscape of multiple food values, a range of possibilities that are semiotically linked to different general scenarios of implementation of those values: while taste is stressing the actual perception, an embodied relationship between the object and the subject, sustainability is connecting the subject/object relationship to the destiny of the environment and also of human groups, assuming the ethical aim at its core. Quality, on the contrary, seems to isolate or separate the object from the subject in order to introduce a cognitive dimension of knowledge about the identity of the object. We could have hence the confrontation between an *esthetic* value, the taste, with an *ethic* value, sustainability, to end with a *critical* value, the quality². Nevertheless, things are more complex, as we will try to demonstrate.

In the very popular square of the values of consumption proposed by Floch (1990, ch. 6), the quality, always connected to price and not really having a proper autonomy, is located among the critical values, as negation of utopian or existential values, since the cognitive aspect of comparison is dominant. It is true that the semantics of quality demonstrates first of all the quest for explicit parameters in order to evaluate the quality itself: the critical knowledge involves the possibility to compare different productions, at least inside the same category. Quality, this is the first feature we would like to point out, signals the alliance between industry and hard science. In this sense, it has always been coupled with quantity. The quality becomes a value if it can be measured in order to assess the performance of a product or of a production. The value quality involves always a form of delegated sanction that objectifies the product passing through the mediation of a third, whether it be another authoritative subject or the knowledge itself, what supports the rhetoric of the trust of the final consumer.

On the other side, quality witnesses immediately the projection of a system of values, an *axiology*, introducing the opposition between high quality and low quality, or between presence or absence of quality³. Affirming the quality of something means sometimes, immediately, underlying the high quality.

Each specific quality evoked inside a promotional discourse activates a *referential dimension*, following the analysis of the scientific writing made by Greimas (1983). The quality pretends to be “quality of something”, under a certain relevance, but this cross-reference is not only pointing to other discourses but also to an universe of practices and relationships among different social domains. Industrial food quality, we could say, is such if it could overcome the proofs of science, medicine and law, before arriving inside communication and marketing. The quality is what passes through domains, is the residual that survived to the multiplicity of interests and heterogeneous perspectives. Quality is a kind of compromise that virtually contains struggles, tensions, challenges. The text of Alessandro Stanziani (2005) about the history of quality in France widely demonstrates this stratification of aspects. All the rhetoric of the quality of wine, for instance, arose in the second part of the XIX Century, following a period of crisis in the market with the massive introduction of chemistry inside the production and the new possibilities of falsification of the product itself. A strong questioning about the identity of wine required the different actors involved in the chain of production to establish more rules.

The law of 1905 closed a long period of debate and conflicts about wine definition. We could say that a *veridictive* question arose, establishing what was a genuine or a fake wine, and the term quality, at the end, covered all the negotiations about the re-determination of the identity of the product. As a consequence of this way to consider quality, we could potentially determine different networks of quality, with different rhetorical strength, at least if we were sociologist of science practices.

Not surprisingly, it is quite evident the gap existing between the studies in the sociology of the markets and their interest about quality issues⁴, and the relative absence of semiotic reflection about this topic. From one side, a debate around the definition of quality is widely present inside sociology, with a proposed theoretical solution that can be semiotically appreciated, the idea of studying the processes of qualification of products⁵. Quality, then, is the big engine of differentiation in modern markets, but it can work only if the industry creates the alliance with the socio-technical networks responsible of assessing, evaluating and measure the pretended quality. From the other side, the semiotic one, we clearly miss structured works, using specific corpora in order to explore this topic more in depth.

2. Four discursive regimes for quality

This is not the place to open a general semantic discussion about the canonical economic definitions of quality that could be find in any marketing manual: in their diversity, one common element is the matching always stable between the needs of the consumer and the characteristics of the product. This perfect coupling is, on the contrary, an open semiotic issue, since a meaning elaboration is always supposed as a relevant mediation in the subject/object relationship. We could on the contrary switch to the observation on how quality is treated inside different discourses and practices that deal with food. From a discursive perspective, quality appears at least under four different regimes of meanings, which we will try to characterize as follow:

i) Quality seems first of all connected to the respect of certain rules of production which are forms granting a general identity of the output of the process. In continuity with the institutional and law domain, the food supply need some qualitative standards, especially in the perspective of food safety. Quality as standard thematizes the adherence to a system of constrictions, often highly procedural, as in the case of the different formal systems of quality (see the ISO). The syntax of the process is what matters, the shape of the process being more relevant than the contents that are treated. The value, then, switches to the identity of the operations and, extensively, on the subject/ producer that is responsible for that. The process as such is already a form of abstraction: the input and the output count less than the operations. From another point of view, what prevails is an algorithmic logic, where the production is the manifestation of a type, an ideal form. We can call this first case of figure, the normative or *grammaticalized* quality.

ii) A second meaning of quality is exemplified by the technical policies of production (*disciplinari* in Italian), for instance in the case of the Slow Food presidia. In that case, the difference with the standard procedures is the fact that the quality depends on a praxis settled over time, which is of course codified, but where the codification keeps memory of all the heterogeneity of the traditional aspects of the production process. It is about a testimonial quality, connecting an identity to a specific past, historically hence culturally determined. The kind of knowledge introducing norms pretends to mirror historically attested praxis more than imposing new forms of process depending on a certified knowledge. We can call this second figure, *praxeological* or *typified* quality.


iii) A third case of figure depends on the refusal of already existing norms, introducing new evaluative parameters. The quality in this case becomes part of a process of innovation or of redetermination of the identities of products, first of all from a cognitive point of view. It's about

the re-opening of a dispute about the identities, amplifying the expressive possibilities on the basis of new knowledge or on the inedited projection of knowledge created in a field, into another one. An example of this kind of new quality is the extension of the wine system of cru into another field of production, like honey, which was done by Mieli Thun in Italy, a clear attempt to redefine and refine the complexity of a tasting object like honey.


Of course, the search of a new quality faces the problem of re-qualifying the consumer. This kind of quality, which constitute a movement forward, that anticipates the contact with the consumer, can be called “designed”, or *redesigned*, in order to emphasize the attempt to reconfigure inter-identity relationships. Indeed, the project of enhancing a quality requires formative or educational strategies for the consumer. If the producer is not considering this necessary moment, foreshadowing possible couplings, the operation risks to remain under-perceived.

iv) In the last case of figure, quality is played as singularity, as a sum of specificities. The quality as exceptionality of something is the very contrary of grammar. It can be a local product, specific, layered, that reinvents nature-culture relationships in its own. As a contrary of grammar, here the concept of text as singularity is what counts, following also the idea of autography proposed by Goodman (1968). This quality, as singular, is *textualized*⁶. Products and production practices that are part of this niche, individuate a ground of possibilities, that not necessarily is inside a circuit of rationalization of practices or ingredients that constitute its specificity. The case of the *terroir* in the field of wine can be taken as an example. Each terroir is singular and the reflexive movement of explanation of its constituent is never ending⁷.

We could resume these four meanings in a square of oppositions, articulating in this way the different interpretations of quality.



Moreover, we could move toward a tensive representation of these positions, slightly different, but probably more interesting, since we can realize a topological representation, a mapping, that starts from continuous valences. The problem, in that case, is the interpretation of the two axes of control. From one side we should have the degree of heterogeneity in the relations involved along the process of determination of the value (the opposition being between /restricted/ vs. /extended/ or /uniqueness/ vs. /multiplicity/). The extension is hence concerning the comparison as a form of rationalization. From the other side, on the contrary, we find the intensity of differentiation, more or less tonic. The oscillation between the quality as conformity and the quality as specification, already present in literature, is better represented in this second semantic representation.



The contrast between the two main meanings of quality finds here a form of translation and reinterpretation: excellence is a model that insists on singularity whose limit is the subtraction of the object from the comparability itself (like in the models of valorization of the luxury products¹), while the conformity ends to be indifferent to the product in favor of the process, which can be participated by other producers.

3. Quality inside advertisement

If the general model of quality informed the world of production, the internal logic of organization of industries and factories and the quest for innovation and differentiation, the arrival of quality inside the domain of the communication seems to be a kind of derivation. This is probably one of the reasons why quality has not been really considered an interesting field of analysis, as a pale reflection of what happened elsewhere. Nevertheless, we can observe the different forms of translation of quality inside promotional communication.

Sketching a typology of the different strategies of communication, we start with the most adopted solution, the *certification*, that exactly imagines the object as the result of a performance of production, already sanctioned by a third social actor and then trustful. The presence of a label on the packaging is typically the textual element that points to and assures the quality claim of the product.

The focus on the sanction can change in what we can call the descriptive model, where the reasons of quality are argued, as an attempt to work on the competence of the consumer. But sometimes, in this process of derivation, quality becomes a kind of empty rhetorical device used only to point out a difference, hence a value, without any further explanation, without any specific label. This is a sort of dead-point, the degradation of the quality model inside communication.

On the other side, considering the requalification of the same value, quality can become an attractor around which imagining a whole form of life, what represents an effective promotion of the value. We had occasion to work on a corpus of print advertisements of Eataly, the Italian store of high quality food products, where quality is the absolute protagonist also in communication, with a lot of facets. In the following couple of print advertisements, the movement toward a form of life seems to us more evident.

NON SIAMO ANCORA SODDISFATTI

LA QUALITÀ NON HA LIMITI

ABBIAMO CERCATO CIBI ANCORA MIGLIORI

ABBIAMO CERCATO SOLUZIONI PER LIMITARE I NOSTRI ERRORI

CI SFORZAMO DI ESSERE PIÙ PREPARATI E DISPONIBILI

ABBIAMO INVENTATO PIATTI ANCORA PIÙ SANI E GUSTOSI

POSSIAMO MIGLIORARE

VENITE A VEDERE SE CI SIAMO RIUSCITI.

DEDICATO A CHI PREFERISCE CIÒ CHE METTE DENTRO IL PROPRIO CORPO, RISPETTO A CIÒ CHE NE STA FUORI.

MANGIARE CIBI DI QUALITÀ CI AIUTA A VIVERE MEGLIO PIÙ DI OGNI ALTRA COSA.

CONVIENE SCEGLIERE I PRODOTTI MIGLIORI. VARIARE OGNI GIORNO E NON MANGIARE MOLTO.

EATALY IN QUESTO VI PUÒ AIUTARE

GLI EVENTI DI PRIMAVERA DA EATALY

IL 25 APRILE SIAMO CHIUSI

IL 1 MAGGIO SIAMO CHIUSI

TUTTI GLI ALTRI GIORNI SIAMO APERTI

EATALY

Fig. 2: Two print advertisements by Eataly.

The first one says: “We are not satisfied. Quality has no limits. We looked after even better food, (etc.)”. Quality is grasped as imperfect from an aspectual point on view (“no limits”), what requires an always activated subject, in search of new qualities, hence a refined modern subject. That driving dimension of quality is shared between the producer, the distributor and the consumer, being a crossing valorization but only in the form of life perspective. The second one is more centered on the consumer: “Dedicated to who prefers what puts inside his body rather than what remains outside”. The search for quality seems immediately to foreshadow an axiology that depends on filtering values (the refinement of the food choice), a pathemic disposition (curiosity and generic passion for food), a rhythm (regular intervals), a modal dimension (combining *wanting to* with *knowing*), etc. All the semiotic levels of organization of contents are affected by this “coherent deformation” (Greimas 1993), that defines a form of life.

4. The power of quality

As a consequence of this approach, moving toward a conclusion, we realize that a dialectic between the production of qualities and the communication of them is effective. This inevitable tension permits us to detect four phenomena that we will briefly comment. First of all, inside the quality paradigm of industry, all the strategies of falsification, sophistication or adulteration of quality becomes possible. Since the communicative gap is present, all the uses of signs in order to lay are possible, and the progressive complexification of the controls is paralleled by the inventiveness of the forgers. Secondly, we should reflect about the statute of certain kind of discourses or knowledge involved in a quality assessment, that impact on the strength of certain webs of quality. For instance, the science of nutrition can be highly controversial, following

a kind of Latour characterization of scientific practices², at least since it structurally depends, more and more, on lifestyles, which are intrinsically introducing a semantic and axiological dimension.

A third observation is that quality in communication can disappear in favor of a constellation of other values which are *avatars* of the quality model: freshness, genuineness, organoleptic contents, nutritional aspects, nutraceutical components, food safety. Beside these different determinations and denominations, the common aspect is exactly the alliance between socio-technical webs of measurement and the industry. Quality can be indefinitely specified through many descriptors that become values in their own.

As a last point, since quality is mainly about the rational organization of the domain of production, we could say that it tried to cannibalize the two other big forms of valorization of food, taste and sustainability, which seemed both to resist to the quality model for different reasons, creating a growing destabilization for the actors of the food market. Taste involves a phenomenological and hence embodied experience of the product, a strongly qualitative experience. Nevertheless, the development of sensorial analysis created the background for the imitation of a scientific approach, capable of determining or of giving a scientific-like representation of taste³. More and more, we see spider schemas or scales of value with specific taste descriptors appearing on the packaging of certain products (coffee and tea are leading examples of this phenomenon). Tasting quality, then, tends to be reconfigured inside the pure quality model, while audiovisual advertisement, on the contrary, faces the problem of using its own language (mainly audiovisual) to translate the invisible tasting experience, in order to promote and enhance it, as a subjective event. On the other side, the quality model is stressed by the value sustainability, which immediately poses the problem of denying the autonomy of the product, putting it in relationship with the environment (also pushing more democratic instances inside the life of the enterprises, for instance giving more weight to the stakeholders). Sustainability pretends to activate a reference to ethics, an ethical system of production that enters in relationship with the future generations, what can hardly be measured as required inside the quality systems. The narrative of the achievement, as a consequence, is substituted by the narrative of the engagement and challenge.

Nevertheless, starting from the early appearance of the discourses about sustainability, the concept of “environmental quality” was developed during the 70s⁴, exactly with the intention of mapping all the relationships a product could interweave with the environment. A quality, furthermore, no more immanent to the product, but already relational, like in the case of taste quality. Many indexes of the impact of the product on the environment were then developed, like the life cycle assessment (LCA) and today we count many institutions that try to certify sustainable productions. That said, can we really label ethics? The price to pay to this quality approach toward sustainability is the substantial disappearance of the ethical dimension and the reduction of sustainability only to the environmental aspects, largely avoiding the socio-cultural dimension. The phenomenological tasting body from one side and the holistic perspective on the environmental issues from the other side, which were supposed to erode the historical dominance of the quality model, have to face the adaptive and masking power of this highly semiotic dispositive of communication which is quality.

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(Endnotes)

¹ On this point, see Stanziani (2006) and Peri (2006).

² For these three denominations, we thank Pierluigi Basso Fossali (personal communication), who also suggested to replace the critical values with the expression esthetical values, adopting in this case a meaning more related to the philosophical tradition of the term (as a linguistically driven and articulated platform of categories).

³ This aspect is clearly evidenced in the voice “Quality” by Milne (2013), inside a dictionary of food words.

⁴ I refer here in particular to what is more close to a semiotic sight, the works of Michel Callon (2000), who was one of the creator of the expression “economies of quality” and also protagonist of the “quality turn” (see Milne 2013).

⁵ See in particular Harvey, McMeekin & Ward (2004: 192–194).

⁶ The opposition between grammaticalized and textualized cultures has also to be referred to the conceptualization of Lotman & Uspenskij (1975).

⁷ An in-depth discussion on this point is present in Teil (2011).

⁸ We refer here to the sociological characterization of luxury made by Teil (2004).

⁹ See for instance Latour (1987).

¹⁰ See Méadel & Rabeharisoa (2001).

¹¹ See for instance *The Journal of Environmental Quality*, that started officially in 1972.

LE PARADOXE DU VIN SELON LES VOYAGEURS OCCIDENTAUX

Mohamed Bernoussi
Université de Meknès, Morocco
barnoussim@ymail.com

Abstract

From the Middle Age to nineteenth century, wine constitutes a real headache for Westerners travelers visiting Muslim's land. These travelers knew that Islam had prohibited wine in all those societies, but they noticed at the same time how this drink was appreciated and consumed by people. This intricate situation gave rise in travel narratives to many discourses and fictions about the origin of wine's interdiction, Arabs' taste, Islam and pleasure, etc. The variety of discourses and scenarios about the taste of the other, in particular about wine interests us from an semio-cultural point of view; not only because all those forms of fiction give precious information on culinary prejudgments, but also because they reveal their proper culinary mythologies, in particular those concerning wine.

Introduction

Depuis quelques décennies¹, les études sur l'aliment se sont développées avec une vitesse surprenante. L'anthropologie, l'historiographie et la sémiotique ont montré diverses facettes de cet objet d'étude, non seulement pour comprendre le statut important qu'il occupe dans la construction de la *semiosis* sociale et interpersonnelle, mais son rôle déterminant dans la sémiosphère. Devenu un marqueur culturel de la plus haute importance, l'aliment révèle beaucoup de choses sur l'identité, la culture et la psychologie de l'autre. Seulement lorsqu'il s'agit d'une culture étrangère, la saisie de tous ces éléments devient problématique puisque faisant appel à des préjugés et à des stéréotypes qui mettent à nu aussi bien les préjugés sur l'autre, que ceux sur sa propre culture culinaire. D'un point de vue sémiotique, cette problématique nous intéresse car elle nous permet d'interroger les spécificités du discours culinaire sur l'autre, c'est-à-dire ses fables culinaires d'une part et d'autre part de comprendre comment les voyageurs occidentaux construi-

saient leur propre mythologie culinaire, particulièrement celle du vin.

Cette saisie embarrassée et brouillée se trouve en même temps, et c'est un des buts de cet article, tributaire du contexte historique et de l'évolution du récit de voyage, support discursif choisi ici pour étudier cette saisie. La thématique du vin dans les récits de pèlerinage, la chronique historique, la relation ou le récit de voyage sous sa forme laïque et désormais moderne, se décline à chaque fois de façon différente, faisant parler à la fois sa bibliothèque de référence et la tension entre sa propre saisie et les références de son époque.

L'objet de cette étude est de retracer brièvement les différentes saisies de la semiosis du vin dans le récit de voyage sous ses multiples formes ainsi que les codes avoués ou implicites à l'œuvre et qui révèlent comment cette dernière est au carrefour d'une série de thématiques sur l'Islam, le christianisme, la jouissance, le plaisir, le corps, l'autre et soi.

Depuis la littérature religieuse, comme exemples la *Bible* et le *Coran*, l'aliment s'est imposé comme véritable topos littéraire. Le récit de voyage a été pendant longtemps influencé par cette littérature où l'aliment est d'abord et avant toute chose le vecteur d'une identité religieuse. Mary Douglas (1966) a été dans ce domaine une pionnière puisqu'elle a, à travers son œuvre, révélé les ressorts sémantiques de cette construction de l'identité religieuse, et souvent donc de l'identité tout court, par l'interdit culinaire. Rappelons ici son explication de l'interdit culinaire chez les hébraïques qui fonctionne plus comme marqueur d'une identité et d'une volonté de démarcation par rapport à toute forme d'altérité.

Le récit de voyage a reproduit pendant plusieurs siècles le modèle religieux, en essayant de s'en émanciper depuis le Moyen Âge jusqu'au XVI^e siècle. En effet, les thèmes dominants dans les récits de croisade ou dans les récits de pèlerinage sont la nourriture comme moyen soit de dénigrement et de guerre contre les sarrasins, soit comme motif de célébration d'une identité catholique fondée essentiellement sur la présence bienveillante du Dieu chrétien – thème de la manne et du miracle culinaire – ou des valeurs de charité et de partage propres à la communauté catholique. Les récits qui suivent vont plus ou moins s'émanciper de ce modèle catholique pour inaugurer une nouvelle vision et une nouvelle approche du culinaire de ce que mange et boit l'autre et de la façon de se l'expliquer.

À l'aube des grandes explorations géographiques, de la Renaissance et d'autres bouleversements culturels et socio-économiques, l'Europe découvre la différence, l'altérité sous ses multiples formes. La littérature n'échappe pas non plus à ce séisme. Dans les récits de voyage du XV^e siècle, l'intérêt que commence à avoir l'autre n'est pas sans susciter quelques curiosités, voire quelques angoisses, et ce à cause de plusieurs mœurs culinaires qu'on n'arrive ni à comprendre ni à expliquer. Une de celles-ci concerne le vin. C'est un produit qui intrigue beaucoup les voyageurs de cette époque, car inscrit dans un nœud inextricable de contradictions et créant ce que l'on peut qualifier de paradoxe du vin. Dans son journal daté du XV^e siècle, Louis de Rochechouart raconte cette scène anecdotique certes, mais combien emblématique du sujet qui nous intéresse :

Au moment de l'offertoire, le père gardien² nous fit de nombreuses recommandations. Tout d'abord il a absous ceux qui étaient rentrés en terre sainte sans licence pontificale, ensuite il nous a exhortés à l'amour fraternel... en troisième lieu, concernant les périls rencontrés habituellement par les pèlerins, il allait de soi que nous devions nous déplacer tous ensemble en prenant garde à nos bourses, et que nous devions cacher notre vin, parce que les Sarrasins l'apprécient beaucoup. (Louis de Rochechouart 1997 [1461] : 1139).

L'anecdote fait sourire, mais elle est révélatrice d'un sujet qui intrigue les voyageurs de cette époque. Le vin, une boisson très prisée chez les Arabes, les intrigue. Ils ne comprennent pas la clandestinité de cette boisson, ni son succès, malgré la surveillance renforcée au niveau des portes des villes et malgré les mesures punitives contre quiconque en boit ou en possède. La

recherche des causes de ce phénomène révèle tour à tour et de manière paradoxale une volonté de comprendre et la tentation irrésistible de bestialiser l'autre. Dans la relation de Louis de Rochechouart, on peut lire :

Les Sarrasins qui habitent en Syrie, en Egypte, en Berbérie et jusqu'à l'Asie Mineure sont des gens bestiaux. Ils servent la loi de Mahomet et le Coran. Cependant contrairement à leur loi, ils boivent du vin, j'en ai vu plusieurs le faire, quand ils n'ont pas de vin, ils font bouillir des raisins qu'ils ont en grande abondance, et avec lesquels ils font un assez bon vin. (Ibidem : 1165).

Le vin continue d'intriguer autant par le rapport paradoxal que les dits Sarrasins entretiennent avec cette boisson, que par l'interdit qui le frappe. Les voyageurs ne comprennent pas le sens de cet interdit et tentent de trouver des explications dans les histoires colportées à ce sujet. C'est l'occasion de recourir au niveau de l'intertextualité à des *topoi* de manuscrits trouvés, d'histories colportées qui tournent autour de l'interdiction du vin par Mahomet. Toutes ces histoires sont des variations sur un même thème : piégé par le vin Mahomet décide de ne plus en boire ; des moines jaloux décident de se débarrasser de lui en le faisant boire et une fois ivre, lui subtilisent son épée, tuent quelqu'un avec, la remettent à sa place et lui font croire que c'est lui le coupable :

Mahomet prit son épée, la tira du fourreau et la vit ensanglantée. Il crut donc qu'il était vrai qu'il avait tué le moine. Aussitôt il prononce la promesse de ne plus jamais boire du vin, ni lui ni les autres païens. Et ainsi ils s'en gardent par peur, mais non par dévotion : là où ils en trouvent, ils s'y noient. (Emmanuel Piloti 1997 [1420] : 1243).

Une autre légende relative à l'interdiction du vin réactive une vieille histoire de façon un peu hasardeuse attribuée à Mahomet en mobilisant deux personnages célèbres de la littérature populaire arabo-musulmane. Il s'agit de Haruth et Maruth, deux personnages réputés pour leur maîtrise absolue de la magie noire. La forme de cette histoire est un peu laborieuse, mais à cette époque on ne s'embarrassait pas de lourdeurs ni de digressions ; nous en reproduisons ici une partie pour son intérêt historique et pour sa valeur symptomatique du retour du préjugé religieux :

La raison pour laquelle ce porc de Mahomet a interdit le vin se trouve dans la Doctrine de Mahomet. Il y avait deux anges, Baroth et Maroth, envoyés par Dieu sur terre pour gouverner et instruire le genre humain. Ils interdirent trois choses, tuer, juger injustement, boire du vin. Au bout de quelque temps, ces deux anges parcoururent le monde entier et une femme d'une très grande beauté vint les trouver. Elle était en procès avec son mari et invita les anges à dîner pour qu'ils soutinssent sa cause. Ils acceptèrent. Elle apporta avec les plats des coupes de vin, leur en offrit, insista pour qu'ils en prisent. Que dire de plus ? Vaincus par la malice de cette femme, ivres, ils acceptèrent de révéler ce qu'elle leur demandait, que l'un lui apprit les paroles qui leur permettaient de descendre du ciel et l'autre celles qui leur permettaient d'y remonter. Quand elle les sut, elle monta aussitôt au ciel. A son arrivée, Dieu fit son enquête et fit d'elle Lucifer, la plus belle des étoiles, comme elle avait été la plus belle des femmes. Quant aux anges, Dieu les convoqua et leur demanda de choisir entre un châtement en ce monde, ou dans l'autre. Ils choisirent ce monde et furent jetés, tête la première, attachés à des chaînes, dans le puits du diable où ils resteront jusqu'au jour du jugement. Voilà ce que raconte ce faussaire, fils aîné du démon. (Symon Semeonis 1997 [1330] : 979)

Le thème du vin, plus précisément du vin interdit dans la culture de l'autre, permet ici de stabiliser une culture du vin propre aux voyageurs. Derrière la condamnation et les insultes, le vin se profile comme un marqueur culturel. Il permet de parler implicitement d'une culture du vin où la modération, le sens et le sacré sont présents, en parlant explicitement ou en feignant des prosopopées pour condamner une autre culture du vin faite de démesure, d'hypocrisie et de non-sens. La référence implicite de ce discours de vérité sur le vin reste d'abord et avant toute chose liée à la référence cénique. Le vin reste lié à Jésus Christ et c'est pour cela que lorsque nos

voyageurs tentent d'en parler dans la culture de l'autre, ils le lient directement à Mahomet. Ce qui est mis en avant dans ces explications, c'est plutôt la peur de ne pas se contrôler et de commettre des erreurs que l'on regrettera sûrement. Ce qui est sous-entendu, c'est que le vin est chez l'autre synonyme de dépravation, d'ignominie et d'absence de contrôle. Le discours sur le vin du voyageur occidental cache en filigrane un discours sur deux choix religieux. Ce discours procède par épuration et par exclusion. Epuration dans la mesure où il sous-entend deux représentations du vin : le modèle chrétien ouvertement assumé mais protégé par l'origine sacrée - la cène- et dans lequel cette boisson symbolise le sacrifice et le don de soi opposé au modèle musulman³ qui est un modèle refoulé non assumé et qui donne lieu à des écarts proches par leurs débauches et leurs débordements du modèle bachique.

Parallèlement à cette vision très imprégnée du modèle religieux, d'autres formes, cette fois-ci laïques font leur apparition. La description du culinaire se trouve façonnée par un nouveau regard posé sur l'autre. Si ce dernier ne fait plus l'objet d'appellatifs totalitaires ; ce qu'il mange subit le même affranchissement et se trouve librement appréhendé par le regard du voyageur. Les récits de cette époque évoquent aussi telle habitude culinaire relative à telle communauté, tel interdit culinaire relatif à la confession de telle autre, mais autorisée par une autre partie de la même communauté. Le même bouleversement affecte des topographies alimentaires bien ancrées pourtant. De lieu exclusivement chargé de réminiscences bibliques, Jérusalem devient le centre d'une altérité culinaire aussi riche qu'intrigante. Cela impose entre autres, parmi les conséquences immédiates, la relativité des rites et des interdits culinaires. On peut lire par exemple : « Les Grecs célèbrent la messe avec du pain et du levain...les Arméniens diffèrent peu des Latins...comme les Grecs, ils mangent de la viande seulement deux fois par an, le vendredi. » (Louis de Rochechouart 1997 [1461] : 1164).

« Les Druses habitent entre Rac et Beyrouth. Ils ne croient pas en Mahomet mais en l'Evangile et ne mangent pas la viande de porc ; on les appelle Sarrasins. Ils ont une religion secrète sur laquelle ils ne veulent pas s'étendre. Ils boivent du vin ouvertement. » (Ibidem 1164).

« Les Raphati habitent à côté du Liban, ne croient pas aux disciples de Mahomet, mais en Mahomet seul. Ils sont hostiles aux Sarrasins et ne mangent pas dans de la vaisselle. » (1164)

« Les Arabes habitent en Syrie, en Egypte, en Berbérie jusqu'en Asie Mineure de par et d'autres du Jourdain, et vivent comme des bêtes sauvages...ils vivent de rapine de lait de chamelle et de viande, sont couverts de vêtements l'été, ne boivent du vin d'aucune sorte. » (Ibidem 1165).

Ces quelques citations révèlent la variété des habitudes culinaires mais au-delà, la possibilité d'autres encyclopédies et d'autres visions, même si le préjugé continue d'opérer avec une force incroyable⁴.

Belon nous donne une idée précise de la Bière fabriquée en Turquie. En effet *la posca* est une boisson proche de la bière, et fort répandue dans les tavernes turques « c'est un breuvage blanc comme lait, épais et bien nourrissant, et entête beaucoup ceux qui en boivent par trop, jusqu'à les éni vrer ». Cette sorte de bière st faite d'orge et de millet et est peu coûteuse. Son mode de fabrication est assez simple, paraît-il, mais Belon ne nous dit rien sur le procédé de fermentation utilisé. On prend des graines d'orge ou de millet entières ou cassés qu'on fait cuire dedans une chaudière et on laisse cuire jusqu'à obtenir une pâte qu'on met dans de l'eau puis on laisse jusqu'à

obtenir une « bevette épaisse ».

A propos des boissons des Turcs, Galland souligne le paradoxe des Turcs qui ne font pas de vin chez eux, mais qui le prennent chez les Chrétiens. Ce qui est nouveau dans le discours sur le vin, c'est son aspect cosmopolite, qui ne s'attarde pas beaucoup sur le paradoxe du vin chez les Turcs, mais qui passe directement chez les autres communautés :

Les autres nations boivent du vin, et en quantité, aussi bien que de l'eau de vie, le vin se recueille du pays et la plupart des marchands achètent le raisin pour le faire eux-mêmes chez eux [...] les juifs ne boivent pas du vin fait par les Chrétiens –il faut qu'il soit fait par eux-mêmes chez eux – et disent que leurs Khacams ont été obligés de faire cette défense, tant à Smyrne qu'en d'autres lieux. (Galland 1997 [1678] : 148-149)

Chez les Turcs, les boissons les plus prisées sont donc le Cahvé et les cherbet, c'est-à-dire des sorbets à base de fruits, de glaces et d'épices et qui se déclinent en une impressionnante variété de parfums : on peut en faire à base de violettes, de roses et d'autres fleurs mais cela est réservé aux riches ; pour les pauvres on en fait en général à base de raisins secs. D'autres curiosités sont évoquées, notamment les types de conservations des grenades et les vertus thérapeutiques de la glace (voir Galland 1997 [1678] : 175).

C'est à partir du XVII^{ème} siècle que l'on remarque une évolution notoire dans la saisie du vin et ce grâce aux échanges économiques et à la découverte de nouvelles boissons telles que le café. Ces échanges économiques ont permis aux voyageurs, souvent de grands négociants issus de la bourgeoisie européenne naissante, de décrire et de parler de ce que mange et boit l'autre d'une façon nouvelle.

Lorsqu'on examine le récit de la première expédition de la compagnie des indes, on découvre un nouveau discours et de nouvelles références. Chez Laroque, auteur et initiateur de cette première expédition au Yémen, le café opère comme un médiateur idéologique, et se révèle en même temps comme un agent actif d'un imaginaire de l'indolence et de la profusion orientales, thèmes qui seront bien exploités tout au long du dix-huitième siècle. Mais ce n'est pas tout, deux aspects particuliers caractérisent ce discours : le premier concerne la construction de nouvelles valeurs idéologiques autour du café tels que la philanthropie et l'amour des hommes, le second, et c'est ce qui fait sa valeur au niveau des signifiés individuels, où le café est érigé contre le vin par l'auteur comme propice à la découverte de l'autre, tandis que le vin est consacré comme plutôt propice à la perfidie. C'est un cas intermittents dans les récits de voyage que celui de voir de nouveaux signifiés individuels remettre en question et invalider des signifiés socio-culturels aussi puissants et aussi bien établis que ceux attribués au vin.

Au XVIII^{ème} siècle par exemple, nous retrouvons d'autres récits de voyage qui se démarquent par un discours fantasmagorique⁵ sur la nourriture et sur la boisson de l'autre. Dans un récit comme celui de William Lemprière, médecin anglais ayant visité le harem et par la même occasion s'étant largement penché sur les mœurs culinaires marocaines, ce n'est pas tant le vin qui est mis en cause, mais c'est plutôt le fait de manger et de boire sans modération qui sont pointés du doigt. La fantasmagorie consiste à remarquer par exemple comment les Marocains boivent sans modération, le vin comme le thé, peu importe, et d'établir un lien grâce à l'enthymème entre cette absence de limite dans la façon de boire et l'absence de limite en ce qui concerne le sexe. Pour le médecin anglais, les Marocains tout comme le prince sont anéantis de débauche, car ils boivent beaucoup et cette situation augmente leur appétit sexuel. La répétition de la boisson favorise la répétition du plaisir sexuel. Le médecin ne nous explique pas comment ni pourquoi. Mais il semble avancer dans d'autres passages, sans établir de lien avec ce qui précède, que le désœuvrement est la cause première de cette frénésie pour la boisson, principalement le vin et le thé. Raisonnement antiémétique, mais aussi circulaire où la table conduit au lit et le lit à la table jusqu'à l'anéantissement.

Au XIX^{ème} siècle, siècle de l'expansionnisme européen en Afrique et en Asie, nous assistons au retour du discours totalitaire sur le vin, mais avec une particularité topographique. Le vin est étroitement lié à la description du ghetto juif et aux rapports entre Juifs et Marocains. L'évocation de ce lieu est lié au vin ou à l'alcool en général parce que les juifs étaient les seuls autorisés à le fabriquer et à le débiter selon la loi musulmane. Dans un texte comme celui des frères Teraud par exemple, ce qui est intéressant pour le voyageur, c'est la confrontation entre deux personnages et par la même occasion entre deux cultures du vin et de la boisson ; ici l'évocation du mellah et du vin se double de signifiés individuels propres au voyageur. Lorsque le voyageur évoque sa fréquentation des cabarets juifs et sa rencontre –distance– des autres clients, la forme de l'aveu et le ton intimiste ne sont pas les seuls à prendre en considération comme nous allons voir dans ce passage :

J'y ai passé moi aussi, bien des heures dans ce vermineux Mellah entraîné par le mystérieux attrait qu'exerce sur moi la vie juive. Un attrait au fond assez pareil à celui qui emporte les fassis vers le cabaret clandestin. Non pas que j'éprouve, comme lui, du goût pour la *maia*, qui n'est qu'un affreux tord-boyaux, ni que j'aie l'envie de séduire la femme du cabaretier, mais à moi aussi ce Mellah versait sa liqueur extravagante. (Les frères Teraud 1930 : 190)

L'aveu exprimé ici par le *je* énonciatif et par le *moi aussi*, de culpabilité, va au-delà du témoignage et focalise autour d'une boisson la *Maia*, sorte d'eau de vie produite exclusivement au Maroc par les juifs. La topographie alimentaire du Mellah prend ici des allures de paradis artificiels, de fleurs malades ou de plaisirs défendus et honteux. Pour une fois, le voyageur et le fassi se sentent proches, mais ce n'est qu'un détour, une rencontre éphémère. La concession introduite par *non pas* tient à spécifier qu'il ne s'agit pas des mêmes besoins ni des mêmes motifs ; l'enivrement, la soûlerie serait le mot juste, recherché par le fassi à travers cette boisson qualifiée de façon hautement péjorative (notons la redondance) « *affreux tord boyaux* » ; cet enivrement recherché par le fassi n'est pas le même que celui recherché par notre auteur, qui parle de façon métaphorique d'une sorte de « *liqueur extravagante* ». Notons par quel détour l'évocation du « *tord-boyaux* » appelé *maia* est fondatrice d'une morale où l'auteur spécifie que son enivrement n'a rien à voir avec celui du fassi dont il dénonce le côté immoral (se soûler avec du mauvais vin et séduire la femme du cabaretier), car il est d'un autre ordre, un ordre moins immoral, moins vulgaire, et plutôt intellectuel exprimé ici par « *attrait mystérieux* » et « *liqueur extravagante* ».

La morale du vin est exploitée aussi dans la description des soirées galantes organisées par quelques marocains libertins. C'est à travers l'histoire de sidi Feddoul, un riche seigneur fassi qui a dilapidé sa fortune à cause des *chikhats* et du vin, que la description de ces ambiances est introduite. La description est celle d'un dîner libertin bien arrosé avec « fillettes » et « promiscuité » :

Suivant la *Quaïda*, vers les neufs heures du soir, les négresses apportent une douzaine de bassins de cuivre, coiffés de capuchons de paille, sous lesquels se tiennent au chaud les couscous, les poulets et les ragoûts. Invités, musiciens, chirat tout le monde s'installe autour des tables basses, où les plats passent tour à tour. Quand les gens d'une table ont pris avec les doigts ce qui leur convenait, le plat est emporté à la table voisine, d'où il passe à une autre, et à une autre encore, jusqu'à ce qu'il ne reste plus rien [...]

Les fillettes font circuler le verre de vin à la ronde, en le faisant tinter d'abord contre leur boucle d'oreilles, dans ce geste rituel qui semble avoir pour effet de monter en alcool, et de plusieurs degrés, le breuvage épais et noir. Ah dans ces nuits de Fez, que devient la loi du prophète ? en voyant l'état frénétique où le vin jette tout ce monde, comme on comprend que Mahomet ait mis ses adeptes à l'eau. (Les frères Teraud 1930 : 194)

Le passage est placé sous le signe de la *quaïda*, mot clef et polysémique qui désigne la règle, l'usage ou « selon les connaisseurs » et qui exprime ici un rituel et un usage fort connu des milieux libertins ou *Nchaywiyas* marocains. Mais un élément important dans la description du

début du dîner surprend : celui des plats qui circulent d'une table à une autre, confirmé par un autre détail culinaire tout aussi surprenant « ont pris avec les doigts ce qui leur convenait ». Il tend à attirer l'attention sur le rôle de catalyseur du repas, sur l'absolu du partage et sur son refus des sphères de l'intime. Aucune règle, aucune syntaxe ne vient perturber cette liberté totale de circuler de l'aliment et de s'offrir à chacun et à tous en même temps. La distribution des verres de vin par les fillettes, diminutif à valeur métonymique, vient ratifier la dimension ici hors société, hors règle de cette soirée bien arrosée. L'ambiance est à la fois d'un culinaire fétichiste, tinter les verres aux boucles d'oreilles, et ésotérique ou alchimiste, exprimé ici par le terme de « *breuvage* » qui se métamorphose. La morale du vin resurgit ici *via* l'interrogation de l'auteur qui dénonce l'absence totale de contrôle « frénésie » et l'évocation de l'interdiction par Mahomet du vin pour donner à cette fête organisée par Sidi Feddoule une dimension communautaire.

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(Endnotes)

¹. Pour une synthèse des études sur l'aliment en sciences humaines, voir Mohamed Bernoussi, Chapitre 1 in *Viator in Tabula. Sémiotique de l'interculturel culinaire dans les récits de voyage*, Fès, Postmodernité, 2014.

². Le père gardien faisait à l'époque le travail d'un guide touristique de notre époque chargé de la logistique mais aussi de la sécurité des pèlerins.

³. Le paradoxe du vin existe même dans la culture arabe. En fait dans le premier texte législatif musulman, à savoir *le Coran*, l'interdiction du vin n'est pas explicitement avancée comme définitive dès le départ, mais se fait de façon bien progressive. Les premiers versets annoncent son interdiction pendant la prière, ensuite cette interdiction est devenue totale à n'importe quel moment et frappant tout ce qui peut d'une façon ou d'une autre rendre ivre.

⁴. Le préjugé, on le sait depuis Voltaire, est « une opinion sans jugement », il sert très facilement et sans grand effort à dénigrer l'autre. C'est comme l'a pertinemment montré Jean Goulemot un « mot de ralliement » et sa dénonciation a pour but de montrer que tout est relatif. Voir J. Goulemot, « L'Autre du préjugé », *Le temps de la réflexion*, 1984, V, p.p. 213–223.

⁵. Pour un examen de ces fantasmes culinaires, voir mon article, *Favole alimentare*, E/C Rivista dell'associazione italiana di studi semiotici. Novembre 2014.

“CON-FUSION CUISINES”: MELTING FOODS AND HYBRID IDENTITIES

Simona Stano
University of Turin, Italy
simona.stano@gmail.com

Abstract

The expression “fusion cuisine” is generally used to refer to a style of cooking combining ingredients and techniques from different foodspheres. Asian fusion restaurants, for instance, offer blends of various cuisines of different Asian countries and the culinary traditions of the places where they have become increasingly popular. Similarly, the Tex-Mex cuisine combines the South-western United States culinary system with the Mexican foodsphere, while the Pacific Rim cuisine is based on the mix of different traditions from the various island nations; and so on and so forth. In all these cases, foods based on one culinary culture are prepared using ingredients, flavours, and techniques inherent to another culture. Consider for instance the case of “Taco Pizza”, a pizza made with cheddar and pepper jack cheese, tomato sauce, refried beans and other common taco components; or that of the so-called “fusion-sushi”, including several variations of rolling *maki* with different types of rice and ingredients, such as curry and basmati rice, cheese, tomato sauce, raw meat, etc. According to the etymology of the word *fusion*, the main feature characterising fusion cuisine could be described in terms of a harmonious combination of different culinary *traditions* in order to create *innovative* and seamless dishes. This has important implications not only on the material side, but also and most importantly with respect to the sociocultural sphere and the symbolic dimension. Far from simply coinciding with material needs or physiological and perceptive processes, nutrition concerns all the various activities, discourses, and images that surround and are associated with it, becoming a form of expression of cultural identity. Sometimes, however, fusion cuisines run the risk to degenerate into “con-fusion cuisines”, causing inevitable clashes between incompatible flavours and textures, and fomenting a chaotic overlapping between different foodspheres and “food identities”. While novelty is certainly commendable, restraint and continuity are also important. The same

concepts of tradition and innovation, moreover, are complex and multifaceted, and need to be further analysed and discussed. Building on the analysis of some specific case studies, chosen for their relevance within the wide range of examples of fusion cuisine, we aim at addressing such issues and investigating the processes of translation between different substances, sensorialities, and eating experiences, focusing on the negotiation of the sense of food in specific situations.

1. What is fusion food?

The expression “fusion cuisine” is generally used to refer to a style of cooking combining ingredients and techniques from different *foodspheres*.¹ Asian fusion restaurants, for instance, offer blends of various cuisines of different Asian countries and the culinary traditions of the places – especially the United States and Europe – where they have become increasingly popular. Similarly, the Tex-Mex cuisine combines the South-western United States culinary system with the Mexican foodsphere, while the Pacific Rim cuisine is based on the mix of different traditions from the various island nations; and so on and so forth. In all these cases, foods based on one culinary culture are prepared using ingredients, flavours, and techniques inherent to another culture. Consider for instance the case of “Taco Pizza”, a pizza made with cheddar and pepper jack cheese, tomato sauce, refried beans, taco chips, lettuce, and other common taco components. Or that of the so-called “fusion-sushi”, including several variations of rolling maki with different types of rice and ingredients, such as curry, basmati rice, cheese, sauce, raw meat, etc.

But how do the processes of “fusion” between different substances, sensorialities, and eating experiences take place? How is the sense of food negotiated in these situations? And how can we describe such processes in semiotic terms? This paper aims at addressing these issues, building on the analyses of specific case studies chosen for their relevance within the wide range of examples of fusion cuisine.

2. Two case studies: *Wok'n roll* and *Fuzion* in Turin (Italy)

Building on previous research (Stano 2014), we decided to deal mainly with sushi, taking into considerations two specific case studies: *Wok'n roll* and *Fuzion* in Turin (Italy). Open in 2010, *Wok'n roll* is ranked among the best noodle and sushi bars in Italy, providing customers with restaurants where they can enjoy food, as well as with takeaway and delivery services. The same facilities are offered by *Fuzion*, which opened its doors in 2014, combining the Italian cuisine with sushi and other dishes typical of the Eastern foodspheres.

2.1. *Wok'n roll*

Wok'n roll's menu – which can be found both at the restaurant and on its website – immediately reveals the predominance of fusion cuisine in the dishes available at the “noodle and sushi bar”.




Fig. 1: Wok'n roll's menu (first page).

Specifically, fusion emerges on two levels: the map at the bottom of the page (fig. 1) introduces the reference to different Asian countries, namely the places where the foods used in the menu come from. This first level of fusion is reiterated by the figures in the right-bottom, evoking a Vietnamese cook and a Japanese waitress, as well as by the figurative elements on its top (i.e. drawings of a statue of the Buddha, a Malaysian tiger, the Itsukushima Shrine and the Mount Fuji in Japan, the Hả Long Bay in Vietnam, the typical Asian hibiscus flowers, and other common elements referring to Asian culture and settings). The logo introduces a second level of fusion, recalling the Western world. The same could be said for the text, which makes explicit reference to the Italian foodsphere: “Oltre al pesce crudo proponiamo anche rolls con prestigiosi prodotti made in Italy. Avevi mai pensato a un sushi roll con la salsiccia di Bra oppure con il Parmigiano in tempura?” [In addition to raw fish we offer rolls made of excellent Italian products. Have you ever imagined a sushi roll containing Bra sausage or Parmesan tempura?, *our translation.*]




Fig. 2: Wok'n roll's menu (second page – detail).

Actually the restaurant offers two main types of food products to its guests: as regards to woks, people are able to customise their meal through a three-step process: the choice of (i) the type of pasta and of (ii) the sauce is characterised by the same first level of fusion described above, since all these products refer to one or more Asian culinary traditions. On the contrary, the third step, consisting in choosing (iii) other ingredients and toppings, introduces the second level of fusion, as it includes elements such as Parmesan and other fresh local products.

With sushi, things radically change. First of all, modularity disappears, and costumers are asked to delegate the *know-how-to-do* they were provided in the case of noodles to the restaurant itself, choosing among the several already set options listed in the menu.



Fig. 3: RIPLEY (on the left) and MEDITERRANEO (on the right) rolls.

Figure 3 shows the RIPLEY (on the left), which is a roll made of rice, raw meat (“cruda di vitello”, which is very popular in Piedmont, the region where Turin is located), lettuce, tempura Parmesan, taggiasca olives (which are typical from Liguria), and lime sauce (substituting the commonly used soy sauce). On the right, we can see the MEDITERRANEO roll, made of sushi rice, Tempura local vegetables, fried mozzarella (which is a typical Italian cheese) and strawberry aromatic vinegar.

<p>“ CREA IL TUO MENU' IN SEMPLICI PASSAGGI , SCEGLI LA BASE DELLA TUA PIZZA O DEL TUO SUSHI ED AGGIUNGI TUTTI GLI INGREDIENTI , VERDURE , SPECIALI E TOPPING CHE PREFERISCI ”</p> <p>BASE 3,90 €</p> <p>PIZZA IN TEGLIA ALLA ROMANA BIANCA - FOCACCIA ROSSA - POMODORO SAN MARZANO</p> <p>SUSHI ROLL 8 PEZZI RISO SUSHIMESHI MIX DI CEREALI</p> <p><small>*AL SUSHI ROLL BASE AGGIUNGERE MINIMO 3 INGREDIENTI, 1 VERDURA O 1 SPECIALE*</small></p>	<p>INGREDIENTI</p> <p>COTTO 1€ CREMA DI FORMAGGIO 1€ CREMA DI GORGONZOLA 1€ DALRY (ingrediente del giorno) 1€ GRANA IN SCAGLIE 1€ MOZZARELLA 1€ NDUJA 1€ PANCETTA 1€ POLLO 1€ PROVOLA AFFUMICATA 1€ RICOTTA 1€ SALSICCIA FRESCA 1€ SURIMI 1€</p> <p>VERDURE</p> <p>CIPOLLOTTI 0,50€ FUNGHI SHITAKE 1€ GOMA WAKAME 1€ NI RICE TAGGIASCHE 1€</p>	<p>SP</p> <p>ALICI 1,50€ BACCALA' 1,50€ CRUDA DI FASSO PROSCIUTTO CRUDO GAMBERETTI 1,5€ SALMONE MARINA SPECIAL 2,00€</p> <p>TOPPING</p> <p>SPEZIE : -AGLIO FRITTO -CIPOLLA FRITTA -GOMASIO -MISTICANZA D'EI -NANAMI TOGARU -PEPE DI SICHUAN -PEPERONCINO TH</p> <p>SALSA : -BALSAMICO ALL</p>
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Fig. 4: GALA GALA rolls.

Finally, the GALA GALA (Fig. 4) contains the famous sausage from Bra, usually eaten raw, lettuce, arugula, Parmesan and lime sauce, with an external layer of coloured soy paper (instead of the more common nori).

In these and other cases, different Asian cuisines are mixed (i) among each other and (ii) with the Italian foodsphere. What is more, the extreme variability characterising the Italian cuisine emerges, making reference to different regional traditions. It is also very interesting to note that actually the only unchanged element with respect to the source foodsphere (namely the

Japanese one, where sushi is thought to have originated) is the shape or form in which such a food is served. This is what, building on Hendry’s works (1990a, 1990b, 1993), we (Stano 2014) proposed to describe in terms of a “wrapping structure”, that is, a specific configuration of concentric layers reflecting many aspects of Japanese aesthetics and thought. Attention is paid mainly to maintain such a structure, while ingredients are considered as perfectly interchangeable among each other, provided that they are “shaped” in the right way.

2.2. Fuzion

The visual identity of the restaurant plays a crucial role also in the case of Fuzion. The logo (fig. 5) is particularly interesting: first of all, focusing on the lettering, the inversion of the “N” seems to suggest the idea of reversibility. Both the O, recalling the well-known Japanese calligraphic art, and the initial F, evoking the shape of a shrine or temple, refer to the Japanese semiosphere. The use of green could also be interpreted as a reference to the Japanese culture and the importance it confers to nature (cf. Stano 2014 and in print). Moreover, polychromy suggests the idea of variety. However, the uniformity of the second and third lines stresses complementarity, as the verbal text clearly states: “ASIAN AND MEDITERRANEAN MELTING FOOD.”²



Fig. 5: Fuzion’s logo.

With respect to the menu (fig. 6), modularity embraces in this case also sushi. People are invited to create their own menu, through a two-step process always recalling the previously mentioned second (or third, if we consider also the reference to the Italian regional cuisines)-level process of fusion.



Fig. 6: Fuzion’s menu (second page – extract).

Costumers can choose their favourite base for pizza (plain or with tomato, but always in the typical Roman type “by the slice”) or sushi (with rice or mixed cereals) and then add their favourite ingredients (vegetables, toppings, and sauces). More extended sections, however, provide consumers with already set options for “traditional” or “fusion” pizza and sushi (which, although erroneously, is always referred to as *uramaki*, regardless of its actual configuration, generally actually coinciding with *hosomaki*³ or *futomaki*⁴).



Fig. 7: *CRI CRI*, *BUFFALO BILL*, *JULIA ROLL*, *CHICKEN TAGGIASCHE* and *SMOKE SABA* rolls.

Figure 7 shows the *CRI CRI* roll, which is made of sushi rice, raw meat, cheese cream, one fresh local vegetable (chosen among the available options by costumers), arugula, “Japanese mayonnaise”, and tempura grains. *BUFFALO BILL* contains sushi rice, buffalo sausage, cheese cream, lettuce and *citronette*. The *JULIA ROLL* includes *carne salada* (i.e. marinated meat typical from Trentino), Parmesan, arugula, truffle cream (since truffles are also typical from the North of Italy, especially Piedmont), and *citronette*. In *CHICKEN TAGGIASCHE* roll mixed cereals substitute rice, and Asian spices and sauces are used. Finally, the *SMOKE SABA* roll includes also the typical Sicilian tomato (*ciliegiino di Pachino*) and smoked mackerel. In all these cases, moreover, nori is generally substituted by thin coloured soy paper, and rice is short grain but grown in Italy.



Fig. 8: *SALMON JAP* pizza.

Finally, at Fuzion, fusion extends to pizza. Among the various cases that can be cited, figure 8 shows the popular *SALMON JAP* pizza, which is made of a plain base with marinated salmon, soy aromatic vinegar, *gomasio*⁵ and *goma wake*⁶ on the top. Exactly as for Wok’n roll, both in this case and as regards to the previously analysed sushi rolls, no matter which ingredients are used and “melt”, provided that the typical structural configuration of foods remains unaltered.

3. Conclusion

According to the etymology of the word *fusion* (from Latin *fusio*, past participle of *fundere*, “to pour, to melt”), the main feature characterising fusion cuisine could be described in terms of a harmonious combination of different culinary traditions in order to create innovative and seamless dishes. Modularity is in this sense crucial, because, as previously discussed, it highlights the possibility of creating several combinations with specific ingredients introducing different layers of fusion. These combinations have important implications not only on the material side, but also and most importantly with respect to the sociocultural sphere and the symbolic dimension. Far from simply coinciding with material needs or physiological and perceptive processes, nutrition concerns all the various activities, discourses, and images that surround and are associated with it, becoming a form of expression of cultural identity (cf. Barthes 1961; Lévi-Strauss 1965; Montanari 2006; Pezzini 2001). While novelty is certainly commendable, therefore, restraints and continuity are also important. This is where the importance of pre-set fixed options emerges, stressing the role of the providers (namely, the addressers) of the eating experience as regards to the competence – i.e. the previously mentioned *know-how-to-do* – required to establish such combinations.

Making reference to a well-known model mainly used in linguistics but afterwards expanded to other domains of knowledge, we could describe the “food continuum”, intended as an amorphous sequence of ingredients that can be used to create different combinations, in terms of *expression-purport* (Hjelmslev 1943). Through the existence of an *expression-form* (which exists by virtue of being connected with a content-form and which organises the expression-purport), such expression-purport is formed into an *expression-substance*, that is, a specific sequence of ingredients. The expression-form, therefore, can be described in terms of the models or rules by which specific combinations are carved up and selected from all the possible associations. Building on these considerations, what can be said about these models or rules with respect to the here considered cases? What are the dynamics carving up the analysed “fusion” combinations? The previously described cases seem to stress the importance of mechanisms that, adopting a Greimasian terminology, we could describe in terms of *lie* or *illusion* (Courtés 1976; Greimas 1989): de-composing foods in unitary constituents, they claim to replace them with elements from other foodspheres, provided that the general structural configuration of food remains unaltered. In other words, the functioning mechanism of the considered examples is “it seems sushi, but it is not”, “it seems pizza, but it is not”, and so on and so forth. But how could a lie generate the euphoric state and positive sanction expected in the case of fusion foods eaten at restaurants? How could these mechanisms enhance curiosity instead of provoking disgust? In other words, how can they foster innovation instead of causing rejection?

A first point requires us to consider the intrinsic nature of the eating experience, which does not rely on depth and funded knowledge, but rather on superficial curiosity and simulation. As Franco La Cecla (1997), Roland Barthes (1961) and other scholars remind us, food can be considered an easily crossable frontier, where alterity assumes the form of an exotic and “palatable” experience. Such an experience is always based on *simulation*, since even what is presented as authentic and traditional is itself the result of an internal look somehow imitating the external look whose “taste” it has to match. This is why food seems particularly compatible with such “lying mechanisms”, which introduce elements of innovation by hiding them under already established forms of expression. Normalisation processes thereafter make novelty slowly become part of tradition, and what is unknown become part of what is known and usual.

This recalls Giulia Ceriani’s distinction (2004) between *contamination* and *fusion*. Building on the dictionary definition of these concepts, the Italian semiotician distinguishes them on the base of the semantic opposition “multiplicity/uniqueness”. Favouring the first pole in this

opposition, contamination works by juxtaposing and putting together different elements, therefore making all the constituents of the final object recognisable – even though, the sense arises only from the union of these elements, as in any form of *bricolage* (Lévi-Strauss 1962; Floch 1986, 1990, 2006). Fusion favours instead the second pole of the opposition, opting for the nomination of a new object replacing those that gave origin to it. Whilst the first case establishes a sort of equilibrium among the different elements assembled together, the latter is characterised by a substitution creating a new form through the elimination of the pre-existing ones, without leaving any trace of this process. Continuity therefore replaces in this case discontinuity, and conjunction supplants disjunction, reducing the polyphonic heterogeneity of contamination to the hierarchized structure of components obtained through fusion. After describing these models, Ceriani identifies fashion with contamination, and food with fusion.

By contrast, the previously analysed examples seem to partially contradict such a classification, pointing out the “lying” mechanisms underlying fusion cuisines and the crucial role played in them by discontinuous structural configurations. It seems to us that this contradiction can be explained by making reference to Landowski’s model (1997) for the description of the interactions between identity and alterity. According to the French scholar, with *assimilation* the Other is disqualified as a subject: “its” singularity does not refer to any formal identity and its alterity is reduced to one’s own identity, so that it can be integrated into the environment by “absorbing” it. Such a process of standardisation and “ingestion” of the Other by the Self is strongly centripetal, leading Landowski to describe it in terms of a *conjunction* of identities. On the contrary, *exclusion* denies the Other as such through confinement and elimination, not in a reasoned connection (as in assimilation), but in a more passionate relationship. The shared feature of these two configurations is that otherness, faced with a referential consistent identity, is always conceived as a threatening difference coming from the outside. However, unlike assimilation, exclusion is based on a centrifugal movement, implying a *disjunction* of identities. In *segregation* (*non-conjunction*), the Other is recognised in spite of “his” difference, but still with a fundamental ambivalence between the inability to assimilate him and the refusal to exclude him. Only *admission* (*non-disjunction*) leads to a permanent construction of a multicultural collective subject, since differences are in this case attested and accepted, promoting a real encounter between identity and alterity.

Even though exclusion and segregation are in any case excluded – since the consumption of the meal at the restaurant always implies the establishment of a contract proving customers’ openness (or at least their curiosity) toward alterity – admission is not compulsory. Research (Greco and Zittoun 2014; Greco in press) has shown that home-cooked ethnic foods tend to favour the establishment of multicultural collective subjects unceasingly reshaping food grammars by replacing pre-existing units with new foods resulting from their combination – leading to what Ceriani would properly call “fusion” cuisines. By contrast, in all the observed cases, the conjunction between different foodspheres is reduced to assimilation, since otherness is “ingested” by the local Self and curbed into the previously described “lying” structures. The negotiation of the sense of food between and across different foodspheres is in these cases reduced to simple structural models, disregarding the essential synesthetic nature of the eating experience. In fact, eating implies diverse sensorialities, which are just partially subjective and physiological, and mainly intersubjective and socially determined (cf. Perullo 2008). Therefore, the sensorial and cultural specificity of the eating experience makes it impossible to reduce it to simple processes of de-structuration and de-composition of foods in individual unities considered as interchangeable among themselves. This is precisely where the importance of the delimitation of possible ingredients or combinations – that is, the centrality of the addresser of the eating experience – arises, as we previously discussed. But it is also where a fundamental, still open

issue emerges, running the risk to leave a bad taste in the mouths of fusion foods’ promoters: to what extent fusion cuisines really enhance sensorial and cultural share and encounter? And to what extent, by contrast, don’t they risk degenerating into “con-fusion cuisines”, causing inevitable clashes between incompatible flavours and textures, and fomenting a chaotic overlapping between different foodspheres and “food identities”?

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(Endnotes)

¹ The term *foodsphere* (firstly introduced in Stano 2014) is here used to make reference to the concept of “alimentary semiosphere”, therefore stressing the inherently cultural and semiotic nature of the food system.

² It is also worthwhile to remark that, unlike Wok’N Roll, Fuzion provides customers with both chopsticks and the common Western cutlery, allowing them to choose their favourite tool, also depending on the type of food they choose to eat.

³ *Hosomaki* (細巻, “thin rolls”) is a small (0.8-1 in / 2-2.5 cm in diameter) cylindrical piece, with nori on the outside, generally containing only one filling (cucumber – *Kappamaki* –, raw tuna – *Tekkamaki* –, *kanpyō*, avocado, or sliced carrots or cucumber). For more detailed information, see Detrick 1981; Hosking 1995; Ashkenazi and Jacob 2000; Barber 2002; Dekura, Treloar and Yoshii 2004; Lowry 2005; Mouritsen 2009; Zschock 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012.

⁴ *Futomaki* (太巻, “thick, large, or fat rolls”) is a large (2-2.5 in / 5-6 cm in diameter) cylindrical piece, wrapped in nori, often made with two, three, or more fillings chosen for their complementary tastes and colours. For more detailed information, see Detrick 1981; Hosking 1995; Ashkenazi and Jacob 2000; Barber 2002; Dekura, Treloar and Yoshii 2004; Lowry 2005; Mouritsen 2009; Zschock 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012.

⁵ *Gomasio* (ごま塩) or *gomashio* is a dry condiment made from unshelled sesame seeds (ごま, *goma*) and salt (塩, *shio*). It is often used in Japanese cuisine, sometimes being sprinkled over plain rice or on sushi.

⁶ Edible seaweeds.

COCINA MIGRANTE: HISTORIAS SOBRE LA IDENTIDAD GASTRONÓMICA (MIGRANT CUISINE: STORIES ABOUT GASTRONOMIC IDENTITY)

Zuly Usme
Universidad de Varsovia, Polonia
znusmel@unal.edu.co

Abstract

This analysis comes from seeing that immigrants can modify their habits to a new linguistic, cultural, social, economic and political reality, but they cannot leave their food habits easily. This paper presents seven cases that, with a qualitative view, helps to understand how the sense is generated and articulated in the discourse of food, because to eat is not only to consume food.

Resumen

Este análisis surge al ver que los migrantes¹ se adaptan a una nueva realidad lingüística, cultural, social, económica y política, pero no dejan atrás sus costumbres alimentarias. Se presentan siete casos que, de manera cualitativa, aportan al análisis para comprender cómo se genera y se articula el sentido del discurso alimentario, puesto que comer no es solo ingerir alimentos.

– ¿Qué es ser colombiano?
–No sé –le respondí–. Es un acto de fe.
– Como ser noruega –asintió.
Ulrica, Jorge Luis Borges

1. Aperitivo o entrante

Yo soy migrante, siempre lo he sido, desde que nací. Soy de Venezuela, pero allá siempre fui “la colombiana” porque mis padres son colombianos. Luego regresaron a Colombia y nosotras con ellos (mis hermanas y yo), entonces pasé a ser “la venezolana”. Ahora vivo en Polonia, y allí soy “la latina”. Y, como lingüista que soy, me gusta la lengua; pero no solo esa lengua que

habla, también la lengua que come, la que paladea. “La lengua que fluye, la lengua que constriñe, la lengua que puja y empuja palabras y sabores. Lengua que palabrea sabores. Lengua que saborea palabras” (Usme 2010: 52). Esa con la que se construyen relatos alimentarios (llámense “recetas”, pero no solamente) a partir de la combinatoria de los elementos (llámense “ingredientes”, pero no solamente) que se tienen al alcance de la mano en los nuevos lugares de asentamiento. De este modo, mi objeto de estudio son las representaciones sociales cotidianas de la cultura material, específicamente, las relativas al alimento y al cuerpo y, con ellas, la alteridad, la identidad, la transformación. En pocas palabras, lo que estudio es cómo se genera y se articula el sentido del discurso alimentario, puesto que comer no es solo ingerir alimentos. El acto de comer lleva anclado el concepto de incorporación. “Somos lo que comemos” (Gracia 2002).

2. Primer plato o sopa

Entiendo la cultura de manera semiótica, es decir, en tanto sistema de relaciones simbólico-discursivas organizadas de manera jerárquica y, por tanto, como espacio supraindividual, es decir, inscrita en un colectivo a su vez dinámico, productor de múltiples dimensiones significativas. De esta manera, y de acuerdo con Geertz: “el concepto de cultura que propugno (...) es esencialmente un concepto semiótico (...), el análisis de la cultura ha de ser por lo tanto, no una ciencia experimental en busca de leyes, sino una ciencia interpretativa en busca de significaciones” (1987: 20). Tal ciencia buscaría identificar los componentes que conforman la estructura de significaciones de una cultura, las relaciones sintácticas entre estas unidades, particulares para cada grupo cultural y, al final, reagrupar los elementos obtenidos y sus relaciones internas a un nivel general, por lo que el “análisis cultural es (o debería ser) conjeturar significaciones, estimar las conjeturas y llegar a conclusiones explicativas partiendo de las mejores conjeturas, y no el descubrimiento del continente de la significación y el mapeado de su paisaje incorpóreo” (Geertz 1987: 32). Para este autor, el estudio de una cultura se debe hacer desde la descripción etnográfica y, específicamente, desde una descripción densa, no generalizar a través de datos particulares sino dentro de estos; la cultura, entonces, debe ser vista desde el contexto, no por fuera de él.

Así entendemos que toda manifestación cultural lo es porque está inserta en una significación, los modelos son jerarquizables, es decir, susceptibles de categorizarse en una escala valorativa. De esta manera, se puede leer cómo los patrones significacionales de las conductas, o iteraciones texto-discursivas, están más o menos valorizados por el sistema social. Para ello, resulta relevante el concepto que desarrolla Genette (1989: 495) sobre el palimpsesto, así múltiples sentidos y múltiples valores otorgan sentido a la praxis culinaria, ya que tales patrones del sistema culinario que ha sido transformado –palimpsesto culinario– reposa sobre un modelo polisémico de la transculturación, por la múltiple coexistencia de patrones culturales de la alimentación, es decir, las culturas.

De este modo, al entenderla como inscrita en la cultura, se puede estudiar la cocina como discurso. Desde un punto de vista semiótico, el discurso alimentario puede ser analizado bajo la perspectiva de Courtés (1980), es decir, a partir de la identificación de la estructura narrativa que subyace en los palimpsestos culinarios. De tal forma se puede estudiar cómo se genera y articula el sentido de la alimentación.

En concordancia, y de acuerdo con Foucault, “yo supongo que en toda sociedad la producción del discurso está a la vez controlada, seleccionada y redistribuida por un cierto número de procedimientos que tienen por función conjurar los poderes y peligros, dominar el acontecimiento aleatorio y esquivar su pesada y temible materialidad” (Foucault 1987: 11). Por esta razón, se pueden encontrar diversos procedimientos de exclusión e inclusión de los productos, de las redes de intercambio, así “el discurso, por más que en apariencia sea poca cosa, las pro-

hibiciones que recaen sobre él, revelan muy pronto, rápidamente, su vinculación con el deseo y con el poder” (Foucault 1987: 12).

En el terreno de la lingüística hablaríamos de cambio lingüístico. Ahora bien, al pensar el alimento como un sistema lingüístico (Montanari 2005: 105), la cocina migrante se asemeja a las variaciones en el léxico. A nivel lingüístico, no se producen en la estructura morfológica ni en la sintáctica del discurso, en la medida de lo posible. No obstante, en ocasiones pueden modificarse y con cambios profundos, incluso traumáticos.

3. Segundo plato o plato fuerte

El corpus observado está compuesto por siete personas²: tres colombianas (Dina, Pablo y Ángela) y cuatro de otras nacionalidades (Renee, australiana; Francesca, italiana; Andreas, danés; Radek, polaco). Mi escrito se centra en la comida/alimento como vehículo de significación de la cultura: si el acto de comer es una textualidad (Lotman 1996), los inmigrantes improvisan con productos que tienen a la mano, buscando ‘reproducir’ el texto culinario originario, es decir, generan una textualidad culinaria palimpsestual.

Un primer síntoma de identidad lo encontramos mediante el uso de topónimos que se transforman en índices³ identitarios. A Andreas no le gusta la comida danesa, en general, la comida del norte de Europa no es de su agrado. Andreas es de Dinamarca, ha vivido en España, Ecuador, México, y ahora vive en los Estados Unidos. En este país ha encontrado que preparan un pastel danés (sin la apariencia del pastel danés) y, como no lo ha probado, no puede hacer ningún comentario. A diferencia de Francesca, quien es italiana, ha vivido en Francia, Gran Bretaña, Colombia y Argentina. Supongo que ella, a cada vuelta de la esquina, se topa con un restaurante italiano. Explica que los platos ofrecidos en estos restaurantes sí existen en Italia, pero son muy malas imitaciones. Además de que algunos nombres son meras creaciones de los Estados Unidos. Por ejemplo, los tales “espaguetti a la bolognesa” no existen en Bologna, ni en ninguna otra ciudad de Italia. En realidad se denominan “tagliatelle al ragu”. Además, relata que, en un restaurante colombiano que hay en Milán, “se come paella y se toma sangría”. “¡Qué decepción!”, dice.

De esta manera, el uso de topónimos genera cierta expectativa en el consumidor, cuyo grado de satisfacción con el producto puede variar y depende de la relación con la experiencia previa. A partir del cuadrado semiótico de la veracidad (Greimas y Courtés 1979: 96–99) vemos que, si las propiedades organolépticas concuerdan, es decir, las relacionadas con las características físicas que perciben los sentidos (sabor, olor, color, textura), se podrá hablar de manifestación de Verdad (ser–parecer). Mientras que se manifiesta como Mentira (no ser–parecer) cuando solo se le aporta un aspecto exterior (color, forma) y un nombre, pero en su esencia no hay similitud similaridad con el plato verdadero. Será Falsedad (no ser–no parecer) cuando se ofrecen por el nombre, pero no concuerdan con ninguna experiencia anterior. Y, solo en caso de aplicar principios de la cocina molecular, se podría hablar de Secreto (ser–no parecer).

Dina es de Colombia, ha vivido en Sudáfrica y Polonia, ahora vive en Inglaterra. Ella cuenta que, en Pretoria (Sudáfrica) probó “empanadas” pero el sabor era diferente. Así que ella prefiere no prestarle atención a los restaurantes que ofrecen comida latinoamericana, “para evitar desilusionarme”, dice. Aclara que en ciudades pequeñas no es fácil, o casi imposible, encontrar restaurantes latinos, pero en ciudades grandes sí los hay. Lo que sí encuentra son “granos de café” asociados a Colombia. De acuerdo con Magariños (2013: 299) “no solo es signo la palabra significativa externa o la marca, sino que también lo será la imagen que se espera que suscite en la mente del receptor (...) de la imagen semejante en la mente del comunicador y, mediante ella, también un signo de la efectiva cualidad de la cosa”, es así como los granos de café están fuertemente asociados con el concepto de “Colombia”. Y, de acuerdo con esto, en relación con

las “empanadas” de Dina y el restaurante colombiano del que habla Francesca (donde se come paella y se toma sangría), se hace necesario conocer el Referente, es decir, haber conocido la comida colombiana alguna vez. De otro modo, y anclado a la denominación, “lo único que permanece es la representación que se desarrolla en los signos verbales que la manifiestan y que se convierte, por ello, en discurso” (Foucault 1968).

Precisamente, una de las maneras de hacer reconocible un plato en el exterior es denominarlo con algún topónimo de donde proviene: como el “café varsoviense” que tomó Radek en Crimea (Ucrania) pero tal café no existe en Varsovia. Él es polaco, ha vivido en España y en Colombia. Y Andreas, quien vivió en España, aprendió a hacer “pulpo a la gallega”. También ocurre con las papas⁴ a la francesa, que en realidad son belgas. Bien afirma Foucault que “[s]i, en el fondo de sí mismo, el lenguaje tiene por función el nombrar, es decir, el hacer surgir una representación o mostrarla como con el dedo [como ocurre en el caso de los topónimos], es una indicación y no un juicio. Se liga a las cosas por una marca, una nota, una figura asociada, un gesto que designa: nada que sea reductible a una relación de predicación” (1968: 109). De este modo, los migrantes a través de estas denominaciones, ven los platos de las regiones de las que provienen como señalados con el dedo.

En cambio, al pertenecer a una región similar, en este caso Latinoamérica, los ingredientes tienen cierto grado de uso común. Pablo, un colombiano que vivió en Argentina y ahora vive en los Estados Unidos, relató que, en Argentina, sí existen “varios platos similares, pero con otros nombres”. Entre ellos están, por ejemplo, la “sopa de lentejas” que se llama “guisado de lentejas”; la “sopa de frijoles” es “sopa de porotos”. Una gran diferencia que encontró es que los argentinos “no consumen casi granos, arroz, ni papa, pero sí consumen mucha carne y pasta”. Esto es comprensible por la fuerte migración de italianos a Argentina a mediados del siglo XIX.⁵

Por su parte, Renee, una australiana que vivió en Colombia y en México, cuenta que los ingredientes para preparar los platos tradicionales australianos no se consiguen en los supermercados latinoamericanos. En cambio, Pablo dice que, por la proliferación de tiendas latinas, “[en los Estados Unidos] se pueden encontrar casi todos los ingredientes para preparar un plato colombiano”; a diferencia de Argentina, donde no consiguió cilantro, guascas ni harina de maíz. Tuvo que remplazar el cilantro por perejil. Lo que él hace para dar el punto de sabor colombiano es buscar algo similar en color o textura, además de “agregar un poco más de los ingredientes que se encontraban fácilmente”. De manera que se consume el representamen del alimento; no por el alimento en sí mismo, sino por lo que representa, la identidad: “Un signo, o representamen, es algo que, para alguien, representa o se refiere a algo en algún aspecto o carácter. Se dirige a alguien, esto es, crea en la mente de esa persona un signo equivalente, o, tal vez, un signo aun más desarrollado (Peirce 1978: 22). Este signo creado es lo que yo llamo el interpretante del primer signo” (Peirce 1978: 22). Montanari indica que, cuando los sistemas alimentarios están fuertemente arraigados, se tiende a reproducir los modelos de referencia, de tal manera que dentro de un sistema “cada elemento ocupa un puesto preciso, [entonces] el primer objetivo será el de conservarlo” (Montanari 2006: 102).

Dina dice que el preparar ajiaco santafereño no es fácil, pues no se consiguen guascas ni papa criolla (dice que en Londres la venden, pero es costosa). Cuando Dina se reúne con colombianos, tratan de preparar algún plato típico con los ingredientes que tienen a mano, según Montanari “el «truco» consiste en tratar (...) los productos nuevos con procedimientos y preparaciones tradicionales” (2006: 106).

No obstante, los “principios de sabor” que deberán tener los platos dependerán de los lugares de los que provengan los migrantes, y aquí un segundo síntoma de identidad. A esto lo denominó Fischler “principios de sabor”, de este modo, lo que en Colombia se llama ajiaco,

dependerá de la región: mientras que en Bogotá se toma una sopa de papa criolla, papa sabanera y papa pastusa con pechuga de pollo, crema de leche, alcaparras y guascas, en los Santanderes, el ajiaco es una sopa con carne de res, plátano, alverja, repollo, papa y apio (nombre dado a la arracacha en la zona). Así tenemos que los principios de sabor varían según lo nacional, lo regional, lo local y hasta lo familiar o lo individual, de manera tal que es difícil o imposible “trazar la frontera entre unidad y discontinuidad, entre «dialectos» e «idiolectos» culinarios, y aislarlos” (Fischler 1995: 77).

Ángela, quien vivió en Francia y ahora vive en España, dice que la mayoría de los alimentos que hay en Colombia se encuentran en España, incluso algunos tienen el mismo nombre. Algunas frutas no se encuentran: “las diferencias son en cuanto al tamaño de los alimentos, por ejemplo el aguacate, la papa, algunas frutas, los granos son más pequeños, esto sucede tanto en Francia como en España”. Por esto, para preparar platos colombianos, le ha sido más fácil en España que en Francia “tenía que buscar mucho y cuando los encontraba (que era muy raro) eran muy costosos, y no era el mismo sabor”. Relata que intentó remplazar algunos productos, pero sin éxito (principios de sabor), en cambio, no ha tenido ningún problema en España.

De esta manera, vemos que los productos y preparaciones se transforman en símbolos potentes que evocan los modos y las formas de comer de una determinada sociedad. Son, así, una expresión tangible de la cultura, concebida como un todo coherente, establecida a lo largo del tiempo y que se puede identificar. “Que esa concepción esencialista de la cultura sea altamente inconsistente no impide que actúe de manera eficaz” (Montero M. 2011: 127).

Pero ellos también hicieron aportaciones gastronómicas a los entornos en los cuales vivieron, encontrando las mismas dificultades antes indicadas. Renee ha preparado *pavlova* y *lamingtons*⁶ pero no fue fácil encontrar los ingredientes. Radek, por su parte, preparó *knedle*, *kopytka* ‘casquitos’, *kluski śląskie* ‘pasta de Silesia’, *barszcz* y *żurek*⁷ pero no encontró harina de papa, alimentos fermentados (como los pepinos y el repollo) ni salchichas blancas. Mientras que Andreas no pudo encontrar nata fresca para preparar *havregrynskugler* ‘bolas de avena’ y dice que logró algo similar, pero no con el sabor propio. Mientras tanto, Francesca ha preparado tiramisú, *risotto ai funghi*, *pasta ai broccoli* y *lenticchie* ‘lentejas’. En Colombia, le fue muy difícil encontrar *mascarpone*, *prosecco* fino, setas salvajes, galletas *Savoirdi* y otros ingredientes. Sin embargo, para sorpresa suya, encontró muchas de estas en Cochabamba (Bolivia).

Y, esas nuevas cocinas que conocieron, ¿les aportaron algo? Claro que sí. Andreas dice, “es casi lo único que hago cuando cocino en Dinamarca: comida de todo el mundo”. En España aprendió a preparar “gazpacho”, “guiso de frijoles”, “guiso de verduras y calamar”, “calamar al ajillo”, y cierta variedad de tapas. Del Ecuador, prepara batidos de fruta y “huevos pericos”, de México hace “salsa de chile”, burritos, guacamole y otros moles. Además, afirma con toda seguridad, que de la cultura culinaria de los Estados Unidos no se llevará nada. Él dice “aquí comen aún peor que en Dinamarca”. Renee ha preparado “empanadas” para su familia y amigos, para así mostrar el delicioso sabor de la comida de Colombia y, de Argentina, disfruta tomando mate en casa. Mientras tanto, Francesca, ha llevado consigo harina de maíz, pues no se consigue en las tiendas latinas de Italia, y el jugo de lulo no es natural sino en caja. “¡No es lo mismo!”, dice (principios de sabor).

De esta manera, se incorporan nuevos platos, nuevos ingredientes, nuevos sabores, nuevas experiencias. Como ocurrió con el latín, el eslavo, el germánico, el nórdico; o si tenemos en cuenta que el contacto de dos comunidades con lenguas diferentes deriva en el surgimiento de *pidgins* y, de este contacto, se llega a la creación de nuevas lenguas, como ocurrió con las lenguas criollas, por ejemplo; entonces también podríamos hablar de *cocinas en contacto*, lo cual, cada vez se da más frecuentemente por la migración. No obstante, se debe tener en cuenta que las costumbres alimentarias son las más arraigadas y de más difícil cambio en una comunidad.

4. Garnitura o acompañamiento

En una lengua hay combinaciones que resultan “de difícil digestión”. Una lengua no acepta cierto tipo de combinaciones entre su inventario, ya sea fonético, gramatical, semántico o discursivo. Pongamos un ejemplo fonético: en español una palabra no puede comenzar con la letra “s” seguida de otra consonante, como en inglés la palabra “smile” (sonrisa). Un hablante de español dirá “esmail”, asimilándolo así a las reglas fonéticas de su lengua. Por otro lado, en inglés no hay una diferenciación fonética entre “pero” y “perro” o “caro” y “carro”, ya que el inventario fonético inglés solo articula la vibrante retrofleja simple.

De igual manera ocurre con la cocina, hay alimentos o platos que resultan “agramaticales” en ciertas cocinas⁸. Por ejemplo, en Colombia, tenemos las hormigas culonas y el mojojoy⁹, de tal modo que los migrantes con cocinas donde el consumo de insectos no está gramaticalizado, no podrían consumirlos fácilmente (o pueden hacerlo, pero solo a manera de curiosidad, “por probar”). Incluso, pueden llegar a ser completamente incomibles o insoportables por personas extranjeras no acostumbradas a su consumo. También están los rasgos subjetivos en las fobias alimentarias, aquellas que nos hemos formado a lo largo de nuestra vida y por motivos diversos (pueden ser lo religioso, lo político, lo económico, lo estético, etc.).

Estos rechazos o disgustos alimentarios pueden ser de tipo cognoscitivo (no comemos los hongos si se sospecha de su toxicidad), de tipo sensorial (por estimulación gustativa, olfativa o de textura), inapropiados (lo no clasificado como comida) y de contaminación (por cercanía a uno de los anteriores), “podría decirse, pues, a fin de cuentas, que el disgusto consiste en una protección biológica reconstruida culturalmente” (Fischler 1995; 76).

Sobre estos rechazos, Ángela indicó que le resultaba desagradable el olor de los quesos y la textura de los caracoles en Francia. Mientras que le resulta difícil aceptar el olor del alioli (salsa a base de ajo) en España. Su disgusto es, principalmente, de tipo sensorial. En tanto que a Andreas le trae un mal recuerdo el consumo de ojos de pescado cuando estuvo en Ecuador, “nunca consideraré los ojos como algo que se podía comer”. Para él “tiene que ver con comer algo que te hace pensar que, lo que realmente estás haciendo, es comer un ser vivo”, encontrando así un ejemplo de consumo de lo inapropiado. Sobre la comida de su país, “no creo que haya un plato en especial. Sé que en Noruega tienen un pescado podrido¹⁰ que comen, pero para la mayoría de los turistas es absolutamente horrible”.

Francesca relata que “en Cerdeña se produce mucho un pecorino o queso de oveja.¹¹ Lo que pasa es que dejan los quesos madurar tanto que se forman gusanos grandes y blancos y la gente se los comen así, vivos, con sus pedacitos de queso”. En cuanto a las comidas que vio, le pareció increíble que en Perú y en Ecuador puedan comer cuy: “aquí [en Italia] se consideran mascotas, creo que a muchos europeos les daría asco o mucha tristeza el comérselos”. Por otro lado, Renee contó que sintió náuseas cuando le ofrecieron comer serpiente, “porque en casa tengo una serpiente como mascota y nunca consideraría comerme una”, siendo un disgusto de tipo *consumo inapropiado*, pues no consumimos mascotas.¹² De la cocina australiana, lo que más se destaca es el rechazo que se tiene al “vegemite”.¹³

A Pablo lo que más le ha causado repulsión fue la morcilla argentina por su consistencia “tiene mucha sangre y no lleva arroz como la colombiana”. También dice que, entre las comidas colombianas que más rechazo producen son las “hormigas culonas”, la lengua de vaca, el “mute”¹⁴ y la “pajarilla”.¹⁵ Y a Radek le causó gran repulsión la changua.¹⁶

Se aprecia que, en la mayoría de los casos, el disgusto fue de tipo sensorial: ya fuera por el olor, el sabor o el aspecto, o por considerar al alimento como no apropiado (es el caso de los ojos, de las mascotas y de los gusanos o insectos).

Por mi parte, tengo dos fobias alimentarias bien definidas: 1. No como nada que tenga más de cuatro patas ni menos de dos; y, 2. Tampoco me como un pescado que traiga la cabeza, no me gusta que me mire mientras me lo como.

5. A manera de café

“La identidad no existe en el origen, sino al final del recorrido”

M. Montanari

En la cocina migrante se mezclan sabores, colores, olores; a veces lejanos, a veces cercanos. En cuanto a los procesos (tipos de cocción), no hubo cambios que fueran lo suficiente importantes como para ser nombrados.

En definitiva, la cocina nos marca. El alimento es algo que no podemos evitar y, cuando nos movemos de nuestro espacio conocido, es necesario adaptarnos; ya sea adquiriendo nuevas expresiones culinarias, ya sea transformando nuestros platos. Somos animales de costumbre, estamos en constante construcción de nuestra identidad cuando necesitamos adaptarnos de forma fácil al entorno. Hay rasgos alimentarios que se mantienen pero, en ocasiones, no los podemos reproducir así que para el ‘chef/comensal’, la traducción/transformación se hace necesaria.

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(Endnotes)

¹ A nivel internacional no hay una definición universalmente aceptada del término 'migrante'. Este término abarca usualmente todos los casos en los que la decisión de migrar es tomada libremente por la persona concernida por 'razones de conveniencia personal' y sin intervención de factores externos que le obliguen a ello. Así, este término se aplica a las personas y a sus familiares que van a otro país o región con miras a mejorar sus condiciones sociales y materiales y sus perspectivas y las de sus familias, Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM Colombia 2014).

² Todos han vivido más de tres meses en los lugares de asentamiento para poder denominarse "migrantes".

³ Según Peirce, "285. Cualquier cosa que atraiga la atención es un índice. Cualquier cosa que nos sobresalte es un índice, en cuanto marca la articulación entre dos partes de una experiencia" (1978: 50). "276. Un ícono es un Representamen cuya Cualidad Representativa es una Primeridad de él en tanto Primero. Esto es, una cualidad que el ícono posee en tanto cosa lo vuelve apto para ser un Representamen. Así, cualquier cosa es apta para ser un Sustituto de otra cosa a la que es similar" (1978: 46).

⁴ Conocida en España como "patata", deformación entre "papa" y "batata". El nombre originario es un préstamo lingüístico del quechua "papa" y que es nombre usado en toda América Latina. (Moreno de Alba, J. 2014).

⁵ "Statistics for immigration into Argentina were first collected in 1857. In 1873, 26.878 Italians arrived. (...) Except for thirteen months in 1911-12, when the Italian government prohibited emigration to Argentina, the annual movement held close to 100,000 a year until the war brought it emphatically to a stop" (Foerster 1919: 17).

⁶ *Pavlova* es un postre australiano que recibe su nombre en honor a Anna Pávlova, bailarina rusa; *lamington* es una torta esponjosa con cubierta azucarada de chocolate y coco.

⁷ *Knedle* son *dumplings* de fruta; *kopytka* y *kluski śląskie* son parecidos a los *gnocchi* italianos; *barszcz* es una sopa roja con verduras, donde el principal ingrediente es el agua de cocción de la remolacha, y *żurek* es una sopa de centeno fermentado.

⁸ Sobre esta temática se pueden revisar Fischler 1995: 70-76; Harris 1989; y Douglas 1996: 152-165.

⁹ La hormiga culona u hormiga santandereana, del género *Atta*, es una tradición culinaria heredada de los indígenas. Solo la reina es comestible. También es consumida en México, Guatemala y Bolivia. El mojoyoy es una larva de cucarrón o escarabajo

¹⁰ Se trata del *surströmming*, se prepara con arenque que se deja fermentar de tres a seis meses. Puede encontrarse enlatado. Esto recuerda al *garum* que preparaban en la Antigua Grecia, es una salsa de pescado fermentado descrito por Apicius en *De re coquinaria*.

¹¹ El *casu marzu* es un pecorino sardo que se elabora con las larvas que deposita la mosca *Piophilacasei*.

¹² Es lo que ocurre con los gatos y perros en la comida vietnamita: "En Vietnam tienen la costumbre de comer animales considerados en otros países animales domésticos" (El Espectador 30.07.2014).

¹³ Pasta para untar sobre una tajada de pan o una tostada. Se elabora con extracto de la levadura sobrante en el proceso de producción de la cerveza, es altamente salado.

¹⁴ Sopa que se prepara con estómago de la res.

¹⁵ El páncreas de la res.

¹⁶ Sopa de agua y leche a la que se agrega un huevo cuando está hirviendo, se le adiciona una tostada, o "calado" que consiste en un pan sin levadura, cortada en trozos al momento de servir. Se come al desayuno con cebolleta y cilantro picados. En Venezuela no lleva pan, sino arepa.

CINEMA AND SEMIOTICS

UNE SÉMIOTIQUE DES ARTS DU SPECTACLE EST-ELLE POSSIBLE ?

André Helbo
Université libre de Bruxelles
Andre.Helbo@ulb.ac.be

Abstract

The sensitive problem of intermediality, adaptation, transposition the transition from one language to another gives the opportunity to raise a few questions that are common to the fields of both the performing arts and film. By the way it is time to raise the question of the (ir)relevance of a joint semiotics for these arts.

I will focus my attention on three types of questions:

- First, the place of externality in semiotics. By reconsidering the issue of the origin of meaning, as general semiotics does, the semiotics of performing arts and film opens the way for externalising theories (embodiment, the study of bios/life, theories of corporeity).
- Second, the issue of the researcher and in particular his or her exteriority regarding the object. Redefining the researcher's position towards both the performing arts and music as objects raises many questions, not least as to the dialogue with other disciplines (performance theories, neuroscience, cognitive science).

The third and last topic is that of the scientificity of the methodology. Although particularly relevant with regard to contemporary concerns centred on the subjectivity of the utterance (presence, effect of presence, intermediality, body-machine relations, etc.), does semiotics still have a universalising vocation? How can one reproduce the experience of subjectivity if we accept that the experience is an important process in semiotics?

1. Objectifs

Nous sommes un certain nombre à nous interroger sur les formes d'historicisation de notre discipline.

En filmologie, il est beaucoup question de Christian Metz : la grande syntagmatique fut un

moment de gloire des sémiotiques de la production, moment qui culmine par ce bel ouvrage posthume qu'est *L'énonciation impersonnelle* (Metz 1991) et que d'aucuns estiment indispensable de prolonger.

Cette étape, on l'a connue aussi dans les premiers temps de la sémiologie du théâtre, centrés sur la segmentation, les invariants, les plus petites unités. A l'heure où de grands changements de paradigmes ont eu lieu, – on parle aujourd'hui de spectacle vivant –, j'aurais pu moi aussi me demander à quelle distance nous nous trouvons d'Anne Ubersfeld, dont on se rend compte de plus en plus aujourd'hui qu'elle était proche d'une sémiotique du texte. Son hypothèse du *texte troué* (Ubersfeld 1977) qui réservait à la régie et à la mise en scène une juste place revenait cependant à préserver la toute-puissance du texte tout en élargissant la texture spectaculaire. Cette démarche a été repensée par des théories ultérieures comme celle du postdramatique de Hans-Thies Lehmann (Lehmann, 2002) qui conteste le textocentrisme et la prééminence de la fable.

Or le poids de la narrativité est sans doute une des lignes de crête qui sépare théâtre (plateau, mise en scène primitive) et film (diégèse, contre-champ). Le paradigme du vivant a réorienté la recherche vers la question du corps et de la régulation des émotions : on est en train de redécouvrir sous un angle présémiotique les études de Meyerhold et les travaux de Stanislavski sur le rapport entre corps et émotion, qui repense le problème des unités qu'on croyait dépassé par la recherche sur l'externalisation du sens.

J'ai souhaité saisir l'occasion de ce congrès pour poser une question provocatrice, à contre-courant, et qui concerne les limites d'une sémiotique du spectacle. A l'heure où les barrières entre les sciences humaines perdent de leur robustesse, une sémiotique des arts du spectacle est-elle possible ?

Je pose ainsi la question du tournant des études contemporaines, au moment où la recherche sur le spectateur, sur l'événement spectaculaire, sur la cognition incarnée, le travail sur le corps, le bios, le dialogue pluridisciplinaire avec les neurosciences, l'anthropologie, les *performance theories* impriment de nouvelles orientations à la recherche en spectacle vivant. Ces perspectives semblent en apparence nous éloigner de plus en plus de la sémiotique du film (du plan) tout en nous rapprochant d'une sémiotique des médias (du flux, de la communication clivée). Quelle réponse la sémiotique, et en particulier la réflexion sur les origines externes du sens, peut-elle apporter à l'analyse des processus complexes du vivant.

Une distinction fondamentale à opérer oppose le *spectacle* comme pratique instituée par convention supposant une scène (un mode de représentation primitif : frontalité, cour et jardin) et un observateur (du spectacle vivant, p.e. le concert, la performance) au *spectaculaire*, qualité liée à une compétence modale, qui permet de regarder comme un spectacle n'importe quel faire, n'importe quelle performance ou pratique dans une situation qui n'est pas un spectacle reçu comme tel par convention. Le théâtre et le film projeté dans une salle sont *spectaculaires* à des degrés divers dans la mesure où ils sont regardés comme des pratiques qui font sens pour le spectateur et qui se démarquent à des degrés divers de la réalité. Ils font sens dans la situation regardée comme spectaculaire.

On parle de convention anthropologique du spectacle vivant pour désigner des mécanismes de mise en sens spectaculaire transitoires par rapport à la réalité que je regarde autrement : le billet d'entrée, le vestiaire, l'entracte, le rideau signalent que le monde possible est celui que délimitent les frontières du théâtre. Ces seuils spectaculaires sont fragiles, voire poreux : le cirque joue avec les codes qui permettent de faire sens, il fraie en permanence avec un basculement possible dans la réalité, la difficulté étant la limite du risque. Le dompteur peut se faire dévorer « vraiment » par le lion, l'acrobate peut tomber « réellement ». Le numéro chiqué simule les risques, et rappelle l'intérêt de la prouesse qui se joue du réel en scène. Le théâtre aussi au moment de l'entracte suspend les règles de la convention pour réinsérer un discours naturel dans

les limites de la convention.

De nombreuses formes du spectacle vivant exhibent cette limite spectaculaire, ce processus de mise en seuil : elles ont pour objet la condition même d'observation qui les rend spectaculaires; ces pratiques exposent le réel et le titre de la pièce devient un programme (tel Rodrigo Garcia dans *A mon retour du supermarché, j'ai flanqué une raclée à mon fils, j'ai acheté une pelle chez ikea pour creuser ma tombe, Fille de pute*) qui invite le spectateur à modifier son vécu de la situation.

Au cinéma, la médiation écranique et les processus d'indentification relèguent cette anthropologie de la convention aux étapes de la production énoncée que le réalisateur, et non le spectateur, est amené à vivre.

2. Une analyse comparative des sémiotiques

Trois questions découlent de la comparaison entre théâtre et cinéma du point de vue sémiotique.

2.1. Première question : le statut sémiotique du visuel

Peut-on parler d'image scénique au même titre que d'image filmique? On a souvent dit que la dimension visuelle du spectacle théâtral (spectare) repose sur un impensé anthropologique qui présuppose que le théâtre serait destiné seulement à être vu. C'est une position européenne : l'anthropologie théâtrale nous rappelle qu'il existe pourtant des formes de spectacle rasiq (en Inde) qui font appel à tous les sens, certains metteurs en scène cuisinent en scène, certains performeurs privilégient le toucher. Les recherches sur la proprioception, la sémiotique du sensible, confirment le danger d'amblyopie qui consisterait à réserver le spectacle au seul canal visuel sans se poser la question du statut de l'image.

L'image filmique, autant que le spectacle théâtral, constitue des lieux de *focalisation* grâce à des dispositifs d'encadrement. Le cadre ou la conscience spectaculaire font du *je suis*, je suis au théâtre, je suis au cinéma, la condition du mode d'adhésion du spectateur au spectacle.

Ce *je suis* est identitaire pour le spectateur immergé dans la salle obscure et dans son enveloppe sonore, il l'est tout autant pour le spectateur de théâtre dont le regard observateur non intervenant est la condition du cadre théâtral.

Dans le cas du théâtre le cadre est lié à la démarche du *spectateur*. L'observateur apparaît comme une espèce de signal qui invite à franchir un seuil, à appréhender comme spectaculaire un événement, une situation doublement interprétable (comme « réalité » ou comme fiction). Il convoque une compétence modale. Sa présence sémiotique fait que le regard divise, fracture. C'est parce que le regard fait scission, que la souffrance vécue dans sa chair et exhibée par Angelica Lidell, la performeuse qui se scarifie, est perçue comme spectaculaire, peut-être comme métaphore d'une autre violence du monde. L'observateur met à distance, cadre l'événement, contraint celui-ci, l'enferme dans un pacte de convention partagée.

Dans le cas du cinéma, le cadre est lié au regard du *réalisateur*. La production précède la réception. L'image filmique, concerne l'observation de parcours perceptifs déjà *déployés* dans une diachronie, il y a une forme d'énonciation énoncée (intersubjectivité inscrite et prescriptive) qui exclut l'observateur de la coconstruction, ou plus exactement prescrit les manières de lire l'image. Ce qui n'est pas le cas du théâtre. L'image scénique *concentre au contraire* dans une même topologie tous les parcours perceptifs qu'on effectue dans la diachronie (car, face à une image, on peut opérer une lecture linéaire mais aussi tabulaire) et elle les déploie simultanément *in vivo, in praesentia*.

2.2. Deuxième question : l'origine du sens

En réexaminant la question de l'origine du sens, comme le fait la sémiotique générale, la sémiotique du spectacle vivant ouvre la voie aux théories externalisantes (embodiment, étude du bios, théories de la corporéité).

Mais ce fut loin d'être le cas jadis. La recherche scientifique en arts du spectacle vivant a posé sur son objet des regards portant d'abord sur la méthodologie des descriptions (sémiotique interprétative). On peut citer la problématique de la notation, conçue d'abord en arts du spectacle sur le modèle des découpages descriptifs transmis par la tradition pratique des gens de scène. Mais que note-t-on et avec quels outils ? Il existe des procédures permettant de capter la production en cours de création. En danse, ces dispositifs de notation émanent de maîtres à danser; parfois ils portent sur le mouvement : ils saisissent aussi le rapport à la musique au fil de la création. Parfois la photographie est un outil de notation du mouvement. Au théâtre, il existe une notation génétique : travail à la table, plateau, premières versions, versions travaillées, filages, conduite des représentations et reprises. En un premier temps, prolongeant ces préoccupations, certains sémioticiens de la représentation se sont intéressés à la question des plus petites unités, des « invariants » et de leur articulation.

C'est incontestablement une démarche où le rapprochement avec les premières sémiologies du film s'impose ; je rappellerai pour mémoire la question du plan, de la syntagmatique. Une différence marquée dans le mode de production justifie le développement des études d'invariant au cinéma : c'est la dissociation entre les étapes de réalisation et de réception. Alors que le spectacle vivant se caractérise par son aspect éphémère, le cinéma joue la pérennité puisque la production est antérieure à la projection. Une interrogation sur le montage, sur la segmentation paraît plus légitime.

Ce qui explique que très rapidement cette procédure d'étude du découpage suscite des questions sur la posture du chercheur en spectacle vivant et sur la nature de son objet d'investigation. Bien vite des tentatives plus critiques ont eu lieu portant sur la réception, adoptant le questionnement du spectateur : comment garder la trace scientifique (objective, exhaustive, reproductible) du spectacle ? En musique on parle de trace narrative laissée dans la mémoire de l'auditeur. Au théâtre, à l'opéra, le récepteur, soumis au régime du tableau qui casse la narrativité, ne peut reconstituer des processus, des vectorisations, des copies verbales sans passer par le rendu de sa propre perception (du vécu de l'événement).

La question principale est donc devenue celle de la modélisation de l'expérience: comment peut-on rendre compte de pratiques croisées, complexes et protéiformes (spectacle vivant : théâtre, danse, opéra, cirque, arts de la rue, concert), quels sont les paradigmes et dispositifs mobilisés ; l'objet spectacle existe-t-il ?

Une sémiotique expérientielle s'impose aujourd'hui dans les modélisations (Helbo et al. 2013). Les notions de présence et de corporéité soudent production et réception du sens dans la contemporanéité : le spectateur invente le sens, l'émotion en même temps que l'acteur et sans médiation.

2.3. Troisième question : qu'est-ce qu'un savoir expert en spectacle vivant ?

L'évolution suscite un passage de la sémiotique interprétative à l'interrogation sur le spectateur expert. Le questionnement sur le chercheur et en particulier sur son extériorité face à l'objet réoriente radicalement la recherche. L'objet performance pose la question de la compétence modale du spectateur. La redéfinition de la posture du chercheur tant face à l'objet spectacle vivant qu'à l'objet filmique suscite des interrogations notamment quant au dialogue avec d'autres disciplines (théories de la performance, neurosciences, sciences cognitives). La problématique englobe aussi celle de la scientificité de la démarche. Particulièrement pertinente par rapport

aux préoccupations contemporaines centrées sur la subjectivité dans l'énonciation (la présence, l'effet de présence, l'intermédialité, le rapport corps-machine, etc.), la sémiotique a-t-elle encore vocation universalisante : comment peut-on reproduire l'expérience de la subjectivité ?

Cette question de l'expérience peut-elle se poser dans les mêmes termes au théâtre et au cinéma ? L'objet spectacle vivant peut-il être appréhendé comme le film. Quel est le statut d'existence de l'objet ?

3. Mutation de l'objet-spectacle

Pratiquant le paradoxe de Wittgenstein qui élabore un modèle lié à son objet, on remarque que certaines pratiques artistiques réflexives ont intégré les modèles sémiotiques pour déboucher sur de nouveaux modes relationnels.

Au cinéma, on parle de physicalité de la projection, certaines salles d'art et d'essai réintroduisant des projecteurs des années 50 pour restituer une dimension performative à la projection.

Du côté du film, de plus en plus de créations placent le spectateur dans une position de spectateur de théâtre. Elles renoncent à la sécurité du montage, pour laisser au spectateur le soin de reconstruire son scénario à partir d'images sans fil narratif cohérent. Peter Greenaway joue par exemple dans *Prospero's Book* le cadrage contre la diégèse. Comme au théâtre, le spectateur renoue les fils, se fait son cinéma. De ce point de vue, le théâtre d'images (Castellucci) tout en élaborant une écriture de plateau invite aussi à un travail de reconstruction, à un montage dont le spectateur est l'artisan.

Dans certaines pratiques du spectacle vivant, l'expérience des processus sémiotiques est radicalement centrale.

- Le réel en scène sans médiation. La performance (Lidell, Rodrigo Garcia) affirme la prévalence du corps ou met en scène le réel (chez Rimini Protokoll : la réalité judiciaire ou la clinique du malade palliatif, le personnel licencié de la Sabena) et fait éclater le paradigme de la représentation ; ce rapport au réel n'exclut pas le recours à l'image filmée, au contraire il l'impose. On voit apparaître sur scène des projections, des extraits de journal télévisé, des images publicitaires (*La dame aux camélias* de Castorf d'après Dumas, Bataille et Heiner Muller). On s'interrogera sur le statut de cette image en scène, qui demeure observée dans un cadre spectaculaire, contrainte qui est celle du spectacle théâtral. Il y a un effet lié au surgissement du réel en scène et qui est celui de la violence extrême
- L'immersion. Dans la dernière production de Rimini Protokoll *Cargo Sofia* (Kaegi), les spectateurs sont assis dans un camion par les fenêtres duquel ils voient à la fois l'environnement qui défile, les rencontres fortuites des camionneurs sur les aires de repos et des films retraçant leurs longs voyages. C'est ainsi qu'ils prennent part au monde des camionneurs roulant pour des salaires misérables à travers l'Europe. Le camion se met en route : double circulation virtuelle et réelle dans laquelle le spectateur se trouve englouti. La réalité au théâtre ne bouleverse nulle part aujourd'hui autant que dans ce travail de Rimini Protokoll.
- On parle pour d'autres spectacles d'intermédialité, d'hybridation ; les écrans sont sur scène chez Murgias, Lesage. La technologie permet de simuler la présence, à travers des *effets de présence*, (même lorsque le corps est absent, il peut donner l'impression d'être présent grâce à certains effets), à des prothèses technologiques, des illusions, du monde virtuel. Parfois le procédé est très simple comme dans *Hansel et Gretel* où des moniteurs vidéos remplacent des êtres vivants et donnent la réplique aux comédiens présents en scène. On a la sensation d'être dans un espace augmenté où la narration nie progressivement la séparation entre la perception du réel et sa transformation par écran vidéo. Parfois l'effet est plus sophistiqué tel le Pepper Ghost Effect chez D4 Arts (Lemeieux et Pilon,

Montréal) ou Robert Lepage. IL s'agit d'un procédé montrant sur une glace sans tain le reflet d'un acteur placé devant un projecteur et face à un miroir sous la scène : la glace faisant croire à une présence scénique alors qu'on ne montrait que l'image. Ici au lieu de projeter une image, on projette une image vidéo. L'effet de présence peut aussi se marquer dans le son à travers l'orchestration, les voix de synthèse, les playbacks, la postsynchronisation, les voix chantées, les cris comme *Lipsynch*.

- Le théâtre contemporain, notamment postdramatique, s'inscrit résolument dans ce que j'ai appelé un mouvement de médiaturgie qui traduit non seulement des thématiques médiatiques (Falk Richter travaille sur la webcam, le Wooster Group travaille sur les Call center, le décalage horaire, le montage en scène d'émissions télévisées), mais aussi sur des techniques réceptives (Blast Theory propose des spectacles par SMS), ou des techniques scénographiques utilisées au cinéma et à la télévision. Cette médiaturgie a pour objet principal le dialogue entre la présence et l'effet de présence : elle thématise une problématique qu'Auslander a qualifiée de liveness (direct, présence) et qui est proche du direct ou du direct médiatisé par l'écran (la webcam). Le théâtre renonce à la vision directe pour intégrer des visions induites.

4. Pour conclure

La mise en scène, à partir d'Artaud, revendique sa nature pédagogique. Elle *fait voir* à la fois le plateau (la performance) et la fiction. Elle revendique une nouvelle épistémè, un savoir intime de l'incorporation (par exemple l'anthropologie théâtrale chez Barba) qui réoriente le savoir expert vers le jeu, la mise en scène, la scénographie, le travail du corps.

Et suscite un nouveau type de spectateur expert, attentif aux processus plutôt qu'aux produits, et susceptible de participer autrement à la création : on assiste à la naissance d'un public qui n'escorte plus l'œuvre mais qui contribue à constituer celle-ci. L'événement théâtral s'affirme dans sa performativité, modalité qui le différencie du film.

Face à un objet en mutation, peut-on encore parler d'arts du spectacle autrement qu'au pluriel ; une sémiotique unifiée est-elle possible ? Il semble bien qu'en dépit de l'utilisation conjointe de techniques hybrides auquel l'objet théâtre fait appel, les méthodologies sémiotiques du spectacle sont appelées à poursuivre leur développement dans des voies séparées.

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COMICS IN MOTION: THE INTERSEMIOTIC TRANSLATION OF COMICS INTO FILM

Federico Zecca
University of Udine
federicozecca@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper aims at investigating the ways in which cinema “repeats” and transposes – in a word *translates*, in an inter-semiotic sense – comics. My analysis will be grounded on an original theoretical approach, combining Descriptive Translation Studies, Glossematics and Generative Semiotics. On the one hand – drawing on Itamar Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory and Gideon Toury’s descriptive translation theory –, I will consider the translation of comics into film in terms of “acceptability” to the (cinematic) target system, rather than in terms of adequacy or “fidelity” to the (comics) source text. On the other – drawing on Louis Hjelmslev linguistic theory and on Algirdas J. Greimas semiotic theory – I will identify different “levels” of translation, distinguishing among three linguistic planes (expression, content and text).

Following these theoretical premises, my paper will be articulated in two parts. First of all, I will try to identify the “norms” and constraints (imposed by the target system) that regulate the acceptability of the cinematic translation of comics. In particular, I will make a distinction among technological/linguistic, economical, and institutional constraints, focusing in particular on the first ones. Through a series of examples, I will thus investigate which elements of comics can be translated into film, and how. I will identify three different translation processes – duplication, transformation, obliteration –, depending on whether elements of comics succeed in “passing through” the above-mentioned cinematic constraints or are instead deeply transformed, or even “rejected”, by the target system. In the second part of this paper, then, I will outline a taxonomy of the main “translative relations” between videogame and cinema, identifying four different intersemiotic levels: the intertextual, the interexpressive, the interdiscursive, and the intersystemic. I will focus on the main linguistic forms pertaining to each level (quotation, allusion, adaptation), with examples taken from contemporary international film production.

1. Introduction

This paper presents some theoretical and analytical tools for the study of “intersemiotic relations,” that is the relations established between two or more texts belonging to different semiotic and medial systems. In particular, it focuses on the relations established between film texts and comics texts – or more precisely, on the relations developed by film texts *towards* comics texts in the digital era. My argument considers these relations as the result or, better, the “logical consequence” of a translation; it is, more precisely, an “intersemiotic translation” that involves texts semiotically different from each other. At the end of the Fifties, the category of intersemiotic translation was introduced by Roman Jakobson, who defined it as “an interpretation of a verbal sign by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems” (1959: 233). Later discussions in this field brought the category – as Gianfranco Marrone (1998: 125) writes – to be “reinterpreted from a rigorously semiotic point of view,” depriving verbal signs of any “function of general interpretant,” and considering instead every sign system at the same “level,” “regardless of the matter of expression they employ.” Thus, today the category of intersemiotic translation is generally used (Dusi 2003) to describe the re-production of a source-text (or part of it) belonging to a source-system (here, the comics system) in a target-text (or part of it), which belongs to a target-system (here, the cinematic system).

Before delving deeper into the matter, however, there is the need to point out two further remarks about how to understand here the concept of translation (both intersemiotic and intrasemiotic). First of all, I consider the translation process in a broad Lotmanian sense (Lotman and Uspenskij [1970] 1975; Lotman 1985), that is as a general cultural-semiotic process which underlies the transfer and the re-production of *every* semiotic unit (whatever form they have and whatever size they have) from a source-text to a target-text. Within this framework, every intertextual relation (both intersemiotic and intrasemiotic) is thus founded on a previous translation, that is on the transfer of some elements from a text to another text – the elements that therefore constitute the relation itself. In addition to Jurij M. Lotman, the main references here are Anton Popovič’s ([1975] 2006) category of “intertextual invariant” and Peeter Torop’s ([1995] 2010) discussion of “total translation.”

Secondly, I consider translations as “facts” (Gideon Toury’s (1995 [2012]: 23) of the target semiotic, medial and cultural system. In this perspective, translations (both intersemiotic and intrasemiotic) always originate *within* the target-system. For this reason, I believe translations can be more profitably studied in a target-oriented perspective, which means taking into account the norms and constraints employed by the target-system to regulate the transfer process. In fact, these norms and constraints have the purpose to conform the source-text to the structure of the target-system or, in other words, to adapt the source-text to the internal requirements of the target-system. My references here are, among others, Itamar Even-Zohar’s (1990) Polysystem Theory and Gideon Toury’s (2012) Descriptive Translation Theory.

2. The translation process

Moving from these premises, I will now draw a general overview of the intersemiotic translation process, which is outlined in the following scheme (table 1). According to it, the intersemiotic translation process is based (1) on the involvement of at least two media, a source-medium (M1) and a target-medium (M2); (2) on the transfer of semiotic units from a source-text, produced inside the source-medium, to a target-text, re-produced inside the target-medium. Drawing on Even-Zohar’s Polysystem Theory (1990), I conceive the two media as polysystems (PS1 and PS2), each composed of different sub-systems (S) both of semiotic and non-semiotic nature (i.e. socio-economic, institutional, technological etc.). Every sub-system contributes to the production of a text (or parts of it) inside the source-system, and to the re-production of this text (or parts of it) inside the target-system.




Table 1: The translation process: A general outline.

Due to issues of space here, it is not possible to describe the translation process in detail. I will thus focus only on the transfer mechanism. As it is possible to see from the scheme, I account for at least three different transfer typologies, depending on the capacity of the source-text elements to pass through the border of the target-polysystem. It is possible to identify (1) a “duplication” process (TP1) when some elements pass through the border of the target-polysystem without any changes; (2) a “conformation” process (TP2) when some elements undergo a transformation in order to be accepted by the target-polysystem; (3) and an “expunction” process (TP3) when some elements are rejected by the target-polysystem due to their incompatibility. The “border” (B) of the target-polysystem plays a central role in this process. Paraphrasing Lotman (1985: 59), the border represents the “sum” of the socio-semiotic constraints that regulate the translation. More precisely, these constraints regulate how (and how much of) the source-text can be translated into the target-polysystem.

But how many constraints are there? And what is their nature? Drawing again on Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory (1990: 31), I identify at least three macro-typologies of constraints: economic constraints, institutional constraints, and semiotic constraints. For reasons of space, I cannot examine these issues in depth here. Thus, I will only give an example that highlights the role of economic and institutional constraints – which include, among other things, business models and censorship laws – and then I will analyse the semiotic constraints.

I will compare the movie *The Amazing Spider-Man* (Marc Webb, 2012) to the comic book mini-series *Torment* (written and pencilled by Todd McFarlane in 1990), one of the primary source-texts of the movie. It is easy to notice that gore, one of the distinctive figurative elements of the comic book, has been almost completely expunged from the film adaptation. It has probably occurred because the translation of the comics into film has been regulated by economic and institutional constraints. The movie was in fact meant to enter a specific market sector, that of the early teen-agers, who purportedly have been (and still are) the main readers of the comic book franchise. So, first of all, there was an economic constraint at play. To achieve this aim, the movie necessarily had to be rated PG-13 (i.e. unsuitable for children under thirteen), according to the US film industry rating system, which is very strict regarding gore. If the movie had been rated NC-17 (which is the next category in the rating system), no one under Seventeen would be admitted to the screenings, causing the movie to lose a big part of its potential audience. By

removing any gore element, instead, the producers have maintained the possibility to address the movie's potential "natural" audience. Therefore, the PG-13 rating represents an institutional constraint, related to the US film industry and its self-censorship code, which has regulated the cinematic translation of the comic book in concurrence with an economic constraint, related to a specific commercial requirement.

The semiotic constraints concern the semiotic differences of the languages involved in the translation process and their potential "translatability." Focusing on the relationship between cinema and comics, the following scheme can be outlined (table 2):




Table 2: From comics to cinema: Semiotic constraints and translatability.

On the content plane, provided there are not any institutional and economical constraints involved, the content form and substance of the comics text (i.e. its narrative and discursive structure) can be potentially subjected to a total duplication in the film's content form and substance, by being then re-semiotized through the expressive substances of the target-medium. On the expression plane, there is a "conformation" process that involves two main processes: the transmutation of the comics expression substances and forms – for example, from hand-drawn still pictures to live-action moving pictures – and the shift of part of the comics expression form from the original comics substances to the cinematic substances – for example, a dialogue between two characters shifts from the substance "graphic form of written words" to the substance "phonetic sound of [spoken words]," as Christian Metz would say ([1971] 1974: 16).

However, the translation process should not be conceived as an overall "passive" and conservative process; on the contrary, sometimes a translation can "force" the border (and even move it), allowing some non-conforming or less-conforming figures to pass through it. For instance, on the expression plane this "forcing" can cause what Metz calls "semiotic interferences" (1974: 228), which occur when the target-text features an expressive unit that pertains to the source-semiotic system. It is possible to find an example of semiotic interferences in *Scott Pilgrim vs the World* (Edgar Wright, 2010) – the film adaptation of the comic book series by the same name (2004–2010), created by Bryan Lee O'Malley – where the movie features some comics-like onomatopoeia (figure 1).



Fig. 1: Semiotic interferences in *Scott Pilgrim vs the World*.

3. A taxonomy of intersemiotic relations

I will now proceed to deepen the analysis of the translation transfer and of the intersemiotic relations it determines. Here, the framework of reference is Structural and Generative Semiotics (Greimas and Courtés [1979] 1993) and Louis Hjelmslev’s glossematics (Hjelmslev [1943] 1969). For Hjelmslev a sign (and a text, more generally) is “an entity generated by the connection between an expression [plane] and a content [plane]” (1969: 47). For this connection the author uses the term “sign function” (1969: 47). Moreover, Hjelmslev maintains that “both the expression plane and the content plane are further stratified into semiotic form and substance” (Nöth [1990] 1995: 66). The author contends that, before being formed in a proper sign, both the expression and the content are semiotically amorphous matters. To become substance, in fact, the matter must be structured, that is organized in a specific and invariant form (Hjelmslev 1969: 52–53). Drawing on these premises, I believe that the translation transfer can be productively analysed through the following model (table 3):




Table 3: The translation transfer: an analytical model.

According to this model, the units' transfer from the source-text to the target-text can occur first of all on three different levels of semiotic "depth:" the expression plane, the content plane, and the textual level. More precisely, this transfer can involve (1) elements that constitute the source-text's expression and/or content form – what Hjelmslev calls "figures," which are non-signs that "enter into a sign system as *parts* of signs [emphasis mine]" (1969: 46); (2) "real" signs, which are already manifested textual units. In the first case, the transfer implies the re-making of the source-text's content or/and expression figures: the figures are re-semiotized through the target-text's language, which means they are re-employed to produce a new sign. In the second case, instead, the transfer is based on the "repositioning" of integral signs from the source-text to the target-text.

Furthermore, as illustrated by the table above, the semiotic depth is intertwined with another factor, that of the semiotic "width" of the transfer. This other axis describes the "amount" of elements transferred from one text to another. More precisely, the width of the transfer oscillates between two ideal "extreme" poles: "punctuality" and "extensiveness." In the first case, the transfer involves specific figures, single texts units, a limited set of features, and so on; in the second, the transfer involves semiotic entities of bigger "size," for instance the whole narrative structure of the source-text, its discursive configuration, and/or broad portions of its textual structure.

However, the model proposed here can be articulated further. Using it as a backbone, it is possible to build a taxonomy of intersemiotic relations depending on the "site" in which the translation transfer occurs. This site is determined by the intertwining of two main factors: the plane of language, i.e. the expression/content axis seen above; and the aspect of language, i.e. the text (process)/system axis, as it is defined by structural semiotics. According to Structural Semiotics, the system is the set of possibilities that characterise a language, while the text (or process) represents an actual combination and manifestation of some of these possibilities (Floch 1985: 193). The connection between the system and the text is provided by an enunciative instance, that is by an "instance of mediation" (Greimas and Courtés 1993: 126) which transforms and converts the possibilities of the system into actual discourses. Through the superimposition of the plane of language axis on the aspect of language axis, it is possible to build the following taxonomy of intersemiotic relations (Table 4):




Table 4: Taxonomy of intersemiotic relations.

As the table above shows, depending on the site in which the translation transfer occurs, it is therefore possible to identify four macro-typologies of intersemiotic relations: interexpressive relations, based on the transfer of expression figures from a source-text to a target-text; interdiscursive relations, based on the transfer of discursive figures from a source-text to a target-text; intertextual relations, based on the transfer of “real” textual units from a source-text to a target-text; and intersystemic relations, based on the transfer of expression or content figures from a source-system to a target-text. The first three typologies are founded on the “horizontal” transfer of figures from a source-text to the target-text; the fourth typology is founded instead on the “vertical” transfer of figures from a source-system to a target-text.

Drawing on Greimasian generative semiotics, it is possible to distinguish the transferred figures according to their mode of semiotic existence (Greimas and Courtés 1993: 138-139). More precisely, it is possible to make a distinction among virtual figures, actual figures, and realized figures. The first ones are systemic figures, i.e. figures that pertain to a semiotic system and that have not been taken on by any enunciative instance; the second ones are discursive figures, i.e. more “concrete” figures that have already been enunciated, i.e. already put into discourse, but that have not been (yet) textually manifested; the third ones are textual figures, i.e. figures that have already been wholly manifested through one or more matters of expression. Starting from these premises, it is possible to say that the interdiscursive and the interexpressive relations are grounded on the transfer of actual figures from a source-text to a target-text; the intertextual relations are grounded on the transfer of realized figures from a source-text to a target-text; the intersystemic relations are grounded on the transfer of virtual figures from a source-system to a target-text.

Through the model here outlined it is possible to understand which transfer procedures constitute different intersemiotic relations and forms. For instance, the above-mentioned semiotic interferences in *Scott Pilgrim vs the World* are based on the punctual transfer into the movie of some expressive figures of the comics’ system (that is the onomatopoeia), which in return constitutes some intersystemic relations between the film text and the comics’ system. Or, the movie *V for Vendetta* (James McTeigue, 2005) – the film adaptation of the comic book series by the same name (1982-1985) written by Alan Moore and pencilled by David Lloyd – is grounded on the extensive cinematic transfer of the comic book series’ discursive structure (i.e. the story and the plot), which in return constitutes an extensive interdiscursive relation between the movie and the comic book series. Or again, the title sequence of *Sin City* (Robert Rodriguez, 2005) – the film adaptation of the comic book series of the same name (1991–2000), created by Frank Miller – is based on the punctual transfer into the movie of some textual fragments of the comic book series (i.e. some of the actual comic book’s drawings), which in return constitutes some punctual intertextual relations between the film text and the comic book series (figure 2).



Fig. 2: An example of intertextual relations in the title sequence of *Sin City*.

4. *Sin City*: A case study

To further illustrate the model outlined in the last section, I will now proceed to analyse the movie *Sin City*. As just mentioned above, this movie is the film adaptation of the comic book series by the same name written and pencilled by Frank Miller and published by Dark Horse between 1991 and 2000. In particular, the movie draws on the volumes *The Hard Goodbye* (1991–1992), *The Big Fat Kill* (1994–1995), and *That Yellow Bastard* (1996) – respectively the first, the third and the fourth of the series –, and on the one-shot “The Customer Is Always Right” (1994), collected in the fifth volume of the series, *Booze, Broads & Bullets*. Every volume, as well as the one-shot, are translated into a specific episode of the movie.

Sin City is the result of a complex translation in which different transfer processes intertwine with one another. First of all, the movie is based on the extensive transfer of the content plane’s form of the source-comic books. In other words, *Sin City* takes both its story and its plot (or *récit*) from the comic books: on the one hand, it draws its narrative universe and diegetic world from the comic books – or better, their existents (characters and settings) and events (actions and happenings), as Seymour Chatman would argue (1978 [1980]: 32); on the other hand, the film replicates the same narrative means through which the story is delivered in the comic books – and more precisely, its temporal organisation, its focalization processes, and its narrator types, in Gérard Genette’s words ([1972] 1983: 35; 189-190; 228-229; 245).

For instance, the movie’s opening sequence can be used to further support and exemplify some of the points made. The sequence, composed by 16 takes, is the cinematic translation of the one-shot “The Customer Is Always Right,” composed by 10 panels distributed on three pages. If compared to the comic book, the film sequence shows the same characters (the professional killer and the young women waiting to die) making the same actions or being subjected to the same events (the killer offers the girl a cigarette; he hugs and kisses her; and he shoots her with a silenced gun) in the same space and time (a terrace of a building in Basin City, during a rainy night). In Greimasian terms, the film sequence entirely takes from the comic book both its semantic “isotopies” (i.e. its thematic and figurative configurations) and its syntactic structure (i.e. its time, space, and actors) (Greimas and Courtés 1993: 198; 379–380). At the same time, the sequence tells this story through the same linear order, the same singulative frequency and

the same synchronic duration (Genette 1983: 34–35; 114) employed in the comic book's plot. Moreover, it employs the same type of narrator (extradiegetic-homodiegetic) and the same focalization strategy (external) (Genette 1983: 228–229; 245; 190). The sequence is therefore based on the extensive transfer and re-production of the comic book's narrative.

However, the translation of the source-comic books into the movie involves at least one *other dimension*. *Sin City* is also based, in fact, on the extensive transfer of the comic books' expression plane (or at least of some of its sub-levels). Drawing on Algirdas J. Greimas' ([1984] 1989: 627–649) notion of "plastic" semiotics, it is possible to say that the transfer involves primarily the chromatic and eidetic categories (Greimas 1989: 639–641) that articulate the source-comic book's expression plane. In other words, *Sin City* re-employs the very same "colours" and "forms" employed in the comic book. On the one hand, the film draws from the comic book the same high-contrast and expressionist black and white, and the same primary colours that occasionally "paint" some of the comic book's figures (such as the yellow of "that yellow bastard" in the fourth episode of the movie). On the other hand, the film re-employs the same outlines and contours that shape the comic book's spatial and actorial figures (e.g. the silhouettes of the buildings or the facial physiognomy of the characters). To sum up, the movie is based both on the extensive transfer of the comic book's content plane and on the extensive transfer of the comic book's chromatic and eidetic expressive sub-levels.

What just described can be read as the "global" translation strategy (to use a term formerly employed by Nicola Dusi [2003: 75–76]) that underlies the film in its entirety and its relationship with its source-texts. However, *Sin City* is also based on some other "local" translation tactics – i.e. tactics based on punctual transfers –, which cooperate to increase the intensity of the "global" strategy itself. As an example, I will compare two panels drawn from the volume *The Hard Goodbye* with the two film shots that represent their "filmic" translation (figures 3, 4).



Fig. 3: From the comic book to the movie: The "global" translation strategy.

In the first case (figure 3), the panel is translated into the shot according to the "global" translation strategy that underlies the whole movie. First of all, on the content plane, the shot reproduces the same fragment of the story (and of the plot) that is represented by the original panel: Marv tortures the hit man that has been sent to kill him, shooting him in a non-vital point, in order to extort information about the mysterious murder of the woman he loved (the prostitute Goldie). More precisely, both the panel and the film shot focus on Marv's efforts to gain the necessary "competence" (the knowing) in order to avenge Goldie, his "object of desire." Furthermore, on the expression plane, the shot reemploys the same eidetic and chromatic categories of the comic book: the high-contrast black and white, the sharp chiaroscuro, and the general "form" of the settings and characters (with significant work on the actors' makeup and digitally-enhanced set design).

Instead, in the second case (figure 4) the filmic translation of the panel is the product of a further translation investment, regarding in particular its expressive dimension and his general sign function. Like in the previous example, on the content plane the shot reproduces the same fragment of the story (and of the plot) presented by the panel: Goldie's twin sister Wendy hides in an alley spying on Marv, who she believes to be her sister's murderer. In the film shot, Wendy embodies the same actantial status she was characterized by in the original panel: from the narrative point of view, she is modalised as an opponent, characterized by a "wrong" knowing, who wants to kill Marv; from the enunciative point of view, she is an "observing subject" (Fontanille 1989: 17–21), who brings an internal point of view in the discourse.



Fig. 4: The translation of the "sign function."

On the expression plane, however, the shot diverges from the previous one for a fundamental reason. In this shot, in fact, forms and colours appear in the same position in which they are arranged in the comic book's panel. Drawing again on Greimas' plastic semiotics, it is possible to see that this shot is based not only on the transfer of the chromatic and eidetic categories of the source-panel, but also on the transfer of its topological categories, which, according to the Lithuanian semiotician (Greimas [1984] 1989: 14–15), underlie the positioning of the elements on the planar surface. Therefore, the shot re-enacts through the cinematic expressive substances the entire set of "plastic figures" that constitute the source-panel's visual expression form. In summary, the film shot is based on the translation of the panel's original "sign function" (to get back to Hjelmslev's expression), i.e. it is based on the transfer of the very same "system of relations" that connects the content form and the expression form in the comic book.

To conclude this quick analysis of *Sin City*, I will focus once again on the movie's opening sequence to discuss an issue previously overlooked. As already pointed out, this sequence is the translation of the short one-shot "The Customer Is Always Right," from which it extensively draws both the content plane and the expression plane (according to the global strategy and the local tactics described above). While the source-comic book is all in black and white, though, in the film sequence the girl's dress and lips are magenta red. In other words, the film sequence employs a chromatic category (the magenta red) that does not appear in the original comic book's panel. However, this added element is not the result of an "inner" production of the film sequence. On the contrary, the girl's red dress and lips are the product of *another* translation transfer – a punctual one, in this case. More precisely, the film sequence takes these figures from another one-shot of the comic book series, entitled "The Babe Wore Red" (1994) (also collected in the volume *Booze, Broads & Bullets*), whose main character is in fact a girl with a red dress and red lipstick (figure 5).

Therefore, not only is the opening sequence based on the extensive transfer of the content and expression planes of "The Customer Is Always Right," but also on the punctual transfer of

an expressive figure from a *different* source-text (although part of the same comic book series). Going back to our taxonomy of intersemiotic relations, the sequence establishes both an extensive interdiscursive and interexpressive relation with the one-shot “The Customer Is Always Right” and a punctual interexpressive relation with one-shot “The Babe Wore Red.”



Fig. 5: A punctual interexpressive relation.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, I have developed an analytical model for the study of intersemiotic relations, in particular those established by cinema *towards* comics. I have considered those relations as the direct product of a translation, intended as the cultural process underlying (and regulating) the transfer of elements between different texts (and between different systems). In order to articulate this model, I have combined different theoretical traditions such as Cultural Semiotics, Descriptive Translation Studies, and Structural and Generative Semiotics.

First of all, drawing on Lotman’s cultural theory, Even-Zohar’s polysystem theory, and Toury’s translation theory, I have identified the three different transfer processes (duplication, conformation, obliteration) through which translation is articulated, depending on whether or not elements of comics succeed in “passing through” the border of the cinematic target-system. Then, I have analysed the constraints that regulate the access of elements of the (comics) source-texts to the (cinematic) target-system, focusing in particular on the semiotic constraints.

Secondly, drawing on Hjelmslev’s glossematics and Greimas’s semiotic theory, I have identified the different “sites” in which the transfer process occurs in relation to the linguistic plane (expression/content/text) and to the linguistic aspect (system/process) involved. According to these distinctions, I have outlined a taxonomy of the main intersemiotic relations, identifying four main typologies: the intertextual, the interexpressive, the interdiscursive, and the intersystemic. The analysis of some of the main translation processes inherent to the film *Sin City* has exemplified some of the concepts outlined and, at same time, has demonstrated the methodological performativity of this model.

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A QUELLE DISTANCE SOMMES-NOUS DE LA SEMIOLOGIE DU CINEMA ?

François Jost
Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3, France
francois.jost@univ-paris3.fr

Abstract

Cette conférence vise à rendre compte d'un parcours : non pas celui qui nous rapproche d'un but inaccessible que serait la sémiologie du cinéma, mais l'itinéraire qui nous en éloigne. Le terminus a quo est évidemment la sémiologie metzienne qui, par défaut, était une sémiologie du cinéma, persuadé qu'en était son auteur, que la télévision et l'audiovisuel en général, quel que soit le genre, ne s'en écartaient pas.

Le terminus ad quem est la télévision et certaines formes audiovisuelles présentes sur internet qui sont aujourd'hui mon objet.

Entre les deux : « l'aventure sémiologique », comme aurait dit un de ses fondateurs, avec ses péripéties, ses rebondissements et sa sérendipité.

Le titre de mon intervention est la parodie, qui peut-être échappera aux plus jeunes, du titre d'un article de Christian Metz publié en 1976 : « À quelle distance en sommes-nous d'une possibilité réelle de formalisation? ». Pour le sémiologue, le *terminus ad quem* de la discipline était bien cette *formalisation*, qui lui donnerait cette allure scientifique représentée par une écriture d'où disparaîtrait toute subjectivité. Vu sous cet angle, ce titre représente parfaitement son époque : ce rêve des sciences humaines de devenir aussi « dures » que les sciences exactes, ce rêve de la sémiologie d'être une nouvelle linguistique, ce rêve du chercheur de s'effacer derrière son texte, conforme à l'idéologie alors en vigueur de la mort de l'auteur.

De l'eau a coulé sous les ponts : le structuralisme est aujourd'hui régulièrement vilipendé, prendre plaisir à un texte n'est plus une activité honteuse et l'on annonce périodiquement la fin du cinéma. Dans ce contexte, auquel, comme on sait peut-être, je prends ma part, le titre de mon exposé ne garde de celui de Metz que l'apparence et il signifie autre chose, si ce n'est exactement

le contraire. La question n'est pas pour moi de savoir quand nous arriverons à formaliser le langage cinématographique, mais plutôt de prendre ses distances par rapport à cette sémiologie initiale et, si j'ose dire, initiatique. C'est donc plutôt d'un mouvement centrifuge que je veux vous parler, de l'éloignement progressif qui a animé ma démarche depuis quarante ans (car cela fait plus de quarante ans que je publie de la sémiologie).

Je n'ai personnellement jamais été metzien. Dès mes premiers écrits il m'est apparu que ce que Metz appelait cinéma n'était en fait qu'une région très limitée de ce que l'on pouvait appeler cinéma. Dès que j'ai essayé de faire fonctionner les concepts metziens dans le cadre d'un corpus de films dynarratif comme ceux de Robbe-Grillet, rien ne fonctionnait : la liste des syntagmes recensés par Metz s'allongeait indéfiniment, la négligence du son devenait un obstacle à la formalisation, comme il le constata lui-même dans son analyse d'*Adieu Philippine*. Bref, il apparaissait clairement que la théorie de Metz ne s'appliquait qu'au film classique et, même, à une sorte de western imaginaire. Sans doute manquait-il des analyses textuelles, qui lui auraient permis d'éprouver ses concepts. En 1978, d'ailleurs, c'est-à-dire deux ans après l'article dont je suis parti, l'analyse textuelle submergea la théorie « pure » et je participai à ce mouvement en écrivant « la sémiologie remise en cause par l'analyse textuelle » (Jost 1978). Pour donner une idée des défauts auxquels donne lieu une réflexion purement théorique, on peut citer cette analyse du syntagme alternant, dont le meilleur exemple est pour Metz, la retransmission d'une partie de tennis. A-t-on jamais vu une telle mise en cadre pour filmer une partie de tennis ? Ni chez Hitchcock, ni à Roland Garros. Si deux caméras alternaient à chaque coup, le mal de tête serait inévitable et la compréhension du match impossible.

Ce que nous proposons alors avec Chateau était de faire une « nouvelle sémiologie », qui ne prenne plus comme unité minimale le plan, mais les paramètres audiovisuels (Chateau, Jost 1979). Ainsi, pour prendre un exemple, on pouvait montrer qu'un enchaînement de plans en continuité par une direction de mouvements d'un même personnage, pouvait être contredit par le changement de son costume entre les deux plans. Ce qui était alors exceptionnel chez Robbe-Grillet est devenu une sorte de cliché esthétique avec les clips, la publicité et même des séries américaines. Avec l'arrivée de la vidéo, où tout objet pouvait être incrusté par des éléments hétérogènes, la sémiologie des paramètres audiovisuels s'est imposée comme un cadre nécessaire, pour lequel le film classique n'est qu'une exception d'un processus général : par exemple, on peut différencier le flash-back classique des flash-backs « modernes » par le fait que le premier traite tous les paramètres en bloc, alors qu'*Hiroshima, mon amour*, par exemple, fait varier différemment le son selon les lieux. Il va de soi que, dans le contexte du numérique, la sémiologie du cinéma ne peut être que paramétrique.

Bien que la sémiologie du cinéma se soit développée dans le cadre du CECMAS (Centre d'Études de Communication de Masse), le concept de communication recouvre une autre acception que celle que nous lui donnons aujourd'hui. Dans le paradigme dominant de la linguistique de Jakobson, héritière de Shannon et Weaver, communiquer veut simplement dire encoder un message envoyé à un destinataire qui le décode. A l'époque tout est message ! Ce schéma aboutit au contraire de ce pour quoi il était fait, à la négation de toute communication. En effet, si comprendre un message c'est décoder ce qui a été codé, il n'est pas besoin de ce se préoccuper du destinataire ou du destinataire, il suffit d'étudier le message lui-même. D'où le principe d'immanence, qui, comme on sait, perdure dans le cadre d'une certaine sémiotique. Si *le Pacte autobiographique* ou *Seuils* ont fissuré cette théorie de la sémiologie originelle, la parution de *La Chambre claire* lui a donné un coup de boutoir décisif en admettant que la photographie n'était pas la même selon que l'on parlait de l'intention de l'*operator*, du *spectator* ou du *spectrum*.

Pour moi, l'ère du doute est venue du laboratoire sémiotique que nous offrait la révolution roumaine de 1989. Lors de la retransmission du procès expéditif du couple Ceausescu, à certains

moments les plans qui les représentaient se figeaient, proposant aux spectateurs des *frozen shots*. Une analyse selon les conclusions de la sémiologie aurait dit que le récit était alors suspendu, les images figées étant pour Gaudreault, dans la foulée de Metz, une suspension du récit : « l'on ne saurait les considérer [l'arrêt sur image ou le plan immobile] comme des énoncés narratifs » (1988 : 47).

Quelques jours plus tard, on sut la vérité : ces *frozen shots* étaient mis là où l'on aurait dû voir les plans des juges. Au lieu de les considérer comme une négation d'un énoncé narratif, il fallait plutôt les voir comme des actes d'énonciation narrative, des actes de censure. D'où la nécessité de repenser le schéma de communication et de l'actualiser avec une théorie plus adéquate, comme celle fournie, par exemple, par Sperber et Wilson à propos de la communication verbale, qui montre le rôle des inférences, des savoirs, de l'environnement cognitif partagé ou non par les acteurs de la communication. Pour cette première narratologie, signifier et raconter sont une seule et même chose. Mais, bientôt, la narratologie genettienne a pris son autonomie et a apporté un nouveau paradigme. Néanmoins, il faut souligner une autre idée reçue qui a obéré le développement de la discipline : la peur de l'anthropomorphisme. Le refus de prendre en compte l'intention, la volonté de construire un système scientifique qui tienne tout seul, la mort de l'auteur, etc. sont autant de raisons qui ont poussé les chercheurs à repousser toute présence humaine, pourtant présupposée par les premiers écrits de Metz.

Plutôt que de considérer que les films sont des objets humains fabriqués pour dire, montrer, raconter quelque chose à d'autres hommes, Metz a préféré ne voir dans ceux-ci que des choses. La belle ambition première – comprendre comment on comprend – est devenue au fil des années : *comprendre comment cela fonctionne indépendamment de toute présence humaine*. De ce point de vue, la théorie de Metz a été d'une étonnante stabilité, persistant dans son être contre vents et marées, rétive à toute effet de mode. *Le Signifiant imaginaire* repose sur deux pétitions de principe :

- la première, empruntée à Jean-Louis Baudry, est que le spectateur s'identifie à la caméra. C'est l'identification primaire ;

- la seconde, que Metz développera d'une autre façon dans *l'Énonciation impersonnelle*, est que la communication cinématographique repose sur une absence : « l'acteur, le "décor", les paroles qu'on entend, tout est absent, tout est *enregistré* » Metz 1977 : 63). C'est dans cette perspective qu'il peut soutenir que le film est un dispositif voyeuriste, qui repose sur « l'absence de l'objet vu » (*ibid* : 86) et sur le fait que, « le spectacle filmique, l'objet vu *ignore* son spectateur de façon plus radicale, puisqu'il n'est pas là, que ne peut faire le spectacle théâtral » (*ibid.* : 89).

Si, au lieu de se placer du point de vue du spectateur en salle, on se place du côté de la production, de la fabrication du film, on peut objecter facilement à Metz que tout spectacle cinématographique est d'abord un spectacle théâtral, pour le simple fait qu'il met l'acteur face à un public qui le regarde. C'est ce qui ressort de mon petit film « Lumière » *La Première fois* (disponible sur Youtube : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xI3W9p_a-KM).

Dans *La Première Fois*, ce qui m'intéresse d'ailleurs, c'est le fait que, effectivement, cette jeune femme se déshabillait devant moi pour la première et aussi pour la dernière fois. D'où un très joli rosissement de ses joues au moment où elle choisit de retirer sa culotte. Au final, évidemment, le spectateur est loin de voir ce qu'a vu le metteur en scène et son inaccessibilité au hors champ lui est insolemment exhibée. Certains spectateurs, de dépit sans doute, croient d'ailleurs que la jeune femme, qui n'est pas une comédienne, mais une assistante parlementaire, fait semblant de se déshabiller, feint de se mettre nue.

Si je me permets ici de renvoyer à un de mes courts-métrages, c'est qu'il rend sensible, plus que les mots, me semble-t-il, que tout film, loin d'être le fait des anges, est d'abord un lieu théâtral, où tout ce qui est humain joue sur la réalité filmée : timidité, trac, arrogance ou peur. En la

circonstance, l'émotion presque imperceptible que la caméra a captée n'est pas due à l'instrument de prise de vue, mais à ma présence : ce rosissement des joues est la trace visible de l'émotion d'une femme qui se déshabille devant un homme qu'elle ne connaît pas ou presque (je l'avais rencontrée la veille et nous avions parlé ensemble). Ce film pourrait aussi bien s'appeler *Féminin/Masculin*, dans la mesure où il rend sensible, le temps d'un regard, l'émotion que produit son déshabillage devant un homme qui revendique et assume sa position.

L'énonciation impersonnelle poursuit dans la même voie et aboutit à cet énoncé sans appel : « l'énonciateur, c'est le film », qui, une nouvelle fois, fait fi de tout processus communicationnel. C'est contre cette position, qui abouti chez Gaudreault à attribuer à des instances des passions humaines que l'on attribuait avant à l'auteur, que j'ai écrit *Un monde à notre image* (Jost 1992), qui plaide pour un « anthropomorphisme régulateur », sans lequel nous serions incapable d'apprécier un film, de faire notamment la différence entre une erreur et une intention. Et pourtant, qui n'a pas eu une discussion avec ses amis en sortant du cinéma pour déterminer si tel détail était « fait exprès » ou non, ce qui prouve bien nos besoins de reconstruire l'intention pour comprendre et évaluer un film. L'oubli de la communication, l'immanence, le refus mal compris de l'anthropomorphisme, toutes ces erreurs, si je peux dire, s'ancrent dans le fait que la sémiologie du cinéma s'est fondée sur la volonté de comprendre le *langage cinématographique*. Non pas le langage audiovisuel en général, mais le langage cinématographique mobilisé par un certain cinéma, indépendant de ses usages. Selon ce parti pris, télévision et cinéma « constituent, au moins dans leurs traits physiques essentiels, un seul et même langage » (1971 : 177) ; « l'image cinématographique et l'image télévisuelle ne diffèrent guère que par la taille » (Metz 1971 : 178).

De même qu'aucune partie de tennis n'est retransmise avec un syntagme alternant, il suffit de regarder *Apostrophes*, en 1976, pour voir que les règles d'enchaînement des plans sont bien différentes de celles du cinéma et que les « fautes de grammaire » (franchissement de l'axe des 180 degrés, erreurs de direction de regards) ne gênent nullement la compréhension. La sémiologie de la télévision n'a été possible qu'à partir du moment où l'on s'est défait de la sémiologie du cinéma, ce qui a pris quelque temps. Il est apparu à l'évidence que le propre de la télévision est d'abord sa capacité à diffuser tous les genres et que, si l'on restait au niveau du plan ou même des séquences on ne réussissait pas à saisir ce qui faisait sa spécificité. Je me souviens d'avoir expérimenté avec enthousiasme, dans les années 90, la capture automatique d'écran à l'Institut National de l'Audiovisuel. En visionnant un programme de télé, je captuais plusieurs centaines d'images, refaisant une sorte de story bord. Très vite, je me suis aperçu que c'était un *terminus a quo* mais sûrement pas un *terminus ad quem*. Car cela ne disait pas grand-chose du programme. Il m'a alors fallu faire un zoom arrière et m'intéresser à un objet qui avait été totalement négligé par la sémiologie du cinéma, le *genre*. Cela a impliqué aussi un changement de paradigme car le genre est apparu comme un interprétant qui pouvait susciter des réceptions très différentes de la même séquence selon le monde auquel on la rattachait. J'ai quitté les rivages saussuriens pour rejoindre ceux de la sémiotique peircienne.

Pour terminer, je résume en quelques mots, les fondements, les présupposés de la sémiotique de la télévision que j'ai élaborés (Jost 2005) :

1. *Tout genre repose sur la promesse d'une relation à un monde dont le mode ou le degré d'existence conditionne l'adhésion ou la participation du récepteur. En d'autres termes, un document, au sens large, qu'il soit écrit ou audiovisuel, est produit en fonction d'un type de croyance visée par le destinataire et, en retour, il ne peut être interprété par celui qui le reçoit sans une idée préalable du type de lien qui l'unit à la réalité.*

2. *Il existe trois interprétants au genre le monde réel, le monde fictif et le monde ludique.*

3. *Loin d'être fixée une fois pour toutes, la place des genres est variable selon le point de vue dont on les considère, et c'est ce qui fait de la communication télévisuelle autre chose qu'une chambre*

d'enregistrement dans laquelle le récepteur entérinerait la sémantisation des genres par l'émetteur.

4. La communication télévisuelle ne repose pas sur un contrat, mais sur une double promesse.

- une *promesse ontologique*. Cette promesse est contenue dans le nom de genre lui-même. Toute « comédie », par exemple, est une promesse de rire, indépendamment de la réussite effective de cette comédie.

- une *promesse pragmatique*. Une chose est de savoir ce qu'est *le direct* ou *la fiction*, une autre de déterminer si tel ou tel programme est *un direct* ou *une fiction*. La communication de la chaîne sur ses programmes est fondée sur une promesse d'appartenance de ces programmes à tel ou tel monde, promesse qu'elle effectue via les bandes-annonces, les dossiers de presse ou sa communication externe. Il suffit qu'elle étiquette un programme, direct, par exemple, pour que le spectateur soit incité à le regarder comme tel, même si ce n'est pas vrai.

J'ai dit au début qu'il fallait confronter la sémiologie à l'analyse textuelle. J'ajouterai qu'il faut toujours exporter les concepts vers d'autres champs pour voir quelle est leur validité. J'ai tenté de la faire en reprenant cette théorie des mondes pour le cinéma (*Realtà/finzione*). Je pense que ce qui reste à travailler est notamment le pôle ludique. Celui-ci reste trop imprécis et il faudrait le creuser en fonction de la théorie des jeux.

Ce mouvement nous entraîne chaque jour un peu plus loin d'une sémiotique générale, mais qu'importe. L'abstraction a certes son charme, mais ce dont nous avons besoin pour comprendre les manifestations audiovisuelles aujourd'hui (je ne dis pas les messages), c'est plutôt d'être au plus près de ses transformations.

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THE ROLE OF SOUND IN FILMIC EXPERIENCE: A COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS APPROACH

Juan Alberto Conde
Jorge Tadeo Lozano University, Bogotá, Colombia
juan.conde@utadeo.edu.co

Abstract

In the Semiology of Cinema tradition sound was assumed as a particular type of “expression substance” among others, an ingredient of “syncretic” semiotics. From this perspective, films are closed texts made of codes decipherable by the spectator (Metz, 1971, 1974), one of which would be the sound code. After the cognitive turn in film theories (Bordwell, 1987; Branigan, 1992; Currie, 1995; Bordwell & Carroll, 1996; Grodal, 1999, 2009, among others), film (and audiovisual) semiotics is interested in accounting for the viewer’s *experience*. This experience is now understood under the same parameters of real life experience, to the extent that humans use the same skills to understand movies that to deal with reality. Some researchers have devoted part of their theories to the description of sound and hearing experience in cinema from different approaches: ecological (Anderson, 1998; Anderson, Fischer, Bordwell et al, 2007), socio-historical (Altman et al, 1980, 1992, 2001, 2007) “eclectic” (Chion, 1985, 1991, 1998, 2003) or even cognitive – in a broad sense (Jullier, 1995, 2002, 2012). Nevertheless, the bridge between cognitive theories and film semiotics is still weak, particularly when dealing with the multimodal dimensions of spectatorship experience.

To address the role of sound in filmic experience with more powerful tools, in this presentation I propose to follow the current trend of cognitive semiotics and its link with phenomenology and cognitive sciences (Sonesson, 2009). First, I will show the insights of philosophy and phenomenology of sound (Ihde, 2007; O’Callaghan, 2007; Nudds, O’Callaghan et al., 2009): the phenomenological description of the auditory field and sound horizons, and the idea of conceiving sounds as *events* in hearing experience. Second, I will present some discoveries of cognitive research from an enactive perspective, about the intersubjective exploration of sound spaces (Krueger, 2006, 2000, 200). Third, I will link these ideas with a general description of

event perception and conception (Zacks, 2008, 2010; Zacks & et al., 2011), particularly in film comprehension (Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds, 2009; Zacks & Magliano, 2009). Finally, I will integrate all these insights in the context of a new semiotic theory: agentive semiotics (Niño, 2013a, 2013b; Niño, 2014, forthcoming). This theory provides precise criteria to distinguish (but also integrate) the experience of “semiotic scenes” (intentional constructions assumed here as a particular type of events) and the experience of the world. Thus I hope to provide a new approach to understand the role of sound in the (multimodal) experience of film spectatorship.

1. Introduction: three paradigms in film (sound) theory

In the tradition of film theory, sound was assumed with different levels of attention across history. We can use Francesco Casetti’s scheme about the stages of film theory (Casetti, 1999: 7 – 20), to place the multiple authors that have shown interest in the sound track in a broad sense (that is, not just music but all the material expressivity of sound, including sound effects, words, ambient sound, etc.).

According to Casetti, there are three periods, each one with its own objectives, approaches and criteria to build knowledge about cinema. In each of the three, there are theorists who have addressed the role of sound in film experience. In the first period, I want to locate Siegfried Kracauer (1997 [1960]: 102 – 131), because he was the one who proposed the most systematic list of criteria to talk about the relations between sound and the other components of narrative cinema.

1.1. Kracauer’s proposal

In Kracauer’s terms there are six axes of relations between sound and image. According to Roger Odin (1992) the axes two, four and five are the most important, given that almost all sound theorists after him have used these three criteria, in more or less the same words. Thus, theorists like Percheron (1973), Gardies (1980), Château & Jost (1979) and even Odin himself (1992) have focused in this kind of relationships, using different models and schemes.

1.2. The semiology of cinema and the material expression of sound

This brings us to the second moment, the one in which, according to Casetti, film semiology was born. The main character in this period is, of course, Christian Metz, the father of this discipline, for whom sound is just a particular type of “expression substance” among others, an ingredient of what greimasians will call later a “syncretic” semiotics.

From Metz’s perspective, films are closed texts made of codes decipherable by the spectator (Metz, 1971, 1974), one of which would be the sound code. Later, the so-called “second Metz” put his emphasis on describing how films are understood. In that sense, he opened the gate to a new kind of approach. Nevertheless, he continued to talk about the relationships between systems and codes, manifested in a closed object: filmic text.

1.3. Film narratology and enunciation theory

In the transition between the second and the third paradigm, film narratology was developed. The main authors of this approach returned to distinctions similar to those proposed by Kracauer. Also, in this period theories of (audio) visual enunciation were developed, and the spectator, named the “enunciatee”, timidly appeared.

Here, movies are complex narrative constructions that “cognitively” and “perceptively” place viewers facing the information of the story world. The concepts of auricularisation and oculari- sation, proposed by Francois Jost (and developed also with André Gaudreault) came to the

field to explain the different ways in which spectator is acoustically and visually positioning in the narration (see Jost, 1987, 1992; Jost & Gaudreault, 2000).

In a way, theories of audiovisual enunciation are placed between the second and the third paradigm, since these theories focus on immanent film “forms”, but also on spectator’s activity. In fact, the third paradigm called by Casetti the *Theories of field*, represents the “pragmatic turn” in film theories. With respect to sound, two interesting approaches arouse: Michel Chion works on sound, music and voices in cinema, and the so-called “cognitive turn” given by David Bordwell, Noël Carroll, and others. In this point, some theorist who came from the old traditions, started to approach cinema in a new way.

For instance, Roger Odin, who developed the semio-pragmatic theory, intended to understand cinema from the spectator’s side. According to Odin, it is necessary to describe the inferences that spectator needs to do in order to understand sound-image relationships. Now, Odin talks about film hearing (*l’écoute filmique*), Spectator’s motivations (selective hearing) and attention (Odin, 1990: 238 – 239).

Odin and other authors of this period of transition continued to describe the same film features before called as “material expressions”, but now, at least, they pointed them as cues to spectatorship activity. See, for example, Odin scheme on the codes of construction of sonic sources (Odin, 1990: 251 – 254), or Michel Chion’s famous scheme of the three zones of filmic sounds (Chion, 1994: 73 – 80). Both schemes emphasizes on the way in which spectator perceives or infers the sources and the features of sounds with the point of reference of the filmic screen.

In the same way, French theorist Laurent Jullier, who proclaims his approach as “cognitive”, extends the levels of hearing experience to different “worlds” that the viewer face when watching narrative movies: the narrative world, the hetero-universes (subjective, possible worlds), the “pit” world, and the making and projection (or broadcast) worlds. And that’s how we arrive to the most interesting point of this story. Because when theorists start to talk about the actual space of sounds, or the “pit”, or even the “speakers” in the theater, or in the TV set, is increasingly difficult to continue with the idea of a film “text”.

Nevertheless, the first cognitive film theories seem not to pay particular attention to the sound. In fact, David Bordwell, the one that initiated this movement, he himself rests more in the “formalism” that in cognitivism in his description of the different aspects of cinema. In his work with Christin Thompson, Bordwell describes filmic sounds in very similar terms to the Kracauer tradition: Rhythm, Fidelity (to the source) space (related to the Diegetic/nondiegetic distinction), resources of diegetic sound, and time (in terms of synchronism/simultaneity).

However, Bordwell and Thompson also mentioned the perceptual properties of sound (loudness, pitch, timbre), and the operations that film makers execute over sound materiality: selection (choosing), operation (manipulating), and combination (mixing). And most important: when talking about space, Bordwell and Thompson include the idea of “Sound perspective”, related to the actual spatial (nor diegetical) properties of sound (volume, stereo, surround sound).

1.4. The cognitive turn

Among the main authors that developed cognitive film theory, just few devote a particular section to sound issues: particularly, there is a section on the famous book *Post-theory* (Bordwell and Carroll, 1996) dedicated to music in cinema, with articles by Jeff Smith (pp. 230 – 247) and Jerrold Levinson (pp. 248 – 2832). And with a broader approach to sound, Joseph Anderson and his seminal work based on Gibson’s ecological perspective Anderson, 1998), devotes some pages to the description of the auditory system (chapter two: pp. 26 - 28) and to the relations between sound and image (chapter five: pp. 80 - 89). In the same spirit, Anderson and Bordwell edited a book in which appears two articles on *acoustic events* (the first one, *Background Tracks in Recent*

Cinema by Charles Eidsvik; the second, Acoustic Specification of Object Properties, by Claudia Carello, Jeffrey B. Wagman, and Michael T. Turvey).

Thus, the cognitive film theory has opened a completely new approach to the role of sound and image in filmic experience. And this is how we arrive to the subject I want to propose: if film semiology and film narratology (both more or less based on structuralism) impose the *text* metaphor in the field of film theories, cognitive approaches invite us to take a new formula: we are going to start talking about *film experiences*, based on *film events*.

As a point of departure, I want to refer another theorist who has also defined cinema as event, with an emphasis on sound, Rick Altman. In his own words:

Considered as a text, each film appears as a self-contained, centered structure, with all related concerns revolving around the text like so many planets. In opposition to the notion of film as text, I have found it helpful to conceive of cinema as event. Viewed as a macro-event, cinema is still seen as centered on the individual film, but according to a new type of geometry. Floating in a gravity-free world like doughnut-shaped spaceships, cinema events offer no clean-cut or stable separation between inside and outside or top and bottom (Altman, 1992: 3).

In his model Altman integrates the worlds of production and reception, and he identifies twelve attributes of cinema that had been hidden because of the “textual approach to cinema” (Altman, 1992: 4 – 14). The general idea of all these attributes is that cinema is a live embodied experience: watching a movie implies been in a concrete space (the theater, our homes, a train, etc.), facing diverse kind of reproduction technologies, in a specific projection (or broadcast) in a particular circumstance. For example, the textual approach to cinema makes us emphasize the bidimensionality of the image:

Though conventional speaker placement attempts to identify sound sources with the two-dimensional area of the screen, sound occurs only in the three-dimensional volume of the theater at large. Because sound is always recorded in a particular three-dimensional space, and played back in another, we are able to sense the spatial cues that give film sound its personalized spatial signature (Altman, 1992: 5).

Altman approach is more historical and technological than cognitive. Nevertheless, the conditions of hearing he describes are big challenges to a cognitive theory of cinema. In order to face this new idea of assuming films (and film sounds) as events, I want to propose three lines of inquiry, within the frame work of cognitive semiotics: phenomenology (as a theory of hearing *experience*); cognitive (empirical) research (particularly on event perception); and agentive semiotics (as a new approach to meaning that emphasizes the intentional, enactive, and embodied location of semiotic agents).

2. Phenomenology of (film) hearing

As Jordan Zlatev notes, “there are multiple schools and types of phenomenology, but the basic idea is to *depart from experience itself*, and to provide descriptions of the phenomena of the world, including ourselves and others, as true to experience as possible – rather than constructing metaphysical doctrines, following formal procedures, or postulating invisible-to-consciousness causal mechanisms that would somehow “produce” experience” (Zlatev, 2012: 15).


For this particular case is wise to take advantage of what has already been done in the field of phenomenology. Particularly, I want to introduce some of the ideas developed by Don Ihde

in his book *Listening and voice: Phenomenologies of sound* (Idhe, 2007). In this work, Ihde takes as starting point the phenomenology of Husserl in order to describe the way in which sounds appear to the experience: “the invisible is the horizon of sight. An inquiry into the auditory is also an inquiry into the invisible. Listening makes the invisible present in a way similar to the presence of the mute in vision” (Ihde, 2007: 51). We find again the idea of event: “Insofar as all sounds are also ‘events’, all the sounds are, within the first approximation, likely to be considered as ‘moving.’” (Ihde, 2007: 53).

That relates sound with space. As Joel Krueger notes, “phenomenologically speaking, it appears that auditory experiences are locational. They represent both *what* is happening (e.g. children playing outside) as well as *how* what is happening stands in relation to oneself (e.g. slightly behind me and to the left)” (Krueger, 2011a: 65). In Krueger’s terms, “Listening to sounds is an exploration of our world—including spatial and locational aspects of things in it. Sounds routinely furnish spatial information about our world, and we use our auditory experiences to explore and skillfully respond to things happenings in it. Phenomenologically, sounds are thus spatially structured” (Krueger, 2011a: 67).


We can also find this idea in Joseph Anderson’s ecological perspective, when he affirms that “Vision tells us where things are in space; hearing tells us when they move. And when they move, we are able to locate them in space” (Anderson, 2007: 27).

Back to Ihde, this author uses the phenomenological concept of horizon to describe sound and vision. He represents these experiences as two circles: one for the horizon of invisibility from which emerges vision, and the other for the horizon of silence, from which emerges sounds.



Idhe, 2007: 52

In our experience, the two types of information overlap. The graphic represents this relation: “in the visual field a vast totality of entities that can be experienced. Some are stable (x) and usually mute in ordinary experience. Some others (-y-) move, often “accompanied” by sounds. Beyond the actually seen field of presence lies a horizon of invisibility. And a similar diagram can be offered for a “region” of sound presences. What may be taken as absent for one “region” is taken as a presence for the other. While the area of mute objects (x) seems to be closed to the auditory experience as these objects lie in silence, so within auditory experience the invisible sounds (--z--) are present to the ear but absent to the eye. There are also some presences that are “synthesized” (-y-) or present to both “senses” and “regions”.



Idhe, 2007: 53

2.1. The spatial dimension of sound field

According to Ihde, “sounds are frequently thought of as anticipatory clues for ultimate visual fulfillments. The most ordinary of such occurrences are noted in locating unseen entities” (p. 54). The auditory world is then one of “flux” and that it is primarily temporal. Nevertheless, Sounds also manifest it selves in space. Some theorists talks about the “weak” spatially of sounds, because of the difficulty of placing sounds with accuracy. This is way for us sounds are first experienced as sounds of things, even when we are not capable to say “where” exactly they are. To this extent, sounds are also understood as aspects of things: shapes, surfaces and interiors: “in the movement from shape-aspects to surfaces to interiors there is a continuum of significations in which the “weakest” existential possibilities of auditory spatial significations emerge” (p. 71). However, as we point before, there is also a “strong” spatiality in sound experience, and it is related to the phenomenological concept of *field*:

The question of an auditory field has already been proximately anticipated in the observation that all things or occurrences are presented in a situated context, “surrounded” by other things and an expanse of phenomena within which the focused-on things or occurrences are noted. But to take note of a field as a situating phenomenon calls for a deliberate shifting of ordinary intentional directions. The field is what is present, but present as implicit, as fringe that situates and “surrounds” what is explicit or focal. This field, again anticipatorily, is also an intermediate or eidetic phenomenon. By intermediate we note that the field is not synonymous with the thing, it exceeds the thing as a region in which the thing is located and to which the thing is always related. But the field is also limited, bounded. It is “less than” what is total, in phenomenological terms, less than the World. The field is the specific form of “opening” I have to the World and as an “opening” it is the particular perspective I have on the World (Idhe, 2007: 73).

In film and audiovisual experiences this field has visual and auditory dimensions. The visual field has a *forward oriented* directionality, relative to bodily position, because of the place of our eyes in front of our heads. As a shape the auditory field does not appear so restricted to a forward orientation. Instead, Sound *surrounds* me in my embodied positionality: “the auditory field and my auditory focusing is not isomorphic with visual field and focus, it is *omnidirectional*” (Idhe, 2007: 75).

In that sense, according to Idhe, “the auditory field would have to be conceived of as a “sphere”

within which I am positioned, but whose “extent” remains indefinite as it reaches outward toward a horizon”¹. The surroundability, then, is an essential feature of the field-shape of sound, but it also includes directionality. Both features provide to sound experiences its dynamic aspect. In this respect, Idhe he offers a filmic example: “*In 2001: A Space Odyssey*, it was found that without the sound of background music the slow drifting of the spaceship did not appear even as movement. The silent movie is accompanied by the piano. The intimate relation between animation, motion, and sound lies at the threshold of the inner secret of auditory experience, the *timefulness* of sound. The auditory field is not a static field” (Idhe, 2007: 83).

2.2. The temporal dimension of sound field

This example shows the importance of the temporal dimension of hearing to a conception of film sounds as events. Idhe addresses this question from Husserl’s conception of time:

A phenomenology of experienced temporality soon comes on the notion of a temporal span or duration of sounding that is experienced in listening. I do not hear one instant followed by another; I hear an enduring gestalt within which the modulations of the melody, the speech, the noises present themselves. The instant as an atom of time is an abstraction which is related to the illusion of a thing in itself. In terms of a perceptual field we have noted that a thing always occurs as situated within a larger unity of a field; so temporally the use of instant here is perceived to occur only within the larger duration of a temporal span, a living present. Moreover, according to Husserl’s prior analysis (...), this temporal span displays itself as structured according to the onset of features coming into perception, protension, and the phasing and passing off of features fading out of presence, retention. Within the temporal span the continuing experience of a gestalt is experienced as a succession within the span of duration (Idhe, 2007: 89).

However, this version of the temporality of sound experiences must be related to the attentional aspect of listening intentionality that Idhe called the “temporal focus”. As intentional activity, listening can be attached to certain aspects of experience. This “temporal focus” may be narrow, thin or wide, according to the intentionality of the listener. In this perspective, protentions are “empty temporal intentions” which seek access to presence, but it can be achieved or frustrated. The protentions are attentional structures that should be future-oriented.

2.3. Between “field state” and “deep listening”

Idhe also speaks of a particular phenomenon of listening he calls “field state”, when the attentional focus is extended to the entire sensory field. This is the case of certain musical experiences in which the listener’s attention is full and open. This is that Krueguer calls *deep listening*:

...a voluntary form of musical experience consisting of sustained attentional focus and affective sensitivity. It is an immersive form of listening in which the subject *selectively orients* herself to a piece of music by actively attending to its various sound features and

¹ From another perspective, French semiotician Jacques Fontanille have propose to conceive the “sensory field of hearing” also as a “sphere”, but more like a “bubble”, in the sense that a bubble can be deformed, extended; that is to say, it is a flexible shape, as it is our hearing experience (Fontanille, 2011: 68 – 69).

their interrelationships – while simultaneously maintaining a state of affective receptivity, or a readiness-to-be-moved, by what is happening sonically in the music (Krueger, 2011a: 70 – 71).

It is possible to think that film listening oscillates between regular attentional listening and Deep Listening. That is, of course, because of the presence of music in films, but also because the way in which sound in general is *designed* to modulate spectator's experiences. To understand the way in which sound and image interacts in filmic experience, phenomenology could provide a rich set of tools to describe our fluent interface with movies.

3. The cognitive/empirical study of event perception

The second line I want to propose to understand hearing experience in cinema is the empirical study of event perception. One of the main researchers in this field is Jeffrey M. Zacks, the leader of the Dynamic Cognition Laboratory of the Washington University's Department of Psychology. According to Zacks and his colleagues, event perception is the set of cognitive mechanisms by which observers pick out meaningful spatiotemporal wholes from the stream of experience, recognize them, and identify their characteristics. One of the procedures to understand the way in which we perceive events is *event segmentation*, understood as “a form of categorical perception in which intervals of time are picked out as units and distinguished from other intervals. As such, it is a mechanism of Gestalt grouping: The ongoing stream of activity is parsed into meaningful wholes” (Zacks, 2008: 2).

3.1. Event recognition

Other cognitive operation that people performs every time is *event recognition*: “in addition to picking out individual events from the behavior stream, observers also recognize events as belonging to classes. Event recognition is closely tied to event segmentation. Individuating events helps to identify them, and identifying events helps to individuate them” (Zacks, 2008: 3). According to Zacks, many categories of events can be identified from motion patterns, but these basic experiences are used to understand more complex human actions.

3.2. Event segmentation theory

Zacks and his colleagues have developed an *event segmentation theory* (EST), from empirical research: “the perceived structure of events can be measured explicitly by simply asking people to watch movies of everyday events and identify the points at which they believe one meaningful unit of activity ends and another begins. Although these instructions are somewhat vague, there is good agreement, both across and within individuals, as to the point at which one unit of activity ends and another begins, and observers are able to adjust their grain of segmentation in order to identify larger or smaller units of activity” (Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds, 2009: 307).

According to EST, observers form models, called event models, in working memory, which guide the perception of incoming information. These event models permits predictions as to what will occur in the environment, and as long as incoming information is consistent with these predictions, the current event model remains active. When predictions fail, the event model is updated, and the system becomes momentarily more sensitive to incoming information. Once the event model is updated, prediction error falls, and the system falls into a new stable state. The cascade of a transient increase in error, event model updating, and resettling is experienced as an event boundary.

EST also proposes that event boundaries tend to occur when features in the environment are

changing, because changes are generally less predictable than stasis. In this point, Zacks et al make a very relevant distinction to us: in reading and film comprehension:

Two broad classes of feature can be distinguished: perceptual features such as movement, color, and sound timbre; and conceptual features such as characters in a story, characters' goals, and causes. There is growing evidence that changes in perceptual features are associated with event boundaries. Observers are more likely to identify an event boundary at points with large changes in movement (Newtson, Engquist, & Bois, 1977), and brain areas involved in the perception of motion are activated at event boundaries (Speer et al., 2003; Zacks, Braver, et al., 2001). More recently, studies in which simple animations were used have provided quantitative evidence that precisely measured movement features, including acceleration, distance, and speed, are excellent predictors of the points at which observers segment activity (Hard, Tversky, & Lang, 2006; Zacks, 2004). The evidence that conceptual changes influence event segmentation is more limited (Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds, 2009: 308).

Thus, as perceptual features sounds are very important in the discretization of events, but also a particular kind of events it selves. Nevertheless, sound features are even more describable as events than other perceptual features like colors or shapes. As Casey O'Callaghan noted, "Sounds, intuitively, are happenings that take place in one's environment. This is evident in the language we use to speak of sounds. Sounds, like explosions and concerts, occur, take place, and last. Colors, shapes, and fiddles do not" (O'Callaghan, 2007: 57).

So even when certain visual features change according to movement, sounds are always events, always in transformation: "Sounds, that is, appear to relate to space and time in ways characteristic to events. Understanding sounds as events of some sort amounts to a powerful framework for a satisfactory account of both the metaphysics of sound and the contents of auditory experience" (O'Callaghan, 2007: 58). The categorization and segmentation of sound events are, thus, theoretical instruments to understand the general way in which spectators perceive and categorize events in film experience. This has a particular interest to different kind of film and audiovisual productions as abstract films or musical video clips, besides the general trend of narrative movies.

4. Agentive semiotics: intentionality, attention and semiotics scenes

The last trend I want to propose to the study of sound in film experience is a new semiotic theory developed from some of the theories revised here: phenomenology, cognitive semiotics, but also from the central role of the concept of purpose in peircean semiotics. According to Douglas Niño, the main developer of agentive semiotics, significance is produced in the relationship between an agent and her agenda ((Niño, 2013a, 2013b; Niño, 2014, forthcoming). Agency here is understood as the capacity that enables the agent to make sense of something; thus meaning emerge when an agent tries to fulfill an agenda (that is, the type of result that 'point' the agent through his/her action) by exercising her agency (Niño, in press).

Agentive semiotics defines an agent as an embodied, situated and dynamic being that focus her attention in some point of her environment according to the agenda(s) in course. Audiovisual spectator is a particular agent, place in a particular field of experience (as defined before from the phenomenological perspective): a film, a TV broadcast, etc. Nevertheless, if we understand audiovisual productions as *experiences of events*, perceptual and cognitive activity of an

agent oscillates between the experience of “semiotic scenes” (intentional constructions assumed here as a particular type of events) and the experience of her actual world, called the “base scene”, by Niño.

4.1. From “diegetical worlds” to “semiotic scenes”

According to Niño, *agentive meaning* emerges in a certain place and in certain moment, both constituting the agent’s *base scene*. But this *meaning* is about something, a phenomenon also placed in space and time that constitutes her *semiotic scene*. In the case of audiovisual experience, the place and moment in which spectator perceives the projection or broadcast of any audiovisual production constitutes her *base scene*, and the technically constructed events that she perceives in the screen and the speakers are her *semiotic scene*. However, “as the place and moment ‘in’ which meaning emerges could be also the place and moment ‘about’ about we are trying to make sense, as in perception (...) that is to say that base scene and semiotic scene are not different from a phenomenological point of view. The distinction is thus merely methodological: is like the difference between ‘where’ (base scene) and ‘to where’ (semiotic scene)” (Niño, *Fortcoming*: 255).

With this clarification, Niño just want to say that we use the same cognitive and perceptual abilities to perceive and make sense about movies that we use to the actual experience of the world. The only difference is that in movies (and other audiovisual productions) perceptual information is modulated by someone who wants to manage our attention in a particular way. And, as I tried to show before, sounds are a particular way to build semiotic events, that is, semiotic scenes that modulates spectator’s attention.

Agentive semiotics is a new trend that offers several concepts and theoretical instruments to explore and describe audiovisual phenomena. By integrating to its conceptual frame the developments of phenomenology of hearing and event perception theory I hope to provide a new approach to understand the role of sound in the (multimodal) experience of film spectatorship.

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MUSIC IN FILM SEMIOSPHERE: RECONSIDERING KUBRICK'S *2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY*

May Kokkidou, Christina Tsigka, Ifigeneia Vamvakidou,
University of Western Macedonia, Greece
ibambak@uowm.gr / christina.tsigka@gmail.com

Abstract

It is well accepted now that it is of great significance to break down and cross barriers and artificial distinctions between every designated area or discipline (interdisciplinarity) in order to bring disparate areas of interest into contact with one another. In this vein, the underlying idea of this paper is to bring together concepts and issues on music-semiotics and film studies areas, illustrating important points of their inter-connections.

Theoretical filed:

Our study is based on the axiom that film music is not an isolated structure; it influences film interpretation and vice-versa. This idea was highlighted by Nicolas Cook (1998) who stated that “the very fact of juxtaposing image and music has the effect of drawing attention to the properties that they share, and in this way constructing a new experience of each; the interpretation is in this sense emergent” (p. 73).

The main aim of the present study is to explore how music functions in the film context and, in particular, how it constantly generates new connotations and interpretations.

Research material:

Our research questions have as follows: What is the nature of the boundaries between music and image in films? Are there shared characteristics between music and image and, if so, how can we interpret them at a semantic level? What is the case of pre-existing music in films? How music functions in the construction of meaning-making in a film and in the generation of new meanings? Does music, as it opens up the filmic scenes, lead to the emergence of new meaning? Ought we re-consider the conceptualization of non-diegetic music in films and the ongoing debate regarding the term diegesis in cinematic music?

Finally, acknowledging that every film is an integrated semiosphere, we examine whether the

narrative can function as a whole if we separate the filmic music from filmic images.

We discuss the aforementioned issues through the paradigm of Stanley Kubrick's film *2001: A Space Odyssey*. Moreover, taking under consideration that Kubrick, as powerful and dominant auteur, came to the decision about the seven music works which had initially been chosen by him as temp tracks (temporary), we investigate the music connotations which emerge in the continuity of the filmic narration and we focus on their construction in the certain filmic context.

Stanley Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey* is a masterpiece of cinema. The film continues to affect, move, puzzle, and inspire the audience and the filmmakers until nowadays, almost 45 after its world premier.

The film was in part based on Clarke's novel "The Sentinel". It was directed and produced by Kubrick in 1968, whose artistic view was very intense, in-depth and holistic. It is a philosophical audio-visual poem. The director's own intention was to establish an open-endedness, so that the viewer-listener could feel free to speculate as he/she would wish with regard to the philosophical and allegorical meaning. According to McGinney (2009: 45), *2001* hypothesizes that human development requires the intervention of a god-like outside intelligence to save mankind from decline and eventual extinction.

In classical Hollywood movies music supplements the action on screen and never overshadows it. *2001: A Space Odyssey* takes a turn away from it. Kubrick drew on the classic status of pre-existing musical selections to augment the role of music, breaking deliberately the tradition and the conventions for the use of music in science-fiction film genre.

McQuiston (2013) claims that for Kubrick music is neither post-production afterthought nor background nor incidental, but rather core to the ideas and meanings of his films. Kubrick used music in order to deal with the mystery of the universe and the forces that are greater than man's comprehension. Alex North's score was rejected by Kubrick in favor of the temp-track list of musical works which he eventually used when directing and editing. The seven musical works which compile the list are: György Ligeti's *Atmosphères*, *Kyrie* (from his Requiem), *Lux Aeterna*, *Aventures*, Richard Strauss' *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, Johann Strauss' *The Blue Danube waltz* (An der schönen blauen Donau, Op. 314) and Aram Khatchaturian's *Adagio* (from his Gayane Ballet Suite), and appear in thirteen places in the film. Kubrick came up to this decision not because he had become infatuated with temporary music but because he felt it was the right music for his film, because of its potential to imbue the film with extra meaning (Merkley 2007: 30; McGinney 2009:163-167).

The music in *2001: A Space Odyssey* differs from other film scores by its prominence. The musical pieces chosen by Kubrick bring an aura of intellectual sophistication to the film, they are striking and, in combination with the images on the screen, uniquely impactful. Kubrick, when asked about the meaning of this film, replied as follows: "I intended the film to be an intensely subjective experience that reaches the viewer at an inner level of consciousness, just as music does" (Patterson 2004: 469).

The aim of the study

The present study advocates for an approach which can broaden the understanding of the ways music functions, signifies and gets signification within a film context.

In this vein, the main aim of the present study is to investigate how music functions in the film context and, in particular, how it constantly generates new connotations and interpretations. The research questions are:

How does music function in *2001: A Space Odyssey*?

What is the nature of the boundaries between music and image in *2001: A Space Odyssey* and how can we interpret their shared characteristics at a semiotic level?

Does music, as it opens up the filmic scenes of *2001: A Space Odyssey*, carry particular connotations and associations? How music influences and/or determines the meaning of the filmic images?

Methodological model

Stanley Kubrick's oeuvre, developed over nearly 50 years, has long been studied and interpreted in terms of each narrative, thematic, visual, and musical elements. However, the attempt to find a semiotic model for the analysis and interpretation of the music in *2001: A Space Odyssey*, pre-existing classical music, was fruitless. Very few music semioticians have focused on film music. On the other hand, in the field of film studies no methodological approach has been developed to analyze film music with regard to the inner elements of music. Film studies are often dominated by visual analysis. Yet, by focusing on musical elements and signs, we can understand better the visual and, probably, we can conceive the film narration at a new level. In Gorbman's words (1987: 12) film music should be analyzed in its filmic context, as a part of the whole, in its natural state.

Consequently, we concluded that we should develop our own model, considering that: a) the director Stanley Kubrick was the one who selected the musical works and decided about their use in the film, b) the genre of the compositions is classical –western art music– and thus the works pre-existed, c) Kubrick designed the music editing upon the movie, thus the visual and the aural elements are indecomposable.

For the construction of our methodological model we were based on the schematic designation of the function of music in a film according to Wingstedt (2005, 2010), and Gorbman (1987). Our analytical framework draws on Kassabian's description (2001) of the relationships among the events of music and other aspects of film and on the semiotic model of Cook (1998) for identifying the ways that film music interacts to images. In addition, we examine *2001: A Space Odyssey* film's music in terms of denotation and connotation and we discuss the qualities of *leitmotiv* that characterizes the music of the film. Borrowing from previous studies (see Tolchinsky & Lipscomb 2005; Merkle 2007; McGinney 2009), we speculate how the music provides referential and/or narrative clues for the understanding of the film: the meaning of music-image events arise through the study of how these systems are related, whether they are juxtaposed, if they reinforce each other, and/or if they exist in a status of counterpoint. The analysis focuses on both the context and the content of the music.

Results and Discussion

1. How does music function in *2001: A Space Odyssey*?

Many film music scholars and theoreticians have described and classified the functions of film music. Their categorizations, in the vast majority of cases, share common characteristics.

Wingstedt (2005, 2010) suggests six classes of film music functions: emotive, informative, descriptive, guiding, temporal and rhetorical. Gorbman's (1987: 259) principles have as follows: invisibility, "inaudibility", signifier of emotion, narrative cueing, continuity, unity, "breaking the rules". According to her (1987: 73), film music can be (a) referential (music indicates the point of view, it sets the characters and the atmosphere), (b) connotative (music interprets and illustrates the narrative events). Kassabian (2001: 28) suggests that music enables us to comprehend what are in themselves non-emotional meanings in an emotional way.

Considering Wingstedt's categorization, music of *2001* has emotive, informative, guiding, temporal and rhetorical functions. Ligeti's works and Khatchaturian's *Gayane-Adagio* communicate emotive qualities; they provide a deep emotional atmosphere and mood in association with on-screen action and characters. Yet McGinney (2009) suggests that *2001: A Space Odyssey* has no music that suggests the emotions of individual characters; the characters appear largely devoid of emotion. Ligeti's *Kyrie*, which accompanies all appearances of the monolith, has an informative character as it represents the alien consciousness. When blended with the *Atmosphères*, in the Star-Gate scene, it creates a unique spacetime sense. Strauss' *Also Sprach Zarathustra* directs the attention to the Moonwatcher's weapon invention and thus has guiding function. Most of the musical works create a sense of time, impose a rhythm for the on-screen narration and therefore have a temporal function. Particularly, the *Blue Danube Waltz* is the rhythmic basis of the movements of characters and objects; Ligeti's *Kyrie* and *Atmosphères* when played in sequence in the Star-Gate scene, provide continuity. The rhetorical function lies on the repetition of specific musical works throughout the film narration and works as an inner-comment.

With regard to Gorbman's categorization, music in *2001* functions as signifier of emotion, gives narrative cues, unifies the scenes and the shots and provides continuity. Music in *2001* never serves as a neutral background filler and it does not follow the principle of Gorbman's inaudibility.

From our analysis it is found that music in *2001: A Space Odyssey* functions in a way that is unlike music in other films. At first, we noticed that music and dialogues almost never co-exist. When we listen to music, the characters remain silent –though in action– and vice versa. This counterpoint-type relation makes us to infer that music is a kind of dialogue within the narration.

The relative lack of dialogue and extended visual sequences rely on the music to “explain” the scenes in the film's story. Moreover, music goes beyond emotions and atmospheres, and takes on a narrative role (McGinney 2009: 167-168). The function of music is significantly enhanced by the ambiguity inherent in the visuals.

Moreover, music in *2001* also has an exceptional function: following the theatrical tradition, in the overture, intermission and “final bow”, music connotes the curtain of the film. More specifically, in the beginning of the film, the first appearance of the *Atmosphères*, in conjunction with the total black screen, simulate the curtain, signifying an invitation to the viewer-listener: “clear up your mind and get involved in the experience”.

In all, music in *2001: A Space Odyssey* functions in multiple and complex ways. It is used in order to express atmospheres, moods and emotions, to enhance Kubrick's main philosophical ideas, to mirror and illustrate the action, to comment the narration and the actions portrayed on screen, to provide unity and to give rhythm. It extends the image, contributes to the film experience and creates a new semiosphere.

2. What is the nature of the boundaries between music and image in *2001: A Space Odyssey* and how can we interpret their shared characteristics at a semiotic level?

The study of both acoustical and visual elements in a film is not an easy task but it can highlight aspects of music and images overlooked when each modality is studied in isolation. Kassabian (2001: 60) describes the relationships among single events of music and other aspects of the film and proposes the study of a music piece in relation: [a] to other music, both within the same film and more generally; [b] to the narrative and the world it creates; and [c] to other tracks of the film (visual images, dialogue, sound effects).

Cook (1998) created a model for analyzing music in the context of film, focusing on the ways that film music and images interact. Describing the relations between two media in a multimedia context, he distinguishes three cases: conformance, complementation, and contest. Cook (1998: 73) stated that “the very fact of juxtaposing image and music has the effect of drawing attention to the properties that they share, and in this way constructing a new experience of each; the interpretation is in this sense emergent”.

If music and image say exactly the same thing, expressed in separate modalities, Cook chooses to refer to them as conformant. If the separate media add independent, functionally non-redundant information to the overall work, this case is referred as complementation. A simplistic example of complementation is that the image provides denotative information and the music provides connotative, emotional information, and together they provide the total meaning of the multimedia work. Finally, the separate media can be functionally redundant and in competition. This model is referred to as contest. This state is also referent in literature as counterpoint.

Following the Cook's semiotic model, we concluded that the relations between music and image in *2001* are sometimes in conformance and in most cases in complementation. Two clear examples of complementation are identified when the spanning motion of the waltz mirrors and accompanies the spinning movement of the Space Station and when the airhostess walks on the circular corridor. The most characteristic example of conformance is when Moonwatcher hurls the bone-tool into the air. As the bone hurtles against the sky in slow motion, we listen to the dominant c-chord of *Also Sprach Zarathustra* played in fortissimo by the whole orchestra. There is no competitive interaction between music and image. In many scenes the music has a dominant role: as music in *2001: A Space Odyssey* is employed as a narrative resource, the music elements often dictate the visual ones.

Patterson (2004: 455-456) remarks on the musical symmetry between the opening gestures of the waltz and those of the prologue to *Zarathustra*. He notes how the “softened” opening of the waltz in comparison to the grand opening of *Zarathustra* mirrors the parallel confrontations between the groups of aggressive hominids and their more civil scientist counterparts aboard the space station.

Brown (1994: 239) describes the musical excerpts in *2001* as “separate artistic fragment[s] expressing in a different medium what the film expresses in visual and narrative terms.”

A general conclusion is that the fade-in and fade-out techniques are used effectively and in conformance to the on-screen images. There is obviously a kinetic interplay of visual and auditory rhythm: the temporal and the rhythmic elements of the music interact with the visual rhythms (on-screen motion, camera motion, and cutting patterns).

3. Does music, as it opens up the filmic scenes of *2001: A Space Odyssey*, carry particular connotations and associations? How music influences and/or determines the meaning of the filmic images?

Film music is a semiotic system both in its own right and within films (Kassabian 2001: 60). Wierzbicki (2009) notes that film music has a rich semiotic content because it is derivative; its meaning is not fully contained within the music itself. The more open aesthetics of film music allows it to co-exist with material whose meaning derives from associations quite independent of the music itself.

It is widely accepted that different music produces different interpretations of the on-screen activity. The same music work in different film setting generates new and different connotations (Gorbman, 1987). McQuiston (2013) argues that some of the most compelling aspects

of Stanley Kubrick's films are musically conceived. In *2001: A Space Odyssey* the music appears to have a relationship of primacy over images and dialogues. Under the impact of music, the images cease to signify in a predictable manner. The connotative dimension of music derives from certain inner music elements, such as tonality (tonal and non-tonal music), harmony, tempo, timbre (voices vs orchestra) and from extra-musical elements, that is the expressive elements of music, which are connotated by themselves (e.g. immer breiter, sostenuto molto calmo, wie aus der Ferne, dolcissimo).

We can easily recognize a stylistic polarity between the tonal selections and the non-tonal, sound-mass selections in *2001: A Space Odyssey*. If we distinguish the musical works in tonal and non-tonal, we could infer that the first are related to human presence from hominids to the humans of the very near future (emotions, moods, acts and awareness) while the latter depict and signify the unknown, the transcendental and the alien: a non-human state of consciousness.

Ligeti's music connotes the timeless space and the spaceless time. According to McGinney (2009), the Ligeti's micropolyphonic choral passages, with unusual harmonies and lack of discreet rhythms and melodies, evoke agony and tension and suggest an alien consciousness. It conveys a sense of energy when it brings monolith to life. Merkley (2007: 9) remarks that Ligeti's music is most suggestive of the future and of the alien intelligence behind the monolith. In our view, Ligeti's musical compositions are signs by themselves. They signify the "alien", but in terms of anything that is beyond Man's cognition, knowledge and senses – in opposition to the tonal works, whose meaning varies through the narration.

Strauss' epic and iconic music connotes progress; human progress, technological progress, and spiritual progress as well. It also connotes revelation and knowledge. It serves to reinforce the philosophical content of the narrative. The prologue to *Zarathustra* imbued with the cosmic significance of the planetary conjunctions during the film's opening titles, paints these scenes as victorious and triumphant (McGinney 2009: 83).

The pleasant relaxed tempo of the *Blue Danube* indicates the character and the beauty of the motion of spacecraft. Kubrick once interviewed said that "It's hard to find anything much better than *The Blue Danube* for depicting "grace and beauty in turning. It also gets about as far away as you can get from the cliché of space music" (Patterson, 2004: 454). McQuiston (2013: 30) emphasizes the circular nature of the waltz music, discussing the cue in connection with the prevalence of circle figures in the images of the spacecraft's interiors and exteriors and their relationship to the movement of the craft. One could speculate that *The Blue Danube* appears as an anachronism. Merkley (2007: 11) argues that these "future archaisms" help to link together the different eras of man and adds that "the preserved musical elements lend a continuity to the evolution of the species that would otherwise appear to be disjunct."

Khatchaturian's *Adagio* from Gayane Ballet Suite in the centrifuge scene brings the feeling of isolation and is charged with the severity of a non-escape long-distant journey to universe. Is this the music that the astronaut listens in his head while exercising? McGinney (2009: 84) observes that the slow excerpt from the Suite accompanies the solitary routines of the astronauts, while Merkley (2007: 9) notices that the depressive anxiety of Khatchaturian's chromatic music bottles up the energy of a man stuck on ship traveling through outer space with a taciturn companion and a suspicious computer.

In the scene "Jupiter and Beyond the Infinite" we have a rather unique case in film history. We listen to three musical compositions by Ligeti in sequence, for about 17 minutes (*Kyrie, Atmosphères, Aventures*) and Kubrick has edited them in continuity, so that the non-musician viewer-listener cannot identify that these are three autonomous works. This part of the movie is exceptional for many other reasons. It is timeless, with arbitrary linearity, strongly dramatic and highly expressionistic. Music conjures up visions. It fills the airless space in the borderline

of reality and fiction. From the semiotic point of view, it is too hard to define the signs in the Star-Gate scene. However, considering the whole scene as a sign, music once more signifies the passage to the transcendental, unknown, and divine.

In sum, music in *2001: A Space Odyssey*, which is outside classical Hollywood's semiotic code, allows and offers a wide range of possible interpretation and it is a powerful generator of meanings. In many scenes, the meaning of the visual images is ambiguous and it is the music which determines the process of interpreting the scene. Music provides cues for interpretation.

Some further Findings

1. Kubrick's re-conceptualization of non-diegetic music in *2001: A Space Odyssey*

In *2001: A Space Odyssey*, though the composed score pre-existed, it seems as if it was "tailored" on the film. Music is ingeniously edited: the fade-in, fade-out and cut sound techniques are used in an enigmatic manner so that viewer-listener is likely puzzled about the non-diegetic nature of music. Do the characters of the film listen and react upon the music? Is the monolith the sound source of Ligeti's *Kyrie*? Does Dr. Floyd (William Sylvester) listen to *The Blue Danube Waltz* while sleeping and traveling in space? Does Frank Poole (Gary Lockwood) listen to *Gayane-Adagio* while exercising inside the spacecraft? The fade-out and cut sound techniques show that music in *2001: A Space Odyssey* is probably non-diegetic, but this appears not to be the question at all. In any case, Kubrick went beyond the limitations and conventions of musical diegesis.

2. Leitmotiv

In film music, a musical theme that is repeated could be seen as *leitmotiv*. According to Chattah (2006:138-139), the composers establish a leitmotiv through signifier-signified proximity. Once a leitmotiv has been introduced and attached to its corresponding signified, it can represent events that are absent in the visuals or dialogue. Chattah further claims that composers in order to achieve a strong linkage between a leitmotiv (signifier) and the character, object, or place it represents (signified), they often rely on metaphorical correlations between signifier and signified based on image schemas. The associations based on a leitmotiv transmit connotations related to the film's narration. (Guadalupe Silveira 2013: 127)

Leitmotifs function as signs which evoke a re-conceptualization of certain associations. For instance, when *Zarathustra's* theme appears in the Moonwatcher scene, it indicates the very beginning of civilization. In the scene of the mysterious virgin-birth of the Star-Child, it could be linked to the concepts of wisdom and self-consciousness, reversing the prior destination of mankind of "killing and be killed". Patterson (2004: 451) argues that in the above scenes, music underscores "the dramatic turning points of *becoming*".

The use of Ligeti's *Kyrie* in three scenes (the discovery of the monolith by the hominids, the encounter of monolith by the specialized scientists in Tycho crater, and the Star-Gate Dave's experience) diminishes the space and time distance among them. Ligeti's music in these scenes provides unity and connotes the idea and the question of consciousness through the contact with an extraterrestrial intelligence. Ciment (2001: 128) regards the *Kyrie* as a leitmotiv for the alien consciousness, which invokes "Clarke's idea that all technology, if sufficiently advanced, is touched with magic and a certain irrationality". Considering the total duration of *2001: A Space Odyssey* (about 2 hours and 29 minutes) and the duration of Ligeti's compositions (about 33 minutes) we assert that Ligeti's music is a leitmotiv by itself.

Since Kubrick had decided to use the chosen musical works in repetition, we came to the conclusion that these works ought to be considered as leitmotifs. The recurrence of certain works establishes and communicates various meanings. Furthermore, the use of musical leitmotifs in *2001: A Space Odyssey* is not stereotypical, nor cliché.

3. Silence

Music transfers its own attributes to the story-line (Cook 1998: 20). The presence or the absence of the music perform as narration by itself, making the 'musical silence' a carrier of meaning (Lipscomb & Tolchinsky, 2005).

In *2001* the music is carefully placed and timed with the visuals and the other aural elements. Silence (non-music) is equally important as sound and music. Arved (2004: 365-367) notes that the most catastrophic event in the film, the death of the astronaut Frank Poole, aboard the *Discovery*, occurs with no musical accompaniment at all. Furthermore, the actions of the HAL 9000 computer, which was responsible for Poole's death, also have no musical accompaniment.

4. Are there textual references made through music in *2001: A Space Odyssey*?

One could hypothesize that Kubrick's choice about music works was intentional in terms of their textual references. For instance, when one recognizes Richard Strauss's *Also sprach Zarathustra* she/he could associate it to Nietzsche's work and equate the future man to "superman". Yet there is evidence that Kubrick did not choose the music works for their textual associations.

Merkley (2007:8) explains that *Also sprach Zarathustra* was chosen by Kubrick for *2001: A Space Odyssey* because it was a majestic music piece of the approximate length that the director needed. Nietzsche's ideas were not the reason for this choice. Moreover, by the time Kubrick chose this music his shooting was complete. Consequently, all of the speculations on Nietzsche in the secondary literature that surrounds *2001: A Space Odyssey* are unfounded.

Coda

Film music has broadly been studied in the context of the images and within the framework of the filmic narration. Film music studies suffer from an academic exclusivity, whereby the findings of each approach –cultural studies, film studies, semiotics, musicology, aesthetics, cognitive psychology– remain in isolation from each other. Yet, film music cannot be studied with traditional musicological methods, which rely on formalistic orientated procedures and are poorly adapted for the use of music in the more complex filmic context.

In the present study, we examined the interaction of music and other elements in *2001: A Space Odyssey*, we investigated the connotations of the music mapped onto the narrative and we focused on the parallels between musical and visual linear parameters. We propose an interdisciplinary approach that aims to broaden the understanding of the ways music is given signification and functions within a film context. This approach borrows models from the fields of semiotics and musicology and uses them in a complementary way in order to formulate a framework for the study and the interpretations of the use of pre-existing music in the film context.

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INNOVATION IN DEFIANCE OF HOLLYWOOD'S “INVISIBLE STYLE”: JEAN-LUC GODARD'S À BOUT DE SOUFLE (*BREATHLESS*, 1960).

Nikos P. Terzis
Technological Educational Institute of Athens, Greece
nterzisz@yahoo.com

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to bring forward the innovative filmic devices that Godard, in a *palimpsest* process, introduced in filmic language, against the tradition of *cinema du papa*, and the overall narrative reassurance of Hollywood's pseudo-realism of verisimilitude.

More precisely, I am attempting to present the overall aesthetic, anarchic/revolution that Godard (the first famous, deliberately deconstructive, **semiotician filmmaker**, enigmatic especially in his latest period) brought to the Cinema worldwide, with his debut feature film *Breathless*.

In order to do so, I intend to use semiotics:

1. To analyze the very first & last shot of the film.
2. To attempt a close analysis (shot to shot) of the second sequence where the film noir icon protagonist Jean-Paul Belmondo (Michel Poiccard, alias Laszlo Kovacs) drives off Marseilles on a country road with his first stolen American car.
3. To examine its first created, famous, **internal jump-cuts**, that a film ever introduced to international audiences, a montage technique, that American television later on first adapted (European television followed), with the video clip artists universally integrating it in their work, alas, devoid its Godardian, first, radical usage!

Breathless, after all, although a well established monumental/breakthrough film some decades now, it still strikes us afresh with its immediacy, existential aura, syncopated rhythm, meta-filmic dimension, its innumerable self-referential elements, finally its inter-textual qualities (before the term inter-textuality was ever coined!).

My semiotic approach in accordance to Godard's attitude will be one of combining the most appropriate tools that semiotic theory has to offer up to now for bringing forward the mean-

ing of moving pictures and sounds, namely: denotation, connotation, paradigmatic/syntagmatic axis of creating meaning, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche. I will utilize Peirce's theory about indexical codes (Peirce 1974) that Peter Wollen (I was very lucky to have him as a visiting professor in my first film course at Columbia University), first brought forward in film theory (Wollen 1972).

***À bout de souffle*: semiotic analysis of an innovative sequence as to the handling of montage and the male protagonist/film noir icon**

Hollywood's dominant, classical cinema is based on a set of *generic codes* and conventional *narrative devices* which act as *motifs* and cognitive schemes, such that we as spectators are taught/conditioned through repetition to understand mainly the story and identify with the positive characters in a more or less passive process. This mainstream narrative orthodoxy is channeled through the *cinematic genres* and aims to bring about clarity and unity through goal-oriented protagonists who function in a godly star system that foregrounds individual problems devoid of any critical social context. They follow a storyline that, except for small gaps and clearly cued flashbacks, orders events in a naive linear chain of *cause and effect*, thus obeying the norms of narrative closure and bringing about a reassuring happy end.

Peter Wollen (whose student I was at Columbia University), in his article: *Godard and Counter Cinema: Vent d'Est. Afterimage 4* (autumn 1972): p. 6-17, mapped the *seven deadly sins of Hollywood versus the seven cardinal virtues of counter-cinema*, as follows:

Narrative transitivity (Sequence of events)	Narrative intransitivity (Gaps and interruptions, episodic construction, undigested digression)
Identification (Empathy, emotional involvement with a character)	Estrangement (Direct address, multiple and divided characters, commentary)
Transparency (Language wants to be over-looked)	Foregrounding (Making the mechanics of the film/text visible and explicit)
Single diegesis (A unitary homogenous world)	Multiple diegesis (Heterogeneous worlds. Rupture between different codes and different channels)
Closure (A self-contained object, harmonized within its own bounds)	Aperture (Open-endedness, overspill, intertextuality-allusion, quotations and parody)
Pleasure (Entertainment, aiming to satisfy the spectator)	Unpleasure (Provocation, aiming to dissatisfy and hence change the spectator)
Fiction (Actors wearing make-up, acting a story)	Reality Real life, the breakdown of representation, truth)

In my opinion, Jean-Luc Godard's *Breathless* aligns so radically all seven cardinal virtues of counter-art cinema for the first time in narrative feature films. *Breathless*, a film that managed to reach vast audiences, propels toward an inimitable, innovative spirit of playful *cinematic disobedience* in departing from the tradition of *spatio-temporal continuity* that grounds Hollywood's "invisible style." Although a well-established monumental film for some decades now, *Breathless* still strikes us with its immediacy, existential aura, syncopated rhythm, meta-filmic dimension, its innumerable self-referential elements and finally its inter-textual qualities (before the term inter-textuality was coined).

My semiotic approach to this film applies mainly the Peirce/Wollen trichotomy (Wollen 1972: 116-154), for it is Wollen the theorist who stresses for the first time "the relevance of the Peircean scheme to the study of film and makes some very suggestive remarks about particular examples of iconicity and **indexicality** [my emphasis], but the topic has not been widely pursued by other theoreticians" (Silverman 1983: 24).¹ This interpretation was sketched out two to three years before Silverman could anticipate Gilles Deleuze's *Cinéma 2, L'Image-temps*, 1985 (transl. as *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* in 1989).²

But out of respect for materiality, let us first carefully examine the film itself. A detailed description of the introductory sequence is mandatory before we close examine the second sequence which will be our main focus. This is something that Deleuze, for example, never does when considering films in the context of his extremely ambitious general grand theory.

Breathless (À bout de souffle, 1960): semiotic analysis of the first and second sequence.



The first sequence, which precedes the sequence whose semiotic/aesthetic analysis we are to focus on, amounts to 12 shots. The first shot is of the greatest importance for all 12 shots. The action goes as follows: We see the *close up* of the newspaper with the drawing of a young woman dressed in underwear, holding with coquetry a little doll behind her, while we hear Michel off camera exclaim, "After all . . . I'm stupid. After all, yes, it must play that way, it must, it must." The camera, tilting up, reveals a *medium shot*. Michel, lowering the newspaper, appears smoking arrogantly; he lifts his head up looking left, then turns his face abruptly right with a decisive, exaggerated, masculine forcefulness, removes the cigarette, rubs his lips in the style of Bogart as if he were signaling to someone (duration: 23" + 16 frames).³ We see a woman signaling to Michel with her eyes, while we notice a military officer parking his American car and walking away with his wife. Michel turns on the car's engine with some cables; the woman on the look-

¹ "This is surprising since the emphasis in Peirce's semiotics on the mediating role of the *icon* would seem to have special pertinence to the analysis of cinematic signification. It would also seem to supplement the recent amalgamation of film study with Lacanian theory, in which the category of the "imaginary" figures so centrally" (Silverman 1983: 24).

² Silverman had no way of anticipating Luc Moulet's idiosyncratic, casually written, occasionally ironic, sardonic article: "The Green Garbage Bins of Gilles Deleuze", 2000 (transl. in English in 2005), which claims: "...his philosophic polish masks his real skills. Deleuze can be passionate and invigorating, if you steer away from his stories about movement and time. He is like a Skorecki who thinks he is a Spinoza... The system is as void as his particular insights are often exciting and stimulating" (<http://www.rouge.com.au/6/deleuze.html>).

³ Michel is only an "acting thug" modeled after the thugs portrayed in 1930s film noir by the likes of Humphrey Bogart. Humphrey Bogart had a natural tick of running his thumb over his lips. This action doesn't come from any particular movie or role, but from Bogart himself. Godard uses the thumb/lip rub as an acknowledgment of the iconography of Bogart and the hard-boiled gangster associated with him.

out asks him to take her with him. Michel then asks her what time it is; she answers, and he takes off alone.

Let's examine the very first shot. **1a.** The **close up** of the newspaper with the drawing of a young woman dressed in underwear, holding with coquetry a little doll behind her, signals very early in the film, and as an *index* connotes and announces, Godard's search for the *woman's code* that will follow the film's unfolding: the woman is thus conceived as a victim of language⁴ and consumerism, kept in ignorance, a subject that the filmmaker will investigate/expose/present cinematically and more thoroughly in his subsequent films of the 60's. **1b.** Michel with his unnatural, overplayed Brechtian acting, as if he is inside his role and at the same time outside of it, commenting on it (as a *connotative* comment on his role/character) makes clear from the very beginning that he is nothing else but a French actor who impersonates a *petit-gangster* (first degree of displacement/doubling). Michel in turn rubs his lips (an *index* that works *metonymically*), imitates Bogart, the prototype of masculinity in American gangster films (second degree of displacement/doubling). Furthermore, Michel's enigmatic words may function as *symbols/indices* that foreshadow cryptically/*connotatively* the outcome of the story, namely, his upcoming death. Here are a few observations:

With the exception of the first shot, the rest of the shots do not present us something innovative, other than the complete non-existence of a shot that informs us about the *spatial* associations of the action taking place. Furthermore, the first four alternating shots of Michel and the woman on the lookout do not present a clear *eye line direction match* in the order of visual communication, while we get the impression that the two of them are close to each other, which is a false impression as the next shots reveal. All these create an estranging, waking up and alienating effect on the viewer.

To summarize, this controversial film opens with a shot that is very peculiar, enigmatic, self-referential, intertextual and very semiotic, indeed. Instead of having an introductory shot followed by other that would introduce the main characters and progressively initiate the story with an *analytical editing* as in classical American film noir, we have a jump into the middle of a critical action. Furthermore, this shot is full of visual and aural *connotative signs*. First, in the visual/drawing in the newspaper of a young, coquettish woman holding a doll, we get the first visual *connotative sign* about the code of women as somnambulists. Second, the cryptic/enigmatic *connotative* utterance of the male protagonist (whose face is hidden by the newspaper while he speaks), proclaims cryptically of what is yet to come, namely, his doom, as we could expect, since his persona is an amalgam of film noir characters. Third, his post-Brechtian overplayed masculinity, expressed through the *unnatural/unrealistic* visual side of his performance, reminds us that what we see is a filmic construction (and thus, it functions *connotatively/indexically* as a *self-reference* and an *alienating device*). And last but not least, Michel, rubbing his lips in the style of Bogart, operates as an *intertextual/connotative/indexical sign*, creating a *meta-language* looming above the *storyline* and the *diegetic elements* yet to come.

Now let's examine the second sequence, which presents most of the aesthetic innovations of this remarkable film, warning that our experience seeing it will be like no other.

⁴ Patricia asks questions inexcusable even for an uneducated woman, such as when she asks Belmondo: "What is a Horoscope?"



End of dissolve. [13]. Long travelling shot of a provincial road through the wind shield of the American car Michel just stole. **Michel off** is singing: *lala lala lala... la la... Buenos notes me amor...* (dur: 18" + 3 frames). **[14]. ¾ tight medium shot** framing Michel (from behind), who has turned to look back. **Michel:** *If he thinks he is he is gonna pass me in that crappy thing!* (dur: 4" + 3 frames).



[15]. Long travelling shot of cars on the road. Michel goes on singing till shot #16. **Michel off:** *Pa...Pa papa...papapa...Paaaaatriicia... Patriiiciaaaa...* (dur: 1"). **[16]. Long travelling shot** of the road. Michel passes by a petrol track. (dur: 1" + 19 frames).



[17]. Long travelling shot of the road. Michel passes by a car. (dur: 1" + 8 frames). **[18]. Long travelling shot** of the road. Michel passes by another car. (dur: 1" + 1 frames).



[19]. ¾ close up shot of Michel smoking while driving. (dur: 3" + 14 frames). **[20]. Long travelling shot** of the road. **Michel off:** *I pick up the cash. I ask Patricia yes or no, and then... (singing) Buena's notes me amorrr... Milano, Genova, Rome...* (dur: 12" + 15 frames).



[21]. Long 150° pan left to right, frames Michel's car driving away with a long liberating sound of its horn... (dur: 6" + 14 frames). **[22]. ¾ tight medium shot** of Michel looking outside first left, then right. He turns on the radio (music). **Michel off:** *The countryside's is nice.* (dur: 8" + 14 frames).





[23]. Long $\frac{3}{4}$ Michel's p.o.v. diagonal travelling shot of the countryside. **Michel off:** *I really like France.* (dur: 6" + 21 frames). [24]. **Medium shot** of Michel in profile driving and smoking. He turns four times to the camera,⁵ proclaiming with scoffing voice! **Michel:** *If you don't like the sea, if you don't like the mountains, if you don't like the city, then get stuffed.* dur: 14" + 23 frames).



[25]. **Jump Cut. Travelling pan right. Medium profile shot** of Michel ends to a long shot of the street. Two girls are standing at the right side of the street. **Michel off:** *Ahaa... little girls trying to hitch a ride!* **Pan left to a medium shot** of Michel. (dur: 9" + 18 frames). [26]. **Jump Cut. Medium shot** of Michel in profile. **Michel:** *I'll charge a kiss per kilometer.* (dur: 2" + 15 frames).



[27]. **Long travelling shot**, approaching the girls. **Pan right** framing them, while Michel slows down and finally passes them, commenting. **Michel:** *The short one is not bad. She has nice thighs. But the other one.* (dur: 8" + 3 frames). [28]. $\frac{3}{4}$ **tight medium shot** of Michel who is looking at the girls as he moves on. **Michel:** *shit... they are too ugly...* Michel turns front, finds a music station on the radio. **Pan right.** (dur: 9" + 5 frames).



[29]. **Jump Cut.** Michel with his right hand pulls out a revolver from the car's cabinet. (dur: 2" + 20 frames).

[30]. **Jump Cut.** He points the gun to the mirror, then at several targets. **Michel off:** (imitating the bullet's sound) *pa... pa... pa...* (dur: 12" + 4 frames).




⁵ **Fourth wall:** Speaking directly to or otherwise acknowledging the audience through a camera in a film or television program, or through this imaginary frontal wall in a play, is referred to as "breaking the fourth wall" and is considered a technique of [metafiction](#), as it penetrates the boundaries normally set up by works of fiction.



[31]. **Jump Cut.** Michel looks right. **Pan right** while he points the gun to the sun. **Michel:** *The sun is beautiful.* (dur: 5" + 20 frames).

[32]. **High angle, travelling shot** of the sun whose beams glitter through the foliage. A gun shot is heard. (dur: 3" + 17 frames).



[33]. **Medium shot** of Michel. **Michel:** *Women are such cowards behind the wheel. Overtake them. Oh, there are road works. Never use the breaks. As old Bugatti said: "Cars are made to run, not to stop".* (dur: 23" + 23 frames).

[34]. **Very short tight shot** of the front part of Michel's car that enters the frame from left side. (dur: 1" + 1 frames).



[35]. A **tight shot** frames the right part of Michel's windshield. Two policemen on their motorcycles parked at the right side of the street. **Michel:** *Shit... cops.* (dur: 2" + 2 frames).

[36]. **Dynamic tight shot** of Michel's car speeding up, passing the track right to left. (dur: 22 frames).



[37]. Rapid **pan left** from Michel's back to the back of his car framing the track and the cops that come after him on their motorcycles. (dur: 4" + 7 frames).

[38]. **Jump Cut.** Same with shot 37, only the cops are closer. Rapid **pan right** that ends as it reaches Michel's back. (dur: 3" + 17 frames)



[39]. **Full Shot, 120° pan right** of Michel's car passing by fast another car. (dur: 1" + 13 frames).

[40]. **Full Shot, 120° pan left** with the two policemen on their motorcycles roaring past. (dur: 1" + 13 frames).





[41]. **Medium long shot.** Michel's car turns off the main road down the slope of a dirt road. **Pan right to a medium shot** of the car stopping. **Michel:** *Oh, my clamps have come off.* (dur: 5" + 6 frames).

[42]. **Long shot.** A policeman passes along the main road left to right. **Michel off:** *The fools have fallen into the trap.* (dur: 19 frames).



[43]. **Medium shot.** Michel goes to the front of the car. He opens bonnet and begins to fiddle the engine. He hears the noise of the motorcycle and looks to the main road upfront. (dur: 5" + 1 frames).

[44]. **Medium long shot.** The second motorcyclist policeman passes along the main road left to right. (dur: 1" + 4 frames).



[45]. **As in 43.** Michel continues to fiddle with some car cables; hearing motorbike noise getting louder he looks up front. (dur: 4" + 22 frames).

[46]. **Medium long shot** like 42. The second policeman motor-cyclist rides down the slope of the dirt road towards Michel's car. We hear the squeal of his brakes that runs over the beginning of the next shot. (dur: 3" + 12 frames).



[47]. **Wide medium shot.** Michel runs back to the passenger's door and leans in through the open window. A shadow gets in the frame and casts on him few tenths of a second before the shot ends. (dur: 3" + 12 frames).


[48]. **Close up** Michel's face. **The camera tilts down** first over his hat and then on to his face. **Policeman off:** (the voice doesn't sound like Michel's, whose lips are not moving, anyway): *Don't move or I'll shoot.* (dur: 1" + 20 frames).





[49]. **Extreme close up, pan right** along Michel's arm holding a gun. He cocks the gun. (dur: 1" + 19 frames).

[50]. **Extreme close up, pan right.** The pan continues to the right along the revolver's barrel. We hear the sound of the gun being cocked. (dur: 1" + 5 frames).



[51]. **Plan Americain.** The sound of the gun firing. The policeman barely glimpsed, falls comically backwards into the trees, clutching a branch which he breaks off. (dur: 2" + 9 frames).

[52]. **Long shot, pan left.** Michel is running across a bare country field. A dramatic music score overtakes the soundtrack and climaxes bridging the next scene. Fade out. (dur: 16" + 12 frames).



Let us now first consider the stylistic techniques that this sequence shares in common with Hollywood's industrious, conventional mode of narration, before we examine how it specifically transforms cinematic language:

1) The use of short duration shots (42, 44) and their alteration with shots of longer duration, as with shots 41, 43, 45, creates pace, and then shot 46 allows a break in rhythm, with the policeman turning to the dirt road following Michel's trails, climaxing in the intensity that the previous 5 shots had already developed.⁶

2) The sound of the guns being cocked produces as an *audible cut* between shots 49 and 50, and heightens the intensity of the action.

3) The final loosening of intensity with shot 52, bringing the dramatic musical bridge at the end of the sequence—at least ten times longer than the average duration of the short shots (48, 49, 50, 51) that it supersedes.

In sum, the *montage* of this film seems to take serious liberties in deviating⁷ from the rules of editing which the classical narrative paradigm strives to attain: hence, we are witness to Godard's challenge to the *spatio-temporal verisimilitude* of Hollywood's *invisible style*.

But it seems that we are jumping unnaturally from one part of the action to another. The shots often do not seem to connect with each other in accordance with mainstream Hollywood conventions. Let us remember, however, that the mere idea of *cinematic verisimilitude* is itself a convention, and certainly a manipulative one. What is, after all, the cinematic convention according to which cutting to a short shot of the pursuer permits the pursued to travel a distance

⁶ Let's notice the progressive increase in duration of the short shots (42 and 44), while a decrease happens to the longer shots (41, 43 and 45).

⁷ The critical deviations from the *invisible style* Godard uses are: severe ellipsis, breaking the axis, breaking the 4th wall, jump cuts.

incredibly long for the time that intervened, or again, the convention where the participants in a chase must be seen moving in the same *territorial grounds*? In general, cinematic conventions aim to sustain the omnipotent, narrative economy and the efficiency, clear cut, unambiguous, *denotative* semantic demands. Godard for certain does not aim to simply demolish those useful narrative mechanisms/devices, but to create more open and drastic ones, while pushing the existing ones to their limits.

Godard not only defies the never-ending repetition of classical narrative as it unfolds in commercial films. He also aims to employ *alienation effects*, on the level of acting and editing techniques that cause estrangement, thus pushing the viewer's logic to extremes. Due to the overall impression of an elliptic, unexpected, narrative structure, we get only what is necessary; just as we, as oblivious observers, perceive things unfold in the midst of real life, having to decipher the meaning by putting bits and pieces together, with no indication or any hints about what is going to happen; finally, without the comfortable, hypnotizing aid of an omnipotent, self-effacing, *invisible* director.

Godard's cinema does not offer us any kind of mystical insight, since it is enunciated and structured on the *antipodes* of the reassuring omnipotence of dominant classical narration. Hence, we must accept without any explanation that the policemen have tracked down Michel and that he suddenly decides to get off the main road without any clue of having to repair his car engine, and that he finds it proper—if not necessary—to kill the policeman! With this *elliptical montage*, Godard lures us to accept this sequence of events with the same ease that we accepted that Michel steals cars (exclusively American), that he refuses to take with him the woman on the lookout, although she was the accomplice who helped him steal the car, as well the two young women hitchhikers (shots 25, 26, 27, 28), not out of misogyny but simply because he found them ugly. All of this unfolds without any sociological or psychological explanation whatsoever.

The internal logic, the information and the insight that the omnipotent creator shares with his spectators in a classically constructed film is replaced for better or worse—by the spontaneous, discontinuous, and unguarded perception of a passerby who has much less knowledge about the action than we do. In a way, Godard seems to acknowledge that he knows his protagonist as much as we do and that it is impossible and inappropriate for anyone to pretend that he has the ability to predict the behavior of a character [whose nature is to be unpredictable even for himself] who invents himself moment by moment.

These remarks are the outcome of my detailed close analysis of this remarkable revolutionary *montage sequence*. We see the first *innovative jump-cuts*⁸ in the history of world cinema in shots 25, 26 and 29, 30, 31, which, in becoming more extreme in shots 37, 38, demolish one of the most basic classical cinematic conventions, namely, spatio-temporal continuity. In shot 38, which has an identical point of view with shot 37, the truck that the patrolmen had appeared behind it pursuing Michel now disappears abruptly in the depths of the frame.

In shot 39, Michel's car passes by a car with scenic direction left→ right, while last time as viewed in shot 36, it was heading the opposite way: right→ left. Then, in shot 40, the cops who are chasing him on their motorcycles appear to drive after him in the opposite direction, breaking the 180° rule. Then again, in shot 41, Michel turns left on a dirt road, stops and off camera soliloquies undisturbed, justifying his stop *that the cables he had connected to start the car in the first*

⁸ There are two kinds of jump-cuts. The *forced logic jump-cuts* that Kreidl (1980) claims that Godard does not use, and the *internal jump cuts* that the ever daring Godard was forced to invent due to the fact that the first montage edit of his film summed up to 150 min., while his contract with Beauregard, obliged him to deliver a 90 minute film! The jump-cut was actually first employed by Georges Méliès' *La Tentation de Saint Antoine* (1898) to magically evoke appearances and disappearances. Contemporary use of the jump cut stems from [Godard's](#) ground-breaking *Breathless* (1960).

place have been disconnected. The previous shots of the chase *connote* that the distance between Michel and his pursuers is very little, thus justifying the unsuspected passing of the first patrolman in shot 42, at the point where Michel had turned off the main road, additionally creating the impression that the patrolman comes from the opposite direction.

All of these deviations seem like anomalies when set against the smooth flow and conventional, narrative logic of Hollywood's classical paradigm, as in a film like *Casablanca* (1942). But just as these deviations can at first be seen as defects, they acutely convey a sense of confusion because of the unexpected chase, the flight, fear, and underlying violence, while remaining within the borders of the potential configurations of real life. The use of montage in these shots presents the real visual experience of a passerby much better than would the style of a lesser director, who would bring to classical editing a conventional *spatio-temporal continuity* audiovisual scheme. Considering things on the plane of *montage*, Godard seems to wink at us, *connoting* that our usual perception of *spatio-temporal continuity* in cinema is simply an illusion, a *subsidiary crutch* in the mental process through which the spectator produces the meaning of a scene in a film.

Thus, by bringing to our awareness the essentially unrealistic nature of these classical conventions, Godard substitutes them with a fresher, raw, elliptic and direct recreation of the action. The action becomes even more elliptic, from the moment the second policeman turns back to follow Michel's trails on the dirt road. We see Michel rushing to the car and bending inside through the open window, and with 2 jump cuts, we see his face, his arm and a pistol at the end of his extended forearm; we hear a gunshot and glimpse the policeman falling down, unsuccessfully trying to hold a frail branch from a tree in shot 51. Shot 52 shows Michel running away in the country fields. What we have is shorthand coverage of the action that is raw, direct and functional with lyrical overtones and a sharp sense of parody.

A conventional American thriller would have treated the same scene with a *classical decoupage*, conveying every detail and even expanding time to intensify dramatically the action with the policeman, who after all is going to die. Instead of Godard's connotative treatment, we would at least have a shot of the policeman uttering the warning before the gunshot: "Don't move or I'll shoot" (that starts at shot 47—where if we are alert we can catch a glimpse of a shadow getting inside the frame—and ends at the beginning of shot 48). But due to the short duration of shot 51, we just see him the moment he falls from being hit by the bullet, as if we are catching an instance with the corner of our eyes, as if we were eyewitnesses, and glimpse the funny composition of a body falling back, trying in vain to hold himself from a branch that brakes.

There is no sign of premeditation in Michel's deadly action. Moreover, from the very start of the sequence, Michel resembles an impulsive anarchist who risks everything and lives dangerously in pursuing his freedom. In order for Michel's actions to look unexpected, his deadly deed is presented indirectly and discontinuously by the additional intervention of 2 *jump cuts* between shots (48, 49 and 50). "Don't move or I'll shoot," threatens the cop *off camera* one tenth of a second before the gun shot is heard. Although we don't see the person who speaks, we attribute this warning to the policeman. We never see the surprise in the face of the policeman or even find out if he had a chance to defend himself. The director already, either at the stage of writing the script or at the cutting table, gave him no chance to do so. Nor does this kind of *elliptical montage* leave us spectators any chance to project our usually irrelevant or misleading thoughts. Instead of a threatening *close up* and a *two shot* focused on the victim at a safe distance, we have a *tilt down* from Michel's hat to his face with shot 48 (providing a lyrical treatment of Michel's profile), while we hear the warning without seeing the moving lips of the person who utters it.

And with shots 48, 49, 50, we finally have a studied and lyrical treatment of Michel's status as a *film noir icon*, face in profile, the extended arm, the gun, the ritual of his fingers while he

cocks the gun, the superb click of the gun's mill, the deafening gunshot. And instead of having 5¾ of the total duration of shots (48, 49 and 50) to conclude in a fetishistic, elegiac treatment of Michel's persona as a gangster, the scene is saved by the comic nature of the cop's irrevocable downfall in shot 51. But the released humor is mainly the outcome of this specific *montage* arrangement: in frames 8 and 11. We can enjoy an intentional demonstration of heterogeneity, incompatibility and disharmony in the directorial treatment of the action, which, while opposing the classical portrayal of such an event, warns us not to rush into conclusions about any cinematic event or character, based solely on a previous experience of *our* surrounding world—in this case, the conventional, stereotypical mode of presenting things on the screen to which Hollywood has addicted us, in a Pavlovian manner, for long decades.

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ÉNONCIATION AUDIOVISUELLE : FAUT-IL RENIER CHRISTIAN METZ?

Sylvie Périneau
Université de Limoges, France
sylvie.perineau@unilim.fr

Résumé

Le nom de Christian Metz est indissociablement lié à l'analyse sémiotique du film (le cinéma comme langage et sa spécificité ; les opérations fondamentales de condensation et déplacement ; la grande syntagmatique, etc.). Cette présence forte – pour ne pas dire cette aura initiatrice – de Christian Metz, a clairement un effet inhibant, d'autant qu'il a échoué dans sa tentative pour théoriser un/le système filmique comme tel. La question se pose alors : pourquoi essayer à notre tour ? Or, c'est la nécessité qui fait droit : il nous faut reprendre là où Metz s'est arrêté, faute de quoi, il n'existe pas de sémiotique filmique ou audiovisuelle en tant que telle mais des contextualisations de problèmes sémiotiques dans le terrain de l'audiovisuel (cinéma, télévision, vidéo, etc.).

En me situant par rapport l'aspiration de Gilles Deleuze (1985) à une sémiotique pure de « l'énonçable » et avec le renfort théorique de Jean-François Bordron sur l'effectuation (2003), je propose de travailler l'énonciation comme n'étant ni l'activité globale ni même les traces de son passage mais véritablement une prise de la situation filmique, c'est-à-dire un cadre d'existence et d'actions offerts aux spectateurs.

Le nom de Christian Metz est indissociablement lié à l'analyse sémiotique du film (le cinéma comme langage et sa spécificité ; les opérations fondamentales de condensation et déplacement ; la grande syntagmatique, etc.). Cette présence forte - pour ne pas dire cette aura initiatrice - de C. Metz, a clairement un effet inhibant, d'autant qu'il a échoué dans sa tentative pour théoriser un/le système filmique comme tel. La question se pose alors : pourquoi essayer à notre tour ? Or, c'est la nécessité qui fait droit : il nous faut reprendre là où C. Metz s'est arrêté, faute de quoi, il

n'existe pas de sémiotique filmique ou audiovisuelle en tant que telle mais des contextualisations de problèmes sémiotiques dans le terrain de l'audiovisuel (cinéma, télévision, vidéo, etc.).

Comme le chantier est ouvert et qu'il faut bien commencer, j'ai choisi de suivre ce qui témoigne de préoccupations actuelles et qui est également un serpent de mer chez les théoriciens (pour n'en citer que quelques-uns : Laffay 1947/1964 ; Branigan 1984 ; Casetti 1990 ; Gunning 1990 ; Jost 1992 ; Odin 2000 ; Boillat 2001, etc.) : l'énonciation audiovisuelle. Or, dans *L'Énonciation impersonnelle ou le site du film* (1991) le rôle excessif dévolu à la « machine cinéma » et la mutabilité des figures de l'adresse constituent des obstacles à une énonciation comme partie intégrante d'un langage audiovisuel. D'aucuns se sont positionnés par rapport à une théorie globale de l'énonciation, parfois dans des directions tout à fait inverses. Ainsi, du côté de la *deixis*, là où F. Jost (1997 ; 1998 ; 1999 ; 2001/2003) ou R. Odin (1988) nous permettent de distinguer entre Je-origine-réel et Je-origine-fictif, C. Paolucci (2014) au contraire offre de dépersonnaliser l'énonciation comme de désindividualiser la subjectivité.

Pourtant, entre la version représentationnaliste de l'énonciation et la version autoréférentielle du dispositif énonciatif qui se met en scène, entre la conception déictique ou la conception impersonnelle, il existe, me semble-t-il sinon une troisième version, ou du moins des espaces vacants et qui satisfont à un impératif de spécificité propre tout en permettant d'inscrire l'audiovisuel comme langage (Hjelmslev 1968–1971). À cet égard, je propose de m'appuyer sur deux éléments clés : la spécificité de la médiation comme de la représentation audiovisuelle ; l'effectuation nécessaire par et pour le spectateur. En effet, ni l'activité globale de l'énonciation en acte, présumée, ni même les traces en tant qu'elles sont censées renvoyer à cette énonciation, ne permettent ou ne suffisent pour envisager ce que les spectateurs font avec l'énonciation.

En me situant par rapport l'aspiration de G. Deleuze (1985) à une sémiotique pure de « l'énonçable » et avec le renfort théorique de J.-F. Bordron sur l'effectuation (2003), je propose de travailler l'énonciation comme n'étant ni l'activité globale ni même les traces de son passage mais véritablement une prise de la situation filmique, c'est-à-dire un cadre d'existence et d'actions offerts aux spectateurs.

1. Lire les propositions de *L'Énonciation impersonnelle* (C. Metz)

1.1. Comme impulsion sémiologique majeure

Qu'il faille continuer à travailler l'énonciation, C. Metz s'en déclare « partisan » (1991 : 18). En ligne d'horizon, Metz lui-même espère que « l'exemple du cinéma (...) nous invite à élargir notre idée de l'énonciation » jusqu'à peut-être « rétroagir sur la sémiologie et la linguistique générale ».

Mais dès qu'il pose la question de l'instance énonciatrice, il en soulève le problème majeur : « l'énonciation a volontiers quelque chose d'anthropoïde » (1991 : 12). La solution qu'il propose assez tôt dans l'ouvrage (1991 : 19) : « concevoir un appareil énonciatif qui ne soit pas essentiellement déictique (donc anthropomorphe), pas *personnel* (comme les pronoms que l'on appelle ainsi), et qui n'imite pas de trop près tel ou tel dispositif linguistique ».

La non-reconduction du couple anthropomorphe (1991 : 26) l'amène à conclure que « *l'énonciateur c'est le film*, le film en tant que foyer, agissant comme tel, *orienté comme tel*, le film comme activité ». Ce sera donc l'énonciation dite impersonnelle, sans les personnes mais pas sans les divers signes énonciatifs et leurs glissements de niveaux. Au contraire même, renvoyant à F. Jost et à J.-P. Simon, C. Metz (1991 : 77) indique que le « cinéma pratique l'emploi énonciatif de n'importe quel signe » au contraire de la langue « qui a des signes énonciatifs spécialisés (déictiques) ». Plus fermement dans son dernier chapitre, il précise que « l'énonciation est coextensive à tout l'énoncé » (1991 : 210). Telle est donc la solution trouvée lorsque ce n'est pas le fait manifeste d'instances.

1.2. Pour poser le cadre théorique

Tout en se présentant comme une réponse, l'ouvrage ne résout pas vraiment les problèmes théoriques et en pose d'autres, autant de méthode que de théorie. Précisons que *L'Énonciation impersonnelle ou le site du film* a fait l'objet d'au moins deux discussions sémiotiques serrées avec l'ouvrage *Un monde à notre image. Énonciation, cinéma, télévision* de F. Jost (1992) et l'article de J. Fontanille « Des simulacres de l'énonciation à la praxis énonciative » (1994).

1.2.1. Adéquation

Le problème d'adéquation est lié à l'importation de la théorie de l'énonciation hors du domaine linguistique. C. Metz s'en fait lui-même l'objection. Bien d'autres, comme A. Gaudreault ou D. Bordwell, évoquent une métaphore et un transfert inadéquat. Effectivement, ceci suppose d'élargir la perspective et de considérer que nous avons affaire avec les films, les émissions de télévision ou les vidéos à des faits de langage. Mais le problème est également cette importation se réalise dans un contexte mass médiatique où les conditions de communication sont multiples. Pourtant, dans le dictionnaire *Sémiotique*, l'article de M. Hammad (1986 : 75) indique qu'« écrire la signification d'un énoncé, c'est donc décrire son énonciation, c'est-à-dire proposer une représentation du surgissement de cet énoncé dans un contexte donné ». Par conséquent une discipline qui s'intéresse à la production de la signification rencontre nécessairement la question de l'énonciation. Le tout est d'y adapter les théories préexistantes. À part le regard-caméra qui est véritablement sacré comme « 2^{ème} personne optique » (1991 : 67) C. Metz n'effectue pas vraiment de transposition de l'*origo*. Il traite en fait de l'énonciation comme thématization singulière ou comme un effet illocutoire dans le cadre d'interpellations qui jouent sur les niveaux diégétiques et extradiégétique. Soulignons aussi que C. Metz se concentre finalement sur la fiction, alors que le Je-ici-maintenant peut réellement intervenir pour les énoncés non fictionnels, à la télévision par exemple, sous condition d'interlocution et de concomitance avec le temps spectatorial.

Quelle est l'incidence du rejet de l'anthropomorphisation sur la réversibilité ? C. Metz signale lui-même (1991 : 13) que « les instances d'incarnation ne correspondent pas aux postes énonciatifs de façon régulièrement homologique. Ainsi, le spectateur [...] qu'on attendrait tout uniment du côté de la cible, occupe à la fois le foyer dans la mesure où il est identifié à la caméra, et la cible pour autant que le film le regarde ».

Or, C. Metz opère ici deux rabattements. Le premier consiste à créer une symétrie de miroir entre les situations de production et les modes de réception. Pourtant, si le dispositif d'enregistrement puis de visionnement du cinéma a été réversible, cette condition technique initiale par la suite dépassée ne peut suffire à conditionner l'acte spectatorial en général comme double position de visée et de source. Le second rabattement consiste à hypostasier la dite situation d'énonciation pour comprendre l'énonciation. Or, sur ce point, il faut faire une distinction claire entre les possibilités du contexte cinématographique et celle du contexte télévisuel. Dans le contexte télévisuel, la situation d'énonciation n'entraîne de co-présence effective, exactement une concomitance, entre tous les partenaires que dans le cas de direct diffusé immédiatement.

Dans tous les autres cas, si nous parlons de déictisation des énoncés, c'est sur le mode de l'effet, comme rhétorique, car la co-présence n'est pas une appartenance au même régime d'existence que celui entraîné par toute autre situation énonciative. Ainsi, le spectateur peut être *comme* identifié à la caméra, c'est-à-dire à une instance originelle qui peut d'ailleurs ne pas se laisser différencier de la première instance déléguée. Par exemple, si l'incipit de *The Tree of life* (T. Malick) construit une situation d'adresse, c'est pour proposer au spectateur - sans garantie - une place *telle que* celle qu'occuperait un interlocuteur.

Le second déplacement concerne la réflexivité. De prime abord, rien ne contrecarre l'exercice énonciatif à condition de considérer comme C. Metz (1991 : 19) que « lorsque l'énonciation se

marque dans l'énoncé, au cinéma, ce n'est pas, ou pas principalement, par des empreintes déictiques, mais par des constructions réflexives ».

Or, la réflexivité n'est pas continue (certes, les déictiques pas plus) et surtout pas englobante même si la tentation est grande de lui conférer une dimension absolue. Ainsi, C. Metz affirme-t-il (1991 : 30) : « L'énonciation filmique est toujours une énonciation sur le film. Métadiscursive plus que déictique, elle ne nous renseigne pas sur quelque hors texte, mais sur un texte qui porte en lui-même son foyer et sa visée ». Et C. Metz d'évoquer volontiers : « cette sorte de dédoublement de l'énoncé » aussi appelé « repli » (1991 : 20) « qui consiste à être à la fois [...] dehors et dedans... Or, comme va devoir le souligner C. Metz lui-même en renvoyant à J.-P. Simon, « le film, même émancipé, ne saurait faire coïncider en lui le produit et la production (1991 : 86), mais seulement, en un geste mimétique, le produit et la mise en abyme de son procès ». Donc, on se retrouve de nouveau avec des effets de récursivité ou de commentaire, c'est-à-dire avec des procédés rhétoriques dont nous serions bien en peine de déterminer s'ils constituent le film comme tel et le configurent ou s'ils en exhibent les procédés.

1.2.2. Observation, donc systématisation

Certes, la distinction entre ce qui pointe vers l'énonciation en acte, en prise avec la situation d'énonciation, et ce qui appartient à une représentation n'est pas toujours facile. En fait, toute la difficulté, nous dit C. Metz, est d'identifier ce qui vaut comme des procédés « plus nettement discursifs que d'autres figures ». La difficulté d'objectivation augmente lorsque la forme du dit empêche de désintriquer le dit du dire ou que l'on cherche la signification d'une séquence tout en y décelant une subjectivation flottante.

En outre, on s'aperçoit un peu nécessairement mais aussi caricaturalement que C. Metz verse au rang des procédés pouvant valoir comme marqueurs discursifs, ceux qui se voient tels les fondus ou les volets. Mais alors, *quid* des traces énonciatives imperceptibles ou neutres ?

1.2.3. Simplification

Disons que C. Metz, tout en cherchant vraiment les conditions de possibilité d'une énonciation comme système général, reconduit les problèmes lorsqu'il assigne aux seuils tels que les génériques ou les mentions paratextuelles (de fait linguistiques) une fonction énonciative (1991 : 68) : « Tout titre de film, au moment où il apparaît à l'écran, est enchâssé dans une phrase « profonde » comme *Vous allez voir* ». Si la présence du film comme film suffit à installer une deixis, alors la simplification théorique à viser (Hjelmslev) n'est en rien atteinte par la formulation d'évidences. C'est déjà ce que pointe F. Jost (1992 : 17) à propos de l'instance énonciative dont C. Metz (1968 : 29) dit qu'elle « est nécessairement présente et nécessairement perçue dans tout récit ». Or, le glissement de nécessairement présent à nécessairement perçu est une sortie des conditions de description sémiotique puisque, dit F. Jost (1992 : 17), « la phénoménologie s'appuie sur une ontologie ». Ce que voit très bien F. Jost, c'est que la simplification par l'aplat de l'évidence n'est pas du tout une simplification heuristique. On en arrive à tout simplement ne plus pouvoir dire quoi que ce soit en raison du postulat machinique puisque, comme le relève F. Jost (1992 : 31), « si le texte est une chose, il ne faut même plus parler d'énonciation ».

Par ailleurs, les différentes manifestations ou les déclinaisons du Je semblent elles aussi poser un problème de simplification, *i.e.* de réduction. Dans son commentaire de l'ouvrage, J. Fontanille signale que la multiplication des instances ne résout rien puisque c'est finalement la combinatoire qui fait la particularité de l'instance.

1.2.4. Stabilisation, donc généralisation

En outre, la généralisation vers laquelle tendre bute sur la variabilité des figures de l'énonciation (Metz 1991 : 31). Ne faudrait-il pas acter l'impossibilité de leur inventaire puisque l'énonciation (1991 : 36) est « coextensive au film [...] : pas toujours marquée, mais partout agissante ». Ainsi, du regard cinéma, dont C. Metz indique, s'appuyant sur A. Gaudreault, qu'il est un procédé très fréquent et banal du cinéma des premiers temps. En fait, les motifs types de l'énonciation sont engagés dans un mouvement diachronique, plus ou moins long, qui pose un problème pour la description systémique et ses niveaux. Il peut se produire ce que relève C. Metz (1968 : 120) : certaines figures telles que le fondu enchaîné qui apparaissent d'abord comme des connotateurs sont ensuite reversés au « schéma d'intelligibilité » de la sémiotique dénotative.

2. Vers une théorie énonciative procédant de la *subjectivation*

Sur les options de recherche, J. Fontanille (1994) suggère d'en traiter deux séparément : (i) les *modes de manifestation et d'inscription de l'activité d'énonciation* dans le discours, ce qui revient au simulacre méta-discursif, aux opérations embrayage-débrayage et aux motifs types ; (ii) le *contenu de l'activité énonciative* en général (ce qu'il va appeler *praxis énonciative*). Or, déjà, J. Fontanille (1994 : 194) envisage l'énonciation en tant qu'*usage* susceptible de modifier les processus de construction et de figement énonciatif ou de déconstruire les produits de l'activité énonciative. De son côté, F. Jost propose de faire l'étude des instances narratives et de travailler la subjectivité comme phénomène langagier puisqu'il constate (1992 : 82–83), à raison, que l'attribution impersonnelle de l'énonciation n'invalide pas toute perception de subjectivité.

La seconde partie de mon propos va concerner la possibilité d'inscription de l'énonciataire dans l'activité d'énonciation ainsi que la manière dont peut œuvrer la *subjectivation*, en tant qu'inscription d'une sphère d'engagement subjectale. F. Jost critique justement la conception automatique du rapport entre foyer et source, incapable de traiter le processus d'identification au récit, les projections spectatorielles ou les évaluations. Pour renchérir, on voit mal comment, loin de toute réduction à un encodage-décodage, la théorie du signal saurait rendre compte d'une élaboration qui s'ajuste toujours dans le cours de son action.

Les relations énonciatives possibles sont au nombre de trois : entre les deux partenaires de l'énonciation (sous une forme majoritairement indirecte) ; entre l'énoncé et l'énonciateur (sous la forme d'opérations, de traces ou de glissements) ; entre l'énoncé et l'énonciataire.

2. 1. Soutenir la thèse de la *subjectivation*

Tout d'abord, je souscris à cette idée de D. Château (2011 : 10) selon qui « de même, un film n'est rien s'il n'est reçu par une subjectivité, mais n'est rien non plus s'il n'existe objectivement ». Pour nuancer son propos, un film non vu reste au stade de la disponibilité, alors que le spectateur, en le voyant, l'actualise.

En revanche, je ne suis pas d'accord ni avec F. Jost (1992 : 67) ni avec C. Metz qui affirment tous deux que l'énonciation au cinéma relève du métalangage en ce qu'elle renvoie au langage filmique avant de renvoyer à l'émetteur. Au contraire, mon premier postulat, symétrique de l'intentionnalité, est qu'un film procède d'une « destination ». J'emprunte le terme à C. Metz lui-même qui précise (1991 : 51) : « le spectateur-auditeur ne pense pas vraiment qu'on lui parle, mais il est assuré qu'on parle pour lui ». Ce n'est pas une distorsion de l'énonciation, juste une manière de la concevoir par ce qui la fonde. D'ailleurs, F. Jost (1999 : 54) me conforte dans cette affirmation : « si le terme d'énonciation a un sens s'agissant d'audiovisuel, c'est qu'aucune médiation, visuelle ou verbale, n'existe sans être adressée par des hommes à d'autres hommes ».

Mais comment ménager au spectateur une place qui, tout en restant dans une logique interne, rende compte des manières dont il va l'occuper selon la destination promise ? Je m'inspire

d'une proposition d'A. Rabatel (2005 :101) qui distingue entre trois postures interactionnelles conciliables en succession : (i) la *coénonciation* (101) comme « co-production d'un point de vue commun et partagé », qui donne lieu à un phénomène d'accord ; (ii) la *surénonciation* comme « expression interactionnelle d'un point de vue surplombant dont le caractère dominant est reconnu par les autres énonciateurs », précisant qu'elle peut s'établir dans la suggestion ou dans l'implicite ; (iii) la *sousénonciation* comme « expression interactionnelle d'un point de vue dominé, au profit d'un surénonciateur » qui construit ainsi une objectivité apparente. Cette proposition revient, selon moi, à concilier instances et opérations tout en maintenant l'idée (nécessaire) que l'énonciation, quoiqu'inatteignable, est ancrée, originée au cœur du film. Les postures interactionnelles délimitent donc le champ de présence offert pour une subjectivation, qui n'est pas forcément subjective, mais qui procède d'un mouvement d'engagement ou, inversement, de désengagement (perceptif, passionnel). De même, un point de vue, même singulier, n'est pas forcément celui d'un personnage. Ainsi, écrit D. Château (2011 : 71), « l'interne montré dans un film n'est pas le résultat de l'action d'une véritable intériorité ; c'est plutôt l'inverse : il y a dans le film une certaine représentation qui suggère l'inférence de l'interne. La question qui se pose alors est de savoir si le spectateur est mis en position d'intérioriser à son tour cette inférence, c'est-à-dire de ressentir cet interne inféré dans sa propre intériorité ». Ainsi, dans *Martha Marcy May Marlène* (S. Durkin), les apparitions du gourou d'une secte dont une jeune femme vient juste de s'enfuir servent au spectateur autant à percevoir la profondeur de l'endoctrinement qu'à accompagner un processus hallucinatoire.

Le problème est que, tout en gardant son intérêt, la proposition d'A. Rabatel n'est pas suffisamment générale parce qu'elle soumet l'énonciation au seul point de vue. Ce non recouvrement a déjà été noté par N. Nel (1997 : 39) lorsqu'il signale que la relation entre énoncé et énonciation est celle de la « tension entre narratif et non narratif ».

2.2. L'effectuation de l'énonciation ou l'énonciation comme « effectuation »

Ne faudrait-il pas se dire que si l'on ne trouve pas l'équivalent des déictiques linguistiques, ce n'est pas parce que les déictiques sont spécifiques de la langue mais parce que l'on n'a pas transposé l'énonciation comme processus spécifique et que l'on a cherché à trouver des équivalences discrètes ? Relisons C. Metz (1991 : 43) : « à force de concevoir l'énonciation comme une mise à nu de l'énoncé [...] on avait presque oublié que cet énoncé est cela même qu'elle produit, et que sa fonction principale n'est pas de révéler mais de fabriquer ». C'est très logiquement d'ailleurs que J. Fontanille (1994 : 190) suggère de « ne plus aborder la question de l'énonciation, même simulée, sous l'angle des instances (subjectives, notamment), mais sous celui des opérations de la simulation ».

À mon sens, il faut à présent s'interroger sur l'énonciation du point de vue de ce qu'elle fait du spectateur et de ce qu'elle lui suggère de fabriquer. Tout comme F. Jost avait reformulé la traditionnelle question de la définition (qu'est-ce que) en une question d'identification et de repérage (« Quand y a-t-il énonciation télévisuelle ? »), la question serait celle du comment. Comment y a-t-il énonciation audiovisuelle à destination de l'énonciataire ?

À cet égard, F. Jost propose la piste très stimulante de l'indication ou de la communication, arguant que (1992 : 43) l'illusion filmique fonctionne d'autant mieux qu'elle s'adosse à « la reconnaissance d'un univers cognitif commun ». Par ailleurs, lorsque F. Jost (1992 : 86) livre comme questions « *Comment un film émeut le spectateur [...] ? Comment un cinéaste fait-il passer telle ou telle impression ?* », le point de vue peut tout à fait y pourvoir. Mais si l'on élargit notre perspective, y compris dès le niveau perceptif, ce sera à condition de pouvoir doubler ou transformer le point de vue *de* (d'un personnage, généralement) en point de vue *sur*.

Si l'on cherche une théorie qui concilie la dimension générale et modélisante tout en posant

l'énonciation comme processus conditionné par la relation, l'on trouve une conception développée par J.-F. Bordron (2003). Selon lui, la réalité textuelle (donc les points d'intersection de l'énonciation) recouvrent trois registres : un texte comme somme de ses énoncés ; une instance productrice qui réalise les procédures d'embrayage et de débrayage ; l'effectuation du texte qui « désigne les procédures d'ajustement entre l'énonciation et l'énoncé », procédures qui ont un aspect dynamique et forment un « espace de médiation ». Or, J.-F. Bordron souligne la singularité du processus d'effectuation puisqu'il suppose que l'on ait « simultanément un sens et la règle pour le comprendre ». Dans les manières de faire de la médiation, J.-F. Bordron donne trois types : l'analogie, le modèle et le simulacre. Pourtant, si ces types permettent en gros de se faire une idée des principes et régimes de construction de l'effectuation en tant de « modélisation interne » (l'analogie rapproche l'un et le multiple ; le modèle fait le lien entre le général et le particulier tandis que le simulacre assure la communication entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur), ils ne disent en rien de quoi est constituée ou par quoi passe l'effectuation. Or, si l'on peut admettre l'effectuation comme principe général de prise, nul doute aussi qu'il faut l'acclimater aux réalités médiatiques, du cinéma, de la télévision ou de tout autre contexte.

Aussi, je propose de considérer l'énonciation en tant qu'effectuation comme un acte qui engage le destinataire, indépendamment de sa réception effective, à trois niveaux : (i) par la *médiation* : par la sollicitation de sa perception, le spectateur fait l'expérience du film ou de l'émission de télévision ; (ii) par la *configuration i.e.* la construction cognitive des relations au film ou à l'émission comme histoire, diégèse, récit, genre, discours ... ; (iii) par la *pathémisation et l'axiologisation i.e.* la mobilisation des affects et des valeurs.

Prenons le niveau de la médiation. Il se produit bien des effets de réglages par lesquels les spectateurs se mettent en phase avec ce qu'ils voient et entendent ou, à partir de cela. En quelque sorte, l'expérience offerte du film en déictise réellement le contenu fictionnel. Ainsi, projeter à un public la marche dans le désert de *Gerry* (G. Van Sant) ou l'incipit de *Sombre* (P. Grandrieux) c'est s'adresser à l'endurance de corps réels.

Le niveau de la configuration engage la manière dont le spectateur est positionné par rapport à la diégèse, aux personnages, aux genres, etc., et ce indépendamment du vrai et du faux ontologique. Un cadre fictif invalide-t-il la possibilité de deixis énonciative ? Répondre par l'affirmative arrêterait ici toute réflexion. Inversement ou avec plus de nuances, la deixis énonciative vient du cadre d'interaction (ou d'interlocution) promis, entretenu voire consenti avec le spectateur à partir de la deixis suscitée depuis le film ou en parallèle.

Quant au dernier niveau, il mobilise chez l'énonciataire différentes possibilités de se mouvoir par rapport aux affects ou aux valeurs qui sont représentés et suscités. Dans *Clean Shaven* (L. Kerrigan), la stridence ou les bruitages indiciels incitent à se détourner, au nom de sa propre expérience d'un sonore désagréable, tandis l'application du protagoniste à s'arracher l'ongle prête plutôt à l'empathie, d'autant que la focalisation est supposée interne.

Évidemment, l'effectuation, pour réussir en tant que médiation, nécessite d'être investie, c'est-à-dire en termes sémiotiques, actualisée. La difficulté est que le spectateur, lui, ne laisse pas de traces alors même qu'il active le film et de façon non métaphorique. Trois limites s'opposent à évoquer ce travail spectatorial : il est potentiel, invisible et donc seulement déductible. Symétriquement, ne faut-il pas déjà réussir à nuancer cette affirmation de F. Jost (1992 : 63), selon qui il est impossible de déceler un acte de langage au niveau de l'image, que ce soit parce qu'on ne pourrait pas trouver les différents degrés de force illocutoire, parce que la perception varie selon les spectateurs ou que le film ne possède pas de marqueur à l'instar de la langue. Pourtant, il existe la possibilité d'en affecter la substance (en insérant d'autres images qu'originellement filmiques dans le dispositif filmique) comme la forme (par des distorsions et jeux rhétoriques).

2. 3. Les combinaisons subjectales : entre subjectalité persistante et subjectivité diffuse

La dimension personnelle de l'énonciation va bien au-delà de la transposition de l'appareil formel de l'énonciation tel que l'a théorisé E. Benveniste. Dans son article, J. Fontanille (1994 : 190) évoque un double problème et une double dissymétrie : « entre une 'énonciation sans personne' (le processus en tant que simulacre) et un 'spectateur sans objet' (un spectateur pour témoigner de l'absence de ce qui s'affiche comme acte à travers le simulacre ». Or, je propose de changer de perspective puisque l'on n'est plus dans le simulacre d'une énonciation inaccessible mais dans la possibilité d'une effectuation.

Ce n'est pas tant la subjectivité qui compte que la *subjectalité*. Tout d'abord, le regard et l'écoute ne sont pas des automatisations mais des médiations prenant place au sein d'une médiation audiovisuelle. Ceci veut donc dire que la réception est elle aussi une médiation sous la forme d'un parcours sensoriel, cognitif et pathémique découpé à même une médiation proposée.

Ainsi, pour *Martha Marcy May Marlène*, la praxis énonciative consiste à inscrire le film comme une coulée de conscience. Ce que peut être le Je-ici et maintenant du spectateur faisant l'expérience du film dépend de la manière dont il accepte de se positionner face à Marta, qui est elle-même un Je : voudra-t-il être un Je comme Marta l'est ? Voudra-t-il devenir l'allocutaire de Marta lui laissant apercevoir son hallucination ? Ainsi, la composition subjectale est riche de ses combinaisons possibles : partant d'une auto-détermination périphrastique d'égo, nous allons vers une configuration complexe et relationnelle, où, en bout, se trouve le « je » du « il » ou du « on ».

Dans l'énonciation, à l'instar du Je « juxtadiégétique » manifesté par la voix-je de narration, ne peut-on envisager une simulation juxta-relationnelle plus large proposée au spectateur ? Ainsi, l'incipit *The Tree of Life*, convoquant un Je passionnel calqué sur le protagoniste, se distingue de celui de *Melancholia* (L. von Trier) qui, s'il propose une relation d'ordre analogique entre une mariée, un enfant et un processus de destruction, bloque leur mise en rapport diégétique.

Si je reprends les types de médiation de J.-F. Bordron, je peux considérer le processus de subjectivation comme une possibilité d'actualisation *faite pour l'énonciataire*, offerte selon les trois schémas et validée par l'appropriation ou invalidée par la distanciation. Dans le cas de l'*analogie*, je propose de parler d'*inception*, pour traduire ce qui est une naturalisation et une incorporation de quelque chose d'étranger *comme sien*. Par exemple, filmer en caméra portée favorise cette actualisation par le voir. Pour le *modèle*, je propose le terme d'*individuation*, au sens où un individu réalise en lui une idée générale ou une espèce. Ainsi, dans *Jackie Brown* (Q. Tarantino) ancrer la première rencontre entre Jackie et son chargé de suivi dans le regard de l'homme et la ponctuer musique largement sirupeuse saupoudré d'ironie cette situation type du coup de foudre. Et dans le cas du *simulacre*, je propose de traduire par *introjection* cette projection qui permet d'être, d'entendre et de voir (avec) ce qui est autre *en sien propre*. Tel est dans *Libera Me* (A. Cavalier) le procédé qui consiste à faire « compléter » par le spectateur les sons manquants des scènes de torture.

Conclusion

Cette réflexion ne renie pas C. Metz et constate même avec lui (1991 : 20) que « l'énonciation est l'acte sémiologique par lequel certaines parties d'un texte nous parlent de ce texte comme d'un acte ». Elle s'inscrit dans la ligne du dictionnaire *Sémiotique* (1986 :76) pour qui « une linguistique de l'énonciation doit se donner pour tâche la construction d'un système de représentation métalinguistique, apte à simuler de manière explicite les mécanismes cognitifs des sujets énonciateurs, accessibles à travers les textes, c'est-à-dire des "agencements de marqueurs" », proposant par contre d'ajouter l'énonciataire à l'énonciateur. Pour autant, elle affirme que l'énonciation n'est ni personnelle ni impersonnelle mais en prise avec une subjectalité dont l'emprise est

portée par des rapports d'analogie, de modèle ou de simulacre.

Elle reste ouverte puisque seules apparaissent les versions positives et réussies des types de médiation. Être tout à fait exhaustif serait prévoir leurs contraires (détourner les yeux ou se boucher les oreilles face à un simulacre trop pressant, tel l'œil coupé du *Chien Andalou*) ainsi que les conditions de leurs échecs.

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**DESIGN SEMIOTICS AND
POST-STRUCTURALISM**

TOWARD A SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS OF TOYS

Mattia Thibault
University of Torino, Italy
mattia.thibault@gmail.com

Abstract

Nowadays academical interest towards games is endemic. Papers on “videogames”, “gamification”, “urban gaming”, “location based games” and similar are published by dozens; game studies are now considered a new discipline, discipline that, indeed, owes a lot to semiotics.

Many other aspects of the human playful behavior, however, are neglected or ignored, and among them, toys are potentially an extremely fruitful object of analysis. Toys are a cultural universal, we found toys in pyramids and in prehistoric tombs and they are present in every country in the world. Toys, in addition, are linked to puppets, to animated films and, of course, to videogames; the main characters of successful films as *Toy Story*, *Small Soldiers*, *Lego the Movie* and many other are toys. A semiotic point of view on such a various and widespread phenomenon is strongly desirable. Approaching a semiotic analysis of toys, anyway, requires to take into consideration the (few) works on the topic pertaining to other disciplines. Psychology is probably the field that had more interest in toys: Donald Winnicott and Erick Erickson both dedicated important essays to them. Also Eugen Fink and his “Oasis of Happiness” bring a valid contribution to the study of toys and, of course, several ludologic theories can be fruitfully applied to toys.

Caillois’ four form of play, for example, allow us to draw a typology of toys: toys oriented to *alea* (dices, coins) to *agon* (plastic swords, balls), to *ilinx* (trampolines, pogo sticks, swings, rocking horses) and to *mimicry* (figures, teddy bears, construction sets, hats, disguises).

Bateson, on the other hand, underlines the importance of the material lightness of toys, that make them immediately recognizable even to animals.

Among the few semioticians who wrote about toys, Jurij Lotman is probably the one which contribution would be more useful. In his brief paper on “dolls in the system of culture” he fo-

cuses on the differences between statues and dolls, on the role of fantasy in the use of toys, on the ability to create a “second world” of dolls and on their modeling ability. This extremely fraught work is undoubtedly an ideal basis upon which a complete and general semiotic theory of toys can be built. The aim of this presentation, thus, would be to provide an overview on the state of the art of toy studies and to propose a possible integration between different theories, oriented to the creation of a semiotic toolbox dedicated to this fundamental and too often forgotten aspect of human culture.

1. Introduction

Toys are relevant. They are between the most ancient artifacts created by man: found both in Egyptian tombs and in the excavation of the Indus valley: a toyless human civilization doesn't exist. Nowadays toys are an industrial mass products, and one of the most popular western festivities – Christmas – has become centered around them. Toys, in addition, are linked to puppets, to animated films and, of course, to videogames; even the main characters of successful films as *Toy Story*, *Small Soldiers*, *Lego the Movie* and many others, are toys.

Despite all this, toys are generally neglected in Academia. A few works focusing on toys does exist, but they mainly focus on the psycho-therapeutic functions of toy-play, or on the history of toys. Even fundamental works on play, such as Caillois (1967) and Huizinga (2002[1938]) fail to focus properly on toys or, in the latter case, to even mention them.

Among the few works on toys we should mention Erikson's (1977) and Winnicott's (1971) works about toys and psychoanalysis, Fink's (1969[1957]) *Oasis of Happiness*, in which the German philosopher focus briefly on toys. Finally, Bateson (1956) makes some consideration about the connection between toys and lightness.

Semiotics also has generally ignored toys: Barthes (1957: 55–56) dedicates a couple of pages of his *mythologies* to criticize contemporary French toys and Lotman (1980) focuses on dolls and puppets from a semiotic perspective.

A semiotic theory regarding this aspect of the human playful behavior is, in my opinion, strongly desirable. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to promote the establishment of such theory by outlining the basis of a semiotic analysis of toys.

2. What are toys?

By definition toys are related to playfulness. However, the semantic field of the word “play” is very vast and heterogeneous, ranging from videogames to theater or illusions. If we want our analysis to be pertinent, we will have to restrict our definition of play. As Huizinga (2002[1938]) second chapter shows, the semantic field of “play” is greatly contrasting in different languages. It would be appropriate, then, exclude from our definition of play, all the activities that – even if semantically related to it – are not universally considered playful: for example every form of show (music, theater, cinema, etc.), hoaxes and illusions, all considered “play” only in a limited amount of languages.

In the same way we should exclude all metaphoric uses of the words related to playfulness – as, for example, expressions like “toy-boy” – from our analysis.

Finally we should exclude the digital supports of videogames (as well as similar analogue supports for book-games) from the list of items used to play: in this case playfulness is not related to their material ontology, but to their being media.

2.1. Playful items and Caillois' forms of play

Even if Roger Caillois didn't write anything relevant on toys, his famous typology of play should help us investigate the different kinds of items used to play. The sociologist (Caillois

1967, the English translations have been found in Salen and Zimmerman 2006) draws a typology of four forms of play, which appear to focus on the (pleasurable) sensations given by different ways of playing. These categories should help us differentiating the many items used to play, on the basis of the form of play involved.

2.1.1. Agon

First of all we have *agon*, which involves, basically, competition and puzzle solving. Caillois describe it like:

a combat in which equality of chances is artificially created, in order that the adversaries should confront each other under ideal conditions, susceptible of giving precise and incontestable value to the winner's triumph. (...) Such is the case with sports contests and the reason for they very many subdivision. (...) In the same class belong the games in which, at the outset, the adversaries divide the elements into equal parts and values.

Salen and Zimmerman (2006: 131)

The author also gives some examples, as polo, tennis, football, fencing, golf, athletics, checkers, chess and billiards.

The items necessary to play an agon game, thus, consist of the many kinds of balls, clubs, bats and, in general, of every kind of sport equipment. In addition, many of the items related to boardgames pertain to agon too, as boards, pieces and playing cards.

All these items are necessary to execute some kinds of activity: they can be both *objects of value* (like balls or flags) or *helpers* and *competences* (clubs or ice-skates) in order to allow the player to perform the game.

2.1.2. Alea

The second form of play is *alea*, which comprehends all play based on chance and randomness. According to Caillois *alea* designates:

all games that are based on a decision independent of the player, an outcome over which he has no control, and in which winning is the result of fate rather than triumphing over an adversary. Perfect examples of this type are provided by games of dice, roulette, heads or tails, baccara, lotteries etc. Here, not only does one refrain from trying to eliminate the injustice of chance, but rather it is the very capriciousness of chance that constitutes the unique appeal of the game.

Salen and Zimmerman (2006: 133)

Items related to *alea*, then, are dice, playing cards (because of their being shuffleable), roulette, slot machines, bingo counters and electronic *random number generators*.

These items substitute the player's *performance*, giving an unpredictable and unquestionable outcome. In complex games exploiting *alea* items, as role-playing games, the player's competences may be represented as modifiers to the result of the dice (e.g. a 10 faced die's result, *plus 2*) which indicates a higher or lower likelihood of succeeding in the performance (the sanction being generally based on a numeric value to reach with the combination of the die throw and the modifiers).

2.1.3. Mimicry

Mimicry, is the form of play that involves imitation and disguise. Caillois describe it as:

a diverse series of manifestations, the common element of which is that the subject makes believe or makes others believe that he is someone other than himself. He forgets, disguise, or temporarily sheds his personality in order to feign another.
Salen and Zimmerman (2006: 135)

His examples focus mainly on self disguise, and comprehends role-playing and carnival-like activities, which involve items such as masks, costumes and replicas of objects or people (like toy-swords and human-sized dolls). However, another form of mimicry that is very common involves the creation of another world in a smaller scale. Even if Caillois doesn't mention it in his book, this form of play is clearly related to mimicry because its features of imitation and make believe. Items related to this kind of mimicry are construction sets, puppets, figurines and models.

These objects are able to play many different actantial roles in a play session – especially the figurines – their key characteristic it in not the structural place that they occupy in the canonical narrative schema, but the fact that they all play important *thematic* roles – their thematic nature being precisely what makes the make-believe possible.

2.1.4. Ilinx

The last form of play is *ilinx*, from the ancient Greek word for “dizziness”, vertigo. According to Caillois it:

consist of an attempt to momentarily destroy the stability of perception and inflict a kind of voluptuous panic upon the otherwise lucid mind. In all cases, it is a question of surrendering to a kind of spasm, seizure, or shock which destroys reality with sovereign brusqueness.
Salen and Zimmerman (2006: 138)

Therefore to *ilinx* pertain all the kinds of play that involve a rapid and/or spinning movement which produces a state of dizziness in the player. Items related to *ilinx* are: trampolines, sleighs, carousels, roller coasters, ice-skates, pogo sticks, skateboards and so on.

These items don't play any actantial or thematic roles, nor they simulate a performance, but they appear as devices aiming at recreating a sort of artificial *saisie esthétique* ('aesthetic seizure', Greimas 1987) overloading the player's senses and lowering the control on his own body.

These four forms of play aren't exclusives, but they can be present, in different measures, in different games and items. Merry-go-rounds, for example, although being spinning devices dedicated to *ilinx*, are also related to a theme (e.g. the baroque horses of the ancient carousels) which bring them closer to mimicry. On the other hand, the first performance in many team sports it's a coin toss to decide which team will *kick-off*, mixing *alea* with *agon*.

This overview on the items commonly used in the different forms of play, gives an idea of their number, variety and differences. It also shows that, even if toys are items used for play, not *all* items used for play are toys.

2.2. Defining toys

The Online Oxford dictionary defines a toy as: “an object for a child to play with, typically a model or a miniature replica of something”. This definition both circumscribe an audience – a childish one – and underline a characteristic – being a replica of something else. However, toys are rarely a perfect replica of something, they rather are a support that, featuring some basic formal resemblance to a referent, is invested by an interpretative/imaginative activity that transforms it during the play. This hypoiconic nature makes toys a subset of the items used in mimicry, in particular those that involve a free, unregulated and creative play behavior, typical of children – what Caillois names *paidia*.

Fink (1969 [1957]: 9) states that toys are objects of a particular kind because they have different values according to the point of view – playful or not – adopted. Seen from outside play, toys are perceived as a commodity, an object covering the function of entertaining children. On the other hand, toys seen from inside play, have some “magic” feature that transforms them into something else, something more. This magic feature, in semiotics terms, is nothing else than *semiosis*, which arises only when the competence in the semiotic domain of play (Nieuwdorp 2005) is activated.

2.3. Toy, signs and texts

Toys, therefore, are not only cultural texts, but they can be considered individual signs. According to Oxford’s definition of toys being “replicae” of something, we can assume that they consist mainly in hypoiconic signs, imitating some of the features of their model. As many different types of toys exist, however, we can individuate both quite complex and very simple signs.

In addition, the degree of resemblance between toys and models can variate a lot. Toys are not always manufactured: also a stone or a stick can be used as toys, basing their meaning in a vague resemblance with some human artifact (Fink 1969 [1957]: 8). There are several different degrees of detailedness, then, that separate the ideal referent from the actual toy-sign.

3. Toy-play as a language

Toy-play, hence, consists in the discursive organization of a certain amount of toys-signs. This kind of playful activity firstly organizes a limited amount of toys – those who are owned by the player – in a system and subsequently exploits this system in order to give birth to a discursive utterance. Toy-play puts together a system of signs and utterances, a *langue* and a *parole*, and thus it can – and should – be considered a language.

In this third section, therefore, we will investigate the features of toy-signs – in particular their form and substance of expression (Hjelmslev 1943) – and then attempt to outline the structure and working of toy-play, focusing on its syntax, semantics and pragmatics.

3.1. Substance of expression

Toys’ substance of expression is simply the material of which toys are made. The material features of a toy, however, are particularly important both because of the toy’s purpose of being handled and for the metonymic or onomatopoeic relationship that certain materials are able to evoke. A rather interesting example on the importance and meaningfulness of the substance of expressions of toys can be found in Barthes (1957).

Beaucoup sont maintenant moulés dans des pâtes compliquées ; la matière plastique y a une apparence à la fois grossière et hygiénique, elle éteint le plaisir, la douceur, l’humanité du toucher. Un signe consternant, c’est la disparition progressive du bois, matière pour-

tant idéale par sa fermeté et sa tendreur, la chaleur naturelle de son contact ; le bois ôte, de toute forme qu'il soutient, la blessure des angles trop vifs le froid chimique du métal ; lorsque l'enfant le manie et le cogne, il ne vibre ni ne grince, il a un son sourd et net à la fois ; c'est une substance familière et poétique, qui laisse l'enfant dans une continuité de contact avec l'arbre, la table, le plancher. Le bois ne blesse, ni ne se détraque ; il ne se casse pas, il s'use, peut durer longtemps, vivre avec l'enfant, modifier peu à peu les rapports de l'objet et de la main ; s'il meurt, c'est en diminuant, non en se gonflant, comme ces jouets mécaniques qui disparaissent sous la hernie d'un ressort détraqué. Le bois fait des objets essentiels, des objets de toujours. Or il n'y a presque plus de ces jouets en bois, de ces bergeries vosgiennes, possibles, il est vrai, dans un temps d'artisanat. Le jouet est désormais chimique, de substance et de couleur : son matériau même introduit à une cénesthésie de l'usage, non du plaisir. Ces jouets meurent d'ailleurs très vite, et une fois morts, ils n'ont pour l'enfant aucune vie posthume.

Barthes (1957: 56)

[Current toys are made of a graceless material, the product of chemistry, not of nature. Many are now molded from complied mixtures; the plastic material of which they are made has an appearance at once gross and hygienic, it destroys all the pleasure, the sweetness, the humanity of touch. A sign which fills one with consternation is the gradual disappearance of wood, in spite of its being an ideal material because of its firmness and its softness, and the natural warmth of its touch. Wood removes, from all the forms which it supports, the wounding quality of angles which are too sharp, the chemical coldness of metal. When the child handles it and knocks it, it neither vibrates nor grates, it has a sound at once mused and sharp. It is a familiar and poetic substance, which does not sever the child from close contact with the tree, the table, the floor. Wood does not wound or break down; it does not shatter, it wears out, it can last a long time, live with the child, alter little by little the relations between the object and the hand. If it dies, it is in dwindling, not in swelling out like those mechanical toys which disappear behind the hernia of a broken spring. Wood makes essential objects, objects for all time. Yet there hardly remain any of these wooden toys from the Vosges, these fretwork farms with their animals, which were only possible, it is true, in the days of the craftsman. Henceforth, toys are chemical in substance and colour; their very material introduces one to a coenaesthesia of use, not pleasure. These toys die in fact very quickly, and once dead, they have no posthumous life for the child.] (Barthes 2013: 54–55)

Barthes criticism of the “French toy”, although driven by nostalgia, shows the importance of the sensory feeling while dealing with toys and, at the same time, underlines the emerging opposition between *reality* and *play*. Playfulness tends to escape from reality and the material dedicated to it reflects this tendency. In particular, Bateson (1956: 54) notes that toys are related with unreal lightness, both for concerns of safety and because play often takes possession of everything that feels unreal (let's think, for instance, at the effect that a sudden snow has on people and animals), however also bright colors and smoothness are typical toys' “unreal” characteristics.

Some particular malleable materials made especially for play, as Plasticine and Play-doh, let players to shape toy-signs at will. These materials are not toys, but a substance of expression thought to allow an easy sign creation for a language that, typically, uses manufactured signs.

3.2. Form of expression

The importance of details is underlined also by Lotman (1980) who investigates the links between dolls and statues. According to him, the main difference between toys and work of art is the amount of details that they feature. Statues have many details in order to convey the artist's message, while dolls have less details, leaving to the player the freedom of completing their meaning. We could say that, if for art the textual nature is predominant, toys are meant to be used as part of a system.

The amount of details among toys, however, is also changeable and meaningful, varying the amount of information that the toy-sign is able to convey. Considering toys as part of a narration will allow us to borrow Greimas' terminology in order to differentiate three kinds of toys:

- Actant toys: those are the less detailed toys, generally they are not manufactured objects (as sticks and stones), objects made for other purposes (corks, pens) or toys and playful items converted (marbles, construction bricks). They are both the less meaningful and the more versatile toys. Providing a simple support for the player's creativity, they can fulfill basically any position in the actantial model and play any thematic role.
- Thematic toys: those are probably the most common kind of toys, featuring enough details to indicate a precise thematic role or figure (ranging from a farm, to a sword, from a pirate to a Ferrari toy car). These toys are less versatile – their thematic role is fixed – but their meaningfulness is increased as well.
- Actor toys: this kind comprehends all toy-signs which represent an actor both animate (Batman, Barbie) and inanimate (Excalibur, *Back to the Future's* Delorean or even the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry). Their intertextual nature makes these toys particularly meaningful, as they carry with them roles, figures, relations, background narrations and thymic values. This increased meaningfulness, however, is parallel to a decreasing versatility of the toy, that will always be susceptible of reinterpretations, but for which it will be harder to escape from his predetermined meaning. Actor toys are the closest to statues and their adult versions, *action figures*, are no longer for play but of aesthetic decoration.

Parallel to these three, a fourth kind of toys exist, including those toy-signs, as Lego and construction sets, which are made of discrete parts and have a modular nature. Their peculiar form of expression allows the player to recombine them in order to create new toy-signs belonging to any of the three categories above.

3.3. Toy-play syntax

Toy-play is a peculiar language, similar to idiolects. Its main feature is that the system comprehends a very small amount of signs, including proper toys and objects that cover the function of toys. This set of signs is hardly the same for two different players: toy-signs cannot be easily produced, and are generally purchased. However, toys are industrially produced by thousands and very different types do exist. In addition, many different objects can, unpredictably, become improper toys. Non manufactured toys, finally, come in all shapes and forms, as they are subjects of natural creation. Every player, therefore, own a very personal set of toy-signs, often accumulated in years, that is highly different from any other. Still, not only the types of toy-signs, but also the number of owned tokens is relevant: at every moment of the utterance – the play-session – each toy-sign can be used only once for every token owned.

The literacy in toy-play language, hence, doesn't depend only on the player's competence in the syntactic rules, but also on the possession of the necessary toy-signs.

If the signs belonging to the system are always different, their organization in utterances appear to be far more regular. According to Erikson (1977) and Winnicott (1971) each play-

session (utterance) is articulated in two moments.

Firstly toys are chosen, distributed among players, and arranged in space. This is a synchronous phase of creativity and it is highly meaningful: in this stage children playing with toys always create a *scene*. The reciprocal position of the objects in that scene, shapes the syntactic links and relationships between all the toy-signs. The toy-signs are arranged in positions of domination and subordination, can be close or distant from each other and form groups and oppositions. An in-depth analysis of all those relationships and their thymic values would be, obviously, impossible here. At any rate, it is important to underline the importance of the creation of the scene, which is the most meaningful phase of the utterance.

After the creation of the scene, a second, more dynamic phase begins. The toy-signs are moved, used, removed, displaced, disassembled and sometimes even destroyed. The scene evolves the meaning of toys and their relationships change. The initial situation becomes the starting point of a narration in which toys become actants and their thematic roles, when present, participate in the creation of a setting. This phase is probably more “playful” and less serious than the first one: entertainment becomes prominent, overshadowing the communicative aspects of toy-play.

Both moments are eventually accompanied by onomatopoeic sounds and pieces of dialogues, sometime only thought, produced by the player(s) which explicit and emphasize the utterance without being part of the toy-language.

3.4. Toy-play semantics

We have seen that toys, as replicaes, can be considered hypoiconic signs and thus have a direct, explicit relationship with their referent. Toy-signs place in the discourse, so, is often isomorphic to the position hold by their referent. A toy-policeman will probably chase toy-thieves as well as a toy-sword's function is to pretend to cut other players or invisible enemies. However, as we have said above, a degree of semantic manipulation is always possible: actant toys are open to infinite interpretations, thematic toys can cover different actantial roles and even actor toys can be resemantized by the player's authorship. This versatility of toys-signs is necessary to remedy at the limitations of the sign system: with only a limited number of versatile toy-signs the player will be able to create many different narrations.

Toy-play, however, appear to have also a second, underlying semantic system. According to Winnicott (1971) children while playing with toys, do re-enact the ideas that occupy their lives. This representation is never explicit, but proceed with metaphors, in particular, the creation of the scene is strongly influenced by the symbolic values attributed to the different toy-signs. Even if the psychological implications of this theory are not of interest for semiotics, I believe this second semantic system still worth of investigation. This implicit re-enactment of the player's life, is not a simple unconscious reflex, but also an act of self-communication. In other words, the player's utterance has two layers of possible interpretations: one about the scenes and events narrated in the play session, and the other being an expression of the player himself.

Both these messages, however, are extremely difficult to decode and interpret apart from the sender and the designated receiver – which are often the same person. The meaning investment of toy-signs, due to their versatility, is strictly related to their interpretation. If a player wants to share his play session with another player or an audience, he must explain every sign he exploits, by using another – typically verbal – language to explicit its meaning. The specific semantic value of a toy-sign in an utterance, then, is not explicit, but it is an interpretative choice of the player, which is, at the same time, a reader and an author.

3.5. Toy-play pragmatics

Due to the difficulty of interpretation of toy-play semantics, playing with toys mainly assumes the form of a monologue. The player plays alone, focused, needless of an audience. The player chooses the toy-signs to use and, after giving a particular meaning to each, starts to build the scene and after that, to develop a narration.

Winnicott (1971: 178) writes that a child playing with toys is communicating with himself, with his own, observing, ego. In (more accurate) semiotic terms toy-play pertains to the culturally relevant activity that Lotman (1990) defines “auto-communication”. According to the Tartu-Moskow scholar:

In the I-I system the bearer of the information remains the same but the message is reformulated and acquires new meaning during the communication process. This is the result of introducing a supplementary, second, code; the original message is recoded into elements of its structure and thereby acquires features of a new message. (...) the I-I system qualitatively transforms the information, and this leads to a restructuring of the actual I itself.

Lotman (1990: 22)

In this case the “second code” is the language of toys, and, according to this point of view, its peculiar rules and limitations that we have analyzed above, are meant to complicate the recoding, eventually allowing new meaning to rise.

One could object that toy-players aren't always alone, but often play in groups. Although some differences – a contact is generally made, a theme chosen, there is a distribution (sometimes “appropriation”) of toys, and thus of communicative power – it is important to underline that, even if it involves a great deal of communication between the players, playing together is not about communicating to each other using toy-play language, but it is an activity of co-authorship, in which each player tries to create his own narration inside a collective utterance.

4. Conclusions

Considering toys as signs and toy-play as a communicative phenomenon in between readership and authorship, mainly oriented to autocommunication is, in my opinion, not a conclusion, but a starting point. Much work as yet to be done, notably on the position that toys hold in culture, on their intertextual characteristics and on their relationship with animation and digital games (can we consider *avatars* digital toys?). Besides, the other items used for play, even if less prone to a semiotic analysis, should also be taken into consideration in future research as well: artifacts such as balls and playing cards would be probably very interesting objects of analysis.

As already said in the introduction, then, this paper's aim is to promote and open a discussion – and hopefully a research trend – among semioticians. Playfulness, even if it's often felt this way, it is not marginal and it has never been.

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DESIGN SEMIOTICS AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

Melahat Küçükarslan Emiroğlu
Bahcesehir University, İstanbul, Turkey
Melahat.kucukarslanemiroglu@arc.bahcesehir.edu.tr

Abstract

The association of *design semiotics* and *post-structuralism* proposes not seeing the design as a closed entity, installed with certain meanings, rather seeing design as irreducibly multiple, plural configurations of signifiers which can never be finally fixed to a single meaning; indestructible system of relationships. Design calls into being as a medium of communication configured by design elements that are channelizing signifiers towards the rest of the world; therefore almost any kind of the product of design becomes as reality through which the addressee and designer communicate; referred as an 'interface'. Furthermore, each interpretation of a design is a new configuration of signified(s) articulated by a new system of relations arising from diversities of human beings, and consequently, meaning liberates via articulation. A poststructuralist look argues that to understand an object it is necessary to study both the object itself and the systems of knowledge that produce the object. This point of view does not propose to focus on understanding how concepts were understood by the designer at the time, rather it seeks to comprehend how those same concepts are understood by addressee of the design in the present, opting in studying how cultural concepts have changed over time. This manifests a mediating language to describe reality and its expressions from a diachronic point of view to understand the reality which design mediates for an ever-changing dialogue.

1. Prologue

Our study session titled as Design Semiotics and Post-Structuralism is actually came out from my recent excitement with openings of what may or is called as post-structuralism and its possible interactions with what may be called as Design Semiotics. Indeed, design semiotics is

the title of an elective course that I've been giving in faculty of architecture and design, whom title is not determined by me, it was given to me, and it had never been given by any instructor before in the faculty. Having a course titled Design Semiotics in a curriculum of a design department, manifests to me a presupposition for associating the field of design with the studies of semiotics. For some time, I had second thoughts whether there is something called design semiotics, meaning that there is a specific kit or definition of semiotics, which works specifically for design. Apparently there is not. Substantially, it cannot be talked about a design without semiotics; semiotics is already embedded in designing process. What is important is to set how elements or understanding of science of signs are being used mostly with intuition. Since we could all admit that all the principles or elements of design are semiotic in nature; so how they are articulated together to communicate meaningfully with the receiver of the design?, and how the ascription of meaning is integrated throughout design processes?

As a designer I admit that analytical components that constitute the semiotic analysis can be traced throughout the concept development process of design projects implicitly or explicitly. Design speaks with a language in which elements of semiotics are embedded per se: industrial design, advertising, graphic design, interior architecture, performing arts, etc. I also admit that majority of these designing praxis, presuppose that they are incorporated within an established dialogue in an imagined territory shared with the addressees confronting with the created work. Throughout this dialogue both designer and the confronting body spontaneously transmit messages to each other.

The vast majority of semiotic studies are based on language and communication. The signification for designed object (interior design, industrial design, jewelry design, etc.) is being constituted by constructing interrelations between the arguments in anthropology, cultural studies, morphology, and philosophy, etc., a part from that design comes to being as a context of applied semiotics. This context is a territory where paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of design theories, design elements, levels of signification get into contact as codes, sub-codes, channels of encoding and decoding systems of signs and structured in such ways as to create concrete end-product originating by intentions of designer. Thus, it has a character of a medium. Designed product, in this circumstance, can be manifested as an interface, a mediating channel for the feedbacks throughout the interactive dialogue of constructed and reconstructed meanings between addressers and addressees of the work of design. Interface is the meeting place between different entities that are assumed to confront with each other, in order to communicate. Consequently, my initial lecture in the course of *Design Semiotics* is used to be as setting design metaphorically as *interface*. The schedule of the course is structured sequentially as formerly understanding interrelations in semiotics –to understand the latent components of this interface, then transferring this understanding into manifestation of the semiotic relations embedded in design works –the interface, finally encouraging students to use this point of view in their own design projects –constituting their own interfaces. The tendencies of students during interpretations of interfaces reveals the dominance of their current way of experiencing the reality and contributed to my thoughts to engage in new articulations with given reality.

Design as interface is an intermediary surface facing both sides towards designer and user/reader (addresser and addressee) providing a territorial land for in-between dialogue. This personal and at the same time academic experience is an emphasis for me on addressee side of the *interface*, especially in relation with diachronically articulation of memory with realities, at the same time, associating it with post-structuralism that argues as every individual reader creates a new and individual purpose, meaning, and existence for a given text. Outside of literary theory, this position is generalizable to any situation where a subject or a confronter perceives a sign or confronts with an interface that is design. Herewith, the author's intended meaning and author's

identity is secondary to the meaning that the reader perceives. Consequently, the interface is perceived as neutrally and meaning liberates from pre-established configurations.

2. Provocation

In recent days, an already established definition on how to look backwards displaced all of my compromised thoughts regarding the phases of my life in accordance with my questionings and following interventions of my existence in the world. Thinking about the exact time that I have started to displace my unconsciously embedded feelings made me to turn back to the moment that I have heard the below words (not exactly the same words, words as impressed me) from the mouth of Massimo Leone at the end of his presentation on the third day of 10th International Conference on Semiotics whose theme was “Changing worlds & Signs of the times” (2013). I was about to be lost in words and theories and among the great endeavor of interconnecting them on my mind –as Leone does not used to require any need to accompany his verbal presentations with visual ones as long as I experienced- and his voice was becoming a homogenous sound pattern... since he said something like “vintage designs are popular among the young people of today, because the products of vintage are ‘new’ for them”, I heard him deeply. All grayness of the previously homogenous sound pattern on my mind blew up and transformed into colorful combinations of connotations at the same time re-formatting my previously constituted inter-relations of history. It was this *definition* itself that re-constructing, re-articulating my own history of articulating things as with conjunctions such as “then...”, “... in that case”, “... if that so” ...etc. The title of the Leone’s presentation was *Longing for the Past: The Nostalgic Semiosphere*. However the presentation forwarding idea was not yearning for the past, but a “future lies in the past hidden in potential paths that history never took” (Leone, 2013).

It can be stated that the idea of *new* for Leone is constituted on the expression of ‘this is the first time they use them’. So the new users and the ones that had been used before are living and experiencing the vintage design during the same time period. What kind of an interaction is this? At least there is a continuous transformation of meaning of a kind of nostalgia in Leone’s words that re-articulates temporally. This was the triggering idea for emphasizing the user/reader side of the interface that previously elaborated in introduction and gave the way to first sentences of provocative abstract proposal for discussion of *Design Semiotics and Post-structuralism*: which may refer not seeing the design as a closed entity, equipped with definite meanings, rather seeing design as irreducibly plural, an endless play of signifiers, which can never be finally nailed down to a single center, or meaning, a fixed system of relations. Therefore, meaning is de-territorialized and re-territorialized over time, thus liberated by articulations and “re-articulated synchronically” (Leone, 2013).

In this context, the addition of post-structuralism associative with design semiotics is because poststructuralist studies often emphasize history to analyse descriptive concepts, by studying how cultural concepts have changed over time, understand how those same concepts are understood by readers in the present. As is known, structuralism understand the historical interpretation of cultural concepts, by focusing on understanding how those concepts were understood by the author in his or her own time, rather than how they may be understood by the reader in the present. Michel Foucault postulated numerous ways to re-think and resituate the past that destabilize our preconceived concepts of boundaries and “change over time” (Scott, 1998). In relation with that, Deleuze strongly argues that things should not be defined according to the actualized forms. That is to say, we should not, for instance, explain designs on the basis of how the meaning is usually, generally or actually given to them.

Synchronized with this, a diachronic look to realities tries to find out how the systems of relationships have changed over time; a concept, which is already challenging among so-called poststructuralists.

3. A diachronic look

Design benefits from every kind of representation, which are evidently semiotic by nature, in a manner of a system, which is multi-layered and assembled with paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations ending with a creation that makes inventing new ways of expression a precondition of itself. A diachronic look, to me, situates design as an interfacing surface between a nomadic designer who is viewed as 'dead' and a user/reader/receiver (hereafter addressee) as being *becoming* temporary.

Nomad, in Deleuzian sense is a way of being in the middle or between points, characterized by movement and change, and is unfettered by systems of organization. Thus the goal of being nomadic is only to continue to move within the intermediary territories. When designer seen as nomadic, this can lead to liberation of addressees from pre-established forms of understanding of design and from the domain of designer originally regarded with structuralism.

Barthes, in 1967, wrote *The Death of the Author* as a metaphorical event: the "death" of the author as an authentic reference of meaning and argued that any literary text has multiple meanings, proposing that the author was not the primary reference of the semantic content of the designed work. Additionally, the *Death of the Author*, for Barthes, was the *Birth of the Reader*, as the metaphor of the multiplicity of meanings of the text. Herewith, meaning is accepted to challenge by *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization* over time, thus liberated by articulations of changing relations and continuously re-articulating within the experience of interchanging addressees. A general view for addressee, in such understanding, can be described as *becoming* in Deleuzian sense, that describes a process of change, or movement within an assemblage, rather than conceive of the pieces of an assemblage as an organic whole, where one piece of the assemblage is drawn into the territory of another piece, changing its value as an element and bringing about a new unity.

A part from that, semiotics, as a methodology is an analysis in understanding meaning transferred by design, presents a mediating language to describe reality and its expressions. As Eco (1962) argues, in *The Open Work*, that design, particularly contemporary art, has an undefined meaning, in that the will of the artist was exactly that of producing such "indeterminacy or openness". This proposes openness to new articulations as in Deleuzian territory definition, which can be viewed as perpetually changing configuration of various interrelated assemblages. Meaning then is a dynamic configuration of diverse assemblages as forming a specific territory in time, which may then become the surface where deterritorialisation, and reterritorialisation take place. This gives a way for a diachronic point of view to understand the reality which design mediates for an ever-changing dialogue.

4. Design: ever-changing dialogue

Within the design field, there is a kind of people-to-people flow of knowledge institutionalized in cultural systems generated by the realization of design in a manner of a dialogue. For designers, considering the semiotic implications of whatever they design is an inherent mediation for a possible dialogue with the one(s) s/he designs for. The locus of this dialogue concretizes itself as the surface of intersections and articulations of constitutive elements of used languages specific to that design field and the context. Inherently, each field of design is a form of expression and an entry into experience. Majority of designers of any field do not use the integrals of semiotic analysis along the same path that semioticians follow when they attempt to describe their design ideas. Designing praxis, although cannot be directly applicable to syntagm and paradigm of verbal language, but has its own embedded culture constituting with paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations conceptualized with design theories and principles. Nadin (1990) argues that "since symbols are the dominant sign representation in human culture, and since each

symbol contains iconic or indexical elements, it is easy to make use of the semiotic principles governing the cognitive condition of design". As an exemplification, the place of representation in design gains value as application of sign systems, an approach of various relationships of signifier and signified. Design requiring inventing new discourses, in other words new problem definitions each time, all methods of representation fulfil the basic function of intermediation of design between two or several distinct entities assembled with(in) a dialogue via confrontation with different phases of design. Each of the mediation is constructing a unique dialogue in time as an intrinsic nature of designer-interface-addressee. Furthermore, each interpretation of a design is a new configuration of signified(s) articulated within experience of a specific time-context relations arising from diversities of human being, and meaning is liberated from pre-established forms.

This dialogue, by enabling to uncover a process of transformation, it also reveals and gives a chance to introduce for ideas of a-signifying, neutral signs and, non-representativeness. A designed product, as a whole, just as a sentence or an essay, is also a result of the constitution of a densely structured web of these relations between paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. Similarly, every element of design, as every word in an expression, exists at the intersection point of two axes (syntagm and paradigm). First level of meanings (denotation) and second level of meanings (connotation) confronted with readers/users (addressees) of design as text are re-configured mentally as multi-levelled signifieds specific to the addressee's time/space /cultural background.

The content of the studies of semiotics can be described as a translation language between the confronted entity and its connotations. The question is where if the design comes to being as the translation language between confronter and the confronting design; can design be read without any subject and representation? The use of design elements, which are non-representative and a-signifying syntagms and paradigms, would support the liberation of addressee's translation of the interfacing design and lead to a new articulation with own memory and reality.

In such case, the experience of the addressee itself creates the language independent from the subject. Regarding this acceptance, the idea of *minor literature* of Deleuze&Guattari (2003), language escaping from signification and representation, resisting to resemblance and mimetic representation, as in abstract art resists figuration, representation or imitation of real life. Both the language of design and its interpretations are 'becoming' in which elements of design are intensities as neutral as not dictating a dominant meaning.

5. Epilogue

Consequently, a work of design comes to being as a medium with all its systems and elements for mediating inter-cultural communication, a dialogues of various cultural systems, institutions, changing temporarily (Küçükarslan Emiroğlu, 2012). Designer use language (written, visual representation, tactile component) in designing process in a perception and comprehension of knowledge of design as represented by language and other representations within design knowledge, understanding problem and generation of response, processing of the problem specifications, consequently applied generic and specific knowledge through design representation language (based on Nadin's diagram, 1990). The interfacing territory of design situates in time/space covering the process of designing-the product-its usage, this is when/where designer and user get into an interactive dialogue.

A recent approach called *participatory design* proposes user to be co-partner or co-designer during designing process, which aims to foresee and design for future users, communities, and forthcoming cultural relations. This approach concurring with post-structural point of view, vise versa transforms signification of designed product. The medium of design apparently constructs a language for its speakers, in other words its authors and readers, in order to get in con-

tact, understand each other's intended meanings, interpreting, interact with each other, and end up with a responsive design. Configuration of a pre-coded system of a language of a designed space, of any designed product, or a written poem deals with the diversity of combinations and selections deconstructed in the plane of syntagm and paradigm in designed whole.

This topic welcomes a wide spectrum of research fields such as semiotics in design education, applied semiotics, comparative studies of pre- and poststructuralist approaches in relation with design, etc. A structuralist look focus on to understand how concepts are understood by the designer at the time, wherever a post-structuralist look seeks to understand how those same concepts are understood by addressee of the design in the present, opting in studying how cultural concepts have changed over time. The understanding of participatory design would contribute to understanding and inclusion of future addressees as well. Therefore, as a proposal for the beginning quests of this paper can be a suggestion of a content for the course entitled Design Semiotics; which is concentrated on especially post-structural contributions (Barthes, Eco, Deleuze, etc.) interlacing with eminent understanding of the structuralism and encouraging students towards approaches of participating addressee to designing processes.

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THE CONCEPT OF SCENARIOS SUPPORTED BY SEMIOTIC CAPABILITY TO DESIGN A BICYCLE BETWEEN TRADITION AND INNOVATION

Liliana Soares
Polytechnic Institute of Viana do Castelo, Portugal
University of Lisbon, Portugal
lsoares@estg.ipvc.pt

Ermanno Aparo
Polytechnic Institute of Viana do Castelo, Portugal
University of Lisbon, Portugal
aparo@estg.ipvc.pt

Manuel Ribeiro
Polytechnic Institute of Viana do Castelo, Portugal
ribeiro@estg.ipvc.pt

Abstract

The analysis and evaluation of the concepts of scenario and meta-design as a reflection of the liquid modernity (Bauman 2005) are the basis to structure a system of bicycle for the city of the 21st century, supported by semiotic capability.

The first section rush back the meaning of scenario to understand how to use it in design, namely the semantical dimension of scenario as a complex organism that implies addressing the experience of knowledge through cultural symbols and the power of the media. Designing scenarios means to present a whole fragmented into images, a continuous process that fails to take shape. Instead the designer takes on the project, it is the project that takes on the designer, along with the project tools - materials, technologies, semantics - within the designer's interior and all that is hidden behind appearance. The designer interprets the story of an artefact, using the language of the past (Gadamer 1976) and becoming an interpreter of his reality. To recognize this approach, the text revisits Walter Benjamin's thinking, based on the individual knowing how to tell a story instead of on the story itself. The concept of 'story-teller' (Benjamin 1936) is

the designer's ability to create a historical narrative, deforming it by semiotic competence and eventually transforming it into innovation.

The second section presents a case study of a system of bicycle, involving design master students; diverse companies and institutions from the same region and three researchers illustrate this notion.

The thesis is to demonstrate that thinking the reality in different scenarios means employing a phenomenological method, being transformed along with the scenario; one way to interpret the relationship of the individual in the liquid modernity transformed into images. Design enables the city's scenarios to be an image hypothesis, something ever renewable and embryonic. While image, a scenario consists of a system of layers ready to be experienced by the self while using a bicycle.

1. Introduction

Since the 60's, the nature of the city's project became an arbitrary aggregation, due to major contradictions and oscillations characterizing the western reality. The design of the city was manifest as answer to a new way of thinking, as image for the mass society. Designers chose discontinuity before continuity among things. This regarded benefiting the continuous discussion, change and renovation characterizing the 60's. In a period of continuous renovation as the liquid modernity (Bauman 2005), the constructive order in the project of the city's re-evaluated constitutive elements and values. The projectual choice regarded the individual and the reality as active actors co-intervening in their respective transformation processes, constituting a step forward in the open process relating all (people, information, time, culture) that interacts incessantly in each reality.

In the 70's, according to thinkers such as Jean Baudrillard, Umberto Eco and Mario Perniola, the world was transforming into a repository of dangerous images. Jean Baudrillard, for instance, addressed the new problems generated by the means of communication: "what else do the media dream of besides creating the event simply by their presence? Everyone decries it, but everyone is secretly fascinated by this eventuality. Such is the logic of simulacra, it is no longer that divine predestination (...)" (Baudrillard 1994: 55). As if the application of the means of communication to the city were a mere denotative exercise. Other authors such as Maurizio Vitta, Mary Douglas, Baron Isherwood, Andrea Branzi and António Petrillo, on the contrary, considered the image excess, characterizing reality since the end of the 60's, to be able to become an advantage for the experience of knowledge. As advocated by Margolin: "through the power of communications media, and particularly advertising, images become a persuasive means of motivating people to act" (Margolin 1989: 11). This meant namely that the exchange of goods was mostly regarded as a symbolic and affective process.

This text addresses the second hypothesis. As defended by Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood (2004), it regards interpreting the consume relations (mirror of reality that is also individual reality) as connections between objects and users. The objects transform into interpreters, providing communication with the user and enhancing the relationship among individuals. As if the objects, enlarging their secondary role (Eco 1984), were also suited for the act of thinking, transformed into mediators for an experiential, interpretative and continuous interaction with the users.

Applied to design this means the symbolic process allows interpreting objects as carriers of memories through complex and mutating individuals living in a contradictory and metamorphic reality. According to Maurizio Vitta, it means "(...) the designer's centrality is confirmed because the consumption of the use-object requires that it be continually transformed while it remains faithful in substance to its original function; and the task of expressing the cultural,

aesthetic, or semiological values that interact behind that transformation is the designer's specific duty." (Vitta cit in Margolin 1989: 11-12). The image excess is interpreted as a moment for reflection, to think discontinuity, in the sense of de-construing to construe again, being on the edge of something as a scenario. The project methodology relates to the philosophical thought to question and transform itself, depending on the cultural, social and economic changes of reality. This continuous transformation of concepts determines a permanent development of project methodology as a technique that explains the method in design.

The connection between the project methodology and the concept of scenario can generate projects in the city. However, the city is a very complex organism to try to evaluate it as a whole (Alexander 1968). So, in order to achieve the understanding of a system like the city, this study analyse one of its parts. This research is focus oriented to analyze and evaluate the theme of bicycles as they are an image of the today's cities and widely used in cities. Bicycles, like people, become crossbred, hybrid and customised, as a marker of different settings as equipment scenarios.

2. The Basis

Etymologically, the term scenarios derives from Latin and has different meanings, such as:

1. Its full definition - "(...) 3: *a sequence of events especially when imagined; especially: an account or synopsis of a possible course of action or events (...)*;
2. Its origin - "(...) *from Latin scaenarium place for erecting stages, from scaena stage (...)*"
3. An example - "(...) *a possible scenario would be that we move to the city.*"¹

In this study a sequence of events imagined could mean a shift towards reality consists of thorough, independent and innovative action that is presented to the individual in a written motion. When the designer understands the concept of scenario as a cinematographer of images (Sartre 1936), and relates this concept in design bicycles, he is presenting solutions that interact with reality. It is a competent pattern-system (Alexander 1968) that relates to the requests and the continuous changes that happen in the environment, adding meaning to human being. If the concept of scenario can be interpreted as a dynamic system patterns, changing and connotative, the equipment must express a cultural pattern. The continuous display of related images allows the transformation of the place through the scenario bike system. As if the bicycle was a possible mirror to reflect the images of the individual in place. These are images that offer the user, providing him an animated show. That is, if he is an active user that interacts with the bike, then each image is automatically extended for another and so on. A complex object manifests a diverse nature. Consequently, the scenario/bicycle is presented as a sequence of images, always moving. This means that the same portion where the image sequence happens that may give rise to a new sequence of pictures of the same or another reference. The place predisposes to renew itself naturally to the user to actively participate in the scenario.

So, using the abduction (Pierce 1932) as project methodology, the concept of scenario can be interpreted as a practice to design patterns (materials, technologies, semantics) by design.

The association of the word scenario to a practice of design patterns is possible to produce. Firstly, because this association is proposed to be held by a weak and diffuse subject as design. On the other hand, because ontologically, considering the 'being' of scenario's word with an existence, can not mean the ontological connotation of the traditional term of scenario. This term may have a connotation, linking the 'being' of the word scenario in the reality the designer wants interpret; that is, now (Benjamin 1932). If the patterns operate with a system, then the system patterns, which define the bicycle while setting, can be interpreted as bike tools that change continuously. This means that the significance of the pattern should be equal to the meaning

¹ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/>

of patterns system that defines the bicycle. The scenario involves the user, manifesting itself in a cultural message; the result of the relationship between all patterns - new signs and also old signs - that make up the city. As Gadamer states “there can be no doubt that the great horizon of the past, out of which our culture and our present live, influences us in everything we want, hope for, or fear in the future. History is only present to us in light of our futurity.” (Gadamer 1976 : 8). The interpretation of the historical tradition depends on the designer’s ability to establish relationships with reality, that is, depends on its ability to dispose of the historical narrative, to know being in the universe. As Walter Benjamin states “a story does not aim to convey an event per se, which is the purpose of information; rather, it embeds the event in the life of the story-teller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening. I thus bear the trace of the story-teller, much the way an earthen vessel bears the trace of the potter’s hand.” (Benjamin 2003: 316). Today, the proposal of thinking tradition in discontinuous mode and as a cultural vehicular of the past can be interpreted as the intuition of Walter Benjamin to break the story. This is a gesture likely to establish a different relationship with the past. A gesture achievable through interpretation; far from the traditional proposal. The designer that, through the project, tells the story of an archetype using the language of the past, becomes a maker of tradition, an interpreter who gives a new lease of life to the archetype, but now narrated differently and updated way.

3. The Case Study: RaiOOO and the concept of scenario as the power of design to create a bicycle

To argue that the concept of scenarios can be interpreted as a system of bicycle, we analyze the use of the scenarios concept as system of bicycle in a Design research project/teaching, involving 18 Design master students from the Master in Integrated Design course of the Polytechnic Institute of Viana do Castelo, Portugal, that were coordinated by professors Ermanno Aparo and Manuel Ribeiro. Specifically, the RaiOOO project is an opportunity to experiment and to demonstrate design’s abilities to materialise product systems. It was intended for the students to implement these systems to enhance new features interacting as new urban models.



Figure 1. Draft hypotheses for the Raiooo project. Source: Joana Ferreira.

In terms of implementation, the project team developed the prototype of a tricycle with an electric motor connected to sensors on the pedals. Namely, the RaiOOO project allowed master students to relate with different productive entities. On the one hand, the RaiOOO project intends to demonstrate that connexions between the academic context and companies can be the key factor to create sustainability. This action involves entities and businesses that normally would have remained on the margins, if not totally excluded from the processes of conception. On the other hand the RaiOOO project focus oriented to a pedal vehicle, with a high capacity to adapt to changing scenarios validate the possibility that the experimentation, in the universities, can become a crucial tool for the identification of new models of business development in the area of urban mobility. The idea arises from a series of stimuli received and collected within the world of urban mobility, taking into account trends expressed in a society devoted to the inclusion should promote a new concept of urban cycling within social groups that normally this are excluded. A bicycle can bring either individual, either high and low technology, high and low materials. It means, as an image of the city, a bicycle produce values conferring a product capable of integrating scenarios, leading to a new way to experience the city. Methodologically, the challenge was to bond three players (the students and the companies), promoting design research projects and also the connection among distinct knowledge fields in the threshold between teaching and profession.

During six months, students and businessmen worked together both at school and in the companies, investigating and outlining their proposals for targeted hypotheses of system of bicycles. This process equated new demands from users, such as purchasing a service/product not requiring the need/obligation to enter the distribution level, but its threshold. This vehicle makes use of materials rather unusual in the context of the bicycle. Although, these materials are common in the Portuguese culture, such as the wood, the cork and the leather. Added to these materials, the bicycle uses the aluminium, the ecological plastic and mechanical components, typical form the traditional bicycles. This action generates not only a cross-cultural product, but also a sustainable product.



Figure 2. Patten accessories for the Rai000 project. Source: Joana Ferreira.

Specifically, the project team resorts to craft production, seed production and industrial printing 3d, which enhance the process of creating leading him to the conception of a concept as a clear example of applied research to production. The tricycle shows a structural shell made from two plates of birch plywood bolted to two aluminium brackets that incorporate one hand the box of the other direction and the axis that goes up from the saddle to the pedals. The structural shell serves as a container for the electrical (battery, controller and cables); the shell is then closed on the perimeter by the cork agglomerate. The fork and the steering wheel are made by a process of laminating and bonding pressure of different kinds of wood; the front wheel is equipped with a 250w motor activated by a sensor located behind the crown of the pedals. The rear suspension is made from a block of two wheels with differential that facilitates the distribution of the driving force. Finally, the tricycle have been placed with a series of accessories: a basket in plywood, wood and leather in the back, two leather bags under the steering wheel, a front fender in wood and a saddle in agglomerated cork. The project is presented as a possible bike sharing that, making use of its features, can be inserted in street circuits as an alternative transport.



Figure 3. The Raiooo project. Source: Joana Ferreira and João Teixeira.

4. Conclusion

This investigation, stemming from the scenario concept ambiguity, intends to emphasize design method as process to provide knowledge in two dimensions: product/service and interaction/experience. To include interpretation as a method for design means qualifying the design process, analyzing and pondering the relationship of the designer in context to understand how both, designer and context are transformed.

The designer assessing the cultural value has the predisposition to reach an innovative and sustainable response. Innovative solution because the designer, through interpretation, accepts

time fragmentation and defines the answer including the cultural factor, becoming an ever-renovated solution. A sustainable answer because the process benefits from factors crisscrossing context, as time, communication or complexity, enabling interpretation while design process to be a cyclic method; recyclable and therefore sustainable.

A cognitive and dialectical process because being a path open to contrary and contradictory ideas, it becomes an innovative process conducting to other ideas. A vast process whose product's final quality will depend on the strength of the relationship among the parts constituting the bicycle's product system. The designer as interpreter of the city, namely the bicycle as a pattern, takes on the scenarios as a complex object that manifests a diverse nature, presenting a sequence of images, always moving. This is as an opportunity to interpret the complexity and ambiguity that characterize the liquid modernity. Therefore, the concept of 'story-teller' is interpreted as the designer's ability to create a historical narrative, deforming it by semiotic competence and eventually transforming it into innovation.

The alternative to assess and evaluate all appearances of the nature of the two concepts will allow him the right to choose when relating the individual to the world.

In this sense, it is a productive action in which design works with other disciplines, design tendering architecture to interfere in the true reality, complex and difficult to define, instead of design operating on a dream-like reality. As culture carrier of meaning, design contributes towards preserving the cities' identity and also to uphold emotions in people's lives.

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Webography

- ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA. Encyclopædia Britannica Online: [<http://www.britannica.com>].
- MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY. Merriam-Webster Online: [<http://www.merriam-webster.com>].

**RESEARCH METHODS FOR
EDUCATIONAL SEMIOTICS
SYMPOSIUM**

THE VALUE OF EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS' ADVERTISEMENTS: A VISUAL SEMIOTICS-BASED MIXED METHOD RESEARCH APPROACH.

George Damaskinidis
The Open University, UK
damaskinidis@hotmail.com

Anastasia Christodoulou
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
nata@itl.auth.gr

Abstract

Our research studies the meaning structures of international organizations' objectives regarding how education is defined and makes connections and correlations about the way in which education's objectives and vision are promoted through images. We examine how international organizations treat the objectives of culture and education as vehicles for values in the pictures and texts of their advertisements. By means of a mixed research method combining socio-semiotics, multimodality and visual methodologies, we focus on exploring the vision for education, as this is shown in international organizations' advertisements. We approach the advertisements as social artefacts, in the form of multimodal texts, where the investigation of their social meaning involves the juxtaposition of their semiotic elements on the same interface. We direct our analysis towards a critical visual methodology where images are taken seriously, their social conditions and effects are addressed, and viewer reflexivity is promoted. This mixed method facilitates the exploration of the diverse ideological representation of education in international organizations' advertisements. However, this methodology is at an early stage of development and requires additional elaboration and extensive applications. Also, an in-depth study needs to be made of the relevant theoretical background of any previous attempts to combine the three different methods.

1. Introduction

The subject of values, culture and education has been dealt with by numerous academics both diachronically and synchronically. In this research effort, we make a similar attempt to combine these three areas by designing a mixed-method research model to study the meaning structures of international organizations. In particular, we look at the ways in which education's objectives and vision are promoted through print and audio-visual advertisements. We examine how international organizations treat the objectives of culture and education as vehicles for values in the pictures and texts of their advertisements. By means of a mixed research method combining socio-semiotics, multimodality and visual methodologies, we focus on exploring the vision for education, as this is shown in international organizations' advertisements.

We direct our analysis towards a critical visual methodology where images are taken seriously, their social conditions and effects are addressed, and viewer reflexivity is promoted. This mixed method facilitates the exploration of the diverse ideological representation of education in international organizations' advertisements. The reason for combining three different models, that is, isotopies, image-text relations and metafunctions (as shown later), is to allow us to research a single phenomenon from three different perspectives while taking advantage of the similar theoretical and methodological approaches. The complexity of this endeavour has been a challenge for us for several years now, and we are not without awareness of the slippery research paths we are about to follow.

The article begins with the overall theoretical framework, and in particular, with our visual socio-semiotic perspective, the three components of the model, that is, the concepts of isotopy, image-text relations and metafunction. We then move on to the presentation of the development of the mixed-method model. After that, we make an attempt to validate the mixed-method model, which includes a very brief note from our experience of putting this model into practice with postgraduate students. We conclude this article with an overall evaluation of the proposed mixed-method model and the limitations it poses for future research.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. A visual and sociosemiotic perspective

The visual semiotic perspective that has been adopted here is governed by the fact that the visual is a social research process. Jewitt and Oyama's (2001) theoretical investigation of the concept of 'semiotic mode' is based on social semiotics. This theoretical approach investigates human signifying practices in specific social and cultural circumstances (Lagopoulos and Boklund-Lagopoulou, 1992). The method allows viewers to create their own interpretations and interconnections about visual material. At the same time, it creates windows on the world and offers subjective points of view, which are socially determined.

This perspective is possible if we move away from pure language and adopt the concept of *semiotic mode*. This would require a broadening of traditional views about language. Linguists, for example, have started to realize that verbal language may not be adequate by itself to discuss the various intersemiotic relations between certain verbal and non-verbal aspects of multimodal texts, such as the translation of humour in film and comics. Hortin (1994) supports the validation of visual language within a visual literacy framework and argues for the establishment of an analogy between verbal and visual language. However, despite the foregrounding of semiotic elements other than language in the production of modern texts, the fact that "most Western societies remain print dominated" (Hull and Nelson, 2005: 2) makes any effort to discuss non-verbal modes of communication a difficult task.

The semiotic explorations of the visual are made within social contexts, and in particular, the advertising world. This socio-semiotic method analyses the advertisements beyond a formalistic

approach and treats them as integral parts of a material, socio-economic and political context. In order to accomplish these explorations, we have adopted three main theoretical and methodological concepts: Greimas' (1996) isotopies, Barthes' (1977) image-text relations and Kress and Van Leeuwen's (2006) metafunctions.

2.2. Isotopies, image-text relations and metafunctions

The perspective described in section 2.1 underpins theoretically the three-pillar model that consists of the concepts of *isotopy* (Greimas, 1996), image-text relations (Barthes, 1977) and *metafunction* (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006).

Isotopy is a key term in sociosemiotics supported by Greimas (1996) who, since the late 1960s, has been the central figure in the Paris School of Semiotics. Adopting a theory of structural semantic isotopy, we could describe the coherence and homogeneity of different multimodal texts in order to find the isotopies in these texts and thus detect when there is a repetition of a basic meaning trait (*seme*). In advertisements, for example, this would involve the examination of the verbal message and any accompanying visual material, such as a photograph. Such a repetition, which establishes some level of familiarity within the texts, would allow readers to find if there is a uniform reading/interpretation of them. In this case, the focus would be to bring to light potential ways that the polysemous photographs are disambiguated or complicated by the co-occurrence of the captions.

Barthes (1977) presents an interesting semiotic reading of an advertisement and some photographs, in terms of image-text relations. He illustrates that there are three messages, or three levels, of signification to the analysed semiotic text: the linguistic or informational; the coded iconic or symbolic; and the non-coded iconic or obtrude. At the first level, everything is clearly given; there is a clarity and immediacy in the image and the information it provides. At the second level, we deal with symbolism, but since there are different kinds of symbol, the signification is more complex, giving rise to different interpretations. At the third level, things are entirely different; the viewer or reader is confronted with indeterminate, undecidable meaning, a place of presence and absence. There is no natural relationship between image and its meaning, and what furnishes the image with connotations is metonymy. The syntagm of denotation naturalizes or legitimates the system of the connoted message, bringing disparate, discontinuous and unrelated connotations into a concerted whole.

A similar three-stage analysis is provided by Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006), consisting of the representational, interpersonal and compositional metafunctions. Briefly speaking, the representational metafunction presents narrative and conceptual images which examine what the picture is about. The narrative image represents the unfolding of actions, events or processes of change in terms of the people, places or things depicted. Conceptual images do not represent the participant as doing something, but as being something, meaning something, belonging to some category, or having certain characteristics or components. The interpersonal metafunction deals with the image's act/gaze, social distance and intimacy, and perspective to examine how the picture engages the viewer. The compositional metafunction deals with the layout of the picture, the placement of the participants and its relative salience. This metafunction examines how the representational and interpersonal metafunctions integrate into a meaningful whole. The placement of participants on the page allows them to take on different information roles. Salience refers to the ability of a participant to capture the viewer's attention. Modality is an indicator of the message's validity and reliability, in terms of various visual factors.

The above three, briefly presented concepts are considered here as three distinct models which could be combined in various ways so as to make up a mixed methodological model. The next section describes our exploration of such a mixed model which would choose selectively,

from the range of the options offered by each model, without being constrained by conflicting factors, such as the different epistemological stances.

3. Developing a mixed-method research methodology

According to Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005), most current educational research runs along a continuum between the postpositivistic and the constructivist paradigms. According to Burgess et al. (2006: 54), a paradigm is “a set of beliefs that deals with ultimates and first principles [and] presents a world-view that defines for its holder the nature of the “world”, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships in that world”. Many researchers, according to Rossman and Wilson (1985), still believe that studies (and as such their methodological basis) need to be situated in either a qualitative or quantitative approach.

Here, we work against the polarization that methodologies cannot be mixed (Howe, 1988) and that epistemology dictates the method of data collection or analysis (Cohen et al., 2007). We view this research from a unified perspective where the research question drives methodological approaches/choices. We also cite ‘pragmatic researchers’ who are flexible in their research techniques and collaborate with other researchers with multiple epistemological stances (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). This methodology is in fact an ongoing process that requires prolonged engagement, persistent observation, and triangulation (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). The research is approached mainly (though not exclusively) from different paradigms, such as post-positivism, interpretivism and postmodernism.

The post-positivism paradigm accepts that an absolute model is difficult to establish, but it could still strive for objectivity while combining quantitative and qualitative methods of data-collection and analysis. From an interpretivistic perspective, any model can be studied and interpreted in different ways, mainly because people and situations differ. The postmodernism paradigm seeks to break down conventional boundaries and draw attention to how permeable and movable they can be. Taking into account the post-positivist perspective, we acknowledge that it would be difficult for the researcher who uses a mixed model to establish a definitive reading of the phenomena examined. However, some degree of objectivity could be gained through a combination of research methods, in other words, through triangulation, that some readings are more likely than others. By adopting an interpretivist approach, researchers could be allowed to interpret for themselves the phenomena under investigation. Moreover, a post-modernist approach would facilitate the breaking down of the conventional boundaries between the three models by drawing researchers’ attention to the permeability and mobility of these boundaries.

The semiotic square extends the binary models of Saussure and his followers, such as Claude Levi-Strauss (1983), into the realm of anthropology, by providing a means of mapping semiotic dimensions in four rather than two dimensions. Beginning with the binary opposition of two values, such as male/female or for self/for others, the researcher can explore the grey areas between these extremes by introducing an operation of negation: not male/not female, not for self and not for others. By superimposing a plurality of binary oppositions including gender, relationships and emotional orientation, the semiotic square provides a more nuanced and refined grid for mapping consumer segments and brand meanings than the simple paradigmatic opposition of two dimensions. Floch (1990/2001) later applied Greimas’ theory to illustrate the double layer of signification in the picture, namely iconic and plastic levels, in order to explain how concrete or abstract concepts are transmitted by the picture. Floch (1990/2001), applying structural semiotics, further argues that pictorial signification exists and plays a role in the structure of binary opposition.

Adopting the research method of Lagopoulos and Boklund-Lagopoulou (1992), who studied

the notion of isotopy on the verbal and visual levels, we approach the advertisements as social artefacts, in the form of multimodal texts, where the investigation of their social meaning involves the juxtaposition of their semiotic elements on the same interface. In this way, both the verbal and the non-verbal semiotic elements are studied as an integrated system of communication, and as such all meaning-making modes are treated equally when assessing their contribution to multimodal texts.

Although Kress and Van Leeuwen's (2001) visual grammar is a useful tool, its application requires careful consideration. For instance, the interpretation of a multimodal text based on this visual grammar should bear in mind whether the text was also designed and produced on the basis of the same visual grammar. The same applies in cases of cross-cultural communication, especially between Western and non-Western cultures.

Type of Model	Stages-Components	Distinctive Feature
Greimas' isotopies	repeating patterns verbal and non-verbal semiotic elements	homogeneity and coherence of texts
Barthes' image text relations	linguistic/informational coded iconic/symbolic non-coded iconic/obtrude	levels of signification
Kress & Van Leeuwen's metafunctions	representational interactive compositional	visual grammar

Table 1: Delimiting Barthes, Greimas and Kress & Van Leeuwen.

Table 1 shows the various components that make up the proposed mixed model, which a researcher could choose from in order to analyse a text. In figure 1 we can see our suggestion for the two main ways of applying the mixed model, in other words, the syntagmatic and paradigmatic application modes.




Fig. 1: Syntagmatic and paradigmatic application of the mixed model.

In the syntagmatic mode, the three models are applied consecutively, where the application of the preceding model will unavoidably affect the application of the following one. The research outcome will be the result of the analysis of Model C, as affected (as applicable) by Models A and B. In the paradigmatic mode, the researcher takes into account the three models, all at the same time, and after careful consideration decides to use a combined model consisting of several stages.

For the sake of illustration, we will describe the combined model consisting of stages AB, B, CA or BC. AB stands for a stage where the researcher applies Model A in its entirety and an aspect of Model B. CA stands for a stage where the researchers apply Model C in its entirety and an aspect of Model A. BC stands for a stage where the researchers apply both Model B and C in their entirety. B stands for a stage where the researchers apply only Model B because they have deemed it the most appropriate for the analysis of the phenomena at hand. The last case is an example of the freedom offered to researchers to abandon any consideration of combining the models for a variety of reasons. However, the fact that researchers would have been involved in this brainstorming may actually affect the application of a single model. In addition, the combination of different models for examining a single phenomenon may not only be time-consuming but may also lead to conflicting interpretations of the same phenomenon.

4. Validating the mixed-method analytical model of the concept of value in education

In order to evaluate such a mixed research approach, we propose the validation framework put forward by Leech, et al. (2010). This framework consists of five elements: the foundational element; the elements of construct validation for quantitative, qualitative, and mixed research; inferential consistency; the utilization/historical element; and the consequential element. Due to space constraints, this framework will not be presented in theoretical detail, but will instead be illustrated in a small-scale study we carried out as part of a postgraduate course.

4.1. Description of the study of value as an educational advertising product

Mixed research methods were used to study the impact of reading videos and print advertisements on postgraduate students. The advertisements had to be about international organizations and how they promote their education values. However, since the students had difficulty finding appropriate educational advertisements, or they did not like this particular topic, we modified this criterion and allowed them to choose their own topic, as long as the advertisement was made by an international organization. For example, some students chose advertisements on human rights, environmental protection and public health.

We gave students some examples of semiotics-based postgraduate assignments from previous courses of ours and asked them to choose the one they liked the most, or to combine them, as applicable. The students provided a very brief review of the literature at the beginning of the assignment and focused on the analysis of the advertisements. The analysis was to be guided by the values each organization held (either in education or another topic) and the ways in which these values were fulfilled and promoted by the educational product (e.g. a video, a single print advertisement, a campaign).

Although students were instructed to analyse them using all three models in any way they liked, most of them used only one or two models. It should be stated that their training in these models was not thorough enough to enable them to combine the models in a variety of ways. That said, their training was sufficient for the purposes of this project.

4.2. Evaluation of the proposed mixed-method model using the validation framework

First, the foundational element of construct validation should be addressed. In terms of the

level of quality and the function of providing a review of the literature in this study, it addresses theoretical issues related to all three models as well as issues that are related to their design in the present literature. These issues are used to make arguments about and support the purpose of the study. One area that is not covered sufficiently in the review is the literature addressing conflicting epistemological and ontological aspects of the three models.

Second, as regards the traditional quantitative and qualitative elements, the model offers opportunities for the examination of factors such as design, measurement, sampling and data analysis. For example, the design would account for the order of the various components. Measurements would include the number of isotopies identified in relation to the non-verbal semi-otic elements of a metafunction or level of signification. Elsewhere, internal validity would be examined by inferring that the relationship between verbal and non-verbal semiotic elements in the interactive metafunction is causal owing to the absence of repeating patterns due to lack of homogeneity of the texts under analysis. A single researcher could analyse the qualitative data of the symbolic level of signification as opposed to the symbolic conceptual aspect of the representational metafunction. This stage of analysis could possibly compensate for the lack of a team of researchers or independent external auditors.

Third, the mixed-method elements may lead to a design that would be appropriate for the purpose of the study at hand. For example, a sequential approach could be used, with emphasis placed on the initial qualitative stages that would provide results for use in instrument development. However, there are some issues about various types of legitimation, such as sequential legitimation. For example, the sequence of the qualitative and quantitative stages of the model would not necessarily result in the same findings if the order was reversed. In addition, the sample size may also be an issue because it could lead to an imbalance between the amount of qualitative and quantitative elements used, as opposed to those needed, for each different model.

Fourth, the analysis of inferential consistency would include an examination of the way the different elements of the study flow to lead to the inferences that are made by the researchers, and the purpose, design, analysis, and inferences of the literature review. The three models may require different measures of qualitative and quantitative analysis. This imbalance may make the translation of qualitative results into quantitative measures, or vice versa, appear inadequate. Additionally, a number of measures of items (e.g. reporting the analyses, factor analysis and regression results) may not be correlated. One possible way to overcome this obstacle is to identify a data-text or corpus that would be appropriate for all three models. However, this *identification* would be possible only after numerous experimental applications of the three models to a variety of texts.

Fifth, the historical/utilization element would help to determine how the study results and measures will be used in the future. For example, the data obtained by a mixed-method model with a certain structure could be directly applied and analysed by another model with a different structure. This is important in cases where the researcher would show a preference for playing with the data in an attempt to analyse and investigate the same phenomena from various points of view.

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to demonstrate the application of a new methodological framework to assist researchers in conducting mixed research studies. As shown in this article, the mixed-method model is also a flexible tool for researchers to use when needing to evaluate mixed research studies.

The benefit of conducting research with this model is its flexible approach to investigating a single phenomenon from multiple points of view. The model incorporates multiple areas of a

study for a researcher to use, including the concepts of isotopy, image-text relations and visual grammar. In addition, it is open to additions from other epistemological, theoretical and methodological areas.

Also, as a mixed research study, the model lends itself to the validation framework proposed here. As expected, each application of the model will differ in the way it will be designed and implemented. Therefore, for each study, one evaluator from each model may be required to make sure that all aspects of the mixed research model are thoroughly examined.

There are also two main limitations to our proposal for a mixed research model. First, applying the proposed model to a given study may be difficult, or simply not feasible, especially for novice researchers, such as postgraduate students. The fact that the latter were not properly introduced to this mixed-method model, though they were more or less familiar with the three distinct models, may be an indication that the model's overall effect is greater than the sum of the meaning of the three different models. Second, a detailed rendering of the students' application of the mixed-method model was not possible because of space limitations and our wish to focus on the presentation of the model per se.

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YOUNG CHILDREN ACCESSING MULTIMODAL TEXTS: A CASE STUDY

Polyxeni Manoli
University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece
pegyma@hotmail.com

Maria Papadopoulou
University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece
mariapap@uth.gr

Abstract

The study aimed to explore whether young children, who did not have formal reading skills, could speculate the linguistic message depicted in contemporary multimodal texts based on information provided in various modes (such as, colour or typography). The contribution of each mode to the meaning-making process was investigated as well. A further aim of the study was to probe into students' answers in relation to their age. The sample of the study consisted of 45 young children; 26 of the participants were five to six years old and 19 were four to five years old. The basic tool used in the research was a matching exercise derived from a picture book intended for young children. Semi-structured individual interviews were used for the data collection, which were tape-recorded and, later on, were transcribed and processed. The results of the study indicated that the majority of the children were able to use the typographic and colour cues along with separate letters they already knew to guess the linguistic content of short multimodal texts. It was also revealed that colour and typography played a critical role in helping students match the linguistic elements with the visual ones. Regarding the age variable, it was found that the group of the older children seemed to perform better than the younger ones but the difference was not found to be statistically significant. At the same time, the results highlighted the fact that children at this age tend to rely more on visual cues when approaching written texts. The study pointed out the need for educators to extend the limits of the semantic field of literacy beyond language texts in order to allow for multimodal texts, as nowadays, students, even from an early age, are exposed to an increasing dominance of multimodal texts -both print and digital texts- that involve a complex interplay of linguistic elements, visual images, graphics, and design elements.

1. Theoretical issues

Till recently literacy education in the Western societies has focused solely on language, ignoring all other communicational modes of meaning-making (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006). However, in the last decades of the 20th century, the technological development along with the wider changes in the socio-economic and cultural field imposed radical changes in the representational and communicational landscape that led to the need to redefine and broaden the limits of literacy in order to fulfill the current and future communication needs of all citizens (New London Group 1996). Contemporary multimodal texts require a new definition of literacy as new learning needs have arisen (Unsworth 2001). People, especially youths, are continually exposed to multimodal texts either print or digital, such as websites, video games, picture books, texts, magazines, advertisements, and graphic novels that include a complex interplay of written texts, visual images, graphics, and design elements (Kress et al. 2001; Kress and Leeuwen 2006; Unsworth 2001). As Fleckenstein (2002) asserts readers encounter more multimodal texts in their everyday life than print-based texts. In this context, meaning is derived from ways that are increasingly multimodal (Cope and Kalantzis 2000). According to Kalantzis and Cope (2012: 2), “we need to supplement traditional reading and writing skills with multimodal communications”. Multimodality refers to the active and dynamic interrelationship among the different semiotic modes of meaning which individuals can draw on during interaction with various texts to derive meaning, though one mode can prevail over the others (Baldry and Thibault 2006; New London Group 1996). In addition, research in the field of multimodality has highlighted new ways of conveying meaning from texts emphasizing the fact that becoming an efficient reader/viewer of multimodal texts is much more multitasking than just reading the words of a text. At the same time, multimodality, in particular the visual mode, can help young readers who have not developed formal reading skills access a text (Arizpe and Styles 2003; Pantaleo 2005; Papadopoulou 2001a; Yannicopoulou 2004). Images, colour or even typography can provide cues revealing the information in a text. Indeed, research has shown that children can even be more efficient readers of pictures than adults (Kiefer 1995; Meek 1988).

Among other texts, picture books for children have always relied on the visual mode to make meaning. Although there is quite a lot of research on how children read images in picture books (Arizpe and Styles 2003; Kiefer 1995; Styles and Arizpe 2001; Walsh 2003), only a small body of research regards picture books as multimodal texts and provides tools for the understanding of the contribution of the various modes, such as, typography or colour, to the meaning-making process (Papadopoulou, Manoli, and Zifkou 2014; Serafini and Clauzen 2012; Walker and Linda 2003; Walsh 2003). In this context, acknowledging the contribution of the various semiotic modes to the meaning-making process, the purpose of the present study was to explore whether young children (4-6 year-old preschoolers) could speculate the linguistic message of multimodal texts included in a picture book based on information provided in various modes. Additionally, the study investigated the contribution of each mode to the meaning-making process as well as the relation between children’s answers and their age.

2. Method

2.1. Research questions

Allowing for the theoretical framework discussed above and the purpose of the present study, the following research questions were addressed:

- Could young children, who did not have formal reading skills, identify meaning in contemporary multimodal texts derived from picture books based on information provided in various semiotic modes (such as, colour or typography).
- Which of the semiotic modes contributed most to the meaning-making process?

- Was there an association between children's correct answers and their age?


2.2. Participants

Forty-five (45) children aged four (4) to six (6) years old participated in the study. Twenty-six (26) of the participants were five to six years old and 19 were four to five years old. The sample of the study came from four state nursery schools in the city of Volos, in central Greece, while one nursery school located in the suburbs of the city of Volos. The choice of the sample relied on the following criteria: the children did not face learning difficulties or any other mental disorder; they had not developed formal reading skills. The two first criteria were judged based on their teachers' perceptions, while the development of formal reading skills was assessed through a short test administered prior to the study. All participants had Greek as their first language (L1).

2.3. Research instrument

The basic tool used in the research was a constructed matching exercise drawn from a picture book, which was entitled *Me + you = together. The art of being a grandmother* (Marantidou 2010). The book was written in Greek but the specific extract was translated into English by the researchers. The specific extract was chosen for its variety of semiotic modes that provide visual salience by means of conventional or more expressive typography and colour. Initially, the page consisted of images and short phrases beneath each image explaining and extending what was symbolically depicted in each image. However, the page was modified for research purposes; the phrases were separated from the relevant images to construct a matching exercise. The first part of the phrases was written in normal black typefaces, while the second part was written using semiotic modes which diverged from the normal black typefaces.


The first image depicted a birthday cake with a candle, while the corresponding phrase was 'the land of birthday'. The special element of the phrase was that the letter 'i' ('i' in Greek) of the word birthday (γενεθλίων in Greek) was written in a larger typeface than the rest letters and the accent was yellow bearing a resemblance to the flame of the candle.




η χώρα των γενεθλίων

'the land of birthday'

The second image depicted pairs of feet dancing and hands moving around while the relevant phrase was 'the land of dance'. The distinctive feature of the phrase was that the last part of the sentence was written three times on three different lines, which diverged from the regular line spacing and the horizontal dimension of the rest of the phrase to remind readers of the concept of dancing.



The third image depicted a Christmas tree, while the corresponding phrase was 'the land of Christmas'. What made the phrase diverge from the normal black typefont was the use of colour; namely, half of the letters of the word 'Christmas' (Χριστούγεννα in Greek) were in red, while the rest were in green to resemble the colours used to depict the Christmas tree in the image.



The fourth image showed the sun, while the related phrase was 'the land of light'. The distinctive feature of the phrase was the use of colour, which was gradually changing; namely, the word 'light' [φωτός in Greek] was written using the shades of yellow, such as red or orange, to help readers associate the phrase with the sun.



The last image depicted a piano, while the corresponding phrase was 'the land of music'. The distinctive features of the phrase were that the letter 'ο' of the Greek word 'μουσικής' (music in English) was replaced by a note to remind readers of the concepts of the piano and music; moreover, the specific word diverged from the regular line spacing and the horizontal dimension of the rest phrase.



2.4. Data collection and coding

Semi-structured individual interviews were used for the data collection, which were carried out in Greek, the participants' mother tongue. The interviews were conducted at the different nursery schools and lasted for 20 minutes approximately. The interviews were tape-recorded and, later on, were transcribed verbatim and processed to have objective record and reanalyze data after the interviews being conducted (Nunan 1992). The researchers coded the data independently until they had reached 90% agreement (inter-rater reliability) on the coding of the participants' answers. In cases in which disagreement on the coding scheme occurred, the researchers met to discuss possible differences in order to arrive at a high level of consistency concerning the number of students' correct answers and the type of semiotic modes identified by preschoolers as the reason which helped them answer correctly (Charmaz 2000; Patton 1990). The thorough data management and analytic procedures, such as the verbatim transcription and accurate records of the interviews, contributed to the validation of the research findings. The research belonged to a broader survey on preschoolers' ability to derive meaning from multimodal texts, which was conducted in spring of 2011 and lasted for three months (Papadopoulou et al. 2014).

3. Results

The data of the study were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0. In accordance with the aims of this study, descriptive statistics as well as the statistical analysis of one-way Anova were computed. The level of significance was set at .05. To examine children's correct answers, descriptive statistics, particularly frequencies, were computed. It was found that the majority of children were able to match the linguistic message with the correct image drawing on the semiotic modes used to convey meaning. Table 1 presents the frequencies and percentages of students' correct guessing for each image:


	IMAGES	FREQ.	PERCENT
1		30	67%
2		25	56%
3		29	65%
4		38	85%
5		27	60%
	Total	45	100

Table 1. Frequency of students' correct answers per image

In a next step, it was attempted to investigate the contribution of the various semiotic modes to the meaning-making process. Based on Table 2 below, it was shown that primarily colour and then typography played a critical role in helping students match the linguistic elements with the images, since most of the children seemed to have mainly relied on these two modes in order to justify their answers.

	IMAGES	REASONS	PERCENT
1		Typography Colour Letters Other	55% 37% - 7%
2		Typography Colour Letters Other No answer	28% 20% 21% 21% 7%
3		Typography Colour Letters Other	- 45% 51% 24%
4		Typography Colour Letters Other	- 77% 5% 18%
5		Typography Colour Letters Other	78% 26% - 7%

Table 2. Children's reported justifications

Two third of the children (67%) achieved to match the image of the birthday cake to the corresponding phrase 'the land of birthday'. Their choices were mainly driven by typography ("there are two candles"; "I saw the cake and I found the letter of the cake [i]") and by colour ("there is a yellow accent"; "there is red here and red there"). Most children's false matching (47%) was again based on colour associating the image to phrases abounded with it, such as 'the land of Christmas' or 'the land of light'. A disparity of justifications was given by children for the second image which was correctly matched by 56% of the sample, a rather low percentage. While some children took notice of the fact that the last word ('dance') diverged from the usual linear alignment of sentences in print texts reminding them of the concept of dancing ("the letters are moving": "[the letters] are going up and down"), other justifications such as colour, lettering and various answers ("it's the last one") were also equally mentioned. Most false answers were based on colour. Children were mainly attracted by the colour which, in this case, led to false answers. Mostly younger children failed to do the right matching. Relying on previous research (Papadopoulou 2001b), it is known that children find it difficult to accept the non linear alignment of a sentence, as most young children consider that writing has a horizontal layout). Letters and colour were the main modes that guided children's attention to the matching of the third image. Twenty nine children made the right match and half of them justified their answers based on the

knowledge of some letters appearing in the phrase (“*there is an ‘X’*”). An almost equal number of children referred to colour (“*there is green here and green there*”; “*the letters are green and red*”). False matching also indicated the ways children use to approach the visual mode. Some children mistakenly matched the image of the Christmas tree with the phrase ‘the land of music’ referring to the note over the letter ‘o’ associating Christmas with charades and songs. The image of the sun was easily associated with the ‘land of light’ by most children who used the mode of colour to justify their matching (77%). Few children made false matching also referring to colour but relating the ‘sun’ to other colorful phrases, such as ‘the land of birthday’. Last but not least, most children, who correctly related the image of the piano to the phrase ‘the land of music’, noticed the transformation of the letter ‘o’ to a music note.

Additionally, in order to investigate whether students’ correct answers associated with their age, one-way anova analysis was performed. The total number of children’s correct answers was used as the dependent measure. The results revealed that, though children aged five seemed to report more elements ($M = 3.5$, $SD = 1.5$) than younger children aged four ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.5$), this difference was not found to be statistically significant, $F(1, 44) = .97$, $p > .05$.

4. Discussion

The main aim of the study was to explore whether preschoolers (four and five year old) who had not developed formal reading skills could derive meaning from contemporary multimodal texts based on information provided in various semiotic modes (such as, colour, typography or other modes); another aim was to investigate which of the semiotic modes contributed most to the meaning-making process. The age variable was also examined in this study.

According to the findings of the present study, it seemed that preschool children were able to detect the information provided by various modes and use it as a cue to reveal the linguistic content of the phrases. More than two thirds of the children were able to answer the matching activity correctly based on information provided in various semiotic modes; in addition, they were able to provide a proper justification in each case. In particular, the results indicated that the mode of colour, followed by typography were mainly identified by children as the modes that contributed to the visual salience of the phrases and helped most of them answer correctly. Regarding the age variable, though it was found that the group of older children seemed to perform better than the younger group, this difference was not statistically significant requiring further research.

Overall, it was shown that the visual elements which deliberately blurred the boundaries between image and letter were identified by most children in the attempt to match the images with the correct phrases. In fact, the presence of colour and the rather ‘awkward’ typographic features of the words have attracted children’s attention in conjunction with their pre-existing familiarity with some letters of the alphabet (usually those appearing first in a word) due to the activities conducted in the nursery schools. The latter strategy is often used by pre-schoolers, who have not developed formal reading skills yet, in the attempt to have an early access to literacy (Papadopoulou & Poimenidou 2004). Few references were made to other reasons, such as ‘the only card left’ or ‘it is the smallest or the biggest card’.

There is no doubt that any deviation from the conventional typographic form of text makes the text impressive, funny, and familiar to pre-schoolers, as texts intended for this age are multimodal, in which the visual mode, especially colour, typography and images prevail. In fact, pre-schoolers, who have not developed full literacy skills yet, tend to draw on the visual mode when approaching written texts; this tendency should be cultivated and enhanced by educators, as nowadays children, even from an early age are exposed to a variety of multimodal texts where the various modes of communication interact to produce meaning (Baldry and Thibault 2006;

Kress and van Leeuwen 2001). Yet, in most cases, school curricula and educators draw more on language ignoring the contribution of other modes to the meaning-making process. In this context, there should be a shift of interest from language to the development of a multimodal literacy. As Martens et al. (2012: 293) advocated: “helping children read picture books multimodally and expanding their understandings of text not only enriches their reading, but also moves them toward being multimodal readers and creators of meaningful texts in our world”.

Taking everything into account, there seems to be an urgent need for educators and those who plan educational policy to familiarize students with multimodal texts enabling them to analyze, produce and critically approach information conveyed in various modes. Students have to be taught the processes involved in constructing meaning from multimodal texts since they are increasingly prevalent in everyday life. In this way, educators should teach students to take advantage of the various semiotic modes of communication in order to help them have better access to literacy and meet the communicational demands of the era (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001).

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**SEMIOTICS OF WEB SURFING
AND ITS USERS / SEMIÓTICA
DE LA NAVEGACIÓN POR
INTERNET Y SUS USUARIOS
/ SÉMIOTIQUE DE LA
NAVIGATION PAR INTERNET ET
LEURS USAGERS**

ESTRUCTURACIÓN COGNITIVA Y NAVEGACIÓN POR INTERNET EN LOS ADULTOS DE SANTIAGO DE CHILE

Evelyn Campos Acosta
Universidad de Chile
evelyn.camposacosta@gmail.com

Abstract

Se trata de un estudio socio semiótico sobre el procesamiento cognitivo presente en la navegación por Internet, específicamente de un estudio de casos polares de funcionamiento: uno simple y otro complejo, correspondientes a Estrato Medio, de 40-45 años, y de 30-35 años, respectivamente.

La investigación semiótica tomó como punto de partida la realización de guiones o cuentos a sujetos de los segmentos etarios y estrato socioeconómico antes especificado con la finalidad de establecer si se ajustaban, como caso polar, en alguno de los polos estudiados (simplicidad/complejidad). Una vez seleccionados, se procedió a hacerlos navegar por Internet sin un objetivo definido por 5 minutos y, a posteriori, 25 minutos con un objetivo específico, registrando filmicamente su comportamiento ocular y corporal y también su navegación a través del registro de la pantalla del computador utilizado. A partir de allí, se procedió a elaborar un modelo semiótico interpretativo de los tres registros, y se comprobó y validó en una entrevista semi-estructurada.

Respecto a la definición simple/complejo debemos decir que desde las Ciencias Cognitivas, Petitot-Cocorda, Varela, Pachoud y Roy (2002) definen que la estructuración cognitiva se asocia a la capacidad de establecer diversos tipos de relaciones entre los espacios perceptivos, como son las relaciones de conjunto, de contigüidad, de conexión y dependencia y la articulación de una totalidad o captación de momentos figurales que reagrupan los elementos en configuración, por lo que se tuvieron dichas variables en cuenta en el establecimiento de los casos: presencia/ausencia de tratamiento paralelo de la información (un solo espacio cognitivo/más de 10 espacios cognitivos). Por otro lado, se validó dicha conceptualización semiótica a través de una encuesta, donde a partir de los resultados estadísticos del proyecto Fondecyt N°1120064 sobre navegación y consumo de Internet se generó un Índice de Manejo de Complejidad, que reveló que entre los

adultos de Santiago se presenta una mayor concentración de casos en las categorías “Manejo de complejidad Bajo” (42%) y “Manejo de complejidad Medio” (41,4%), mientras el “Manejo de complejidad Alto” sólo alcanza un 16,7%. En estos resultados la variable decisiva no es el género ni el estrato socioeconómico, sino el rango etario, por lo que usuarios adultos de 30-35 años presentan una estructuración cognitiva más diversificada (simple/complejo), asemejándose con ello a la distribución existente en los rangos de edad 11-12 16-19 años y 20-24 (encuesta Fondecyt N° 1061166), mientras que en aquellos de 40-45 y 50-55 años prima un manejo de complejidad bajo (estructuración cognitiva simple).

1. Introducción

La presente comunicación tiene por objetivo describir la navegación por Internet de usuarios adultos de Santiago de Chile, desde el punto de vista de la estructuración cognitiva puesta en juego en la interacción sujeto-máquina, esto pues tal como propone Scolari (2008) “Hay interactividad en las comunicaciones sujeto-sujeto, pero también en los intercambios entre un sujeto y un dispositivo tecnológico” (Scolari 2008: 94).

Lo que se busca es analizar y comparar cualitativamente dos casos polares de usuarios de 30-35 y 50-55 años, diferenciados por una estructuración cognitiva Simple/Compleja. Los datos fueron obtenidos a partir del Proyecto de Investigación Fondecyt Regular N° 1120064 “Navegación por Internet: percepción y cognición en población adulta del gran Santiago”, cuya fase cuantitativa consideró la construcción de un Índice de Manejo de Complejidad a partir del cual se identificó que entre los adultos de Santiago se presenta una mayor concentración de casos en las categorías “Manejo de complejidad Bajo” (42%) y “Manejo de complejidad Medio” (41,4%), pues la categoría “Manejo de complejidad Alto” sólo alcanza un 16,7%. En estos resultados la variable decisiva no es el género ni el estrato socioeconómico, sino que más bien el rango etario, por lo que usuarios adultos de 30-35 años presentan una estructuración cognitiva más diversificada (simple/complejo) que aquellos de 40-45 y 50-55 años donde prima un manejo de complejidad bajo (Estructuración cognitiva simple).

La reflexión sobre la estructuración cognitiva puesta en acto en la interface de los usuarios de Internet se nutre del desarrollo de las Ciencias Cognitivas y los aportes del Enfoque Enactivo propuesto por Francisco Varela (1996) que, contemplando los aportes del Enfoque Conexionista, entiende la percepción como la activación de redes distribuidas de neuronas que generan propiedades emergentes y que depende tanto del contexto como de la historia del sistema cognitivo en cuestión, desplazando las propuestas del modelo cognitivista que consideraba al cerebro como un operador lógico central que procesa símbolos. Para el enfoque enactivo, en cambio, la percepción es co-determinada en cada momento: “la mayor capacidad de la cognición viviente consiste en gran medida en *plantear* las cuestiones relevantes que van surgiendo en cada momento de nuestra vida. No son predefinidas sino enactuadas: se las hace emerger desde un trasfondo, y lo relevante es aquello que nuestros sentido común juzga como tal, siempre dentro de un contexto” (Varela 1996, pp. 88-89).

En este sentido, percepción y cognición son procesos que manifiestan la estructuración cognitiva en tanto esquema mental, que es construida en cada momento de la vida cotidiana.

La observación y análisis de la interface de los usuarios de Internet implicará necesariamente el estudio de su estructuración cognitiva, orientada en torno a la distinción Simple/Complejo. Esta distinción se traza en función del tratamiento de la información que realizan los sujetos y que bien puede estar orientada por un tratamiento secuencial (Simple) o paralelo (Complejo) de la información (Varela 1996).

Asimismo, se contempla el estudio de la estructuración cognitiva de los usuarios de Internet sobre la base de la realización de diversas operaciones intelectivas (Petitot-Cocorda et al. 2002):

a) **Relaciones de conjuntos:** se percibe una relación simple al detectar la relación que opera con una parte de lo percibido: se detecta una variable.

b) **Relaciones de contigüidad:** detectar que dos variables pueden estar conectadas por coexistir una cerca de la otra. No son un campo asociativo en el sentido semiótico del término, señala Petitot-Cocorda (2002), pues no se trata de correlacionar dos operaciones de sentido, sino que de una coexistencia de dos operaciones que van juntas.

c) **Relaciones de conexión y dependencia:** se detecta que dos operaciones pueden ligarse y producir otra.

d) **Captación de momentos figurales que reagrupan los elementos en configuración:** lo que significa tener un concepto de totalidad y, eventualmente, construir una estrategia.

Por consiguiente, una estructuración cognitiva simple tendrá lugar en aquellas interfaces de usuarios de Internet con un tratamiento secuencial de la información y la realización de algunas de las operaciones intelectivas antes descritas, mientras que una estructuración cognitiva compleja será identificada cuando se observe un tratamiento paralelo de la información y la realización de todas las operaciones intelectivas.

Lo anterior resulta relevante a la hora de analizar las interfaces puestas en juego en la navegación por Internet en tiempos de la masificación de esta tecnología y su implicancia actual en el mundo productivo en el que operan los adultos.

2. Consideraciones metodológicas

Se propone un diseño cualitativo para el estudio de la estructuración cognitiva de los usuarios de Internet adultos. El diseño contempló en un primer momento la selección de casos a partir de la realización de un guión, que analizado semióticamente permitiera identificar la asignación del usuario en el polo simple/complejo.

Posteriormente, los casos seleccionados debían someterse a una sesión de navegación por Internet que contó con dos fases: a) una fase de navegación libre durante cinco minutos b) una fase de navegación por Internet inducida de 25 minutos, donde los usuarios debían navegar con la misión de resolver el problema de categorizar a los diferentes tipos de seres vivientes en su relación con la energía del sol, tarea que no tenía respuesta directa en la Web, tal como lo comprobó el equipo de investigación en forma previa.

A partir de un software se registró el desplazamiento de los usuarios por la pantalla del computador, mientras que una cámara de video frontal registraba sus movimientos corporales y oculares.

A continuación de la fase de navegación se realizó una entrevista en profundidad para validar los resultados obtenidos.

Se construyó un instrumento de análisis de los datos, que consideró como parte de la estructuración cognitiva el análisis de la forma de ligar espacios conceptual o espacial (Vignaux, Walter y Silverstein 2001; Foucault y Coulet 2001); la forma de funcionamiento de la estructuración cognitiva utilitaria o asociativa (Vignaux, Walter y Silverstein 2001; Foucault y Coulet 2001) y la estructuración cognitiva misma organizada en torno a la distinción simple/complejo, según número de espacios perceptivos o fragmentos focalizados, tratamiento de la información y operaciones intelectivas puestas en juego (Petitot-Cocorda et al 2002; Le Blanc 2001).

3. Resultados

A continuación se presenta el detalle del análisis de la navegación por Internet y la manifestación de la estructuración cognitiva de dos casos polares de navegadores adultos, el primero de ellos pertenece a la edad de vida 50–55 años –SHMIS_11_51– y el segundo a la edad de vida 30–35 años –SMMIC_8_35–, adscritos a la categoría simple/complejo, respectivamente.

3.1. Estructuración cognitiva simple

El análisis semiótico del guión realizado por SHMIS_11_51 devela una estructuración cognitiva simple. En el guión desarrolla un solo espacio perceptivo: el cuestionamiento de las instituciones sociales o servicios. SHMIS_11_51 realiza una crítica a las instituciones sociales que según su percepción se guían por una estructura militarizada donde no puede más que obedecer las normas y pautas propuestas para el uso de dichas estructuras, frente a esto SHMIS_11_51 propone la necesidad de educar para lograr un buen comportamiento social y de ese modo alcanzar el bienestar que la militarización de lo social finalmente impide. La contradicción se presenta entre el espacio social militarizado y el bienestar social, que se consigue con educación y no con obediencia.

Hasta cuando nos abusan y nos militarizan "

Todo nuestro quehacer diario, donde implica involucrarse en la sociedad se base en instrucciones militarizadas; no se trata de educar para un buen comportamiento social sino de instruir para que se obedezca; desde cuando se toma o se usa un servicio público, transportes metro (los militarizados); registros civil, hospitales, etc., todo.

Todo lo sistemático justificado en el "bien común"; que en lo general de común tiene muchos de bienestar poco.

SHMIS - 11 - 51

Fig. 1: Guión SHMIS_11_51.

Instituciones sociales	/	Comportamiento social
///		///
Obediencia	/	Educación
///		///
Militarización	/	Bienestar

Tabla 1: Análisis semiótico del guión de SHMIS_11_51.

En cuanto a la estructuración cognitiva del texto éste es de complejidad baja, dada la existencia de un solo espacio perceptivo en el que se presenta la contradicción entre la militarización de las instituciones y la necesidad de bienestar opuesto a lo militar.

3.1.1. Simplicidad cognitiva y navegación libre

Durante los cinco minutos de navegación libre SHMIS_11_51 presenta un anclaje perceptivo conceptual toda vez que lo que busca son conceptos, introduciendo las páginas Web de su interés (noticias) en las que ancla en conceptos deportivos y económicos para una revisión detallada de los mismos. No navega espacialmente por los sitios, saltando de un espacio a otro por la propia proximidad de los contenidos, sino que navega en ellos para buscar un concepto específico.

Obedece a un plan racional de búsqueda prefigurando la navegación, pues abandona el portal Terra e introduce páginas Web de su propio interés como *Adnradio* y *Latercera.com*, en ambos sitios Web de noticias prefiere remitirse a la versión oficial, ya sea escuchando la señal en vivo de la radio, como revisando la versión impresa digital del diario *La Tercera*, que hojea rápidamente hasta encontrar los contenidos que le interesan: la sección económica. Por todo lo anterior, su navegación libre se considera utilitaria, en tanto obedece a un plan prefigurado y racional de búsqueda.

Respecto al tratamiento de la información SHMIS_11_51 trabaja con dos espacios paralelos, el de la audición de la radio online y el de la pantalla, pero no realiza un tratamiento paralelo entre ellos, a pesar de abrir varias ventanas en el navegador Web y de escuchar la programación en vivo online de una radioemisora. Mientras abre las páginas del diario *Latercera.com* hasta obtener la versión digital del diario impreso del día, no vuelve a atrás, sino que se centra en la revisión de la última ventana abierta. Su navegación se orienta por la apertura de páginas de modo secuencial sin visualización paralela, sino más bien lineal. En total ancla en 46 espacios perceptivos en cinco minutos y 20 segundos, lo que significa un promedio de 6,95 segundos por espacio.

3.1.2. Simplicidad cognitiva y búsqueda inducida

Durante la concreción de la búsqueda inducida, o una navegación por Internet con un objetivo pre-definido, SHMIS_11_51 trata de cumplir con la tarea solicitada mediante la búsqueda de conceptos específicos tanto expuestos explícitamente en la pregunta a responder, tales como “seres vivientes en relación al sol” o “categoría seres vivientes”, como los significantes propios de una tarea de esta naturaleza, es el caso de la búsqueda de la frase “responder preguntas” con la cual inicia la búsqueda inducida, aunque si bien prontamente lo cambia por el concepto central de la tarea, selecciona en diversas ocasiones el concepto “pregunta”. Todo esto da cuenta de que SHMIS_11_51 emplea un anclaje perceptivo eminentemente conceptual.

Presenta un plan de búsqueda racional basado en el concepto *ser vivo*, la insistencia en la búsqueda de este concepto lo lleva a navegar por páginas de resultados que le aportan información sobre los seres vivos y sus clasificaciones, pero no sobre la relación que tienen con la energía del sol (tarea solicitada) y cuando encuentra una categoría cercana a este objetivo como organismos “autótrofos” predomina en su navegación el utilitarismo y anclaje conceptual y no la asociación de espacios que le podrían haber aportado provechosamente, por lo que abandona la profundización de este concepto para continuar e insistir con la búsqueda del concepto *seres vivos*, *seres vivientes*, *categorías seres vivientes*, *seres vivos invertebrados*.

A pesar de que SHMIS_11_51 abre varias pestañas o ventanas durante esta fase, no realiza un tratamiento paralelo de la información, sino que más bien centra su atención en la lectura de una página por vez. Como busca el concepto “ser vivo”, olvidando la relación que estos tienen con el sol, es posible identificar la concreción de sólo dos tipos de relaciones entre los elementos

seleccionados: relaciones de conjunto en la búsqueda de seres vivos, y relaciones de contigüidad en la búsqueda de categorías sobre seres vivos, como indican las Figuras 2 y 3.

Objetivo de la Navegación:
Categorice a los diferentes tipos de seres vivientes en su relación con la energía del sol.
 Son los seres que necesitan la luz para fabricar su propio alimento son los VEGETALES o PLANTAS
 Organismos autótrofos
seres vivos: vegetales y animales
vertebrados e invertebrados
vertebrados
cinco clases de vertebrados: **mamíferos, aves, reptiles, anfibios y peces.**

invertebrados

INVERTEBRADOS ARTRÓPODOS NO INSECTOS (Phylum ARTHROPODA)

- o **Clase Xiphosura** (cangrejos cacerola)
- o **Clase Pycnogonida** (arañas de mar o pantópodos)
- o **Clase Arachnida** (ácaros, arañas, opiliones, escorpiones, solífugos, pseudoescorpiones, ambliplégidos y palpígrados, entre otros)
- o **Clase Crustacea** (copépodos, ostrácodos, cirrípedos, anfípodos, isópodos, estomatópodos y decápodos, entre otros)
- o **Clase Chilopoda** (miriápodos del tipo escolopendra y similares)
- o **Clase Symphyla** (miriápodos pequeños y blandos de lugares húmedos)
- o **Clase Diplopoda** (milpiés)
- o **Clase Paupoda** (miriápodos blandos con pocos pares de patas)

• *INVERTEBRADOS NO MOLUSCOS (resto de phyla)*

- o **Phylum Porifera** (esponjas)
- o **Phylum Cnidaria** (hidrozoos, medusas y corales)
- o **Phylum Ctenophora** (cinta de Venus y similares)
- o **Phylum Platyhelminthes** (turbelarios, fasciolas, tenias)
- o **Phylum Nemertea** (gusanos cordón y similares)
- o **Phylum Gnathostomulida** (pequeños animales vermiformes)
- o **Phylum Mesozoa** (rombozoos, orntonéctidos)
- o **Phylum Gastrotricha** (gastrotricos)
- o **Phylum Rotifera** (rotíferos)
- o **Phylum Kinorryncha** (kinorrincos)
- o **Phylum Nematoda** (filarias, lombrices intestinales, nematodos edáficos, etc.)
- o **Phylum Nematomorpha** (nematomorfos)
- o **Phylum Acanthocephala** (acantocéfalos)

Fig. 2: Categorización búsqueda inducida caso SHMIS_11_51.

No realiza relaciones de conexión y dependencia, pues no vincula las dos partes de la pregunta formulada ni en la introducción de búsquedas en Internet ni en el desarrollo de la clasificación o argumentación, pues a la hora de construir argumentaciones sólo copia y pega desde distintas páginas Web las categorías que considera adecuadas para clasificar seres vivos. De

modo que no procesa la información, sino simplemente selecciona datos de Internet, tarea que abandona prontamente, pues el poco manejo de los dispositivos de búsqueda lo impacienta y prefiere renunciar antes que continuar navegando para cumplir el objetivo planteado.

Búsqueda inducida: caso SHMIS_11_51




Fig. 3: Argumentación caso estructuración cognitiva simple SHMIS_11_51.

3.1.3. Síntesis estructuración cognitiva simple y navegación por Internet

SHMIS_11_51 presenta una navegación libre e inducida donde predomina una estructuración cognitiva simple, cuya forma de funcionamiento es utilitaria, pues obedece a un plan racional de búsqueda, y una forma de ligazón de espacios conceptual. Esta manifestación de la estructuración cognitiva deviene una dificultad a la hora de construir una categorización o argumentación, ya que sólo puede realizar operaciones de conjunto y de contigüidad entre los subconjuntos seleccionados, sin articular una globalidad total.

La estructuración cognitiva simple había sido detectada a partir del análisis semiótico del guión realizado por SHMIS_11_51, luego fue observada en la navegación por Internet y posteriormente confirmada a partir de la entrevista en profundidad, donde SHMIS_11_51 afirma la dificultad de realizar un tratamiento paralelo de la información en la vida cotidiana, ya que necesita tener encendida la radio o poner música en Internet para concentrarse en el trabajo, pues así se siente acompañado, pero no utiliza el chat mientras trabaja, sino que hace uso del sonido como acompañamiento, concentrándose en un solo espacio al trabajar.

Por consiguiente, se confirma una estructuración cognitiva simple, sin tratamiento paralelo de la información tanto en el plano de la vida cotidiana como en el contexto de la navegación por Internet.

3.2. Estructuración cognitiva compleja

En el guión de SMMIC_8_35 es posible advertir en primer lugar dos espacios contrapuestos. Por una parte, SMMIC_8_35 esboza el espacio social como un espacio superficial, de queja. Se trata de un espacio que oprime al espacio del yo, que generaliza y cuestiona la diversidad y sus razones profundas, pues en el espacio social no es posible dar cuenta de la profundidad del yo. El tema del cuento es la evaluación sobre el clima, donde la sociedad se identifica con “la gente”, una mayoría que se queja del calor y que cuestiona cualquier otra visión que se aleje de la percepción mayoritaria. Por otra parte, se encuentra el espacio del yo, un espacio oprimido, pero también profundo, que puede ser entendido como la expresión de dos nuevos espacios perceptivos: el espacio del deseo o la ensoñación, donde el gusto por las altas temperaturas se explica por un sueño de habitar lugares cálidos, y el espacio del pacto, que parte del yo como estrategia para insertarse en el macrosespacio social con intentos de diálogo mantenidos siempre a nivel superficial, de modo que desde el espacio del yo se despliega una estrategia de integración social aparente, como una forma de transar sólo a nivel enunciativo con ese espacio social que oprime, pero al que SMMIC_8_35 otorga rápidamente un punto final, pues la transacción le incomoda.

Quiero enuchar a la gente que se quejan por el calor de estos días en Santiago. Entre las muchas otras cosas por las cuales se quejan, pero al pensar el quejarse del clima es más aceptable y muchas veces es una forma de romper el hielo cuando aparecen esos momentos incómodos entre las personas. Hacer referencia a que respondes es "yo no le maltrato tanto calor" y eso puede despertar una variedad de respuestas que van desde cuestionar mi capacidad prosocial hasta la recalcación de mi respuesta. Eso lo hago por que no puedo más, mis motivos son los siguientes: El primero es que de verdad no me molesta el calor como a las otras personas; quejarse es por que me molesta el ser y siempre estoy con aquellos lugares donde el calor me molesta cuando se respira, por lo que para mí los cuantos grados sobre 35 me van a molestar me. La segunda razón es simplemente humanitario y es que prefiero mantener las charlas en un nivel un poco superficial con este tipo de gente, después de todo, si se vuelve al tema del clima es por que ya no hay mucho más de que hablar y esto es mi forma de darle una vuelta graciosa al instante de la conversación antes de ponerle su punto final.

SMMIC_8_35

Fig. 4: Guión SMMIC_8_35, Estructuración Cognitiva Compleja.

Espacio social	/	Espacio del yo
///		///
Superfluo	/	Profundo
///		///
Queja pública	/	Deleite secreto
///		///
Cuestionamiento	/	Pacto

Tabla 2: Análisis semiótico del guión de SMMIC_8_35.

En cuanto a la estructuración cognitiva del texto éste es de complejidad alta, pues SMMIC_8_35 maneja en el relato cuatro espacios perceptivos: el espacio social y el espacio del yo, y al interior de éste el espacio del deseo y el espacio del pacto social, que finalmente permite una conexión con el primer espacio social, presentando entonces una relación de globalidad entre todos los espacios propuestos en el relato, pues la contradicción principal entre los espacios perceptivos tiene un correlato explicativo a partir de los dos subespacios al interior del espacio yo, que por último anclan, explicitan y resuelven dicha contradicción expresada en el cuento.

La estructuración cognitiva en SMMIC_8_35 es compleja, complejidad que se expresa de modos diversos en las dos etapas de navegación consideradas en esta investigación.

3.2.1. Complejidad cognitiva y navegación libre

SMMIC_8_35 realiza un manejo paralelo de la información, generalmente mantiene tres o cuatro ventanas paralelas, yendo de una a otra mientras se cargan los contenidos, o bien de arriba hacia abajo con el mouse, expresando una navegación pulsional. Asimismo, en la mitad del tiempo destinado a la navegación libre mantiene la primera ventana como índice al cual puede volver en busca de nuevos temas o vínculos. Además de manejar ventanas paralelas, SMMIC_8_35 utiliza esta estructura de navegación para ahondar en un tema que llama su atención, y también para ampliar la búsqueda de contenidos en otros sitios Web, saltando de uno a otro espacio perceptivo. En total ancla en 106 espacios perceptivos en siete minutos, lo que significa un promedio de 3,96 segundos por espacio, lo que da cuenta de su complejidad cognitiva.

3.2.2. Complejidad cognitiva y búsqueda inducida

Si bien SMMIC_8_35 introduce la búsqueda de un concepto (cómo el sol afecta a los seres vivientes), a partir de los resultados obtenidos en Google se dejará llevar espacialmente por los contenidos ahí dispuestos para comenzar a estructurar una clasificación. Desplegando nuevamente la estructura de navegación de apertura de ventanas paralelas, manteniendo la ventana de resultados en Google como índice o mapa de ruta, SMMIC_8_35 parte con la búsqueda de una frase y no vuelve a introducir nuevos conceptos, pues desde esa primera exploración y gracias al mapa de ruta de titulares articulará toda la búsqueda inducida para dar cumplimiento a la tarea, dejándose llevar también por la lectura de nuevos enlaces dispuestos en las distintas páginas Web arrojadas por Google. Todo esto da cuenta de su anclaje perceptivo espacial, pues su búsqueda es orientada por la contigüidad de los espacios.

SMMIC_8_35 no presenta un plan racional de búsqueda, no se observa una idea preconcebida para la clasificación solicitada, sino que más bien se nutre de la contigüidad espacial de los contenidos para desarrollar la clasificación. Su forma de funcionamiento de la estructuración cognitiva es asociativa no sólo por asociar espacios contiguos dispuestos en la Web para obtener categorías, sino también por asociar la información obtenida para crear categorías propias, que no necesariamente han sido leídas en la búsqueda, es el caso de las subcategorías “Los que ven al sol como una ‘deidad’” y “Los que utilizan sus ciclos para regir sus propios ciclos”, donde lo que obtuvo de Internet fue la información respecto de las concepciones psicológicas del hombre sobre la oscuridad, a partir de lo cual asocia estos datos con otras formas de relaciones que pueden establecerse respecto a la energía del sol, con un carácter antropológico, ampliando así la reflexión, gracias a su estructuración cognitiva asociativa.

Trabajó con tres espacios perceptivos: el de índice de resultados, el espacio de los contenidos Web y el espacio de trabajo en Word, siendo estos dos últimos los que vincula permanentemente, yendo de Word al contenido leído y viceversa para concretar la tarea.

En SMMIC_8_35 la estructuración cognitiva es compleja. Trabaja con la misma estructura de navegación de la primera fase, esto es, con una ventana a modo de índice de resultados o mapa de ruta y la apertura de cuatro o más ventanas paralelas, pero a diferencia de la navegación

libre, en esta ocasión no salta de una ventana a otra, sino que más bien revisa el contenido de una ventana por vez, va a Word a trabajar en la clasificación y vuelve a mirar el contenido leído para cerrar la ventana en cuestión y continuar con la siguiente. Por ende, realizando un tratamiento paralelo de la información al navegar con sólo dos espacios perceptivos, aunque se nutre de la contigüidad de los espacios para asociarlos en pos de la clasificación solicitada.

Desarrolla una argumentación múltiple, con la configuración global de los fragmentos seleccionados y relacionados entre sí para la construcción de una categorización compleja. En cuanto a las relaciones implicadas en ese proceso logra relaciones de conjunto, relaciones de contigüidad, por ejemplo cuando vincula animales y plantas a la categoría “Los que lo usan como parte de su sistema de vida” y las criaturas marinas de las profundidades del océano a la segunda categoría. Logra relaciones de conexión y dependencia al vincular “Animales y plantas” a la posición que tienen respecto al Ecuador y puntos cardinales, como constituyentes de los seres vivientes que usan al sol como parte de su sistema de vida. SMMIC_8_35 alcanza la captación de momentos figurales que reconstituyen el todo, en tanto organiza ese todo en torno a la oposición cercano/lejano al sol, a partir de la cual establece nuevas subcategorías y dentro de ellas, otras subcategorías que permiten articular la relación de los seres vivientes con la energía del sol en función de esa cercanía/lejanía, y al interior del polo cercanía nuevas categorías organizadas por variables biológicas, geográficas y antropológicas o culturales como se observa en la Figura 5.

Búsqueda inducida: caso SMMIC_8_35




Fig. 5: Argumentación múltiple caso Complejidad Cognitiva SMMIC_8_35.

3.2.3. Síntesis estructuración cognitiva compleja y navegación por Internet:

La estructuración cognitiva en SHMIS_7_43 es compleja, complejidad que se expresa de modos diversos en las dos etapas de navegación consideradas en esta investigación. Durante la navegación libre, la complejidad se expresa en el tratamiento paralelo de la información y el número de espacios perceptivos utilizados. Mientras que durante la búsqueda inducida la complejidad se expresa en el desarrollo de todas las relaciones propuestas para lograr la tarea, SMMIC_8_35 alcanza una clasificación compleja de la relación de los seres vivientes con la energía del sol, orientada por la oposición cercanía/lejanía, de la cual desprende nuevas relaciones de conjunto, de contigüidad, de conexión y dependencia y de captación de momentos figurales, logrando una

argumentación de relatos múltiples y, por ende, un tratamiento paralelo de la información. Por lo mismo, este caso es considerado como de una estructuración cognitiva compleja, que se ve reflejada tanto en la argumentación escrita como en la navegación por Internet.

Por último, es preciso agregar que tras la entrevista realizada se comprobó que SHMIS_8_35 maneja siempre muchas ventanas abiertas al navegar por Internet: su correo, sus cuentas de redes sociales, sitios o blogs de interés personal. Maneja dos navegadores o bien dos cuentas, una solamente relacionada al trabajo y la apertura de ventanas con contenido laboral y otra sección de uso personal, cuando se siente aburrida no se desconecta de la página de uso personal, sino que más bien se traslada al otro espacio de navegación, pero establece una retroalimentación entre ambos espacios porque afirma que la revisión de otro espacio de recreación finalmente refuerza la búsqueda creativa o la creatividad que genera rendimientos en su espacio productivo.

Se comprueba, entonces, que tanto en el guión como en la navegación por Internet y en la vida cotidiana SMMIC_8_35 manifiesta una estructuración cognitiva compleja.

4. Conclusiones

La estructuración cognitiva incide directamente en la navegación por Internet. Si se parte de la base de que la percepción es construida y co-determinada por la acción en cada contexto de la vida, la puesta en juego del esquema mental del usuario en la navegación por Internet co-determina su forma de navegar.

Así, se observa a partir de los resultados que los casos de estructuración cognitiva compleja pueden desarrollar en mayor medida la Captación de momentos figurales que reagrupan los elementos en configuración global, generando argumentaciones de relatos múltiples y paralelos. Lo anterior puede estar en relación con una forma de funcionamiento de la estructuración cognitiva asociativa y de vinculación de espacios por proximidad o contigüidad, pues tal como se observó en el análisis de los casos expuestos la búsqueda lógica-racional de conceptos manifiesta mayormente en el caso de simplicidad cognitiva más bien entorpeció la concreción de la tarea solicitada, pues para resolverla era preciso construir un argumento y no sólo seleccionar fragmentos o conceptos desde la Web. Cuestión que sí pudo concretar el caso de complejidad cognitiva.

Se comprueba, además, que la variable edad de vida está asociada a la complejidad cognitiva respecto no sólo del manejo de las tecnologías y la navegación por Internet, sino también respecto de la resolución de problemas en la vida cotidiana. Esta diferencia había sido detectada en una fase cuantitativa de esta misma investigación, donde se observaba que en los adultos de entre 30 y 55 años sólo los sujetos de 30-35 años presentaban una distribución normal – según la campana de Gauss – en el Índice de Manejo de Complejidad, (Del Villar, 2013), donde 30-35 años manifestaba una concentración mayoritaria en la categoría *Media Complejidad* (40,5%), y concentraciones menores en las categorías *Baja Complejidad* (30,4%) y *Alta Complejidad* (29,1%), cuestión que no ocurre entre 40-45 años y menos aún en el rango 50-55 años, donde la concentración mayoritaria de casos se organiza en torno a la categoría *Baja complejidad* (60,3%).

De modo que, a la luz de los datos estadísticos resultaba más probable encontrar estructuras cognitivas complejas en adultos de 30-35 años que entre las edades de vida 40-45 y 50-55 años, cuestión que se confirma también a partir de los casos aquí analizados cualitativamente, donde la complejidad cognitiva de un caso de 30-35 años probabiliza una navegación por Internet y argumentación compleja, en desmedro de lo logrado por un caso de estructuración cognitiva simple de 50-55 años.

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SEMIÓTICA DE LA NUEVA CULTURA DIGITAL Y EL USO DE LAS TAXONOMÍAS EN EDUCACIÓN.

María Loreto Lamas Barrientos
Center for the Improvement, Experimentation and Teaching Research, Chile
lorelamas@gmail.com

Abstract

The purpose of the present work is to describe the epistemic basis of categorial systems used in taxonomies and subsequently used in Education to plan the teaching – learning process together with its limits and analytical voids. Although being true that such authors like Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) have achieved an update of the Categorial system proposed by Bloom on 1956, and Andrew Churches (2008) adapted to the digital era it is maintained on base of its analytical functioning, the lack of the semiotic study of the educational message on its way of generation as well as on the reality of its users from the cognitive and perceptive point of view are not limiting as a real object the learning situation, the different variables of dissimilar consumers, but it considers them homogeneous with a presumably epistemic of logic, symbolic, cognitive processing, it is assumed (a system with a logical sequential representation) with no relation with what is today known about cognitive processing: operating by using connections of multiple neuronal sets (Francisco Varela, 1996).

This is why of the need of the semiotic which appears as a contribution to the weaknesses of this form of categorial, taxonomical functioning used in education. What system presumptions are doing is to override, forclur the instrumental conflict possibly generated by the different interface contradictions; namely didactic, pedagogical technologicals and the forms of processing or the real interface of users.

Finally, what are not there are the instrumental conflict categories proposed by Pascal Marquet (2004) interface category made operational for the Digital Semiotic by Carlos Scolari (2008) among others. Moreover the appearance of a new digital culture in the new generations whose ways of perceiving reality and information processing are totally different to those of their previous generation, does no more than feedback the needs of a semiotic that would allow to redefine the taxonomies which describe the teaching – learning process.

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es describir las bases epistémicas de los sistemas categoriales usados en las taxonomías empleadas en educación para planificar el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje, sus límites y vacíos analíticos. Si bien es cierto que autores como Anderson y Krathwohl (2001) han hecho una actualización del sistema categorial propuesto por Bloom en 1956 y Andrew Churches (2008) lo ha adaptado para la era digital, se mantienen en la base de su funcionamiento analítico una ausencia del estudio semiótico del mensaje educativo para la generación de mensajes que lleguen a la realidad de sus usuarios desde el punto de vista cognitivo y perceptivo. Dichas perspectivas analíticas no delimitan como objeto real la situación de aprendizaje, tener en cuenta las variables diferentes de los disímiles consumidores, sino que se los presupone homogéneos con un supuesto epistémico de procesamiento cognitivo simbólico lógico, presuponiendo (un sistema de representación lógico secuencial) que no tiene ninguna relación con lo que se sabe hoy del procesamiento cognitivo, pues sabemos hoy que él opera por conexión de múltiples conjuntos neuronales (Francisco Varela, 1996). De allí la necesidad de la semiótica que se perfila como un aporte a las debilidades de dicha forma de funcionamiento categorial taxonómico usado en educación, pues dicho sistema lo que hace es anular, forcluir el conflicto instrumental posible generado por la contradicción de las diferentes interfaces: didácticas, pedagógicas, tecnológicas, y las formas de procesamiento o interface real de los usuarios. En definitiva, las que no están son las categorías de conflicto instrumental propuestas por Pascal Marquet (2004). La categoría de Interface operacionalizada para la Semiótica Digital por Carlos Scolari (2008), entre otros. De otra parte, la emergencia de una nueva cultura digital de las nuevas generaciones cuya forma de percibir la realidad y procesar la información es radicalmente distinta a la de sus generaciones anteriores, no hace más que retroalimentar las necesidades de una semiótica que permita redefinir las taxonomías descriptoras del proceso enseñanza-aprendizaje.

1. Semiótica de la cultura digital.

Las investigaciones en semiótica digital y ciencias cognitivas proporcionan al ámbito educativo importantes categorías analíticas que contribuyen a la comprensión de los procesos de enseñanza-aprendizaje en un presente caracterizado por la complejidad de sus fenómenos comunicativos y sociales, propios de la cultura digital del siglo XXI.

En la sociedad del conocimiento^{1 2} no se entiende la comunicación si no es realizada en un espacio abierto que hace que el aprendizaje no termine en el aula, rompa el límite del espacio físico de la sala de clases, a través del uso comunicativo de una multiplicidad de formatos virtuales de naturaleza espontánea como las redes sociales (Facebook, Twitter); uso masivo de tecnología digital, cada vez más compleja; más el aumento de la comunicación individual o grupal a través de Iphone, celulares inteligentes (Chat, Whats App u otros), que coexisten con espacios virtuales institucionalizados, de naturaleza formal, denominadas “aulas virtuales” que las instituciones de educación crean para que los estudiantes accedan a contenidos disciplinares desde sus propias plataformas tecnológicas. Pero más allá de la facilidad en el acceso a la red, la relatividad del tiempo en que permanecemos conectados, los contenidos que compartimos, el consumo en términos de creación de contenidos colaborativos propios de los usuarios, ha cambiado también el sentido tradicional de la interactividad, de “uno a muchos” a de “muchos a muchos” (Scolari, 2008). No nos sorprende entonces el lugar de privilegio que tiene la comunicación digital en la cultura posmoderna; es más, la vivimos día a día, su presencia transforma el modo tradicional de conectarnos con la realidad, de relacionarnos, de generar conocimiento y lograr aprendizajes significativos.

En educación las taxonomías como instrumento pedagógico para estructurar los procesos de enseñanza-aprendizaje en base a objetivos educativos, tienen una larga tradición. Pero sin

duda, la Taxonomía de Bloom, con sus posteriores adaptaciones ha sido la más presente en la práctica de aula, en sus diferentes adaptaciones. A continuación revisaremos la Taxonomía de Bloom Original (Bloom 1956), Taxonomía de Bloom Modificada (Anderson y Krathwohl 2001) y Taxonomía de Bloom para la era digital (A. Churches, 2009), esta última es frecuentemente citada como recurso pedagógico en Blogs de maestros.

2. El aporte de la Taxonomía de Bloom en Educación.

2.1. Los presupuestos teóricos de la Taxonomía de los Objetivos Educativos (Bloom, 1956) son de naturaleza conductista y cognitivista, este sistema categorial determina tres dominios psicológicos: cognitivo, afectivo y psicomotor. De los cuales, el dominio cognitivo describe seis niveles de pensamiento que ordena las habilidades de pensamiento y objetivos en un proceso secuencial que va desde habilidades de orden inferior (conocimientos, comprensión) a habilidades de orden superior (aplicación, análisis, síntesis, evaluación).-

El mayor aporte de esta taxonomía fue proporcionar una herramienta para ordenar el proceso de aprendizaje; categorizar habilidades de pensamiento y permitir a los docentes evaluar los aprendizajes de los alumnos en base a logros de objetivos determinados, según conductas observables y medibles.

2.2. Taxonomía revisada de Bloom.

El primer intento de revisar esta taxonomía y precisarla fue el realizado por los discípulos de Benjamín Bloom, liderado por Lorin Anderson (2001), con el propósito de corregir algunos aspectos débiles de la versión original. Sin embargo, su epistemología de base se mantiene inalterable. El aporte de Anderson y Krathwohl fue incorporar en el sistema de clasificación de niveles de las habilidades de pensamiento en el dominio cognitivo, la acción por la cual los alcanzamos, cambio que vemos reflejado en el reemplazo de los sustantivos por verbos, aun cuando esta acción cognitiva se mantenga en términos intelectuales más que prácticos.

En relación a las habilidades de pensamiento éstas se modifican reemplazando el “conocimiento simple” por el verbo “recordar”; además se modifica la secuencia de habilidades al incorporar la creatividad como habilidad cognitiva superior, así la habilidad de orden superior que culmina esta Taxonomía Revisada es “crear”, de lo lógico- racional se abre un espacio a lo imaginario del pensamiento divergente.

2.3. La Taxonomía de Bloom para la era digital de A. Churches (2009).

Esta taxonomía comienza a circular en la web, desde hace algunos años, se propone atender los nuevos comportamientos, acciones y oportunidades de aprendizaje que aparecen con las nuevas tecnologías. Esta propuesta aporta metodologías y define herramientas usadas en el ámbito de la comunicación gráfica digital, que el autor relaciona directamente con la secuencia de niveles de pensamiento de las versiones anteriores de la taxonomía revisada de Bloom (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001), aun cuando precisa, como lo hizo antes L. Anderson, que lo que importa es “la calidad de la acción o del proceso lo que define el nivel cognitivo y no la acción o el proceso por sí mismo” (A. Churches, 2009).

Las modificaciones más detalladas están en cada nivel de pensamiento, espacio en los que integra a los verbos ya existentes, nuevos verbos que pertenecen al ámbito de las nuevas tecnologías y navegación en internet desde un enfoque constructivista. Los estudiantes son los llamados a generar, a construir conocimiento; más aún en su condición de “nativos digitales” (Marc Prensky, 2001)³, a desarrollar el trabajo de “colaboración con otros”, estas incorporaciones son las que desde el punto de vista conceptual y teórico, nos parecen más relevantes.

Por otra parte, en su referencia a la necesidad que los estudiantes generen su propio co-

nocimiento, cita al Michael Stevenson, de Cisco, quien en una presentación sobre Educación 3.0 (Stevenson, M. 2007), expuso las siguientes ideas: 1) El conocimiento que le suministramos a nuestros estudiantes constituye la base de su ciclo de aprendizaje, 2) Debemos enseñar el conocimiento o contenido contextualizado con las tareas y actividades que llevan a cabo los estudiantes, 3) Los estudiantes responden positivamente a los problemas del mundo real, 4) El contenido o el concepto entregado sin ningún contexto u otra actividad de apoyo tiene una retención muy baja

Por lo tanto, su punto de vista destaca la relevancia de desarrollar las habilidades de pensamiento pues “una vez que estas se adquieren, permanecerán con nuestros estudiantes toda su vida” (A. Churches, 2008).

3. Vacíos analíticos

En esta taxonomía de los objetivos educacionales (1956) y sus versiones modificadas (2001), (2009), se mantiene en la base de su funcionamiento analítico la ausencia del estudio semiótico del mensaje educativo en vías de generación, como de la realidad de sus usuarios desde el punto de vista cognitivo y perceptivo, no delimita como objeto real la situación de aprendizaje ni las variables diferentes de consumidores disímiles.

Se centra principalmente en los procesos cognitivos con un orden lógico secuencial de los niveles de pensamiento, dispuestos en orden ascendente. El carácter jerárquico de esta taxonomía, ha sido una de sus limitaciones más criticadas, al suponer que cada habilidad superior, necesariamente debe estar compuesta por las habilidades cognitivas que le anteceden en la escala jerárquica.

Otro aspecto que evidencia las limitaciones de este sistema categorial se observa en el carácter conceptual y abstracto de los objetivos educacionales (en las tres versiones de esta taxonomía que hemos estado revisando). Los objetivos se formulan desconectados de la situación real de aprendizaje, no se explicitan los desempeños ni la emocionalidad con las que estos se asumen.

Los objetivos educativos se construyen suponiendo una audiencia homogénea, por lo tanto se evalúa en consecuencia, no hay espacio a que lo heterogéneo se manifieste como alternativas a lo correcto.

Asimismo, se mantiene el concepto de cognición simbólico- lógico, opuesto a lo que las investigaciones de ciencias cognitivas han demostrado. El procesamiento cognitivo opera por conexión de múltiples conjuntos neuronales (F. Varela, 1988; 2005). Más aún, el pensamiento de F. Varela rompe con la definición del cognitivismo clásico, que afirmaba que era el cerebro el que procesaba información del mundo exterior y procesaba esta información simbólica en reglas secuenciales aplicadas una por vez, lo que hacía una tarea imposible, atender a gran cantidad de operaciones secuenciales simultáneamente. Por otra parte, cualquier daño en la secuencia perjudicaba gravemente el resultado; estos modelos simbólicos no perciben la recursividad, la globalidad, ni la flexibilidad de los organismos vivos.

4. La Necesidad del aporte de las ciencias cognitivas y la semiótica digital.

Para F. Varela (2000) se opera a partir de interconexiones masivas, de forma distribuida, las conexiones entre conjunto de neuronas cambian como resultado de la experiencia. La cognición será “la emergencia de estados globales en una red de componentes simples que funciona a través de reglas locales que gobiernan las operaciones individuales, y de reglas de cambio, que gobiernan la conexión entre los elementos” (autoorganización).

La cognición no es la representación de un mundo exterior. El conocimiento es acción en el mundo, interacción cognitiva a través de la percepción, emoción y comportamiento. El mundo no está separado de nosotros, no es algo pre-dado, ni está representado en nuestra mente, sino

activado en una situación concreta, inseparable del punto de vista del observador.

De esta manera, la cognición como enacción entiende la percepción como acción guiada en un contexto, en una situación que cambia constantemente por la actividad del sujeto. (De igual modo, las estructuras cognitivas emergen en nuestro cuerpo, en actividades sensorio-motrices recurrentes de la acción guiada perceptivamente).

En el proceso de conocer necesitamos saber qué hacer y cómo hacerlo (realizarlo). Para F. Varela el “conocer –cómo” es adquisición de transparencia (F. Varela 2000) para la acción, no es necesario reflexionar para actuar. Luego, las posibilidades de aprendizaje son: la autogestión (esfuerzo individual) o la cooperación entre individuos; en relación a esto último, al aumentar la cantidad de interacción entre individuos el conocimiento también aumenta.

Las nuevas tecnologías, la red de conocimiento que circula por la web nos han cambiado los hábitos y las formas de pensar, lo cual tensiona el sistema educativo tradicional. Pero como señala Varela sólo conocemos en la medida que interactuamos, vivimos la experiencia, nos emocionamos. Estos planteamientos son los que nos ayudan a entender cómo se genera el conocimiento en la era digital.

En Chile, las investigaciones de socio-semiótica cognitiva de Del Villar (2006-2008) en los segmentos juveniles que describen los protocolos perceptivos, cognitivos y corporales de los usuarios, aborda conceptos fundamentales para comprender cómo interactuamos con la nueva cultura digital; tales como, la hipertextualidad, interfaces e interacciones.

Scolari, en su texto *Hipermediaciones* (2008), aporta como conceptos relevantes para un modelo de comunicación emergente, las siguientes caracterizaciones: Carácter digital, el paso de manejar analógicamente la información para convertirla en bits; Hipertextualidad, la linealidad del texto tradicional se combina con otros textos, a partir de los cuales se pueda acceder a otra información; Reticularidad frente al esquema de “uno a muchos”, se configura un modelo organizado en forma de red que permite la comunicación de “muchos a muchos”; Interactividad, frente al receptor pasivo que sólo puede recibir información, surge un receptor activo con capacidad para producir contenidos comunicativos; la Multimedialidad, confluyen en un mismo soporte informaciones de diferente naturaleza (textos, sonidos, videos), que antes requerían soportes específicos. Pero, C. Scolari, además nos proporciona otra categoría semiótica digital que es fundamental para comprender el conflicto instrumental (P. Marquet: 2004) que propone Pascal Marquet, la interfaz (2008) que debemos entender como dispositivo de interacción.

“Una interfaz con buena *affordance* ⁴atrae al usuario como el enchufe a los niños: los botones piden a gritos ser apretados, las puertas están esperando ser abiertas, los volantes quieren ser girados. Parte del trabajo del proyectista de interfaces digitales consiste en redescubrir todos estos dispositivos de interacción presentes en la vida cotidiana y llevarlos a la pantalla interactiva.” (C. Scolari: 2008).

En el ambiente hipermedial el usuario está obligado a la aceptación, en palabras de Scolari, de un contrato de interacción que significa para el usuario entrar en un mundo con su propia gramática, un universo donde estará obligado a manipular ciertos dispositivos y a realizar ciertas operaciones y no otras.

La interfaz es el lugar donde se desenvuelve esta comunicación, el espacio donde los modelos mentales y los simulacros del usuario y el proyectista se actualizan y confrontan (2008). También, como lo señala R. del Villar (2006-2008) interacciones es el concepto emergente del hecho que todo texto multimedial plantea una actualización, pues quienes lo diseñan presuponen que lo ocupará el consumidor de una determinada forma, sin embargo, al mismo tiempo sabemos por el desarrollo de las ciencias cognitivas y la semiótica, que el usuario lo ejecutará desde sus propios archivos de mundo. Luego, para que haya la interacción proyectada se requiere la correspondencia de la Interface del programa educativo con la interface constitutiva del cerebro de

sus usuarios.

En educación, en palabras de Pascal Marquet, el Conflicto Instrumental se manifiesta en las interferencias entre los objetos didácticos, pedagógicos, técnicos y sociales. La noción de instrumento designa con el mismo término objetos simbólicos y objetos materiales.

La perspectiva de análisis de los aprendizajes mediados por la tecnología es socio-constructivista, para P. Marquet escoger el instrumento como unidad de análisis de las situaciones de enseñanza-aprendizaje necesita los objetos didácticos; es decir, los objetivos disciplinarios enseñados y los objetivos pedagógicos como los objetos mediadores del saber. Estos objetos adquieren el status de instrumento en el momento en que son instrumentalizados y usados por el profesor y /o el alumno. Por lo tanto, al desafío de los docentes del siglo XXI en la transformación y/o actualización de sus interfaces pedagógicas, didácticas y disciplinarias de los procesos de enseñanza-aprendizaje; le falta el aporte de la semiótica a los sistemas categoriales taxonómicos usado en educación, tal como, incluir la categoría de interfaz real de los usuarios; las estructurales textuales no secuenciales del hipertexto; la convergencia de medios y lenguaje multimedial; la participación activa de los usuarios en la generación de contenidos individualmente y/o colaborativamente, a partir de la interactividad con los dispositivos tecnológicos.

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(Endnotes)

¹ Según Taichi Sakaiya (1995), "Sociedad del Conocimiento".

² "Sociedad del Conocimiento", según M. Castells: "Cuando hablamos de sociedad del conocimiento nos estamos refiriendo a un nuevo paradigma tecnológico, que tiene dos expresiones fundamentales: una es Internet y la otra es la capacidad de recodificar la materia viva. Partiendo de la base de que Internet no es una tecnología, sino que es una producción cultural, él destaca la importancia decisiva de esta dimensión cultural en la producción y las formas de las tecnologías que la han hecho posible, y analiza sus distintas capas: la universitaria (cultura de la investigación por la investigación); la hacker (y la pasión de innovar y crear); las formas culturales alternativas (gente insatisfecha con la sociedad actual que encuentra en Internet formas alternativas de vivir), y, finalmente, la cultura empresarial (representada por empresarios sin aversión al riesgo y con gran capacidad para innovar)".

³ Prensky. M [2001]. Digital natives, digital immigrants. *On the Horizon*, 9(5).1-6. Disponible en línea: <http://www.marcprensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-%20Digital%20Natives,%20Digital%20Immigrants%20-%20Part1.pdf> (Última consulta 24-12 -2014).

⁴ Don Norman (2013). El diseño de las cosas cotidianas (revisado y ampliado ed.). Basic Books. p. 11. “Un affordance una relación entre las propiedades de un objeto y las capacidades del agente que determinar hasta qué podría utilizarse posiblemente el objeto”.

TEORÍA SEMIÓTICA: LÓGICA/CONTRADICCIÓN, CUERPO Y EDADES DE VIDA

Rafael del Villar Muñoz
Universidad de Chile
rdvillar2001@yahoo.fr

Abstract

Resúmen

La teoría semiótica puede retroalimentarse de la lógica de sus propios dispositivos o en el juego entre los límites puestos por sus propios formalismos y el objeto real mismo. Es el caso de la presente comunicación. Se trata de establecer como la descripción del objeto real hace un cierre y un límite a las posibilidades descriptivas. En este cuadro se hará una ligazón entre la teoría semiótica en relación al tratamiento de la contradicción (la lógica de Charles Sanders Peirce, las relaciones de contradictorios en Algirdas Julien Greimas, la catástrofe en Jean Petitot a partir de René Thom) y el tratamiento del concepto de cuerpo (como un espacio de representación del sí/ como un flujo de energía en el sentido de Wilhem Reich) con las descripciones de los recorridos cognitivos empíricos en la navegación por Internet recolectado a partir de investigaciones etnográficas en Santiago de Chile, y analizadas según un punto de vista semiótico, sobre la base de datos estadísticos que han hecho posible la constitución del corpus. Los recorridos cognitivos aprehendidos dicen relación con lo focalizado y con las ligazones entre dichos fragmentos. Se detecta que hay polos que operan según los caminos analíticos propuestos por Peirce (entre aquellos que focalizan conceptos, palabras) y se trata, también, del empleo de estructuras lógicas, donde sería aplicable Greimas; es concretamente el caso de las edades de vida 40- 45 y 50- 55 años; en oposición a las edades de vida 30- 34 y 20- 24 donde hay dispositivos contradictorios. Se detecta, también, sentidos diferentes en relación al concepto de cuerpo puesto en acto en la navegación. Los navegadores de 40- 45 y 50- 55 años, e incluso un grupo minoritario de 11- 12 años (16,7%, según encuesta) hacen un bloqueo del propio cuerpo, se trata del control de él, lo que está presente tanto en los navegadores conceptuales simbólicos como en los jugadores de video- juego de estrategia, a diferencia de navegadores imaginarios que se implican con la má-

quina como una expansión de sí mismos. Luego, el punto de vista analítico es una mezcla entre tradición e innovación, como la realidad misma.

1. Introducción

La teoría semiótica puede retroalimentarse de la lógica de sus propios dispositivos o en el juego entre los límites puestos por sus propios formalismos y el objeto real mismo. Es el caso de la presente comunicación. Se trata de establecer como la descripción del objeto real hace un cierre y un límite a las posibilidades descriptivas.

Problematización que se inserta en un diagnóstico de funcionamiento de la práctica científica en la sociedad blanca. La ciencia opera como un dispositivo, como un modo de producción, lo que implica una materialidad a la base, un objeto real, y herramientas de producción (teoría y metodología) que transforman dicho objeto real en conocimiento científico. El proceso de Transformación se logra a través de herramientas de producción, teóricas y metodológicas. Su estructuración de funcionamiento ha sido descrita por A. J. Greimas (1976) como la existencia de dos isotopías, una remitiendo a la teoría, denominada semántica, otra metodológica, denominada veridictoria y que funcionan como una anaforización discursiva que liga a ambos, pero no se comprueba la isotopía semántica. Ahora bien, dicha forma de funcionamiento, para que una sociedad la tome en cuenta, debe llenar una necesidad de uso. Luego, el objeto científico es construido, la teoría y la metodología delimita un espacio de lo real, pues no es lo real lo que habla a través de la ciencia sino que una anaforización discursiva. El conocimiento científico no está en el dato ni en la teoría sino que en el doble juego de los dos espacios. Y de lo que se trata, en estas páginas es situarnos en ese doble juego.

El objetivo es de la investigación es establecer como la descripción del objeto real hace un cierre y un límite a las posibilidades descriptivas de aplicación de una perspectiva teórica. El punto de partida será la exposición sintética del tratamiento de la contradicción en Charles Sanders Peirce (1968, 1974, 1987), y su caracterización como un modelo de coherencia y estabilidad estructural, en oposición a la teorización de modelos de catástrofe propuestos por Jean Petitot (1985, 2000) a partir de René Thom, a posteriori el tratamiento del concepto de cuerpo como un espacio de representación del sí, como en Jacques Lacan (1968; 1973) y Françoise Dolto (1999), en oposición a entenderlo como un flujo de energía en el sentido de Wilhem Reich (1946–2000). Teniendo dichas descripciones teóricas antitéticas se sintetizará una descripción semiótica de un caso empírico sobre las descripciones de sus recorridos cognitivos de navegación por Internet, caso significativo, pues una investigación Sociosemiótica más vasta (que interrelaciona datos estadísticos, tomados como indicios) nos detectó casos contradictorios en las formas de navegar sobre todo en aquellas edades de vida de tránsito de las transformaciones tecnológicas de la sociedad chilena.

2. Consideraciones empíricas contextuales

La investigación sociosemiótica, al interior del cual se seleccionó el caso, partió de una encuesta en Santiago de Chile (2012) con una muestra intencional de 544 casos segmentada por estrato social, género y edades de vida (30–35/40–45/50–55), desde donde emergieron polos de navegación según los ejes Simbólico/Imaginario, y Procesos Cognitivos Simples/ Complejos. El caso analizado es significativo pues siendo imaginario y simple cognitivamente, no cabe dentro de las categorías teóricas de coherencia estructural en su forma de funcionamiento. Otro descriptor del caso es Mujer, 30 años.

La investigación cualitativa consistió en lo siguiente: 1) a través de la elaboración de guiones y una mini- encuesta a los sujetos se seleccionaron los que más se acercaban a cada uno de los polos de formas de funcionamiento detectadas, según tramos etarios por la encuesta, 2) a cada

uno de los 24 sujetos seleccionados, y este es un caso de ellos, se les hizo navegar durante 30 minutos (5 libremente, 25 con un objetivo) y se grabó su navegación, al mismo tiempo que una cámara registro su movimiento ocular y corporal, 3) se elaboró un modelo semiótico interpretativo del guión, registro fílmico y de la navegación, y 4) se comprobó el modelo interpretativo con una entrevista semiestructurada.

3. Consideraciones teóricas

3.1. La descripción de sistemas coherentes

Sabemos que Peirce trata de darle sentido a algo que algo nos quiere decir: el punto de partida son los significantes, se reconoce una materialidad, se trata, en definitiva de la focalización perceptiva, y se plantea implícitamente qué puede significar, ello remite a la inserción de un segundo plano consistente en la transformación de los significantes en indicios de algo, tratando de buscar en sus archivos mentales que archivos de vida o mundos posibles pudiesen ser aplicables a lo que se reconoció, a lo que primero detectamos, la Primeridad. Esa Secundaridad es una serie de reenvío, que Verón (1998) los describe como leyes de parte/todo; aproximación/alejamiento; dentro/fuera, etc.; lo que significa decir que se establecen relaciones de complementariedad entre fragmentos, y al mismo tiempo relaciones de similaridad que permiten comparar y sustituir. En dichos reenvíos de lo que se trata es de constituir un modelo interpretativo, una cosmovisión, un archivo valórico a lo reconocido, es esto lo que se llama Terceridad. Es claro, que hay una orientación lógica en su estructura, se trata de la puesta en marcha de un dispositivo deductivo formal que origine la aprehensión del sentido, dispositivo que de iconos reconocidos se infieren deducciones posibles, avanzando en la Complejización de conexiones que se prueban con la aplicación de la deducción a nuevos fragmentos de la Primeridad, lo que significa decir, que Peirce nos propone una meta- metodología aplicable a la descripción de los procesos de significación que mezcla de deducción con la inducción recíproca e inversamente, que él denomina abducción. Esto es, se plantea una meta- metodología, sin una técnica concreta de operacionalización, más bien se trata de una propuesta de diseño metodológico de la investigación, y serán sus continuadores quienes proveerán de las técnicas pertinentes para la transformación del objeto real en objeto científico. En esa línea, el diseño propuesto sirve tanto para describir un proceso de significación que opera en un objeto real, como la arquitectura descrita por Claudio Guerri (2014) o como el diseño publicitario y objetos reales más extensos (Magariños de Morentín, 1989; 1996). Se ha complejizado, sucesivamente el dispositivo analítico descriptor lo que implica formalización del *nonágono semiótico*: en tanto que diagrama, se caracteriza por: 1. Ser una estructura vacía que da cuenta de lugares lógicos de relaciones y no de contenidos fijos; 2. Privilegiar la relación entre los lugares a los efectos de la construcción cognitiva y no de la esencialización de cada uno de ellos, y 3. Favorecer la interpretación de un signo y su aplicación metodológica a la investigación o a un proceso proyectual, a través de una nueva nominación también de carácter relacional” (Guerri, C., 2014: 13). Lo que significa decir que no se busca la contradicción de funcionamiento de los sistemas sino que una ligazón lógica entre la Primeridad, la Secundaridad y la Terceridad, deducción basada en la lógica, en la construcción de un mundo coherente.

3.2. La contradicción de funcionamiento de los sistemas interpretativos y/o productivos

La teoría de las catástrofes nace en Matemática con René Thom y se instala en Ciencias Cognitivas y Semiótica con Jean Petitot Cocorda (1985). Para Thom el problema no es describir cómo funcionan los sistemas, sino que sus contradicciones de funcionamiento. Es ello lo que nos permite describir su estabilidad y su historia. Esto significa que la matemática de Thom entra en ruptura con quienes creían que las leyes físicas eran estables como creía Richard Feyn-

man (1992) y Stephen Hawking mismo (1989), donde la historia es una mera descripción. Si los físicos buscaban la coherencia de los sistemas, ahora se trata de buscar sus contradicciones de funcionamiento: el “universo no es invariante, es necesario incluir el acontecimiento, la historia hace que la estabilidad de los fenómenos no exista”. El concepto de catástrofe es definido por Petitot- Cocorda como: “sea S el sistema para el valor G del control, encontrándose Sg en el estado estable. Al hacer variar el control G en forma continua, puede suceder que para ciertos valores de este control, una variación mínima que sea, haga saltar bruscamente el sistema de un estado a otro. Se dice que el sistema ha sufrido una catástrofe” (Petitot-Cocorda, 1985: 130). Hay dos grandes tipos de catástrofes: a) en el inicio hay un solo elemento o variable que comienza a desarrollar valores inversos, a lo que se denomina catástrofe de Una Rama; b) hay en el inicio Un Conflicto Inicial, y donde Un polo del conflicto inicial en vez de oponerse al otro, genera su inverso o catástrofe de dos ramas.

3.3. Cuerpo como sistema de representación/ cuerpo como energía física, biológica, psíquica.

Sí desde el punto de vista semiótico teórico podemos formalizar sistemas de funcionamiento coherentes, siguiendo a Pierce, o contradictorios, siguiendo a Thom, también debemos insertar otra dualidad teórica. Es Lacan (1966, 1973) quien aporta a la semiótica la oposición entre imaginario/ simbólico. El imaginario son trazas de condensación y desplazamiento, una galaxia significativa que no significa nada. El significado a partir del cual podemos interpretar los significantes que no significan nada es el *complejo de Edipo*, esto es, es del concepto, de la adscripción de roles y atributos, del asumir el *modelo parental o de negarlo*, desde donde se construye toda interpretación. Jean Petitot (1981) dirá que se está presuponiendo un significado trascendental no fundamentado empíricamente (Edipo) al que se supone como punto de partida. La conceptualización, en definitiva, presupone que el cuerpo es un sistema de representación, y “el cuerpo mismo queda fetichizado, el propio cuerpo del sujeto es abolido, reemplazado por una imagen, que está allí, por lo demás, como una sustitución de una falta” (del Villar, R. 2012: 64). Será Wilhem Reich (1946–2002) quien nos aportará la operacionalización cuerpo-pulsión, no como indicios de una implicación imaginaria sino que como cuerpo mismo, interrelacionando cuerpo físico con cuerpo biológico y cuerpo psíquico.

4. Análisis semiótico del caso SMAIS_15_30

Cuento: diez líneas SMAIS-15-30

Había una vez, un pueco espín llamado Pindio. Vivía con sus padres, en una madriguera, en medio del bosque. Pero, Pindio tenía un problema. Siempre se metía en líos, debido a sus púas y, por esto, no podía hacer amigos.

Paso el tiempo. Y una tarde de verano un pequeño sapito, compañero de clases de Pindio, entró a la casa del león, por equivocación.

El pequeño sapito fue devorado de un sólo mordisco. Pindio, que había visto lo ocurrido, entró sus púas en el estómago del león y este se desinfló como un globo, liberando a sapito y haciendo un nuevo amigo.

Gráfico 1

4.1. Estudio semiótico del guión SMAIS_15_30

SMAIS_15_30 desarrolla una cosmovisión a partir del mundo del bosque. El bosque es como la vida, donde aparecen seres segregados como el puercoespín, y seres integrados con roles concretos, como el sapo y el león. El león es el poder, pero también es, al mismo tiempo, un depredador, y el sapo la presa, que será aplastada por el león. De hecho, se lo come. En ese mundo, el puercoespín es segregado por sus púas y por meterse siempre en líos. Sin embargo, existe un mundo real más allá de la apariencia subjetiva. En ese mundo, el puercoespín por sus púas, por su crítica, por estar fuera de la red, tiene un poder real que en este caso descubre y aplica salvando al sapo. En ese instante, pasa de ser segregado a partícipe del universo social.

Concretamente:




Gráfico 2

La estructura de funcionamiento no es un polo de simplicidad, pues tiene a lo menos, tres niveles: la diversidad y segregación, el sistema social, el poder aparente y el poder real. Sin embargo, la estructuración no es absolutamente coherente, sino que operan roles contradictorios porque el puercoespín que es segregado, aparece en lo aparente sin poder, pero en el mundo real si lo tiene y logra transformar en globo al depredador.

4.2. Análisis Navegación: el objeto empírico

Tabla 1: Transcripción de lo realizado respecto al objetivo pedido en la navegación inducida.

Objetivo de la Navegación: categorice a los diferentes tipos de seres vivientes en su relación con la energía del sol.

Número, según proximidad al sol: altura, tamaño y gasto energético según habitad.

1. Flora. Considero en primera categoría por efecto fotosíntesis.

- Árboles Ejemplo: Álamos
- Arbustos: Ejemplo: Mora
- Flores: Ejemplo: rosas
- Pasto
- Musgo
- Algas

2. Fauna. Considero en segunda categoría, dada su variedad, y posibilidad de modificar su habitad. Se reflexionó, necesidad/relación de luz solar dentro de su habitad y según alimentación y gasto energético y tamaño.

Según energía empleada en cadena alimenticia.

- a) Herbívoros
- b) Carnívoros
- c) Omnívoros

Otras formas de relación con gasto energético: vertebrados e invertebrados. En orden

- a) Anfibios y/o reptiles Ej.: Salamandra y serpientes (son pequeños, sangre fría)
- b) Insectos e invertebrados Ej.: pulgones, orugas, mariposas
- c) Ovíparos como las Aves: Ej.: Gorrión, paloma
- d) Mamíferos: Ej.: perro, oso o gato. Cerdos o ballenas (son un buen ejemplo porque comen principalmente carne pero también pasto o materia vegetal)

4.3. Focalización del espacio perceptivo

Tabla 2: Objeto Focalizado.

Palabras (Vignaux, Walter, Silverstein, 2001 :284)	Imágenes (Foucault, B., Coulet, J. 2001: 65–66)
En la navegación libre: SMAIS_15_30 sólo focalizó dos archivos, su Facebook y e-mail. Respecto a la búsqueda inducida: SMAIS_15_30 busca palabras, escribe en el buscador ‘seres vivos relación sol’, de allí se plantea internamente conceptos, no ve las páginas mismas sino que en definitiva, lo que busca son significantes que le faltan, no se nutre de ningún concepto que aparezca en el desarrollo de la tarea.	En la navegación libre: SMAIS_15_30 no focaliza imágenes. Respecto a la búsqueda inducida: no focaliza.
En la Navegación inducida y en la navegación libre se busca informaciones concretas, uno sobre la vida social (Facebook) y otro sobre las tareas que le proponen hacer respecto a la categorización. Pero allí tiene una presencia marginal, pues sólo se navega cuando falta un significante en un esquema previo.	

Tabla 3: Mirada.

Geometría Euclidiana	Geometría Fractal
<p>Respecto a la navegación libre y respecto a la búsqueda inducida: hay algunos elementos repetitivos en sus recorridos de mirada captados por la cámara, de líneas horizontales de recorrido derecha-izquierda y viceversa, pero también recorridos curvos en ascenso del margen superior al inferior. Sin embargo, hay muchas formas de mirar implicadas que la sacan del marco analítico euclidiano de focalizar el espacio perceptivo en base a recorridos intelectivos rígidos.</p>	<p>Respecto a la navegación libre y respecto a la búsqueda inducida: hay elementos que saltan de la lógica de recorridos intelectivos: movimientos oblicuos de derecha-izquierda e izquierda-derecha que saltan la pantalla, estableciendo una interacción con el medio. Por otra parte, abre los ojos y el rostro y cuello se mueven no con una lógica intelectual que toma como referencia la pantalla, lo mismo abrir los ojos y cerrarlos más en un movimiento que tiene dos implicancias en última instancia: por una parte, en aprehender a interactuar con otro espacio interactivo que no está en la pantalla y, por otro, darle fuerza a su navegación por una relación de implicación fundamentalmente corporal.</p>
<p>En estricta lógica, no pertenece el caso a una lógica propiamente intelectual, ni fractal ni euclidiana, sino que a una lógica que interconecta el cuerpo transformándole en un sujeto propio que da energía y le permite realizar lo que se le pide, desde el más profundo de su ser. La inserción entonces, de lo fractal, es por una parte, fractal y no relaciones de importancia figura/fondo de lo que está en la pantalla, sino que en una lógica intelectual que se nutre del contexto. Pero, como decíamos, insertando el espacio corporal, ayudándose no sólo al abrir y abrir más los ojos, sino que por el movimiento de su cuello, rostro y hombros.</p>	

4.4. Formas de ligazón entre espacios focalizados

Tabla 4: Anclaje perceptivo.

Conceptual	Espacial (Dinet, J. 1998: 152): contigüidad de espacios
<p>Respecto a la navegación libre: SMAIS_15_30 sólo busca las páginas que le interesan, lo que implica que liga categorías conceptuales.</p> <p>Respecto a la búsqueda inducida: no parte de nutrirse de la realidad, sino que de categorías de sentido que ella construye en su cerebro respecto a la pregunta. Es ella, antes de navegar, quién diferencia a los seres vivientes por su proximidad con el sol y es ella quién caracteriza a ellos por tener distintas necesidades del sol, lo que implica generar nueva categorías. Su punto de partida es buscar en Amazon ‘seres vivientes relación sol, de allí detiene la navegación y comienza a escribir las categorías que están en su cerebro y solamente, seleccionando un sitio web de educación y tareas escolares, nutres algunos significantes que le faltaban y estaban en el texto escolar. Esto es, en el texto no sólo buscó palabras, sino que no las relaciona entre ellas, ni por contigüidad ni por explicación del mismo texto, en realidad lo que busca son significantes que le faltan en su propia argumentación.</p>	
<p>La ligazón está en su cerebro, no en la realidad ni en la navegación misma. La conexión que se establece con el computador es cerebro, cuerpo y fuera de ello, el computador es una extensión del cuerpo en una relación imaginaria y corporal con él.</p>	

Tabla 5: Hegemonía de la forma de funcionamiento de la estructuración cognitiva.

Utilitario	Asociativo
Respecto a la navegación libre y a la búsqueda inducida: lo que hace es usar el computador como herramienta, no nutriéndose de los espacios asociativos que allí emergen, pero el instrumento se transforma por su relación con él, como en los videojuegos, en una extrapolación del propio cuerpo y de su propio mundo interior y donde lo que busca y lo que hace está en función de su archivo de mundo previo respecto al problema.	
Predomina lo utilitario, pero como instancia de manifestación de su mundo interior y su cuerpo en el afuera.	

Tabla 6: Estructuración cognitiva.

Simple	Compleja
Un solo espacio	Manejo paralelo de la información
Respecto a la navegación inducida: hay tres espacios perceptivos: uno es su archivo mental que ha establecido la categorización, el otro es nutrirse de la navegación respecto a significantes que le faltan para llevar al texto escrito sus categorías, puesta en acto de navegación similar a la descrita por Le Blanc, S. (2001: 83) y el tercer espacio y más importante, es la relación que establece su propio cuerpo (mundo interior) que se expande en el computador como realización de la tensión y desplazamiento energético. Y, al mismo tiempo, con el entorno	
La estructuración cognitiva puesta en acto al navegar es asimilable a lo simple, pero en definitiva es la interacción de tres espacios perceptivos los que se ponen en acto, lo que la hace ser, tomando lo contextual de la navegación, compleja; siguiendo como descriptor la perspectiva de ciencias cognitivas en sus corrientes conexionista y enactiva, planteada por Francisco Varela (1992; 1996; 2004), y Jean Petitot, Pachoud, Roy, Varela (2002).	

Tabla 7: Pulsionalidad.

Imaginario		Simbólico		
Catártico	Ensoñación	Transaccional	Aceptación	Negación
Respecto a la búsqueda libre y a la búsqueda inducida: SMAIS_15_30 desarrolla un dispositivo, fundamentalmente, pulsional. De hecho su, comportamiento frente al computador tiene unas características comunes con el videojuego. Como funciona cerebralmente, el desarrollo de la argumentación que presuponemos desarrolla, se ve retroalimentado a veces negativamente y se tensa, y a veces lo inverso llegando a sonreírse con la pantalla. Al mismo tiempo, el desarrollo pulsional lo hace a través de los ojos, el movimiento del rostro, cuello y tronco.				
El computador se transforma en una extrapolación del propio cuerpo.				

SMAIS_15_30 da sentido a la navegación a partir de sí misma, esto es su mundo interior que clasificó previamente los seres vivos según la proximidad al sol y la necesidad, y la navegación opera como llenar las categorías del modelo. Sin embargo, es en la extrapolación de su cuerpo en la máquina lo que le da sentido a lo que hace y ese dispositivo pulsional imaginario que la remite a espacios paralelos de implicación, pero la estructura de la navegación es fundamentalmente simple: si habían tres espacios en el cuento, hay también tres espacios en la navegación, por lo que podemos pensar que tiene una estructura simple, a pesar de la complejidad media del cuento.

4.5. Análisis Entrevista SMAIS_15_30 y Consideraciones Finales

La entrevista, en tanto que semiestructurada, se orientó a:

– *la validación del modelo interpretativo del texto escrito:* SMAIS_15_30 trabaja generando propuestas visuales de cuentos infantiles y la polaridad que presenta el cuento realizado dice relación con su cosmovisión y en ella tiene un lugar predominante no solamente lo conceptual, sino que también lo imaginario. El puercoespín es para ella un personaje, al mismo tiempo un animal y al mismo tiempo una cosmovisión de valorar la diversidad y de oposición a lo establecido. La estructura del cuento es a su vez contradictoria, pues el personaje parece no tener poder, pero sí lo tiene, hecho vinculado a los dibujos animados que consumía cuando pequeña, fundamentalmente no le gustaban los dibujos animados americanos por ser muy parecidos a una comedia, los personajes eran histéricos y tenían siempre un mismo valor asignado. Ella era consumidora de Ranma ½, donde el personaje era a veces hombre y a veces mujer, otro era Dragon Ball y Sailor Moon. El cuento está fundamentalmente construido a nivel de una visualidad y en eso se ve también el parentesco con el tipo de obra de teatro que a ella le gustan, como el grupo La Puerta en Chile, Grifero y Arianne Moushkine, donde lo que se privilegia es la propuesta visual. El personaje del puercoespín no es elegido por el rol, sino que por su singularidad visual.

– *la concretización del sentido asignado a Internet:* es tanto para trabajar, como para entrete-

nerse. Cuando tiene un conflicto escucha música y navega por Internet. Ella hace varias cosas a la vez y cuando está normal la música y el Internet le permiten aumentar su nivel de energía y focalizarse en la tarea, sin embargo, cuando está mal la presencia de otro texto la desfocaliza, pero en general la presencia de varias cosas al mismo tiempo es lo que le da fuerza y energía en la vida.

– *la descripción del lugar asignado a navegación en la construcción de su identidad*: para ella, su identidad está dada por la microcultura a la cual perteneció: la de los dibujos animados, la de la música y la puesta en imágenes del teatro. Internet, al mismo tiempo que es una herramienta de trabajo es una instancia de refugio.

– *la percepción intelectual de lo real*: parte de un concepto, de una idea que está en sus archivos mentales, y usa lo real para darle sentido a lo que ve usando sus cosmovisiones.

– *se le preguntó qué haría ante un conflicto virtual*: parte de la emotividad, del sentimiento, no analiza la situación global, sino que manifiesta lo que siente, se involucra corporalmente.

– *Relaciones entre guión, navegación y vida cotidiana*: el guión posee un desarrollo argumentativo racional, que tiene un significado, una cosmovisión puesta en actos de respeto por la diversidad y de negación del abuso de poder y la depredación. Ella debía hacer un cuento infantil, por razones laborales y buscó aquello en los personajes de los cuentos infantiles de animales y seres vivientes lo que más se podría parecer a una visión imaginaria, para desde allí construir el relato. Esto es, ella misma, como sujeto que navega, una navegadora pulsional imaginaria, por la relación corporal puesta en acto, pero cómo debe enfrentar una tarea, hacer una categorización de los seres vivientes en relación a los tipos de energía solar, parte del imaginario presente en sus archivos mentales como conceptos, y lo que ella hace es buscar en Internet los significantes que le faltan a un ya- visto en sus archivos, por lo que si vemos bien, se comporta conceptual o simbólicamente en su búsqueda por Internet, pero ella misma navega implicándose corporalmente, como un jugador de video- juego, aunque nunca haya jugado video- juego alguno. Su implicación con la vida, cómo resuelve un problema es eminentemente pulsional, parte del sentimiento y del afecto. Así Internet es un espacio de refugio, al mismo tiempo que un espacio de trabajo. Si bien es cierto, que no es una analista de la vida cotidiana, solo la siente, ella tiene una complejidad cognitiva media: por una parte no procesa más de diez variables al mismo tiempo, sino que tres, tampoco opera con una secuencialidad lineal única, de hecho su cuento es más complejo que simple, la categorizamos por simple, desde el punto de vista de la forma de navegar que es simple, y de que la forma de enfrentar la vida cotidiana también es simple. Hay entonces, un sujeto imaginario a la base, que cuando opera en la vida o en la navegación, inteligibiliza sólo los aspectos que le llaman la atención, de una forma simple: buscar y aplicar, la hoja de ruta ya definida de antemano. Por otra parte, ese procesamiento audiovisual de varios soportes a la vez, es lo que la hace concentrarse, focalizar más la realidad, pues le retroalimenta positivamente su energía interior.

5. El doble juego entre lo real y la teoría

Si describimos sólo la navegación y de cómo trata de lograr los objetivos que se le propuso, vemos que podría ser interpretable según los caminos analíticos propuestos por Peirce, pues busca conceptos según una secuencialidad narrativa, aproximándose a nuestras investigaciones similares realizadas sobre las edades de vida 40–45 y 50–55 años. Sin embargo, dicha interpretación sería incorrecta, pues si tomamos su guión, su comportamiento corporal cuando navega y los datos de su vida cotidiana, vemos que su dispositivo lógico es parte de un dispositivo de implicación corporal más profundo lo que le da sentido a su vida y a la navegación, que con respecto a la búsqueda es casi instrumental pero al mismo tiempo se implican con la máquina como una expansión de sí misma. Luego, desde el punto de vista analítico este estudio es una

mezcla entre tradición (la lógica) e innovación (el cuerpo), como la realidad misma, tema de nuestro XI Congreso IASS-AIS, Nueva Universidad Búlgara, Sofía, 2014.

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SOCIOSEMIOTICS



Sociosemiotics and mediatized public sphere

Chairman:

Cristina Peñarín (crispemar@telefonica.net)

Complutense University of Madrid

Semiotics of the City

Chairmen:

Isabella Pezzini (isabella.pezzini@uniroma1.it)

Sapienza University of Rome

Paolo Peverini (ppeverini@luiss.it)

Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli, Rome, Italy

SOCIOSEMIOTICS AND MEDIATIZED PUBLIC SPHERE

EL RELATO ÍNTIMO EN EL MUNDO COMÚN: DEL SINSENTIDO AL SENTIDO EN LOS DISCURSOS AUTOBIOGRÁFICOS DE MUJERES MALTRATADAS

Diana Fernández Romero
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (Madrid, España)
diana.fernandez.romero@urjc.es

Abstract

El texto analiza un corpus de 23 entrevistas autobiográficas en las que se recogen las vivencias de mujeres maltratadas que están en el proceso de conformar un discurso sobre un trauma que precisa ser reconocido para ellas mismas y para ser compartido en el mundo común. A partir del intercambio con los expertos, con otras mujeres y con la investigadora, las protagonistas del relato elaboran y comprenden su experiencia dolorosa y traumática a partir de un discurso polifónico que toma vocabularios, sintaxis, sistemas de sentido y valor de la sociología, la psicología o los feminismos. En ese proceso, se produce una transformación semiótica del sinsentido al sentido en un recorrido que parte de y vuelve a lo privado, pero pasando necesariamente por lo público, desde donde dan sentido a sus biografías recientes, a sus historias de violencia, sufrimiento, anulación y reconstrucción.

1. Dar sentido a la experiencia traumática

Adecuar el relato íntimo de una experiencia traumática como la de haber sufrido violencia de género para hacerla pública y poder contarla requiere de la transformación de esa vivencia en un discurso. Si, como dice Violi (2014), hay una distancia temporal entre el hecho que sucede y su adquisición de sentido, es preciso separar los hechos traumáticos del sentido de los hechos traumáticos, que solo se adquiere cuando estos son reconocidos como tales. En este texto queremos explorar, a partir de 23 entrevistas autobiográficas a mujeres maltratadas¹ que

¹ La investigación que recoge este texto forma parte de una tesis doctoral que estudia la transformación de la identidad de mujeres maltratadas a partir de sus relatos autobiográficos: "Destrucción y reconstrucción de la identidad de mujeres maltratadas: Análisis de discursos autobiográficos y de publicidad institucional". Dirigida por Cristina Peñamarín Beristain. Premio Extraordinario de Tesis Doctorales del curso 2011/2012 otorgado por la Facultad de Ciencias de la Información de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

El corpus lo conforman 23 entrevistas en profundidad a mujeres con diferentes edades y perfiles socioeconómicos. Todas

han contactado con una institución para poner fin a su situación, cuáles son los recursos necesarios para que la vida íntima de una mujer que sufre o que ha sufrido violencia por parte de su pareja o expareja se transforme en un discurso con el que poder narrar a otros/as y a sí misma su experiencia traumática.

Como indica Peñamarín (en prensa), refiriéndose a Arendt, la transformación semiótica fundamental del sinsentido al sentido es posible sobre todo a partir de representaciones, discursos, relatos que nos permiten dar forma a la experiencia oscura o desconcertante e integrarla en un sentido de la realidad público, compartido. Así, los relatos autobiográficos que vamos a analizar suponen una transformación del sinsentido al sentido: la experiencia traumática de las mujeres entrevistadas realiza un recorrido desde el ámbito íntimo y privado al espacio público, a partir del relato que han de elaborar tanto para quienes las orientan y ayudan (asistentes sociales, jurídicos, psicólogos/as con quienes todas han entrado en contacto) como para otras mujeres con las que comparten experiencias en los grupos de terapia, y para quienes las entrevista para la investigación. Ese discurso retorna después al espacio privado en cuanto les ayuda a dar sentido a su propia experiencia y a comprender su proceso de transformación.

La necesidad y la voluntad de referir su relato íntimo para ser ayudadas, poder comprenderse y servir a otras mujeres de modelo les llevó a adoptar otra perspectiva sobre sí mismas y sobre su experiencia, incorporando así, en su discurso, un sistema de valores en el que la violencia de género es algo reprobable, monstruoso. A partir de su intercambio con asistentes sociales, juristas, psicólogas/os, se fue conformando un discurso híbrido, polifónico, en el que encontramos ecos del discurso *experto* que se mezcla con el lenguaje hablado. Sus relatos incorporan fragmentos de la psicología, de la sociología, de las ciencias jurídicas, de los feminismos, del habla coloquial. La entrevista de investigación supone a su vez un *ensayo*, una situación de interacción particular en el que las mujeres son actores anónimos que relatan, con un lenguaje de tanteo, de ida y vuelta en la búsqueda de expresiones, su experiencia íntima a alguien que está en un espacio intermedio entre el interpersonal y el público; y que se compromete a trasladarla al “mundo común” arendtiano.

Así, la “palabra semiajena” (Bajtín 1989) que las mujeres incorporan a sus discursos responde a la idea bajtiniana de que el hablante “construye su enunciado en un territorio ajeno, en el fondo aperceptivo del oyente”. Bajtín considera que todo discurso es fundamentalmente híbrido, pues cuando hablamos se hacen presentes en nuestro discurso las voces de otros que recuperamos y que transformamos, la mayor parte de las veces de forma automática e inconsciente (citado en Carvalho 2007). Así, el propio sujeto del discurso acaba siendo también híbrido y por tanto “ningún sujeto es dueño de su expresión”. Elaborar una experiencia personal traumática como la que aquí investigamos requiere este paso por la palabra que equivale a hacer público lo privado, si entendemos, con Wittgenstein (1988), que no hay lenguaje privado, pues no es pensable un lenguaje que solo una persona pueda entender. Así, las fronteras entre lo propio y lo ajeno se desdibujan, como veremos, tanto en el lenguaje, como en los valores, criterios o afectos, mostrando que, como advierte García Canclini a propósito de la alteridad (2007), “somos habitados por voces y gustos heterogéneos. Vivimos en una época intercultural y somos interculturales en nuestro propio interior”.

2. Discursos polifónicos

En las entrevistas invitamos a las mujeres a reconstruir su autobiografía desde el tiempo que comenzaron su noviazgo con el maltratador hasta el momento presente, en el que la mayoría de ellas ya había roto con el maltratador y se había separado de él. Las narradoras recurren a

ellas tenían en común que habían sido maltratadas por sus parejas o exparejas masculinas y que habían acudido a una institución (centro municipal de atención a la mujer, de servicios sociales, casa de acogida o similar) para tratar de poner fin a su situación.

registros diferentes para referirse a cada etapa del proceso. En los primeros momentos del relato predomina el lenguaje del amor romántico, y, cuando refieren el período en el que la violencia se instala en la relación, incorporan el lenguaje machista y denigrante del maltratador. Para recordar y elaborar la narración de las sucesivas etapas del relato, como la fase de anulación de su identidad; los constantes vaivenes de la relación; la fase de inflexión, en la que deciden poner fin a la situación y la etapa posterior de reconstrucción, en la que se encuentran cuando son entrevistadas, las mujeres recurren a expresiones híbridas que son la huella de las conversaciones coloquiales y expertas con los/as asistentes sociales, psicólogos/os, juristas, amigas/os, familiares y otras mujeres en los grupos de terapia. También la situación particular de la entrevista condiciona el uso de un registro concreto, dado que, como dijimos, las mujeres se encuentran con una interlocutora que está en un espacio intermedio entre lo público y lo privado.

En los siguientes apartados queremos poner énfasis en algunos fragmentos de las entrevistas en los que encontramos esa polifonía, la incorporación de la palabra semiajena en los relatos autobiográficos. En todos los casos, subrayaremos² aquellos términos o conceptos que consideramos ilustrativos de lo que queremos mostrar.

3. La dificultad y la necesidad de hablar

En distintas partes del relato, se pone en evidencia la dificultad que las mujeres manifiestan a la hora de elaborar su discurso, que se mezcla con su necesidad de hablar. Por un lado, han de recuperar la voz perdida por la influencia del maltratador, ya que la destrucción de su identidad conlleva su anulación como sujetos y su incapacidad para verse a sí mismas con otros sistemas de sentido y valor que los del maltratador. Así, el momento de la entrevista refleja ese proceso en el que, tras el contacto con el personal de las instituciones, están recuperando su capacidad de hablar y de dar sentido a su experiencia traumática. Los relatos refieren algunos de los momentos en los que trataron de contar su historia, y las dificultades que tuvieron para hacerlo:

“Es que *te quedas sin voz*”

“*No sabes por dónde empezar*, ni qué explicar, ni qué es lo que sientes ni nada, solamente que te sientes muy mal”

“Es muy complicado contarlo, porque *te sientes avergonzada* diciendo: es que estoy soprotando esto... y además, como nos han educado así, que se supone que los problemas de casa son problemas de casa...”

“Cuando empecé a ir al grupo de terapia, *estuve dos años sin poder hablar* casi, venga llorar; pero vas oyendo, vas escuchando, y te va ayudando”

“*Siempre me he negado a ella* (la terapia de grupo), y maldita la hora en la que lo he hecho, porque al final me convencieron y la he tenido, y ha sido cuando de verdad empiezo a ser yo”

Sin embargo, ya la fase de reconstrucción, las narradoras manifiestan que, a pesar de los obstáculos, sienten la necesidad de que su historia se conozca y sirva de modelo a otras mujeres

² En todas las citas, en cursiva.

que están pasando por la situación que ellas van abandonando. Así, utilizan la oportunidad de la entrevista para lanzar mensajes de esperanza, para animar a las mujeres que sufren violencia a romper su silencio:

“(Recomiendo a la mujer maltratada) Que hable, que cuente lo que le pasa, pero que se lo cuente a todo el mundo, *que no se calle*, y que hay un montón de gente en su situación, que no se va a encontrar sola”

“Ahora siento que puedo hacer muchas cosas. *Y eso me gustaría decírselo a muchas mujeres*, que pueden hacer cosas por sí mismas”

“*Yo les digo a otras mujeres* que no sirve de nada aguantarse, y que tiren para adelante, que se sale, a pesar de que se ve todo muy negro y sin ninguna salida”

“Es importante asociarnos para captar mensajes que luego ponemos en práctica, por eso *es importante contar las cosas, que nos liberemos de no contar, de avergonzarnos*”

4. El discurso *experto*

Los relatos autobiográficos están plagados de expresiones y de términos que consideramos ayudan a las mujeres a comprender y a asumir su experiencia traumática. En la entrevista, las narradoras recurren un lenguaje de tanteo, que supone un ir y venir de conceptos y locuciones para narrar y reconstruir su historia. El discurso *experto* se incorpora a sus relatos, en los que asumen expresiones como “violencia de género” o “violencia doméstica”, “maltrato” o “ciclo de la violencia” para explicar lo ocurrido. En ocasiones, las mujeres hacen explícito en el discurso el paso por el otro/por la otra, el/la experto/a, quien las aconseja y les aporta recursos prácticos y simbólicos desde los que reconocer el trauma:

“Yo no sentía que él *me maltratara* porque no me dejara irme con mis compañeros de facultad o con mis amigas”

“Porque como *te maltratan*, no quieres salir, no quieres relacionarte, te sientes culpable, no quieres ver a nadie...”

“Cuando peor pasé los *malos tratos* fue durante el embarazo”

“Siempre se le pone una justificación a todo el *maltrato psicológico*”

“Esto me ha pasado a mí (*el ciclo de la violencia*): agresión, denuncias, luego viene, lo perdonas, y otra vez”

“Me dijo (*el asistente social*): ‘Yo soy hombre y te voy a decir una cosa. *Hay patronos de él que no van a cambiar*. Si él te maltrató hace 15 días, él te maltratará dentro de 15 días. Así que tú decides. ¿Quieres que te ayude o no?’”

“Entonces el día ese, *la doctora de cabecera* me dijo: ‘el problema que tienes es un problemón muy gordo y es un problema de *violencia doméstica*’”

5. El lenguaje del amor y del odio

Cuando las mujeres refieren la etapa del noviazgo y los comienzos de la relación con el maltratador en una primera fase del relato, encontramos numerosos ejemplos de cómo para subsumirse en aquellos momentos recurren al léxico y a las sintaxis que proporcionan los relatos masivos del amor romántico. Según avanzan las narraciones, ese discurso del amor, que en un principio lo ocupaba todo y que hacía de sustento a la relación quebrada por la violencia, va haciendo aguas y se mezcla con el relato del odio ante el dolor, el miedo, la traición. Incluso en la fase de reconstrucción, las mujeres reflexionan sobre si amaron o no o sobre cuándo comenzó el odio. Los continuos vaivenes dan lugar a un discurso de las emociones no lineal plagado de matices e hibridación:

“Yo *quería* mucho a mi marido y para mí *era el todo*”

“*Pensé que era el hombre de mi vida*, que era buenísimo, que estaba pendiente de mí en todo momento”

“En realidad fue la persona de la que *me enamoré*. A la que quise. (...) Me dije: *estoy viviendo un cuento de hadas*”

“Le odio, le odio con locura, con, con, con... *le odio, lo mismo que le quería*”

“Yo no me daba cuenta (...) No, porque yo... *le quiero mucho, le quería mucho*”

“Yo supe que era maltrato, cuando supe que era maltrato, que me maltrataba, *cuando comencé a odiarlo*”

“Yo quererlo, no se puede querer a una persona así, *cada día lo odiaba más*”

“Ya no es amor, *ya es dependencia, ya es miedo, ya es pánico*. El amor se perdió hace mucho tiempo”

“Es que dicen, es que el amor está ahí siempre. Mentira, mentira y bien gorda (...) *Ya te queda nada más odio, odio, odio*”

6. La anulación y la patologización del discurso

Para recordar, comprender y poder contar cómo llegaron a sentirse las mujeres entrevistadas ante los insultos, las humillaciones o los golpes del maltratador, las narradoras incorporan el vocabulario denigrante, machista y degradante que el agresor utilizaba para referirse a ellas. Las protagonistas del relato conectan con los momentos en los que se desdibujaron, se anularon y dejaron de ser personas por la acción del maltratador³. Con mucho dolor, relatan ese proceso de destrucción de su identidad utilizando expresiones de la psicología, de tal forma que podemos hablar de una patologización del discurso:

³ En este caso, tomamos la idea de Wieviorka de que la violencia supone “la negación del sujeto”, la supresión de la capacidad de constituirse en sujeto, pues el sujeto es, para este autor, la posibilidad de constituirse a sí mismo como principio de sentido, como ser libre, y de producir su propia trayectoria (Wieviorka, 2004: 101 y 286).

“Te están matando por dentro, para hacerte pues, *su esclava* (...) Ya no eres... eres *un ser ahí sin voluntad*, que hace lo que quieren ellos, y aún así, aún así, sabes que no te vas a librar de la violencia, o de la humillación”

“Estaba *muy machacada, muy destruida*”

“Yo *derrotada, golpeada, maltratada, violada, humillada, creyéndome una mierda, creyéndome una sombra*, no mirándome, ya te he dicho, a los espejos, porque *me daba asco a mí misma*”

“Me he sentido *menos persona*, como si fuese *anulada*, que yo *no servía para nada*, lo que decía él”

7. Verse y contarse desde otra perspectiva

Ver su historia desde fuera y desde otro sistema de valores en el que la violencia es algo reprobable y monstruoso implica, para las narradoras, adoptar un cambio de perspectiva⁴ y construirse, en el relato, como un *personaje* que observar y del que separarse, distanciarse de la que en parte todavía es. Esa distancia se manifiesta a través de pronombres personales, de ese “yo” que en el relato se convierte en “nosotras” o en “una”. El maltratador también es un actor, un “tipo” perverso, infame, del que se toma distancia al despojarlo de su nombre propio y al etiquetarlo como “ellos”, como “individuo” o “señor”:

“Buscan a sus mamás, y cuando ven que no lo somos, el único medio que les queda para tenernos sujetas y ver que ellos son superiores a *nosotras* es el maltrato”

“Estoy cansada de que se ría de mí (el maltratador), de que *ellos* (los hombres maltratadores) tienen todos los derechos, *nosotras* no tenemos nada.

“Y ahora con la segunda (denuncia) *te* siguen poniendo a prueba, quizá pensando que tú no estás diciendo toda la verdad”

“Llega un momento en el que *una* se la... se cree lo que esta persona le dice, yo lo tenía totalmente asumido”

“Y entonces casi aceptas lo que *te* está pasando, con lo cual dices: casi, casi me lo merezco”

“Ellos sabían perfectamente cómo era *ese tipo, individuo* o como quieras llamarle”

“*Los maltratadores* te permiten vivir, y en su ámbito, es el que te está dando la vida. Cuando te están matando”

⁴ Mannheim (1993: 238) define “perspectiva” como “la forma en que contemplamos un objeto, lo que percibimos de él, y cómo lo reconstruimos en nuestro pensamiento”.

“¿Por qué no se le mira a *este señor*? El porqué. Yo no encuentro el porqué, no me han dado una explicación (...) no lo investigan, se investiga a la madre”

8. El estigma y la culpa

La reflexión sobre su historia pasada permite a las mujeres ser críticas con ciertos sistemas de valores que en el espacio social y público condenan, en ocasiones, a la mujer que sufre violencia. Así, hacen suyas algunas expresiones que les provocan dolor e indignación con el fin de denunciarlas. Rechazan por tanto el estigma que sufrieron en carne propia cuando se atrevieron a contar su problema. Sin embargo, en los relatos también se percibe un discurso autoculpabilizador que demuestra que aunque son capaces de verbalizar y de asumir lo ocurrido, e incluso de ser críticas con el entorno, muchas de ellas aún soportan sobre sus hombros la culpa como un lastre por haber “aguantado” la violencia o por sentir que así han dañado a sus hijos e hijas:

“No lo entienden, no entienden que aguantas, es que, inclusive hasta como que *te culpabilizan*”

“Y luego el comentario de los tíos: *algo habrá hecho*, cuando la han pegado a esta, algo habrá hecho”

“Te dicen que eso es normal, que todos los hombres son iguales”

“Que por mi culpa, sí han salido perjudicados los niños, los mayores, al vivir eso, que han sufrido, y de eso sí me culpabilizo”

“Me siento mala madre”

“Sigo pensando (...) que yo tengo la culpa, que he elegido... que cómo me pude ir con él”

“Y la culpabilidad queda rastro, por eso sigues con el tiempo pidiendo perdón, es algo que te han inculcado tan... tan adentro, y durante tanto tiempo que... bueno eso cuesta, echarlo fuera”

9. La autoafirmación

Como parte de su reconstrucción, y con la autonomía como horizonte, la mayoría de las narradoras asumen también y dan autoridad a los vocabularios y sistemas de sentido y valor de los feminismos. Casi todos los relatos concluyen con el discurso de la autoafirmación por el que expresan sus nuevos propósitos y metas, y a través del cual comprobamos que, a pesar de la culpa, las narradoras afirman sentirse seguras, libres, independientes, valientes:

“Empiezo a sentir que *mis ideas tienen valor*”

“Me voy sintiendo mejor, voy saliendo sin miedo, voy *siendo yo*”

“He llegado a lo más alto de la cumbre para mí”

“Sé lo que quiero (...) *tener mi independencia*”

10. A modo de conclusión

En el conjunto de estas autobiografías analizadas, hemos visto que se recoge la vivencia de mujeres maltratadas que están en el proceso de conformar un discurso sobre un trauma que precisa ser reconocido para las narradoras y para ser compartido en la esfera pública. A partir del intercambio con los expertos y con la investigadora, las protagonistas del relato elaboran y comprenden su experiencia dolorosa y traumática. En ese proceso, se produce una transformación semiótica del sinsentido al sentido en un recorrido que parte de y vuelve a lo privado, pero pasando necesariamente por lo público, desde donde dan sentido a sus biografías recientes, a sus historias de violencia, sufrimiento, anulación y reconstrucción.

Para ello, las narradoras adoptan un discurso polifónico en el que toman léxicos, sintaxis, sistemas de sentido y valor de diferentes procedencias, según el momento del relato. Así, cuando rememoran los primeros momentos de la relación con el maltratador, recurren a vocabularios que adquieren de los relatos masivos del amor romántico. Después, asumen, en el relato, la terminología machista y humillante del maltratador. El discurso se patologiza en ocasiones y se torna *experto* al poner nombre a lo vivido, al incorporar términos como “maltrato”, “violencia de género” o “ciclo de la violencia”. La expresión de sus emociones transita del amor al odio, mostrando sus dudas y sinsabores con respecto a sus sentimientos pasados y presentes.

Con el fin de poder distanciarse de quienes todavía son, las narradoras cuentan su historia para hacerla realidad, para devenir otras. Para ello, han de adoptar otra perspectiva y tomar distancia de la protagonista del relato: como vimos, las entrevistadas evaden el “yo” frente al “nosotras”. También se separan del maltratador, que aparece en el relato como un “tipo” perverso e infame al que se etiqueta como “individuo” o “señor”.

Reflexionar sobre lo ocurrido permite a las mujeres ser críticas con el estigma social de las mujeres maltratadas y calumniar expresiones que demuestran que la sociedad no solo no las comprende, sino que las culpa del maltrato. Una culpa que, por otro lado, ellas mismas se atribuyen en muchos momentos de relato, asumiendo como propio el sufrimiento de sus hijos e hijas por no haber roto a tiempo con el maltratador. Aun así, en la fase final del relato, se hace patente su autoafirmación a partir de expresiones y vocabularios que dan autoridad a los feminismos. Declaran sentirse libres e independientes y afirman haber recuperado el sentido de sí y experimentado un cambio, diríamos en palabras de López Carretero (2005: 77), de “colocación simbólica”.

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SEMIOTICS OF THE CITY

NATIONALIZING KAZAN': TATAR STATE NATIONALISM AND ARCHITECTURE

Fabio De Leonardis
Italy
sentenza77@libero.it

Abstract

The remodelling of the urban space (first of all of capital cities) has been one of the common trends that has characterized all the new states that have emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. Urban planning and architecture have gone hand in hand with state nationalism, materializing and 'naturalizing' the '(re)birth' of the nation and legitimizing the new regimes. The city of Kazan' is in this sense almost a paradigmatic example: a close reading of the remodelling of its urban landscape provides a rich insight in the political agenda and in the way the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan sees the country and the city and wants it to be seen by others. In this urban remodeling Tatarstan's former president Shaimiev, Kazan's former mayor Iskhakov and their ideologue Khakimov followed a multi-vectorial course that reflected the multifaceted image they wanted to construct for Tatarstan's society and for the city as its symbol. This image can be seen as a myth in which different narratives intertwine: the narrative of Kazan' as a European capital; that of Kazan' as a Tatar city; that of Kazan' as the place where East and West meet and coexist in peaceful harmony. To be sure, the construction of this multiple urban identity was not just a top-down process, but the outcome of a political and social situation in which the Tatarstani leadership had to reach a compromise with very different interests.

1. Reshaping the post-Soviet urban landscape

The remodelling of urban space has been one of the common trends that has characterized all the new states that have emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. This is hardly surprising: as argued by Jurij Lotman, architectural space is always a semiotic space: it shapes the world, but at the same time it is itself the result of a modelling activity which reproduces the worldview of its creators (Lotman [1985] 2010: 676–82). In turn, the way architectural space is laid out plays

an active role in shaping both individual and collective conscience (Lotman [1985] 2010: 683). Therefore, cities are also “a *discourse*, a signifying practice that [...] in every moment projects behind itself a *text*”; yet that text remains always “unaccomplished”, for it is also the site of conflicts which inevitably leave their traces on it (Volli 2005: 6, my translation); hence the need by power to organize the urban landscape and re-shape it in such a way as to allow certain interpretations of it and prevent others, effectively contributing in shaping what Gramsci termed the “common sense”, namely “the most widespread conception of life and morale” (Gramsci 2013 [1975]: 76). As a consequence, the territory must be read “first of all as an *ideological text*” (Volli 2005: 16, my translation). In post-Soviet countries urban planning and new architectural enterprises often have gone hand in hand with nationalism, being a tangible way of both naturalizing the (*re*)*birth* of the nation and legitimizing the incumbents. Indeed, Eric Hobsbawm explained his concept of “invention of traditions” – i.e. “a set of practices... which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” and that, where possible, “attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past” – providing as an example the rebuilding in Gothic style of the House of Parliament in London (Hobsbawm 1983: 1).

2. The case of Kazan’ and Tatarstan

The city of Kazan’ is in this sense almost a paradigmatic example. A close reading of the remodelling of its urban landscape provides, as Katherine Graney has rightly stated, a clear insight in the political agenda and in the way the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan saw the country and the city and wanted it to be seen by others (Graney 2007: 17). In this field Tatarstan’s former president Mintimer Šaimiev, Kazan’s former mayor Kamil’ Ischakov and their ideologue Rafael Khakimov followed a particular course that reflected the multifaceted image they wanted to construct for Tatarstan and for the city as its symbol. This multifaceted image can be seen as a myth in Roland Barthes’s sense – i.e. the naturalization of something which is culturally constructed (Barthes 1970 [1957]) – and a myth intertwining different narratives: the narrative of Kazan’ as a European capital; that of Kazan’ as a Tatar city; that of Kazan’ as the place where East and West meet and coexist in peaceful harmony (Graney 2007: 20). To be sure, this multiple identity was not just the result of mere abstract elaboration, but the outcome of a political and social situation in which the republican leadership had to reach a compromise with very different interests in order to keep the situation under control and stay in power.

The nationalist and religious revival that swept across the USSR at the time of Gorbačëv’s *perestrojka*, when underground political currents were given a relative freedom of expression, involved Tatarstan as well (Faller 2002: 82). In 1990 grandiose celebrations in Kazan’ commemorated the 1100th year since the conversion to Islam of ancient Volga Bulgars. Since in the previous decades the Soviet policy of nationalities had secularized Islam, transforming it into just a component of the national heritage of some of its peoples, adherence to Islam more often than not did not imply any strict observance of its precepts (Khalid 2004): therefore, this religious revival was to be seen as part of the national revival, with ethnic and religious identities often overlapping (Malašenko 2009: 243). In February 1989 Tatar nationalists founded an autonomous organization, the Tatar Public Centre, whose aims ranged from political issues (the upgrading of Tatarstan from Autonomous Republic to Union Republic) to cultural and economic ones (the promotion of Tatar culture and cultural autonomy for Tatar diaspora and a revision of Tatarstan’s contribution to the all-Union budget). A more ethnically-oriented wing of Tatar nationalism gathered one year later around the *Ittifaq* party (Khakimov 2004–05: 47; Amirkhanov 1998: 38). Riding this nationalist wave, in August 1990 Šajmiev, by then chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan and First Party Secretary, prompted the latter body to unilaterally approve a Declara-

tion of Sovereignty; later on, in March 1991, he urged the population (together with the other nationalists) to boycott the referendum on the establishment of a presidency for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic; two months later he even declared that Tatarstan would sign the new Union Treaty only as a full republic, and not as one of the entities of Russia. On 28 May the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan declared that the republic would elect its own president and not participate in the All-Russian presidential elections. Appropriating nationalist slogans and platforms, Šajmiev in June 1991 was elected president of the self-appointed sovereign Republic of Tatarstan (he was the only candidate). After the August 1991 coup, Šajmiev announced that Tatarstan would ask for admission in the newly-born Commonwealth of Independent States as a full member, and not as a subject of the Russian Federation. This rapid state-building process reached a turning point in February 1992, when Tatarstan's Parliament decided to hold a referendum on the status of the republic, provoking a wave of threats from the Russian State Duma, while the Constitutional Court declared its illegality and El'cin made an emotional appeal to Tatarstani citizens against voting in favour of sovereignty. The pressure from Moscow went so far as to hold military manoeuvres in the neighbouring regions. Despite that, the result was a 61.4% majority in favour of independence, with Kazan's population split into two camps (in the capital, 51.2% had voted against). In autumn, a Constitution was passed by the Tatarstani Parliament, which refused to ratify the All-Russia Constitution and boycotted the referendum on it.

By then Šajmiev seemed to have managed to outmanoeuvre the most radical nationalists and his challenge to the federal centre earned him a significant popularity. Moreover, his cautious policy on privatizations spared Tatarstan the most odious economic consequences brought about by the transition, guaranteeing the republic a stability which earned him the acceptance, if not the support, of at least part of the Russian minority (about half of the population). The turning point in this political course was the signing, on February 15, 1994 of a treaty with the Russian Federation: whereas today, in retrospect, that treaty is seen as a remarkable success, as it guaranteed Tatarstan a high extent of autonomy (Graney 2001: 34–35), at the epoch Tatar nationalists accused Šajmiev of treason, for the republic renounced sovereignty (Beissinger 2002: 264–265).

After 1994 Šajmiev and his political associates had thus secured their position vis-à-vis the federal centre, but risked losing their own constituency. As a consequence, in the following years they tried to reaffirm their nationalist credentials in order to regain legitimacy, multiplying the initiatives aimed at institutionalizing and appropriating Tatar nationalism. Part of this course consisted also in a stronger support for the Islamic revival, as a response to Moscow's active support of the Russian Orthodox Church: the outcome of this course of action was an extraordinary increase in the number of mosques in the republic (Bennigsen Broxup 1996: 89–90). At the same time, though, Šajmiev had to keep the balance between the necessity of cultural reassertion and that of avoiding alienating Tatarstan's ethnic Russian population, while at the same time pursuing an internationalizing agenda that aimed at modernizing Kazan' and transforming it into a European capital. Keeping together these contradictory drives was difficult, but the Šajmiev leadership managed to do it. Part of this policy was a whole series of showcase architectural enterprises aimed at enhancing the role of Kazan' as a capital (the construction of lavish shopping centres, the development of an underground railway network, the restoration of part of its architectural heritage, the erection of new public buildings), at the same time Europeanizing and Tatarizing its urban landscape (Graney 2007: 18).

3. The Tatarization of Kazan'

3.1. The Kul Sharif Mosque

The most evident architectural example of what Faller (2002) has aptly called “the repossession of Kazan” is definitely the ‘reconstruction’ of the Kul-Šarif Mosque: the latter is indeed so imposing that it dominates Kazan’s skyline and the Kremlin complex, and its location allows it to remind the *Tatarness* of the city to commuters and visitors alike. The mosque has also become one of Kazan’s major tourist attractions, and one of its most recognizable symbols. This *reconstruction* is a paradigmatic example of “invention of tradition”. As the capital of the homonymous khanate, Kazan’ had been until 1552 also the seat of various mosques, the biggest of which was probably located in the area of the current Kremlin before being destroyed following the conquest of the city by Ivan IV. In the early 1990s popular demand arose for a reconstruction of Kazan’s great mosque as a way to reaffirm a Tatar national identity (Faller 2002: 85). Šajmiev espoused the idea and issued an *ad hoc* decree in November 1995. The construction of the new mosque was presented as a “rebuilding” (Batyr 2005), and the choice of locating it in the Kremlin was a modern response to the Russification of the city’s architecture implemented by the Russian tsars in the XVII and XVIII centuries. Furthermore, naming such an architectural enterprise after Kul-Šarif was by itself a decision with strong nationalist and religious overtones, for he had been not only an important figure of the Tatar clergy of the XVI century, but also one of the chieftains in charge of Kazan’s defence in 1552¹. By honouring as a national and religious hero someone who had fought against the Russians Šajmiev was making a bold political statement, challenging the legitimacy of Russia’s presence in Tatarstan. The political significance of the mosque is highlighted by its architectural solutions: it does not follow the traditional Tatar style (e.g. the Mardžani Mosque) but a neo-Ottoman model (Chalit 2012), suggesting a return to a past prior to the Russian conquest. This past is presented as a glorious one: blending the signs of Islam (minarets, crescents, etc.) with the fundamental structure of Byzantine religious architecture, Ottoman mosques represented indeed “the most sustained attempt in all of Islamic architecture to reconcile the divergent aims of royal and religious iconography” (Hillenbrand 2000: 165). It is worth noticing that the presence of more than one minaret is by itself a symbol of power, because only sultans were allowed to erect more than one minaret (Hillenbrand 2000: 161–165). Adding signs of an alleged Bulgar and Tatar tradition (the lancet arches, the tulip-shaped windows and decorations, the form of the dome), references to the previous building (the eight minarets) and hints to Central Asian architecture hinting at the kinship with other Turkic peoples (the *iwan*-shape entrance), the mosque Tatarized the Ottoman model, transforming it into a symbol of the return to the past greatness.

Tatar nationalist reassertion, though, was only one side of the coin: it is worth noticing that in those same years (1995–2005), and by the same presidential decree, also the Annunciation Cathedral of Kazan’s Kremlin underwent restoration works (although the original bell tower, which would have dominated Kazan’s skyline, was never rebuilt): the latter decision was strongly opposed by radical Tatar nationalists, who maintained that the Cathedral itself had to be rebuilt as a mosque². The reaffirmation of Tatar identity, in Šajmiev’s nation-building, was always balanced by equivalent concessions to the Russian constituency which were part and parcel of the “Tatarstan model”, in which ethnic self-affirmation was articulated within the framework of a civic nationalism underlining the multiethnic and multiconfessional character of the republic and claiming at the same time the cultural heritage of all its ethnic and religious components (Khakimov 2004–2005; Davis, Hammond, and Nizamova 2000): as Šajmiev himself said to the State Council in February 1996, “we are building a polyethnic, polycultural community, where the priority is citizenship, and not ethnic membership” (quoted in Khakimov 2004–2005: 46). If one looks at the mosque in the architectural context of the whole Kremlin, one cannot help

noticing how its volume gives balance to the entire complex, allowing the citadel to become the architectural embodiment of Šajmiev's national vision for modern Tatarstan, based on the balance between the two main cultures and religions of the country³.

This idea of peaceful coexistence does not fully correspond to historical truth, though, for the conquest of Kazan' in 1552 had meant not only the end of the khanate, but also the beginning of "a systematic policy of colonization" by Muscovy (Bennigsen Broxup 1996: 76), with Tatars expelled from the urban centre and the Muslim land aristocracy dispossessed, the destruction of mosques and forced conversions and deportations that ended up only under Catherine II's rule. Šajmiev's interpretation was propagated also by the official publication devoted to the city's jubilee of 2005, which describes Kazan' as "the cradle of Tatar culture, the place where East and West meet, the heart of Eurasia [...] a melting pot" (VV.AA. 2005). There is however a certain ambivalence in this, for, as Rashad Amirkhanov put it, "Tatarstan is a multiethnic republic, but it is also [...] the homeland of the Tatar nation" (Amirkhanov 1998: 46): Šajmiev's civic nationalism does not renege an ethnic core which sees as its task that of developing "Tatar nations' renaissance" (Amirkhanov 1998: 46) not only for its own citizens, but also for the Tatar diaspora (Graney 2001: 34–35), which explains the drive to establish Kazan' also as the capital for all Tatars (Faller 2002: 85). The emphasis on tolerance, however, was also an indirect way to distance the official Tatar version of Islam, advertised as "Euroislam" (Khakimov 2004), from more radical ones. Although both Šajmiev and Tatar civil society have always been extremely critical of the federal policy in Chechnya, they have also been very careful in making clear that, in the word of Indus Tagirov, then head of the Executive Committee of the World Congress of Tatars, they "well understand the experience of Chechnya and [...] do not want to follow that way" (quoted in Davis, Hammond, and Nizamova 2000). From the religious point of view, the mosque gave Kazan' the possibility to propose itself as the main religious centre for all Muslims from Russia, another ambition actively pursued by Šajmiev, who sponsored the First Unifying Congress of Muslims in Kazan' and favoured the establishment in the city of the sole Islamic University in the Russian Federation. Last but not least, it proved a way for Šajmiev to leave his own architectural mark on the city: at the official beginning of the construction works on 21 February, 1996, Šajmiev himself laid the first stone of the mosque and had his Presidential Decree carved in the memorial site next to it. The mosque was officially opened on June 24, 2005, during the celebrations of Kazan's Millennium Jubilee.

3.2. The Millennium Jubilee

Promoted by the republican élite to celebrate the alleged 1000th year from the foundation of Kazan', the Millennium Jubilee was another example of historical invention aimed at celebrating lavishly the Tatar cultural heritage⁴, duly responding to Moscow's 850-Years Jubilee by asserting the more ancient pedigree of Tatarstan's capital. The Millennium Jubilee, besides a whole series of cultural and political events aimed at positioning Tatarstan as a bridge between the East and the West and Kazan' itself as one of the capitals of the Muslim world, was also the occasion for a second huge architectural restructuring of the city: its most notable results were the opening of an underground, the construction of the Millennium Bridge and numberless restoration works of public spaces and buildings. Last but not least, it crowned Šajmiev as the national leader (Graney 2007: 25). However, the political background of it was quite different from that of the early 1990s. The coming to power of Vladimir Putin and the subsequent effort to re-establish the "power vertical" in the country had stopped the process of loosening of the federal ties and started a reverse process of re-centralization (Graney 2001: 36–37; Ponarin 2008: 269). In June 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court had declared illegal and unconstitutional Tatarstan's claim of being sovereign; however, dismantling Tatarstan's large autonomy was no easy task, for the republican

government had gained control of many state spheres (Graney 2001: 33); the Šajmiev leadership, which in the course of the 1990s had managed to neutralize its internal opposition, tried to defend its prerogatives (Ponarin 2008: 268–272; Graney 2001: 38–39). As a result, the loss in sovereignty was ‘paid for’ by generous federal contributions to huge cultural events such as the 2005 Millennium Jubilee and the 2013 World University Games, besides some relatively smaller events (Graney 2007: 24). All this inflow of money gave the republican leadership the possibility to invest in large construction and reconstruction schemes that boosted the second wave of the reshaping of Kazan’s urban landscape; in this case the Tatarization drive was even more evident, which can be explained by Šajmiev’s need to make up for the loss in actual statehood vis-à-vis the federal centre with a multiplication of the paraphernalia of statehood.

3.3. The policy of memory: monuments and toponomastic

Beyond the Kul-Šarif case and the restoration of old mosques, the Tatarizing course in the reshaping of the city has taken different forms. The most obvious one has been the dissemination of monuments and memorials specifically related to Tatar history and culture. The first wave of the erection of such monuments took place in the 1990s. After the transformation of the Kazan’ section of the Central Lenin Museum into a National Cultural Centre in 1992, the new Sultan-Galiev Square was embellished in 1996 with a 40-metre column topped by a statue of Horriyat (‘freedom’), a mythical bird-like woman from Tatar mythology⁵. In 1995 a small pantheon in memory of the Tatar heroes of World War II was established in the area behind the monument to Musa Džalil in 1st May Square, while in 1999, next to the Painters’ Union House, a statue was erected to the Tatar artist Baki Urmanče. To be sure, all these monuments were partly ‘balanced’ by the statue of Šaljapin in Bauman Street and some other memorials related to World War II lacking any ‘ethnic’ characterization. But it was with the second wave, in the 2000s, that the establishment of new monuments reached a peak. The bust to Lev Gumilëv (2005) is probably the most significant one from the ideological point of view, for he was not only a Eurasianist intellectual who had a great role in re-evaluating the Tatar heritage in Russian culture, but was of mixed Russian and Tatar origin as well, thus embodying the bicultural model promoted by Šajmiev and Khakimov. Further highlighting this double heritage, the bust stands at the crossroads between Tukaj Square and Peterburgskaja Street and looks towards the pedestrian Bauman Street, as if overlooking it. Another significant example of this dual character is the monument to the constructors of the Kazan’ Kremlin, which represents two male figures distinctly identifiable as a Muslim (Tatar) and a Russian, the former standing and supportively laying his hand on the shoulder of the latter, who is sitting and showing the project of the Spasskaja Tower. This position allegedly represents the temporal sequence of the two cultural layers of the complex and the reciprocal understanding between Russians and Tatars (Zabirov, Daiševa 2007). However, the fact that one is standing and the other one is sitting is ambivalent as to which of the two is in a position of pre-eminence. The Millennium Park, opened for the 2005 Jubilee, is all punctuated with references to Tatar mythology’s drake Zilant, which is Kazan’s symbol; it is also home to a statue to Kul Gali, one of the greatest Bulgar poets of the XII–XIII centuries, who perished during the Mongol invasion (thus presenting the Tatars as victims of the Mongol invasion as much as the Russians). A monument to the Tatar composer Salich Sajdašev was erected in front of the Pedagogical University of Humanities in 2005; as a counterpart to the imperial memorial to the fallen for the conquest of Kazan’ in 1552, two memorials were erected for the defenders of the Kazan’ Khanate in the Tatar cemetery and in a corner of Gor’kij Park. In this second wave of Tatarization of the urban landscape, the ‘tribute’ due to the Russian heritage was not neglected, either: in 2003 the monument to Gavriil Deržavin was restored and in 2004 a statue to the physicist E. Zavojskij was set up next to Kazan’ University’s Faculty of Physics.

Another, simpler form of this process of Tatarization has been the change of the city's toponomastic. One of the central squares, Junusovskaja Square (formerly Kujbyšev Square), was renamed after the national poet Gabdulla Tukaj in 1997; a new square built in the 1980s was named after Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, the Tatar nationalist Communist repressed in the 1930s; Revolution Square was renamed after the writer and scholar Naki Isanbet; Sacco and Vanzetti Street was renamed after the composer and pianist Rustem Jachin, author of the national anthem of Tatarstan, and so on. Concessions were made also to a Russification of Soviet toponomastic: for example, Sverdlov Street was renamed Peterburgskaja. A look at the changes in the city's toponomastic since 2005 allows us to identify a general pattern⁶: out of 38 streets (most of them bearing a Soviet name), 20 have been Tatarized, while the rest bear names which are related to Russian culture or personalities, or in more rare cases 'neutral' ones. Again, pre-eminence to the assertion of Tatariness, but without neglecting the Russian element.

Still another aspect of this Tatarization, probably the most visible one, was the self-Orientalization of public and private architecture, where motifs and solutions taken from allegedly Oriental architectural styles and Tatar language writings and signs have the function of *othering* the urban landscape, so that city-dwellers and visitors can perceive Kazan's *difference* from the other cities of Russia. This trend has had as its counterpart the destruction of a significant part of the old buildings in Kazan's centre, many of which were Russian in style (Hughes 2008: 113). The most evident outcome is the new concert-hall named after Salich Sajdašev, with its windows in the shape of pointed arches that remind Persian and Central Asian architecture. The underground proved another site for the assertion of the Tatar cultural heritage: the most central station was entitled to Gabdulla Tukaj, and its interiors decorated with Oriental-style mosaics of pictures related to his fairy-tales. This process of architectural self-Orientalization, though, has also taken place in the field of private architecture, wherein it is more difficult to assess the extent to which this is the result of a top-down policy: it is quite likely, though, that architects and clients are simply following the general trend.

4. Conclusion

On the whole, in the light of Hobsbawm's concept of invention of traditions, the whole process of Tatarization of Kazan's urban landscape provide a typical example of the first two types of invented traditions, namely those whose purpose is "establishing or legitimizing institutions" (in this case, the Republic of Tatarstan as the historical heir of the Kazan Khanate and of the Bulgar Tatars, see Graney 2001: 35) and those whose purpose is the "inculcation of beliefs, value system and conventions of behaviour" (Hobsbawm 1983: 9) (a form of civic Tatar nationalism, which sees Islam as part of its heritage).

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(Endnotes)

¹ Kto takoj Kul Šarif [Who is Kul Sharif]. (2012) http://www.kul-sharif.com/index/kto_takoj_kul_sharif/0-6 (last accessed: 4 November 2014).

² See the interview with Šajmiev by Rustam Batyr (2005).

³ V Kazani otrkryta samaja bolšaja v Evrope mečet' Kul Šarif [The Kul Sharif Mosque, the biggest one in Europe, opens up in Kazan']. (2005) http://www.newsru.com/religy/24jun2005/kazan_mosque.html (last accessed: 4 November 2014).

⁴ The issue of the date of Kazan's foundation is an extremely controversial one, and is far from being settled: indeed, only seven years before, in 1998, that same republican élite was thinking of celebrating *the 850th year* of Kazan's foundation (see Sulejmanov 2012).

⁵ Nacional'nyj kul'turnyj centr "Kazan'" [National Cultural Centre "Kazan'"]. <http://horriyat.ru/> (last accessed: 4 November 2014).

⁶ Perečen' pereimenovannyh ulic g. Kazani za period s 2005 goda [List of Kazan's streets whose name has been changed since 2005]. (2014) <http://www.kzn.ru/old/page8623.htm> (last accessed: 4 November 2014).

LES LIMITES DE LA VILLE : ENTRER EN AVION

Gianfranco Marrone
Université de Palerme, Italie
gm@gianfrancomarrone.it

Abstract

Le film *The Terminal* de S. Spielberg (2004) est une amusante comédie qui exalte la magie d'une signature capable de transformer en succès, donc en enthousiasme et en argent, tout ce sur quoi elle s'inscrit. Mais *The Terminal* construit aussi une véritable théorie socio-sémiotique des machines aéroportuaires d'aujourd'hui. Ce film montre la présupposition réciproque (et donc la réversibilité) qui lie, relativement à un *non-lieu* par excellence, le « JFK » de « NYC », le plan de l'expression (où les formes architecturales sont des dispositifs de contrôle) et le plan du contenu (où différentes formes de vie trouvent leur place et un sens). Il s'agit d'une théorie fort respectable, d'autant plus qu'elle est formulée avec des moyens autres que ceux de la philosophie ou de la sociologie : avec les moyens *textuels* d'une architecture spécifique, d'une part, et d'autre part avec ceux d'un dispositif filmique, les uns et les autres assortis de contraintes économiques et culturelles, d'astuces expressives et sémantiques, et surtout d'une ironie voilée mais constante qui met en dérision toutes les hypothèses apocalyptiques concernant les formes du contrôle dans ce qu'on a appelé les « hétérotopies » de notre temps.

1. Expériences de pensée

The Terminal (2004) est une amusante comédie qui exalte la magie d'une signature capable de transformer en succès, donc en enthousiasme et en argent, tout ce sur quoi elle s'inscrit. Steven Spielberg n'est pas seulement un metteur en scène hollywoodien très aimé du grand public et respecté par la critique internationale. Il est aussi une véritable marque, un sujet énonçant dont émane un flux discursif tous azimuts qui diffuse autour de lui un système de valeurs et de croyances, des affects et des concepts, des corps et des choses. La marque Spielberg surdétermine une histoire de frontières et de marginalités, de triomphes et de malheurs, une histoire

faite de longues attentes et de patience. Ce que raconte cette marque, ce sont en l'occurrence les aventures complexes d'une grande machine – un gigantesque aéroport – qui par hasard se bloque. Du coup apparaissent au grand jour mille petites astuces constitutives d'autant de micro-histoires qui déclenchent elles-mêmes autant de programmes euphoriques de consommation, à leur tour producteurs de choses et de lieux, le tout mettant à nu les régularités formelles et sémantiques, les effets pragmatiques, les dérives passionnelles de cette grande machine.

The Terminal construit ainsi une véritable théorie socio-sémiotique des machines aéroportuaires d'aujourd'hui. Ce film montre la présupposition réciproque (et donc la réversibilité) qui lie, relativement à un *non-lieu* par excellence, le JFK de NYC, le plan de l'expression (où les formes architecturales sont des dispositifs de contrôle) et le plan du contenu (où différentes formes de vie trouvent leur place et un sens). Il s'agit d'une théorie fort respectable, d'autant plus qu'elle est formulée avec des moyens autres que ceux de la philosophie ou de la sociologie : avec les moyens *textuels* d'une architecture spécifique, d'une part, et d'autre part avec ceux d'un dispositif filmique, les uns et les autres assortis de contraintes économiques et culturelles, d'astuces expressives et sémantiques, et surtout d'une ironie voilée mais constante qui met en dérision toutes les hypothèses apocalyptiques concernant les formes du contrôle dans ce qu'on a appelé les « hétérotopies » de notre temps (Foucault 1984).

2. Une bulle narrative

L'histoire est connue. Un certain Viktor Navorski, venu de Krakhozie, pays imaginaire de l'Europe de l'Est, arrive comme touriste au JFK pour visiter New York. A la fin du film, nous apprendrons qu'il avait reçu un mandat très précis de son Destinateur de père, qui aimait la musique de jazz américaine d'antan. Il devait rencontrer le vieux saxophoniste Benny Goldson et obtenir sa signature, laquelle était ensuite destinée à en rejoindre beaucoup d'autres, similaires, dans une vieille boîte de cacahuètes – sorte d'écrin très précieux, objet de valeur capital pour le père désormais décédé. Bref, Viktor veut continuer la collection commencée par son père, geste en même temps un peu stupide et très important puisqu'il s'agit de poursuivre une tradition à la fois personnelle et collective, idiosyncratique et familiale. Ce programme narratif très simple dans sa structure mais difficile à réaliser devient, au fil de l'histoire énoncée par le film, un véritable destin. Cependant, personne, ni à l'aéroport (dans l'énoncé) ni dans la salle de cinéma (espace de l'énonciation), ne connaît ce programme car il ne sera dévoilé qu'à l'occasion de la typique déclaration d'amour qui s'impose à la fin de tout film hollywoodien à succès.

Viktor finira par obtenir la signature de Benny, la rangera dans sa boîte et retournera chez lui. Programme réalisé. Mais le film parle aussi d'autre chose. Il raconte un apprentissage, celui des signes, des coutumes, des rituels et des valeurs des Etats-Unis. Moyennant un classique rite de passage, le héros va découvrir le sens profond de l'Amérique, société de consommation qui passe son temps à jouer avec les marques, *melting pot* d'ethnies et de races, de langues et de cultures, société dominée par la bureaucratie, par la peur des étrangers, des autres – eux qui, en débarquant sur ce territoire, se voient toujours plus minutieusement examinés, contrôlés avant d'être finalement, si tout se passe bien, acceptés. Cette Amérique que tout le monde connaît mais qui n'est pas décrite dans les guides, elle est ici tout à fait présente, *in nuce*, dans l'articulation de l'espace de l'aéroport où Viktor se trouve reclus – et les spectateurs avec lui – pendant presque toute la durée du film.

Ce qui rend possible cet étrange processus d'apprentissage de la part d'un voyageur qui, à bien y regarder, n'est ni touriste ni homme d'affaires, ni ethnographe ni esthète (Landowski 1997), c'est justement l'expérience de pensée dont procède l'idée même du film. En arrivant à JFK, Viktor apprend que pendant qu'il volait entre la Krakhozie et les Etats-Unis le gouvernement de son pays a été renversé par un soulèvement. Du coup, son passeport n'est plus valide. Il ne peut

donc ni entrer à New York ni retourner chez lui. Il est tout à coup devenu un « indésirable », un sans papier privé de tout pouvoir faire. Bref, le voilà pris dans l'enceinte de ce terminal, sorte de *bulle* narrative, zone frontière pour lui sans entrée ni sortie, ou mieux, territoire dont toutes les entrées et les sorties lui sont barrées. Ce *non-lieu* que constitue, du point de vue diplomatique, un aéroport va dès lors se révéler, pour Viktor, exactement le contraire : un véritable *lieu* – historique, identitaire, relationnel (Augé 1991) – où toutes les aventures sont possibles, où toutes les transformations narratives sont envisageables. On a bien là un *Gedankenexperiment*: presque tout le film raconte ce qu'il arrive à un homme qui, pour une raison fortuite, se trouve bloqué dans un espace qui n'est pas le sien, un espace « non propre » qui pourtant n'est pas non plus un espace « autre ». Qu'arrive-t-il à quelqu'un qui devient étranger dans un espace à la fois très vide du point de vue de sa culture d'origine, et très plein de gens et de choses, de signes et de rituels quant à ce qui est de la langue et de la culture qu'il devra progressivement apprendre ? Tout cela sans aucune aide humaine ou matérielle, sans amis, sans argent, sans aucun code auquel faire confiance. Et surtout sans aucune idée du temps que cela pourra durer.

Après un moment de découragement, Viktor saura réagir à cette situation négative avec une certaine obstination. Ses difficultés avec la langue anglaise l'ont empêché de bien comprendre les raisons de sa bizarre condition, mais sur les écrans distribués un peu partout dans l'aéroport il peut regarder les images relatives à ce qui se passe dans sa Krakhozie en révolution. Il pleure, erre sans but dans tous les coins de cet espace clos, y compris les plus secrets, perd son argent et la carte téléphonique qu'il a reçue de la Sûreté, et il a faim. Pourtant, peu à peu, il trouve une façon de survivre, et même une certaine aisance. En parfait bricoleur, il sait adapter à ses besoins les matériaux – « pré-contraints », aurait dit Lévi-Strauss (1962) – qu'il trouve à sa disposition. Il se construit un abri, se procure de quoi manger, trouve moyen d'apprendre l'anglais, se lie d'amitié avec des gens qui travaillent sur les lieux, courtise une hôtesse de passage, et en fin de compte trouve un travail. Il est capable aussi d'affronter le cynisme de Dixon, son principal antagoniste, dont il rejette les maladroitesses tentatives pour le faire entrer à New York « à l'anglaise » : ses manœuvres auraient fait de lui un énième sans papier, un étranger qui admire de loin les splendeurs d'une ville et d'un pays qui ne seront jamais les siens. Et juste au moment où la confrontation avec Dixon devient le plus féroce, alors qu'il est devenu un petit héros aux yeux du personnel de l'aéroport, la révolution en Krakhozie se termine et tout rentre dans l'ordre. Il acquiert la signature du jazzman et retourne chez lui.

3. Explorations

Analyser ce film, c'est poser une question sur les *niveaux de textualité* qui se superposent dans ce film, et donc des procédures de *traduction intratextuelle* nécessaires pour passer d'un niveau au suivant – autre question sur laquelle la sémiotique a jusqu'à présent trop peu travaillé. Ce dont il est question ici n'est pas le *sens* du texte si on entend par là le parcours nécessaire pour le générer à partir de ses différentes saisies, plus ou moins abstraites, plus ou moins profondes. Il s'agit en revanche du nombre et de la distribution des « textes », des passages entre eux à l'intérieur de ce film – tout comme, différences d'époque mises à part, Barthes (1971) reconnaissait *quatre textes* à l'intérieur de l'œuvre de Loyola. Si le film *The Terminal* est une œuvre, il doit contenir plusieurs textes, ou mieux plusieurs niveaux de textualité qui s'entrelacent et que l'analyse devra individuer, séparer, articuler et reconstruire dans leur structure globale. Un « texte », ainsi entendu, n'est évidemment pas une chose, une réalité empirique, mais une *configuration de sens avec des supports expressifs variables*. Il est par suite normal qu'à l'intérieur d'une œuvre on puisse en trouver un certain nombre. Et c'est le cas de notre film.

4.1. *L'Amérique in nuce*

Le premier texte est celui de l'histoire de Viktor. A la grande simplicité des programmes narratifs et de leur emboîtement se superpose ici l'idée directrice du film et la longue digression à laquelle elle donne lieu, si longue qu'elle compose la majeure partie du film. Il s'agit de cette grande « bulle » narrative dont nous parlions plus haut, c'est-à-dire de cet aéroport dans l'enceinte duquel le principal protagoniste vit enfermé durant des semaines, bloqué par hasard, comme dans *l'Ange exterminateur* de Buñuel, en produisant des programmes narratifs supplémentaires qui pourtant n'effacent jamais le programme principal.

Dans ce texte, la relation polémique qui fournit le ressort de la narration est celle qui oppose Viktor, qui *veut aller* à NYC mais *ne peut pas le faire*, à Dixon, qui, lui, *ne peut pas* l'y laisser aller mais en même temps *ne veut pas* le laisser errer dans l'espace aéroportuaire qu'il dirige, raison pour laquelle il se livre à de vaines tentatives pour le pousser à s'enfuir. Dixon, comme il le dit lui-même à un moment donné, vit un *dilemme*¹ : il doit faire respecter la loi et ne peut donc pas laisser sortir quelqu'un qui n'a pas les documents requis ; mais en même temps, la présence de Viktor dans l'aéroport, sa manière de se promener partout en peignoir, de manger des crackers avec du ketchup et de dormir affalé comme il peut sur les banquettes inoccupées, tout cela trouble la tranquillité de cet espace, et surtout dénonce la fragilité implicite du système de règles sur lequel il s'appuie. Viktor veut seulement entrer à New York pour quelques heures, juste le temps de rencontrer le jazzman et de lui demander sa signature, et éventuellement de visiter quelques monuments. Mais Dixon a, en plus, un autre problème : après de longues années de dur travail, il aspire à devenir le Chef absolu du JKE, et pour cela il attend la visite d'inspection d'un comité ministériel. Il en est, en somme, à la fin de son Epreuve Décisive, et son Epreuve Glorifiante est donc imminente : il ne peut pas, dans ces conditions, se permettre de laisser subsister cette « erreur de système » qu'est la présence de Viktor. Le comité ne le comprendrait pas.

Malgré tout, moyennant toute une série de pathèmes affectant les deux personnages, les choses se passeront finalement très bien – Viktor obtiendra la signature du jazzman et Dixon sa promotion – et toute l'histoire sera perçue comme un terrible cauchemar ou, selon la perspective qu'on adopte, comme un conte de fées. Du reste, et c'est là un des « messages » du film, la lutte entre les deux sujets n'aura, au fond, jamais eu lieu. Car, à la vérité, l'Amérique qui se refuse à Viktor, cette Amérique qu'il veut tant connaître, elle ne se situe pas de l'autre côté de la frontière (transparente, réfléchissante) de l'espace aéroportuaire, elle est déjà là depuis le début, partout présente à l'intérieur même de l'aéroport, entre les personnes et parmi les choses, dans les technologies et les langages, dans les interactions humaines, les perspectives existentielles, les interdits, les désirs, les affects.

4.2. *Resémantisation des espaces*

Mais cette histoire énoncée n'est pas le seul texte du film. Elle en constitue seulement le niveau le plus apparent. Et le semblant de théorie sociale qui s'en dégage ne mérite pas qu'on s'y attarde. Cependant, à l'intérieur même du film, ce premier texte se trouve traduit en un autre, celui-là réellement vécu par Viktor car il constitue tout simplement *la forme de son expérience*. La véritable histoire de Viktor (si on laisse un moment de côté ses programmes narratifs les plus superficiels) est en effet celle de *l'invention progressive d'un texte*, plus précisément celle de la resémantisation de l'espace aéroportuaire, opération qui va transformer cette zone institutionnellement neutre et indifférente en un lieu plein de choses et de signes, d'abris et d'amis, de besoins et de désirs, en un nouveau « texte », support possible, aux yeux de Viktor, pour une nouvelle forme de vie.

¹ Sur le dilemme, cf. Greimas 1976a.

Dans un premier temps, sous son regard d'étranger apeuré, l'espace du JKF est un simple continuum expérientiel, pure matière sans aucune forme (ni de l'expression ni du contenu). Greimas (1976b) aurait dit : une *extension* plutôt qu'un espace. En revanche, le temps passant, cet espace acquiert peu à peu, sous le regard de plus en plus expert et compétent du héros, une forme très précise et en même temps dynamique, une articulation qui ne sera plus institutionnelle mais idiosyncratique et qui ayant affaire avec l'*usage* plutôt qu'avec la langue, va produire une nouvelle expression et de nouveaux contenus. Cette transformation narrative qui fait passer l'aéroport du statut de non-lieu à celui de lieu (Augé), ou de celui de lieu à celui d'espace pratique (De Certeau), est un procès typique de résémantisation par des opérations progressives de bricolage : retrouver dans la dernière *gate* de l'aérogare un bon abri pour dormir ; réadapter les sièges au corps qui veut dormir ; réussir à éteindre la lumière pendant la nuit ; utiliser les toilettes pour son hygiène quotidienne, se raser et rester en forme. Mais aussi utiliser la monnaie que les gens oublient dans les charriots à bagages pour acheter – en parfait américain – de gros sandwich chez Burger King. Et encore, faire un *usage productif* des guides touristiques en plusieurs langues, les lire au kiosque de l'aéroport pour en comparer les versions et ainsi, peu à peu, apprendre l'anglais – d'où la possibilité de bavarder avec les passagers ou de mieux suivre sur les écrans les péripéties de la révolution krakhozienne. L'apothéose de ce bricolage est la construction, avec des matériaux abandonnés dans l'aéroport par quelque entreprise de construction, d'une énorme fontaine, cadeau pour la bien-aimée.

4.3. Le régime du Panopticon

Ce deuxième texte, construit par la progressive réinvention de l'espace aéroportuaire, sera lui-même traduit en un autre niveau de textualité, qu'on pourrait appeler, avec Foucault (1974), *isotopie panoptique*, ou régime diffus de contrôle. Il faut en effet remarquer que presque toutes les actions de Viktor, ses trouvailles pour survivre, ses ruses pour manger et gagner de l'argent tout comme ses rencontres avec sa petite amie et son travail de maçon, sont constamment observés, sinon espionnés, par Dixon sur une multitude d'écrans installés dans son bureau et connectés avec les caméras distribuées aux quatre coins de l'espace aéroportuaire. Le travail propre de Dixon est précisément celui de l'*observateur* : son regard professionnel est hypercompétent, il sait reconnaître tous les détails, tous les signes, toutes les attitudes minimales, tout ce qui peut faire d'un faux touriste un possible ennemi sinon un terroriste². Dixon est un acteur qui tout en apparaissant comme l'Anti-sujet de l'histoire sur la dimension pragmatique, joue le rôle de l'actant Observateur (Fontanille 1989) sur la dimension cognitive. Avant même d'être doté de la modalité du savoir, il *sait qu'il y a quelque chose à savoir*. Dixon doit regarder et savoir : c'est son travail et il y va de sa carrière ; et par conséquent il peut savoir, notamment grâce au système de caméras (acteur non humain délégué par lui) qu'il a distribuées dans toutes les salles de l'aéroport, y compris les toilettes. C'est ainsi que la bizarre expérience vécue par Viktor est pour Dixon un *texte à construire*, une suite d'actions à structurer pour en saisir le sens. Et comme le spectateur voit ce que Dixon voit, il comprend avec lui le sens – signification et direction – du récit.

Face à Dixon, le Sujet narratif Viktor se qualifie très tôt comme l'actant cognitif complémentaire et symétrique de l'Observateur, plus précisément comme l'Informateur. En effet, il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un acteur qui est espionné de haut, sans le savoir, par les caméras de Dixon, mais d'un actant qui est doté de la modalité « *savoir qu'il y a des choses à faire savoir* ».

² Sur la notion de regard professionnel, cf. Goodwin 1994.

4.3.1. Une saisie esthétique

Une des scènes les plus significatives du film permet de voir que Viktor a très bien compris le jeu sémiotique que, tout à fait involontairement, il est amené à jouer : ces caméras partout présentes, elles sont là pour l'espionner, pour suivre ses mouvements, pour anticiper ses intentions. Cherchant par tous les moyens possibles à se libérer de Viktor, Dixon lui dit que pour quelques minutes, à midi, les portes de l'aéroport ne seront pas contrôlées : aucun agent de la Sûreté ne sera là pour les surveiller. Donc Viktor pourra s'enfuir ! « Pendant cinq minutes, l'Amérique ne sera plus fermée pour toi ». Et Dixon file aussitôt vers sa salle de contrôle dans l'idée d'assister sur les écrans à la fuite tant attendue de Viktor. Mais Viktor a très vite compris le mécanisme de délégation du faire humain à des acteurs non humains : s'il n'y a pas d'agents de la Sûreté devant les portes, c'est parce qu'y sont installés des appareils qui font leur travail, peut-être même mieux qu'eux, des caméras connectées aux écrans de Dixon, lui qui veut connaître tous les mouvements de sa proie. Sachant donc qu'on l'espionne, Viktor s'arrête devant la sortie en un long moment d'hésitation : au-delà de cette porte, semble-t-il penser, il ne sera jamais un simple touriste étranger parmi tant d'autres mais un sans-papier sans toit ni loi. A cet instant précis, le régime visuel du film reflète sur le plan plastique la thématique narrative, en produisant aussi une parfaite *saisie esthétique*³. Le plan sur Viktor en arrêt devant la porte vitrée est en effet construit à partir de l'extérieur, comme si c'était le monde qui regardait Viktor au moment où il s'apprête à s'échapper. De plus, la vitre de cette porte transparente est aussi réfléchissante, en sorte que le monde extérieur se superpose au visage de Viktor [Illustr. 1]. En somme, en ce moment d'hésitation, c'est-à-dire de perte du savoir faire pragmatique, se déclenche une sorte de défaillance cognitive et pathémique. Le sujet devient objet. Vice versa, le monde, devenu sujet, se tourne vers lui, l'extériorité le surplombe en le bloquant et en l'obligeant à reculer. Après quoi, alors que Viktor retrouve sa subjectivité, il n'est plus le même : il a décidé de rester et d'attendre la possibilité d'entrer aux Etats-Unis avec la permission nécessaire, c'est-à-dire avec un /pouvoir faire/ socialement partagé. Il comprend ainsi le pouvoir des caméras !



1

4.3.2. Jeux optiques

A partir de ce moment, le rythme d'alternance entre le point de vue de celui qui regarde et de celui qui est regardé s'accélère. Selon un jeu cinématographique déjà bien répertorié⁴, Viktor

³ Greimas 1987.

⁴ Cf. Casetti 1990.

regarde vers la caméra, vers Dixon qui est en train de l'observer, et en même temps vers le spectateur qui suit le film dans la salle. Alors, à se sentir surpris, Dixon perd contenance, son visage pour ainsi dire se décompose et, essayant de faisant semblant que c'est seulement par hasard que son regard se pose ici ou là, il oriente prestement la caméra dans une autre direction. Viktor en profite pour se cacher sous la caméra, si bien que l'autre perd sa trace, et par suite aussi toute compétence interprétative : « Où est-t-il ? où est-t-il donc passé ? ». Enfin, troisième renversement, Viktor s'approche de nouveau de la caméra, de si près que son visage paraît déformé et, s'adressant nerveusement (mais itérativement) à son adversaire qui continue de l'observer, il s'écrie : « J'attends, j'attends ». Dixon comprend alors que Viktor – Informateur désormais hyper-compétent – a gagné. Furibond, il s'aperçoit alors, en se retournant, que tout au long de cette scène toute son équipe, tous les agents de la Sûreté n'ont cessé de le regarder faire : « Qu'avez vous donc là à me regarder ? Allez, allez, filez ! ».

Ainsi donc, tout en sachant qu'il a des choses à faire savoir, Viktor ne fait maintenant plus rien pour les cacher aux yeux impitoyables de son Anti-sujet et Observateur. Il n'en a plus ni le besoin ni l'envie. En d'autres termes, tandis que son adversaire essaie d'instaurer un régime de contrôle (où à son *vouloir voir* devrait correspondre un *ne pas vouloir être vu*), lui, Viktor, récuse ce régime tout simplement en se montrant avec un parfait sans-gêne devant les caméras. De la part de Viktor, il n'y a ni ostentation ni pudeur ni modestie mais, avec une certaine perversion, un régime du *ne pas vouloir ne pas être vu*, un « j'mèn-foutisme » programmé qui annule le programme panoptique de Dixon⁵. Viktor sortira gagnant dans cette confrontation cognitive parce que, comme Forrest Gump, il est doté d'une *transparence* absolue : il n'a rien à cacher, il est là seulement pour obtenir la signature du jazzman. Transparence : le matériel le plus utilisé dans les aéroports, justement pour délimiter intérieur et extérieur sur la dimension pragmatique (mais non cognitive⁶), c'est bien sûr le verre. Cependant, les vitres du JKE, on l'a vu, ne sont pas seulement transparentes, elles sont de plus réfléchissantes : elles reflètent ce qui est au dehors. Si bien qu'à la fin, quand Viktor réussira à quitter l'aérogare pour se diriger vers New York, la célèbre *skyline* de la ville n'apparaîtra pas filmée directement mais réfléchie par le bâtiment de l'aéroport [cf. ill. 2].



⁵ Sur ces « jeux optiques », cf. Landowski 1989.

⁶ Cf. Hammad 2006.

4.4. *Emergence du reality show*

La parodie est très proche, et elle arrive en effet : ce sera le quatrième et dernier texte du film. On se souvient de la scène où Viktor devient un Informateur compétent en montrant non seulement qu'il se sait observé mais aussi qu'il sait jouer avec les caméras. A la fin de cette scène on se rend compte que pendant que Dixon regardait Viktor, les autres agents de la Sûreté le regardaient, lui, en train de regarder Viktor. Viktor devient donc un double objet de spectacle. Mais il ne s'agit pas dans les deux cas du même spectacle : si Dixon regarde Viktor à des fins stratégiques – pour espionner ses mouvements –, les autres le regardent avec une curiosité innocente, comme un personnage de cinéma, simplement pour savoir comment se terminera cette affaire : « Voyons comment il va pouvoir se sortir de cette situation... ». Plusieurs fois au fil du récit, les hommes de Dixon se montrent fascinés par les petites aventures de cet homme un peu bizarre qu'est Viktor. Ils le regardent se dépêtrer avec ses petits problèmes, assistent à ses découvertes au jour le jour, participent à son étrange apprentissage anthropologique. A un certain moment, il en viennent à parier entre eux sur son sort : « Réussira-t-il oui ou non à aller à New York ? »

En somme, dans ce quatrième texte, Viktor n'est plus le migrant qu'il fallait observer avec persévérance et inquiétude pour décider si un jour il serait digne, ou non, d'entrer au cœur de l'Empire et de faire partie de l'univers culturel et social de l'Amérique. Au contraire, il devient le protagoniste comique d'un film ou, mieux, d'une sorte d'émission de télévision relevant d'un genre très précis : le *reality show*. Prenez donc au hasard un type un peu bizarre, enfermez-le dans un espace clos, fournissez-lui les conditions minimales de survie, associez-le à d'autres types du même acabit. Et observez le spectacle. Le divertissement est assuré : tout deviendra un jeu, avec, bien sûr, des vainqueurs et des vaincus. L'influence d'un autre film célèbre, *The Truman show*, est ici évidente. S'il y a partout dans l'espace aéroportuaire autant d'écrans que de caméras, c'est parce que, comme déjà Big Brother le savait bien, l'écran télévisuel peut devenir un parfait espion.

5. Actions et passions spatiales

Ce qui permet de dire qu'à sa manière *The Terminal* propose une véritable théorie des aéroports contemporains devrait à présent être clair. Le vrai héros de ce film, en effet, ce n'est ni Viktor ni Dixon ; et ce qu'on y trouve de réellement significatif, ce n'est pas leur confrontation narrative, d'ailleurs quelque peu élémentaire. Le vrai héros, le vrai protagoniste de ces quatre textes qui se traduisent l'un l'autre tout au long du film, c'est bel et bien l'aéroport, le JFK. L'espace aéroportuaire n'est pas un simple décor pour des expériences humaines ou des péripéties sociales qui lui seraient étrangères. Au contraire, il faut le considérer comme un véritable actant narratif qui commande, par délégation, un certain nombre de programmes d'action et toutes sortes de passions chez des acteurs divers, humains ou non. Le JFK est avant tout un milieu ambiant où des choses se font, où se déroulent des actions. Et l'aéroport est aussi un lieu où on se rencontre, où des rapports intersubjectifs se nouent et se transforment en permanence. Mais surtout, l'aéroport est un espace qui *fait faire*, un Destinateur qui manipule les Sujets pour activer des programmes narratifs. En un mot, c'est un actant, un *topos* (Hammad 2006) investi de modalités toujours changeantes et qui contribuent de façon déterminante au développement narratif.

Réexaminons donc brièvement la série des délégations qui, à partir de cet espace, font émerger des personnes, des choses, et même d'autres espaces. Première et principale délégation, celle, sur le plan institutionnel, par laquelle l'aéroport confie à Dixon, acteur humain, la surveillance de ses frontières. Si l'espace veut rester entrouvert, il faut un actant pour contrôler ses seuils d'entrée et de sortie : telle est la fonction de Dixon, acteur délégué (par débrayage) qui assume le mandat de sauvegarder l'espace aéroportuaire et ses issues vers l'extérieur. Il y a ensuite la

délégation de Dixon aux caméras, prothèses tactiques de son regard d'Observateur compétent, et aux écrans qui garantissent son *pouvoir voir* sur l'ensemble de l'espace de l'aéroport, tant vers l'intérieur que vers l'extérieur. Il y a en outre la distribution verticale des étages du bâtiment, qui produit des hiérarchies parmi les acteurs qui les parcourent selon la catégorie haut/bas ; et puis, encore, la distinction entre espaces publics (salles d'attente, magasins, restaurants, toilettes) et espaces privés (bureaux, salles pour Vip, consignes), ainsi que toute une série d'autres articulations spatiales qui parlent d'autres choses que d'elles-mêmes et donnent une représentation dynamique et une évaluation possible des interactions entre êtres humains, ou entre humains et non humains.

On peut donc affirmer qu'avant la confrontation narrative, pour ainsi dire standard, entre Sujet et Anti-sujet, il y en a une autre : celle, présupposée, entre Destinateur et Anti-destinateur, qui se manifeste, au niveau des acteurs, à travers l'opposition entre l'espace géant et ouvert de l'aéroport (Anti-destinateur, ou Destinateur de l'Anti-sujet) et celui d'un espace très petit et très intime, celui de la boîte à cacahouètes (américaines, cela va sans dire) qui renferme la collection de signatures et qui est sans aucun doute à interpréter comme la figure du Destinateur du Sujet de ce récit. Cet objet contenant est le symbole le plus évident de ce qui, pour Viktor, est vraiment important : son « chez soi », sa patrie. Quand Dixon lui propose de se déclarer prisonnier politique, exilé de son pays, il réplique : « Pourquoi devrais-je avoir peur de retourner en Krakhozie ? C'est mon pays ! » Et au chauffeur de taxi qui, dans la dernière scène, lui demande où aller, il répond sans hésitation : « Je veux retourner chez moi ». Extraterrestre ?

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PRETENDING DEMOCRACY. DELEGATION OF AGENCY IN URBAN PLANNING

Gunnar Sandin
Lund University, Sweden
gunnar.sandin@arkitektur.lth.se

Abstract

In this paper the democratic dilemma of community members' participation in the creation of urban space is discussed, in reflection of the political, i.e. change-promoting capacity of semiotic theory. The discussion departs in a reflection on recent thoughts on democracy as a matter of subjectivity-formation (Mouffe 1993; Rancière 2010a). In relation to a case of urban transformation in Malmö, Sweden, and in a theoretical discussion of the possibilities for un-authorized (Sassen 2002) and self-organised (Purcell 2010) democratic subjects to make their voice heard, an attempt is made here to render spatial decision-making as a matter of delegated agency. This extended analysis is basically emanating from the actantial semiotics of Greimas (1987) that was to be taken further specifically into space and architecture by Hammad in the late 1980es (2002), and partly appropriated into the sociology of objects (Latour 1992). Here, in this paper, a clustering of mainly architecture-associated agency is regarded as representing governmental wills that confront citizens on an everyday basis. It is suggested that spatial decision-making generally, and municipal, regional, national and corporeal urban planning procedures in particular, apart from occasionally being scrutinised by socially liable architects, by legalised public consultation, and by mass media coverage, are usually a quite concealed and "un-public" matter, that could benefit from viewpoints grounded in critical agency analysis.

1. Introduction: the semiotics of societal change

The subject of democracy is generally today seen as a topic that belongs primarily to political science because it addresses the empirical matters of national states, real world conditions and elective mechanisms. The communicational features of democracy, relating for instance to how citizens are addressed, is therefore rather seldom seen as a case for semiotics, the discipline

supposed to be concerned more with general forms for meaning-production. However, this division of labour has of course not hindered “semiotic” writers from dealing critically with the political power of messages, as seen for instance in the stream of thought following Roland Barthes’ presentation of the idea of a “mythological plane” of signification implicating that everyday popular culture has a hidden political agenda, or in interrogations of existential and ethical unjustness, to be found in the currently expanding field of social semiotics. Nor did any academic division stop the Bari-Lecce school of semiotics from developing the thoughts of Rossi-Landi about the strong materiality but also changeability of societies, into a program that include for instance the following thesis:

Semiotics is a critical science not only in Kant’s sense, that is, in the sense that it investigates its own conditions of possibility [...]. Semiotics is a critical science in the sense that it interrogates the human world today on the assumption that it is not the only possible world, not the definitive world as established by some conservative ideology. Critical semiotics looks at the world as a possible world, one among many possible worlds, therefore a world subject to confutation (Petrilli 2007).

In what follows, this text deals to a large extent with the possibility to change matters. It does so basically in reflection of “agency” in semiotic theories, however a departure is made in a brief reflection on contemporary philosophy and political science, and as a whole, the text stays quite close to recent critical theories about citizens’ representation in environmental decision-making.

In contemporary philosophical critique of current hegemonies of political practice, and the effects of deliberative democracies, the idea of a contested space that allows emancipatory wills to emerge has been forwarded as describing the basic idea of what constitutes a democracy. Democracy, as it were, is a collection of a manifold of radically differing voices and wishes. This idea, of contestation, or discrepancy, has been expressed through notions such as “dissensus” (Ranciere 2010b) or “agony” (Mouffe 2008). Partly in line with these ideas, albeit with some notes also on the pragmatic side of societal participation, this paper regards urban space, and the mediation thereof as crucial for our sense of democracy, i.e. the sharing of society.

2. Democracy, dissensus and space

In recent critical theories, democracy is regarded as a form for societal existence as much as an organisational principle for governing. The critique is directed towards the ways in which the world is mediated and explained by strong parts in the actual political realm, and the driving force of the critique of this reigning definition and self-proclaimed representation of democratic systems is the blunt existence of real, often “dirty” but also beautiful, circumstances in everyday life that inevitably escape the framework of those democracies, i.e. realities that regardless of their belonging to a supposedly ideal representative state system, or instead to those states along “the axes of evil” (described as such by the American Administration after the terror attacks in September 2001), that lack proper deliberative orders. The remedy to the discrepant views of what constitutes democracy, from the point of view of critical philosophy, is to acknowledge, further and foster a thinking in terms of dissensus, i.e. promoting the mutual existence of more than one view, thus confronting what is taken for granted as *agreement*, or compromised will, in ruling and decision-making.

Whether the critique emanates from the perspective of political theory and history, such as in Chantal Mouffe’s (1993: 62) conception of a “radical or plural democracy” or from a discourse

more in reference to philosophy's division between *polis* and politics, such as Jacques Rancière's (2010b: 42) this critical field argues for a democratic model based in an acknowledgment of the co-existence of conflicting perspectives, and the rights of several subjectivities. Emancipatory subjectivities are thought of as demonstrating, altering or subverting the failures of dominating political paradigms. These subjectivities may appear on the one hand through a partial acceptance of traditional (liberal/deliberative) democratic systems, by way of acting both with and against existing hegemonies and reigning political worldviews (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 189). But such alternative political subjectivity is also produced, more fundamentally according to Rancière (2010b), through the idiosyncratic actions, redistributions and standpoints that we actualise whenever we assign ourselves a partition of social space alternative to the one proclaimed by current "regimes" (Rancière 2005: 13). Mouffe as well as Rancière view artistic activity as a possibility to construct (visualise) the new types of subjectivities that are needed to conquer the conservative menu of possible subjective roles such as consumers, owners or experiencers. Artistic activity could in their view therefore make a real difference – not as per se standing out from the non-artistic rest in society – but as showing in one instance more than one perspective and presenting new identities and spatial realities. Rancière, more than Mouffe, takes pains (as a writer in the tradition of aesthetics) to try to figure out what kind of art can actually produce real dissensus. Mouffe is more content with a general activist potential in art as an "agonistic" possibility of making emancipatory space in the world. Both Rancière and Mouffe discuss the spatial features of public artistic action that make visible, or take place in, contemporary urban milieu. More seldom however, do these two major proponents for a production of alternative subjectivities refer explicitly to architecture or architectural practice, which is strange because of the absolute (physical) impact that architecture has on space, thus on the governmental as well as the emancipatory politics of spatial division. Furthermore, the becoming of architecture is a procedure that changes communal comprehension of their surrounding life-worlds, and introduces divisions of time-space. It thus works as a fundamental divider also of societal rights. For architecture and urban planning, the problem of democratic inclusion of several wills appears in processes of public consultation, formalised in many countries as Environmental Impact Assessments, therefore also bearing the marks and variation of national political history and procedures. These wills are however often isolated in the processes themselves and needs, from a democratic perspective, to be put more clearly in relation to procedural elements such as: the division of city planning labour, the material impact of long building construction processes, and the visual rhetoric and timeliness of architectural proposal-making. A recognition of such major and minor actors, including human operations but also the legal, visual and material circumstances (Hammad 2002; Latour 2005; Yaneva 2012), are fundamental for a mapping of the politics of marginalization. Actantial (or agency) approaches has appeared as the basic idea in a number of interpretations and applications, such as in research domains associated with Actor Network Theory (ANT) and Science and Technology Studies (STS). In agency oriented theory, major and minor human actors are viewed as forming situational agency in connection with material, legal and other "silent" or "objective" circumstances. Such agency-oriented approaches could also support a differentiation between types of authorisation that are not sufficiently transparent in everyday planning practice (Sandin 2002). Authorization, as a key attribution to the members of a democratic society, can be more fully categorised, so as to increase transparency into decision-making and help capturing otherwise marginalised voices (Sassen 2002).

3. Preference and Pretence in Democracy

In a meditation on Plato's view on democracy, Rancière renders democracy as the seventh "right to rule," a conditional and hazardous right beside the six natural or unquestionable rights

that follow a governmental principle of strength already at work in life: the wealthy over the poor, the elderly over the young, parents over children, master over slaves, nobles over villains, and the learned over the ignorant (2010a: 51). Rancière acknowledges, with Plato, these six “rights predicated on a natural difference” as established from a common sense or tribal point of view, i.e. a view where no externally constructed elements are taken into account in decisions about what has governmental value. Rancière follows the Platonian model to the extent that he sees in the seventh right, which is the democratic one, the possibility that those who are ruled over, rather than being rulers themselves, are given a supplementary chance. Plato nominated this right hazardous or more precisely a “drawing of lots,” since the implementation of this right includes individuals and wills that may destabilise the system itself.

One could of course in our times, when societal roles are more frequently re-evaluated and re-constructed, have good reasons to say that there are no natural rules of power, or at least no essential ones, only hegemonies that include them as taken for granted. Instead of “natural”, which is a term that often blurs the difference between “habitual”, “ordinary”, and “biological,” it is probably more fruitful to make the distinction here as that between “conventional” and “motivated” grounds for human action, which is also what seems to be at stake in Rancière’s (and originally Plato’s) discussion.¹ The rights, all seven of them, then become rights that could be discussed in terms of having for the moment either motivated or conventional grounds. And democracy, as the seventh “right to rule,” could then be viewed as conditioned by a preferential choice (of political system, of persons to lead, etc.), since preference implies a motivated selection process.²

4. The multiple agency of spatial will

In order to get closer to the mechanisms of marginalisation in urban planning, we then need to discuss where marginalisation occurs, and on what level democratic authorization is given to a citizen. A penetrating insight into the organisation of authority can be made through the notion of “delegation” (Latour 1992), i.e. the capacity of material, legal and ritualized bearers of architectural space to hold agency. That lets us view planning as a contested space where “architecture and the social mutually define themselves.” (Yaneva 2012: 46) Hence, a more vivid critical reflection is possible of contemporary trends in physical planning and architecture, where multi-agent forms of exploitation, branding and privatisation are part of everyday practice. Crucial for an agency-based understanding of contemporary spatial and architectural landscapes are the moments of authorization and delegation (Latour 1992; Hammad 2002; Sandin 2009). An important principle of division was made in an experiment by Hammad (2002) revealing different types of authorization such as affiliated positions, temporary delegation, written laws and etiquette. Empirically, Hammad’s analysis concerned primarily interior spatial division, but his observation of “actantial roles” is applicable, as here, also to urban space and matters of planning. Hammad’s investigation bear the traits of a structuralist desire for a general validity, but contains also reasoning and comments under ways, about specific societal issues such as ownership of sight in cultures where veiling is used, and the importance of dividing time to achieve spatial and social change.

Recent approaches in political space theory have considered the agency potential of otherwise marginalised interest groups by pointing to the necessity to differentiate and articulate collaborative action possibilities. In this vein, Saskia Sassen (2002) recognizes a form of citizenship where the disadvantaged can be seen as “lacking power but counting as actor,” and so possess “presence.” Sassen (2002: 22) exemplifies with two types of civil identity: on the one hand “unauthorised yet recognized” subjects, like the undocumented immigrants that show involvedness and loyalty towards their new location “while legislation as a citizen may continue to evade

them”; and on the other “authorised yet unrecognized” actors like those “housewives and mothers” that have an attributed position in the societal structure, but lack symbolic governmental part, or simply fall into a traditionalist reason of categorization.

Alliances between otherwise incompatible groups and NGOs may rise collective agency, gain authorization but also “build equivalence” (Purcell 2008: 175) enough to become a network and a communicational actor that can be recognized as a counter-part to the neo-liberal forces where land use is business on a daily basis, usually negotiated only amongst a few economically and politically strong actors. Already existing associations and organisations that possess a certain measure of societal authority could contribute to the work of more spontaneously emerged but well formulated activist groups. Even if groups such as homeowners associations in some instances can be judged as conservative and contrary to the interests of radical activists, or even ignorant in matters like race and immigration, collaborative efforts from these actors may have an influence not only as a united emancipatory force, but also on the level of political awareness within the groups themselves (Purcell 2008: 180-181).

Before this discussion about architectural space and democracy continues in a theoretical reflection and conclusion about the agency and rights of those in the margin of decision-making, we will look into a case of physical planning and follow the recent history of the remaking of a square, typical for contemporary urban densification and architectonic infill.

5. Governmental taking-over of space

In 2012 a new 12-storey building was erected as part of renewal of a square in Malmö, Sweden. During the slow progression of this renewal, from a first presentation of ideas in 2002 until the erection of the building in 2012, there was a lack of interest from the major authorizers in listening to what types of place-specific needs and activities that could actually have been contributing to this act of urban renewal (Sandin 2013). Answers to the formalised public consultation showed a large number (approximately 330) of officially delivered written petitions with protests concerning the local consequences in regard to height, location and function. The new square, whether functioning as programmed or not in the future, as a housing and as a node in a commercial web, must therefore be seen as a case of spatial domination, rather than as a creative co-operation with existing local wills. And given the fact that people were also driven away from the area (Sandin 2013) the future potential for “newcomers” (Rancière 2010a: 59) must be regarded as very restricted.



Figure 1. Material agency: fence. Photograph by author.

In the phase when the new building contractor was awaiting a decision on the building permit application for the project, an existing single-story brick building was demolished. For a period of approximately four years, between the approval of the development plans and the actual start of the new construction, the site was cordoned off in various ways, for example in order to protect an occasional soil-quality test, or to accommodate containers filled with equipment. This was done by delegation of spatial obstruction to material forms for agency, communicating to the public that this is no longer their area, and was in practice done through digging activities, placing containers for long periods of time, prohibiting insight through the erecting of fences with signposts, and boards with information about consultants, constructors. In one end of the area physical obstruction was realised by way of blocks of stone (Fig.1 and Fig. 2).



Figure 2. Material agency: blocks of stone. Photograph by author.

Thus, temporally conditioned agency, in connection with the usage of time itself, i.e. delays caused by keeping land free while waiting for decisions and economical solutions. The temporal actors were: letting possible ideas fade out, both from the public, but also through deliberate oblivion the original municipal idea of having rentable apartments; time for scattering and grouping of opinions; waiting out relocation of groups and shop owners in the area, etc. (Sandin 2013).

In the first phases of the project the sketches showed a low enough building to be accepted, and in the second part the building's height was emphasized to give the impression of a landmark and a building offering apartments with an outlook (Fig. 3).



Figure 3. Material agency: building. Photograph by author.

It could be assumed that the big number of written protests to the project was partially an effect of the fact that the majority of protesters were a quite solid economical group, owners of apartments the aesthetic and economic values of which they wanted to protect. These citizens were speaking with a certain measure of authority, capable of formulating quite elaborated reflections, and devoted enough to pursue a formal response procedure. But there were also protesters less familiar with how to raise a voice, and there were also homeless people that resided in the area with no voice at all, not recognized as concerned by the project leaders, nor by the municipality, and neglected also by the neighbouring community.

In the Slussplan case there was no clear-cut global actor in the sense a geographically distanced and financially obscure exploiter, however one could say that the global city is nevertheless present: the new building looks generically "international" in contrast to the immediate neighbourhood of early modern and classical styles. The plan was generated by local actors: politicians, exploiters, financiers and planners, in an attempt to symbolically manifest a local feature (the name of a well-known Swedish film actor), made with a declared ambition by the City Planning Office to create land marks addressing a global receiver, in the sense an anonymous visitor to the centre of Malmö. But precisely because of this locally generated "globalisation", the control of the renewal became even more manifest, and more hidden from the public, allowing nothing of what Sassen (2002) regards as a paradoxically positive feature of globalisation towards the local, namely that it may provide opportunities for disadvantaged individuals and groups, who can gain presence as a collective actor both "in engagement with power but also vis-a-vis each other" (Sassen 2002: 21).

In planning procedures like these, the authorities or even individual civil servants have the authorized and delegated right to summarise opinions, and more importantly, to keep voices separated. Despite a quite elaborated public response procedure, pursued in an act of addressing the wills of those concerned by a new establishment, and showing comments of similar kind by several actors, the same procedure allows the authority to treat the totality of voices as scattered, simply by answering the commenters one after another. This means that opinions about for instance the height of the building in this case, opinions raised for reasons of security by the official examiner, and for reasons of increased shading by the neighbours, could have gained a more collective voice had it been collectively judged, or perhaps even stronger, if the separated actors had been able to "build equivalence" (Purcell 2008: 175) enough to become one clear voice during the process of answering.

6. Concluding remarks on delegation of authorization.

A general problem concerning authorisation appears regularly in planning: who is to take decisions and who is to be included in that decision-making? A clearer recognition of the various forms of possible authorizers in the theoretical discourse of planning would help defining an otherwise somewhat blurry domain, a domain in which the role of the architect become more a project disseminator and less a spatial negotiator. The civil servants of city planning offices have become more of admission agents and less of project advisors, but still with the power to categorise responses and opinions raised in legally stated consultation processes. A more profound articulation of the authorizing capacity of affiliated positions, temporary delegation, law-based, or etiquette-based agents (Hammad 2001) would be a way of making clearer the roles of the close, the intermediate, and the distant actors in the becoming of architecture.

In recognition of what Sassen says about authorization (2002: 12-15), and how it actualises social differences as regards citizenship, the case here studied showed also a need to view formal authorization in relation to what in a local community could be recognized as real agency. A tripartition of what has been discussed above shows first the completely unauthorized actors that

are officially ignored, such as the homeless or the paperless citizen that lead a social life in the urban fabric suddenly actualised by architectonic proposals; Secondly, the authorised but not fully recognised actor represented by private persons and associations that are in the social position to raise an opinion about architecture via formalised committee consultation processes, but still does not necessarily count in the final official definition of participation, partly because they can both be kept apart and summarised by governmental will; And thirdly, the fully authorised and recognised actors, appearing as the political, entrepreneurial and professional agencies that have the actual ability to decide what a design outcome will comprise.

In the network of actors sketched in principal above, the architect appears traditionally as an actor appearing in the third (and major) authorization category, however as a producer also of visual agency (sketches) that fills a rhetorical function also outside the immediate projective hands of the architects themselves.

The remaking of a public square has here served to exemplify the democratic dilemma of addressing, hearing and acknowledging the voices of those who are concerned in renewal of urban situations. Do the philosophical concepts at hand give us scope enough to cover these complex issues? Is the recognition of agony, dissensus, and resistance to elimination of conflict, applicable when urban planning decisions and architectural creation is to be realised? And is participation even a desired request from members of society: who can actually afford the time it takes, or raise the interest needed to be engaged in physical planning? These are common questions raised as soon as participation is at stake theoretically, or actualised in practice. These dilemmas, addressed not only in everyday special practices but as well in philosophy and political theory as concerning the issue of radical equality, emancipation and pretended consensus, has several implications for how planning procedures and architectural competence could be regarded. In a semiotic perspective, placing agency itself in the centre of analysis, architectural formation of urban futures was here shown as a matter “closed beforehand”, with only minimal adjustment possible during public consultation processes, despite the fact that there can be a unified objection from official as well as private voices.

Acts of pretence and appropriation were here highlighted as important for both individual and common parts of supposedly democratic decision-making. As a way to consider these aspects in theorization about participation, in society in general, but also specifically in the practice of planning, it was suggested that a more profound consideration of the ways in which spatial agency is divided, formalised, delegated and operationalized could be made. Such a division, hence a proliferation of actors at hand, would benefit from an approach where the “close”, “intermediate” and “distant” traditional actors are seen a linked also to the semiotic means at hand, including visual and material objects. Such an articulation, that would necessarily also include the temporary ownership of spatial production has the potential to break with rigid polarisation in theorisation on democracy, but also on an applied level, with static organisation in practice that lacks communicational reciprocity. On a theoretical level, semiotic investigations of what time itself can do as an actor in decision processes, may be taken more into account by acknowledging, as here implicated, cognizable governmental actions such as “fading out”, “oblivion”, “prolongation” and “waiting”.

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(Endnotes)

¹ The common habit of referring to Charles S Peirce and the separation between symbols (as conventionally grounded) on the one hand and icons/indexes (as motivated by a given situation) on the other, is in a closer examination not necessarily completely consistent but must include also Peirce's distinction between firstness, secondness and thirdness (cf. Sonesson (1999) on primary and secondary iconicity, where "secondary" implies a clue before the recognition of the sign). However in a first approximate take the traditional distinction between "conventional" and "motivated" coincides with Peirce's claim about convention as the ground for the comprehension of symbols.

² I avoid, again, the epithet "natural" when speaking of selection, in order not to be mistaken for a neo-Darwinian advocate of irreversible developmental succession. I take here, without any further problematization, "preference" and "selection" to serve reasonably well as terms denoting intuitive drives for human action.

CONNOTATIONS OF EQUATED SIGNS IN MODERN URBAN SPACES

Sergio Marilson Kulak
Londrina State University, Brazil
sergiokulak@gmail.com

Miguel Luiz Contani
Londrina State University, Brazil
contani@sercomtel.com.br

Dirce Vasconcellos Lopes
Londrina State University, Brazil
dircevl@sercomtel.com.br

Maria José Guerra de Figueiredo Garcia
Londrina State University, Brazil
majogue@uol.com.br

Abstract

This study is aimed at analyzing the potential influence on the representation resulting from the visual transformation undergone by the urban space in Londrina (Paraná state, southern Brazil) because of the implementation of a project for removal of publicity signs from the visual landscape in which they had been present for decades. The city population is 500 thousand inhabitants, and it ranks the fourth largest in that region of the country. A presupposition is that the urban signs become “emptied” inasmuch as their prime signification is shifted onto newer understandings when a connection is made with what is suggested by Roland Barthes’s concept of mythologies. In the case under study, the urban aesthetics is in focus, being that the notion of excess stops connoting the senses of luxury and sophistication, and starts to suggest the idea of surplus, leftover, remainder, all resulting in visual pollution. The study is exploratory in nature and phenomenological in method. Photography is utilized as a resource for data gathering and analysis support. The concept of symbolization is a key element to describe the process of representation of the city image.

1. Introduction


Understanding the city as home to an immense variety of signs that spread in polyphony, means to look at publicity and advertisement messages as a considerable source of urban language. Signs can be found on the roads, avenues, shops, buildings, indoors or on the street, all over, in a permanent invitation for interpretation and (re)signification. On the other hand, the removal of publicity signs from a visual landscape in which they have been present for decades, superimpose a set of new connotations onto the landscape, as was the case of the Projeto Cidade Limpa (Clean City Project) adopted recently by some large and medium size Brazilian cities like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba and Londrina.

The urban phenomenon is experienced through the manifestations that occur in cities. In the daily flow – the crowds, the vehicle traffic, the buildings that emerge through the pathways, the nature that expands in the squares, fields and roads and the interrelations between individuals that populate the urban – manifest the changes that man constantly foments in the environment, such as buildings, streets openings, the population and the consumption of the city as a whole. When something is removed from the visual field, a “meaningful absence” is created – which is what this study seeks to understand.

Gradually, the cities enhance the imagination of its residents and visitors, with many signs that perform different operations in the mind of the viewer, among them, the signs of commercial messages. The pathways are filled with commercial establishments, formerly with small stalls and groceries to hypermarkets and malls of today. The signs emerge and proliferate stimulating the sale and consumption of goods and / or services, with publicity constituting a strong component of urban image.

By showing themselves as a differential in the sales process, brands began to increasingly exploit this feature, characterizing it as a strong element of acceptance and extremely effective in convincing the consuming public. The publicity reached the streets, and the brands started to use the physical spaces, as also the city pathways to promote the services, and the media used are posters, displays, billboards, signs, up to the use of technology with digital dashboards, interactive shop windows and other formats.

What is relevant, however, is to estimate how the publicity acquires a capacity to transform the urban space, by making variations that can modify the imagery speech of these environments; it hides the senses settled in space with the customs and habits obtained through time, transmuting the environment for the meanings that become commercial, and no longer the matters that were endeavor by city residents.



Picture 1: Higienópolis Avenue (Londrina), Gleba Palhano way, before the implementation of the Clean City Law; **Source:** Janela Londrinense. Photography: Roberto Custódio.

The transformations reach alarming levels, to the point of some Brazilian cities awaken to the interest in promoting a visual cleaning to the environment, in other words to establish parameters for placing advertisements in the city ambience, occupying the streets, the urban ways, and not those commercials that have taken arbitrarily, the entire city. It leads to a concern about the use of the urban ambience and what the representation projections can cause in the city's image viewers –that is what the justification of the Clean City Law was all about.

Large state capitals in Brazil, like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Curitiba started a process in the revitalization of the city regarding the use of wall advertisings and signs in the visual environment. Not long after that, other cities, as Ribeirão Preto, Londrina and Osasco, also joined the movement and release their versions of the Clean City Law, paying attention to the people's well-being and the rational use of the city spaces by the market.

With the implementation of the new law, the environments refresh themselves and re-display the frontages hidden in the signs of shops. With the withdraw of billboards and totems of identification, the traffic through the pathways acquire new formats and urban use begins to concentrate in the freely image that the city used to express, rather than the images of brands and advertisements that pile up on the blocks: the city transforms itself again, but now rescues its own history amid the image emanation. Empty spaces now form the blank area that produces sense.

This research illustrates how the space undergoes certain changes by the interference of advertising images allocated in the urban ambience of the city of Londrina – Brazil, flexed from their first meaning, which will mislead the perception of the city's residents, and how this is remodeled with the removal of several commercial signs and the establishment of the Clean City Law. Theoretical references include the works of Ferrara (1993, 2000), Canevacci (1997) and Lynch (1999). Photography will act as a methodology of data gathering and analysis.

2. The city image

There is an appraisal that the onlooker of the city involuntarily produces regarding its environment, and he does so by means of representations that vary not only because of his sociocultural background, but also because of the uses and habits he associates with a particular location. Nevertheless, his classifications or ratings are not static; they inevitably change since the city is in a continuous state of flux, so he absorbs that urban experience by means of this daily living and the urban images he conceives.

According to Lynch (1999), the observer selects, organizes and attributes signification to what he sees. Therefore, the city's image varies from each observer, this will be only a framed image of the city as a sort of selection. According to the author, "the city is an overlap of individual images" (Lynch 1999: 51), so mentally, certain areas appear to be expressed in all that is the city. They work as microimages that, through customs and habits, will lead to greater significance.

In accordance to Canevacci (1997: 35), "understand the city means to collect fragments." A plurality of meanings can be found. For the author, the population live the city, and at the same time is lived by the city. Naturally, the observer experiences the urban in its transformations, by consuming it, simultaneously, by the daily experience.

From the moment that a person establishes a contact with the space, it is natural to perform certain meaning processes, in which that environment will characterize and thereby ensure idea to the place. It is vital for a person to build this idea, because it will depend on her to perform the process of localization and identification of the spaces in the city. For Lynch (1999), this process occurs with the establishment of three intelligibility levels: the identity, which will ensure the singleness of an area; the structure, which is the physical and spatial connection of the place; and the meaning, which are the senses and representations that the user of urban spaces guarantees to the environment.

Environmental images, therefore, are products of a bilateral process between the observer and its ambience. However, the “urban image is not tight or rigid, but is caught in a fluid, dynamic and selective process: seizes, and attracts this representation from the individual or collective repertoire” (Ferrara 1993: 71-72, our translation). Over time, the change and maturity of individual repertoire and the modifications that occur in urban areas, the images that have been created, can be reframed and vary several times.

The construction of the environmental image of the city viewer is the result of representations that it is faced daily. These, in turn, are composed of a large polyphony; the results are synesthetic representations of locations, which support the creation of a total representation from that space. The representations come from environmental characteristics, which can be olfactory, tactile, kinetic, among others, but above all visual, since “the mental image we recorded from city focus on a basic requirement: the visual quality” (Ferrara 1993: 252, our translation). These polis sensorial qualities ensure the identity and force of the environment signification. Canevacci, (1997), points out that the city is the place for the sight and that is why “visual communication becomes his featured characteristic. [...] Communication is the journey of difference that contains the meaning of information. Urban communication nettled these differences, by multiplying, coexist and made them get into conflict.”(Canevacci 1997: 43).

From the access of the ambience characteristics, the city viewer will be able to formulate their own image of the city, filling the individual images of representations and moving from simple visual observation of the environment to its significance, in other words, from visually to visibility. According to Ferrara (2002: 105, our translation), “the passage of pure concept to iconic exploration leads to signify reproduction process, that comes from visually to achieve the cognitive dynamics of visibility”. The author advocates the theory that the urban elements extrapolate the simple relation of visual data, obtaining a representation that surpasses the environmental image relations, but obtain a genuine signification, going from visually, that is a mere visual observation, for visibility, becoming a reflection from visual data, which turns into a cognitive flow.

3. Clean City Law

The Law #14,223 from September 26th 2006, the Clean City Law, as it became known, is an initiative for the first time in Brazil in São Paulo, by the mayor Gilberto Kassab. It aims to order the elements of the urban landscape, aiming, among other things, attack the visual pollution and environmental degradation. Consequently, the law preserves the cultural and historical memory of the city and facilitates the access to the features of the urban context, in other words, it seeks to recover certain urban senses that were lost over time.

According to the primer of the Law #14,223/06, the citizens have the right to experience a clean landscape, which guarantees more freedom and security in public areas, ensuring the supremacy of the shared resources over corporate interests. Thus, the Law focuses its efforts on a balance of the elements of the city, creating the visual depollution of the urban landscape and ensuring a better quality of life for environmental users, and to ensure the well-organized management of public spaces, with permission of certain publicities, since there is its regulation and supervision by the city, giving the city a better structured and more welcoming environment.

The main impaired by the Clean City Law was publicity, since there were created new communication standards for urban forms, such as the indicative, informative and commercial advertisements. The new law fetched a wide restructuring imagery of the environment, which saw its commercial discourse printed in advertising images being widely contested.



Picture 2: São Paulo City, before and after the Clean City Law.
Source: flanelapaulistana.com. Photography: Eduardo Nicolau.

Inspired by the São Paulo project, the city of Londrina, Brazil, also enacted their version of the Clean City. The Law #10.966, from July 26th, 2010 stands out as its goal the next point:

Clause 1: constitute objectives of this law the ordering of the landscape and the attendance of environmental comfort needs, with the improving the quality of urban life, by creating new and more restrictive standards, for visible announcements of public places in the territory of the city of Londrina. (LAW #10.996/2010 our translation).

The Londrina's version is not as soft as the São Paulo's, in spite of the heavy influence of the latter in the conception of the first. According to the Londrina Law 10.996/2010, posters, signs, and all kinds of display advertising in the downtown area is forbidden, while in the surrounding neighborhoods, such exposure suffers various restrictions. To discuss the new law and its tasks, a Permanent Technical Board was defined, which approached several institutions that defended a balance in handling the interests of merchants, external media companies, the town hall and the general population. Through several meetings and intense debate, a consensus was reached that led to the placement of advertising in areas of lower flow in Londrina, but with certain limitations, such as size, location in the establishment and distance between two displays of same nature elements, among others. Cases such as advertising vehicles on public roads and their elements such as streets, telephone networks, sewers and energy, roads and telephone booths were banned.

With the conclusion of Law 10.966 / 2010, it can be said that the city's image suffered a major change, and started to connote new meanings when the architecture and the natural image of the environment were recovered, and generated a depollution of the urban landscape of Londrina: there was a visual cleaning in the city, which now did not express itself in the naturalness of the urban fervor, with commercial communications aimed at the mass, but a new "garment" that explores the own territory and its architectural and natural elements.



Picture 3: Sergipe Street (Londrina), before and after the Clean City Law.
Source: Bressan (2011, p. 1226). Photography: Fernanda Grosse Bressan.

Barthes (2012: 223) has it that “in myth, we find again the tridimensional pattern which I have just described: the signifier, the signified, and the sign. But myth is in a peculiar system, in that it is constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is second-order semiological system (author’s italics).” The sign forming the associative total of a concept and an image in the first system is converted into a “mere” signifier in the second.

We must here recall that the materials of mythical speech (the language itself, photography, painting, posters, rituals, objects, etc.), however different at the start, are reduced to a pure signifying function as soon as they are caught by myth. Myth sees in them the same raw material; their unity is that they all come down to the status of a mere language. Whether it deals with alphabetical or pictorial writing, myth wants to see in them only a sum of signs, a global sign, the final term of a first semiological chain. And it is precisely this final term which will become the first term of the greater system which it builds and of which it is part. (Barthes 2012: 223).

By undoing the typical appropriation by the myth, the Clean City Project operated in reverse: it removed the effects of a sum of signs that replaced the facades in their primary format, thus restoring the first system. In other words, it created an emptiness, an absence capable of expressing more than a mere signifier. The scheme below is a classical illustration of Barthes’s tridimensional pattern:



Source: Barthes (2012, p. 224)

The history of the city of Londrina, the colonization of the northern region of Paraná State, the powerful agricultural background of this same region, the influx of immigrants in various time periods, the architecture brought by coffee wealth (the so-called green gold) and many other associations the visual landscape can allow for, are now recovered. Therefore, a comparative analysis of a before-aftertype, will tend to be instrumental for a more genuine perception of the city. Photography provides a key contribution in this case.

4. The transformation of a visual landscape

The city of Londrina is the fourth largest city in southern Brazil. It has about 500,000 inhabitants and was considered, in the mid-twentieth century, the world capital of coffee. The city had its urban landscape full of signs coming to fill the social imaginary of the population in buildings, houses, shops, large houses dispersed in avenues that lead to the European boulevards, such as Higienópolis Avenue, among others. However, what stood out in Londrina's urban environment were the interventions from advertisements of various brands and sectors.

In fact, the great intention of the market and industry is to draw the consumer's attention at any cost, without the least concern for the quality of this image. [...] Who do not gain anything from it is the city itself. [...] This situation tightly reflects on the city's image, and in the urban environmental quality of tertiary centers. Visual pollution, orientation trouble, difficulty of movement in the streets and sidewalks, for misuse of the same. (Vargas and Mendes: 2002, our translation)

With the enactment of the Clean City Law, a process of visual depollution of the Londrina's environment took shape. The law consists in regularizing the situation of advertisements as well as the signs in shops and sale outlets, which are now allowed to occupy only one third of the facade. Through the new legislation, the visual landscape of Londrina suffers a large-scale mutation, in which all its urban context is transformed, in other words, the amalgamation involving the streets, squares, buildings, houses, sidewalks, and other elements that compose the urban scenery are changed in favor of the visual cleaning objectified in the legislation. This change starts in micro plans, through isolated significance of certain buildings, such as stores that redefine their frontage, others that bring the visual characteristics that the buildings had before the establishment of the commerce in that space, among others, going to the macro level, with all the city adapting itself and acquiring a new meaning.

The visual cleaning that the Clean City Law introduced in Londrina emanates new meanings to the space, generating discourses that are naturalized in the environment due to human actions – such as road constructions, the settlement buildings and their architecture – to the imagery exploration of the local flora elements that manifest themselves in the squares, avenue corridors, in front of residences, among many other situations, the people live the city and its elements, and not the commercial appeal of brands anymore.

Thus, it is possible to see that, through the Clean City Law, and the regulation of the publicities aired in the city, it was possible to establish new paradigms in physical and spatial relationship of the environment. The city began to emanate senses that have become transparent over time and were not experienced by its inhabitants, since the ads hide the real significance of the landscape, unseen among the advertisements.

This becomes clear when looking at the same scene into two distinct periods, as in the following example (Picture 4). At first, the space is filled with advertisements, with nameplates of shops and totally focused visual exploration to commercial discourse, while in photography that records the same environment in the post-implementation period of the Clean City Law, is characterized by a rescue of the discourse that is naturalized in the space earlier, with frontages that were under advertisements.



Picture 4: São Paulo Avenue (Londrina), before and after the Clean City Law.

Source: Bressan (2014, p. 90-91). Photography: Fernanda Grosse Bressan.

The presence of advertisements generated new types of representation of the environment, therefore, emanated the brands commercial discourse. However, the imagery renovation of the place made it possible for the deleted discourses on site, to gain strength again and to demonstrate its value. The images (Picture 4) show how the implementation of the Act changed the relationship of space with viewers, as the number of publicities decreased considerably. The imagery renovation of the environment made the Avenue to suffer a deep publicity cleaning, in which shopping facilities had to readjust the new local regulations and a cleaner environment replaced the visual pollution, although popular, but which ensures the experience of a real landscape of the city by the passerby.

The imagery renovation made from a recovery of the original appearance of that urban space allowed the rescue of visual characteristics that the environment had lost slowly over the years. The transformation of the environment generated new meanings after the extraction of the publicities, the place became more enjoyable and less visually polluted.

At the same way, in the Sergipe Street, an important market street in Londrina, the changes are clearly evident:



Picture 5: Sergipe Street (Londrina), before and after the Clean City Law.

Source: Bressan (2014, p 45-49). Photography: Fernanda Grosse Bressan.

The space that previously had a significant number of publicities was substituted by a much clearer view of the environment, ensuring the user of the space to experience the natural urban landscape of the place, without that amount of publicity messages that previously overloaded the space and made that environment, an enhancer of the business/commercial discourse. The directions emanated after the Law deployment ensured the environment the right to issue their real discourse, through its signs, and not those imposed arbitrarily by the commerce and the

capitalist system.

By the results obtained with the Clean City Law in Londrina, it is possible to say that the city gained a new guise, its image began to emanate senses that tend to more urban and less commercial meanings. The ability to enhance the urban landscape of the city ensured that the environment could become naturalized effectively, showing its natural and architectural significance, where the city received an ordering of its landscape and generated, in fact, an environmental comfort regarding their visual characteristics.

5. Closing remarks

The city designs senses while generating representations, the daily life of human beings in the urbanity fills it with meanings that will facilitate the City comprehension procedure. In this process, the individual interfere the urban environment by creating their own representations and exploring the city's image through the meanings imposed to it. Similarly, the presence of advertising on pathways, buildings, and commercial elements, makes the discourse of the environment to be changed, gaining meanings related to commercial purpose.

The Clean City Law acts in the urban environment in a similar way, because it makes it acquires new meanings from the removal of publicity signs: the city started to emanate a sense that it is natural of things, of everyday, and not the commercial discourse that publicity gives to the environment. The city began to live more its urban visuality with the everyday experience of architecture, who hid under the gables, windows and billboards.



Picture 6: After the Clean City deployment in Londrina, many shops showed the original architectural design, especially on the Sergipe Street.; **Source:** www.londrina.odiario.com.

Photographs: Divulgação/ACIL. No photographer credits.

The barthesian conception that “myth hides nothing: its function is to distort, not to make disappear (author’s italics)” (Barthes, 2012, p. 231) works as an eye opener, since the natural elements of Londrina were visually revitalized, considering that its uses and habits were made almost invisible – but had not disappeared! Nowadays one can have access to the story on the bricks and tiles of the old buildings of the city. The reordering of the urban image assured the population to experience the elements of the city that were hidden under the commercial discourse of the publicity messages.

It is concluded, therefore, that the reception arising from the publicities that filled the Londrina urban scenario changed the direction of the city's places and, from its imagery renewal, generated a broad redefinition of the visual qualities of Londrina, that were translucent by commercial messages.

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RETHINKING THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN SOCIAL NETWORKS, URBAN TERRITORIES AND EVERYDAY LIFE PRACTICES. A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE SPREADING OF HASHTAGS IN URBAN STORYTELLING.

Paolo Peverini
Libera Università Internazionale degli
Studi Sociali Guido Carli, Rome, Italy
ppeverini@luiss.it

Abstract

In recent years the centrality of a common sense emerged with increasing strength in the social media scenario: the practice of sharing experiences, practices and rituals is fostered by competition among the manifold networks that enliven a *communications ecosystem more and more based on everyday life storytelling*.

The aim of this article is to contribute to sociosemiotic recognition of several particularly widespread aspects of the renegotiation of *urban everyday life* fostered by the pervasive concept of media overexposure. In particular, the article, at the intersection of three axes – *social networks, urban territories and everyday life practices* – concentrates on the spread of hashtags, seemingly obvious and “transparent” signs that contribute to blurring the borders that separate everyday life in urban territories from the conversations about it. In the social network scenario Instagram is an exemplary case worth investigating, since its growing popularity holds consequences in the representation of urban territories.

1. Social networks, everyday life practices and urban spaces

From the standpoint of sociosemiotic research, analysing the complex transformations that affect the combination of city/communication in the context of the forms of an increasingly advanced and pervasive convergence of media involves first of all recognizing that the meaning of places cannot be separated from the presence of linguistic phenomena or the complex mechanisms that correlate numerous forms and substances of expression and content. Indeed, from a

preliminary standpoint we must observe that any given city emerges as a semiotic “object” that is undeniably plural and polysemic, characterized by the stratification of meaning that calls for patient analysis, discouraging any attempt at immediate “interpretation”.¹

As Isabella Pezzini has noted in this regard, the semiotic study of a metropolis, in particular, can only

proceed by disaggregation, not only of individual objects – monument, shop, warehouse – but above all based on the properties they share on a given level. Therefore, this would involve identifying levels of interpretation or, in short, isotopies: the same ones that intuitively circulate in social discourses about the city, and where value systems – aesthetic (the beautiful and the ugly), political (social and moral “health”) and rational (functionality, economics, etc.) – implicitly intersect, and in which what is always emphasized is a sort of mythology of the relationship between individual and society that the city materializes, often dysphorically (Pezzini 2004: 263).

The processes of signification that characterize the spaces of metropolitan living are founded on complex translation mechanisms (and are continually renegotiated by the various social players who, in different capacities, contribute to their modes of existence) in which the distinction – only seemingly obvious and fully justified – between places and the languages that talk about them fall to the wayside. As emphasized by Gianfranco Marrone (2013: 30), this involves recognizing that

what is typical for any cultural entity applies even more so to the city: the discourse it holds and the discourse about it are the same thing; they rely on and mutually implicate each other. If a city is first of all the memory that is stratified on it in culture, it seems evident that its identity is the final result – albeit one that is constantly being transformed – of everything it says with its own media (geographical, spatial, urbanistic, architectural), as well as everything that is said about it using every possible language (literature, painting, photography, cinema, etc.), including proxemics, idiosyncratic narrations and the value references of those who live in it, cross it and use it.

From the semiologist’s perspective the starting point for an analysis of urban spaces first of all involves emphasizing that it is impossible to situate the city outside a reflection about signification, given that the sense of any city is constituted by and manifested on a dual movement that necessarily revolves around the concept of language, and it ultimately becomes profoundly rooted.

In fact, on the one hand cities are the object of a plurality of languages, textual forms and types of discussion. On the level of content, they are continually called into play by constant “talking”, a polyphony that, by becoming stratified, allows places to acquire and manifest their own semiotic consistency, a depth in terms of signification that sets them in relation to other forms of spatiality, in relationships articulated in the form of analogies and differences, continuities and discontinuities. On the other hand, starting from the perspective of analysis regarding enunciation, cities can be viewed as “subjects” that can produce and feed a large number of discourses pertaining to separate genres that, in turn, are fully manifested in the form of a multiplicity of

often syncretic languages. Investigating the cultural identity of the city, exploring its meaning, thus means recognizing first of all the interdependence of these two movements, the “spoken” city and the city understood as a subject that can produce and circulate discourses and texts.

It is important to note that recent studies on signification thoughts on the semiotic nature of urban spaces have increasingly been supplemented by two very topical research trends, dedicated respectively to analysing *everyday life practices* and *media languages*, thereby contributing to a very open debate that probes a general theory of meaning as well as the methodological instruments needed to “interrogate” increasingly differentiated bodies of text.² Therefore, it is no accident that the city has acquired an increasingly important role within sociosemiotics, understood as “semiotics of significations founded, shared and transformed in social interactions” (Pozzato 2012: 8).

Starting from these premises, and leaving the vast and complex debate on the peculiarities that distinguish the sociosemiotic approach in the human and social sciences in the background, I will attempt here to investigate the correlation between some of the sweeping transformations that have marked everyday life practices in city spaces and the circulation of conversational media (social networks), which are increasingly aimed at closing the gap between direct experiencing the sensible world and sharing its narrative rendering.

More specifically, I will attempt to take a sociosemiotic approach to certain phenomena of *uniform representation of everyday living in urban spaces*, a profound transformation that, from a narrative standpoint, proves to be correlated with the growing use of social networks.

In fact, on the scenario of digital media the centrality of the “common sense”, of the sharing of experiences, practices and rituals, has never emerged as strongly as it has now, favoured by the keen competition among the various social networks that urge forms of competition increasingly based on the narration of everyday life. In particular, the integrated geolocation of the main social networks and the easy Internet access guaranteed by WiFi networks have together contributed to profoundly redrawing the boundaries between the direct experience of everyday urban living and the sharing of that experience. From the standpoint of sociosemiotic reflection centred on the concepts of the signification at play in everyday life practices, one of the most stimulating issues to explore must necessarily involve the sweeping transformations that have been fuelled by the pervasiveness of digital media, which promote a “natural” integration of:

- technological innovation;
- urban territories;
- social networks.
- the sphere of human sensibility.

With social media, the correlation between direct experience and the urban spaces in which the various life forms and practices unfold is undergoing significant transformations. As several scholars have highlighted (e.g., Lovink 2012), managing one’s profile, web reputation and, more generally, conversations with one’s reference communities can look like a “collective obsession”. For example, more and more often, before participants in a live event even take part actively, the object of the direct experience is named through a keyword (an official hashtag) in order to regulate conversations revolving around it and share them online.

One of the most significant aspects of regulating sensible experience that has emerged thanks to ever-smarter technology is the playful side of “ordinary” living, with particular reference to metropolitan scenarios. In the processes of regulating everyday life,³ metropolises and the forms of life that unfold in them emerge as “playing fields” with variable boundaries, resources of potential signification processes whose nature is still uncertain but unquestionably of great interest. Advanced experiments in augmented reality such as Google Ingress and wearable com-

puters like Google Glass bear witness to a playful reconfiguration process of the shared forms of experience that characterize everyday life in urban agglomerations. This increasingly pervasive technology – immediate and easily accessible, like the type that has long been available on ordinary smartphones – draws on the stratified processes of signification through which inhabitants experience a metropolis every day.

Taking up this perspective, the signification at play in metropolitan living thus lends itself to being examined by exploring some of the more striking forms of the *renegotiation, regulation and sharing of the direct and indirect experience of places*. This channelling of forms of everyday life is interpreted in the social media from a narrative approach, creating what is known as *urban storytelling*.

To contribute to thoughts about some of the transformations that characterize the interdependence between urban spatiality and social discourses, I will examine some of the most topical forms that the narrativization of everyday living has acquired in the context of social networks, examining three interrelated axes:

- media semiotics (in the light of the experiential turn,⁴ viewed as regulating and renegotiating devices that can activate unique forms of experience)
- urban semiotics (considering urban spaces not simply as a context in which the multiple phenomena of signification are inscribed and acquire meaningfulness, but as a semiotically dense and stratified form, a co-text in every sense of the word, equipped with its own consistency and its own language)
- the semiotics of everyday life (understood as one of the thresholds of contemporary semiotic research in which reflection on the systems and processes of signification is extended from texts and discourses to styles and life practices).

Taking up the critical reflection developed by Ruggero Eugeni (2010a: 17) towards the project – rather widespread on the composite panorama of media studies – aimed at underscoring naturalization of the experience and, by extension, of the media experience, this will thus involve emphasizing the critical vocation of the semiotic approach, the legitimacy of a method aimed first of all at “undermining the bases of an ideological project pursued by the media: affirming the imperceptibility of their activity”.

In this sense, it will entail disputing the *presumed naturalization* of the media experience, debunking the innocence and transparency of the media apparatuses that regulate access to a vast array of experiential resources and, if anything, reasserting the *projectual and planned nature that characterizes the increasingly closer relationship linking social networks, everyday life and urban spaces*.

In keeping with critical reflection on the common sense that represents one of the orientations of semiotic research into the mythologies of everyday living (moving from the pioneering work that was introduced by Roland Barthes and that, even today, is at the centre of a debate extending outside the boundaries of semiotics), I will attempt to offer a sociosemiotic perspective for the analysis of certain discourses that hinge on life practices in urban spaces. This will focus on the proliferation of signs that are seemingly obvious and “transparent” but are actually filled with repercussions in the effects of meaning: what we refer to as hashtags.

2. The proliferation of hashtags: keywords of common sense

The word hashtag is a neologism, an expression combining the words “hash” (short for hash mark) and “tag”. The hashtag is a type of tag⁵ used by a growing number of social networks to create labels that can help circumscribe the topic of a conversation.

Hashtags are composed of concatenated words or combinations of words that, by conven-

tion, are preceded by the # symbol (hash mark). On an international scale, this instrument for the creation, sharing and regulation of conversations centred on specific contents spread rapidly following its use in the protests that broke out in Iran during the 2009 presidential elections. Twitter, which originally did not feature a service to group its users' messages (tweets), adopted the hashtag as an easy-to-use tool to index content. In 2009 Twitter began to extend hashtag hyperlinks to all recent messages with the same keyword, making it so much easier to find and share content that it fostered the practice of "live tweeting", meaning real-time comments on an event by subjects who experienced it either directly or indirectly by participating in the streams composing the conversations.

What makes analysis of this form of tagging fully pertinent to sociosemiotic reflection on the effects of meaning that emerge from the intersection of everyday life, urban spaces and media apparatuses is not merely the growing circulation of hashtags – nothing short of a boom – but the emergence of a series of gradually more codified practices that define their use by a multitude of subjects of enunciation encouraged by social networks to share and add to discourses about their direct or mediated participation in urban life.

When we observe how the use of hashtags has changed in only a few years, what clearly emerges is that this instrument goes far beyond the labelling of topics by the subjects participating in a conversation. In fact, the decision to use a given hashtag is part of a sociosemiotic logic that is far more sweeping in scope and that, with specific reference to communicative exchanges involving users' experiences, consists of a widespread *regulation of the sensible experience*.

Indeed, attributing a hashtag to a place or event defined by precise spatio-temporal coordinates is never a neutral operation – mere naming – but instead involves an attempt to circumscribe, channel and orient the experience as it unfolds to ensure it is shared as much as possible.

Therefore, hashtags should not be viewed as innocuous "captions" but, rather, as instructions for the use of urban spaces, keywords that circumscribe and increasingly orient a series of conversations on the meaning of places and practices for their consumption, involving a variety of different subjects. Consequently, the regulatory function of these signs – so widespread that they look normal, obvious and "natural" – must be contextualized within a metacommunicative logic.

Significantly, the role played by hashtags in fuelling the process of regulating everyday life is clearly manifested by their massively growing use to encourage the sharing of digital photographs. In the process of the profound transformation of the ways of representing everyday living in urban spaces, the role of images, and specifically of digital photographs, has proven to be decisive. This clearly emerges if we consider the very widespread use of Instagram, the most famous free application allowing users to take pictures with a mobile device, apply an array of predefined filters and share the result on one's social platform as well as a variety of other networks.⁶

The use of sophisticated and portable media devices is obviously encouraged by the narrativity inherent in the conduct of everyday actions. More and more often, in fact, the level of the content acquired by the forms of textuality produced by media devices that are increasingly "incorporated" into individual actions is composed of a series of episodes from one's personal life, made accessible starting with the amply codified operations of selecting, posting and sharing everyday life practices.

In fact, the main characteristics of this type of application, which combines the functions of digital photo touch-ups and the sharing of content typical of the services of social networks, involve:

- the plastic level of the image, particularly the dimensions of the important crop function (the user is required to cut the initial image to make it fit into a square format that clearly

alludes to the measurements of the famous Polaroid shots)

- colours, saturation and sharpness (parameters that can be modified simply, using a limited number of filters that make it possible to reproduce a declaredly vintage photographic aesthetic very easily)
- the option to write short comments, use tags to make the photograph easy to find and, lastly, activate geolocation to visualize the place where the picture was taken.

The growing success of this application, the circulation of the neologism “Instagramming” (now commonly used to refer to the use of filters for photo touch-ups) and the emergence of a series of increasingly codified and shared practices in the choice of hashtags to associate with pictures testify to a gradually more evident process of channelling the media experience that is powerfully documented in everyday use and that contributes to augmenting the semiotics of the common sense. In other words, a *fully regulated representation of sensible activity that permeates the traces of ordinary living*. In this regard, if we observe many of the images tweaked using Instagram filters and categorized based on specific hashtag choices, at least two other significant aspects emerge for sociosemiotic reflection.

On the one hand, we find the collective process of the segmentation of everyday life in the form of a series of powerfully codified narrative programmes, a “cropping” of the common sense that helps document the everyday story revolving around well-defined traces of the experience, named unmistakably thanks to hashtags (#breakfast, #work, #school, #shopping, #dinner). With the flow of everyday life, we thus identify, select, name and share a set of common experiential resources that can potentially add to the level of the content of the photographic image and, by extension, the set of conversations it has triggered.

On the other hand, recourse to a common experiential design (Eugeni 2010),⁷ facilitated by applications characterized by interfaces that are more and more user friendly, plays a decisive role in tracing the images of ordinary life to a series of *preordained* and thus *common* aesthetic forms. The same colour balance, the same lighting effects, the same blurring are used extensively by growing numbers of users to tweak photos depicting very distinct everyday practices. One of the most striking consequences of this widespread and rather wholesale use of standardized visual effects is the overproduction and sharing of pictures that refer to an often standardized representation of the forms of contemporary life.

More precisely, Instagram interface fosters the overproduction and sharing of images that frequently contribute to the production and circulation of a codified representation of living in urban spaces. In this regard, Hochman and Manovich (2013: 12) recently affirmed that Instagram, intended not primarily as a medium but as a software artefact, superimposes its strong “message” (or “interface signature”) on its users, shaping what and how they communicate.

Taking up this reflection, we can identify the sociosemiotic dynamic underpinning the success of applications such as Instagram in the importance that sharing daily experience acquires for users with respect to the signification processes involved in the photographic image. In other words, the use of photography is aimed not so much at *showing something* but at *showing oneself* (and thus making oneself recognized), which responds to a series of shared practices that regulate the circulation of conversations.

As already mentioned, an even more striking sign of this marked tendency towards the aesthetization of ordinary life emerges if we examine the relationship established between the contents of conversations and hashtags. The interdependence between hashtags and photographs never consists of a simple complementary function, and instead we can observe that these keywords go beyond the meaning of the picture itself. The hashtags referring to the forms and practices of life in urban spaces should not be understood as labels whose function ends with one of

the many discourses on cities. If anything, their proliferation contributes to redefining the very sense of the places of contemporary life, and more precisely that *effect of overall sense* through which a city acquires semiotic significance.

In this regard, we should mention the considerations recently advanced by Gianfranco Marrone on how semiotics intervenes in redefining the nature of the city, identifying its foundation ahead of the structural characteristics of the inhabited space, precisely in the dynamic and continually renegotiable processes of the production of signification.

The city is a *city-effect* expressed in some cases through an empirical city in its entirety and in others through a small part of it, and in yet others through any type of communicative support or expressive material [...] Even before its internal configuration, in its structure a city is constituted starting with its boundaries, thanks to the fundamental semiotic act for which the production of a difference is the construction of meaning (Marrone 2013: 11).

If the objective of semiotics is to identify – beneath the surface of urban spaces – the depth and complexity of a true language (seemingly hidden and the object of various and often unknown uses by the very subjects who practice it), it is fully legitimate to recognize that what underlies the proliferation of hashtags dedicated to cities is the presence of a social discourse that inevitably impacts the cultural identity of urban places.

In fact, hashtags contribute to the construction/renegotiation of the city-effect, establishing new boundaries around an “object” that is already semiotically complex, selecting and clearly expressing – often based on ordinary life actions – a series of isotopies, narrative paths and figurative elements, and ultimately renegotiating the limits that separate the concrete city from the discourses that talk about it and that it produces. This seems evident from an ethnosemiotic standpoint if we observe the multiplication of hashtags in the tangible places of consumption, culture and protest.



Fig. 1



Fig. 2

Consequently, the spontaneous phenomenon of “live tweeting” generated during local events, be they planned or impromptu and often ahead of coverage by traditional media, can be considered a contribution – sometimes decisive – to the intersubjective negotiation of the sense of what is happening in urban spaces.

The conventional representation of daily life in urban spaces is thus translated into a series of behavioural and interpretational instructions for the actual space and the intersubjective relationships manifested in it. It is from this perspective that the function of these keywords – by no means obvious or innocent – emerges.

3. Urban storytelling: an expanded and regulated metadiscourse

By introducing the significance of an *expanded* but also *regulated* metadiscourse, hashtags support the process of sharing a common experience that is interpreted on a narrative level and in which we find a *scopic dimension* (related to the circulation of views that regulate access to an object of everyday experience), a *cognitive dimension* (related to the circulation of knowledge) and, obviously, a dimension that involves the subjects’ passionate, *emotional* sphere. From the perspective of semiotics of the digital media, this form of storytelling can be defined as *expanded*, because:

- in terms of enunciation it is open to the contribution of a variable number of subjects with different skills and interests;
- it does not envisage linear development;

- it is fuelled by multiple languages;
- it extends across the various social platforms;
- it does not have a predefined time limit.

At the same time, it seems strongly *regulated*, given that the circulation of images and, more generally, of discourses on the various shared practices is based on acceptance of a set of habits involving not only the choice of situations to photograph, the positioning of the media device, the composition of the framing or the filters to use, but most importantly the choice of hashtags that will ensure their visibility.⁸

Another striking signal of the standardized representation process of everyday life is the fact that, particularly with regard to more active users, the popularity of the various hashtags is what orients the choice of situations to photograph and share in conversations.⁹

In this regard, a widely documented practice consists of multiplying the hashtags associated with a photograph in order to make it shared more widely, drawing on a series of very distinct categories that impact the city-effect on different levels (thematic, narrative, figurative).

In particular, it seems increasingly apparent that the semiotic logic underlying the function of stereotypes orients the choices of a growing number of subjects, guaranteeing access to a store of reconstituted meaning. Aside from hashtags that perform a referential function, indicating the place and the time of year, what proliferate are keywords that refer to a number of clichés, evoking arguments, situations, practices, passions, objects and figures strongly rooted in the shared imagination. This can be observed in the terms most frequently associated with photographs dedicated to a cult city such as Paris:

#cestmonparis, #walkinginparis, #parisianlocal, #urbanromantic, #parisian, #parisfashionweek, #parisbynight, #parisjetaime, #baguettes, #parissaintgermain, #parisamour, #parisstreetart, #parislife, #parisatnight, #cityoflight, #villelumiere, #parismaville.

In this *metadiscourse centred on the common sense*, the strength of a hashtag often proves to be very ephemeral and inevitably temporary, tied to the subjects' ability to generate engagement with the communities of followers and contribute to conversations.

It is particularly significant that the process of the constant updating of keywords also draws on pre-existing texts and discursive genres, fitting into an ecological relationship within the contents of a culture, a fully fledged *semiotic ecology*¹⁰ characterized by marked internal dynamism, as can be observed in particular by examining the titles of films associated with the symbolic places of many cities.

To return to the example of Paris, an iconic example is unquestionably represented by the string of hashtags such as #amelie #ameliepoulain, #cafedesdeuxmoulins and #maisoncollignon, which do not consist of a mere sequence of labels naming the most representative places in Jean-Pierre Jeunet's famous film from 2001 and then photographed by Instagram users. This corroborates the correlation between access to the indirect world of the filmic discourse and the direct experience of the urban place in which it was set, impacting the sense of the photographic image and helping to re-semanticize the city space and the everyday life practices conducted there.

The function of hashtags is thus not merely about anchoring the content of the photographic text or explaining the referential function of the image through which the user testifies in social networks to the fact that he or she is present at a popular place. The distinctive role of these keywords is instead to renegotiate the sense of an everyday life experience, while also increasing the targeted circulation of his or her story as a function of the semiotic concepts of interdiscursivity and intertextuality. In fact, the use of hashtags that conventionally refer to a specific film encourages "controlled" circulation of the photograph, allowing all interested users to access the archive of pictures marked with the same keywords and potentially help expand it.

The choice of these keywords and their combination, in the form of lists with a variable extension, thus inscribe a metadiscourse (that can naturally refer to an array of texts and media genres) within the story of personal experience, contributing to the continuous renegotiation of the distance separating direct experience from media experience. In other words, this increases the progressive regulation¹¹ of discourses revolving around life in urban spaces.

If we again expand our view of the use of hashtags not only on Instagram but on all the main social platforms, then from the standpoint of sociosemiotics, involved in analysing the reflexivity of the social sphere or, in other words, in studying the different modes through which “the social community gives itself in spectacle to itself and thus endows itself with the rules necessary for its own game (Landowski 1989: 13)”, we cannot help but note that the proliferation of these keywords is underpinned by the progressive emergence of an open yet strongly regulated repertory of discourses that hinge on the common sense of living in urban spaces.

Overcoming the ingenuous idea of ascribing hashtags with a purely instrumental function in defining the topic of a message thus means recognizing the relevance of the effects of sense that these “labels” are progressively determining by regulating the daily use of social platforms. Analysis of the relationship between these keywords and the textual and discursive forms to which they refer can help highlight the increasingly stratified yet also regulated nature of the processes of signification that emerge in the interaction of urban spaces, everyday life practices and conversational media.

The stakes for a critical reflection on the mythologies of contemporary life are quite high, as testified by the emerging and manifest signals of the irruption of stereotypes in the formation and circulation of the keywords of the common sense.

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(Endnotes)

¹ We need merely recall the considerations advanced by Yuri Lotman on the semiotic complexity of the urban space (1985, 232): “The city as a complex semiotic mechanism, a generator of culture, can carry out this function only because it is presented as a container of texts and codes that formed in different ways, are heterogeneous, pertain to different levels and make use of different languages”.

² In particular, as clarified by Maria Pia Pozzato (2012, 7), in sociosemiotic analysis “it is extremely difficult to subject every element to orderly and exhaustive analysis as was done in those happy times when we were dealing with texts in the strict sense of the word, and mainly literary or ethno-literary ones, certainly more reassuring in authorizing the procedures of closing and making their components consistent. The sensation was also that, from an analysis of these texts, it was easy to extrapolate a series of significant basic elements, a grammar of the human imagination destined to illuminate any other text.”

³ Where, as Pietro Montani (2010, p. xvii) notes, aesthetics is not considered “a way of philosophizing about art, but a critical reflection the object of which is the entire realm of sensibility (*aisthesis*).”

⁴ On this, see the thoughts of Ruggero Eugeni (2010) regarding the experiential watershed in media studies.

⁵ The scholar who investigated the collaborative nature of hashtags is Derrick De Kerckhove, who conceives of this type of label as a key element of what he calls “connected intelligence”, intuitive instruments that allow an enormous number of subjects to manage communicative exchanges. According to De Kerckhove, the very nature of the Internet, the essential principle underlying its operation, is embodied by the tagging process, encouraging the practices of creation and sharing of contents that are potentially uninterrupted, meaning that they are “always on”.

⁶ Among these, the most popular are Twitter, Facebook, Foursquare and Tumblr.

⁷ As maintained by Eugeni (2010a, 16–17), the media experience “is artificial, pre-constituted and serial; it re-

sponds to an experiential design and takes on the responsibility of making this project operative within ordinary experience. This unique characteristic also means that it constitutes a particularly complex form of experiences, as it overlaps a directly perceived world with one that is perceived indirectly and it introduces the irreducible depth of discourse”.

⁸ Examples of the many popular hashtags include #wakeup, used to narrate what happens after getting out of bed, #foodporn, #instafood and #yummy that, by convention, are associated with photos that enhance the details of dishes thought to look especially appealing. With reference to urban spaces, particularly popular hashtags include #architecture, #streetphotography, #urbanart, #streetart, #wallporn, #architecturelover and #instagraffiti.

⁹ In this sense, the numerous websites devoted to the use of Instagram are particularly significant. In these, users can find suggestions for the best hashtags to associate with pictures and a constantly changing list of keywords.

¹⁰ On this issue of semiotic ecology, Volli (2013, 34) maintains that “in reality, semiospheres and ecologies are theoretical constructs and the only empirical subjects are messages and speakers/readers. The issue of semiotic ecology must be referred to the action, interest and pleasure of these figures. Nevertheless, just as semiospheres have to do with mass phenomena rather than individual communicative actions, so do their users, speakers or readers, who are not individuals but social groups. Grammars, skills and languages are not mental and essentially individual elements, but social ones. And it is on a social level that the phenomena of sense typical of semiotic ecology come into play.”

¹¹ In this regard, it is unquestionably important to emphasize that the very logic of how social networks such as Instagram – but also Facebook, Twitter and Pinterest – work is what elicits users to adopt a series of practices for using hashtags aimed at improving the visibility and potential engagement of messages.

SMART CITY BETWEEN MYTHOLOGY, POWER CONTROL AND PARTICIPATION

Patrizia Violi
University of Bologna, Italy
patrizia.violi@unibo.it

Abstract

The label of ‘smart city’ is today a largely used, or maybe overused, one and it seems to apply to many different dimensions of contemporary urban life. It is not quite clear, however, what exactly it implies to be a smart city and which kind of “intelligence” is here presupposed. My intervention will focus on some of the problems connected to the use and definition of the “smart city” label, in the light of an international project we are currently running together with Brazil.

A spectre seems to be haunting contemporary urban research today, a magic expression full of promises and suffused with a supernatural aura, although while often not too well defined in terms of content and dimensions: the idea of the Smart City.

“Smart city” is a definition widely used for many different purposes and in relation to very different usages and applications, from automatic traffic regulation to the use of key public utilities, such as water, air, or electricity, to the recycling of refuse, green environmental policies, mobility, real estate development etc.

The common goal of all these applications is the development of what is supposed to be a more “liveable city”, a notion that is still far from being univocally defined. What really makes a city “liveable”, what really makes a city “smart”? And first and foremost, what exactly does it mean for a city to be smart? What does “being smart” actually consist of?

A first question to be answered for us, as semioticians, is whether this is merely a technological conjuring trick without particular interest from a semiotic perspective, or it might reveal itself as something with at least some potentially interesting aspects from our perspective too. As we will see, however, potential interest does not come without some potential danger too, the risk of extending the powerfulness of the city’s control over its citizens. On the other hand, we

could also observe that all forms of digital technologies, starting with the smart phones we all use to run our lives with nowadays, are also devices exerting a significant degree of control over our lives, our movements, our tastes and our interests.

But now let us take a closer look at what some actual meanings of “smart” might reveal for us.

The flexible nature of being smart

The word “smart” was first introduced into the world of technology by powerful North American high-tech multinationals such as Cisco and IBM, and was initially merely meant to be no more than a kind of synonym for “technological”.

Indeed, at the very beginning, the expression used was not even smart city but *smart grid*, with an accentuated stress on the purely technological side. A smart grid is a grid connected to a series of Internet-based control systems that assist in optimising power usage, and avoiding waste, thus becoming a kind of an “intelligent grid”. An example of this is an experiment realized through the electrical power supply, lowering peaks of higher consumption and thus saving energy by using the electric net in a more efficient way.

But a smart city is a far wider project than this, and in this context the modifier *smart* implies much more than an intelligent optimisation of energy recourses. Let’s have a closer look at some possible meanings of such an expression. At the beginning of my research on smart cities I was somehow dubious and critical about the use of this word. Why use “smart” and not, for example, the apparently nobler “intelligent” in thinking about technology issues as applied to urban space? The word “smart” seems to have been chosen because it is supposed to add a flavour of caniness, shrewdness, wittiness, fashionability and so on, and this is not necessarily a positive feature.

Browsing in a dictionary however, some other, different semantic features emerge. Smartness is, for example, often associated with the “capability of making wise adjustments in response to changing circumstances”.

Two key notions should be emphasised here: *adjustment* and *changing* situations. One qualifying point is therefore at the level of the quality of the response of the system both in terms of *temporality* and *flexibility*: to be smart means to have a high action capacity. Smartness then is an adaptive capacity capable of facilitating rapid change, a form of practical intelligence that could be compared to the *mètis* of ancient Greeks (Détienne and Vernant 1974). *Mètis* implies flexibility and adaptive capability in relation to a changing environment, the capacity of exploiting the wider potential of some given context, which can also be found in the natural world, as is the case with the camouflage characteristics possessed by certain animals. In ambiguous and uncertain situations it is thanks to *mètis* that individuals are able to respond in successful ways to complex and problematic events. In a way, it is also the secret of providing an adequate response to the environment in a situation characterised by a lack of resources, of initial *scarcity*. *Mètis* includes in its meaning a kind of double valorisation. On its positive polarity it alludes to a plasticity that makes it possible to successfully adhere to the constraints of reality, on its negative polarity it might also imply a certain degree of ambiguity and “trickiness”.

If we now turn to the whole semantic field of related terms, we can see some kind of opposition emerging between *smart* and *intelligent*, where *intelligent* seems to allude to a more continuous, permanent behavioural feature, a quality of *being* rather than a form of behaviour. A key difference in the aspectual configuration of the semantic field is also evident here, alluding to an opposition between *permanent* and *durative* – i.e. connoting a kind of static quality on one hand – vs. dynamic, changing forms of action and transformation on the other.

Technologies and urban spaces: the transformation of public space

Starting from this notion of fast and rapid response to change, it is possible to say that a smart city implies a pervasive use of new digital technologies to change our ways of *interfacing with urban space*. And as such, this is of a greatest degree of semiotic interest, since affecting our relationships with urban space is also going to affect our social life-forms in cities (and possibly too, as we will see, relationships between citizens). Thus, the principle questions at stake here become the re-definition and re-semantisation of *public space*, which in its turn implies the emergence of new forms of intersubjectivity

A common sense opinion regarding technology is that technology in itself is neither good nor bad: it is rather a kind of 'neutral' device, completely deprived of any kind of 'phoric' investment or semiotic value, so that everything depends on the actual uses we are going to make of it. But things appear to be even more complex than this, since any technology, due to the fact of its very existence, is going to produce semiotically relevant transformations of our lives, the ways we interact with objects and the environment, and give sense to them, and as consequence also the ways we give sense to our shared social relationships. Indeed, the initial introduction of the dishwasher affected women's lives in important ways, and probably also produced changes in our gender relationships too.

Thus, to define a smart city merely as a city implemented with certain technological devices appears to be a very poor, even insufficient, view of what technologies are and which kind of transformations they can produce. Different uses of various technologies in the urban environment, combined with other less technological forms of innovation, can produce a very relevant *transformation of public space*, of the relationships between public and private spaces and, more relevantly than anything else, of our social forms of interaction. Whether or not this will all be for better or for worse still remains to be seen.

This may well turn out most important for contemporary and future cities, given that metropolitan landscapes are now dominant: 50% of the world population lives in big cities nowadays and this demographic trend is certainly going to increase

This fact imposes a change in the very way we conceptualize the city in terms of its problems: cities can no longer be seen only as the problem but rather as the solution. In Italy there is a very interesting debate around the notion of the 'greater metropolitan city' area, applied to both small and medium size cities, such as Bologna for example (Vitali 2014). In this framework, new technologies play a very central role.

This is one of the key issues of relevance for any semiotically oriented project focused on smart cities. Recently, we have been actively working on one such project, a joint effort involving a group of semioticians, architects and city planners based at the University of Bologna and a group of semioticians based at PUC, San Paulo, led by Ana Claudia de Oliveira, which aims at comparing two very different realities: the Brazilian megalopolis and Italian cities of much smaller dimensions. A similar comparative cooperation has already been initiated together with the city of Rome, (Oliveira, Pezzini 2013) and I hope that a widening the scope of this project to include smaller cities such as Bologna might also reveal some especially interesting issues, since Italy is, after all, mainly a country of provincial small cities and towns, with very different problems in relation to those of huge megalopolises.

As mentioned previously, one of the more relevant features of a smart city is its capacity for rapid response to change, which is also directly connected to the ways technology can change our ways of relating to space. This happens crucially through a double process of both sensing and actuating: sensing the environment through technological sensors, and actuating/realizing adequate responses that also modify our own human behaviours.

Sensing could be seen as acquiring a form of *competence* with the assistance of a technologi-

cal device (our contemporary magical tool) that allows us to register/utilise data and information gleaned from the environment. Actuating, on the other hand consists of a series of phases of *performance*, where our behaviours are modified through actions.

This double process is semiotically interesting because it implies a transformation of our ways of thinking about what our communication with the environment actually consists of. Indeed, the most relevant change that occurs in this context is that the environment itself becomes a *speaking' environment*, so to say, sharing with us information about itself in ways that were previously unthinkable. Space is now literally talking to us. Tags attached to objects, on trash containers for example, enable us to follow their movements, to see how objects and things move, and where they are going, telling us the story of their possible uses and re-uses. In similar ways, traces themselves become useable. In an analogous way "tags" have been used to develop new experimental art forms.

But there is still more. Users can also choose, and generate, their own forms of information, what they want to be kept in memory, through photos, posts, tweets posted via the net etc. This is what is commonly referred to as *user-generated content*.

An interesting project also moving in this direction has been realized in Spain by a research group led by Carlo Ratti, together with a group of other Spanish researchers (Ratti 2013). The project, called *Los ojos del mundo* (the World's eyes), was first initiated in Florence, based on the idea of using photos posted by users on Flickr (and therefore public and available to everybody), in order to register all points in space where the largest number of pictures had been taken. From this information it was possible to create a map of the most photographed urban spaces in Florence. The second level of analysis was to exploit the chronology retrievable from each photo posted on Flickr in order to reconstruct the actual trajectories of tourists' movements. From these data some interesting differences across different tourist populations became visible, depending on their national identities: Americans tend to explore the territory according to very different mappings than Italians, or other national groups.

This experiment was repeated in Barcelona, and this time it was used to study a more serious problem, i.e. the scarcity of water. Without a complicated sensory system, and just using the normal photos people posted on Flickr, it was possible to obtain some remarkable results. Indeed, in each picture we take, variations in colour are linked to the level of humidity in the air, and can therefore give us information about water scarcity distribution in the territory. *Los ojos del mundo* means exactly this: we can look at some given portion of space, and retrieve information about what is happening there, through the eyes of the people who are currently looking at it.

In this case, the user himself or herself is, in a way, a sensor, which, at one and the same time, sends information to the environment and reacts to it. This is an interesting new way of thinking about our real everyday interactions with our environment. People are part of the environment (themselves being sensors) while at the same time they also act as agents of transformation of the environment.

Communicating with and through the environment

In semiotics we have recently had an interesting development of the basic notion of inter-subjectivity into another, that of inter-objectivity, which not only refers to interactions between human subjects and material objects, but also to interactions among objects themselves, which are seen as real actors within a process of communication.

The same idea can now be extended to the environment: urban space itself can be seen as an actor in a process involving what is not only an exchange of information, but also a real process of reciprocal transformation. Indeed, it can be described as a full process of communication, in the semiotic sense of the term. From a semiotic perspective, communication is something quite

different from a simple transfer of information: it is a process of transformation and manipulation that take places among several actors. The interesting point regarding the notion of the smart city is that we here can apply this enlarged idea of communication to the urban environment itself.

Indeed, it is important to underline that we are not facing here a process of mere information retrieval from the environment, based on technological devices, but something much more complex, an interactive exchange between different categories of actors, some human some not.

In the same vein, in the process just described, another important change occurs: the old fashioned centrality of the computer as a central brain that regulates processes is now completely surpassed. In its place we have distributed interactions among human actors, the net and physical space. The real physical life of urban spaces has now come into the picture, as well as the ways this interacts with our own human (inter)actions.

This resembles very closely the idea of a *distributed network of agents* variously located in urban space and interacting with one another. This is something that, for a semiotician, ought to appear very interesting. I am thinking here of the concept of *extended mind*, of peircean origin, that has very successfully been revisited today in some new developments in the fields of cognitively oriented anthropological and sociological research, such as the well known works of Ed Hutchins (1995) and Bruno Latour (2005). According to Peirce, there exists a physical state of inherent continuity, the study of which he referred to as synechism, between the internal world of individual minds and the external world of our environment. This selfsame idea is today being exploited in the theory of an extended mind of agents and of intelligent networks distributed in space.¹

We could also look at the same phenomenon from a different angle. Marc Augé, in his foundational work on spaces and places (Augé 1992), first introduced the notion of non-places (*non lieux*) to describe places of transition such as airports, stations, malls and so on. Now, Augé's idea was that these places are somehow dehumanized spaces dominated by neutralizing technological relationships. It might not necessarily be so, however. Technological devices that involve users in their communication networks might produce new and different forms of participation, and in the long run, change and affect the apparently impersonal aspects of these non-places.

Experiments in this direction have already been carried out, mainly in Spain, and in particular in Barcelona again, in order to build new public spaces where technologies can facilitate exchanges and interactions (Ratti 2013). The aim of these projects is precisely to facilitate a transformation of urban space both *for* users, and *through* users.

From places to people

We are now moving from places to people, from smart cities to smart citizens (or more precisely to *participatory* citizens).

Smart technologies can be seen not only as devices to allow interactions with the environment, but also to facilitate and transform interactions and communication processes among individuals. This dimension is not always fully recognized.

Often, in the literature on smart cities, the environment and urban spaces appear mainly to be made of 'things' and 'objects', things that can talk to us, things with which we can interact, but always things. It is not by chance that the expression "*The Internet of Things*" has recently become so popular. It alludes to the control that technologies can exert on different sectors of our life, from urban traffic to the way our future kitchens and all our other electro-domestic instruments will be regulated by way of the Internet.

¹ For a discussion of the notion of extend mind see Fusaroli, Granelli, Paolucci 2011.

But this is also a highly reductive view. We know that space is not only a matter of things, but also of people. Urban spaces are inhabited and this is, I believe, the most interesting and challenging aspect of a research focused on smart cities, at least for a semiotician. Considering communication *among people in space* implies to take into account two quite different and closely interacting systems, communication among people and that between people and their lived spatial environment.

Indeed, in today's vast literature on smart cities, more and more attention is beginning to be paid not only to the uses of space but also to the new forms of interaction and social participation that emerging new technologies might make possible in our future everyday lives. One relevant domain of such practices is participatory city planning, where citizens can voice their opinions and become an active part of decision-making processes concerning present and future uses of public spaces.

Some experiments in this direction have already been carried out in Bologna, which according to ICity Rate – a rating agency for technological impact in urban contexts – is the smartest city in Italy, with a long tradition of innovative use of digital technologies. It was the first city in Italy to develop in the 80's a free public digital network: Iperbole, which was made available to all interested citizens.

Similar uses of technology can have potentially useful applications in facilitating multi-cultural societies, opening up for a more democratic access to new public spaces. Recently, urban anthropologists and sociologists have begun to question the notions of multi-culturalism and multi-cultural societies, by focusing more on the related idea of 'coexistence', in favour of the more inclusive and egalitarian notion of the *shared city*. (Sahar, Rosen in press)

Thus, one important question that should be investigated in relation to the notion of the Smart City is the flora of new opportunities that these technologies may offer within the wider perspective of the shared city, involving diffused processes of participation and democratisation. Without forgetting, of course, that given that many people do not have equal access yet to these new technologies: the digital divide can still be a limiting reality for many categories of citizens, from immigrants to the elderly and so on. Particularly interesting, in light of this, are those experiments of local communities that utilise at one and the same time both new technologies and face to face interactions, thus combining both digital and non-digital forms of communication with forms of social interaction and exchange.

To conclude, in the heterogeneous domain of the various, often quite different, forms of interaction that can now take place across a wide range of public and private spheres, smart technologies can facilitate reconceptualization and reconfiguration of the borders between public and private space, contributing to a potential re-semantisation of many of the "non-places" we are at present used to encountering in urban environments. Smart technologies can thus be seen as a medium for *human re-mediation* of currently "inhuman" spaces, such as Augé's aforementioned "non-places".

Smart cities can thus be seen as offering positive opportunities in at least three different directions:

1. as a tool to facilitate communication among citizens and between citizens and the administration;
2. as a tool to re-articulate urban spaces;
3. as tools to challenge traditional distinctions between public and private spaces.

Notice, however, that the possible direction of such change is not exclusively from the "real" to the "digital" but rather towards a creative combination of the digital and the non-digital. This

movement challenges any ontological definition of what is real, in combining technological mediated forms of communication with embodied practices where actors also interact with each another's bodily presence, as in the case of Obama's election campaign, or recent "Arab Spring" movements.

A potentially hopeful result of hybrid interactions of this kind could be, rather than merely the creation of a 'smart citizen', in the longer-term construction of the even more responsible figure of 'participative citizen'. Always remembering, of course, that smart technologies can always conceal a potentially less promising aspect, as a hidden power system for controlling people. Which of these two potential sides of these technologies will end up being most dominant in the future will certainly depend very much on how each and everyone of us does his or her part in choosing the right path for us to follow!

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POSTCARDS AS REPRESENTATION OF THE CITY: A VIVID PICTORIAL JOURNEY

Pedro Henrique Cremonez Rosa
Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Brazil
pedrocremonez@gmail.com

Dirce Vasconcellos Lopes
Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Brazil
dircevl@sercomtel.com.br

Abstract

The city, in its multifaceted urban space, is the outcome of the relation between man and environment, with a materiality that has specific forms of signification. The worth currently attributed to the human-machine hybridization by reproducing images and visual expression of human feelings like amazement, appreciation of beauty, memory, leads postcards to translate their own constituents into new possibilities for reality and meaning, since the virtual allows so to happen. Finding evidence of this new role is the purpose of this study. The intended contribution is to generate perception of postcards as new medias in which the power of signification, the human sensations and the accessibility of men get right through the new technologies. Material consisting of printed postcards and virtual images collected from the social networks, is gathered and refer to a particular landscape, with time intervals of one decade starting in 1980. The use of Roland Barthes's approach on connotation as an analytical tool is the procedure to appraise postcards as a source of meaning and signification.

Introduction

Viewing the city as a symbolic space implies a constitutive relation between urban space and language, a move towards the use of various relevant expressions that allow for a broader comprehension and interpretation of the urban space. In this context, language, as a code that deals with the understanding of the world, is the means by which the subject signifies, and thus becomes (re)signified. Among the many possible forms for this process to take place, postcards are instrumental for the human to perceive the world, by finding a privileged form to settle the

representations in daily imaginary.

The language of the city is, therefore, in constant construction, (re) construction, alteration, for man acts incessantly in this urban phenomenon, meaning and (re) meaning the urban space, that from this process manifests itself symbolically. The presupposition in this analysis is that the space of the city does not have a representative neutrality, but it is a reflection of subjects and senses. The city is the result of the direct relationship between man and his environment. This relationship is built in and as language, which enables men (subject) mean and be (re) meaning, through the historically materiality constructed. Born of this correlation is the fundamental basis of the production of speech.

Postcards have a strong significant power, and for this reason, among the various ways of representing, put the city as a singular symbolic space, in which the subject develops ways to represent and signify, for himself, the urban environment which is part of or which continually comes into contact. Since the basis of language, meaning production takes shape not only in words but by images, feelings, sounds. This convergence of disclosures in the world can be taken as text, paintings, recordings, films, photographs and any manner which allows the man to express the result of her relationship with the world, in the representative sense of “being here” (Barthes, 1990). Historically attributed to reproduce urban and everyday scenes to fix the collective imagination, the card traps time to create eternal scenarios, a protected reality. (Collective imaginary here is to sense the collective way of representing the same object, regardless of inferences of a collective unconscious.)

In the perception of the image, the first level would be the composition of the denotative image, which is iconic and codifiable. The denoting images are relational character and are in the literal message, resulting in a radically objective, innocent meaning. Are literal assignments to registered scene, undressing the connotation of signs. (Barthes, 1990). The second level of significance would be the very rhetoric of the image, which is not coded. At this level, the signs are discontinuous, separated from each other, but comprise a single aesthetic significance from a cultural code. The connoted meaning has a bigger significant scope that denoted, and the connotation of semes are organized in a paradigmatic way. It is in the phrase denoting the message that there is the “naturalization” of the connoted message system.

The constitutive relation between subject-space-language is established so that language can be both reference, when considering the operation of the space, and the space in the understanding of the subject of the city. The subject, the language and the world are “evident”, inseparably, causing the formation of speech, from the evidence, may not be in empty space, but in the material space. (Rodriguez-ALCARA, 2011). The purpose of this study is to identify this phenomenon within the vitality of a non-formal postcard image.

The Photography Worth

Postcards used to be linked to illustrative and photographic reproductions of touristic and historical spots, restricting them to a standstill time, resistant to changes and transformations. Such static time harnessed urban patrimony to eternal scenes of daily life. Postcards, therefore, have become symbolical references entered in medias that constitute the daily imaginary, now changed from printed media to digital, a symbiosis between traditional forms of communication and modern reproduction technology. The main example of this is *Instagram*, where virtual images taken by mobile devices function as postcards confining the urban space to some sort of perception awaiting for interpretation. This transformation generates changes in the actual sense of time and memory of the postcard, now being replaced by episodic, ephemeral and evanescent moments – that is why they become non-formal, as the ones usually found in newsstands.

The photograph, to capture the moment, imprisons, uniquely, what is seen daily, but will not

be repeated existentially. (Barthes, 1984) Therefore, every language that constructive relationship (subject-space-language) is reproduced photographically in a deictic way, freezing the reality on the “here” and “now.” (Ferrara, 1993, our translation) In this expression of “Look”, “Here,” the picture does not differ from the reference immediately, taking the value of the existing as time, but not as a thing, immortalizing here the what “was” to contrary to what “is”. (Barthes, 1984)

In the notion of “it-was” (Barthes, 1984), photograph creates the eternity of the urban setting, this referent that never ceases to be what it was, that will not change and will not be lost and it is. The man with this power of attorney is now a “personalize your look the world expressing meaning and showing your way.” The world of these custom prints, photography allows for artistic display, a particular look. The producer of meaning (re) means what is seen in an attempt to surprise someone before something. “Given these predilections of landscapes, all spending like I’m sure there have been and should go there” (Barthes, 1984, p. 65)

The photography and the “to have been here!” as a representation of the world, for Barthes is a new category of space-time. He points out that there is an illogical conjunction between the here and the old. It is in the dimension of the denoted message or the message without code, that the photograph will allow this “to have been here” as a precious miracle, a reality of which we are protected. (Barthes, 1990, p. 45)

The image, being totally subjective to manifest (studium) is a way to identify the social space, limiting their reality to what is shown, then replacing the space itself. (Ferrara, 1993, our translation) Thus, there is only that which is observed through the image, within a possible field of reality, causing the “there” photographic to be greater, tangible and concrete in relation to physical existence. Thus, the image creates a qualitative resemblance to the physical object, in this case the urban space, existentially ordering the way of seeing the world, lasting and preventing the change of what “is.”

In the case of the city, an image preserves its attractions as an object to be consumed. Union image, urban space and communication, Postcard is a simple replacement and practice of the letter. Its classic form, still found today, comes down to a paper rectangle, having on one side some sort of illustration and the other with spaces for destination address, stamp and posting personal message and does not require envelopes for circulation as a match.

Historically, postcards served as a simple and affective means of correspondence exchange with an elementary form of short message communication, and on its face contained a specific illustration, the ideal being that it was the very place. These illustrations were always linked to everyday scenes in public spaces, especially as sights, landmarks or monuments, invariably characterize the city in question (Eiffel Tower in Paris, Statue of Liberty in New York, a multitude of bridges, among other images). These illustrations had the indented historical time, perennial, resistant to change and transformations. This time motionless, always linked to urban scenes, tends to immortalize images of the city.

The postcards, and historical references of the media, are also constituents of the media popular imagination. They are not always well understood, because their current disuse is given by new technologies. Later, with the ease of technical reproduction, the post came to value the hybridization of man and machine, the mechanical reproduction of images and the intimate expression of feelings. There are scenes and conditions reflected in images that represent and promote symbolization able to allow (re) significance of urban space, and fulfill the same purpose previously assigned to the postcard in their tradition.

The pictures by digital equipment production resources promote the condition to perform such exchange of letters with images that represent the look of your producer. This condition provides customized directions to the environment. That is, each can print a face with the image

you want to spread (very likely to be exactly the place in which it is the issuer) and even make it available for use by others. On the back, write messages like: - I'm on this scene - see that splendor! As a result, contributes to broader perspectives than those of traditional postcards.

The customization of messages then allows for the comparison of postcards with their own social media Instagram. On this platform, the images become personal productions messages that were conveyed by postcards. Facing a tourist spot, the individual has the opportunity to portray his moment of passage through the landscape, attribute intentionality to the picture and make the information available to others in the same way that the postcard was, although not involve personal and intentional character image. This reformulation of the postal understanding itself implements the concepts of temporal image portrayed as a souvenir trips. What once was a time-property and perennial, is now present and episodic.

Studium and Punctum

The postcard is no longer a physical being and becomes a form of poetic its function persists, but its form changes. We can think of it with the contributions of image analysis tools, in this case by applying the concepts of studium and punctum proposed by Barthes (1984), noting that both make up the duality that drives interest in the photo.

The first, (studium) is culturally perceived and generates an interpretation of the photo or in this case the postcard from the prior knowledge of the Spectator (Barthes, 1984), who has contact with the image on the world. For example, on a postcard image identifies the scene and its representation of the city. The second, in contrast, is thrown upon the spectator, so insistent. As writes Barthes (1984), "not me I'll pick you up (as I invest with my sovereign consciousness studium field), it is that part of the scene, like an arrow, and comes pierce me", generating almost endless identifying opportunities and (re) signification.

The studium generates a rational interest that predisposes the spectator to reflect and to an analysis, while the punctum creates an emotional state in the recipient as experience. For Barthes, the studium is always observable and the punctum may or may not be realized in a photographic image. Recognize the first is to find the intentions of the captured the moment. Identify the second is a unique experience that reaches the Spectator emotionally, singular, in which individual does not exist the possibility of a generality. Still, according to Barthes (1984), "to realize the punctum no analysis, therefore, I would be useful" and "Studium is, ultimately, always encoded, the punctum not ..."

These two categories are intertwined in the photographic image. The first element allows rational thinking, and analytical organizer. The second, oblivious to verbal and often overlooked by the difficulty of our minds deal with the unspeakable, enables the feeling. The perception that Barthes' punctum that shakes [...] a great grace, almost a tenderness (Barthes, 1984, p.71) reveals as possible seizure of the punctum, after identification by Studium there is a continuity between the express manifestation and the feeling internalized.

The punctum, for example, is something potentially present in the picture, but that is variable according to previous experiences one who observes the image. A punctum by an observer may be different from each other in a same picture. As Barthes writes (1984, p.69), "[...] give examples of punctum is, in a sense, to give me".

Analysis of Postcards

Reflections are analyzed now two examples of postcards. Images can be printed or digital form but both are representative of urban space. A reflects a city of 460 years and approximately 12 million people (São Paulo). It is the largest city in Latin America, one of the world's largest. The image used is the São Paulo Art Museum (MASP), which in its architectural structure is

unique and has a span of 74 meters that also turns into public leisure space.

The other image is the city Londrina, new (80 years) with approximately 700,000 inhabitants and is within the state of Paraná. For its link with agribusiness is a rich and promising city and also a major center of research, culture and education. The chosen card shows a historical aspect of it with a set of buildings (the first to be built) and Acoustic Shell, public space for concerts and exhibitions and other cultural events.

These references are essential so that we can identify the Studium the images proposals.



As referred to it earlier, the building of MASP is the financial and cultural center of Sao Paulo and is one of the most published images as postcard of the city and it reflects, to some extent explains the synthesis of these qualities: uniqueness, grandeur, privileged aesthetic. These characteristics that impact the look of the Spectator designate the studium.

This same spectator will be affected (punctum) by a sense that reflect their personal characteristics training and its connection with the depicted scene. This impact will be scaled by the feeling generated and the identification provided by the image, being personal, non-transferable and there, at a single time, at a specific time such that the moment the image was captured. It is striking that arrow wound, Barthes conceives.

To take the subjective character reflected by the punctum concept is to take the Barthes's teachings in order to allow us, as researchers, integrate and interact with the corpus selected for analysis, although a risk.



This second image reflects the scenario of another urban environment completely different from São Paulo. This includes traditional building (commerce center), a mixture of residential and commercial building in the city of Londrina. In the foreground we have the space Acoustic Shell, events held in the city environment. The sun reflection shows its privileged geographical location with good weather almost all year round. These are some of the descriptive elements corresponding to the notion of Studium, noting that the previous references designating the place are necessary for identification.

As for the punctum, knowing that the affective and emotional references of each spectator will be essential for the memories may materialize and indicate a close relationship with the meaning of the image.

This theme allows to still remembering the connection we have with the postcards. The request “send me a postcard” done before or as we say today, “put on the face or calls” the question remains this eternal form and imagery representation of the cities but also the (re) signified by them – the city and the image – generated.



The second image of Londrina, captured in Instagram reveals another symbolic aspect of it as the “Little London” has, in various public spaces replicas of famous London phone booths (it’s supposed to be a pun same). The studium is revealed by the compositional characteristics of the image and reflects the city, very wooded and sunny. In the foreground we see the red cabin jumping while looking out the resemblance to the original. For a pioneer of colonization of the city (yes, many are still living) this aspect will certainly attain the affective memory and memories built along with the city. For the visitor who identifies the reference to the original, the landscape allows for comparison and perhaps curiosity motivates the search for more information. There are different faces of the punctum that is revealed.



Back to the São Paulo image, a picture also removed from the social network shows the identification of where is situated the MASP, Av. Paulista also well known to city residents and tourists, and the identification of totem revealed in the foreground. The immediacy with which the image is posted and received the idea of “I’m here or I’ve been there” is recurrent and shows, even if unintentionally punctum, ie, affective connection with the place.

Final remarks

Within the possibilities of representation, the postcard is always linked to urban space. This environment is a product and producer in its direct relationship with man. Urban space would then be the physical environment in which they permeate the relationship between man and the environment, linking the present and the past at the same time, creating a sense of historicity to the place.

The very visual of the city, created from a mosaic of representations, takes shape as a specific form of language. This language, which connects present and past, awakens the perception of man through sounds, traffic, the verticality of the buildings, the rush of passers-by, an atmosphere always capable of telling something else, a topic inviting for permanent deciphering of meanings, when placed in a photograph. So postcards have their perennial role enhanced, although constantly changing in format.

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TOWARDS A SEMIOTICS OF SACRED GEOMETRY: ON THE ARCHETYPAL “ARCHITECTURE OF LIGHT”

Aritia D. Poenaru

Traian D. Stanciulescu
University of Iassy, Romania

**In memoriam
Aritia D. Poenaru**

Abstract

Into the frame of human life, a novelty architecture will be able to mediate the natural harmony between humanity and its cosmic roots, between nature and culture, content and form, respectively. By following the archetypal and modern learning too, the (visual) *signs of light* could be considered as the physical, biological, and psycho-social archetypes able to unify – not only symbolically, but ecologically and healthily too – the human life and its constructed framework. In this way, the hypotheses of a science of the ‘Living Light’, namely ‘*BIOPHOTONICS*’ (biology + theory / technology of lasers), will be able to rationally explain and scientifically recuperate – for the benefits of the modern architecture – the harmonizing features of the old ‘Sacred Geometry’.

♦ *Theoretically*, the macro-cosmic world – inside whom the human ‘being of light’ is pulsating as an integrative micro-cosmos – represents the archetypal matrix of a modern ‘*Architecture of Light*’ – synergically connecting Nature (cosmic space ° structural materials ° biological body) and Culture (cosmic symbolism ° functional planning ° psychological human state). Inside this matrix, the symbols of a “Sacred Geometry” (ovoid, hourglass, column and the grape, spirals, fractals and golden ratio, etc.) are determining a very complex semiosis, by: a) stimulating with energetic / beneficial effects (of the symbolizer / syntactic form) the level of human biological state of health; b) generating informational / positive effects (of the symbolized / semantic content) at the level of human psycho-logical state.

The authors were able to put pragmatically into evidence all these optimizing effects, by measuring them with some type of bioresonance devices.

♦ *Practically*, to prove that all the (visual) objects (architectural ones, in particular), are synergically stimulating the human well-being (health) – through the frequencies generated by the materials used, by their forms and volumes, colors and decorations etc. and, finally, by the telluric effects of the site – represents one of the amazing paradigm of the research, already patented by the authors.

In synthesis, by connecting the analytical privileges of semiotics and of the visual arts / sciences, of biophotonics and bioresonance technology, the old heritage of sacred wisdom and the actual scientific knowledge will be no longer artificially separated. This is due to the New Vision of an integrative “ARCHITECTURE OF LIGHT” SEMIOTICS, to its competence and performance to rebuild the mind’s and body’s architectural space.

In conclusion, to (re)sacralize the architectural frame (semiosphere) of the human being – by the effects of a Sacred Geometry and all its complementary signs, by harmonizing the human life namely – is representing the main purpose of this research. In this way, as a relevant integrative example, the authors are semiotically presenting and interpreting the archetypal project of “ICTHUS” (Sacaramb, Romania).

Introductory thoughts

“*The world as a cathedral...*” (Alice Bailey): in this statement we see the intuitive synthesis of the following assertions:

- the *essential forms* of the world, naturally created or appeared through the cosmic geneses, define the content of so-called “*Sacred Geometry*”;
- *light* represents the unifying factor of the natural world (macro- and micro-forms) and the human technical-architectural forms, also.
- during human history, some essential (architectural) forms reproduced the principles of the cosmic archetypes, to generate the objects of a “*Sacred Architecture of Light*”.

The above-mentioned principles recall the *Rig-Veda* sentence: “*So did (created) Gods (the cosmic world), so are the human beings doing (creating/projecting the buildings of the world).*”

The present paper is synthesizing – from a semiotic point of view – the very strong spiritual connection of the authors, expressed in different public contexts by theoretical and applied papers, such as:




Fig. 1: The cover-signs of authors’ two complementary semiotic books: *Semiotics of light* (Stanculescu 2003a) and *Architecture of Light* (Poenaru 2012, prize of Romanian Academy).

1. The genesis of the cosmic forms: turning back to archetypes

According to all the cosmogonic scenarios of the world, starting with those mythical-initial and religious ones and including those current philosophical and scientific ones, the birth of the world has assumed the emergence of the *Light* (space-order) out of the *Darkness* (chaos-disorder). From the integrative perspective of a model of the *Essential Unity* (cf. Stanciulescu 1990), having the light as a unifying element, it can be said that:

(1) *Structurally*, light can be associated with the four archetypal cosmogonic principles: fire and air, water and earth, or in a scientific language with field and information, energy and substance. *Light* is a dual-complementary reality manifesting itself – in the same way as the photonic theory of energy-information (Constantinescu and Stanciulescu 1993), as:

- *wave-vibration*, defining the attributes of an integrating generic field;
- *magnetic wave*, predominantly characterized by an information (frequency, amplitude, spin) capable of “giving shape” to things;
- *electric wave*, defined by energy (intensity, substance, and vibration) in order to “put things in shape”;
- *corpuscle-photon* that gives consistency to the shape of the things, materializing itself through substance (mass, weight).

In the same direction as those above, we can entirely support Albert Einstein’s statement according to which “Everything is light, in different degrees of concentration”; or, in other words, light represents the first creative sign that the human being has symbolically identified with “*Fiat Lux!*”, the primordial uttered word, with the vibration of the creative sound *aum* or *bhuvah*, with *Nada-Brahma* music or with Shiva’s dance, etc., respectively with the Big-Bang of modern cosmogony.

(2) *Functionally*, for the cosmic world that has just exited chaos, the release of such a vibration-signal, implicitly, has also meant the activation of two dialectical laws of the “universal becoming”, namely (Stanciulescu 1998):

- The *law of the entropic cycle* that describes the evolution of every world system through the birth-maturation-death cycle. The Hegelian “unity of the strife between opposites” manifests its action in this becoming, in which the growth and the diminution, the evolution and the involution of the shape and of the content determine the appearance and the disappearance of the system itself.

- The *law of the informational continuity* that asserts that no system dies entirely as it transfers an essentialized information within a derived system, more or less the same as the first one.

It is enough to regard, from a three-dimensional perspective, the manifestation of the two laws, in order to detach from world architecture the omnipresence of four “essential forms”, namely (Stanciulescu 2003b): *the ovoid, the hourglass, the column, the cluster* (Fig. 2A-3).

Analogically, if we put the representations of some mythical models of Romanian and Oriental (Indian) cosmogony face to face, through their intuitive archetypes, on the one hand, and through their scientific representations, on the other hand, we will notice that, practically, there is not a difference in meaning between them (Stanciulescu 1995; Poenaru 2006). Historically speaking, the “essential forms” have been valued in countless types of cosmograms through which the genesis of the world has been symbolized. Therefore:

- ♦ *The motif of the ovoid* can be found in the Oriental (Indian) spirituality in archetypes such as: “the golden twins”, *Hiranyia-Garbha*, whose total plasma has given birth to the structure of space, the world as a “*kalakhara chakra*”, a wheel of the space-temporality that a section through the cosmic ovoid makes perfectly visible and intelligible, “the cosmic snake” (the sacred cobra, among Indians, whose original cross would have unfolded the whole universe structure) or which, thrown by the centrifugal force of the creative divinity, would have wrapped up like a

“protective river” around the Earth (a planet modelled by hand by divinity like an ovoid, “little cake of clay”) and of the universe itself (the motif of the protective “Saturday water” among Romanians).

♦ *The motif of the hourglass* is implicitly suggested in cosmogonic models focusing on: the word as a “turtle”, among the Chinese and the Indians, whose superposed calotte could generate the image of a cosmic “hourglass”; the world as a “sacred mountain”, emerged from the original waters under the shape of two inverse pyramids, generating the “hourglass-model”, included in the infinite column of Constantin Brâncuși.

♦ *The motif of the column* is suggested in representations such as the world as a “fire column” or “water column”, like a “sacred tree” – the mythical “column of the sky”, described by the Indian and the Romanian traditions – emerged from the deep primordial waters, incorporating archetypal shapes such as: the ovoid of the crown and of the root united in an “hourglass” through the trunk-column continuity.

♦ *The motif of the cluster*, suggested by the existence of an “integrating complex” of systems/forms, is defined by archaic motifs such as “the world as a monster” (*Purusha*) of the Indians, or Tiamat (the Babylonians), whose sequences, chopped by the primordial hero (*Arjuna* or *Markud*), would have shaped the sequences of the world: sky, earth, waters, etc., respectively the world as a “primordial giant” (like Panku, of the Chinese), whose “self-sacrifice” (decomposition) would have given birth to all the world components.

From a structural-integrating perspective, these morphological reference points of the world are mythically correlated with some archetypal elements of content. Thus:

a) The symbolic statement according to which “*The universe is a horse*” (or a “snake” that the Indian texts of *Rig-Veda* formulate) or that “*The world is a table*” (as in the tradition of the Romanian cosmogony) (Vulcanescu 1985: 158) suggests the implication of the symbolism of the four elements (fire, air, water, and earth) in the world construction. The Oriental cosmograms, like the Indian geometrical magical circles or the old Chinese coins, make the most of the intuition of the four elements integrated within the world in an admirable symbolic diversity.

b) The statement that “*The universe is a tree*” implies the same tetrahedral presence: “the root-funnel of the tree” planted in the “cosmic earth” (substance) and watered by the “water” (energy) accumulated in the funnel of a “black hole” has allowed the rising of “the cosmic trunk” in the “cosmic air” (the information of a vortex/tunnel column light), spread in “the air” of the cosmic sky (the light-field of the Great Universe).

In essence, the description of cosmogenesis as an endless continuity of implosive-explosive processes – being able to transform the cosmic dualities BHQ (Black-Hole & Quasar) in “seeds” that generate an endless number of cosmic worlds in succession or in a parallel coexistence (that fits the image of some “infinite columns” and “cosmic cluster”) – corresponds both to archaic intuitions and to recent astrophysical discoveries and theories.




Fig. 2: The modelling of the universe, from archaic intuition to scientific ration.

A. The laws of the creative becoming: (1) the law of the entropic cycle (“the ovoid” and “the hourglass” of the creative becoming); (2) *the law of informational continuity* (“the endless column” of the creative becoming); the image of the two laws has generously been synthesized in works like “The Infinite Column”, by the Romanian sculptor, Constantin Brâncusi, or in the verse of a genuine inspiration written by the poet Mihai Eminescu: “As all people are born to die and die to be born”; (3) the “essential forms” represented volumetrically and in a plan; **B. An integrating cosmologic model:** (1) galactic ellipsoid (galactom); the model of “a cosmic world that is in a throbbing expansion”; (2) the model of “the cluster universe”, suggesting the existence of an infinity of parallel spaces and times; (3) the computational model, similar as signification, of the “foaming universe”.

Consequently, having noticed the obvious analogy between the archaic and the scientific models regarding the evolution of the Big Universe and implicitly of our world, as one of its infinite worlds, a paradoxical remark is appropriate: a) practically, there are no limits to the manifestation of the archetypal forms that are co-present in quasi-identical shapes – in all times and places, unifying the micro- and the macro- space, nature and culture; b) what our forerunners have inferred about space – through experimental-holistic knowledge – has become a premise for the analytic-experimental statements of modern science.

2. The Essential Unity, a reflex of “Sacred Geometry”

The objective correspondence between the intuitive models of the sacred geometry and those proposed by the “Essential Unity” (Stanculescu 2003a), model represents another path to close the distance between the connoisseurs of the initiative times and those of modern times. Based on this metaphysical (onto)genesis, the “sacred geometry” has explained the manifestation of the concise forms of the world, characterized by a series of objective properties, such as (Ponaru 2012: 45–59) offered in the following lines.

2.1. Geometric symmetry, beauty and stability

The sacred geometry emphasizes the fact that *symmetry* is a principle that ensures order in space, which gives it stability and harmony. Through the property of symmetry, the forms of the world become – in their turns – beautiful and stable. The research of this structural property can be realized mathematically (through numeric and geometric criteria). Therefore, like the geometers of ancient Greece have shown, all the structures of the natural, physical and biological (vegetal, animal and human) world can subordinate themselves to some rules of numeric modelling, on the one hand, and to some correlations with the angular or circular geometric forms, on the other hand.

The condition of conservation of the “*connection energy-information*” – that imposes an optimum correlation of the human being with the particularities of the environment in which he lives, a natural (the geographic frame, the view, the site) and artificial (the architecture, the set of utilitarian objects, etc.) environment – is permanently present in human life, implicitly accomplishing itself through the (re)cognition and the creative development of the ideal forms (Schneider 1994: Fig. 3B).

2.2. The spiral, light in movement

The spiral is the result of a dynamic informational-energetic cause, more or less known. Mathematically, the sizes (relations) that generate a logarithmic spiral have as a correspondent the so-called “*law of organic growths*”, described by Fibonacci’s array: 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21... This assumes that “every term of the logarithmic series can be found out by adding two consecutive terms, and the relation between two consecutive terms is close to the value of the «golden number» according as the number of terms of the array grows” (Ghyka 1981: 53).

This feature of living and non-living material developing through compositions that gather successively has been checked by (astro)physicians, geologists, botanists and zoologists. The last ones, for example, have measured the distances between the knots where the leaves grow etc., or they have observed that the shape of the snails and oysters’ shells, of the animals’ horns or of the big bones corresponds to the law of organic growth. It has thus been proven that the living and non-living material keeps an archetypal shape when growing, *the logarithmic spiral*, which evolves through a constant maintenance of its proportions. The manifestation of these proportions and implicitly of the law of organic growth can be found in all the evolved forms of the world, in this way giving credit to Pythagoras’ statement: *Mundum regunt numeri*.

It is enough to regard these forms to understand that the spiral defines a functional track that is present both at a micro- and macro-cosmic scale, being able to describe the essential forms, from ovoid to column and cluster, which, directly or indirectly, human technology (architectural implicitly) has been capable of reproducing and developing (Fig. 3C).

2.3. The golden section: an expression of the harmonious light

Among the algorithms that the light has followed in the process of generating its forms, the one dictated by *the law of the golden number* has a special signification, mentioning that: “So that a whole, divided in two unequal parts, should look nice from the point of view of the shape, we must have the same relation between the small part and the big part as we have between the big part and the whole” (Ghyka 1981: 259). This *section aurea* (Fig. 3 D) has a universal value because it can be found implied in the fundamental forms of the living and non-living world, making the subject of interest to the exact sciences, of mathematics, first of all. Its intuitive expression stands as a proof, an expression translated both in terms of plane geometry and solid geometry, known from Plato and Aristotle.

Proving with the arguments of an original (*bio*)*photonic theory of the energy-information*,

that shape is a form of field, a result of the actions of the fields (electromagnetic, firstly, but also gravitational, geomagnetic, etc.) on the biological (and physical) material – we can state the fact, having both theoretical and practical value, that the light-field (information-energy) is responsible for the generation of the essential forms and of their geometry results from onto-logical aspects that modern physics has been able to describe in analytical models, such as (Fig. 3E):

- ♦ the volumetric unfolding of a light wave generates the “column of columns”, the integrating “flower of life”, the cluster universe;
- ♦ the matrices of the “sacred geometry” – triangle, square, pentagon etc. – represent archetypes that the intersections of the adulatory networks of the universe implicitly assume;
- ♦ the relation between the spiral and the golden proportion can be found in the properties of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Consequently, we can state that the essential forms of the world are the effects of the oscillations of light. Such forms of light have been translated by the human eye that has learned how to discover them and to re-create them in cosmograms, geometric models of space itself. Simultaneously, passing “from light to enlightenment”, humanity has learned to generate creative products of an amazing harmony, among which those of architecture are foremost here.




Fig. 3: Representations of the “Sacred Geometry”.

A. The genesis of the archetypal forms, from the “Originary Points” (1, 2), “Circle” (3) & “Vesica Piscis” (4, 5) to the “Flower of Life” (6); **B.** Some examples of the subordination of the symmetric forms to some geometric figures: (1) triangle vs. insect; (2) square vs. tungsten atom; (3) pentagon vs. cat and man; (4) hexagon vs. snowflake; (5) a frozen drop of “structured water” (by a “thank you” invocation (cf. Emoto 2001)); **C.** The spiral, from physical phenomena to biological ones: (1; 2) macro-cosmos (galaxy) and whirlpool; (3, 4) micro-cosmos (Nautilus) and univalve shell; (5) the vortex of a nettle (Schneider 1994); **D.** The “golden section”: (1) the section’s construction; (2) Platon’s perfect volumes [www.geometrycode.com]; **E.** Models of the light matrices: (1) three-dimensional electromagnetic wave (<http://www.who.int/entity/>

mediacentre); (2) the 3D model of the cosmic network (Tiller) (cf. Dubro, Lapierre 2002); (3) the “golden spiral model” of the electromagnetic spectrum frequencies (Stanculescu and Manu 2002).

3. The postulates of the “Architecture of Light”

Passing from the “world’s architecture” to the “architecture’s world” has assumed a natural process of reflection/transfer of the cosmic archetypes into the area of human existence, a process accompanied by two effects generating “well being”, namely:

- *the balancing of the human bio-psychical state*, through human experiential-holistic resonance with the harmony of the essential forms, with their structure and proportion, being able to optimize, through the resonance of the “form waves” the state of the biological human system, modelled by the same universal principles;

- *the harmonisation of the human spiritual-cognitive state*, through a permanent (re)actualization of the intuitive learning regarding the genesis of the world itself, to generate effects of cognitive therapy.

These two categories of effects have implicitly succeeded in offering intrinsic health-optimizing properties to our ancestors’ life style – starting from dwellings to common utilitarian objects (household objects, clothes etc.).

Taking into consideration the benefits mentioned above, the postulates of the “Architecture of Light” (Poenaru 2004) should be explicitly recognized and practically valued by all the architects of our time, by using the virtues of the integrating science of the “Living Light” that is biophotonics.

An interdisciplinary science discovered at the end of the last millennium by professor Fritz-Albert Popp and his team (1989), biophotonics has as its subject the processes of generating, storing and releasing (bio)photons, under the form of an “*ultraweak luminescence*”, by all living systems (vegetal, animal, human). While German researchers have observed in laboratory conditions that these emissions have the properties of a laser type light, without explaining the phenomenon in detail, a laborious Romanian research has led to an explicative theory regarding the nature of this bioluminescence (aura emission), symbolically named *the “Biological Lasers” Theory* [BLT] (Stanculescu and Manu 2002), and implicitly the *(bio)Photonic Theory of Energy-Information* [BTEI] (Constantinescu and Stanculescu 1993), explaining the EM waves interaction among bio-physical systems, both theories defining a real “core” of biophotonics.

An applicative synthesis of all these emergent theories is represented by *Exogenous Homeopathy* (Stanculescu 2011), proving that every external system can influence the human health by a holographic resonance. By virtue of these premises, the interaction between the human organism and the stimulating reference points of the architectural object (and not only) can be explained in terms of biophotonic technology, as demonstrated Aritia D. Poenaru – in her postface (2011) in ExHo book – showing that:

1. The effect of the EM radiations of the geographical area and of the Hartman telluric network where the building is placed, doubled by the effect of the “form waves” generated by the landscape, is reflected directly in the health state of the human body. Architecturally, this state can be optimized through Feng-Shui strategies, focusing on the correct placing of the dwelling in relation to the cardinal points, with water, forest, through the energetic practices of geomancy, focusing on the placing of some pyramid type “volumes/sacred forms” or some protective “cosmograms” in the building area, these volumes having variable dimensions and made from different materials, capable of cancelling the effect of some harmful, natural or technological radiations, etc.

2. The item of architecture can influence the harmony of the physical, psychical and spiritual

state, through the correct utilization of the colors, of the information on the “form waves” generated by the buildings’ volumetry and the planimetry, the energy-informational waves of the natural or artificial used materials, by the system of construction, etc. Hence, taking into consideration the necessities of the beneficiary, we can choose those properties of the architectural whole – from the symbols of the “sacred geometry” used in different decorative variants to the constructive materials – whose synergy acts through their vibration power both at the body level and at the psychical level.

3. The utilitarian objects present at the dwelling level, starting from houses to the healthy furniture and textile products etc., can bring their contribution to *the conservation of the “connection energy”*, and implicitly to the optimization of human health (Poenaru and Stănciulescu 2014).

This is exactly the idea on which the project “*Ecosane Architecture*” is based, focusing on building some ecological-healthy constructions, under advantageous economic conditions, for a wider range of beneficiaries. The benefits of such an architecture should explicitly be practically recovered by the architects of our time, for the benefit of harmony that the antique people have simply called *mimesis & catharsis*, purified through imitation and signification, namely *Nature & Culture*, connected by the harmony of our buildings.

4. Instead of conclusions: «ICHTHUS», an integrating cosmogram

This sketchy presentation of a project of “Sacred Architecture” as well as of Eco-Sane architecture stands instead of the conclusions of this work. Suggestively bearing the Greek name of the Christian symbol of «ICHTHUS» (International Complex for Human Therapy and Unity of Spirit) Săcărâmb/Romania, the project aims to accomplish (Poenaru 2004; 2010):

- a synergetic view on the relationship between modern humanity and a sacred cosmic-geographic (landscape) space, where a centre of spiritual initiation of the ancient Thracian-Geto-Dacians was placed three millennia ago;
- the construction of a modern architectural ensemble, assuming: (1) a hotel complex functioning as a leisure centre and as a centre of bio-psychic optimization; (2) a sanatorium of complementary therapies;
- a meditation centre, trans-spiritually conceived in relation with the world religions, an ensemble which, through its structure and functions, focuses on body harmony, with the human soul and the spirit.

In essence, the main purpose of «ICHTHUS» Săcărâmb (Poenaru, 2012) is to initiate the travelers into the mysteries of cosmic genesis and of the archetypal history of humankind, by walking only among the architectonic objects and by interpreting them in a symbolical way.




Fig. 5: The Spiritual Center of «ICHTHUS»: an archetypal cosmogy.

A. Two “cosmograms”: (1) the human archetypal embryo (Paris, 4 Match 2003); (2) the analogy of the embryo with the general plane of ICHTHUS; **B.** A general presentation of the Spiritual Center: (1) the plane: a telluric projection of the Cosmic Tree; (2) a frontal view of the “Road of Light”: an initiatory travel/pilgrimage; **C.** Architectural elements: (1) The “Flower of Life” generated from the “originary waters”; (2) The “Gate of Space”; **D.** The ICHTUS “temples”: (1) The “Temple of Time”; (2) The “Temple of the Archetypal Initiation”.

Hermeneutically interpreted, the «ICHTUS» project takes the form of:

(a) *an integrating cosmogram*, which – from a functional point of view – correlates the three architectonic objectives so that it should represent the image projected in the landscape of a symbolic human foetus, coupling the shape of the ovoid with those of the hourglass and of the column, uniting the principle of *fire* (light-sky) with *air* (the mountain ozone), with *water* (the dam) and *earth* (the ground of the building);

(b) *a series of specific cosmograms* characterizing – from a structural point of view – the built shapes (volumes and planes); e.g., the centre of the “universal spirituality”, placed exactly on the old sanctuary, recovers the image of an Oriental magical circle, in which an equilateral triangle circumscribes/inscribes in section within a circle and a square, and which, on a plane, generates figures of the “sacred geometry”, such as *vesica piscis*, the “flower of life”, etc.

Consequently, we could appreciate that «ICHTUS» is symbolically representing – using the architectural language – the essential stages of the cosmogenesis. Learning about the cosmic becoming, by walking among the «ICHTUS» architectural cosmograms, the pilgrim has the privilege to understand some of the following principles: “Know yourself and you will know the Universe”, a Creative Light Matrix (an EM field supporting cosmic forms) is determining the genesis of the cosmic structures, the “original waters” (the «ICHTUS» lake) represents as a mythical “cosmic tree”, the first creative vibration of light (“Fiat Lux”/“Big-Bang”) is generating an archetypal matrix of the cosmic forms of light, the genesis of the four cosmic elements is defining the structure of the cosmic world such as:

- ontologically. starting from invisible (field) to visible (substance);
- gnoseologically, understood by human being starting from visible to invisible;
- (pr)axiologically, according the principle of “esthetical pleasure”, namely: the (architectural) “beauty” is what we (subjectively) like, because we bio-psychically need it.

So, such type of “Architecture of Light”, which the ICHTUS is implicitly using, will recuperate the two functions of the sacred and laic architecture of the old times, namely:

- ♦ to be a “learning book”, able to keep in its “pages” the archetypal forms of the cosmogenesis;
- ♦ to represent a harmonizing frame of life, by its emissions of “light” (colours, forms, volumes waves, etc.), biophotonically resonating with human body/soul/mind complex.

That is why the «ICHTUS» SĂCĂRĂMB (Romania), could become a symbolic pilgrimage place, able to realize the symbolical architectural connection between the archetypal times and the modern ones.

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TYPES OF SETS OF ARCHITECTURAL GRAPHICS AND TEXTS IN BULGARIAN PUBLIC SPACE – XX CENTURY

Stela Borisova Tasheva
Bulgarian Academy of Science, Sofia, Bulgaria
stelabt@gmail.com

Abstract

The study is part of a bigger research project called “Bulgarian architectural graphics of XX century – problems and tendencies”. The aim of this paper is to explore combinations of architectural graphics and verbal descriptions from XX century. The chosen case studies are spread and made public in Bulgaria by professional magazines, articles or other scientific issues. Hence in the article are analyzed main features, forms and applications of graphics and texts and their links and mutual references in the final composite architectural message. The degree of information coherence of verbal and visual parts, used with various purposes, like education, propaganda, marketing, etc. is examined in three directions: as fully and partially connected, and as parallel messages. The study investigates the semantic relations between texts and graphics based on their contrast, lines of consequence or ways of harmonization and integration.

The expected results are in the areas of history of architecture and architectural graphics.

Introduction

Commonly accepted, architectural graphics is a tool of creating, developing and/or communicating architectural concepts and projects. Although their “iconic” or “comic strip” essence architectural graphic signs as any technical form of communication require basic education in the area. Tables, various schemes and graphs are common tools when writing about architecture, same as the constant dispersive mixture of iconic and symbolic (verbal and numeric) signs.

In the paper, the term “architectural graphics” will be used with the meaning of unique written language and a main factor in the design processes. As it is used to describe complex three-dimensional items, architectural graphics elements may include not only two-dimensional

plans, perspectives, schemes, sketches, drawings, CAD files, photos or other images, but also attached and embedded one-dimensional texts and descriptions, typological references comparisons and claims, various forms of graphs, tables, and, of course, new media – real models, video or interactive data sets and etc. Each of those data carriers can exist independently as channel and media, or be grouped with others aiming the transfer of information about one and the same project.

This article is focused on the most common cases of semantic flows and combinations created with the verbal, one-dimensional texts, and the visual two-dimensional images. Architectural scientific notes and articles are seen as systems of higher order – as sets that are combining parallel flows of verbal analyzing substances and some or all other visual elements of architectural graphics.

The semantic capacity of texts and images can vary accordingly to their main subject and message. Usually verbal texts are used more for analytical and theoretical, and therefore implicit, semantic needs: they specify principles, methods and typologies; they compare different objects and stress on chosen features, elements and factors. Although it is possible to use some protocol for verbal information structuring, like series of coordinates, varying matrixes, and selected dimension data to create an explicit verbal description of a building. (For example, some procedures of explicit verbal transcript are in fact what computers are programmed to do, to create an architectural Building Information Model.)

One of the founders of Morphosis, Thom Mayne, quoted by Forty (2000: 37) says “Drawings and Models [...] allow a degree of precision often elusive in verbal discourse”. Images and especially drawings are commonly expected to be more explicit and accurate, describing very particular buildings, dimensions, materials, proportions, geometrical connections, etc. Still, a simplified image can be used to mark a typology (as in the example on fig. 1-left, where Русева Ruseva (1981-1982: 312) is explaining the various structure schemes of a Thracian tomb cupola). This image refers to no explicit, actually existing tombs, and still it argues on possible structure issues of a great number of antique buildings. Another example of implicit data transferred through images can be seen on Fig.1-right, where Давчева Davcheva (2014: 26) gives examples on accessing and exploring the presence of *ice* in alternative hotel forms. As an opposition of the simplified structure models, in Давчева Davcheva image are used very concrete, existing objects, which are colligated in a concept, due to one material use and repetitiveness.



Figure 1: Left: Thracian cupola typology; **Right:** Use and sense of ice in hotels structures

Now it is possible to conclude that images and verbal descriptions in architectural graphic language are used in equal parts for data transfer, depending on an author's choice of explanation methodology. A sender of graphic architectural messages may choose either the only one communication channel (like full set of drawings and images or systematic complete verbal descriptions) or a mixture of them both. Then sometimes as both verbal and visual data flow are used in parallel to deliver one and the same object, the receiver of the data could accept them even as duplication of the data flow – for example when images are explained in detail through the verbal texts.

In fact, it is hard to determine the minimum verbal and visual parts that are needed in order to transfer properly the needed architectural information. A possible reason is the very nature of verbal and visual descriptions. As first, each of them is suitable to stress efficiently on specific building elements and characteristics – just naming the structure types, or showing a line of silhouettes. As second, both verbal (one-dimensional) and visual parts (two-dimensional) of a message are meant to express a three-dimensional architectural structure, therefore their combination somehow increases receiver's ability to decode this structure. And as third, one may notice the various cognitive setting of architects, authors or scientists, which is a reason for quite contradict opinions on the role of a drawing in the design process. There are the well-known words of Carlo Scarpa quoted by Murphy (1990: 12) "I want to see things, I don't trust anything else. I place things in front of me on the paper so that I can see them. I want to see therefore I draw. I can see an image only if I draw it.", but also the statement of Frank Lloyd Wright "I no longer touch pencil to paper until the idea of the design is so fixed within my own imagination that I am arranging the furniture and placing bowls of flowers in the building. Then I go to paper and put it down." quoted by Futagawa (1985: viii). In a bit different context, but in still valid circumstances, the researcher of antique Thracian tombs, *Русева* Ruseva (2013:17) explains the processes of creating architectural objects in the Antiquity like "The words are in the beginning of any creative process. Thoughts, shaped as ideas, which are seeking the rendering of spiritual categories into material objects, are the reason of occurrence, development and existence of architecture".

Method

In the article I shall focus on two cases of combining verbal and visual flows of architectural data: the full coherence, where verbal and visual parts show complementing data aspects of the same architectural object; and the parallel flows of images and verbal parts, where visuals are not directly connected to the project mentioned in the text.

The first one is the most common case concerning the verbal and visual flows in an article. This often is the most convenient way to present a project in magazine or online. A good example of that is the representation of the ancient Christian church "St. Sofia", published in the magazine of the Bulgarian architect-engineering chamber, by *Торньов* Tornyov (1901), shown on fig.2. In the article, the rich images are creating a strong visual impression of the existing building, and the verbal parts are adding data like details, numbers, quantities, myths, stories or even wishes. In other articles verbal explanations are also used as a rhetoric tool to cover opinions and comments, building commission and design stories and typological or real object comparisons. Combinations of drawings (including various building outlooks and their space organizations like plans and sections) and descriptions of the project circumstances and numerical data (sometimes used to defend or attack the chosen paths and concepts) continue in almost all XX century publications as a certain set, a stable data structure.



Figure 2. Article for the ancient Christian church “St. Sofia”.

The parallel flows of verbal and visual data in an article are not that widespread, but still are applied in diverse situations. As borderline examples about this, could be accepted the absence either of verbal texts, or images in one architectural representation. Until the technology for multiplying images and drawings was developed, the buildings were presented in public texts verbally, which was accepted as methodology. But in XX century, the technology was well-know, and both of verbal and visual elements were used, even though multiplying of images, drawings and photos was considered a bit expensive. Therefore the lack of one of the communication channels should be accepted as personal or editorial choice. In fact from the beginning of XX century this choice was somehow loaded with additional meaning. For example use only of images and no comments was widespread as a way to cover competition results for more ordinary buildings almost until the end of century. Verbal and only verbal elements were usually applied in stylistic and philosophic discussions, attack or defense of a chosen life, urban or competition concept, or analysis of project circumstances.

In both mentioned above cases, the use of single channel communication suggests the impersonal and unbiased author or editorial position. Somehow, the use only of verbal explanation is also assumed as more classical and with higher theoretical value. With no images are lots of researches like those conducted or edited by *Джангозов* Djangozov (1943), *Обретенов и Стамов* Obretenov and Stamov (1972), *Христова* Hristova (1979) etc. Modified versions of this “highly theoretical” point of view are also some architectural books or studies illustrated in artistic or conceptual manner like the work of *Класанов* Klasanov (1992) about the technicism tendencies in architecture.

There were also cases of using single channel communication for the expected existence of reasons to underrate a theme or project – a neglected author, highly questioned project etc.

In the end of the century when the world embraces the new technology and the Internet, it is common to use only images for another, third reason – their attractiveness, the haste of their perceiving and their fully accessible “language”. Verbal explanations were accepted by the public as too tiresome and unnecessary. Even now the common representations of any architectural object in the Internet are several realistic or photographic views and the object name.

In Bulgarian public space during XX century were also some interesting tries of embedding images and text in contradict or independent way. In the article I shall examine two specific case-studies: forms of implied messages and the addition of hidden meanings.

The implied messages were constructed when the author was expecting knowledge levels and

shaped opinions from his public, or believed truly in the images solidity. A good example of this is the article of *Ненюв* Nenov (1915) who was disturbed by some inappropriate tendencies in the Bulgarian architectural competitions. Nenov tracks various executed competition procedures and results and complains about the practice of transferring the winning entry to a non-winning but cheaper competitor, and creating unhealthy atmosphere in the guild. His article is illustrated with project drawings by architect Lazarov, who, as it is mentioned in the text, had won the second prize in a competition but no first prize was ever given. Although the detailed analysis of past competitions, one of the implied messages of this article, conducted by the images is about the high quality of Lazarov's designs, and the injustice done towards him as a competitor.

Another form of implied messages can be seen in two retrospective articles in *Serdika* magazine – an issue published by Sofia municipality in the period 1937-1952. The first chosen articles by *Михайлов* Mihaylov (1939) is following the deeds of Sofia municipality for a five year period. The article is 39 pages long, divided in multiple sections about the new administrative and financial structure, the building activities, road and transportation news, water, and electricity deliverance, sewage structure, gardens and parks, hospitals and other health institutions and arrangements, school and social support. All of the sections are illustrated with sustained images – the new municipality crew, the built edifices and structures, sometimes with plans and details, and their happy users. The architectural part contains even a first try of photo realistic montage of a project and pictures of various gypsum house models. The implied messages of these images are of course the happiness to live and work in Sofia, same as the big difference that is made for the observed 5 years. Some 8 years later, under the name “69 years from Sofia liberation” the magazine published 7 page article divided on financial, social, building, health, culture and etc. sections but all the accompanying images were an artistic sketch and some committee members. The article bird-eye view is shown on Figure 3. The shift of the used image themes is outstanding, although of course those years are one of the most dynamic periods of the XX century. It is really amazing, how architecture, which is always supposed to be material three-dimensional object, holder of aims, functions and space, is not depicted anywhere, although it is mentioned in the article. Somehow anything material and solid is taken away from the city as an institution or habituating structure, and also from its management. Instead of any architecture, or citizens, in 1947 the presented committee people are materializing the concept of “soviets” and the new reign, and they are to become the new face of Sofia. The implied message of these images is also about the watching and evaluating governing power, because of the chosen way of presentation of the authority member – sitting on large conference tables, backed by portraits of communist heroes.



Figure 3. Article in Serdika magazine, 1947.

Although the message of the pictures in Serdika magazine is not so direct, it is visible to all of its targets – who are people living and consuming the city. This kind of implied propaganda information is extremely popular in public presentations during the second half of the century. After the fall of the communist regime, the major politics are often replaced by popular culture personalities, same as their heroic inspiration is traded off to marketing ideas.

Hidden messages on the other hand are not so openly transferred as the implied propaganda epistles. They may or may not be visible; they may or may not reach some receivers. A well-known example of misjudged hidden message in Bulgarian public space is a forbidden and burned epigram book by Radoi Ralin (1968), illustrated by Boris Dimovski. On one of the book illustration, under the epigram “Blue paunch, deaf for knowledge” is drawn a pig, which tail is accepted by the censorship as an imitation of Todor Zhivkov’s (the communist head of state in the period) signature.

Examples of possible hidden messages in architectural themes are some of the pictures in the study of *Кръстев Krastev* (1979). The research is focused on the processes, needs, developments and expectations of all involved in an architectural design process. The book is illustrated by its author with witty and sometimes satirical schemes and images analyzing the phases, intentions and perceptions of different architectural objects. Some of them literally so close to the broadly accepted at the period ideas, that when drawn on paper they are touching the limits of the absurd. An image by Krastev analyzing the use of the block buildings in huge new socialist city districts is shown on Figure 4.




Figure 4. Illustration by Krastev (1979: 54)

In Krastev's picture, blocks are shown as a space distributor, which are assorting the chaotic crowd movement. But looking at it, it is possibly also to notice the loss of human identity and the emergence of sense of uniformity and obedience created in the block public space. The image is not criticizing, or arguing, but is making some concepts truly visible and clear.

Results

There are a great amount of published architectural or scientific texts in Bulgarian public space, and until now, they were never been an object of research from graphic and semiotic point of view. As any illustrated articles, architectural studies usually combine visual and verbal parts. Still their aim is a bit different from the other texts, as they are expected to reveal objectively true portrait of the analyzed buildings.

During XX century, images are mostly used to support and illustrate the verbal parts of studies. They are accepted as parallel data flow, following and imitating the verbal analysis. However a various borderline cases existed, including single-channel communication or the deliverance of additional, implied or even hidden messages to their readers. The perception of those messages depends deeply on the context and the environment of a reader and on his knowledge and state of being.

Hidden messages become extremely popular in the period of the socialist governing the state of Bulgaria, and therefore are applied in even more formal, technical languages like the one of architectural graphics. But in fact variations of channels and methods of communication are enriching the processes of data transferring and the architectural language vocabulary and semantic capacity.

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
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
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SEMIOTICS IN THE INTERDISCIPLINARY CONTEXT



From Translation to Semio-Translation: Origins, Evolution and Metamorphoses

Chairmen:

Susan Petrilli (susan.petrilli@gmail.com)

University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy

Dinda L. Gorlée (gorlee@xs4all.nl)

University of Houston, USA

Sobre la corposfera: Nuevos Avances en las cartografías del cuerpo / On the Corposphere: Advances on the Cartographies of the Body

Chairman:

José Enrique Finol (joseenriquefinol@gmail.com)

Universidad del Zulia, Maracaibo, Venezuela

Music, Theater and Performance in a Globalised World: a Semiotic Approach

Chairmen:

Pirjo Kukkonen (pirjo.kukkonen@helsinki.fi)

Helsinki University, Finland

Jean-Marie Jacono (jean-marie.jacono@wanadoo.fr)

LESA, Université d'Aix-Marseille, France

José María Paz Gago (pazgagochema@gmail.com)

University in A Coruña, Spain

Semiotics and Narrative

Chairman:

Maria Popova (mpopova@nbu.bg)

New Bulgarian University

New Forms of Knowledge, of Social Relations, and of Economic Value in the Age of the Internet

Chairmen:

Ivan Kassabov (ivankassabov@gmail.com)

New Bulgarian University

George Tsonev (gtstonev@nbu.bg)

New Bulgarian University

Penser sémiotiquement le présent à l'époque de l'explosion

Chairman:

Yong Ho Choi

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea

The Sense of Action: Dialogues between Semiotics and Anthropology

Chairmen:

Tatsuma Padoan (tp26@soas.ac.uk)

SOAS, University of London

Franciscu Sedda (franciscu.sedda@gmail.com)

Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"

**FROM TRANSLATION TO
SEMIO-TRANSLATION:
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION AND
METAMORPHOSES**

THE POWER OF SILENCE IN INTERLINGUISTIC AND INTERSEMIOTIC TRANSLATION

Caroline Mangerel
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa
MangerelC@ufs.ac.za

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine power dynamics as manifested through the absence of translation, or translation silence. Power dynamics in postcolonial contexts have been the subject of remarkable research by Lefevere, Cronin and Tymoczko, to name only a few translation theorists. There is no doubt that silence is an intricate part of power in translation, both in practice and in theory, both in actual acts of translation and in the context in which they take place.

The power of silence in translation, and absence of translation, appears at many levels, from translation's role to its potential and responsibility, and in all categories of translation – pragmatic and literary as well as translation theory. This paper draws from the semiotic and semantic theories of Jakobson, Peirce and Lakoff to examine silence in intralinguistic, interlinguistic and intersemiotic translation as well as the concept of invariants, those basic elements of meaning. The concept of *interdisciplinary systems* will be introduced.

1. Untranslatability: an overview

The absence of translation's longest standing application in translation theory is the notion of untranslatability.

Many thinkers from various horizons and times in the fields of linguistics and translation studies have wrestled with the notion of *untranslatability*. Humboldt, Jakobson, and Antoine Berman, for instance, all concluded at some point in their body of work that some elements, either at the cultural or contextual level, at the linguistic level, or because of the very essence of human languages, cannot be translated.

Untranslatability has also long been a topic of debate from various perspectives because of the many disciplines to which it is connected and the many epistemological issues involved,

such as meaning, language, and translation proper. Untranslatability finds its origin in *prejudicial objection*, the basis of which is the sacralisation of texts bringing about the sacralisation of languages, and in turn causing translation to become an act of desecration (Ladmiral, 1990). Untranslatability can also be explained in practical terms, such as the German Romantics' very modern idea that "no word from one language is the exact equivalent to a word in another language" (Humboldt, 2000: 33. My translation.), an idea also put forth by Roman Jakobson who points to the necessity of using "creative transpositions... or interlingual transpositions... or finally intersemiotic transpositions" (Jakobson, 2000: 115), according to the type of translation to be performed.

Most of the thinkers who have tackled this topic see translatability as a matter of degrees, coloured by the elements to translate (syntactical or contextual, for instance). Berman highlights the impossibility of translating a literary work's musicality and rhythm (Berman, 1999: 132). Others, however, such as Benjamin, Derrida or Quine, consider translation to be in fact impossible because of the very nature of meaning and the essence of linguistic differentiation. The latter refers to, for instance, Steiner's view of the role of multiple languages for humanity; in *After Babel*, he theorizes that humanity has "formed" different languages to maintain territorial protection and cultural isolation (Steiner, 1975: 37). As a way of keeping one's identity secret inside a defined group, linguistic differentiation means that languages are not meant to be translated.

Other thinkers in the field of translation studies have specifically marked their opposition to the concept of untranslatability. The arguments made in favour of it tend to rest on a theoretical approach rather than a practical one, and texts that really cannot be translated often need simply to be moved from a context (historical, social, economic) to another for the translation to happen. Henri Meschonnic considers untranslatability to be an essentialist notion that is proven wrong by actual translation, and points out that "the untranslatable is social and historical, not metaphysical" (Meschonnic, 1972: 51).

This observation is precisely what this study on translation silence seeks to investigate, that is, a semiotic analysis of the manifestations of the untranslated, while pinning the untranslatable and the untranslated one against the other.

2. Absence of translation in specific contexts

The absence of translation in pragmatic contexts is indicative of power issues between translator and target audience – namely, in this specific context, the paying customer or employer. It brings forth questions of deontology, loyalty, visibility, and framing or re-framing the message, as is the case, for instance, in news translation.

2.1. Pragmatic translation

The issue of power is certainly present in pragmatic translation: "everyday" translation, whether scientific, specialised (such as legal or financial) or general. The concept of non-translation is tied to power dynamics between languages, translation ethics and visibility issues, in this field as in other, more "noble" – at least more theorized – contexts. Among topics of interest is the way that silence intersects with deontology in a pragmatic context. From a reception standpoint, non-translation in pragmatic contexts leads mostly to problems arising from matters of communication, for instance in a software setting, or to legal issues in a corporate or government setting.

In terms of deontology, most regulatory organisations have a main principle along the lines of "Translation consists in rendering a text written in one language into another language and conveying the message as faithfully as possible." (OTTIAQ, 2014) Faithfulness is thus the most important component of the translator-client relationship, and silence, or absence, must be

measured in the frame of said faithfulness, which is also sometimes described as loyalty. For instance, the profession has also been described as based on

four loyalty relationships: (1) loyalty to the commissioner, (2) loyalty to the target-text reader, (3) loyalty to the source-text author, and (4) the translator's loyalty to herself or himself. As an example of this last type of loyalty, he mentions the case in which translators refuse a translation job if they fear that it might jeopardise their integrity for moral-ethical reasons. (Künzli, 2007:43)

Absence of translation is therefore officially excused, in a pragmatic setting, if it violates the loyalty prescribed as the very basis of the translator-client relationship. This point does not, however, take into account the economic relationship that a translator has with his clients. Refusing translation can mean the end of a professional relationship, and the translator is thus a potential victim of her own integrity – and always the weaker party in the professional power dynamic.

Another excellent example of translation silence is its use in news translation. In fact, non translation has been described as a characteristic of news translation, specifically in the context of selection and de-selection principles, which are “considerably influenced by language knowledge and (non-) translation” (Van Doorslaer, 2010: 182). The translator decides what the target audience will get to read or hear, what information they will have access to; however, she works along editorial lines as each press agency and news outlet have specific rules pertaining to target audiences, news contents and media coverage.

2.2. Non translation in cultural contexts

In terms of cultural contexts – historically often prone to censorship – the absence of interlinguistic translation is especially observable in film translation and/or adaptation.

Some of the best, and most vivid, examples, can be found in dictatorships, such as Franco's Spain (1939–1977), where those few foreign films that made it through the censorship committee were adapted to fit specific standards of morality. Dogma, morality and the regime were not to be offended or criticised in any way, and “any production not corresponding to those criteria was prevented from being published, or the offending passages were suppressed, no matter their size” (Petit, 2014. My translation.). Through cutting passages and moral-framing dubbing, lovers became husbands and wives, brothers and sisters or cousins, which in itself brought on other types of problems. With some key scenes cut out, storylines became completely different and often incomprehensible, which could be attributed to bad translation but was in fact a product of non-translation via censorship.

3. Intersemiotic translation

All illustrations discussed so far belong to the area of interlinguistic translation. Before exploring silence in intersemiotic translation, it may be appropriate to review Jakobson's categories of translation, all of which are relevant in the study of translation silence.

3.1. Jakobson's categories of translation

The first of Jakobson's categories, intralinguistic translation “or rewording, is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language” (Jakobson, 2000: 127). An example of this is *spin*. For instance, in some instances of present political discourse, *global*

warming is referred to as *climate change*; *death penalty* as *capital punishment*; *civilian victims* as *collateral damage*. In all three cases, the threatening term is eliminated and replaced with a neutral word that not only avoids evoking real-life issues, but also frames the discourse as stemming from a certain political orientation.

The second category, interlinguistic translation “or translation proper, is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language” (Jakobson, 2000: 127). The most commonly theorised, this category is in itself rich with sub-categories.

The third category, intersemiotic translation “or transmutation, is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems” (Jakobson, 2000: 127). This category is the largest, and the most difficult to circumscribe as it not only involves the translation of codes between very different semiotic systems, but also demands an understanding of both (or all) codes involved. Said understanding must also be sufficiently deep to isolate the elements to be translated. These elements will be known as *invariants*.

Non-translation in film: A blend of interlinguistic and intersemiotic translation

One common characteristic of intersemiotic translation is its blending with other categories. In film, it's not uncommon to have both categories at once, and the absence of translation therefore multiplies the semiotic effects. Specifically, a film in a given language can have some dialogues in another language which are either subtitled or translated by one of the characters. In the following example, such dialogues have been, deliberately or not, mistranslated or completely obliterated.

Numerous American films shot either in foreign locations or with foreign-language extras have added layers of humour or meaning when background language doesn't get translated. Subtitles – or the absence thereof – can also be used as part of the film. In *A fish called Wanda* (1988), the main character Wanda, played by Jamie Lee Curtis, is an American conwoman who is driven wild by the sound of foreign languages, even though she only understands English. Two men seduce her by speaking Italian: Otto the American thug and Archie the British barber.

Otto (Kevin Kline) speaks “guidebook Italian”, with phrases like: “Osso bucco milanese con piselli!... formaggio, spinaci!”; “è molto pericoloso signorina, molto pericoloso”; “Dov'è la farmacia”; “Dov'è la fontana di Trevi?”; “Per cominciare due insalate verde”; “Due cupole grande della cattedrale di Milano”; “Dov'è il Vaticano?” (Crichton, 1988). These are all either names of foods or standard tourist phrases in Italian. Archie (John Cleese), on the other hand, replies to her inquisitive “Do you speak Italian?” with a long monologue in perfect Italian, which remains untranslated, either with subtitles or in-character translation. His reply “I'm Italian in spirit! But I married a woman who'd rather work in the garden than make passionate love. A big mistake!” The absence of translation creates humour by adding an extra layer of meaning, as well as a discrepancy between the members of the audience who pick up on the difference and those who don't.

3.2. Eco's categories

According to Antoine Berman, translation enriches the original work, and the more translations there are, the richer the work becomes (Berman, 1999). In this perspective, then, the main focus of translation is not about reception but rather about reflecting on the translated work. Going against the communication function of translation, this interpretation also goes beyond most foreignizing stances in translation theory. Umberto Eco put it very efficiently, quoting precisely Jakobson himself: “Jakobson demonstrates that to interpret a semiotic item means ‘to translate it’ into another item (maybe an entire discourse) and that this translation is always creatively enriching the first item” (Eco, 2001: 71).

Eco also has a classification of his own, with more categories than Jakobson's, which introduces a notion of degrees in the types of translation:

Eco's classification is, like that of Jakobson's, tripartite. Firstly, there is interpretation by transcription. This involves simple substitution of codes as, for example, in case of the Morse alphabet. Secondly, there is intrasystemic interpretation. This, in its turn, can be divided into three subcategories: intrasystemic interpretation within the same natural language (as, for instance, synonymy, definition, paraphrase, inference, comment etc.); intrasystemic interpretation within other semiotic systems (for instance, changing a piece of music from major to minor); and performance (for example, the performance of a musical score or the staging of a ballet). Thirdly, Eco introduces intersystemic interpretation that includes two types, one with marked variation in the substance, and the other with mutation of continuum. Intersystemic interpretation with marked variation in the substance includes three subtypes: interlinguistic interpretation or translation between natural languages; rewriting (e.g., reworked versions of the same piece by the same composer, parody); translation between other semiotic systems or intersystemic interpretation with very marked differences in substance among non-linguistic systems (for instance, transforming a colourful oil painting into a black and white reproduction). Mutation of continuum includes parasynonymy and adaptation or transmutation. Parasynonymy can be illustrated by amplifying the phrase "that one over there" by pointing at the object with a finger. Adapting literature to film or to theatre belongs to adaptation or transmutation [...]. (Torop, 2002: 597)

Eco's categories will be especially useful in highlighting the interpretative subtleties in describing the semiosis that goes on in re-creating a work of art. However, it may not be as helpful to define the dynamics of intersemiotic translation between interdisciplinary systems, which will be discussed later on.

3.3. Semiosis and the intersemiotic translation of a work of art

The "enrichment" that Berman and Eco mention is one of the characteristics of intersemiotic translation: it creates a semiosis which contributes to the original. The examples are numerous, but one that comes to mind is the artistic and cultural semiosis around Prosper Mérimée's novella *Carmen* (1847). Over the years, it has been the subject of uncountable translations, adaptations, rewritings, intersystemic interpretations, and transmutations. Its most famous adaptation is without a doubt Bizet's opera, *Carmen* (1875). Film versions include several silent versions such as Arthur Gilbert's (1907), Cecil B. DeMille's (1915), and Charlie Chaplin's *Burlesque on Carmen* (1915). Other film adaptations include Otto Preminger's *Carmen Jones* (1954), a flamenco adaptation by Carlos Saura (1983), Jean-Luc Godard's *Prénom Carmen*, and more recently two African versions: *Karmen-Geï* by Senegalese director Joseph Gaï Ramaka, and *U-Carmen eKhayelitsa* by South African director Mark Dornford-May. This is only the tip of the iceberg that is the hundreds of works of art and various productions inspired by *Carmen*, including comic books, hip-hop musicals, paintings (Picasso, among others), as well as merchandise such as china, umbrellas and hair accessories. From a literary work, *Carmen* has become a cultural phenomenon, whose semiosis is still on an exponential curve, one that enriches the original work. The translation silences from one interpretation or version to the next can be hard to point out, especially when the systems are very different from one another. I will discuss later the no-

tion of invariants.

The faithfulness paradigm is historically part of interlinguistic translation theory. This recurring theme is theorised about using a semantic network which encompasses all notions pertaining to treason, betrayal, deception and infidelity casting the translator as a traitor – either to her native language, to the author’s text or intentions, or to any other element of the translator-author-reader relation. The discourse about fidelity makes abundant use of metaphors, some of which are well known in popular culture such as *les Belles infidèles* (coined by Gilles Ménage in the 18th century) and the infamous aphorism *traduttore traditore*.

At the basis of this concept is the idea of original work. In the example of *Carmen*, the comic book – one wonders what’s left of the “original”, in other words: what are the basic themes and elements, such as storyline, characters, and set of values, that constituted the original, finite *œuvre*, and do you find them in the translated work? When the original narrative is no longer represented or recognisable, the basic question as regards the original is: where can the semiotic line be drawn, and when does a translation become rather an inspiration? Translation silence is a very significant matter in approaching this question, as ascertaining what has not been translated allows to assess what those silences mean, making silence into a object of interpretation.

In attributing value to the semiotic process, two approaches can be identified: one centred on the “work” – the *œuvre* – and one focusing on the dynamic. The *œuvre*-centred approach places the original work at the highest place in the creative hierarchy, and thus carries with it a potential of unfaithfulness – a value judgement attributed to any adaptations lacking elements determined to be essential to the integrity of the *œuvre* and its semiosis. Any translation, whether interlinguistic or intersemiotic, is deemed a copy and therefore held to certain standards of fidelity. It is also based on the creator, and holds him or her to the highest regard.

On the other hand, the dynamic-centred approach is open and focuses on the semiosis rather than on the static sign. In the semiosis-centred approach, the original can be modified tremendously, including its basic features, and the fact that other creators are inspired by it is a testament to its semiotic capabilities. There is no end result to this semiosis, and it finds itself propelled by traces of the original – or one of its versions – emerging from the cultural landscape in unexpected places. This approach in fact does away with the notion of the original.

4. Silence in intersemiotic translation

In intersemiotic translation, silence is not as easy to circumscribe. There are a number of factors to consider when describing it, as well as when attempting to perform it.

4.1. Censorship and taboo

At first glance, there is no political agenda behind *not* transforming a poem into a play, or a photo into a sculpture. Absence or silence in translation are first attributed to shifts in technology – for instance, there’s been a bit of a silence in morse code lately. However, some translational silences are significant: the absence of parody in a given culture, for instance, can be a sign of regime interventionism, just like, on the interlinguistic side, not translating certain novels or forbidding their publication or their importation can be as efficient as burning books, though it may lack the dramatic flair. And of course, the form of representation must also be taken into account when evaluating the silence of intersemiotic translation. In a number of countries, it is perfectly accepted and even encouraged to display representations of a monarch or leader; not so, however, to display a caricature of the same.

Not translating intersemiotically is also indicative of a whole system of values. It might indicate a cult or a taboo of the original; an obvious example would be the forbidden representation of God in a number of religions. Similarly, some cultural events must not be talked about or

represented outside a select group, such as the details of men's circumcision initiation in Xhosa culture. Some names cannot be named. Some representational conventions are forms of silence: in most Western countries, for instance, commercials for menstrual products always feature blue liquid, which one could say is the intersemiotic equivalent of *spin* – removing the threatening or taboo element while still managing to talk about the topic, and in turn introducing into it a neutralising factor. In short: a specific category of silence in intersemiotic translation is in and of itself a sign, and silence in intersemiotic translation is a system.

4.2. Interpretant and invariance

The other important factor is that the sheer mass of elements of meaning about which one must decide: translate or not translate? is intimidating, and the task at hand daunting. In interlinguistic translation, or in translation between two systems whose codes are the same or similar, such as visual arts, the elements to translate are generally fairly obvious. Meaning in the target system is determined by factors such as equivalence in relation to meaning in the source system. In the Peircean perspective, the intersemiotic translation semiosis is apposed onto the triadic meaning relationship in a way whereby “the sign is the target, the object of the sign is the translated work, and the interpretant is the interpreter” (Aguiar and Queiroz, 2013: 286). They are also assessed by the translator, who handles those codes with a somewhat expert, or at least knowledgeable, hand. However, in sensibly different code systems, meaning-making elements must be rendered intact, and the operation is performed by re-creators who, as part of the interpretant, decide what essential elements must be isolated. Different codes can be illustrated by the adaptation of an architectural piece into music, for example, or a novel (Mário de Andrade's *Macunaíma*) into a dance choreography (Paula Carneiro Dias's work, “Para o herói: experimentos sem nenhum caráter – corpo s/ papel”) (Aguiar and Queiroz, 2013).

Identifying essential and irreducible meaning-making elements can be achieved by using Peirce's mathematical concept of invariance (Peirce 1931: 1407). This notion of reducing meaning to its essential relationship also rests on another essential Peircean notion: “According to Peirce's model, any description of semiosis involves a relational complex constituted by three terms *irreducibly* connected – Sign, Object, and Interpretant (S-O-I). The *irreducibility* indicates a logical property of this complex” (Aguiar and Queiroz, 2013: 284).

Similar to the relation between points on a graph, which can be “translated” from one axis to another or moved in another way, while still retaining its essential functional relationship, “the invariant rule determines both the relationship among the part and the parts themselves” (Andrews, 1990: 113). In the example of architecture to music, for instance, some invariants are based on the relationships between different parts of the work: harmony, dissonance, cultural contexts and references, and even rhythm. In artistic endeavours, the effect on the target audience is also part of these invariants and must be part of both semiotic systems' interpretants.

4.3. Interdisciplinary systems

Even though architecture and music, or novel and dance, are very different means of expression, they all remain in the realm of art and performance as re-creation, whereby the artist and the translator are (usually) one and the same, and where equivalence is decidedly subjective. In both intersemiotic translations, the effect on the interpreter (the audience) is the interpretant. However, intersemiotic translation is not only a transfer between artistic categories, which are bound by technique as well as narrative and worldview.

Intersemiotic translation is also the adaptation of elements into *interdisciplinary systems*, which are influenced by skills sets such as knowledge, theoretical frameworks and methodologies, target audience needs and of course experts in the discipline(s). This type of intersemiotic

translation can be illustrated by the adaptation of documents, study findings or law enforcement processes between legal contexts and scientific contexts, for instance. The absence of translation in these contexts – either gaps in parts of the original or entire items left untranslated – can be indicative of the significance of the non-translation's would-be target audience and its relationship to the source system. It reflects the power dynamics at play. This type of intersemiotic translation is also interesting due to the fact that it lends itself to blending with intralinguistic translation, inserting more layers of meaning in the equation.

The study of translation silence offers a rich potential for research at several epistemological levels. For interlinguistic translation – whether pragmatic or cultural – as well as for intersemiotic translation, it offers an original way to highlight power dynamics and their constituting elements in translated texts and objects. Exploring silences in a semiotic system also allows to identify invariance, and use it as a basis to analyse intersemiotic and intersystemic translation, its objects, its dynamics, its protagonists, and its challenges.

The Peircean concept of invariance will be examined and developed in further research in order to better work with intersemiotic translation. Interdisciplinary systems will be a specific focus of research.

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FROM TRANSLATION TO SEMIOTRANSLATION

Dinda L. Gorlée
University of Houston, USA
gorlee@xs4all.nl

Abstract

In the first part, *From interpreted signs to interpreted signs*, the mechanism of translation makes logical and nonlogical connections between the linguistic sign and object of the source text. While the Saussurean two-step skill of translation restates in logical language the source text into the target text, the concept of semiotranslation supplements Saussure's sign-internal strategy into Peirce's sign-external interpretant-signs. The interpretants guarantee the logical and nonlogical forms of semiotranslation. The "genuine" effects of three-way semiosis involves "good", "bad", and "in-between" translations made by the translator. The semiotic signature of the translator implies the emotional, energetic, and logical nature of source and target. In the second part, *From intersemiosis to trans-semiosis*, Jakobson's three types of intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic translation continue Peirce's interpretative semiotranslation in the linguistic semiosis, extralinguistic intersemiosis, and artistic trans-semiosis. Semiotranslation forms goal-directed habits, but without fixed results, no fixed methods, no fixed redefinitions, and no fixed agents. All translational results, methods, and agents are tentative, provisional, and temporary attempts to make skeptical versions of translation.

1. From interpreted signs to interpreted signs

Translation can be defined as the ideal goal to recreate the perfect one-way replacement of textual material of the source text in one language by equivalent textual material in another language. The recreation into a different language is made by a human agent (translator) to adapt (reimagine, refashion, reconstruct, rebuild) the thematic, spatio-temporal, and conceptual fabric of the source text into the different language of the target text.). In this working definition, imagine the original Hebrew and Greek Bible translated into a thousand languages

as the original ideal of Christianity, giving a sacred form to later translation studies, to give rise to contemporary translation studies and translation criticism. Further, consider the forms of translation today: technical instructions from Swedish into French, a legal agreement translated from Arabic to Dutch, an English love letter intended for a Chinese lover, Shakespeare's sonnets translated into Spanish, the arias of an Italian opera translated into singable modern English, and so forth.

The process of *translating and translation (process and product)* seems to start as the first translatability, imagined as the romantically-inspired unity of the translator's ego, to produce the first original in the "semiotic signatures" of the translator (Gorlée 2012: 4 and *passim*). Then, the translator must highlight the cultural contexts of the message or text, including them as language-and-cultural equivalence in the "linguicultural" break between source and target languages (Anderson and Gorlée 2011: 222-226). Language and culture must be brought together in the whole version of the translation.

The external agents (readers, critic) must be acutely aware that the translator's mind and heart are basically subjective conjectures of guessing right or wrong. The hypothesis of translation is almost a paradox of language and culture. The translator's reasoning is and remains the obscure imagination of his brain by means of association and combination of the mental abilities. But the mind depends in part on the good or bad circumstances of the practitioner's nature and environment of the activity (here, making the translation). The dubious scholarly pleasure of the subjective and objective efforts of translation stresses that both theoretical and practical questions have a profound effect on the ideal to create the perfect equivalence between source and target texts.

The conventional view of the semiotic perspective is the dual approach of translation of sign and object. This view has tended to predominate in the structural tradition to the positive and creative *différance* to the teaching of foreign-language "skill" of applied linguistics. The ready availability of the convenient and comprehensive theory of translation studies explained the systematic methodology of contrastive analysis, studying two languages in contrast to identify general and specific differences between source and target language. The contrastive approach of the semiotic sign and object encourages the systematic use of formal constraints in the skill of translation, see the textbook of Vinay and Darbelnet's *Stylistique comparée du français et de l'anglais* (1958: 28-31, 1995: 12-15). The "old" manual of stylistics is the groundwork for translators, it has educated many trainee translators and is even today popular in the curricula of schools of translation. Almost 40 years after its publication, Vinay and Darbelnet's textbook has been translated into English under the title *Comparative Stylistics of French and English: A Method for Translation* (1995), suited for new use beyond the French-speaking countries. This structuralist type of "methodology for translation" remains a standard procedure today, see Venuti's manual of translation studies, *The Translation Studies Reader* (2004: 128-137).

Viewed in the terms of structuralist linguistics, Vinay and Darbelnet's "methodology for translation" was based on the duality of contrastive terms derived from Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics* (1949; see Vinay and Darbelnet 1958: 28-35, 1995: 12-19). Saussure's language theory deals in translation with the contrast between two terms: signifier and signified (*signans and signatum*), *langue* and *parole*, denotation and connotation, matter and form, sound and meaning, synchrony and diachrony. The language theory about the double process of translation agrees with Saussure's system of contrastive terms, and works in teaching the practical activities of translation. The modalities of self-thought in educating sign and object of translation has become the handy tool to activate the professional skill of trainee translators.

The division of the dual organization of Vinay and Darbelnet did not reckon with the reasonable assumption that the translation tends to produce a number of "good," "bad," and "in-

between” variations or versions of translation. The form and substance aspects of signs were already present in Hjelmslev’s expression and content, form and substance, Pike’s emic and etic problems, and Jakobson’s code and message, selection and combination, metaphor and metonymy, whole and details, and other terms. The combinatorial relations of “in-between” versions is the confusion of “good” and “bad,” in the analysis of contextual parameters of the changeable nature of translation. The “in-between” mode of translation blurs the dual outline of Saussure, but will be clarified in the syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic elements (Morris 1946: 217-220), following Peirce’s interpretants added to Saussure’s sign and object.

The dual equivalence of the fixed ways of source text to the target text governs Catford’s definition of translation as the “replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by equivalent textual material in another language (TL)” (1980 [1965]: 20). Catford’s transparent and critical grammar in *A Linguistic Theory of Translation* includes issues like lexicography, graphological translation, transliteration, translation shifts, and the limits of translatability. While Catford’s linguistic models and samples of translation are contrastive techniques, relating to linguistic devices, the technique of the transfer of languages within Catford’s contrastive analysis – including Vinay and Darbelnet’s classic taxonomy – does not really consider the changeable nature of language interweaving with socio-cultural elements of linguïculture to form a significant whole of source and target pragmatics. The role of translation not only incorporates a contrastive taxonomy of dealing with sign and object in two languages, but also creates a communicative act between language and culture joining the linguïcultural source and text together into one target text through the unspoken concept of Peirce’s interpretant.

Instead of the various techniques of using the contrast between two languages as such, the clear purpose of translation needs to follow a theory – starting with the naïve pseudo-theory of the translator’s first translatability – on the relevance of a pragmatic action standing for the metalinguistic problems of the jigsaw of languages and cultures. This possibility of the argument of metalanguage in translation is more than a mistaken belief of practical experiences, but concerns the methodology of goal-directed semiosis of the linguïcultural competence “built into” the translator’s knowledge, experience, or intuition (Anderson and Gorlée 2011). Thus the possible equivalence points to Peirce’s model of the translator’s vision (firstness), memory (secondness), and experience (thirdness) to rebuild the total equivalence of the target message. Semiosis is the interaction of sign, object, and Peirce’s interpretant, which integrates the cultural refinements of the cultural system into source and target narratives.

Three points are in order to generate semiotranslation. First, the translator’s multilayered frame of mind does not experience the symmetrical mechanism of Saussure’s structural linguistics, uniting source and target into one linguistic sign (the translation). Saussure’s sign is reducible to the fixed, sign-internal interaction and mutual dependency between the sign’s material side (signifier) and the object (signified) (Gorlée 2004: 55). However, translation has no fixation of unifying signifier and signified, but seems to hide the ambiguity of the co-authorship by the primary author and the secondary translator from the anonymous readership. In translatology, the translator can be regarded as a sign-external kind of pseudo-author, and even the readers can create their own pseudo-image of the target message.

The sign-external translator detaches himself or herself from the parts of the linguistic details of the source material – Peirce’s words, sentences, fragments – to make the own choices of questions in the target material. When offering a choice in the transposition from source to target, the active terminology is Peirce’s interpretant, quasi-interpreter, and ground, coined to counteract the signs of transference and to balance some degree of alienation between source and target. The both linguistic and extralinguistic revolution makes the experience of composing translation not merely the technical skill of expertly executing a transplantation of one

language to the next, but creates the artistic and aesthetic adventure *of handling more than the native autonomous language embedding and translating (or “translating”) language into other sign systems.*

The second type is the fixed change of the sign-environment of translation, which derives from the comparative stylistics of structural linguistics. Based on Saussure’s duality of sign and object, the stylistics of Vinay and Darbelnet and others manipulates the statistical rules of parts of speech and the techniques of literary genre (1958 : 15, 32–35, 102–115, 116–151, 1995: 15–19, 99–114, 115–163). *Unfortunately, the term stylistics has, as Toury states, “been deemed translational”, although the “theoretical and methodological frameworks within which it was handled could not, if only because their interests lacked the wish to fully account for all that translation may, and does involve” (Toury 1995: 3). Stylistics comes from outside translation, but stylistics adds translational norms and values for the writer and translator. This focuses the attention on the almost paradoxical situation of translation. The source and target milieu of translation is never a fixed norm but an open and unique environment for all kinds of stylistic and linguistic changes, isolated from the domination of social, political, and religious stylistics into personal stories. The predominance of stylistics is under pressure especially “in periods and countries where several linguistic conventions are struggling for domination [and] the uses, attitudes, and allegiances ... may be important nor only for the development of the linguistic system but for an understanding of his own art” (Wellek and Warren 1963 [1949]: 174).*

Thus the concept of stylistics has been reworded, reinterpreted, amplified, condensed, parodied, and commented by Vinay and Darbelnet’s examples into a variety of linguistic devices, such as overtranslation, calque, modulation, comparison, transposition, adaptation, and others. The new priority rethinks the fixed-complete (determined) contextual environment into the fluid-incomplete (undetermined) flow of translation. Thus translation seems to move away from the search of the intellectual selection of the fixed sense of interpreted language towards the linguistic-cultural changes of the total significance in what can be called the interpreted language.

A third type is the equivalence of the source text to the target text. The source text disappears from the perfect equivalence of ordinary translation to a degree of imperfect non-equivalence in the target text. In his creative terminology, Peirce called this “a class consisting of a lot of things jumbled higgledy-piggledy” (CP: 3.454), hardly a logical system. Peirce suggested a tentative, perhaps vague, fragment of discourse involving emotional tone in the bodily or energetic performance of the linguistic artifact. The equivalence between original and likeness is not the same as “conventional” translation. The replicas can be semiotized and re-semiotized in new interpretants – what remains in the target is only a shade of fidelity, not the real thing, of the source text. In semiotranslation, brought in a wider sense as ordinary translation, real equivalence is downgraded as only reflecting “some” degree or value of Peirce’s degenerate problem-solving method into generating more and more degenerate signs (Gorlée 1990). The weakening process of the degenerate qualities of the sign gives the translator and translation critic a sceptical tone of almost utter freedom to play with.

Within the term semiotranslation (which I started in Gorlée 1994: 226–232), the ideal of human translators of striving for Peirce’s genuine semiosis – the “perfect” sign of logical thirdness – has become softened (or weakened) in the “imperfect” pseudo-semiosis of Peirce’s “quasi-minds” (EP: 2: 544). As argued before (Gorlée 2004), the human mind of the translator creates new but biased quasi-translations, grounded in quasi-signs made by the quasi-thought of a quasi-mind. Quasi-translations bring forth not the intellectual mind, but also some unanalyzable, unpredictable, unsystemic, and controversial qualities of the feeling and mind of the interpreter-translator. The semiotic signatures of slippages, displacements, and substitutions of

the translated replicas do not manifest the high-level regenerate semiosis of exact logic, but rather reflect the lower-level idea of some degenerate forms of pseudo-semiosis (CP: 3.425-3.455; Gorlée 1990).

Semiotranslation replaces the normative fixities of the technical replica – fixed equivalence in overdetermination, underdetermination, concentration, compensation, explicitation, and other strategies of “ordinary” translation (Vinay/Darbelnet 1958, 1995, to a degree Catford 1980 [1965]) – into the absolute freedom of dynamical translation.

2. From intersemiosis to trans-semiosis

Semiotranslation uses the Peirce-based thinking method of detecting and analyzing signs to form the interpretants to the prior relationship of sign and object. Moving away from the camp of Saussure, and hijacked by Peirce, the view of general translation studies concerns the translation of a broader type of meaning within the open framework of Peirce’s logical and nonlogical terms, brought together as a mixture of rational and irrational terms in the target text. Peirce’s signs are divided into semiotic sign, object, and interpretant, and subdivided into various threeway elements to correspond to Peirce’s categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. In translational activities, Peirce would have distinguished between the relative order of categories: interpretant, sign, and object, meaning thirdness associating firstness with secondness.

Peirce’s concept of interpretants (SS: 109ff.) remains a subject of controversy, since Peirce also used a number of other alternatives, such as explicit, suggestive, ejaculative, imperative, usual, destinate, and normative interpretants. One may conclude that the first trio of immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants can be limited to the successive stages of the interpretive process (semiosis) of translation. The second one, the emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants, will indicate the sign-action from the perspective of the person-oriented agent, the interpreter or translator. The threeway elements are not separate formulas but must interact with one other in semiosis, while genuine sign-action of semiotranslation means that the interpreters or translator must work with the relative art of human pseudo-semiosis.

Semiotranslation channels a dynamic network of interpretant-signs, regarded as “imperfect” sign-things, but the semiosis of translation works with living signs to achieve perfect nature. This means that the progressive sign-action of translation can grow from “imperfect” to “perfect”. A translation is a (re)creative work by a translator, going through the successive moods, aspects, and phases of the never-ending acts of the changing ideas and thoughts in changing time and space. Simplifying the complex tasks of the translator, the vague and impromptu translations, made by so-called “bad” translators, bring in unintegrated and inexact features; they could under the fortunate circumstances of “good” translators grow into “in-between” and even good translations. The eventual growth means that any interpretant-message whatsoever can perform (and re-perform) between “good” and “bad” meaning. In semiotranslation, this is no virtual myth, but actual reality.

In Peirce’s speculative rhetoric of scientific communication, intertextual semiosis moved from “man’s instinctive vehicle of thought” into acknowledging “quite other system of signs into which they are accustomed to translate words and forms of words and so to render them more intelligible” (MS 654: 5). In his last (but unpublished) work, Peirce was inspired by his letters to Lady Victoria Welby (SS: 94–108). In the Preface of *Essays on Meaning* (1910), Peirce put forth the syntactical art of “existential graphs,” and writing that:

In this system, there are none of the ordinary parts of speech; for the indivisible elements are, one and all, complete assertions. It may be that this is the case in some existing lan-

guage: grammarians have, until very recently, had such an inveterate habit in their accounts of all languages of stretching them all alike upon the Procrustes bed of Greek-Latin grammar. But in one aspect at any rate Existential Graphs is essentially different from language. Namely, instead of being merely protracted in time, its expressions are diagrams upon a surface, and indeed must be regarded as only a picture [Peirce's deletion] projection upon that surface of a sign extended in three dimensions. Three dimensions are necessary and sufficient for the expression of all assertions; so that, if man's reason was originally limited to the line of speech, which I do not affirm, it has now outgrown the limitation. (MS 654: 6–8)

Roberts (1973) fully described Peirce's existential graphs as his discovery of the logic of machine translation (announced in MS 831: 2–12, MS 318: 40–45, MS 498: 23–24). The hardware machine articulates, reconstructs, and reasons the software “graphs” of linguistic messages in assertions, propositions, and sentences. The icons of thought are drawn in visual pictures of logical notations, sketched on a board within indexical subsigns. Peirce's visual hypothesis form the data basis to evolve into real laws demonstrating the clearness and validity of the enclosed graphs. As a “guide to Pragmaticism, that holds up thought to our contemplation with the wrong side out, as it were” (CP: 4:7), the vague belief of the agent or receiver will identify (or not) with the formal theory of truth or falsity (Gorlée 2012: 162, 283).

In his last period, Peirce wrote in MS 654 (1910) about the final openness of the triadic semiotic sign in all kinds of contexts, environments, and territories. In theoretical terms, he wrote that:

By a Sign I mean anything whatever, real or fictile, which is capable of a sensible form, is applicable to something other than itself that is already known, and that is capable of being interpreted in another sign, which I call its Interpretant as to communicate something that may not have been previously known about its object. (MS 654: 8)

In practical terms, Peirce wrote that sign would include not language and skill, but language and art:

It considers Signs in general, a class which includes pictures, symptoms, words, sentences, books, libraries, signals, orders of command, microscopes, legislative representatives, musical concertos, performances of these, in short, whatever is adapted to mentally transmitting to a person an impression virtually emanating from something external to itself (MS 634: 18–19)

To manage further the linguistic affairs of speculative rhetoric, Jakobson gave the three types of translation (1959). Jakobson broadened the sense, meaning, and significance of translation, including the traditional concept of translation from logical language into the unknown and non-logical areas of the evolutionary territories of semiotranslation:

Intralingual translation or *rewording* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.

Interlingual translation or *translation proper* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.

Intersemiotic translation or *transmutation* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems. (Jakobson 1959: 233)

Jakobson's revolutionary division of the three types of translation gave the ordinary concept of translation the pioneering dimensions of extralinguistic (or translinguistic) horizons, beyond the fixed ways of conventionalism. He went beyond the accurate "rewording" and less accurate "translation proper" to stress the possibility of free and unbounded forms of "transmutation" (Gorlée 1994: 156ff.). Jakobson's new division did arouse some sharp criticism in the 1960s (and also afterwards), coming from Saussurian scholars for bringing up unfamiliar and uncoded systems outside language. Semiotranslation has become the uncoded and unfamiliar object of art, far away from the skill of "ordinary" translation, which was considered as the familiar and coded activity.

Despite the early notes of criticism, the advent of intersemiosis was "officially" announced as a controversial, but existing, possibility of cross-semiosis beyond "ordinary" language. Now, after more than five decades, Jakobson's three types of translation are supported by semioticians and semiotically-oriented translation scholars. Jakobson's article "On linguistic aspects of translation" (1959) is included in *The Translation Studies Reader* (Venuti 2004: 138–143) – or can be rejected, by purely linguistic translation scholars, as representing the non-empirical and "radical" fashion of semiotranslation. Yet when seen from the outlook of Peirce's dynamical semiotics, including both language and non-linguistic sign systems, Jakobsonian threefold division can from "ordinary" translation be upshifted into the final development of complex signs – moving from semiotranslation to intersemiosis and trans-semiosis.

The criticism of Saussurian semiology and its symbiosis with translation studies may be summarized in the following three points. First, the rejection of a linguistic imperialism, in which a linguistic model can be applied to nonlinguistic objects in a metaphorical replacement, without doing justice to the nature of the nonlinguistic object. Second, semiology is basically the study of signifiers, and does not ask *what* signs mean but *how* they mean, the object referring to the sign. Saussurean meaning becomes wholly a sign-internal affair, while Peirce's sign-external interpretant-sign falls outside the sign and object is not studied nor even described. Finally third, the binarism, the division into *a priori* dual oppositions is presented as the primary instrument for exhaustive analysis, claiming to lead to objective, scientific conclusions; all this without analyzing the meaningful aspects of language and culture, the differences in time and space of sign and what it stands for, the object, can lead further to the dynamic idea-potentiality of the sign as received by the human mind. Sign and object becomes further specified, identified, and translated into Peirce's interpretant-signs. In semiotranslational activities, Peirce would, as argued before, have distinguished between the relative order of the interpretant (itself a sign), followed by sign and object.

Peirce's semiotics argues that any scientific inquiry is best conceived as the dynamic truth-searching process of semiosis. The interpretive web is goal-directed (teleological) but without fixed results, no fixed methods, no fixed redefinitions, and no fixed agents. All results, methods, and agents are provisional and temporary habits of translation, which can be left for new habits. Translation is characterized as a broken chronicle – metaphorized as the meaningful mouthfuls of "haiku" (Gorlée 2003: 235–244) – which accepts repeatable and nonrepeatable patterns of

behavior in forming good habits and leaving bad habits of translation behind. The same is also true for semiotranslation with the significance of interpretative and reinterpreted translation. Peirce's ideas about the broad approach to linguistics have dramatically changed the whole traditional approach of translation studies, which concentrates heavily on the basically unverifiable dichotomies labeled as a dogmatic form of dual self-thought. Semiotranslation offers tentative answers of an evolutionary and skeptical nature about the frontiers of translatability and untranslatability, equivalence and lack of equivalence, fidelity and infidelity of the translation, the role and function of the intelligence, energy, and emotionalism of the translator's fallibilistic mind and infallibilistic heart; as well as the concepts of translation and retranslation, the fate of the source text, the destiny of the target text, as well as posing other semiotic questions of translation in its wider sense to grow into the coded and uncoded phenomenon of Peircean intersemiosis. The linguistic and cultural trans-semiosis has been further argued and exemplified in my most recent book *From Translation to Transduction: The Glassy Essence of Intersemiosis* (Gorlée in press).

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SEMANTIC CONNOTATION IN THE LINGUO-SEMIOTIC RESEARCH INTO TERMINOLOGICAL LOANWORDS

Olga Lesicka
University of Warsaw, Poland
olga.lesicka@wp.pl

Abstract

Semiotics – which is the necessary condition of the existence, functioning, analysis and use of information – is becoming more all-embracing and integrating field of research. It is therefore the basis for integrating sciences of information, among others, linguistics which analyses information connected with language. A particular kind of a sign – carrier of information – are terminological loanwords which, by reason of the role in the modern language, require the semiotic interpretation.

Research on language – as an element of the social and cultural semiosphere – shows, that phenomena emerging in the modern world, considered as semiotic entities, cause specific changes in human's private and social life and thereby participate in communication and information processes [S. Siatkowski, 2012]. My research on the English terminological loanwords in the contemporary Russian economic texts, has shown, inter alia, that owing to the influence of various non-linguistic factors together with intralingual factors, several processes are taking place in the language – transformation inside the structure, interlingual contacts, especially the impact of foreign languages and tremendous amount of loanwords. My analysis of the borrowed economic terms collected from modern Russian texts (mostly Americanisms and Britishisms) allowed to introduce the multiaspectual (multi-level) classification of the numerous and diversified material, which covers almost 8000 examples. Collecting and organizing such extensive research material as well as its classification enabled achieving the main research goal, i.e. creating the classification scales based on grammatical, structural, lexical-semantic and stylistic attributes as well as the phases of adaptation in the text. The research has also shown, that in the specific field of human activity (such as economy), different types of signals form more complex heterogeneous semiotical structures, which can be internally differentiated and complement in-

formation they contain. In this way different types of signs as well as different systems and sub-systems of the semiosphere in our analysis, within the culture in a broad sense, usually interact with each other and complement each other.

The semantic connotation – as an element of the wider semiotic aspect, so connected with syntactic and pragmatic factors – has become one of the criteria for building this classification, because without this type of analysis wouldn't be possible the empirical comprehensive analysis.

The purpose of my paper is to show the role which in the modern dynamic and global life play the existing and newly emerging spheres of formation of signs as well as opportunities of using old and new signs in one of the areas of human activity, which is economy. Any changes in the language (in this case we speak about such a global change like the process of borrowing on a large scale) have the impact on the lingual image of the world, because the meanings of the words (in this case – terms) reflect the attitude of the given society towards the reality. Semantic connotation is therefore an important element of the lingual image of the world, because it enables to draw conclusions based on the analysis of the following phenomena:

- meanings of the borrowed terms and their modification in the host language;
- differences between the borrowed and ethnic terms;
- the way in which the meaning of the borrowed term connects with the reality in which the host language exists;
- mechanisms of adaptation of terms in the host language (inter alia word-formative, grammatical and stylistic);
- meanings of terms in metaphorical and phraseological form.

Devoting attention to the above-mentioned phenomena in terms of a holistic analysis of the collected lingual material clearly indicates that translation a term from the donor language into the host language doesn't confine to the interlingual relation, but is a phenomenon of a heterogeneous nature.

As it is known, a language which is the instrument of communication among people, is constantly changing. Being a verbal reflection of human thoughts a language transforms simultaneously with them, because a human needs more and more resources of language and speech. In order to understand others and communicate them our thoughts we have to use the language adjusted to the new, evolving communication challenges. Therefore also the language contacts becoming more and more diverse and their intensification is getting the hallmark of today's globalised and dynamic world.

The progress, which we can observe nowadays, brings the large number of new scientific fields. Together with them new terms are appearing and then functioning in certain texts – mostly specialized ones – technical languages. Every sphere of professional activity has developed its specialized language-semiotic code, which improves simultaneously with its development and in principle is aimed at expanding the coverage of its influence. This influence among neighboring countries as well as on a global international scale is performing inter alia through the language contacts, because due to them the exchange of information is possible.

The language contacts are performed inter alia through the process of borrowing of various foreign-language units, from one languages to another. Terminological loanwords are special type of borrowings (loanwords), because they belong to the separate semiotic space, which is a particular field of professional activity. Some technical languages are characterized by greater than the rest dynamics of change, which is caused by intense development of the professional field they support. One of them is the professional Russian language (technical language) of economy which has been changing during the last few decades simultaneously with the processes of transformation in socio-economic spheres in Russia. Changes in the Russian language

of economy are reflected in economic texts, in which there is an increasing influx of new foreign-language units. The diversity of the borrowings noticed in the economic texts as well as the rapidity of the processes of their influx and adaptation in this language determined the scope of my research topic. Intensification of the processes of borrowing the terminological units is the result of the necessity to describe new phenomena in the developing world economies and the intensive development of telecommunications lasting for several decades, additionally foster the development of language contacts, which element (and result) are inter alia borrowed foreign lexical, grammatical and other phenomena. Thus the desire to determine the essence of these phenomena as well as to describe and systematize them, to name them and to study the processes of their transfer into host-language was created.

In order to achieve this task it was necessary to determine the causes of increased influx of loanwords into languages in general as well to analyze these phenomena on a broader cultural background. With these assumptions my research on the English terminological loanwords in the contemporary Russian economic texts, has shown, inter alia, that owing to the influence of various non-linguistic factors together with intralingual factors, several processes are taking place in the language – transformation inside the structure, interlingual contacts, especially the impact of foreign languages and tremendous amount of loanwords. My analysis of the borrowed economic terms collected from modern Russian texts (mostly Americanisms and Britishisms) allowed to introduce the multiaspectual (multi-level) classification of the numerous and diversified material, which covers almost 8000 examples. Collecting and organizing such extensive research material as well as its classification enabled achieving the main research goal, i.e. creating the classification scales based on grammatical, structural, lexical-semantic and stylistic attributes as well as the phases of adaptation in the text.

The result of the analysis of such a large material as well as the phenomena accompanied by the influx and adaptation of borrowings in the Russian language of economy becomes the prospect of its further research on a semiotic level. Since the semiotics is the necessary condition of the existence, functioning, analysis and use of information it becomes the basis of also integrating sciences on information, among others, linguistics which analyses information connected with language and speech. We can therefore say, that terminological borrowings as a carriers of specific kind of information (or information vehicles) are involved into process of communication in the specific field of human activity (such as economics) and therefore are the part of the separate semiosphere which contains various types of signs. They form more complex heterogeneous semiotic structures, which can be *internally differentiated* and complement information they contain.

Using in the demanded research the so called semiotic key enables to look at the processes of semiosis in their full scope – syntactic, semantic and pragmatic. It can be assumed that as a result of applying the semiotic approach to research into verbal signs, which are terminological borrowings, deeper conclusions about the phenomena that have already been in the above mentioned studies noticed and described, can be made. In my paper I would like to draw our attention to some of these phenomena, thinking of it as a contribution to further research into this sign material using the whole set of semiotic methods and techniques.

As it was mentioned above the study of verbal signs, which are terminological borrowings, is a process to a large extent interdisciplinary. We will therefore have an interest in, among other things, phenomena associated with the process of their influx into the semiosphere of Russian language of economy as well as their adaptation in it. The subject is important because it is connected with the functioning of signs in the host-language and therefore the process of their creation (translation), interpretation and transmission. Even though the term itself is a language unit of the specific type, it is subject to translation mechanisms understood as a building the

logical links between the verbal sign and its source in the donor-language [Dinda L. Gorlée 2014]. It can be well seen on the examples of multi-word terms (such as *ценовое плато* – Eng. *price plateau*, *способность функционировать бесперебойно* – Eng. *a going concern*) and phrasological calques (for example *плохие/безнадёжные долги* – Eng. *bad debts*).

Without any doubt the semiosis as regards terminological borrowings runs on all 3 levels: syntactic – because being an element of the sign system, the translated sign participates in definite relations with another signs of the system at different level – phonetic phonological, morphological, word-formative etc.; semantic – there are phenomena of multiaspectual, universal (or quasi universal) semantics, having mainly logical and informational basis; and pragmatic – involving all possible relations between the phenomena of two previous levels [Siatkowski 2011]. The pragmatic dimension of semiosis covers however not only the above mentioned relations between the syntactic and semantic phenomena, which are characteristic of the simple signs and much more complex – it covers also much wider semiotic space in which there are signs functioning as elements of the sphere of language and speech. From this results that only semantic signs, which have meaning, may take part in all three the above mentioned types of relations. The meaningless phonemes can be treated as functional signs. However, it is the semiotic dimension of a language which contains the essence of functioning of the definite language. In the matter of language, except the verbal signs, there are also non-verbal signs, which includes logic, psychological, cultural, social and other phenomena which form the whole semiosphere [Siatkowski 2011].

Although each of the three dimensions of semiosis may constitute a relatively self-contained research, it is difficult to analyze each of them in isolation from each other. The phenomenon called semantic connotation – which I would like to focus on in the paper – in spite of being an element of the semantic dimension of semiosis, should, at least partially refer to both other dimensions. Otherwise, introducing this phenomenon in its entirety will not be possible.

The semantic connotation – as an element of the wider semiotic aspect, so connected with syntactic and pragmatic factors – is one of the semantic issue [Tokarski 1991]. This phenomenon is understood here as a broad cultural knowledge about the designatum of a sign. In other words, semantic connotation is a result of human knowledge and beliefs about various designata, and therefore is a component of the lingual image of the world [Tokarski 1991].

Terminological borrowings are – as we stated previously – a special sort of signs, because like all other terms they are created deliberately and denote special concepts in a professional sphere. If a certain term or the nuances of its meaning appeared in the sublanguage, it denotes as a rule the intentional act – so it is justified from the pragmatic point of view. The conscious use of term in accordance with a definite goal provides more or less the same understanding of it by members of the professional discourse [Slozhenikina 2005]. The term has, however, a certain feature, which Slozhenikina calls “situationality” of meaning. If the term goes beyond its conceptual field (which is its exact definite scientific use), its semantics may change, become widespread throughout the language, adapting to the use in the non-professional but more common sphere [Slozhenikina 2005]. We are speaking not only about the determinologization of the terminological borrowings, but also about their influx into the texts of different levels of specialization, as well as into the conversational language and jargons. As an example, *инсайдер* (Eng. *insider*) in specialized meaning “a person belonging to a limited circle of persons who understand the actual facts in a situation or share private knowledge” and its connotation “a person who has special knowledge, authority etc, because he or she is within or part of some privileged group and use it as a mean of enriching” are determined by the extralingual reality depending on the context. The same applies to the borrowed term *аутсайдер* (Eng. *outsider*) in the meaning “*small* or a medium-sized enterprise from any branch of industry, which is not a part of

the branch monopoly” and its connotation “One who is excluded from or does not belong to a group, association, or set” The semantic shifts in the case of terminological borrowings appear at the stage of their influx from the technical language into standard literary language, so in the process of intralingual translation. This process signals the highest degree of the adaptation of a loanword in the language – it gains then additional connotations in the consciousness of the native speakers. As it was shown in the examples above both loanwords *insider* and *outsider* are marked negatively, whereas the terms in their initial meaning are free of this emotional marking.

Relations between the pragmatic and semantic phenomena as regards to the terminological borrowings can be noticed, when we look at their existence not only in different specialized sub-languages, but also in other contexts – in popular science and journalistic texts, in the broadly understood journalistic writing and oral expressions. It creates the opportunity for deeper observation of dynamic qualities of the terminological borrowings’ functioning in a host-language. The words *спонсор* (Eng. *sponsor*) and *сервис* (Eng. *service*) have gained in colloquial language new figurative meanings, having, among other things, a reference to the male-women’s relationship.

The description of the connotative qualities of the various signs (terminological units) requires consideration of the characteristics of the object defined by the name as well as the interpreters of these signs. Due to the fact that the interpreters are usually humans, we will be interested in their attitude towards the world, which involves their system of values [Tokarski 1991], cultural traditions, myths and symbols. Semantic connotation of the words *спонсор* and *сервис* in definite context reflects the attitude towards phenomena which in the consciousness of interpreters is considered as morally ambiguous. We are dealing here with giving new *euphemistic name to the new phenomenon, which exists in the public space as the financing of the project, receiving in return the non-financial profit. In the consciousness of native speakers, the aim of any investment is some kind of profit and we usually do not expect that something we can get free of charge. Therefore the sponsor expects receiving something in return. In the context, for example, of the advertisement for searching a sponsor, which is published by a woman, its message is clear and explicit, although it hasn’t been used the word, which expresses the goal in more precise way.* Thus using the word *спонсор* gives the statement more business-like character and in this way partly mitigates its ambiguous nature. Some equivocal connotation has the loanword PR (public relations), which in Russian language can be used with the tinge of irony, suggesting usage of false content in order to convince the public opinion. There is a sort of manifestation of the lack of confidence in the public and non-public institutions, caused by the experience or concerns of the native speakers.

Special kind of signs are multi-word terminological loanwords which are semantic borrowings. These are units already existing in the lexical system of the host-language that adopt new meanings from the donor-language which has an impact on the nature of the relationship between the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic phenomena. Semantic connotation of the adjectives *теневой* (Eng. *shadow*) and *чёрный* (Eng. *black*) in the European culture, as a contrast with light, symbolizes the negative values, therefore combining with other, semantically neutral signs they give them the pejorative meaning. Words like *экономика* (Eng. *economy*), *капитал* (Eng. *capital*), *бюджет* (Eng. *budget*), *рынок* (Eng. *market*), *вторник* (Eng. *Tuesday*), *деньги* (Eng. *money*) are semantically neutral, but in combination like *теневая экономика* (Eng. *shadow economy*), *теневой капитал* (Eng. *shadow capital*), *теневой бюджет* (Eng. *shadow budget*), *чёрный рынок* (Eng. *black market*), *чёрный вторник* (Eng. *Black Tuesday*), *чёрные деньги* (Eng. *black money*) they are given names of the other phenomena with clearly negative connotations. Functioning of this type of terminological borrowings is therefore conditioned by the relationship between the syntactic and semantic phenomena, because the two-component

structure of these units directly affects the semantic features of the object. In that way we can say that signs like *теневая экономика, теневой капитал, теневой бюджет, чёрный рынок, чёрный вторник, чёрные деньги* have denotata, whereas the designata have the signs like *экономика, капитал, бюджет, рынок, вторник, деньги*. In the pragmatic dimension we have the clear attitude of the interpreter towards the object which is the result of the relationship of the above mentioned phenomena. The semantic connotation of these signs may though change according to the interpreters. Adaptation of the semantic borrowings in a host-language consists of transferring on its basis not the form, but the meaning, and therefore this process is creative, directing towards seeking the appropriate means in the native language with the retain of the original semantics together with the semantic connotation. Black color – as it was stated above – has negative connotation mainly in the tradition of the European culture. In Eastern cultures this color is the color of happiness (China) and life (India), while the white is the color of mourning (China). Differences in the semantic connotations are therefore the main obstacles for the influx of this kind of terminological borrowings into the language.

As it was indicated in my research quite significant group of the terminological borrowings are calques, mainly phraseological. These are linguistic signs – simple and complex – which being an element of a foreign language system reflect all dimensions of their semiosis through the same or similar relations between its phenomena in the system of the host-language. Calking is not therefore automatic, step by step copying a certain sign. This is by all means the creative process, reflecting in its final effect, to a *lesser or greater extent, the relevant qualities of the native as well as foreign languages. As a result of this phenomenon the language enriches by adopting new word-formative models, new motivations, and to a large extent new structural-semantic units as a definite completeness, provided that in addition to the structural phenomena also new meanings have been taken over in this process. This is a special kind of the verbal signs which due to their metaphorical and visual nature are keenly adapted by native speakers of the host-language. Because however of their semantics and figurative meaning, which is not always clear for the users, they often exist in the host-language in two or even three variants, which certain forms may not exactly reflect their sense. It leads to obliteration of semantic boundaries of a term, and this in turn may cause the wrong use in the text. In scientific texts they can play the role of the kind of decoration, may have the ironic tone and much more frequently occur in popular science texts. All these attributes make them rather an element of the professional slang than the unit of the scientific discourse in the serious scientific literature.*

Mutual influence between the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic phenomena is apparent with regard to the borrowed single-word calques like *телохранитель* (Eng. *bodyguard*) and *небоскрёб* (Eng. *skyscraper*). This kind of loanwords, called also structural, are lexical calques, defined in English language as translation loan-words, when the term is approximate or precise translation of the original preserving its, for example, metaphorical semantic mechanism (model, structure), due to which it becomes a calque, otherwise it would be an ordinary translation. All attributes of the host-language, such as grammatical, lexical-semantic, word-formative, stylistic etc, are implemented in this kind of borrowings. Semantic connotation of the terminological calques is also the effect of multi-faced relations in the semiosis that can be seen when comparing them to their equivalents which are not calques – *высотное здание* (Eng. *tower block, high-rise*) and *охранник* (Eng. *security guard, gorilla*).

Because the semantic connotation covers all the attributes which enable *speakers* in their *entirety* to connect the name with the designatum, they also include those which are fixed in metaphors and phrasemes [Grzegorzczkova 1999]. It is well illustrated by a big group of borrowings which are multi-word phraseological calques. Borrowings like *плохие* or *безнадёжные долги* (Eng. *bad debts*), *горячие деньги* (Eng. *hot money*), *налоговые каникулы* (Eng. *tax*

holiday), *синдром рассказа сказок* (Eng. *story telling*), *белый воротничок* (Eng. *white-collar worker*), *синий воротничок* (Eng. *blue-collar worker*), *невидимая рука рынка* (Eng. *the invisible hand of the market*), *шоковая терапия* (Eng. *shock therapy*), *падшие ангелы* (Eng. *fallen angels*), *фонды-стервятники* (Eng. *vulture funds*), *объятия плюшевого медведя* (Eng. *teddy bear hug*), *золотой парашют* (Eng. *golden parachute*), *белый рыцарь*, *чёрный рыцарь* (Eng. *white knight, black knight*), *спящая красавица* (Eng. *sleeping beauty*) have appeared in Russian language together with the political-economic transformation in Russia and in most cases were the names of the new phenomena or new names of the phenomena, which have already existed but need the new names. The appearance of such a large number of borrowings in the language as well as renaming the old names to the new ones, should be considered in the category of a sign, which is a tangible indicator of information about the need for wide-ranging changes in many spheres of life – politics, economy, social relations, ethics, mental attitude towards these changes, language etc. The phenomena that we observe in these spheres are semiotic by their nature, because they affect the mind, worldview, aesthetics, human behavior and emotions, participating this way in the information and communication processes [Siatkowski 2011]. The occurrence of borrowings in the language which are on the one hand the professional terms, thus the signs of the certain system of semiosphere (in this case – the Russian language of economy), on the other hand – possessing the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic attributes of signs that belong to another sign systems (for example standard literary language), indicates the mutual influence between signs and their systems. Hence different kinds of signs in various systems and subsystems of semiosphere remain with each other in relations of mutual supplementing and complementing. The above listed terms are signs which have particular designata – it means that they are carriers (vehicles) of definite specialized information, but their semantics is figurative, visual, which enables somewhat adequate reception of new and sophisticated content by the interpreter. New developments during the process of the systemic transformation demanded the acceptance and understanding by the society, hence the influx of many terms from the sphere of the economic theory into the standard literary language, which made them an element of the wider discourse. We are dealing here with the problem of interaction between the two sign systems – the sublanguage of economy, with precisely defined concepts and phenomena, and the standard literary language with its rich semantics, word-formation, phraseology etc. The connotative feature of the mentioned examples is personification (*невидимая рука рынка* – *the invisible hand of the market*), emotional tinge (*безнадёжные долги* – *bad debts*, *шоковая терапия* – *shock therapy*), figurative expression (*горячие деньги* – *hot money*, *налоговые каникулы* – *tax holiday*, *синдром рассказа сказок* – *story telling*), the elements of non-linguistic knowledge, e.g. social and moral issues (*белый воротничок* – *white-collar worker*, *синий воротничок* – *blue-collar worker*), reference to *biblical connotation* (*падшие ангелы* – *fallen angels*), *characteristic features of animals* (*фонды-стервятники* – *vulture funds*, *объятия плюшевого медведя* – *teddy bear hug*), symbols of colors (*золотой парашют* – *golden parachute*, *белый рыцарь*, *чёрный рыцарь* – *white knight, black knight*), characters from fairy tales (*спящая красавица* – *sleeping beauty*). Therefore, using the terminology of Roman Jakobson we are dealing here with both intralingual translation – because the foreign term is borrowed through its semantics, as well as interlingual – because within the language system (in Russian language in this case) there is interaction between two subsystems – specialized language (orientation to the designatum, functional affiliation of a term) and the standard literary language (syntax, semantics and its connotations). The terms existing so far in the confined sphere of the professional discourse extend the coverage of their using in the standard literary language, participating thereby in the process of its intellectualization. The influx of the elements (in this case – terminological borrowings) of the system of specialized language into the system of the standard literary language

is also the sign by its nature – it betokens the changes of civilization, which are reflected, among others, in the language. Due to terms the speech becomes more definite and precise, able to express all the complexity of thoughts as well as interconnections between them. Scientific and technological changes complicate the very concept of the homogenous language, because a huge number of new words, developing in different spheres of science and technology, steadily pass into the standard literary language; old words obtain new meanings; word combinations (collocations) and syntactic structures of a special type are being constructed, evolve the relations between the styles of language. This way the scientific and technological development as well as communication foster the mutual influence between the standard literary language and the systems which are professional language variants, with territorial and social dialects and other languages. It should be once again emphasized that relations between these systems and subsystems are reciprocal – changes of our civilization generate signs, which provide certain semiotic mechanism enabling communication. Conversely, changes in the system of language, which is emerging new syntactic structures, new relations of signs towards their designata and new interpretations of the signs themselves affect the way of perceiving the world [Siatkowski 2011]. That clearly means that the process of intralingual borrowing takes place both with the system of specialized language to the system of the standard literary language, strengthening its intellectual aspect due to signs which are terms, and vice versa – the system of specialized language is being enriched due to new syntactic structures and semantics of the new terminological borrowings.

Semiotics – which is the necessary condition of the existence, functioning, analysis and use of information – is becoming more all-embracing and integrating field of research. It is therefore the basis for integrating sciences of information, among others, linguistics which analyses information connected with language and speech [Siatkowski 2011]. Semiotic studies on the ground of linguistics have their tradition based on the active work of some semiotic schools, including mainly the school of structural linguistics, which focused its attention on *stricte* language problems. Another semiotic school, called the interpretative school is rooted in Peirce's pragmatism and identifies widely understood translation with the endless semiosis that means the continual process of signs creation [Pieczyńska-Sulik 2009]. Roman Jakobson combined both of these approaches, taking over from Charles S. Peirce the interpretative nature of translation and focusing more on language issues. Further development of the Jakobson's ideas has been transformed in works of another authors into implementation of the Peirce's concept of translation identical with semiosis and culture [Pieczyńska-Sulik 2009].

Drawing attention to the phenomena accompanying the process of borrowing new terminological units in the system of Russian economic language in the aspect of an overall analysis of the collected verbal material clearly indicates that translation a term from the donor language into the host language doesn't confine to the interlingual relation, but is a phenomenon of a heterogeneous nature. The transition of a verbal sign from one language to another alone – that means the so-called intralingual translation – is the starting as well as destination point of a borrowing [Petrilli 2003]. However, between these two stages we can observe a variety of phenomena accompanying the process of adaptation of the verbal sign in the new language system. The analysis of these phenomena with the use of the so-called semiotic key will allow to recognize the semiotic nature of the language and see the bigger picture of its functioning in the cultural space.

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RAISING AND HOLDING ONE'S HEAD HIGH: A CORPUS-BASED STUDY OF STYLISTIC, PRAGMATIC AND LEXICAL VARIABILITY OF THE IDIOM IN RUSSIAN, SERBIAN, ENGLISH, AND GERMAN

Pavel Dronov
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
nord.dronov@gmail.com

Abstract

The report deals with comparing and contrasting the idioms whose literal meaning involves 'placing one's head in an upright posture'. The idioms – namely, *podnimat' golovu* (Russian), *dići glavu* (Serbian), *to raise one's ugly head*, *to hold one's head high* (English), *den Kopf oben behalten / hoch halten* (German). The fact that mention of body parts and/or gestures constitute a significant part of phraseology is self-evident; after all, there are somatic responses and gestures that are shared by all human beings, e.g. a laughing person makes one happy, a yawning person makes one sleepy, etc (see Robinson 1991). Some of those idioms may as well be considered common figurative units (Piiirainen 2012).

The aim is to find out what modifications they can undergo. Similarity of structure, as well as that of figurative meanings, may result in similar mechanisms of their modifications. More interesting, though, are their differences. For instance, the Russian *podnimat' golovu* 'to raise one's head', usually meaning 'to occur' when referred to an event or 'to commence an action' when meaning a person or entity, appears to be modified quite rarely. The reason may be its image structure that allows one to use it in its literal sense rather than its figurative meaning (or, more accurately, to use a homonymous word group that means 'to place one's head in an upright posture'). If a modification occurs, it is usually adnominal (with an adjective or participle inserted into the idiom), context-based, or serving as a double-entendre device (e.g. *podnimaet očerednuû golovu* 'raises yet another head'; on idiom modifications see Dobrovol'skij 2007, Dronov 2011). As for the English counterpart, *to raise its ugly head*, which has an adjec-

tival constituent, it is used in its figurative meaning almost exclusively. The modifications that appear there are usually lexical and may involve replacement of a constituent (e.g. fashion raised its inconsistent head).

The report narrows the topic down to the figurative units having the NP head; thus it excludes idioms such as the Russian *vyše golovu!*, Serbian *glavu gore!*, German *Kopf hoch!* (literally, “head up”) for the reason of their English counterpart involving a chin instead of a head (chin up!). This aspect, along with those of other metaphorically similar units, is to be taken into account in a larger study aimed at taking a closer look at idioms’ semantic, combinational and stylistic properties of idioms containing somatic components across languages.

This paper deals with comparing and contrasting the idioms whose nominal parts include somatic words (and whose literal meaning may involve a gesture).

The fact that mentioning body parts and/or gestures constitutes a significant part of phraseology is self-evident; after all, there are somatic responses and gestures that are shared by all human beings, e.g. a laughing person makes one happy, a yawning person makes one sleepy, etc. – see, for instance, (Robinson 1991).

The interest toward somatic and kinetic idioms in linguistics, semiotics and even neuroscience is traditionally high, with numerous papers written on the subject, e.g. (Culture, Body, and Language... 2008; Čermák 1998; Lipskiene 1979; Moon 1998; Pinsk et al. 2005; Pulvermüller 2005; Shuter 1976; Shiffrin 1974; Kozerenko and Krejdlin 1999; Krejdlin 2001, 2002; Teliâ 1996). F. Pulvermüller (Pulvermüller 2005) reveals that the brain of a person hearing words such as *kick*, *lick*, and *pick* has the corresponding zones of the motor cortex activated even before s/he understands their meanings. Interestingly, V. Gallese and G. Lakoff suppose that the same should happen to motion verbs serving as verbal parts in idioms, even the ones whose figurative meaning is not directly connected to the original motions (Gallese, Lakoff 2005). Some of the most recent works, such as (Shtyrov et al. 2015) may be seen as an argument in favour of this view.

Besides, such phraseological units may well be included in widespread idioms, despite their cultural specificity. Criteria for cultural specificity of idioms, the underlying cultural profile as stated by V. Teliâ (Teliâ 1996) seem to overlap with the classifications of common figurative units akin to those of È. Soloduhu (Soloduhu 2008) or E. Piirainen (Piirainen 2012) or ideas stated in (Dobrovolskij, Piirainen 2005).

The paper focuses on comparing and contrasting the idioms whose literal meaning involves ‘placing one’s head in an upright posture’. The aim is to find out what modifications a somatic idiom can undergo. Similarity of structure, as well as that of figurative meanings, may result in similar mechanisms of their modifications. More interesting, though, are their differences.

The idiom taken for consideration in this report is *to rear/raise one’s ugly head*. It has quite a few counterparts in other languages, such as *podnimat’ golovu*, *deržat’ golovu (vysoko)* (Russian), *dići glavu* (Serbian), *den Kopf oben behalten*, *den Kopf hoch tragen* (German). All these word groups appear to belong to the class of common figurative units, or widespread idioms (a term coined by Elisabeth Piirainen).

These idioms are based on the conceptual metaphors that are so aptly put by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their cognitive theory of metaphor, namely:

HAPPY IS UP; UNHAPPY IS DOWN; CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN;
HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN; HAVING CONTROL

OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN; GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN; VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson 2003).

The paper narrows the topic down to the figurative units whose counterparts have the NP *head* in all the languages under consideration; thus it excludes idioms such as the Russian *vyše golovu!*, Serbian *glavu gore!*, German *Kopf hoch!* (literally, “head up”) for the reason of their English counterpart involving a *chin* instead of a *head* (*chin up!*). This aspect, along with those of other metaphorically similar units, is being taken into account in a larger study whose aim is to classify somatisms in phraseology across languages and cultures.

Russian

A. Fëdorov’s *Phraseological Dictionary of the Russian Language* defines the idiom as follows:

Podnimat’ golovu razg. èkspres. – načat’ dejstvovat’, proâvlât’ sebâ aktivno, obretaâ uverenost’ v svoih silah ‘to commence to act, to manifest active behavior while finding confidence in one’s strength’ (Frazeologičeskij slovar... 2008).

The search through the Russian National Corpus (RNC) demonstrates that the vast majority of contexts (more than 1250 out of 1410) contain collocations that denote the gesture and are homonymous with the idiom, i.e. *podnimat’ golovu* in the sense of raising one’s head per se.

(1) Razve vam ne nado domoj? Elena podnimaet golovu ot tetradej. – Da â vot rešila proverit’ kontrol’nuû. “Don’t you need to get home?” Yelena “raises her head from the exercise-books” [i.e. looks up after looking at the exercise-books] , “Well, I thought I had to check the test.” [Andrej Gelasimov. Foks Malder pohož na svinju (2001); Russian National Corpus].

Nevertheless, the contexts in which the idiom is used in its figurative meaning are quite common.

(2) Sejčas, posle teraktov, oboronnye predpriâtiâ *podnimaût golovu* v ožidanii krupnyh zakazov ‘Now, after the terror acts, defense contractors “are raising their heads”, anticipating large-scale contracts.’ [Vladimir Kvint: «Amerikanskuû èkonomiku vytânet VPK» (2001) // «Izvestiâ», 2001.09.19; Russian National Corpus].

The idiom allows for certain morphological modifications such as the insertion of a negative particle and use of the NP in the Genitive/Partitive case, which is quite common in Russian grammar (3 contexts):

(3) **a.** Lena Garanina vozmušalas’: «Â znaû, što vy v komnate, otkryvajte!» A my sidim, *golovy ne podnimaem*. Â govoriû: «Interesno, o čem oni dumaût, čem my sejčas zanâty?» ‘Lena Garanina was crying in exasperation, “I know you’re in the room! Open the door!” And we were sitting, “not raising the head” [i.e. unable to raise our heads or do anything]. So I go, “I wonder what they think we are up to now.” [Natal’â Bestem’anova i dr. Para, v kotoroj troe (2000-2001); Russian National Corpus]. (3) **b.** Tot na parnâ daže *golovy ne podnimal*, ne zamečal, i vsë tut! ‘He would “not even raise the head on” the guy, he would not even notice him and that’s all’ [Dina Rubina. Belaâ golubka Kordovy (2008-2009); Russian National Corpus]. (3) **c.** Byl u nas portnoj, Fëdor Konstantinovič, – horošij

portnoj <...> Mesâca po dva *golovy ne podnimal*, – š'ët, utûžit, – razve tol'ko vyskočit na kryl'co po ličnomu delu, ili vcepitsâ v golovu i davaj skresti volosy, – češetsâ 'We used to have a tailor, Fyodor Konstantinovich, a good one <...> He would not "raise his head" for two odd months in a row, while sewing and ironing, stopping only to hop out on the porch because of some personal matter or to claw at his own head furiously, scratching where it itched' [A. N. Tolstoj. *Na rybnoj lovlje* (1923); Russian National Corpus].

Here, the figurative meaning seems to be somewhat different. The agent is likely to be too repressed to take any action whatsoever (3 a.) or too disgusted to greet a person (3 b.). In (3 c.), the idiom has a figurative meaning 'to be focused on something'.

In all the three cases, a mental state conceptualized as a posture of a stooping person.

The connection to the gesture is apparent if one considers the contexts where the collocation is used.

(4) Za Dnestrom, pod Âssami, Bogačev vsego odin raz vzâl ego s soboj na peredovoj nablûdateľnyj punkt, gde vse prostrelivalos' iz pulemetov i gde ne to čto dnem, no i noč'û-to *golovy ne podnât* 'It was only once on the other bank of the Dniester, near Iași, that Bogachov took him to the forward observation post, where everything was a target for machineguns and one "could not raise a head" at the daytime, yea even at night'. [G.Â. Baklanov. *Ûžnee glavnogo udara* (1957); Russian National Corpus].

Seven contexts contain lexico-syntactical modifications, all of which are context-based or double-entendre-related (5a, b). Idiom modifications and their classification are covered, inter alia, in (Baranov, Dobrovoľskij 2008; Dronov 2011, Langlotz 2006).

(5) a. Èto čto že teper' polučaetsâ: za ezdu po Nevskomu na privyčnoj dlâ graždan skorosti 120 km/čas štrafovat' čto li budut? Pohože, stalinizm *podnimaet očerednuû golovu* 'Now, what is that supposed to mean? Do they mean that they are going to fine people for driving along the Nevsky avenue at the oh-so-typical speed of 120 kmph? It appears that Stalinism "is raising yet another head"' [Internet Journalism]. (5) b. I â udavil gadûku, *posmevšuu podnât âdovituû golovu v duše moej*. Navsegda. 'And so I strangled the viper that durst "raise its venomous head" in the soul of mine. Forever' [Boris Vasil'ev. *Kartëžnik i bretër, igrok i duëlânt* (1998); Russian National Corpus].

The other idiom under consideration is *vysoko nesti golovu*, cf.:

Vysoko nesti golovu êkspres. – vesti sebâ s dostoinstvom, gordo, nezavisimo'to behave with dignity, in a proud and independent manner' (lit. "to bear head high") [Frazelogičeskij slovar' russkogo literaturnogo âzyka. Pod red. A.I. Fedorova. M., 2008].

The overall number of occurrences is 127, the idiom mostly appearing in its figurative meaning, e.g.:

(6) Net u nego i pobuždeniâ, stol' často tolkaûšego na bezumnuû derzost' molodye i pylkie duši: *vyprâmit'sâ vo ves' rost, vysoko nesti golovu*. 'Nor does he have a stimulus that so often drives young and fiery souls to feats of insane boldness, the wish to "stand straight and hold his head high"' [L. I. Šestov. *Apofeož bespočvennosti* (1905); Russian National Corpus].

The connection to the posture is visible.

In certain occurrences, the idiom has a meaning ‘to have an upright posture’, which is closer to the underlying metaphor. Probably, it might not be regarded as an idiom in its strictest sense but rather as a restricted collocation, see (Dobrovol’skij, Filipenko 2007; Baranov, Dobrovol’skij 2008). Cf.:

(7) Sam on sebâ v lûbom slučae sčital neotrazimym, i èto čuvstvovalos’ v každom ego dviženii: v tom, kak on razgulival po škol’nomu koridoru na peremene, prâmoj, kak bale- rina, *gordelivo nesâ krasivuû, zabolivo pričesannuû golovu*, ustremiv zadumčivjy vzglâd svoih seryh s povolokoj glaz kuda-to vdal’ <...> ‘As for him, he thought of oneself as of an irresistibly attractive boy, which showed in his every movement – in the way he walked along the school corridor during the break, as straight as a ballerina, “haughtily bearing his handsome and carefully combed head”, and musing upon some distant scene with his grey and languishing eyes’ [Ůrij Vâzemskej. Šut (1982); Russian National Corpus].

As a collocation, this word-group is quite often marked by the inserted adverbial modifier *gordelivo* ‘proudly, haughtily’.

Here one might see an interesting connection of figurative meanings:

- *gordo/gordelivo nesti golovu* (‘to hold/bear one’s head proudly/haughtily’): the word-group usually refers to posture, yet the modifier denotes pride.

- *vysoko nesti golovu* (‘to hold/bear one’s head high’): the word-group refers to pride, yet the modifier denotes posture.

There is, however, an example of the idiom denoting pride and having an adverbial modifier. (a magnifier, or LF Magn, in Aleksandr Źolkovskij and Igor Melčuk’s terms).

I to, čto on molod, to, čto *on gordo nês svoû golovu*, čto ulybalsâ, čto legko brosal pod nogi sud’âm svoû žizn’, vse èto ne moglo prostit’sâ emu! ‘The fact that he was young, that he was “holding his head proudly”, that he was smiling, that he was easily throwing his life at the judges’ feet: all that that could not be forgiven’ [S. A. Savinkova. Gody skorbi // «Byloe», 1906; Russian National Corpus].

Serbian

Dići, podići glavu – osmeliti se; pogoditi se; uzoholiti se ‘to dare, to make an arrangement, to become arrogant’ (Rečnik Matice Srpske).

The Serbian corpus of the Belgrade University (School of Math) contains 18 contexts. Not unlike Russian, some of the contexts contain a homonymous restricted collocation, cf.:

(8) **a.** Svi se nasmeju. Miladin lenjo digne glavu ‘Everyone is laughing. Miladin raises his head lazily’ [Dušan Kovačević. Zec: savremena tragedija]. (8) **b.** Ruke dole! – režao je zadihano Sajfert. – Dole, kad kažem! *Digni glavu!* Digni! – nestrpljivo se razderao “Hands down!” shouted Seifert, gasping. “I said down! “Raise your head”! Raise it!” he yelled impatiently’ [Miroslav Popović. Sudbine; Serbian Corpus].

In one context, which is cited in (9), the idiom does mean something similar to ‘uzoholiti se’, although this appears to be a piece of advice regarding pride and self-esteem rather than arrogance in a way similar to English *chin up*, Russian (*ne*) *vešat’ nos, vyše golovu*, Serbian *glavu gore*, German *Kopf hoch!*.

(9) Rekao sam mu : ‘*Digni glavu* , čoveče . Znam kako ti je . Imaš, ipak, veoma, veoma,

svetlu budućnost' 'I told him, "Raise your head, man. I know how you feel. Still, you have a really, really bright future ahead of you"' [RTS100514; Serbian Corpus].

A typical context demonstrating the idiom's behavior looks like this:

(10) *Perec je, javljaju izraelski mediji, govorio u Jerusalimu u Knesetu, izraelskom parlamentu. Njegovo izlaganje bilo je povremeno prekidano žučnim protestima arapskih poslanika, koji su tražili momentalni prekid svih ratnih operacija. On je uzvratilo da će, ukoliko se ofanziva zaustavi, "ekstremisti ponovo dići glave", a opasnost koju oni oličavaju neće biti uklonjena. 'Perez spoke before the Knesset in Jerusalem, Israeli media report. His speech was occasionally interrupted by billious protests of Arab delegates, who were demanding the momentary termination of all military activity. Perez replied that, if the offensive were stopped, the extremists would "raise their heads" again, and the danger they pose would not be avoided' [Politika. 01.08.2006; Serbian Corpus].*

Again, like its Russian counterpart, the idiom allows for certain morphological modifications altering its figurative meaning, such as *glavu ne dignuti* 'not to raise one's head', i.e. 'to be to repressed to do smth.'

(11) *Zar je Bog i vera za krv ? Zar Bog hoće krv na zemlji , a ne živote ? Čujte me: prokleću vas . <...> Prokleću vas, što veru i obraz u krv pretvarate. Prokleću vas, da vam ni čukununci *glavu ne dignu*, u crkvu ne uđu, u stolove ne sednu . 'Is God and faith for blood-letting? Does God really want blood and not lives on Earth? Hearken: I shall damn you. I shall damn you for transmuting faith and God's image into blood. I shall damn you so that not even your great-grandchildren would dare "raise their head", enter the church, be seated at tables.' [Borisav Stanković. Tašana; Serbian Corpus].*

English

The *Collins COBUILD Dictionary of Idioms* defines the idiom *to rear/raise its <ugly> head* in the following manner: "If you say that something undesirable **rears** or, you mean that it starts to appear to be active. You often use this expression **raises its head** when the thing you are talking about appears again after being hidden or absent for a period of time. <...> People often say that something undesirable **rears** or **raises its ugly head**" (Collins COBUILD).

Like in Russian, most of the contexts demonstrate *raising one's head* in rather a literal sense, i.e. denoting nothing but posture (not to mention contexts that appear in the query index due to the lack of disambiguation, e.g. *every family can raise its 300 head of cattle*). Cf.:

(12) **a.** The creature in the doghouse – a 375-pound pink pig – *raises its massive head* and grunts in my direction. [2011; Fic; Bk:UnsaidNovel; COCA]. (12) **b.** The turtle slowly *raises its plumsized head* and pops open its small eyes. [2010; MAG; Smithsonian; COCA].

Of the relatively small number of the idiom's occurrences in its figurative meaning (17 in toto), fourteen contain the attribute *ugly* (13–15).

(13) They'll just start raising the price of oil again and destroy the economy, because I happen to think, yes, the banks and, yes, the derivatives and, yes, all of the crazy financial instruments that were conjured up for people to make money and it turned out to be false money, but I also happen to think that \$150 oil destroyed the world economically. And as soon as the world comes back, OPEC *will raise its ugly head* and destroy it again. [2009;

SPOK; CNN Newsroom; COCA].

Notably, the NP *head* does not seem to be used in its plural form when applied to multiple entities. In three contexts, it is used in its singular form, cf.:

(14) **a.** Most faculty meetings are as exciting as a forty-inning baseball game, and contain even less intellectual content. But *should genuine ideas raise their ugly head*, Wallow taught, the truly wise administrator must know how to quash them. [001; ACAD; AcademicQs; COCA]. (14) **b.** LBO's, they *raise their ugly head* again in unnamed companies. In terms of their affect on innovation, do you want to comment on that? [1995; ACAD; CanadaLaw; COCA]. (14) **c.** "I wanted to apologize for Pam Stem. She's been out there a little too long." "Who turned up the original story?" "I really don't know – it was phoned in," she said. "The therapist." "I really don't know," she said, smiling. "And I wouldn't tell you if I did." "Ah. *Ethics raise their ugly head.*" [1994; FIC; Bk:NightPrey; COCA].

In (14 a., 14 b.), the idiom refers to entities (ideas and policies) that were either repressed or unlikely to happen before. In (14 c.), it deals with a certain feature that is frowned upon by the protagonist.

One context, however, is peculiar. Apart from the fact that the idiom's NP is used in its plural form, its subject is a human being and not an inanimate entity (smb. instead of smth.)

It is the continued resistance by IRA-Sinn Fein that has halted the progress, and *given the extreme militants the opportunity to raise up their ugly heads*, thus cornering David Trimble into having no other option than to resign [2001; NEWS; SanFranChron; COCA].

Insertion of other modifiers is found in 3 contexts:

(15) **a.** I'd not had a particularly good day on the firing line. A flinching problem *had raised its monstrous head*, so I began to think I needed a cartridge with less recoil than the .308 Win. I'd used for years. [1997; MAG; OutdoorLife; COCA]. (15) **b.** "My God. A theme park. Gullah World. That's just extraordinary, Clay," I said fiercely. Anger was beginning to *raise its snake's head*. It felt good, like scalding hot coffee when you are frozen and exhausted. [1998; FIC; Bk:LowCountry; COCA]. (15) **c.** The colonists wore simple utilitarian garments of gray-brown fiber, identical to the universal one-piece shipsuits still in use these many centuries later. I could see, however, that fashion *was raising its inconstant head*. [2002; FIC; FantasySciFi; COCA].

Such modifications are either conventionalized, as in example (15 a.) (i.e. adnominal modifiers are compatible with both the figurative meaning and the underlying metaphor) or context-based, as in (15 b., 15 c.), with inserted adnominal modifiers being incompatible with the underlying metaphor but augmenting the figurative meaning.

With the VP *rear*, however, the idiom is always used in its figurative meaning, and the most frequent lexico-syntactical modification (117 contexts out of 157) is *to rear one's ugly head/heads*, which accounts for its inclusion into dictionaries. The reason behind this may lie in the fact that VP *rear* may denote somewhat bestial or animalistic movement, possibly leading to a rethink of the underlying metaphor. In other words, the subject is associated with an animal or monstrosity rearing its head.

Lexico-syntactical modifications are context-based and/or causing double-entendre, cf.:

(16) **a.** You've been skimming the treasury for years, have amassed a fortune of well over

\$100 million, but now democracy *is rearing its troublesome head*, and it's time to get out, with the money but without a paper trail. [1991; SPOK; ABC_Nightline; COCA]. (16) **b.** Just as astrophysicists were growing accustomed to their ignorance, the problem of dark matter *reared its invisible head* somewhere else. [2003; ACAD; NaturalHist; COCA].

There seem to be few lexical substitutions, such as *when politics reared their ugly side* [1994; NEWS; WashPost].

The second idiom under consideration is defined as follows:

To hold one's head high – to be very confident and proud (Cambridge Dictionary of English).

(17) **a.** Latifah: Mom, you taught me *to hold my head high* and believe in myself [2004; FIC; Scholastic; COCA]. (17) **b.** Tang added that when he goes to class reunions from his university and sees that he is the only one in the cement business, “I feel unacceptable, because the industry is not good.” But he says he knows otherwise, and that he tells recruits to his firm *to hold their heads high*. “They should be proud of what we are doing! Other industries are consuming the Earth. We are preserving it.” [2008; MAG; Atlantic; COCA].

The idiom's obvious connection to the posture manifests itself in many contexts, e.g.:

(18) **a.** Rose held her head high, like a dancer, and her dark hair rolled back in a bun accentuated her long neck. [1993; FIC; Bk:InMyFathers; COCA]. (18) **b.** His slouching shoulders, awkwardly splayed feet, and manner of gripping his hat and cane all convey a humble servitude. In contrast, Courbet has stepped forward with assurance on the opposite side, his thick legs and robust torso implying that he is the strongest of the three. His *head is held high*, and the chin's jaunty angle emphasizes that he boasted the longest beard. [2004; ACAD; ArtBulletin; COCA].

Though all the contexts cited are based on the American variety of English, it might not be too wrong an assumption to say that the idioms act differently in British English, cf.: “No matter how remote the locale, television *is rearing its talking heads* all over Mexico” [EBD; BNC].

German

The German counterparts do not seem to lose their connection with the movement/posture-related metaphor, either, cf.:

Den Kopf hoch tragen – stolz sein ‘to be proud’ (Duden 11).

Den Kopf oben behalten – den Mut nicht verlieren ‘not to lose one's courage’ (Ibid.).

The connection does also manifest itself in collocations like *Er steht sehr aufrecht, den fleischigen Kopf hoch, die grauen Augen geradeaus* ‘He stands very straight, his fleshy head high, his gray eyes [staring] straight ahead’ (Lion Feuchtwagner. Die Opperman Geschwister).

The search query *Kopf hoch* in *Das Digitale Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache* reveals a wealth of contexts (373 in toto) containing expressions like *Kopf hoch!* ‘chin up’ (see supra) and *Köpfen hoch droben* ‘heads in the clouds’ (lit. “heads high above”). Meanwhile, *den Kopf hoch tragen* appears in 31 contexts. The idiom may sometimes allow for lexical substitutions, as its VP *tragen* ‘wear, carry’ can be substituted by *halten* ‘hold’ (19a) or *heben* ‘rear, raise’ (19b):

(19) **a.** Die da vorn sollen wissen, daß sie uns nicht klein kriegen, daß wir trotz allem *den Kopf hoch halten!* ‘Those in front should know that they will never make us small and that “we shall hold the head high” against all odds’ [Langhoff, Wolfgang, Die Moorsoldaten,

Zürich: Schweizer Spiegel Verl. 1935, S. 150; DWDS-Kernkorpus]. (19) **b.** Die neuen Namen finden Gefallen, und Jeder, der einen solchen trägt, *hebt seinen Kopf höher* und ist zuversichtlicher, selbstbewußter, als er sonst gewesen ‘The new names are now in vogue, and he who carries one of those “raises his head higher” and is more confident, more sure of himself than he has ever been’ [Rosegger, Peter: Die Schriften des Waldschulmeisters. Pest, 1875; DWDS-Textarchiv].

The second idiom is not prone to lexical modifications, except for one archaic context from (DWDS) dating back to the 17th century and having a synonymous NP.

(20) So wird dann nun der Cardinal Mazarin seiner Witz vnnd Subtiligkeit wohl bedörfen / daß er sich herauß wickle / vnnd *die Hand / ja das Haupt oben behalte* ‘So shall then Cardinal Mazarin need much of his wit and [subtlety? subterfuge?] to turn himself inside out and “hold the hand, yea even the head high” [Wartmann, Sigismund Friedrich: De Statu Perturbato Franciae et Germaniae: Vnpartheyischer wolmeynender Discursuum Supplementum, oder Fünffter Theil. Frankfurt (Main), 1653; DWDS-Textarchiv].

Here, the idiom’s figurative meaning is similar to that of *to have the upper hand*.

The few lexico-syntactical modifications found in (DWDS) are purely context-based.

21. **a.** Ja, Pink ist albern, aber Reese Witherspoon ist es nicht. Sie *behält den frisierten Kopf oben*, selbst wenn sie nur Bunny-Kostüme anhat ‘Yes, Pink is silly, but Reese Witherspoon is not. She “holds the coiffed head high” even when she wears only Bunny Costumes.’ [2001; DWDS - Kernkorpus]. **b.** Nur ist bei Theweleit der Begriff des „Siegers“ stark ausgeweitet. Sieger ist, *wer den getalterischen [sic; gestalterischen] Kopf oben behält*, wer Lebensstoff in Form bringt, wer das, was ihn berührt, beispielsweise „Frauen“, zum Material zum Auslöser eines Gestaltungswillens „verwendet“. ‘It is only in Theweleit that the concept of “winner” is greatly expanded. A winner is the one who “holds the creative head high”, who shapes the fabric of life, who “uses” anything that touches upon them (for instance, “women”) to trigger the will of creation.’ [1998; DWDS – Kernkorpus].

Conclusion

The connection of the figurative meaning to the underlying metaphor is fairly obvious, manifesting itself in a plethora of contexts where the collocations are used literally (however, this less likely to affect the English idiom variant *to rear one’s ugly head*).

The idiom and its counterparts are prone to a rethink of the figurative meaning. For instance, the Russian and Serbian idioms have morphological modifications *golovy ne podnât’, glavu ne dignuti* whose meanings may be interpreted as ‘not to dare to take an action, being repressed’ and ‘being focused on smth, not to be able to pay attention to anything else’.

Contexts quite often refer to a previously suppressed individual or group that begins to act in a decisive manner.

The English idiom has a conventionalized modification, which indicates its figurative usage and might be likely to prompt a user to make similar context-based or double-entendre modifications.

It is necessary to make a note on translating such idioms. Modifications of gesture/body idioms that are so widespread may be quite close. While there may be language-specific morphological modifications (article insertion/omission, change of verbal aspect, etc.), there is a number of similar models, e.g. lexico-syntactical modifications, which sometimes may be nearly identical (*podnâla âdovituû golovu* and *raised its snake’s head*). Therefore, one may translate a

modified idiom with a nearly equivalent modification.

Yet, idioms such as the one in question tend to have semantic and pragmatic differences sufficient enough to render word-for-word translation impossible (e.g. *ethics raise their ugly head* is not likely to be translated into Russian as **ètika podnimaet golovu*; cf. (Kozerenko 2010) on semantic differences of *Alpha and Omega* or (Dobrovól'skij 2013: 667) on differences between German *sich* (Dat.) *die Beine in den Bauch stehen* 'to be kept waiting' (lit. "to set one's legs standing into the belly", referring both to the process and result; cf. English *to cool/kick one's heels*) and Russian *otstoât sebe vse nogi* ("to bust one's legs", "to 'dstand' all one's feet/legs", referring solely to the result); this one is usually rendered as *стоять в (долгих) очередях* 'to stand in (long) queues'.

Finally, such an approach cannot be applied to more language-specific idioms. For instance, the English idiom *to suck one's teeth* seems to have a lexical rather an idiomatic counterpart in Russian, namely *cykat'* 'to make a noise resembling the *ts* sound' (often describing a crude form of infatuation, an expression of joy or a manner of spitting). A possible way to render *to suck one's teeth* would probably be to use a collocation such as *cykat' zubom* 'make the *ts* sound with one's tooth'. However, since the Russian verb and the collocations based on it rarely convey a meaning of annoyance the way *suck one's teeth* does (however, in *The Ordeal* by Aleksey Tolstoy one can find an occurrence of *kto-to v toške stal cykat' zubom* "someone even started making the *ts*-sound out of sheer disappointment and yearning", which is strikingly similar to *sucking one's teeth*), it might be better to use *šypet'* (*ot razdraženiâ*) 'to hiss with annoyance' instead.

This is tightly connected to the problem of equivalence, which is an important issue for translation and lexicography. The essential types of equivalence are that of translation (e.g. *Ah! Ethics raise their ugly head* and *A, ponâtno, korporativnaâ ètika*; *sich die Beine in den Bauch stehen* and *to cool/kick one's heels*) and that of the language system (e.g. *sich die Beine in den Bauch stehen* and *otstoât' sebe vse nogi* or, modification-wise, *to raise its snake's head* and *podnât' zmeinuû/âdovituû golovu*). The most plausible way of incorporating counterparts such as these into a dictionary might be an amalgam of both approaches, dubbed **functional equivalence** by Dmitriij Dobrovól'skij (Ibid, 665–667).

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INTERPRETATION AND ICONICITY IN THE TRANSLATION PROCESS

Susan Petrilli
University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
susan.petrilli@gmail.com

Augusto Ponzio
University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
augustoponzio@libero.it

Abstract

Translation is a structural part of modelling devices, the very condition even for creativity, innovation, simulation, ultimately for what with Peirce we may indicate as the “play of musement” in the human world. Iconicity, as amply demonstrated by Peirce, carries out a decisive role in all such processes.

Canonical translation is based on the code, convention, authority, authoriality, respect. Contrary to such an orientation, the task of the translator is not to give the impression that the translation is not a translation, but rather to convey the uniqueness, the specificity of the interpretant, its unrepeatability, the sense of its untranslatability, that is, its signifying materiality, absolute otherness. Translation is construed in the specificity of the signifier and in this sense is “by the letter”. As such the translation procedure is dominated by iconicity whose signifying value is an “effect” of language provoked by the “original”, by virtue of what Peirce calls its quality.

1. Theoretical perspectives

We wish to begin by thanking Dinda L. Gorfée not only for inviting us to her round table “From Translation to Semio-Translation: Origins, Evolution, and Metamorphoses,” at the 12th World Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies in Sofia, 2014, but also for proposing that we co-organize and chair it together. As it turned out, just a few days before the event Dinda Gorfée most regrettably informed us that she would not be able to attend. So we had to manage without her. All the same we were able to celebrate her work as a pioneer in

studies on translation developed in interdisciplinary terms at the intersection between semiotics and consolidated traditions in the field of studies on translation theory and practice. With her “semio-translation,” an expression she introduced in 1994 to evidence the live, dynamical character of the translational process, Gorfée demonstrates how the interrelation among signs is not only an inevitable fact, but also the aim, the goal in all human semioses, in the sense of committing to the enhancement and increment of such interrelation. In fact, the relation between sign and translation is inscribed in the interpretive web of semiosis generally, to the point that we can make the claim that all signs are in translation or they would lose their character as signs. Indeed, the very condition of possibility of the sign to subsist as a sign, for it to be this sign here, is its capacity for referral and translation into another sign, for deferral from one sign to the next in the open-ended and dynamic chain of semiosis. Dinda Gorfée has authored a series of groundbreaking publications in the field including, in addition to numerous essays and edited volumes, the epochal books, *Semiotics and the Problem of Translation: With Special Reference to the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce*, 1994, *On Translating Signs: Exploring Text and Semio-Translation*, 2004, *Wittgenstein in Translation. Exploring Semiotic Signatures*, 2012, and most recently, the forthcoming book, *From Translation to Transduction: The Glassy Essence of Intersemiosis*.

Our own analysis of the relation between signs and translation in this paper is focused on the question of iconicity in the framework of our understanding of “global semiotics” (Thomas Sebeok) and “interpretation semiotics” (Charles Peirce, Mikhail Bakhtin), which presupposes the critique of “decodification semiotics” (semiotics understood as “semiology” – a distorted derivation from the Saussurean approach to signs and semiosis). Keeping account of the Peircean distinction between icon, index, and symbol, we evidence the role of iconicity – of central importance in semiotic processes both at the lower levels of perception (primary iconism) and at the higher levels of understanding and abductive inference – and we do so in relation to the problem of translation. Translation contributes to a better understanding of signs, meaning and communication and is clearly not only a topic of semiotic inquiry, but a structural attitude, a method and orientation in semiotic research.

Translation plays a decisive role in the study of signs from a transdisciplinary perspective. More specifically, translation is pivotal in the interpretive approach to the sign where meaning is described as flourishing in translational processes thanks to another sign, its interpretant. Signs becoming other signs, other than what they were becoming, are signs in the process of translation (Floyd Merrell). Semiotics understood as global semiotics focuses on translation processes interconnecting different sign systems and different languages, which also implies the language of different fields and disciplines, ordinary and specialized languages. Semiotic inquiry translates signs and sign systems into its own language, which also means to invent “signs to talk about signs”, as recites the title of an essay by Augusto Ponzio (1990).

In the language of semiotics, abductive inference is grounded in the iconic relation among different sign processes and objects. In other words, interpretation and understanding achieved through abduction proceed on the basis of relations of similarity. From this point of view, the iconic sign is mostly involved when a question of semiosis in the human world is the metaphor (*traslatum*). Moreover, translation is a structural part of the human modelling device and is the very condition even for what with Peirce we may indicate as the “play of musement” in the human world (CP 6.460–465, 486; Sebeok 1981; cf. Petrilli 2014a: 15.4). As demonstrated by Peirce, iconicity carries out a decisive role in all such processes.

Another inevitable point of reference in our approach to translation theory is Roman Jakobson’s tripartite analysis of translative processes into 1) intralingual translation, or rewording; 2) interlingual translation, or translation proper; 3) intersemiotic translation, or transmutation. We associate this triad to Peirce’s tripartition of signs into symbols, indexes and icons. Any given

sign is the product of the dialectic-dialogic interaction among conventionality, indexicality and iconicity in sign situations in which one of these aspects prevails over the others. By relating Jakobson's triad to Peirce's we obtain a more adequate specification of the relation between translation and signs, and a broader yet more precise characterization of the interpretive-translative processes that constitute our semiosphere and proliferate in it.

In the sphere of interlingual translation with special reference to literary translation, another issue that emerges in all its importance concerns the task of the translator. This issue presupposes the concepts we have hinted at above and constitutes the main focus of the present paper.

2. Dialogic otherness and translation

From a semiotic perspective the text is made of sign material. This means to say that the text in itself is already a translation, an interpretation. Translation across languages is a specific case of translation across sign systems, internally and externally to the same historical-natural language. But translation across languages is possible on the basis of *language* understood as a *modelling device*. Language as modelling is an a-priori and condition for language as communication, for *verbal language* which instead arises originally for the sake of *communication* and thanks to the predominance of iconicity in the relation among signs.

A literary translation, if successful, is faithful to the original in terms of *creativity* and *interpretation*, and is never a mere imitation or repetition. As such the translation establishes a relation of *otherness* (or *alterity*) with the source text. The greater the distance in terms of *dialogic otherness* between two texts, the greater the possibility of artistic re-interpretation through another interpretant sign in the potentially infinite semiotic chain of deferrals from one sign to the next, of which the so-called "original" is a part. From the perspective of Peirce's general sign theory and triad that distinguishes between icon, index and symbol, the relation between source text and target text in a successful translation is dominated by iconicity. A translation is at once similar and dissimilar, the "same other"; this is the paradox of translation. Therefore, a text is at once translatable and untranslatable; the paradox of language (cf. Petrilli 2009; 2010: Ch. 6 and Ch. 8).

3. Similarity and intertextuality in interpretation/translation

Translation involves the question of similarity among signs, and if the question of similarity is central to translation, it is not less important in relation to the text, since this is itself an interpretant sign before becoming an interpreted sign of other interpretants in open-ended reading and translating processes. The relation between the text and that to which it refers presents itself in terms of similarity. The relation of similarity is particularly manifest in the literary text where it emerges in terms of "picturing", "depiction", or "figuration", and not of "imitation", as a mere copy. As Paul Klee has repeatedly pointed out, the text – literary, pictorial, artistic in general, etc. – does not picture or depict the visible (which is what theatrical texts in theatre performances or representations do), but renders the invisible visible.

The question of similarity is central to translation and to literary writing. The relation between the original text and the translating text is a relation of similarity; the literary text itself, and not only its translation, is oriented by the relation of *similarity*. In other words, the literary text relates to "reality", to its referents in terms of similarity, as likely to be credible. But what is to be understood by "similarity", "resemblance", or "likeness"? Similarity is inherent in semiosis, structural to it. Similarity subtends perceptual and logical-cognitive processes involved in categorization, which makes the question "What *is* similarity?" a crucial one. Similarity can be either regulated by the logic of identity, or by the logic of alterity. In other words, similarity is either oriented by assemblative logic, the logic of aggregation among entities that tend to iden-

tify with each other, on the one hand, or by associative logic, the logic of affinity among entities that are different from each other and relate to each other on the basis of attraction, election, on the other.

Peirce demonstrated that meaning is not in the sign but in the relation among signs, whether these are the signs of a defined system – a code, a *langue* – or of dynamic interpretive processes, passing from one type of sign to another, or from one sign system to another. Interpretation is not mere repetition, literal translation or substitution by synonyms, but rather re-elaboration, and creative reformulation. Thus conceived interpretation-translation is risky in the sense that it does not appeal to a pre-established code, is not guaranteed by a convention of some sort. Indeed, the higher the degree in iconicity, firstness, and originality regulating interpretive-translative processes, the more these processes are capable of fully rendering the meaning of a sign, of developing it to high levels of expressivity. Moreover, sign identity calls for continuous displacement; each time the sign is interpreted-translated it becomes “other”, in fact, is another sign which acts as an interpretant of the preceding sign.

Translation – with special reference to semiosis in verbal language, whether among different languages within the same language family, or among different language families (interlingual translation), or among different idioms within the same language (intralingual translation) – involves the iconic dimension in the relation among signs, which it in turn enhances. This means to enhance the relation of absolute otherness and creativity in the relation between the interpreted sign and the interpretant sign, therefore between the source text and the target text as new interpretants develop the meaning of the preceding sign, of the preceding text relatively to new signifying contexts. A sign's meaning is not defined in terms of a given sign or sign system, e.g. a given historical-natural language. Meaning converges with the interpretive trajectory delineated by the processes of deferral from one sign to the next in the great sign network, which knows no boundaries of a typological or systemic order. This is particularly obvious when translation processes involve interpretants, whether verbal or nonverbal, from another language or linguistic-cultural modelling system.

Literary texts escape the bounds of deductive logic. This is replaced by *associative* logic. This is the logic of translation understood as reading-writing, which involves active participation and answering comprehension. Where associative logic predominates, the relation between the interpreted sign and the interpretant sign proceeds by hypothesis. It calls for reader initiative and inventiveness, and develops according to inferences of the abductive type, which means logical procedure at high degrees of creativity. Translation processes across languages further enhance the capacity for innovation and linguistic creativity and involve high degrees of iconicity.

As Roland Barthes observes, to read literary writing means to rewrite it (1982 and 1993–2002, vols. I-III), and this process is enhanced in the transition from one historical-natural language to another. Literary writing is characterized by dialogism and intertextuality and by the capacity to move the signifier in semiotic directions which enhance signification. In other words, literary writing is characterized by high degrees of otherness, autonomy, resistance, objectivity, that is, *semiotic materiality*. All this escapes literary criticism when it directs reader attention to what the author says and to his or her autobiographical, psychological, ideological or historical-social reasons for saying it. To consider translation issues from the complex perspective of literary translation, of secondary genres (Bakhtin 1986), also throws light on the problem of translating nonliterary texts, primary genres (cf. Bachtin e il suo Circolo 2014).

Translation across languages further enhances the associative and dialogic character of the reading/writing (rewriting) process, and contributes to freeing the text from a single type or system of signs. This is the task of translation. Translational processes among languages evidence dialogic intertextuality in the relation among texts as much as internally within a single text. Consequently, textual practice in a single language is already in itself an exercise in translation.

4. Metaphor, modelling, and translation

By virtue of the potential for absolute otherness and for irreducible uniqueness or singularity connected to it, iconicity and firstness involve the capacity to evade the logic of totalization and of the identical. This makes the metaphor an inexhaustible source for the generation and renewal of sense, an interpretive-translative device for the enhancement of sense across signs and sign systems. The capacity for signifying innovation, “linguistic creativity”, is the capacity to form new metaphorical associations and to invent new cognitive combinations, the capacity to figure, picture, portray, to present by contrast with the capacity for mere representation. This capacity for “presentation”, rather than “representation”, for “figuration”, “depiction” is programmed by our primary modelling device, specifically what Thomas A. Sebeok (1986) calls “language” understood as “modelling”, more precisely, “primary modelling”, the preliminary basis for human symbolic behaviour, therefore for secondary and tertiary human modelling systems.

Concepts in the human brain are the product of the activity of three different modelling systems largely corresponding to Peirce’s firstness, secondness and thirdness (Sebeok 1986; Danesi and Sebeok 2000). The primary system is rooted in sensory experience, the secondary in referential and indexical forms, and the third in highly abstract, symbolic forms of modelling: “This ‘flow’ from iconicity to connotativity and symbolicity, that is, from concrete, sensory modes of representation (and knowing) to complex, abstract models, characterizes most of human modelling” (Danesi and Sebeok 2000: 171).

The modelling capacity is an interpretive-translative capacity and is regulated by iconicity. Modelling constitutes the very condition for all types of translative processes. The propensity for creativity, inventiveness and innovation is not a prerogative of poets, scientists and writers, but in fact is common to human beings generally. As humans we are all capable of metaphorical associations, of establishing relations among terms that are seemingly unrelated and of extending our gaze beyond the sphere of human culture to contemplate the great semio(bio)sphere at large. As clearly emerges in the semiotic tradition delineated by Peirce, Jakobson and Sebeok, language as a modelling device relates iconically to the universe it models.

5. Signs and meaning in translation

Reading together the typology of translation elaborated by Jakobson (1959) – featuring 1) intralingual translation, or rewording; 2) interlingual translation, or translation proper; 3) intersemiotic translation, or transmutation – and Peirce’s tripartition of signs into symbols, indexes and icons – where any given sign is the product of the dialectic-dialogic interaction among conventionality, indexicality and iconicity in sign situations in which one of these aspects prevails over the others –, we obtain a more adequate specification of the relation between translation and signs, and a broader yet more precise characterization of the interpretive-translative processes constituting our semiosphere and proliferating in it. Each of the three translative-interpretive modalities identified by Jakobson is either dominated by symbolicity, indexicality or iconicity. In other words, the relation between the interpreted and the interpretant, the translated sign and its translant sign is either dominated by the symbolic, or the indexical or the iconic relation among signs. Furthermore, the three types of translation identified by Jakobson are always interrelated, more or less co-existing with each other to different degrees. For example, in the case of interlingual translation a full understanding of the sense of the source text and its adequate rendition in the “target” language will always involve intralingual translation in each of the two languages in question.

When conventionality predominates, the relation between a sign and its object (or referent) is established on the basis of a code. Reference to a code is inevitable to translate the linguistic elements forming a text, especially in the initial phases of translative-interpretive processes. When

reference to the code predominates, distancing between interpreted signs and interpretant signs is minimal. In this case, the mere activity of recognition and identification plays a primary role in translative-interpretive processes.

Moreover, signs and interpretants are also united by indexical relations of contiguity/causality. To mechanical necessity, a bilingual dictionary adds the relation of contiguity between the sign and its interpretant when it associates the words in the source language to its equivalent(s) in the target language.

Therefore, interlingual translational processes present indexicality (contiguity/causality) in addition to symbolicity (convention). Read from this perspective, Wittgenstein's observation on translation in his *Tractatus* is particularly interesting: "When translating one language into another, we do not proceed by translating each proposition of the one into a proposition of the other, but merely by translating the constituents of propositions" (1961: 4.025). Indexicality refers to the compulsory nature of the relation between a sign and its object. This relation is regulated by the dynamics of cause and effect, by relations of spatio-temporal necessary contiguity, and is pre-existent with respect to interpretation. When indexicality predominates, translation-interpretation processes simply evidence correspondences where they already exist. The degree of creative work involved is minimal.

Bakhtin (-Voloshinov) conceptualizes communication and social intercourse in terms of dialectic and dialogic interaction between identity and alterity. Bakhtin introduces another two important categories in his analysis of verbal language that can also be extended to other sign systems: "theme" (*smysl*) and "meaning" (*znacenie*), or "actual sense" and "abstract sense" (Voloshinov 1927, Eng. trans.: 106). The second term in these pairs covers all that is identical, reproducible and immediately recognizable each time the utterance is repeated – it concerns the meaning of linguistic elements, e.g. the phonemes and morphemes constituting the utterance. "Meaning" or "abstract sense" thus understood corresponds to signality at low degrees of otherness, rather than to signness at high degrees of alterity, to the "interpretant of identification", rather than to the "interpretant of responsive understanding", to "plain meaning" rather than to plurivocal meaning, therefore to translative processes (and phases) where the degree of dialogism and distance regulating the connection between the interpretant sign and interpreted sign is minimal. Instead, "theme" refers to all that is original and irreproducible in an utterance, to overall sense, signifying import and valuative orientation as these aspects emerge in a given instance of communicative interaction. "Theme" accounts for communication and signifying processes in terms of responsive understanding or answering comprehension, dialectic-dialogic response, and multi-accentuativity. It concerns translation-interpretation processes dominated by the iconic relation among signs and capable of qualitative leaps in knowledge and perception, of amplifying the semantic polyvalency of discourse and opening it to new ideological horizons.

The iconic relation between a sign and its interpretant plays a fundamental role in the rendition of the "theme" or actual sense of discourse. This is just as much the case when a question of interlingual translation.

Iconicity implies that the relation between a sign and its object is not wholly established by rules and codes as in the case of symbols, does not pre-exist with respect to a code as in the case of indexes, but rather is invented freely and creatively by the interpretant. In the case of icons, the relation between a sign and its object is neither conventional nor necessary and contiguous, but rather hypothetical. It corresponds to Bakhtin's "theme" or "actual sense" (Voloshinov 1929: 73). All these aspects come into play in the interpreter/translator's work of rendering the original interpretant with the interpretant of another language.

When the relation between a sign and its object and among different types of signs is regulated by the iconic relation of similarity, affinity and attraction, ongoing interpretive-translative pro-

cesses forming the signifying and cognitive universe at large are regulated by dialogism, alterity, polyphony, polylogism and plurilingualism. These are all essential properties of language which together also form the condition of possibility for the development of critical awareness, experimentation, progress in knowledge and enhancement of sense. What we are claiming *à propos* interlingual translation is also valid for intralingual and intersemiotic translation. We know that interlingual translation implies both these other two types of translation.

Moreover, taking off from Jakobson's tripartite typology and in light of our conceptualization of the sign and semiosis reading together Peirce and Bakhtin, we have proposed a more elaborate typology of translation. On the one hand, our schema contextualizes human semiosis in the larger picture of biosemiosis in the semio(bio)sphere overall; and on the other hand, it focuses on translation processes in human semiosis articulating the different levels and types of translation in greater detail. This typology was originally proposed in Italian in Petrilli 1998 (now in Petrilli 2014b) and subsequently in English (in Petrilli, ed. 2003). It may be considered as the result of work done by Augusto Ponzio and myself on translation/interpretation theory up til then and a launching pad for further itineraries in our scientific research in the same area (see also Petrilli, ed. 1999/2000, 2000a, and 2001; Ponzio 1985 in Bonfantini, Mininni, Ponzio 1985; and in English in Ponzio 1990; Ponzio 2004, 2005; Ponzio and Petrilli 2008).

Communication is a primary function of human language, but it cannot be reduced to the terms of message exchange. Communication is a far broader semiotic phenomenon, it converges with life processes in the biosphere and presupposes the dynamics of dialogism and intercorporeity. With reference to the human world communication includes the capacity for the unspoken, the unsaid, the vague, the ambiguous, for inscrutability, concealment, reticence, allusion, illusion, implication, simulation, imitation, pretence, semantic pliancy, polysemy, polylogism, plurilingualism, alterity. All this presupposes the predominance of iconicity in semiosis and determines the possibility itself of successful communicative interaction, which involves successful translational practice.

6. Translating the untranslatable. On language as absence, equivocation, and silence

The iconic relation of similarity regulates translation and is associated with the capacity for exotopy, distancing, or extralocalization. This in itself makes translation a privileged place for the orientation of discourse towards literariness. Such characteristics are shared by the literary word and the translant word and, in fact, render them less distant from each other than would be commonly expected. However, "translatability" does not only signify the possibility of translation. It also denotes an open relation between a text and its interpretations/translations. With reference to the general "interpretability" of a text – with respect to which "translatability" is a special case –, translatability also indicates that the interpretation/translation of a text remains open and is never definitive; that a translated text may continue to be translated, in fact may be translated over and over again, even in the same language into which it has already been translated, and even by the same translator, producing a potentially infinite number of translant texts. The sign materiality of the translated text, its otherness and relative capacity for resistance with respect to any one interpretive trajectory, its signifying complexity, is evidenced by the fact that the original is never exhausted in any one interpretant/translant, but rather can potentially be rendered, reinterpreted, translated by a great plurality of different texts.

The problem of translatability must be addressed with the problem of the untranslatable, being two faces of the same process: translatability, interpretability, and the capacity to express the untranslatable, even the uninterpretable, or the inexpressible. By virtue of semiotic materiality, the absolute otherness of signs, their capacity for resistance thanks to their signifying otherness with respect to all attempts at interpretation-translation by the interpreter-interpretant,

the concept of translatability relates to the untranslatable, to that which evades the limits of comprehensibility, to that which cannot be englobed, to the infinite with respect to the totality, to the unsayable with respect to the said of any linguistic system whatever, to that which cannot be possessed, to the unconscious with respect to the conscious, to the impossible.

If repression, removal, silence, the unsaid, absolute otherness, the shadow is the other face of the word, this has consequences for the act of translation, as interlingual translation makes particularly evident. On the one hand there is common speech, invariability, semiotic fluxes, energy, progress, succession, return, transitive writing, transcription, synechism, continuity, what Barthes calls *mathesis universalis*; on the other, there is uniqueness, otherness, fragmentation, death, loss, intransitive writing, variability, unrepeatability, discontinuity, what Barthes calls *mathesis singularis*. All these factors interact and overlap, evoking each other in uncertain, ambiguous relations, relations of *chiaroscuro*, diffraction. An act of forgetfulness, oblivion, neglect, a slip, an omission, an oversight, inadvertence are all phenomena that show how language is discord and not harmony, dissidence and not a system of opposite pairs, absence and not presence, and how language proceeds in the dialogic dialectics among all such elements. The self is not master of its “own” home, the speaker is not at home in its “own” mother-tongue, but rather tends to be spoken by another utterance, by another language that defers to another utterance still, to another language, and so forth. The speaker, the self is nomadic. We are always “strangers to ourselves” (Kristeva 1988): the condition of strangeness implies that what we share and have in common is the condition itself of strangeness, that is, our absolute otherness, our uniqueness.

The code of translatability may attempt to render translation automatic by cancelling the other, by homologating the other to the self, by asserting the principle of totalization, of authority, of authoriality, by cancelling writing understood *à la* Barthes as intransitive writing, indirect writing, writing *avant la lettre*. However, the translation process is regulated by the logic, or, better, the dia-logic of otherness (on the concepts of dialogism and otherness in relation to signs and language, see Ponzio 2006a, 2006b); it emerges from difference and at once is oriented towards difference. Insofar as this is the case, translation is infinite interpretation, deferral among signs, intransitive writing, re-creation: neither translation word by word, letter by letter (*verbo verbum reddere*, criticized by Cicero), nor translation on the basis of sense (St. Jerome’s *non verbum de verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu*).

The experience of translation, like writing, intransitive writing, unfolds in the materiality of signs, as such it is a material process involving letters and the deferral of signifiers (cf. Petrilli 2015: Ch. 12). Translation encounters the turns and twists of language, its equivocations, the indirectness, and the obliqueness of the interpretive trajectories that it puts into play and that translation across languages amplifies. Whether we translate “by the letter” or “on the basis of sense”, we cannot leave out the letter, since it marks the specificity of the signifier, its materiality, which makes a difference in terms of that which cannot be levelled, or equalized, according to the logic of identity. We cannot translate the letter, for the materiality of the signifier, of the letter itself, that is, signifying material, is not translatable. Decisions play on ambiguities, not to dissipate them, given that nothing can be decided, but to evidence their signifying potential, the signifying import of the play between interpreteds and interpretants, which is further enhanced through deferral across the interpreted-interpretants of other languages.

A translation is active and non transparent. As we have said, it is connected with the work of re-reading and re-writing, of re-creating. Canonical translation is based on the code, convention, authority, and respect of authorial intention. Contrary to such an orientation, the task of the translant is not to give the impression that it is not a translation, but rather to convey the sense of its uniqueness, its specificity, its unrepeatability, and together the sense of its untranslatability. Translation is construed from the specificity of the signifier and in this sense is “by the

letter”. As such translation procedure is regulated by iconicity whose signifying value is an “effect” of language provoked by the “original”, by virtue of what Peirce would call its quality.

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**SOBRE LA CORPOSFERA:
NUEVOS AVANCES EN LAS
CARTOGRAFÍAS DEL CUERPO /
ON THE CORPOSPHERE:
ADVANCES ON THE
CARTOGRAPHIES OF THE BODY**

DANCE INTERPRETATIVE SIGNS

Ana Cristina Medellín Gómez
Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, Mexico
cristina.medellin@gmail.com

Abstract

Toda obra de arte puede evaluarse desde muy diferentes puntos de vista, desde perspectivas académicas diversas, que rozan en sus esencias más íntimas, aspectos de la filosofía que le han de vincular con su contexto social e histórico; de este modo, la danza contemporánea y sus signos se deberán dar a la tarea de integrar las disciplinas que se entretajan en sus andamiajes, para construir un lenguaje que permita al espectador identificar un punto de encuentro con el lenguaje coreográfico. Los profesionales que se desarrollan en el campo de la danza contemporánea pueden trabajar como intérpretes, maestros, coreógrafos, críticos o investigadores, pero todos ellos trabajan para poner la danza en escena, al hacerlo se desenvuelven desde diferentes campos y disciplinas que buscan la comunicación con el espectador. Sin embargo los espectadores de danza tienden a ser en su mayoría miembros del mismo gremio, que constantemente se quejan de la falta de públicos. Se conoce que cuando una función de danza (en general de cualquier evento escénico) tiene la aceptación del público entonces cumple con su propósito de comunicación no verbal.

En los años de experiencia que tengo en el campo de la danza, he visto muchas más coreografías que discrepan de los lenguajes utilizados para el propósito de comunicación con el espectador, que aquellas que logran integrar los signos involucrados en favor de un discurso que permita contextualizar el trabajo del coreógrafo con la sociedad contemporánea, esta investigación pretende enriquecer la comprensión del proceso de comunicación entre el proceso creativo y la percepción del espectador.

Objetivo general:

Establecer cuáles son los aspectos signos observables en el proceso de interpretación que realiza el espectador al presenciar una coreografía de danza contemporánea y cuáles de estos

signos se construyeron desde la intencionalidad del coreógrafo. Partiendo de el análisis comparativo entre, el proceso creativo de Merce Cunningham, (que se basa en las geometrías y las líneas exteriores que el espectador interpreta con facilidad como estéticas) y el trabajo de construcción coreográfica de Pina Bausch que da un sentido de interiorización con apoyo de los procesos personales de sus intérpretes

1. Dance interpretative signs

One cannot see further from what one know to see and can see; this depends on our location and learning of the visual codes to which we are exposed through out our lives. At many occasions, the visual codes teaching is left on the massive communication media hands which standardize the ways of seeing and the way in which, for staging facts, the actors must adopt a determined body code to communicate what the viewer have learnt through his exposure to the media “basicly, open TV”. This known as a cliché, establishes certain performer’s body expression *communication rules* that, in a conventional manner, produce an emotional reaction. This reaction is perceived by the viewer as normal, but can be intentionally manipulated. Doing a deeper reading of the appropriate and secondary features from the performer’s body expression, it allows to access the visual code to obtain a reference that enriches the viewer’s sight related to the decoding of body movement, as a way to broaden the viewer’s visual culture, but also, as an staging performer’s communicating tool.

The human condition is corporal. Matter of identity at an individual and collective level, the body is space that offers sight and reading, allowing others appreciation. Because of it we are named, recognized, identified within a social condition, a gender, an age, a history. (Le Breton, 2010: 17).

Choreographic creation is something that must be done with a clear sense and a determined direction, that is the path to generate a performance that “makes sense” for the audience, understanding “make sense” from its multiple meanings, all interrelated in the staging production. Thus, there is the definition of feeling ourselves as a being conscious of what is happening inside us, “make sense” is also understood as each one of the faculties located at each of the sensory organs, with which the animated beings perceive the outer world, as the capacity to understand and particularly to judge or appreciate things, for dancing, both rhythm and orientation sense are essential.¹

The word “feel” comes from the Latin *sentire* which originally meant “hear”, further it became to represent the perception from all the senses, from there the words agree, sensible, sense, sensitive, sensation, sensibility, feel and resentment came.

In order to compose, the choreographer must have an idea about which is his language and work so this language makes sense. When composing it is expected that he considers his dancers’ feelings, *self-perception* and give this feeling to the performance, remembering, performers are not him but at the same time they are performance’s living and independent elements, in this way the creator looks forward to give a determined sense to the performers’ movements.

How many dances start with an stimulating idea dressed with controlled movements,

¹ It is also said: sense of humor to designate the capacity to use it, percibe it or admit jokes.

but suddenly they get lost without a climax or finish in a hesitant manner, with a stop, not a real ending?. There are talented individuals who possess a shape sense and dramatic contrast by nature, but those who lack of these skills can be trained to acquire them as part of the choreography art, because whit out them for sure are lost. (Humphrey, 2001: 21).

The choreographer also must know music, how it is organized within the roll and be able to read a score, the history and literature as well, and have an informed point of view about what he is choosing: be able to talk with any musician, even if he knows little or anything about dance. In the relationships with composers, musical knowledge is particularly important to facilitate the music sense within the performance.

The idea of verbal sense is required by the dances with meaning, because for those based only upon the physical movement, acrobatics language is enough.

A good dance must be armed with phrases, and these must have a recognizable shape, a beginning and an end, with ups and downs along the line and length differences to achieve variety. The phrase should never be monotonous by the above mentioned reason, dance belongs to the reign of feelings and this never reveals itself in an horizontal line. (Humphrey, 2001: 22).

With out caring the subject, the creator's direction is what give sense to the performance, *that direction is a kinetic text that tells in its speech a sequence of meanings*, informing us about the situation of the performer's emotional states. Creators that work in giving sense to their works achieve great performances in which all the elements are incorporated in the same direction. Although it is not necessary that all the works have a literary character, or are filled with emotions, even those of abstract character when counting with a direction, lead the viewer to an aesthetic experience destination in where signs acquire meaning.

Dance by itself counts with elements to evoke emotions within its vocabulary, to excite the kinetic sense and show body's subtleties. On the stage, body language despite of having defined limitations, it communicates with the viewer, who with out being able to use his sense of touch, uses his sense of sight to touch and results to him an easier way to communicate beyond the experience susceptible of being expressed through physical action.

2. Interpretative signs for dance can be taken from two lectures

Firstly, the abstraction by Merce Cunningham whose choreographies resemble more to plastic arts in reference to aesthetic designs that are developed in the space with out a literary message. Secondly, Pina Baush's looks for representing human being from its most personal facets in processes closer to introspection and poetry.

2.1. Merce Cunningham "1919-2009"

Danced as soloist at Martha Graham's company from 1939 to 1945, founded her own company in 1953, getting apart from Graham's Psicological and Literary topics, she gives a relevant value to pure movement. Her choreographic technique consists in a random combination of pre-established movement sequels that can be determined at random, when the audience interacts with the support of different elements such as dice, coins and numbers, establishes the order of the sequence in which can be presented the movement phrases that constitute the choreography.

Cunningham works this phrases with anticipation independently of the music used which was composed parallel with the choreography and did not have a direct influence on it. In many cases Cunningham did not listen to the music previously, but at her choreographies premiere. The main particularity of Cunningham movements is that these are located at any point in space, that are produced at any moment in time and that only are affected by a particular energy that characterized her impulse. Created this way, movements recover their initial meanings with no interpretation ambiguity possible.

Cunningham developed her own technique with which many virtuous dancers have been formed and trained all around the world. Along her large trajectory as choreographer until her death in 2009, she created a choreographic language that revolutionize the History of dance, building up a bridge between modern dance and what is now known as post-modern dance.

...her example, becomes in a stimulant for personality development for a whole choreographic artists generation, even though wouldn't be nor her students neither her associates of the Cunningham professor and choreographer. Nevertheless a large number of dancers-choreographers considered as belonging to the new vanguard are, frequently, Cunningham's former students. Or they have studied her technique or they took the curses of choreographic composition that Merce Cunningham gave along with Robert Dunn, when, at the early 60's, her teachings contributed to the formation of the group from the Judson Memorial Church. (Baril, 1978: 200).

In her work, Cunningham uses what it has been agreed in considering as the consequence of random intervention. In respect to music, her long lasting association with John Cage lead her to work in tight collaboration with the mentioned composer and to experiment along with him the different procedures that were presented as new means, born from random, without thereby elaborate an empiric composition process.

The great dance independence in respect to the accompanying sound authorize Merce Cunningham to use a great diversity of musical support. At her beginnings, she mainly chose pieces written for piano by John Cage. From 1972, she composed a choreography upon concrete music by Pierre Schaeffer and progressively showed her tendency to vary its musical support at each new performance of a same choreographic composition to the point of becoming to use both instrumental and electronic music.

But the real Cunningham's pictorial revolution starts at the moment she draws upon two eminent contemporary American painters: Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns. Throughout 10 years "1954-1964" Robert Rauschenberg tightly collaborated with Cunningham's company, making the decor and costumes of performances, such as: *Suite for Five in Time and Space*, 1956; *Nocturnes*, 1956; *Labyrinthian Dances*, 1957; *Changeling*, 1957; *Antic Meet*, 1958; *Summerspace*, 1958; *From the Poems of White Stone*, 1959; *Gambit for Dancers and Orchestra*, Ruñe, 1959;² *Grises*, 1960; *Hands Birds*, 1960; *Waka*, 1960; *Music Walk with Dancers*, 1960; *Aeon*, 1961; *Field Dances*, 1963; *Story*, 1963, and, in 1964, *Pairea and Winterbranch*. Even more, Rauschenberg was not only in charge of the scenic lighting but he takes over, particularly, of the projections during the performances. Cunningham and Rauschenberg's personalities are closed and complementary. Mainly, because both conceive creation as an impression's instantaneous reflex or as dictated by the immediate event. In example, Roger Rauschenberg used setting of *Story* all he could at the

² Walkaround Time <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVpF7qZPavU>

very moment of the performance. After 1964, the designer-illuminator position was entrusted to Beverly Emmons, who kept it until 1968, when Richard Nelson took relieve of it. From 1967, Cunningham choose Jasper Johns as the company's artistic adviser. Jasper Johns then asked to several painters to contribute to the performance of Cunningham's new compositions. Jasper Johns turned to Frank Stella for *Scramble*, 1967; to Andy Warhol for *Rainforest*, 1968; to Robert Morris for *Canfield*, 1969, and to Neiljenney for *Objects*, 1970.

Jasper Johns supervise adaptation of a performance by Marcel Duchamp, *The large glass*, at *Walkaround Time*², 1968; and personally makes costumes from *Second Hand*, 1970; *Landrover*, 1972; *Tv Rerun*, 1972³, as well as decor and costumes from *Un Jour ou deux*, 1973.

From 1973 Cunningham dabbled with the use of multimedia elements that she integrated to her performances and in 1974, Merce Cunningham turned to new collaborators to the creation of her works. She turned particularly to Charles Atlas for the creation of *Westbeth*, which premiere took place at New York on February 14th, 1975, and to Nam June Paik for another creation in video, *WNET/TV Lab*, also in 1075, *Squaregame Video* 1976.

2.2. Pina Bausch "1940-2009."

Philippina Bausch, has a different path as a postmodern dance pioneer. German dancer, choreographer and director, pioneer in contemporary dance, Bausch proposes dance pieces composed by expression, body movements, emotions and sounds produced by the dancers that participate in her company, and scenery shaping parts framed in the dance-theater movement, from which she is a pioneer and influence around the world. She graduated at the age of 19 from Folkwang School and won a scholarship to continue her studies at Juilliard School from 1960, having as teachers Antony Tudor, José Limón, Alfredo Corvino and Paul Taylor.

After her stay in the United States, Bausch came back to Germany where her first teacher, Kurt Joos invited her to his recently founded Folkwang Ballet Company in 1962 at first as Joss' assistant and after as soloist. In 1968 directed her first choreography *Fragment*, with Bartok's music; the following year se became Joos' successor as artistic director.

In 1972, accepted the direction from the Wuppertal Opera Ballet which later she would change its name to Tantztheater Wuppertal Pina Bausch, where, in 1974 premiered *Fritz*; after it she continued doing choreographic research mixing scenic dance-opera from where her performances *Iphigenia in Tauris* and *Orpheus and Eurydice*. Later, she premiered pieces that can be cosidered autobiographic, such as *Café Mueller* 1978, *Bandoneón* 1987, and *Lilies of the valley*⁴, emerged. Pina declared that *Café Mueller*⁵ is not exactly an autobiographic piece, "in fact, it is not", Pina Bausch said. "In any case, it would be autobiographic from all of those who have worked in it", although, repeatedly, she talked about the relationship between coffee and the fact that her parents owned a coffee shop, where she lived her childhood.

Pina joined the theater resources and analytic psychodrama to express the psychic and social automatism. Its composition base are the emotional experiences of her performers exploring body expressive possibility and from the gestures that produce aesthetic images, that reflex the body's worldly trapped in the drives of desire.

Action must come out with total sincerity, she says; to achieve that just let each one to express him/herself in accordance with their inner motivations. After it, comes an adap-

³ TV Rerun, 1972 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bI9kerR2vWw>

⁴ Lilies of the valley. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWIs89Pub0w>

⁵ Video Café Muller. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEQGYs3d5Ys>

tation of that sentiment to what it wants to be done. Many times you do not have to touch anything up. (Salas, 1985: 9).

Pina Bausch thought that it was much better to work with dancers because these deal with expression with more liberty than actors do. "I prefer to be asked about things after watching my works. It is necessary to watch them previously, because each time for each person the effect is different".

Representation of images extracted from every days life and reconverted in anticlimax portray, form a unitarian and compact whole, of a dangerous density. Pina Bausch had a rough personality. Her language is cryptic but assimilable, and reach the intention of not narrating but showing a painful reality, with any mask but letting introspection flow out.

She finished with the canonized *body-idea* models to show an heterogeneous reality in which movement acquires an enormous transgressor power. She appeared in two occasions on the screen with the movie directors Federico Fellini and Pedro Almodóvar. Performances by Pina Bausch do not follow any narrative structure neither a lineal progression. They are built starting from a series of episodes. Multiple simultaneous staging actions, images, her dancers use of life experiences, of daily activities, of texts, frequently directed to the audience and a great variety of music styles at the sound track are elements with Bausch's recognizable label and that are now part of the dance-theater lexis in Europe⁶.

Her nomadic character and her huge curiosity in investigating other cultures took Pina Bausch, from the 80's on having many different residencies in many of the biggest capital cities of the world. Rome, Madrid, Lisbon, Istanbul or Hong Kong have been some of them. All her works are performed by dancers from very different races and nationalities, that following with the peculiar working method of the director, they imply themselves with their personal emotions.

Investigation about human violence and pain during the 80's ripped off the newyorker critique labeling her work as *eurotrash* but in time it becomes of social-cultural interest, thematizing the conflictive relationships between the individual and the group, with particular interest in sexual, ethnic and political minorities, which generated more acceptance from the critical.

The success reached by the artist has not been devoided of controversy about her work. Wuppertal's audience, in example, was divided: on one side a compact fans group, on the other, a front of convinced detractors, from which the more violent ones covered Pina Bausch with insults and spits and tried to cut her hair off her head, while others woke her up in the middle of the night with telephone calls in which she was invited to leave the city. Reception of her work continued being object of controversy in the 90's. As well as in Rome some fans paid ten times the price of an entrance ticket, shortly after, in London, a critical left the performance and wrote the following day: "It is better to hang around in the London dreary night than suffering the torture of a Pina Bausch's spectacle at the Sadler's Wells". Pina Bausch has explored human most merciless and desperate side, therefore, it is not a coincidence that Pina Bausch and her performances had provoked so extreme and antithetical reactions. It is not a coincidence either that they claim unequivocal positions intakes. All her pieces are about fundamental maters of the human condition and push

⁶ Pina's fragment <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pftKZoVndM>

the audience to face itself with these problems: love and anxiety, nostalgia and sadness, solitude, frustration and terror, childhood and old age, death, man to man exploitation of man by man, memory and forgetfulness. (Bausch and Vázquez, 2006: 1).

3. Conclusions.

Starting from the analysis of these two great choreographers it is concluded that art and dance are the representation of a fictional reality built by the creator in search of generating imaginary worlds that are projected to the intellect of each viewer, integrate to the aesthetic experience their own wishes and daily experiences to make with the performance a unique vision.

Nevertheless, the viewer must have the will of letting be deceived by the visions that she creates during the performance, to the point of believing them more real than the real itself, believing that that moment is objective and rise the false to a higher power.

...movement acquire in contemporary dance another sense: it becomes an aesthetic gesture, in an aesthetic intention. Gesture is then a trail, something that develops through an image or a thing; these are its vehicle; in this case, body appears as a gesture's depositary. Gesture in dance is trapped in the sense, despite of that not necessarily the artistic proposal is subscribed in the performance, but it tries to move forward in exploring art-life relationship, such as it is suggested many actual proposals in contemporary dance. (Le Breton, 2010: 15).

What it is discovered within the contemporary dance's staging fact interpretation, it is not the sovereignty of a sign in particular but the fact that *even in the shortest signs* the viewer is traversed by a multiplicity of perspectives that compete among themselves to which is imposed an ephemeral stability. The necessity of sense is indomitable; the effort that carries it out complicates the speech possibilities and the multiple semiotic deviations generate a dissatisfaction feeling of multiple deviations, delays and for this reasons of failure. Not to all the signs that are generated in contemporary dance performances can be given a sense and there is where fractures between creator-performer and viewer begin.

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THE BODY AND ITS LIMITS WITH ESCENOSFERA

Benito Cañada Rangel
Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro, Mexico
bcanadamx@yahoo.com

Abstract

Esta investigación nace con la intención de encontrar una manera de estudiar y comprender el teatro en el siglo XXI, con el objetivo de aplicarlo en la formación de actores; el mejor método para enfrentar al reto es con el apoyo de la semiótica, como dice P. Pavis: “la semiología teatral es un método de análisis del texto y/o la representación”, nos basamos en los estudios de Kowzan, donde lo primero que plantea es que, el teatro se puede estudiar en dos grandes áreas: lo que se ve y lo que se escucha, esto nos sitúa, para nuestro estudio, desde la isóptica del espectador, el que percibe o ve la dramaturgia escénica; Boves, aludiendo a Kowzan, refiere que en el libro *Teatro y Semiología: la clasificación de todos estos lenguajes o sistemas por “la intercambiabilidad de los signos de diferentes sistemas, su ambigüedad, la posibilidad de la expresión simultánea sobre la escena de algunos signos de diferentes sistemas, frente a la sucesividad que impone el signo verbal; e insiste en los problemas de la percepción e interpretación del signo dramático, por la falta de codificación y por la posibilidad de ofrecer varios significantes para un único significado”*; la multiplicidad de lenguajes y signos, la posibilidad polisémica entre cada uno de ellos, permite que veamos a todos ellos como los que conforman el universo al que llamaremos *escenosfera*, término que acuño y utilizo bajo la idea de Lotman, *Semiosfera*, como el dominio en el que todo sistema signico puede funcionar, el espacio en el que se realizan los procesos comunicativos y se producen nuevas informaciones, este espacio es para nosotros el espacio escénico, donde convergen en todos los niveles todos los sistemas que lo conforman.

En la *escenosfera* sus límites serán los diferentes lenguajes o sistemas escénicos, teatrales, ellos generan el vasto universo material y simbólico que toma vida en el espacio escénico – ficcional, los cuales, a su vez, crearán las fronteras, como señala Kowzan, refiriéndose a los conjuntos de signos que se generan en cada uno de los sistemas escénicos: “*Lo que verdaderamente nos inte-*

resa son los conjuntos de signos de diferentes orígenes, sus articulaciones internas y externas, sus encadenamientos, el aspecto heterosemiótico (o heterosémico) del fenómeno teatral, de la textura del espectáculo”; así, empezamos a conceptualizar los límites y fronteras de la escenosfera, pero como señala Lotman en su nota anterior (*necesita de un entorno exterior “no organizado” y se lo construye en caso de ausencia de éste*), nuestro espacio exterior, será el espectador, quien es el motivo de todo el fenómeno teatral y al ser el último receptor, estará encargado del proceso de decodificación y recodificación del mensaje que se transmite y como ya comentamos el punto desde que nos situamos para observar nuestro universo de estudio.

La semiosfera da paso a la escenosfera y ésta estará conformada por la suma de los límites y fronteras que se generan, como son: el edificio teatral, espacio escénico, la escenografía, la utilería, el vestuario, los peinados, el maquillaje, la iluminación, el individuo – actor – personaje, el texto escrito, el texto pronunciado, la música, los efectos sonoros y, como ya comentamos, el público o espectador; dentro de todos estos lenguajes y sistemas existen diferentes niveles de percepción y lectura, el entramado se gesta en diferentes etapas de creación e interrelación para construir la escenosfera.

This research began with the intention of finding a way to study and understand the theater in the XXI century, in order to apply it in the training of actors; the best method to address the challenge is supported by semiotics, as P. Pavis says: “*Theatrical semiotics is a method of analysis of text and / or representation*” (Pavis, P., 1988, p. 410.), we rely on studies Kowsan, where the first thing that arises is that theater can be studied in two main areas: what you see and what you hear, this puts us, for our study, since isoptic viewer, the perceiver or watch dramaturgy; Bobes, alluding to Kowzan relates in the book theater and Semiotics: the classification of all these languages or systems:

Interchangeability of signs of different systems, its ambiguity, the possibility of the simultaneous expression on the scene some signs of different systems against successivity imposed by the verbal sign; and emphasizes the problems of perception and interpretation of dramatic sign, for the non-coding and the ability to offer several significant for a single meaning. (Bobes Naves, María del Carmen, 2004, p. 505)

The multiplicity of languages and signs the polysemic chance in each, allows us to see them all as those that make up the universe which we call *escenosfera*, term I coined and use under the idea of Lotman, Semiosphere like domain which every sign system can work, the space in which the communicative processes are performed and produced new information, this space is for us the stage area where converge at all levels all systems that comprise it.

One of the hallmarks of the semiosfera is the delimiter character, leading to the concept of boundary or limit. Semiosfera borders of different levels, limits of different languages, occupy the entire space. In turn, each of these sub-semiospheres has its own (his own “I” semiotic) semiotic identity is constructed in relation to the others. On the other hand, semiosfera as organized space “needs an external environment” unorganized “and build it in the absence of it” (Lotman, 1984, p. 8).

In *escenosfera* limits are the different languages or scenic, theater systems, they generate the symbolic universe vast material and comes alive in the venue – fiction, which, in turn, create borders, as Kowzan says, referring to signs sets generated in each of the stage systems: “*What really interests us are the sets of signs of different origins, its internal and external joints, their linkages, heterosemiótico aspect (or heterosémico) the theatrical phenomenon, texture show*” (Kowzan, Tadeusz, 1997, P. 260); so we began to conceptualize the limits and frontiers of *escenosfera*, but as Lotman points out in his previous note (needs an external environment “not organized” and build it in the absence of it), our outdoor space, will the viewer who is the reason for all the theatrical phenomenon and being the ultimate recipient, will be in charge of the process of decoding, recoding and re-significance of the message that is transmitted and as we discussed, the point from which we stand to observe our universe of study.

The scenario makes an offer of meaning through uncoded signs, and the viewer is the need to interpret without knowing the code. So begins a dialogue: expectations are created in the public, which is then fulfilled or not, but in any case, the viewer is not going to hear dialog innocent way, as it has before seen how the living-stage relationship and Secondly sees the theatrical space that will host the story. Two semic coordinates will frame the perception of dialogue and the story from the outset: field scenic, scenic space. (Bobes Naves, María del Carmen, 2004, P. 508)

That is, the *semiosfera* leads to the *escenosfera* and this will consist of the sum of the systems comprising the theater at the time of the dramaturgy, creating these, their own limits and boundaries, such as: the theater building, stage space, scenery, props, costumes, hairstyles, makeup, lighting, the individual – Actor – character, written text, spoken text, music, sound effects and, as already discussed, the audience or spectator.

In each of these languages and systems, different levels of perception and reading, decoding and encoding, search of signs and meanings that are developing at different stages of development and interaction to build *escenosfera*; with the above, we have some clarity of land on which we place our research, this dissertation will discuss how the body interacts with different boundaries and frontiers of the *escenosfera*, for which we must first define what they consider as a body; Royal Spanish Academy dictionary:

Body.

(From Lat. Corpus).

1. m. That which has limited extension perceptible by the senses.
2. m. Set of organic systems that constitute a living being.
3. m. In liquids, thickness or density.
4. m. Each of the parties, which may be independent when they are considered together with another principal.

From what we can highlight body is: something perceptible by the senses, which has its own limits and which in turn can contain internal systems that constitute it, so we can say, referring to some of the systems that make up the *Escenosfera*: body building, body seats, light body, the body of the actor, the body of the scenery, the body of costumes, makeup, hairstyles, body sound, in short, everything we surrounding is or may be considered as a body, being limited and being able to perceive with our senses; to focus better on our “body” of the study, we will rely on

the methodology given by José Enrique Finol, in his lecture last February (2014, as a historical reference) at the VII International Congress of Semiotics the American Federation of Semiotics (FELS) and the VII International Congress of the Mexican Association for the Study of Visual Semiotics and Space in San Luis Potosi, Mexico, where he spoke about: a Contribution to the Corposfera: Space, limits and boundaries of the body.

Finol citing Merleau – Ponty says, “The outline of my body is a border that ordinary relations of space does not exceed” Ponty develops the notion of corporal spatiality, a concept that derives from the body identity, limits itself and borders of the body but also the appropriation of the world through our body: “The body is our general medium for having a world” and, therefore, “the experience of the body teaches us to root space in existence (...) and our body is not in space: the space he lives”¹.

Our body is not in space: the space he lives; our space is the stage area, where life takes the re-presentation of the creative process that goes from the dramatic text to dramaturgy and ends in the fleeting moment of receipt by the viewer, ephemeral, being unique and unrepeatable each function the show is born, lives and dies, or we say, re-born, re-lives and dies, night by night.

Fernando del Toro, where semiotics of theater book (Fernando del Toro, 2008, P. 161,162) allows us to reflect on the double meaning in the process of reception, where each of the boundaries and frontiers of sign systems of staging mean that they are, as object, as clothing, as light, but also for what they mean in fiction, we know that is never a wardrobe that time, it's like ... and in the process of receiving, recoding by our viewers, have value as its referents; those created by the director to generate the dramaturgy and like it, give value to their signs, each of the elements of the escenosfera, according to their own referents and social context or meaning intended addressed.

At the time of creating the dramaturgy and integration of all systems, bodies represented by harmonizing the interplay of different borders and boundaries of the proposed signs, we can consider the different categories that presents Kowsan in his book *The Sign and the Theatre* (Kowzan Tadeusz, 1997), in, clearly, analyze the full range of signs, may be these: natural, artificial, motivated, arbitrary, mimetic, iconic symbols or metaphors; correct use will generate us unity in the process of reception by the viewer, knowing that may be present all, some or mixed at different levels or systems comprising the fact scenic.

How to define the limits and boundaries of bodies at the scene, for this, we will continue referring to the statement made by Finol: *a limit is a separation that creates at least two spaces be they physical, psychological or cultural, but also a limit is a contact* paraphrase Finol limit generates separation and contact between these is given a transitional space, despite the rigidity of the physical boundaries, borders are, however, in varying degrees, porous, permeable. Thus the limits tend to favor the separation while the borders tend to favor the contact and exchange, the limit is conventional, for example, separates countries and the border is the one on both sides, which runs along the boundary; presents at least four types of limits of the body:

1. It is observed when marking start and end, end and beginning of own components of a body, not only physiological but spatially, meaning.

¹ José Enrique Finol. 2014. Contribution to Corposfera: Space, limits and boundaries of the body, VII International Congress of Semiotics of the American Federation of Semiotics (FELS) and the VII International Congress of the Mexican Association for the Study of Semiotics visual and Space. San Luis Potosi, Mexico, from 17-22 February.

2. After skin the second type is the physical environment where the body semiotiza and, in turn, semiotiza the world, i.e., gives meaning to the physical world and is provided, also, of meaning.

3. It is marked by the existence of other bodies, those who occupy a common, real or virtual space, but whose existence delimits semiotiza and brand our own body.

4. Is Semiosphere, within which the Corposfera establishes relationships of reciprocity and complementarity, articulation and contradiction, resistance and balance; so that one and the other are fed and fed back into a universe of languages. It is only in the context of these relationships Semiosphere and Corposfera it is possible to understand the many languages that bind and leave the body itself, such as, for example, in the case of clothing (for us would be the costumes), a system dynamic and changing meaning, which is provided, at its origin to the corporeality and at the same time, becomes an autonomous system of signification.

Finol Corposfera has defined as the set of languages that originate, updated and made thanks to the body, understood as a complex semiotic numerous possibilities that require a phenomenological vision for your understanding; the Corposfera would be this part of the Semiosphere proposed by Lotman and cover all the signs, codes and processes of meaning in which, in many ways, the body is present, acts, means; Escenosfera for us is that part of the Semiosphere which encompassed all systems involved in the act of performing in the theater, it can mean as bodies that are limited in the process of creation and exchange boundaries when polysemy given in; director and as such, suffer from other decoding processes to be seen, read, senses – Scenic, meaning and re-signifying his own essence, under the direction of the dramatic text, under the leaders of creative drama first by the performer and, finally, by the viewer, this being heterogeneous and, therefore, the leaders of individuality in the social collective that form, will autonomously the meaning of the staging and assessment of each of the systems involved.

All bodies present in the Escenosfera have a role and importance in her process of signification, can dispense with any of them, except the actor, as already noted Grotowsky, for him, having a space where the action is developed, lighting allow perceive, whether natural or artificial and actor to implement the activities, was enough to create the scenic fiction; *Wladimir Krysiniski notes that Grotowsky (as in Tadeusz Kantor and Eugenio Barba), “the body is symbolic to the point in the scene is transformed into a production machine signs that invokes the collective, cosmogony and universal human themes”* (Fernando del Toro, 2008. P. 141).

What we can conclude that the ultimate function of the speech of the actor is to show their creative ability in the scene, not only overrides their ability in using the vocal apparatus when communicating the address given in the dramatic text, but: gestures, proxemics and kinetics come to play a key role; is really the actor's body as a whole which serves as an instrument between discourse and mimesis, between discourse and the public; in turn, their physical presence is essential in the operation theater: *The actor is all theater. We can do without any representation, except the actor* (Ubersfeld, 1981. P. 164).

All elements of the staging have a clear reason to exist and also mean each clearly demarcate its limits and being juxtaposed borders coexist in a harmonic way, aesthetics, on behalf of all; make a journey from the most important and difficult body to study, actor, being the only living element that passes over and all systems, using them and re-signifying to tell the fable: the physical constitution of the actor itself and gives us a lot of signica information age, complexion, skills and demonstrated to move around the stage skills, if we add the technique of performance, internal and external characterization of the character and, executing their actions give us more details about the job, socioeconomic status, timing, location and regionalism; everything will be boosted with the costumes, makeup, hairstyles, props to manipulate the scenery through which transit and use; with lighting will be generated atmospheres, other spaces, and even specific ef-

fects that compete with television and film, areas where escenosfera there too, but for reasons of time does not develop on this occasion, as it is: the zoom and segmentation in planes and levels, created according to the placement of the luminaire and the hardness of the light allows different ways of perceiving action, let's add color, cold to warm, which increases us the sign value, supporting or creating them mood states, all this changed or re-mean according to the scenario where the representation.

With this little exercise clarify the complexity of the body of study and the importance of developing it, as if from the formation of actors, we offer this methodological tool for study and analysis, they, in their creative processes will be more aware in search and selection of their actions and those of all other systems, be more careful and observers at the time of search and creation, and use may signify more accurately; already mentioned the high polysemic value of each, to mean: so are, for the use given to them, and their integration into the mise en scene.

We must not forget our ultimate limit, the viewer, enclosed space for the stalls and the "fourth wall" having a very porous borders, we could say that even invasive, first by the interaction itself given among viewers, this, will condition the process of receiving and, viewer situation, looking, making it able to follow the speech in full or in installments, following, depending on your interest, or systems that most appeal to you; the viewer selects to do, the reasons why attend representation, how is modified before the third call and the sensitive and emotional impact suffered at the reception and its own referents, condition the way we generate and decode new meanings what happened in our escenosfera, with this unique and unrepeatable as the same mise en scene process.

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APROXIMACIÓN SEMIÓTICA A LA VISION DEL CUERPO FEMENINO EN LA NOVELA COLOMBIANA MANUELA

Laura Cristina Bonilla N.
Universidad Industrial de Santander, Bucaramanga, Colombia
laura.bonilla369@gmail.com

Jhon Janer Vega R.
Universidad Industrial de Santander, Bucaramanga, Colombia
deuteafat@gmail.com

Abstract

Este trabajo indaga por las representaciones del cuerpo femenino en una crónica periodística colombiana contemporánea y una novela del siglo XIX a través del análisis semiótico discursivo y algunos conceptos de la propuesta teórica de J. Fontanille sobre las figuras semióticas del cuerpo. Esto conducirá a la reconstrucción del recorrido generativo de la significación a partir de las estructuras figurativas, narrativas y profundas que componen el mencionado modelo analítico.

El cuerpo, entendido como presencia sensible, tanto propia como de los otros, determina una dinámica perceptiva entre él y el mundo que le rodea, es decir, entre la intensidad que se proyecta y la extensidad que capta del mundo natural. Es así como el cuerpo constituye la unión de las dos macrosemióticas (Fontanille, 2001: 35) la exteroceptiva y la interoceptiva donde el cuerpo se hace eje perceptivo asumiéndose en una propioceptividad. De esta manera, el cuerpo como envoltura sensible recoge del exterior sensaciones y del interior emociones, afectos y pensamientos dentro de un campo perceptivo. Estas relaciones se crean en el discurso en acto, el cual, a través de la dimensión sensible y perceptiva produce transformaciones generando efectos de sentido en un complejo conjunto significante (Rosales, 2004: 90).

Desde esta perceptiva es importante enfatizar en que no solo la presencia produce efectos de sentido en el discurso, sino que las construcciones de significado están fundadas en la dimensión actancial, cognitiva y afectiva, es decir, la significación está dada por sus interrelaciones. De esta manera, se analizará la configuración identitaria de las representaciones femeninas de dos crónicas colombianas que se concentra en historias de vida de mujeres. Se presenta una aproxi-

mación a la visión del cuerpo materno, la virginidad y la domesticidad de ellas en la sociedad; pues, aunque prevalece el imaginario de la mujer-madre se exploran otras visiones del cuerpo, tales como la rebeldía como manifestación de comportamientos alternos al establecido en su construcción de la identidad. Lo cual evidencia que los cuerpos configurados discursivamente encarnan determinados valores que se encuentran en tensión en una sociedad transicional como la del siglo XIX y XX en Colombia.

1. Acercamiento al cuerpo

Históricamente la figura y el papel de la mujer durante el siglo XIX le han asignado principalmente los papeles sociales de madre, esposa y ama de casa. Estas concepciones responden a un orden cultural sostenido por instituciones de profunda influencia en la vida de los colombianos, como son la Iglesia y su discurso tradicionalista. Este sustenta una forma de vida tradicional que ampara el matrimonio y la sumisión de la mujer al hombre y que se concretó en una escasa participación política femenina y un menor acceso a la educación. Sin embargo, se han encontrado algunos registros literarios que muestran la transgresión a dichos valores, o por lo menos la presentación de formas alternas de vivir el “ser mujer”; y es posible que esos casos-ejemplos, que se encuentran en la literatura, pudieran haber representado modelos – o por mejor decir, antimodelos – de un posible orden de existencia para las siguientes generaciones.

En cuanto al poder de la religión, José David Cortés (1998) en *Curas y políticos* ilustra que ese control de la mujer se ejercía desde el modelo de la madre católica (que se impuso después de la Constitución de 1886). Él escribe sobre la figura de la “madre impía”. Aunque este autor la ilustra muy brevemente, esta constituye un ejemplo de la visión que los clérigos tenían sobre el control que debía ser ejercido por y sobre la mujer. La madre impía era la que se apartaba del cuidado moral de sus hijos, es decir, de la regulación a través del deber hacer-ser de las mujeres mayores hacia su prole.

A pesar de la manipulación del deber hacer que recae sobre la mujer, surgen figuras femeninas que transgreden este imaginario y evidencian estados y transformaciones no solo al discurso cristiano, sino de las normas de urbanidad difundidas en los manuales de comportamiento (Hincapié 2007). Estos casos contradicen esa prédica según la cual “La mujer que se representa en la literatura de finales del siglo XIX sigue los paradigmas de la mujer cristiana, estimulándola a ser sumisa, obediente, fiel a Dios, al padre, al esposo; en otras palabras, al modelo patriarcal” (2007: 290). También, abnegada y con profunda resignación hacia su destino que incluye servicio fiel hacia su esposo y hacia sus hijos.

Dichas figuras dentro de la literatura pueden considerarse como una alteración del orden establecido en la paradigmática *María*, de Jorge Isaacs, que se erigió como la novela cumbre colombiana y la más representativa del romanticismo latinoamericano (Pineda 1999). Sin duda, como guía de comportamiento para las mujeres, esta novela resalta valores como la pureza (virginidad), la abnegación y la absoluta resignación a un destino que debía reflejar la figura cristiana de la virgen *María*, un modelo de carácter conservador que evocaba el pasado: “Su espíritu estaba más acorde con el conservatismo, con el patriarcado, con la sensibilidad romántica y la búsqueda o conservación del pasado, que con un proyecto utópico liberal”, como lo refiere de forma explícita su autor (1999: 180).

Sin embargo, frente a este modelo surge una novela poco aclamada en la historia de literatura colombiana, esta no es leída comúnmente en las escuelas ni tampoco recomendada a los jóvenes, *Manuela* (Díaz 1985). Pues es una novela con varios tipos de mujeres, en la cual se evidencia la variedad de oficios y se observa una tendencia hacia la política por parte de algunas de ellas, craso error según Acosta de Samper (1879) que critica duramente a aquellas que tomen decisiones, pues este rol hace parte de la masculinidad. De manera que la “mujer que se involucra en

política, se le tildaba de “marimacho”, de la que se burlaban hombres y mujeres, aleccionando así, a las señoritas para que no siguieran su ejemplo” (Hincapié 2007: 292). Probablemente por eso, Manuela, no es tan célebre como si lo es María (Isaacs 1867), quien ajena a todo lo que pasa a su alrededor, muere sin hacer uso de una voluntad política específica y totalmente apegada al orden tradicional de su época.

Ese adjetivo de *marimacho* evidencia la trascendencia que tiene la transgresión a la norma por parte de las mujeres, no ser “virgen, ángel y flor” (Hincapié, 2007), sino asumir roles masculinos lo que les vale ser referidas a través de un código intermedio, una alusión que de lo nominativo atraviesa el cuerpo. Es decir, el término “marimacho” transgrede la relación entre el ser respecto a su envoltura, una aparente mujer pero con pensamientos o actitudes masculinos. Ser marimacho es un ‘insulto’, pero más que a la mujer es al cuerpo y al cómo aparece ante los otros. No ser mujer, no ser hombre, ser una mezcla entre estos roles es ser señalada, ser rechazada. Marimacho en su etimología corresponde a un entrelazamiento entre María y macho, y que según la RAE se refiere a una “mujer que en su corpulencia o acciones parece hombre” (2014: 1414). Es decir, Marimacho corresponde a un concepto que define al cuerpo que mezcla la corporeidad y expresión de un macho y una hembra.

Esta descripción evidencia la importancia del aspecto corporal en la construcción de la identidad de la mujer, y de la rigidez con que determinadas expresiones externas se ligan a determinadas identidades; es decir, el cuerpo se esquematiza a través de modelos o pautas predefinidas tanto en su materialidad (tamaño y forma) como en las expresiones usadas por los individuos, desde la forma de hablar, de moverse, hasta el vestido (que sería un recubrimiento corporal). Es allí, en esos diferentes niveles donde emerge la significación discursiva del cuerpo como frontera de interacción entre los individuos y la cultura.

Es por esto que el cuerpo se hace indispensable: ya sea que se le trate como sede, como vector o como operador de la semiosis, aparece como la única instancia común a las dos caras o a los dos planos del lenguaje, capaz de fundar, de garantizar y de realizar su unión en un conjunto significativo. “El cuerpo no se concibe como un “contenedor” o “hardware” sino que pasa a ser aquello que permite y define radicalmente el modo como habitamos el mundo y generamos sentido” (Rosales 2004), es decir, no es solamente el recipiente contenedor de la materialidad o de determinados valores, sino la frontera de interacción entre lo social y lo subjetivo y por ende la frontera compleja y diciente de la dinámica de una cultura.

Por lo anterior, este trabajo busca evidenciar un ideario femenino alternativo en narraciones del siglo XIX y evaluar una posible línea de continuidad entre estas figuras y formas actuales de la vivencia de la femineidad. Para tal efecto, la novela *Manuela*, de Eugenio Díaz Castro, constituyó el foco central de análisis a través de enunciados puntuales que permiten analizar visiones propias de la obra. Esta se considera “[...] una obra típica postcolonial que no olvida los tópicos, valores y estrategias de la tradición española, pues a ella pertenece, pero procura reformularlos y logra repudiar algunos o desplazarlos” (Pineda 1999). En esta línea, fijaremos la mirada en las reformulaciones y los desplazamientos del ideario mariano femenino. Teniendo en cuenta que:

La fuerza de las imágenes y símbolos de la mujer idealizada están fuertemente representadas en el arte y la literatura del siglo XIX, es una imagen mariana prefabricada en Europa y traída a América por medio de los discursos hegemónicos de la clase letrada. Esa imagen bajo la cual el señorito de la hacienda ha sido educado, pero cuando emprende recorridos de viajes a las tierras lejos de su entorno natal, se encuentra con imágenes más naturales, menos domesticada, más sexuales, como las de las mestizas y mulatas, y por supuesto se ve enfrentado y arrobado a esas “tentaciones” prohibidas (Hoyos 2012:88).

2. Cuerpo y belleza

Vergara y Vergara expresa que “en el mundo no hay mujeres feas: lo que hay es mujeres malas o sin educación” (1878:141), lo que demuestra la existencia de la idea de que la mujer presenta en lo físico lo que puede haber en su interior. Es un rasgo de corporalidad inmerso en la descripción femenina, a partir de la oposición belleza/fealdad. Si la mujer es bella, en su interior se encontrarán valores como la bondad. En el caso contrario si se hallara una mujer fea se descubriría el opuesto, la maldad. Así lo manifiesta Pedraza citada por Hincapié (2007) en su estudio sobre el cuerpo, cuando señala que el discurso estético de principios del XIX “nació negando la existencia de mujeres feas por estimar que la belleza era un criterio convencional y relativo que permitía a cualquier mujer ser o hacerse bella, idealizándose” (1999: 305).

2.1. La belleza laboriosa

Desde esa radical negación de la fealdad que constituye los apartes arriba citados se entiende en Manuela la constante alusión a la belleza del actor principal femenino. Desde el principio ella se presenta como una mujer bella según los habitantes de la Parroquia, nombre que recibe el pueblo donde se desarrolla gran parte de la historia. Y aunque la belleza es colectiva pues a todas las mujeres que habitan esas tierras se les apela como bellas, Pía, Manuela, Rosa, Marta, etc., es Manuela la que desde el primer momento recibe los halagos del forastero Demóstenes: “Me bastan tus cuidados, me basta que tus preciosas *manos* se ocupen de mi mesa; yo lo que deseo es tu amistad...” (Díaz 1985). Se hace entonces, alusión a una parte del cuerpo, las manos, a la que se le reconoce no solo por su belleza sino su laboriosidad, pues se hablaba de su habilidad para el lavado y la cocina.

De manera que, las manos de las “señoritas” no se caracterizaban por la laboriosidad sino por la finura y la delicadeza. Lo que se está construyendo o exaltando es la imagen de la mujer trabajadora, lo cual muestra que la liberalidad es una condición también del sujeto femenino para el trabajo y que se preparan unas condiciones óptimas para la entrada de la mujer al mundo del trabajo. Es importante acotar que dentro de los valores tradicionales españoles, siempre, desde la Colonia, el trabajo manual estuvo muy desprestigiado y se le consideró propio de las clases bajas. Esta novela exalta el trabajo manual en contraposición a los valores tradicionales. Aquí es donde las manos, un elemento del cuerpo se constituye en el foco significativo, aquí se constituyen como una metáfora de todo el cuerpo.

Frente a lo dicho anteriormente, es pertinente recordar que Greimas declara que el cuerpo humano puede ser estudiado desde un punto de vista mecanicista en el que “...deja de ser así una forma global para presentarse como una organización de actores metonímicos (brazo, pierna, cabeza, tronco, etc.), que operan, de una cierta manera, por procuración, cada uno en su espacio parcial, en nombre de un actante único” (1989: 62). Estableciendo cierta distancia a esta referencia analítica del autor, las manos aparecen como un espacio de acción de la laboriosidad de la mujer y por ende de la razón de su liberalidad al no tener las “manos atadas” y poder trabajar, a diferencia de las mujeres de la élite que se encuentran enlazadas a la delicadeza y que simbólicamente expresan la dependencia del hombre como principio fundamental de la forma de vida tradicionalista.

Hay que tener en cuenta que las manos se configuran acá en un actor “manos...se ocupen” bajo una laboriosidad que también es la de la mujer que le *sirve* al hombre, eso es lo que le parece bello a Demóstenes. Además, las partes del cuerpo se constituyen como lo dice Hamon en embragadores ideológicos, es decir, en puntos centrales para interpretar la circulación de los valores culturales. Esto posee gran importancia teniendo en cuenta que en el proceso filogenético humano, la mano-herramienta junto al rostro-lenguaje, constituyen dos grandes conjuntos funcionales decisivos en la constitución simbólica humana (2004: 121).


2.2. La belleza exterior: el espacio

Así, la belleza femenina que se reitera en varias ocasiones es resaltada aún más cuando se contrasta con la valoración negativa que se tiene del lugar: “el profesor habla tomando sus lecciones del arte en París y Nueva York y las utilizaba civilizando a una belleza del pueblo descalzo” (Díaz: 1985). Como se ve en esta cita, se refiere a Manuela como una belleza en un pueblo salvaje para él, pues carece del desarrollo que podría tener en su momento Bogotá (la capital). Así mismo hace referencia al pie descubierto, símbolo de la desnudez y al mismo tiempo, la carencia de estatus social, que para el siglo XIX era pobreza, bajo rango social, pues ostentaban un nivel alto aquellos que tenían zapatos. A esto se suma que varias veces se habla del lugar como salvaje, primitivo, pequeño y bárbaro:

[...] bosque pequeño de caracolías (30). Un pequeño arroyo tan cristalino que se veían los pescados, el suelo natal, que dejaba para irse a consumir en una montaña, a una choza salvaje, (49). Es lo que te digo, Manuela, agregó don Demóstenes; lo que se debe aprender es la varsoviana, el strauss y la polka, que son los bailes de alto tono, y dejarse de los usos retrógrados de los pueblos semisalvajes (99).

De manera que no solo el lugar es salvaje sino sus habitantes, expresiones como “Tiene un salvaje de marido, que lo tiene embobado,” (129). Lo que resalta aún más la belleza de Manuela, pues ella es diferente a los habitantes, ella es conversadora. Su espontaneidad hace que Don Demóstenes pase largas horas en la estancia junto a ella y esto a él le parece muy atractivo, tanto como para cortejarla sabiendo que él tiene prometida y ella también.

La complementariedad que se establece entre belleza/salvaje, evidencia las marcas corporales de la belleza en Manuela. Ella es bella como sus coterráneas, pero esta belleza es propia de acuerdo a su entorno, ella no sería bella sino escandalosa en un contexto como la capital, donde su espontaneidad opacaría su particular hermosura. En términos ideológicos la oposición sería: civilidad/salvajismo, con una serie de complejos contrastes. Es decir, por un lado está el recorrido de la fealdad negado para la mujer:



Fuente: Propia

Fig. 1: Cuadrado semiótico sobre la transformación de la mujer.

El cuadro de la figura 1 marca el recorrido típico de la belleza. Sin embargo, en el relato se

están reivindicando otras bellezas y otras concepciones de lo que es el “cuidado” del cuerpo o la “maldad”. De este modo lo salvaje puede ser bello, pero solo en la situación del pueblo, es a la vez una reivindicación de la cultura popular, pero también se le asigna a cada una un lugar específico. Esto es en últimas la carga simbólica de la que se alimentan los cuadros de costumbres propios de la región¹. Vemos entonces que la novela introduce apreciaciones de lo bello que contradicen el proceso de urbanización de la época.

Así lo expresa la propia Manuela refiriéndose a las diferencias entre las señoritas de la capital y las de la Parroquia: “¡Con que al revés de nosotras, que solteras tenemos la calle por nuestra, y el camino, y el monte, y los bailes, y cuanto hay; y después de casadas, nos ajustan la sogá!”. Es decir, la belleza está de la mano con el entorno pues se genera la oposición civilización/barbarie, ciudad/pueblo. Ella en el pueblo, irradia belleza, pero en la ciudad, no sería más que una salvaje como sus paisanas. Además, aparece entonces que el juego del patriarcado es más fuerte para la pueblerina pues en tanto se casa se ata al marido “después de casadas, nos ajustan la sogá”. Se presenta así una oposición entre la mujer de la ciudad y la del pueblo; la mujer “urbanizada” gana libertad al casarse, pues como lo aprecia Manuela ya puede salir sin ser acompañada, contrario a la del pueblo.

2.3. La belleza interior: la cortesía

Tanto en lo exterior como en el interior, el cuerpo se afirma como un instancia sensible. Este actúa como un filtro que envuelve y se ve desde afuera como bello. Así lo aclara Fontanille:

El cuerpo propio es una envoltura sensible, que determina de esta manera un dominio interior y un dominio exterior. Por donde él se desplaza, determina, en el mundo donde toma posición, un clivaje entre universo exteroceptivo, universo interoceptivo y universo propioceptivo, entre la percepción del mundo exterior, la percepción del mundo interior y la percepción de las modificaciones de la envoltura-frontera misma (2001: 35).

En este sentido, la envoltura corpórea de Manuela deja entrever cómo su cuerpo percibe y se deja afectar por la presencia del actor Demóstenes en las escenas de la novela, pues, al entender de cierta manera las intenciones de este y ante la ausencia de su prometido, ella se va dejando llevar a ciertos niveles de intensidad. Además, por la forma en que Demóstenes representa a la mujer de la ciudad como su contraparte, como su alteridad. En un baile, Manuela “se fue dejando resbalar para que la cogiese don Demóstenes” (Díaz 1985: 71). Según el narrador, Manuela se deja caer para sentir la presencia sensible del actor masculino, pero “A este tiempo se sintió ruido de armas en la sala” (72) y todo volvió a la normalidad. Fue solo un momento pues la norma social, impidió que dicha situación pasara a otro plano.

Lo anterior concuerda con las normas de cortesía social que promulgaba el Manual de Carreño (2005), libro muy conocido aún hoy en Colombia por servir de guía para orden social que se quiso imponer. El siglo XIX es el siglo de las buenas maneras, del ajuste del cuerpo y de las normas de cortesía. Estas fueron de gran importancia en la búsqueda de un sentido identitario nacional, que se orientaba hacia la extensión del ideal de ciudadano civilizado, que estaba ligado a la vida cotidiana de las familias notables:

Los cambios bruscos en el nivel de vida de una sociedad traen consigo el intento de im-

poner nuevos cánones de urbanidad y de comportamiento, difundidos en cartillas, catecismos y manuales. Conocidos en Occidente desde el siglo XVI, proliferaron en siglo XIX. En Colombia, las clases altas, al incrementar su riqueza e intensificar el comercio con otros países Europeos hacia mediados del siglo XIX, se preocuparon por mejorar sus modales. Había bastante que aprender, pues con los nuevos consumos variaron utensilios de mesa y cocina, modas, atuendo, muebles, elementos decorativos y hasta el sentido del gusto, alterando modales y hábitos de vida (Londoño 1994).

Así se considera que desde el punto de vista de la cortesía, las mujeres de la provincia no eran más evolucionadas sino que desconocían las normas de la vida urbana, lo que las hacía contar con mayor libertad. Según Hoyos (2012), la mujer subalterna es una mujer más libre sexualmente que la mujer de la clase hegemónica; ellas no tienen las ataduras sociales que deben tener las mujeres de clase alta.

Ese elemento de dejarse tocar incluso ligeramente y sentir cosquillas como ella misma lo describe en primera voz, tiene que ver con la proxémica del actor femenino hacia el masculino. Como los roces continuos se acercan. Primero un roce descuidado, del cual luego Manuela pide disculpas pues fue a oscuras, cuando de forma involuntaria le golpea levemente en los pies, mientras Demóstenes dormía en la hamaca. En segunda instancia aparece la mirada e invitación de Manuela hacia él para que se bañe en el río, aun cuando este se niega, con la pregunta “¿juntos?, ¿bañarnos?” (33), las miradas se entrecruzan y el deseo por bañarse no se lo niega, pero insiste con la pregunta ¿Y lo que dirán en la parroquia de verte ir de los montes con un cachaco? (33).

3. Cuerpo y pasión

Las anteriores referencias de la belleza se refuerzan poco a poco en la obra con la inclinación que siente el actor masculino hacia Manuela. Tanto que, el narrador describe con las siguientes palabras el estímulo y la reacción de Manuela con la coquetería que en lo corporal se percibe:

Él se hallaba tan cerca de su casera como no lo había estado nunca; sus manos estrechaban con dulzura los miembros palpitantes de una beldad y cuando inclinaba la cabeza al sonido de los compases, su barba se mecía por encima de la frente de su pareja, como las hojas de una palma sobre las hojas y flores de los árboles de su contorno; los ojos de Manuela brillaban sobre los suyos de una manera prodigiosa (énfasis propio), la lección era una gloria; pero Manuela se retiró del puesto y la lección quedó suspensa.

En esta escena del baile, la emoción se percibe, en primera instancia, con un acercamiento tan profundo que se llegan a sentir los miembros palpitantes y reforzar la idea de belleza a partir de esta sensación. Luego se acompaña la escena con música y su ritmo permite un acercamiento mayor que se equipara al remezón de las ramas de los árboles. Esta alusión al movimiento termina con la explosión de la pasión a través de la mirada, que se describe como prodigiosa, es decir, extraordinaria y admirable a la vez. Es por esto que se dice que la lección de baile fue lo mejor. Pero nuevamente el “toque-toque” o exploración táctil, termina, o mejor, queda suspendido, bajo la alineación a la norma cortés.

El movimiento también alude a la beldad, específicamente el movimiento de las caderas de Manuela que gran admiración le profesa Demóstenes: “Tal vez no era un punto de política lo

que hacía porfiar a don Demóstenes por ir detrás, sino por ver caminar a Manuela, que tenía gentileza en su andar, belleza en su cintura y formas, que a favor de su escasa ropa se dejaban percibir como eran, como Dios las había hecho” (45).

Estas alusiones al cuerpo desde la intensidad que produce la belleza de Manuela se complementan con la vivacidad que admira Demóstenes en ella. Su fluidez de conversar, sus comentarios aparentemente cultos, respecto a los de las demás habitantes de la Parroquia y sobre toda su lucha por la libertad de su prometido, con su habilidad y carisma para hablar con la gente. Estos elementos parten de la exteroceptividad que complementa la tensión entre la belleza emotiva y la espontaneidad desde la captación que hace Demóstenes del cuerpo de Manuela. Como un anclaje se dispone el cuerpo, así lo indica Rosales:

La presencia del cuerpo se constituye como el centro deíctico que funciona como referente, se trata de un campo relacional y tensivo: relacional en cuanto vinculado necesariamente a un sujeto tensivo porque la percepción implica una atracción o repulsión y esto constituye una tendencia afectiva (10).

4. El cuerpo y la condición social

Esta idea nos remite a la figura de Matea, otra representación femenina de la misma novela, pero con otros elementos sobre el tratamiento del cuerpo y que constituye el ejemplo de una actitud realmente transgresora. En su descripción corporal se puede apreciar su condición social de trabajadora, pero al mismo tiempo sus aires de libertad, tanto en su andar como en su gusto por fumar.

Manuela se fijó en el traje de Matea, la cual tenía enaguas de crespón blanco con fondo del mismo color, camisa bordada de seda negra, y un pañuelo de punto sobre los hombros. Sus dedos, garganta y orejas brillaban con los adornos de oro fino, y aun su cabeza, porque las peinetas estaban chapeadas del mismo metal. Tenía zapatos enchancletados, pero no tenía medias, y en la mano cargaba un rico pañuelo de batista. Muchas de las que se hallaban en los grupos del pueblo estaban vestidas de la misma manera, siendo peonas la mayor parte de ellas. Algunas se cruzaban fumando tabaco y caminando con cierto aire de liviandad y descoco, únicamente tolerable en los puertos y en los lugares demasiado calientes, pero que en otras partes no tiene disculpa (Castro 1985: 238).

Retomar el vestido pone de relieve la idea de las “calentanas” como eran llamadas las mujeres de tierra caliente. Y evidencia que las faldas anchas son atractivas para los hombres pues “a lo mejor no llevan bragas y por la blusas no llevan sostenes y porque asimismo se ríen sin pudor y dicen lo que piensan” (Hoyos, 2012: 87). Además, evidencia el contraste con Manuela que a pesar de trabajar en el campo no portaba joyas, ni tampoco eran exhibidas tal como sí lo hace Matea en señal de su altivez. Ella portaba en la parte superior de su cuerpo oro, lo cual discrepa con la parte inferior donde solo tiene zapatos pero sin medias. Es importante destacar la postura que no es adecuada, pues decir que tiene los zapatos enchancletados supone que no los tiene bien puestos y que anda con ellos como si anduviera con chanquetas, esto es, semisuelos, sin acabar de calzarlos, salidos del talón.

Además se habla de su forma de caminar, con aires de liviandad, que en apariencia podría

tratarse de aires sueltos, o despreocupados. Sin embargo, revisando el sema en la RAE, se encuentra en la quinta acepción: “Dicho de una mujer: Informal y ligera en su relación con los hombres.” Y en una sexta “Lascivo, incontinente” que conjugados evidencian el carácter que el narrador le otorga a esta mujer que en su discurso habla de la libertad que le da el dinero que se gana trabajando de vivir sin depender de ningún hombre y poder gastarlo con amigas siendo feliz. La idea de su caminar evidencia que este discurso se equipara con el de una mujer ligera pero en relación con la masculinidad, es decir, una mujer de la vida alegre, una prostituta, que en el discurso de Don Andrés, se equipara a lo que Demóstenes entendía sobre su entorno:

Las calentinitas son peligrosas. Tienen un talle y garbete que ¡vamos! Y unos ojos y unas dentaduras. Y luego con esta libertad de costumbres que reina por acá, con facilidad para familiarizarse con las muchachas en fin, ya tú verás que si no te mantienes muy derecho en los estribos, muchos jóvenes en tus circunstancias que han venido a estas tierras se han visto cuando menos lo han pensado, metidos en unos berenjenales (Marroquín 2009: 22).

Para Zandra Pedraza (1999), el cuerpo, visto como hecho subjetivo y simbólico, permite comprender a través de los discursos las transformaciones de la mujer para comprensión de la modernidad. Y es así como Manuela representa la mujer rural que si bien no intenta preservar las normas corteses porque las desconoce, si acata de cierta forma los mandatos cristianos que le impiden por ejemplo acercarse demasiado a un hombre comprometido. Además, Manuela resulta ser transgresora desde el punto de vista del decir. Ella habla, dice lo que piensa y trata de actuar sin distinción de género, que frente a las normas de cortesía burguesas le impedirían entablar conversaciones al mismo nivel que sus compañeros.

Para el caso de Matea, las referencias muestran un salto a la liberalidad, un descontrol de la sexualidad. Matea es señalada como descocada, es decir, loca. Andar sola por ahí era sinónimo, para la época, (y aún hoy en algunos contextos) de desmesura e indisciplina. Ambas mujeres de pueblo, trabajadoras y con bellezas particulares que admiran propios y extranjeros, marcan los precedentes donde figuras femeninas del siglo XX empezarán a ser reivindicadas mediante la defensa del trabajo, la posibilidad de hablar y opinar en la lucha política y la reivindicación de sus derechos.

En síntesis, se puede decir que las marcas corporales halladas en cada uno de los relatos figurativizan la relación del cuerpo de las mujeres como espacio de reconocimiento propio y del otro, muestra que lo sensible atraviesa el discurso y permite establecer diferentes grados en la experiencia del “ser mujer”, que no se ajustan necesariamente al modelo conservador, y que señalan que en el siglo XIX existían precedentes de la pluralización que vivirá lo femenino en la Colombia contemporánea, relacionada con su participación en el mundo del trabajo, en la política y en la vivencia de su sexualidad.

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(Endnotes)

¹ El *cuadro de costumbres* es un subgénero propio de la literatura costumbrista en que se describen tipos populares y actitudes, comportamientos, valores y hábitos de una región.

MAROON SUBVERSIVE AESTHETIC: BASTING OF METAPHORICAL AFFECTIVE MEMORY

Marisol Cárdenas Oñate
National School of Anthropology and History, Mexico
marisolquito@hotmail.com

Abstract

La capacidad metafórica como traductora de semiosferas, lenguajes alternativos, fronteras simbólicas, posibilita la emergencia de conocimientos y sabidurías, afectividades, representaciones, corporeidades, desde la plasticidad creativa del proceso de traducción intersemiótica, intercultural e intersubjetiva.

Desde las propuestas de la Escuela de Tartu y de Iuri Lotman en especial, la dimensión simbólica en el sistema cultural se articula una ruta de categorías que son entretejidas con las teorías de la Interculturalidad Crítica, y la Decolonialidad del Ser, desde las epistemologías del Sur, donde se ubica la propuesta de las sabidurías del “corazonar” un diálogo que incorpora a la emoción como hilo invisible-visible de la espiral de semióticas en “juego”.

Así las dimensiones de la memoria y el olvido, que nuestros cuerpos argumentan en el paso etario de la vida, en diálogo con el género, raza, etnicidad, clase, configuran una matriz compleja de tensiones, contrapuntos y coalescencias en este tipo de semiosis compleja.

La importancia del concepto de memoria como mecanismo inteligente desde la propuesta lotmaniana de traducción intercultural, encuentra en el símbolo como elemento cultural dinámico esa posibilidad de innovación por su dimensión creativa. Es en este sentido que consideramos que la configuración metafórica simbólica del continuum gracias a su capacidad dialógica, nómada y políglota es una política de representación que teje este proceso de semiosis compleja, que las epistemologías y saberes cotidianos nos ofrecen.



Araña del cosmos manigua cartografías de nostalgias Caderona zigzaguea memorias en el territorio del Encaje guarida de siglos cimarones a Raíz
Marisol Cárdenas O.

Introduction

The metaphorical capacity as translator of alternative languages, symbolic boundaries, enabling the emergence of knowledge and wisdom, affectivity, representations, corporeality, from the creative process intersemiotic plasticity, intercultural and inter-translation.

Since the proposed School of Tartu and Yuri Lotman in particular the symbolic dimension in the cultural system route categories which are interwoven with theories of Intercultural Criticism, and Decoloniality. So the dimensions of memory and forgetting, our bodies argue that in the age pace of life in dialogue with gender, race, ethnicity, class, form a complex array of tensions, counterpoints and coalescence in such complex semiosis .

The importance of the concept of memory as intelligent mechanism from Lotman's proposal intercultural translation in the symbol as a dynamic cultural element that possibility for creative innovation dimension. It is in this sense that we consider the symbolic metaphorical continuum configuration with its dialogic, nomad, multilingual capability is a politics of representation that weaves this complex process of semiosis, that epistemologies and everyday knowledge. Both provide access to other types of language: poetic life that transcends artistic practices.

Many black cloth cut

The skin is a map of life where memories are checked, re-encounters, ruts, footprints. It is a space where it is hidden and makes visible, dressed-undressed, clean, discarded, moisturizes dry cure. We adopted this policy body metaphor weaving perspectives of gender, class, race and ethnicity to baste an exercise in ritual aesthetics, as I propose to call the forms of symbolic shift key-colonial, feminist criticism and intercultural border in the gap, fold, and lace the possibility of an insurgent metaphorical diaspora. Thus, from every day-sacred, public, private practices, *glocal*, *rurbanas* and others you walk towards the emergence of creative dialogues critical senses hegemonic through the wisdom of the diverse community subjects with their own knowledge, rituals, styles, struggles, poetic.

Historically our peoples or diasporic have withstood the ravages of modes of production and colonialism, global capitalist reproduction, through its own logic and rhetoric, wisdoms "other" memories of being, doing, feeling. Thus this project to create maps is assumed as a performative ethnographic representation policy that aims to meet and exchange forms of bodily knowledge, ways of life and remember childhood between African creative women from different places in

a comparative way. This explicit and visible rules, functions and values, memories and practices of life, daily work, from the body rather limited, symbolic territory has several dermis where it emerges desire, hope, spirituality, which brings creative energy and symbolic economy the object/subject material: “the doll”. This aesthetic ritual gesture walks to the complex sense of the signs, languages, visible and invisible, of various capacities, transmitted imaginary of Maroon women and Afro-Ecuadorian, Caribbean, African descent, among others, co-participating in the creation of a Community body map from various options of way, collective and personal movement, and always, at your own pace.

The history of the Diaspora between America and Africa, you have major about how they have developed on both continents maternity socio-affective dimension. On one hand, the conditions of poverty that have affected the African continent where women were the most disadvantaged in working conditions which has affected its economic and daily life, and secondly, the tearing of families from the slave era made these mothers could not raise their sons/daughters who were transferred to the new continent where they were sold, enslaved and later in servitude processes have continued to the present, with new faces. Recall that under that institution could not even raise their own children, were separated or adopted by other black women who helped raising the slave girls. Black women in America had to develop a series of tasks such as being *maternazgo*: lullabies mothers, surrogate mothers, nursing mothers, mother’s milk from a wide range of these practices which did not preclude exercise of violence, of all kinds.

Are multiple and complex socio-political conditions of production of these macro and micro-stories, over here I will refer mainly to the coloniality of being so far can be seen in some places of our continent where African descent. Women from different age their dimensions, develop unwanted maternity. In the Valle del Chota, we still see and adolescents taking very early motherhood and grandmothers exercise the role of mothers. Adult and reach an average of four or five children, assuming single parenting processes in economic poverty so many are dedicated to selling fruits and vegetables in markets, trucks, streets, difficult working conditions without warranties or institutional support.

This skin has long history and black “dolls” know. One way of representing the multifunctional work is “burden” they carry in their heads while behind “mark” carry, his little son which is tied with a shawl, practice corporal who was also represented in Stitches hands of women of this project and also the exercise of indigenous women. These are some of the circumstances still present policies of sexual and reproductive health still fall short of decolonize.



Little black doll, by Susana Pérez Bolaños (Colectivo Piel Canela, 2014).

In this vein, one of the symbolic dimensions from the circulation of this emotional logic that has emerged in this field work is the memory of lullabies, perhaps because the sound has been one of the voices of people of African descent alter-communication therefore requires no other accompaniment again, although sometimes it can be a rhythmic drum or a piece of orange. Recall also the beginning of the Diaspora, his vocal cords were the only thing that could not be stripped / as. In another province of Ecuador, Esmeraldas, for example, the art of lullabies, songs that way for different reasons and cycles of life, and in times like Christmas, they were singing in the streets and homes preserves all the “good night”.

In this context, we propose the hypothesis that working with cultural symbolic object from the metaphorical language and epistemology of intercultural translation interestética, intersemiotic and inter provides access to emotional argument otherwise since the metaphor speaks from the language of inconsciente_consciente, continuum that opens a gateway to other speak weaving the aesthetic link with the ritual from alternative production agencies, equitable, comprehensive, relational, referential sense.

Therefore the aim of this research is to propose a model of ethnographic study from what I have called ethnographic sculpture, a way of working life stories from everyday metaphorical space-time aesthetic and generate thread other type of stories life. Thus, we analyze the specific objectives main categories constituting an analytical path to apply to this type of research, in Ecuador, Latin America and worldwide, as well as illustrate and explain a couple of exercises to apply this type of object semiotic discourse as transdisciplinary practice, which activates the principles of ancient knowledge and the wisdom UBUNTU Community principle of good living from the existence in relationality, comprehensiveness, complementarity, correspondence, common principles of our ancestral cultures. From this wisdom of African peoples and Afro each individual there are only from the bond with others, present or absent, implicit or explicit, from different time-spaces, and always with permission from the ancestors.

It is therefore a way of exercising the right to one of the most important, the territory of creation, the imaginary, memory that allows the subject to create, think, act, forget, transform, discern, decide collective territories. So the main objective of this proposal is to show how discourses of emotion are survival strategies that have enabled our native or diasporic cultures resist, representing and represented, and above all, re-exist despite the current conditions complex as aforementioned.

Auto-ethnography Sculptures

Sculpting in cloth involves referring to time-space playful sensations, memories, emotions. Requires attention to the needle and thread, look to detail, gesture, rhythm generation, pause, respite. It is “seeing with new eyes”, a moving meditation, it involves each producer be in the present, attentive to the here and now of design, instruments, creating stitch precise production imaginal sketch of who you inspired, the other congener which is the mother, sister, grandmother, herself. It is also a way of exploring gender colored threads translating plastically the thickness and texture of his memoirs. This process of linking a body so with their ancestors, both as daughters, wives, saleswoman and other women in their daily work, and informal marketing.

Also so from the joint work between aesthetics and ethnography as creation, encased notion of art is discipline, to assume from the creative exercise that is transdisciplinary it empowers the wisdom of our people either from the apparent autonomy of institutional representation, or from practices inherited as folk art where these corporeality and corporalities in subversive stitch are located. That is why a practice of performance ethnography, which represents the symbolic body from its comprehensiveness, interrelatedness, complementarity, in partnership to be inter-being and inter-acting as subject and as a community. We therefore believe that taking

into account the agreed proposals Post-Colonial of knowledge that is to be, do and feel (Walsh 2007) it is possible to decentralize the border classic ethnography nomadic place, dialogic and critical moment called Anthropology of the Senses by a horizontal approach that focuses on the construction of narrative data with other languages and alte-native registers as the ritual object, visualities waste, co-tales, or any of the semiotic in crossing, Complexity and transdisciplinary.

For these reasons, this auto-ethnographic soft sculpture possible, since the relationship between some production of material culture and senses that generates trace a semantic field of production of integrated complex sense and link with the various levels of the cosmos, generating a map relational path that open with this pre-text. Thus, the narration of own child or other women who speak through it of “ventricular” mode: grandmothers, aunts, mothers, while they are developing their “doll” is a narrative process of community co-creativity caused by a metonymic aesthetic object. The emergence of a sign gives the possibility to generate multiple senses and weaving analogies with other women who contribute to the texture different colors, particular nuances mingled with hands adult woman today ideas with their experience notes, remembers, orders. The body and is explored in its differentiated corporeality, phenotype, the variance of clothing and other identity codes relate different sewn corporality. Thus their worldview is expressed, ways of being, feeling, living, working, living community, and placed in this “other” border, the Rio Mira, river bathing the area of about seventeen villages that make up the Chota valley in the province of Imbabura and extending to Tulcan, bordering Colombia.

This type of symbolic interaction produces a knowledge dialogue between Maroon women today seeking equidistant despite the difference in declarative sites which are involved in AFROESTETICA. It is therefore a place of mutual exchange of knowledge, from partnerships that are generated from the insurgency of tenderness, women telling stories of her childhood, singing, reciting, by silence, laughter, gestures. Thus, from the attention to listening vice versa, counterpoint, interface, you arrive at conditions of affection, of co-participation in, complicity, learning, alternative technologies in the production of a sculpture in clay, in cloth, or any other narrative as in the rag “other” aesthetic materiality. Afro-descendant cultures have their own expressions of the sensible. The aesthesis sensitivity is caused astonishment, the *kalos*: the invention. The popular and everyday creativity of our ancestral and native peoples who have always known remember is a human right exercised ancestrally.



Grandmother Black doll, Susana Pérez (Colectivo Piel Canela, 2014).

Popular, feminist, maroon: The metaphorical aesthetic

More than a comparison figure from the relationship of similarity between the meanings, metaphor is a way of thinking and feeling a “corazonar” present in many of the everyday languages that insurgency dominant epistemologies and “can contribute to the construction not only of a different academic and epistemic proposal, but above all other senses of existence” (Guerrero 2012: 102). Popular culture makes use of poetic metaphors in proverbs, jokes, puns, and other discursive practices, which of course also evident discrimination, inequality, racism, too. However, its paradoxical key depends on the political place from which this creative right is exercised. The metaphor can be another way to subvert the myopia of the “patriarchal glasses” treated by feminist studies from various positions and schools. She can provoke and persuade the task of equity from working with the subtle senses as political gesture, the associative creativity, emotion transforms and provides individual and collective life energy and generates social conditions of partnership and community co-production acts of ethical, aesthetic and erotic transformation, in turn enabling the development of public policies alternative social representation as reproductive health, emotional health, and spiritual (Cárdenas 2010).

The metaphorical sense then involves bodily experience models and pre-conceptual structures of feeling, where the sociocultural codes involved. Metaphors have historicity and do not work the same for all cultures. Some manage to overcome these limits and become inter- and transcultural. The metaphor is a type of mental representation, contains an imaginary scheme, which involves different levels of expertise around which the meaning is organized and thus creates realities “a metaphor can be a guide for future action [...] this in turn gives more power to the power of metaphor giving coherence to the experience. Understand, grasp how different is both known and invent” (Lakoff & Johnson 1983: 56).

Thus, the metaphorical capacity enables the emergence of knowledge and wisdom, affectivity, representations, corporeality. Hence, we place contemporary metaphor from this rhetoric plasticity. The metaphor is also homeless. To Rosi Braidotti, “nomadic subject is a polyglot because the language is not only, or even the means of communication; It is a place of symbolic exchange that binds us all/as in a tenuous web of meanings according to the context of use and action” (2000: 44).

Creativity configured to turn a post-visual critical subject, a visual polyglot or who knows how also rely symbols, signs, icons abductive way and resist boxed set in a vision, hegemonic, patriarchal. The identity of/the nomad is an emotional-rational map of the places in which he/she has already been or may be to experiment; and you can always reconstruct a posteriori, as a series of steps in a journey that may have their own analytical routes, so they can be works of rhetorical palimpsest, paradox, ellipsis between some of the most evidenced in this work with the *matérico* object. Therefore the *imagineras* dolls are nomads who return to the territory of childhood for *destejer*-weaving-off its symbolic stitches. The metaphor is well translator, polyglot nomadic memories from the most complex and sensitive languages. For some, this practice is a beautiful way to feel the skin, your skin, remember their relatives, thereby leaving talk to the bodies of women who shaped his childhood in different and own local aesthetic in link with its history and heritage.

This nomadic poetic or metaphorical policy generated wandering among the wristbands creative strategies displacement of signs and meanings, which will be useful for their purposes and according to the soul and body of the time of this meeting to work state. Only then emerges that constant and insurgent ability to desire, dream, imagine, which maintains the flow nomadic negotiation processes between them in this mobile bridge a sameness (subject) and otherness (society) creating affective-cognitive links. Creativity is thus an event without borders, where we use all forms of knowledge and wisdom.

In this context, we propose to nomadic metaphor as the main operation of this process of aesthetic maroon we have been outlining, by drawing on her, shifting meanings, practices, imaginary expressed in the visual field as a border constantly moving and exchange, symbolism generated empowering voice in their own nuances, shades, directories, his “musical patterns” nodal lines, knots, networks, their own writing.

Another dialogic sense axes could say they are the implicit and explicit relationship, memory and forgetting, what is said and say that our bodies argue in the age pace of life and form a complex matrix of tensions, counterpoints and coalescence in this type of crossing semiosis between aesthetics and genre whose reflection opens the way to work in the future projection of this type of mapping methodological proposal.

An example of this proposal is applied to the collective “Piel Canela” group of three adult women afro-ecuadorian, about of fourth and fifth decade of life, which are circumstantially joined other women, young or old, same who took the idea of “embrace his memoirs”, and other words braiding black women, color that is steeped in history of diasporic cultures, and now turns into aesthetic power to subvert the canons of beauty imposed by hegemonic models, heteronormative male white.

Susana Perez, Jobita Lara and Delgado Jenny Espinoza are three neighboring del Juncal, one of the many villages that configures the Chota Valley in the province of Imbabura, located in the north of Ecuador. Women are mothers engaged in household work and also strive to improve their economic situation through creative activities manual production, choice they share with other women of Afro-Ecuadorian people. This was a space from the colony, where he worked in the mining and agricultural production. Latter, an activity still devoted his people now becoming less profitable. For these conditions of exploitation, marginalization and poverty, Chota has a long history of migration to the east and Ecuadorian coast and abroad. Currently, he is known for being one of the places where the men’s national soccer players exported, generating another stereotype to it. Of course, now, children play with the ball.

Under these conditions, these women accepted the invitation to conduct the idea of developing black rag dolls, maintained by the sculptor Alice Trepp who offered some models made by Guatemalan and proposed to make their own version of *afrochoteñas* dolls express in their clothes the traditional way of taste women before, one that young and not always preserved to remember this ancient heritage. To this was added a gift of “Abayomi” project working with Afro-Brazilian women, the Mexican specialist and founding feminist folk art of this line of research at the university, Eli Bartra, shared with me in my education. The last bit is personal, my own experience of making wool dolls that Rogelia Montenegro, great aunt taught me in my childhood, and who dedicated the poem that introduces this text.

The first production was bought by the sculptor and then sites that may be interested in supporting this economy, work on which we all performing members was handled. Thus, this project lace weaves a double adjustment: in the words of women basting and the pursuit of moving these memories into other hands, other women (and men), age and ethnic diversity encountered in this Cultural metaphorical symbol pretext of identity, re-known to themselves and other women, healing stories, giving, play with feelings we left hidden in the sewing of children.

Black Dolls: a laboratory of metaphorical ellipsis child

The black leather wrist is the only isotope element of this metaphorical body, all other aspects vary according to the style of each creator, fabrics you have on hand, his creative desire and multiple factors. The conversation structure this way as subversive to questions about their experiences stitches tacked against the topic they embroider or sew from their own stories, comment sayings, proverbs, quotes to other subjects, including in-bending strategies discursive. That is

why this is a process of emotional relationships that are built into complicity and confidence. This means penetrates in the production of memories and regain the rights of the people of shared experience that creates wisdom.

Susy came to Juncal year old so she is considered “one more, an African woman” and no matter what your complexion is white-mestizo, knowing that culture takes more than skin deep. She is a mother and wife. She has very careful with their “dolls” with detail, bending, placing intense detail of every artifice of costume “everything in its place”. The hairstyle is perhaps one of their specialties. Remember how emotion and has previously kept women in their “chimbas” money from the commercial slaughter, one of the hairstyles types of African descent, others are “comb”, “the hair comb,” among others related in the video “Embracing memory.” Most dolls offer gesture work load on the head, stove, dishes, pottery where the goods transported, tomato boxes, the bus.



Little black dolls by Susana Pérez (Colectivo Piel Canela, 2014).

Jobita is a wife and mother and still have small children, so always walks between stitches rising to address them in turn to her elderly mother living with her. Is your home which has sheltered work is this group in the evenings. The room is a place where they meet between cardboard, cloth to engage and disengage these discourses of childhood. Her dolls are less retailers but its simplicity in drawing makes a special tenderness charge although occasionally bearing expressiveness of discomfort, perhaps because of the proximity to the children’s drawing, because with few stitches brings up a face, hands, afro hair. She prefers fabric scraps that remind fabrics worn by women in their daily work are at least dressed for the celebration, dancing or mass. Of course, this does not prevent carry jewelry and brightly colored necklaces, as we look at older women in the porches of their homes or those of their neighbors, daughters, or corner spend time watching the blue sky Valle.

Jenny is the youngest of the three members of the Piel Canela and is in charge of group economy. Have teenage daughters so sometimes they help you in this task. She represents twisted much looser, as young women now use it. Much he remembers his aunt, and pays tribute to

their buses rag, dressing them like I used to see it in its infancy. Thus, through material culture representation of childhood is evoked and a dialogue between adult woman now the girl before about the experience of femininities that were significant for the construction of identity today is generated. The doll is so discursive pretext of sociocultural and personal representation. We must also say that every large doll has a tape which is generally placed on the dress, where the name of each producer is expressed as a way of distinction authoring and creative recognition and also helps to make your accounts.

Thus, from this place of dialogic continuum, are woven stories of life, embracing good memories and forgetting pains to transform into a numinous object and well produced what we might call a “metaphorical cure” cathartic action that emerge to explain the word before silenced taboo subject, dusted deep desire that as the currencies in braids had been kept in his memoirs. Is already the translation is made from a place in the area of awareness of the adult woman yet this playful exercise that triggers the emotion and invisible-visible wire spiral senses “game” is allowed. After, each doll walks to traffic conditions through the sale of the same. That is why we speak of an object metaphorical aesthetic where explicit travels implied, listening to intuition, the pose to pose, the void to form, zigzag and again.



Up doll by Jenny Espinoza & down doll by Jobita Lara (Colectivo Piel Canela, 2014).

Conclusions

The development of ragdolls, especially afros, is a common tradition in many cultures and has also been usurped by capitalism to make them souvenirs, however, possibly because of its homemade, in most cases, even is an object that challenges arguments emotion. Faced with the choice of the wrist, data creation, creative exercises partnership with signs that evoke many passions.

There is a history of the development of black dolls in Quito, for example, groups such as Sugar have developed this production and sale of wood and cloth dolls, we also found some workshops of this kind in Belize where dolls are characters of legends, without But from the link with the ethnographic account, we believe constitutes a “new look” to explore as we focus on the emergence and study of a micro-life story of this very important stage in the life of every human

being and of course where women build gender patterns. Hence we place this proposal in the current discussion of transdisciplinary epistemologies from the dialogue continuum of community arts and visual anthropology open fields studying how out of focus to verbal language and incorporate other “talk” in contemporary ethnography narratives that address emotional argument.

We believe this method aims to make the objects of aesthetic culture everyday of our cultures originating a pre-text of dialogical participant observation, an alternative mode of subjective knowledge exchange community and thus open a debate about alternative modes of argumentation polyphonic including all directions and semiotic not only visible, but especially the “invisible” semiotic as inflectional, internally and subjective of actual cultural discourses.

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**MUSIC, THEATER AND
PERFORMANCE IN A
GLOBALISED WORLD:
A SEMIOTIC APPROACH**

THEATRICAL PERFORMATIVITY AND STAGE SIGNIFICATION – THE PERFORMANCE AS A THEATRICAL TEXT

Ivaylo Alexandroff, Ph.D
Free-lance Theatre Director,
Choreographer & Performer, Sofia, Bulgaria
alexandrov.ivaylo@gmail.com

Abstract

Through the manifestation of the concept of a sign we discuss the question of how the *meaning* and *significance* takes place in a theatre environment, as we analyze the process of *signification/communication* in a theatrical stage reality. This semiotic perspective helps us to develop the idea of a theatre performance as a *theatrical text* created by actor and space, and accepted by the audience. This text includes at its core two aspects of signification – *linguistic/non-linguistic* and *performative* (physical action), which actually stimulates the diversity of *signification* on stage. We explore the premise that as a text, as a semiotic construct of signs and sign formations, a theatrical performance is defined by a set of codes that are generally supra-theatrical cultural codes, and which are based on secondary sign systems of the performance – literature, music, art, mythology, religion, even the theatre itself as art. We indicate that the performative codes (sign systems) normally function simultaneously in a performance (paradigmatically) or linearly (syntagmatically), and thus they actively produce meaning [*signification*]. The signs that the viewer gets from variative sign systems on the stage are accepted under the principle of simultaneous contact, which themselves are in syntagmatic relation among themselves when producing *signification*. Quoting De Marinis 1993 [1982], and in the process of reasoning, also De Toro 1995, we classified the performative text as a *macrotext* or *text-of-the-text* produced by variative series of partial performative texts that in the context of the overall performance constitute unique expressive result, a compilatory product of speech, music, costumes, gestures, dance, body sculpturing, etc. Thus, we conclude that the elements of the general performative text interact and they are united in one sense that constructs the theatrical text as performative expression. Theatre semiotics as a general principle, and in particular the ideas of the Prague structuralists, helped us look at theatre performance from the perspective of an interaction be-

tween actors and space in their overall verbal/nonverbal communication. In view of our reasoning up to this point we finally confirm the position that the actor and stage space are fundamental components not only of the theatrical text but of the theatrical performativity as a whole.

Theatre semiotics (from Bogatyrev, Veltruský, Mukaržovský, Zich to State and Elam, from Pavis and Quinn to Fischer-Lichte, from De Marinis, Ruffini and De Toro to Alter, Ubersfeld and Aston/Savona) has long served a radical effort to generate the idea of the performance as a theatrical text, which strongly appears to be an innovative step forward in the debate on models of stage signification. It could be assumed that any expression from stage to audience overlaps with a theatrical sign equivalent, which is the direct result of a multivalence of sign systems on stage precisely as a complex sign semiosis: from visual to verbal, from the iconic to the symbolic, from the natural to the conventional (Veltruský 1976¹, De Marinis 1980, 1982², Pavis 1982³, Alter 1990⁴, Fischer-Lichte 1992⁵, De Toro 1995⁶, Quinn 1995⁷, Ubersfeld 1999⁸, Elam 2002⁹). The signification (Veltruský 1976)¹⁰ defines the dramatic figure as an aesthetic object (*stage figure*) on the stage (see: Mukařovský 1978)¹¹ and, in this context, especially Prague structuralists regarded the performance as a complex expressive platform. Otakar Zich in *Aesthetics of the Art of Drama* [1931, 1986]¹² and Jan Mukařovský in *An Attempt at a Structural Analysis of a Dramatic Figure* [1978]¹³ based some of their reasoning precisely on the semiotic nature of theatrical representation and communication. As Elam said in his study *The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama* (2002): “In 1930s the Prague School theatre theories radically changed the prospects for the scientific analysis of theatre and drama” and „laid the foundations for what is probably the richest corpus of theatrical and dramatic theory produced in modern times.”¹⁴

Building upon the quests of Prague structuralists, we could move forward and ascertain that the sign feature of a theatre performance has exhibited a certain dialectical nature, representing a *thing*, being a phenomenon embodying simultaneously a binary reality – a physical and an ideological one, i.e. representing signs of the signs, which is a fundamental element of the performative text.¹⁵ The whole stage signification, very much like the one in everyday life, is reduced

¹ Veltruský Jiří. 1976. Contribution to the Semiotics of Acting. In: Sound, Sign and Meaning. Ed. Vladislav Mateika. Ann Arbor: Department of Slavic Languages and Literature, University of Michigan Press, 553-605.

² De Marinis, Marco. 1980. Le spectacle come text. In: Sémiologie et theater. Lyon: Université de Lyon II, CERTEC, 195-258; Also cf.: De Marinis, Marco. 1993 (1982). The Semiotics of Performance. Trans. Aine O’Healy. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

³ Pavis, Patrice. 1982. Language of the Stage – Essays in the Semiology of the Theatre. New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications.

⁴ Alter, Jean. 1990. A Sociosemiotic Theory of Theatre. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

⁵ Fischer-Lichte, Erika. 1992 (1983). The Semiotics of Theater. Trans. Jeremy Gaines and Doris L Jones. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

⁶ De Toro, Fernando. 1995. Theatre Semiotics: Text and Staging in Modern Theatre. Trans. Mario Valdes. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.

⁷ Quinn, Michael. 1995. The Semiotic Stage. New York: Peter Lang.

⁸ Ubersfeld, Anne. 1999. Reading Theatre. Trans. Erank Collins, Eds. Paul Perron and Patrick Debbèche. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 97-119.

⁹ Elam, Keir. 2002. The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama. London and New York: Routledge.

¹⁰ Veltruský Jiří. 1976. Contribution to the Semiotics of Acting. In: Sound, Sign and Meaning. Ed. Vladislav Mateika. Ann Arbor: Department of Slavic Languages and Literature, University of Michigan Press, 553-605.

¹¹ Mukařovský, Jan. 1978. Structure, Sign and Functions. Selected Essays by J. Mukařovský. Eds. and trans. John Burbank and Peter Steiner. New York: Yale University Press.

¹² Zich, Otakar. 1986 (1931). Estetika dramatické umění (Aesthetics of Dramatic Art). Prague: Panorama.

¹³ Mukařovský, Jan. 1978. An Attempt at a Structural Analysis of a Dramatic Figure. In: Structure, Sign and Functions. Selected Essays by J. Mukařovský. Eds. and trans. John Burbank and Peter Steiner. New York: Yale University Press, 171 - 177.

¹⁴ Elam, Keir. 2002. The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama. London and New York: Routledge, 4.

¹⁵ Cf.: Bogatyrev, Peter. 1976 (1938). Semiotics in the Folk Theater. In: Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions. Eds. Ladislav Matejka and Irwin R. Titunik. The MIT Press, 31-38.

to verbal and non-verbal, formally unfolded in time and space.¹⁶ In an overt verbal communication on stage it is necessary to know how to encode and decode this stage language and how, most importantly, these complexes of aesthetic sign systems are formed in the performance. The entire performance, as a text, and as a semiotic construct of signs and sign formations, is defined precisely by a set of codes that are generally supra-theatrical cultural codes, on which the secondary sign systems of the show are based: literature, music, art, mythology, religion, even the theatre itself as a form of art. The performative codes (sign systems) in the show usually operate according to a simultaneous principle (paradigmatically) or linearly (syntagmatically), and thus they actively produce denotation [*signification*]¹⁷. The signs that the viewer gets from the varying sign systems on stage are perceived according to the principle of simultaneous contact, and they themselves are in a syntagmatic relation between themselves, producing *signification*. Quoting De Marinis, we could categorize the performative text as a *macrotext* or a *text-of-the-text*¹⁸ produced by varying series of partial performative texts, that in the context of the overall performance constitute the unique expressive result, a compilatory product of speech, music, costumes, gestures, dance, body movements and more. De Toro, too, based on the thesis of De Marinis, found that these texts (the elements of the general performative text) are constituted and presented in a generalized sense:

/.../ a) the special or *performance context* that consist of the *conditions* of production and reception of the PT [*performance text* – emphasis mine] /.../ b) the general or *cultural context* that is made up of the ensemble of cultural text, whether they be from the theatre (mime, scenografical, dramaturgical, etc.), or from outside theatre (from literature, pictographic, rhetorical, philosophical, etc.) and these belong to the synchrony of the PT. That is, they are socio-cultural surroundings of the PT. In fact, these texts are *intertexts*. Also, both the theatre texts and extra-theatre texts form the *general cultural text* (GCT). The articulation of these two contexts is fundamental in understanding every PT, for in the first case (*performance text*), the elements for understanding the PT are provided *in situ*, and in the second case (*cultural text*), the referents of this text are inserted into the GCT. Any analysis of performance should necessarily consider both contexts if it is to be competent (De Marinis 1980). It is only in the PT that both contexts are found, for in the DT (*dramatic text* – emphasis mine) the performance context is absent as performance, as enunciative situation and as production of this situaton. (author's emphasis)¹⁹

In theatrical conditions, the creation of a comprehensive body of the theatrical text requires generation of a sense applicable to the general body of the show and consisting of the individual elements of this text. Again this is linked to the competence of the viewer, but here the process is also subject to the viewer's belonging to a cultural community. For a conservative audience, representative of European cultural type, a performance of Theatre Noh, built as text in the eastern

¹⁶ Cf.: Jakobson, Roman. 1987. *Language of Literature*. Eds. Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 469–472.

¹⁷ Cf.: De Toro, Fernando. 1995. *Theatre Semiotics: Text and Staging in Modern Theatre*. Trans. Mario Valdes. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 52.

¹⁸ Cf.: De Marinis, Marco. 2004 (1993). *The Performance Text*. In: *The Performance Studies Reader*. Ed. Henry Bial. London-New York: Routledge, 232. Also cf.: De Marinis, Marco. 1993. *The Semiotics of Performance*. Trans. Aine O'Healy. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 224–244.

¹⁹ De Toro, Fernando. 1995. *Theatre Semiotics: Text and Staging in Modern Theatre*. Trans. Mario Valdes. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 53.

cultural traditions, is incomprehensible, to say the least. In order to transform the show into a conceptual text, it is necessary the coding system of the cultural environment to be adequate to that of the viewers, i.e. to be built on the grounds of a conceptually common language. The problem of language as a verbal tool is especially painful in a theatrical reality and especially so, of course, in situations when the verbal strongly dominates the visual expression. But in any case, a unity of the language construct in the depiction and perception of a performance is necessary in the process of decoding a theatrical *metalanguage*, as Pavis puts it:

The status of the language used in the description of the performance is highly problematic; we might define it as metalanguage, but this metalanguage either employs a linguistic discourse or on the contrary is articulated by means of an independent system of units. There, too, only a *semiotics* (in a sense used by Greimas) would be capable of visually representing the theatre object described, of giving a symbolic notation to it, i.e., a notation which “uses in the conventional graphics (geometrical figures, letters, abbreviations, initials, etc.) a set of symbols” and “is used in the visual representation of constitutive units of a metalanguage” (Greimas 1979:257) No metalanguage of this type has ever existed for theatre: this can easily be explained by the diversity of meaning systems in performance and the impossibility of homogenizing them into one sole notation. Thus we have to return to a semiology which attempts at best to combine iconic notation and symbolic notation, to assume the presupposition of its critical discourse and to match its theory to the particular performance. Consequently, one should not detach the metalanguage from the analyzed object, but should seek its traces or suggestions within the performance itself.²⁰

Perceiving the overall performativity of the show, viewers respond to auditory and visual objects that refer the meaning of what is shown into their minds and in the process of perceiving these objects they are separated into simultaneous and consecutive ones. Here we can get back to Jakobson, assuming that „a complex visual sign involves a series of simultaneous constituents, while a complex auditory sign, as a rule, of serial successive constituents”²¹. Jakobson starts from the assumption that the auditory environment (sign) within speech (in our case, stage speech) is, generally speaking, polyphonic and is constructed and perceived as a complex set of „phonemes, simultaneous bundles of distinctive features”²² that is characterized by its spatial and temporal signifiers²³. Presentation of the speech is „conceptualized by the speaker which implies no time sequence; the message as a whole may be simultaneously presenting the mind of the speaker, [...] the performance itself, [which includes] two faces – production and audition” and “the stage of comprehension, where the sequence appears to be changed into a concurrence”²⁴. Here we can conclude that this simultaneousness of the perception confers to stage speech both temporal and spatial nature, which could be extended also to gestures and spatial forms in the context of their communicative and aesthetic theatrical features. Of course, the theory of Jakobson does not consider specifically the theatre performance, but rather – literary works, nevertheless it is a perfect example of how we can regulate speech (actor’s speech) as part of a

²⁰ Pavis, Patrice. 1982. *Language of the Stage – Essays in the Semiology of the Theatre*. New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 114.

²¹ Jakobson, Roman. 1987. *Language of Literature*. Eds. Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 469.

²² *Ibid.*: 469.

²³ *Ibid.*: 471.

²⁴ *Ibid.*: 472.

theatrical text. Here we can define the theatrical text as „composed in the language of theatre”²⁵, and this language being „characterized in particular by the fact that it cannot be reduced to one smallest homogeneous unit, but is instead comprised of heterogeneous sign system” that “cannot all be divided up into their smallest elements of signification”²⁶ and in this context, let’s emphasize again that the performance as a text is composed of different signs and sign systems having pronounced spatial and temporal environments that form and maintain specific theatrical language. This text is interpreted through two main components of the show: the actor and the stage area (which in more detail will be discussed in the next two chapters), and they are the only ones that could represent the other sign systems, too. One such interpretation is in many ways not only verbal (linguistic), but also non-verbal (actor’s physicality and gestures, architecture of space, sound and light environment), i.e. this universality of the performative text allows for each viewer, irrespective of his/her linguistic expertise, to “read” it to a great extent basing on precisely the interaction or the tension, if we have to refer to Ubersfeld, between the dramaturgical and performative text:

The shaping of space by physical movements and by *phone* (author’s emphasis) can be determined or informed by a reading of textual structure, but those physical movements can also have a history, a precedence against which textual structures (syntactic, for example) might be applied (or not). Physical, gestural activity (mime or other) can construct, finally. A space that develops in a parallel or indeed even opposite direction to that which might arise from the imaginary of the text.²⁷

The actual representation of meaning in the theatrical space is the result of understanding (on the part of the viewer) of this performative text as being read by the actor’s interpretation into the space of the stage (via gestures/visually) and it is in theatre performance itself, that „establishing the ‘I am here in the space’ is achieved both by verbal and gestural deixis. In speaking the dialogue, the actor is also using the body to point to her/his relations to the on-stage dramatic world, her/his action within it.”²⁸ The text of the show could be seen as a complex product, that is: one constructed of multiple sign carriers: written text, pictures, images, material objects, sounds, the actors themselves and the stage space. Again, each of these components turns out to be a kind of intermediary between two or more signs from one or multiple sign systems where the communication between them creates the main language of the show as a text. The very heterogeneous nature of theatrical signs allows for the creation of such a multimedia environment in which signs from one sign system, correspond and are re-transmitted to another sign system, and this could be done via one or more sign intermediaries. In a tangible stage sign system, such as the stage architecture, for example, purely linguistic signs could emerge and they could be transmitted through sounds or corporeality (other sign systems) forming the text of the show in its uniqueness (the wood or the stone of the stage can move, dance, talk, make sounds, sing). In such a case, the primary meaning of the theatrical text is generated by the mediation of the individual components of different sign systems, turning it into a general intermediary between

²⁵ Fischer-Lichte, Erika. 1992 (1983). *The Semiotics of Theater*. Trans. Jeremy Gaines and Doris L Jones. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 181.

²⁶ *Ibid.* Loc. cit: 181.

²⁷ Ubersfeld, Anne. 1999. *Reading Theatre*. Trans. Erank Collins. Eds. Paul Perron and Patrick Debbèche. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 112.

²⁸ Aston, Elaine and Savona George. 1991. *Theatre as Sign – System*. London: Routledge, 116.

the significance meant by the creator/s and the meaning as perceived by the viewer. Each sign component can be manifested as an essential and generative medium in different semantic constructs of the theatrical text as long as it serves, to a sufficient level, to the performance's general significance, and the latter, of course, depends on the personal choice, forming and combination of signs and sign systems because „there is a sense in which signs, or certain kinds of signs, or signs in a certain stage of their life cycle, achieve their vitality – and in turn the vitality of theatre – not simply by signifying the world by being *of it*.”²⁹ When for example a creator of a performance chooses to embody the collapse of an entire world through Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* and the destruction of the stage architecture in the literal sense, the transfer of the information volume needed for the artist-audience communication is the result of a private choice in the forming and combining signs and sign systems, i.e. the performance as a text is the result of a personal choice. It could be noted that this personal choice of meaning (*signifier*) corresponds to what is decoded by the viewers, but again it is linked to their intellectual capacity (which was the subject of discussion in the previous chapter). The predominantly personal approach to signifying and decoding a performative text is typical for most modern performances.³⁰ The meaning of a performative text decoded on the basis of an internal field of signification (personal choice) is always dependent on its elements, each of which is determined by the other elements of the system of that text in a completely non-formal dependence on all preliminary circumstances forming and generating the general meaning. And here again we must emphasize that the construction of a performative text engages multiple heterogeneous signs (codes) and a huge range of different sign systems, which is pointed out by De Toro:

The theatre performance is textualized in that a series of common codes function on-stage and thus are disseminated in various *performances as text* (author's emphasis). The particular nature of the PT (performance text – emphasis mine) resides in the fact that, when compared to other dimensions of theatre, there is a heterogeneity of codes, a complexity over and above the dual absence of the performance object: “a first time as ‘scientific’ object ... and a second time as material, ‘pre-scientific’ object.”³¹

In the course of the regulation of the coding system of a performative text and starting from its particular nature, he adequately defines it as a multiplicity of codes (*pluricoded*):

The heterogeneity of codes does not simply mean a plurality of codes or the simultaneous presence of diverse codes of sub codes. A clarification is needed here on what is meant by code, for there are various ways of defining the term code – at least five, according to Eliseo Veron: a) code as synonym of *la langue*, that is, as an ensemble of rules necessary for producing the message or speech (generally, the following equivalences are made: code-*la langue*, message-speech, at least from a linguistic perspective); b) in the area of theory of

²⁹ States O., Bert. 1985 (1929). *Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theater*. University of California Press, 20.

³⁰ Helbo, A. 1982. *Actes du colloque Sémiologie du Spectacle*. Degrés 29, Modèles théoriques, 1-9. In: Fischer-Lichte 1992 (1983). *Op. cit.*: 179.

³¹ De Toro, Fernando. 1995. *Theatre Semiotics: Text and Staging in Modern Theatre*. Trans. Mario Valdes. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 52. Also cf.: De Marinis, Marco. 1980. “Le spectacle come text”. In: *Sémiologie et theater*. Lyon: Université de Lyon II, CERTEC, 202.

information, code designates the ensemble of transformation that make it possible to pass from one system of signs (for example, morse) to another (*la langue*); c) as a synonym of 'ensemble' of '*contraintes*' that defines the nature of the signifier of a given system; d) In the area of semiotics, it is a repertoire of units (signs) common to the users and that is used for communication; e) finally, code can refer to a social practice, that is, the ensemble of institutional norms that make up the way social system functions. (Eco 1976, 1979:49-50) Code as used here has three meanings: it is a social code, the ensemble of rules or the repertoire of signs. At the basis of these different ideas, however, there is a common fundamental element: a code is invariable a group of rules that regulate a message, whether this be linguistic or of some other nature (gesticular, musical, etc.). Whereas verbal text is monocoded, the performance text is pluricoded, not only because it includes various types of codes, but also because it has substances of expression (visual, gesticular, auditive). The theatre performance, however, is characterized as being pluricoded. (author's emphasis)³²

The perception of the show as a theatrical text or a performative text is undoubtedly related to the presence of a specific theatrical code that acts as a regulator relating to the production and presentation of meaning and significance in the stage-audience vector. Such a code may be the actor's physicality, a stage gesture, sets and costumes, vocal or musical score. In the tradition of Noh Theatre, Kabuki, Kathakali, and the Beijing Opera gestures and bodily expressiveness of the actor form up the main concept of this theatrical code. In the tradition of the Brecht's theatre, the so-called *songs* (vocal motifs that are complementary and regulate the general context of the stage action) can be seen as a fundamental conceptual code in the perception of meaning. In the tradition of ancient drama and liturgical or semi-liturgical drama of the Middle Ages, the appearance of the deity as *Deus ex machina* ("God from the Machine")³³ as well as the acting out of familiar mythological or biblical motifs becomes not only a visual but also a specific linguistic code. Such examples could be enumerated in abundance, but more important is to note that each specific theatrical code, regardless of the signs and their combination is influenced to an exceptional degree by its attitude to supra-theatrical cultural codes, on which the dominant cultural system is based. Such a principle of interaction and dependence affects every theatre environment, whether it refers to a psychological and realistic or to a non-realistic and avant-garde performance, while in essence it could be "the vehicle that generates the aesthetic object as a dynamic image in the minds of the perceiving audience."³⁴ A similar view is based on the idea

³² De Toro 1995. Op. cit.: 52. Also cf.: Eco, Umberto. (1976) 1979. *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 49-50.

³³ *Deus ex machina* (Gr. ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός) is a Latin expression that means "god from the machine." A plot feature of the Greek (Roman) drama in which a seemingly hopeless situation is settled suddenly and timely, by the intervention or by the unexpected physical appearance of a divine character, who descends onto the stage with the help of a mechanical device, crane (mekhane). The phrase is rather a transliteration relating to ancient physical methods of mechanical stage manipulation. The phrase entered in the Latin language (and from there – into the main European languages) by the Roman poet Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus, 65 BC - 8 BC), who in his treatise "Ars Poetica" advises poets never to resort to this conventional principle of Greek tragedy when they construct and solve the denouement of their story. In general, *Deus ex machina* is an unwelcome feature of the dramaturgic technique and is often associated with a lack of creativity on the part of the authors. However, we cannot deny the fact that through *Deus ex machina* ancient authors managed to strengthen the impact and significance of myths that underlie their works, where gods and symbols play a key role. Renowned for his preference for the use of the "god from the machine" technique in his work is one of the greatest ancient Greek tragedians Euripides (Εὐριπίδης, 480 BC – 406 BC), due to which, however, he was criticized by his contemporaries.

³⁴ Quinn, Michael. 1989. *The Prague School Concept of the Stage Figure*. In: *The Semiotic Bridge: Trends from California*. Eds. Irmengard Rauch and Gerald F. Carr. Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 76.

that both the actor and the spectator are in the single dimension of a common primary cultural system that dominates the overall theatrical text. A scenographic decision within the necessary style or costumes with their characteristics can refer to a certain milieu, age, social class, event (and, respectively, the type of theatrical convention). The situation is similar to the language or dramatic text that would transmit the meaning only if the given stage relation successfully refers to the respective cultural system (code), because “in the theatre, a focusing of codes is the norm; there is usually hierarchy of signs systems that triggers the elimination or temporary domination of a given system.”³⁵ Different primary cultural systems in the mimesis of the show – language, voice expression, facial expression, gesture, type of movement, makeup, costumes, interior design and overall production design are structural elements defining the aesthetics of each supra-textual cultural code within the performative text and are an integral part of the creating and referencing of the meaning and significance, as: “in semiotic terms, the signs of that system can be defined as all fictional vision of a world, that is, all vision of world communicated in fiction/.../the association between signifier and signified is provided by the special code (*hiper or extra-code* – emphasis mine) of the system of world vision.”³⁶ Hence, the corresponding viewers’ competence allows for shifting the significance and the meaning from the stage to the audience hall, based on the general ability to transfer the relevant significance, as constructed from the elements of the respective performative text where “the impact of the cultural performances depends, of course, on the expectations of individual spectators” and “the exact mechanism by which referentiality, theatrical *performance*, and cultural *performance* interact in a given performance depends on many factors: condition of the production, intention of producers, composition of performers, disposition of audiences, evolution of culture, and social pressures.”³⁷ Similar viewing angle to the dominant cultural system is in the very foundation of any theatrical convention, including the contemporary ones. We should note that in the context of the show, as a performative text, the above supra-theatrical cultural codes can correlate to any secondary cultural system as literature, art, music, film, myth, religion, and many more. And if in this context we again go back to De Marinis, we can emphasize that the performative code „*is that convention which, in the performance, makes it possible to link determined contents to determined elements of one or more expressive system* (author’s emphasis)”³⁸ while, apart from the theatre performance, we can find a similar code also in different artistic practices of everyday life. But what makes the theatre performance truly unique is the use of this theatre code as part of the *general cultural text* (De Toro 1995)³⁹ within the theatrical text, in strictly specific ways, as well as the pure substitution and perceptibility of codes, whether linguistic, proxemic, visual, etc., but – namely as codes that belong to a particular dominant cultural environment of the performative text. For the performative text appears to be a discursive construct precisely in the relation between the performance itself and the specific culture system (code), where „*the performance code are the result of the usage, more or less particular and specific, in the performance, of non-specific cultural codes...* The distance between an *extra-performance code* (as we will call the cultural code before its use in the performance – for example a code of an everyday gesture) and the *performance code* the gestures of the actor in a performance) varies notably according to performances, ‘genres’, authors, periods, etc.”⁴⁰ and is reflected in the audience’s perception, as performative code,

³⁵ Issacharoff, Michael. 1989. *Discourse as Performance*. Stanford University Press, 104.

³⁶ *Ibid.*: 130.

³⁷ Alter, Jean. 1990. *A Sociosemiotic Theory of Theatre*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 79.

³⁸ De Marinis, Marco. 1980. *Le spectacle come text*. In: *Sémiologie et theater*. Lyon: Université de Lyon II, CERTEC, 215.

In: De Toro, Fernando. 1995. *Op. cit.*: 53.

³⁹ De Toro, Fernando. 1995. *Theatre Semiotics: Text and Staging in Modern Theatre*. Trans. Mario Valdes. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.

⁴⁰ De Marinis, Marco. 1980. *Le spectacle come text*. In: *Sémiologie et theater*. Lyon: Université de Lyon II, CERTEC, 224.

namely when cultural and supra-performative codes are configured in a performative entirety. The whole modern theatrical situation is based on the relation between theatre (in general) and performance (as a performative text), which imposes the idea that theatre, at its core, is solely the show that is being presented, while the performative text „*is a performance unit which the analyst's intention (or the intention of the ordinary audience member) designates as semiotically complete.*” (author's emphasis)⁴¹

In: De Toro, Fernando. 1995. Op. cit.: 53.

⁴¹ De Marinis, Marco. 2004 (1993). The Performance Text. In: The Performance Studies Reader. Ed. Henry Bial. London-New York: Routledge, 232. Also cf.: De Marinis, Marco. 1993. The Semiotics of Performance. Trans. by Aine O'Healy. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 244.

PLAY AS THE LIMINAL PERFORMATIVE MODALITY OF EXISTENCE. THE ORIGIN OF 'FLIGHTS OF FANCY' ACCORDING TO HENRI LABORIT

Simon Levesque
Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada
levesque.sim@gmail.com

Abstract

The object of this paper is to demonstrate that our understanding of play can be valuably enlightened by taking in account its biological determinations. Researches in the field of communication acknowledge for animals as well as for human beings the capacity to play, and consider the playful activity as a form of metacommunication that preceded the emergence of verbal language in the course of evolution. This hypothesis cannot be verified, but remains likely. Other hypotheses coexist regarding the role of play in learning processes and sociability, but I am not to be their proponent here. It is to the sphere of play in human beings interactions and its relations to the imaginary that I wish to restrain my remarks. In this field, French neurosurgeon, biologist and philosopher Henri Laborit (1914–1995) proved his genius by having initiated and defended throughout his life a unified theory based on the medical and behavioural principle of the inhibition of action; a principle, as he explains, by which emerged, in the human species, an important disposition, that is, concomitant to the development of symbolic language, being liable to *flights of fancy*, to escape in the realm of imagination, of built abstraction. And it is this flight that enables play – the liminal performative modality of existence. Since Laborit remains almost unknown outside of the *francophonie*, I wish to get his thoughts the attention deserved, especially *vis-à-vis* the fields of contemporary biosemiotics and performance studies.

Play encompasses a very wide range of phenomena. A practical way to deal with the ambiguity of play is to apprehend it by its rhetorics – the diverse way it is talked about. It is this method the play theorist Brian Sutton-Smith chose to put forward in his 1997 book *The Ambiguity of Play*. Sutton-Smith identified seven rhetorics of play: play as progress, play as fate, play as power, play as identity, play as the imaginary, play of the self, and play as a frivolous activity. Here is

not the place to elaborate on each of these specifically; suffice to say that the main principle underlying these rhetorics, as Sutton-Smith develops them, is that none can be isolated and they altogether form an indefinite web of thoughts, prejudices, theories and knowledge beholding any possible version of play we can imagine and/or practice. I shall focus mainly on the rhetoric of *play as the imaginary* for the matter of this discussion, and on the relations connecting play, performance and language together.

The rhetoric of play as the imaginary rely on all sorts of games (whether spontaneous or organized) that favour idealization and stimulate the imaginative abilities, conceptual flexibility and the creation of ludic spaces within human culture as well as, to a certain extent, in the animal kingdom. Any abstract construction, whether it be narrative, logical or aesthetic, rely on this specific rhetoric; and the same applies for the competences required for their appreciation. But what exactly are these required competences, and how do they affect our attitude toward play? By putting forward the works of Henri Laborit, I shall try to establish some clear principles regarding the biological determinations of play as the imaginary.

A biosemiotic approach to play

It is an argument that aims to favour an appreciation of the biological dispositions of play that I wish to develop. This wish of mine to think of a phenomenon that is largely conceived as cultural within a deterministic grid and a biological schema must not be erroneously perceived. In no way is my goal driven by a radical reductionist paradigm, nor do I want to limit my comprehension of such a complex phenomenon within the interpretative frame of biology. Put simply, what has long been for me a persistent intuition now appears to point in that same direction where Thomas Sebeok knew how to pursue its assumed conviction. About his seminal works by which his unique and original contribution to the field of semiotics is largely recognized today – let us name here *Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs* (1976), *The Sign & Its Masters* (1979) and *The Play of Musement* (1981) —, Sebeok wrote: “The pivotal motive pervading the Argument of this entire trilogy and interfused throughout all of these papers is my absolute conviction that semiotics begins and ends with biology and that the sign science and the life science ineluctably imply each other.” (Sebeok 1981: 4). Such a conviction, rather easily defensible, can be verified in the double principle of coding and control that governs life, macrocosmically as well as microcosmically. If we think of the mind (and thoughts) as the manifestation of the information encoded by our physical brain, then we ought to recognize for signs too, which are no more material than our thoughts, the necessity of a material support for them to become actual. Thus, Sebeok writes, “Signs pervade all of life as the encoded information that directs those ordered activities so that life continues.” (1981: 13). This model is in many ways similar to the one Laborit defended throughout his works, which he called, in a cybernetic fashion, “information-structure”, notably in the first chapter of *La nouvelle grille* initially published in 1974.

The heritage of Henri Laborit

It is to the French medical doctor, surgeon and neurobiologist Henri Laborit (1914–1995) that I will borrow a fair part of my line of argument for the matter of this discussion. Since Laborit remains almost unknown outside of the *francophonie*, I wish to get his thoughts the attention deserved, especially *vis-à-vis* the fields of contemporary biosemiotics and performance studies, where his ideas could be regarded as precursory. The heritage of Laborit let us see him as one of the foremost figure of the vast philosophical and scientific enterprise initiated in the course of the 20th century at the crossing of the disciplines of the living and the comprehension of cell intelligence – biology, biochemistry and neurology, as well as ethology, behavioural psychology, cybernetics and semiotics, among others. Laborit described himself as a « eutonologist »,

eutonology referring to the study of tonus regulation in all biological functions (formed of *eu-tonos*, ‘normal tone’, ‘biological equilibrium’; and *logos*, ‘law’, ‘science’). In 1958, Laborit founded the self-financed (through money obtained from patented molecules) Laboratoire d’eutonologie (CEPEBPE) at the Boucicaut hospital (Paris, 15^e) and directed it until his death in 1995. At the same time, he acts as chief editor for the scientific journal *Agressologie* (1958-1983), which he also founded. In the following, I shall explain some of the most important ideas Laborit put forward throughout his life, ideas that are profitable for the purpose of the present discussion.

If we traditionally consider the absence of a central nervous system as the reason why plants entirely depend on their ecological niche, animals, on the contrary, and more specifically human individuals, for what concerns us, are characterized by the necessity to act upon their environment to favour homeostasis (or the stability of their organism). Behavioural biology and neurophysiology have demonstrated that an individual’s general pattern of action is oriented in function of its research for gratification. One’s behaviour is driven by what is called in neuropsychology “mnemonic artefacts” (or engrams); these artefacts are as many cyphered biological traces of one’s passed experience inscribed in his limbic system – the system that dominates affectivity and plays a predominant role in the establishment of the long-term memory. Since we know the importance *habitude* has in Charles S. Peirce’s theories of interpretation, we can only recognize the pertinence of conjoining semiotics and biology, for the latter indicates that it is effectively the long-term memory that allows the repetition of pleasant experiences and the flight from, or avoidance of, the unpleasant ones in the process of interpreting the environment – a process that serves for all practical purposes the stability of the organism.

Yet, as soon as 1970, Laborit formulates what he calls “the environmental paradox of the contemporary man”. In *La nouvelle grille*, he writes:

The yoke of prohibitions, hierarchies, and social structures, inhibiting any gratifying activity, is never as heavy as in our actual industrialized countries’ urban societies, because flight is impossible. That is probably why it is within those societies, governed by the sole notion of production, where man is nothing but a machine that produces merchandises, that aggressiveness and violence, gratuitous in appearances, are most frequently observed. (1986a: 76)¹

Indeed, on a macrospecific scale, mutual avoidance – a primitive behavioural reflex that can be observed in practically all animal species – is proscribed by the nature of the social contract that links us, civilized humans, nowadays. If anxiety essentially results of the impossibility for one to realize a gratifying behaviour (to flee or avoid an unpleasant experience), the simplest reaction to discharge that anxiety seems to adopt an aggressive attitude (Delgado 1967) – that is, after all, what most mammals do. Thus, we must acknowledge that what seems to be peculiar to human beings, what fundamentally distinguishes us from all other animal species, is our ability to *flee in the imaginary*, into the realm of imagination, rather than systematically show aggressiveness (Laborit 1970; 1995). This imaginary presents itself under an indefinite variety of forms, some fleeting, other lasting; they all contribute to play, but the lasting ones in particular support and ceaselessly erect higher and higher the narrative building our History relies on – comprising all the narratives that constitute it, whether they be documentary or fictional. The most ephemeral of these forms are expressed by spontaneous child play: without any prior rules, they live

¹ I translate from the French all quotations from Laborit, including this one.

and die and leave no traces but those consigned by personal experience.

Now, let's see how this flight in the imaginary works, by which means we can say that it is indeed peculiar to the human species and, finally, what is its influence on our games.

The inhibition of action

A rat placed in a cage and subjected regularly everyday over a short period of time to electrical discharges that cannot be avoided will soon develop the reflex to inhibit itself: because it knows it cannot avoid this torture, the rat will not try any action (fight or flight), but rather wait for this bad treatment to end. "When action is impossible, Laborit writes, *the inhibition of action* still allows to survive. Because it evades destruction, the entropic levelling with the environment." (1986b: 1) But this inhibition – and the "psychosocial stress" that causes it – does not allow the organism to evacuate the effects of the unhealthy violence imposed by the environment. Thus, inhibition can be considered at the origin of diverse pathologies, of which signs appear progressively in the individual: "...we cannot find lesions due to a direct action of an aggressive agent. The lesions will often appear over a more or less long period of time and will be secondary to the reaction." (ibid: 21) It is in this sense, Laborit suggests, "that 'disease' in all its forms can be considered as a lesser evil, as a delay given to the organism before its disappearance." (ibid: 1)

Now, let us consider this second experiment. Two rats placed in the same cage, subjected to the same treatment previously described, rather than inhibiting themselves, will fight and, as soon as the electrical discharges stop, will cease fighting. The stress induced can therefore be evacuated in time for the rats to avoid any internal lesions in the long term. We can see in this laboratory experiment the birth, in short, of our modern tournaments and competitions, which for all purposes canalize aggressiveness in a cathartic fashion. The general oppression undergone in consequence of a maladaptation to the environment, or unhealthy social pressures, precipitates the action, and through it the research for gratification that maintains homeostasis. And so, play could be seen as a sort of "reaching out", or a "grasp" attempted by the organism to cope with undue pressures coming in from its environment. Put simply: the organism reacts to external constraints in order to maintain its integrity. Action is realized within space, or spaces, Laborit reminds us.

However, if the same space is occupied by other individuals who are also in search for gratification with the same objects and the same beings, it will result in the immediate establishment, by struggle, of hierarchies. On the top of the hierarchy, the dominant one who can gratify himself will be non-violent, tolerant and in biological equilibrium, at least as long as his dominance is not contested and once the period of the establishment of its dominance is through. The dominated ones on the contrary, by activating their system of inhibition of action, which is their only mean to avoid punishment, will experience anxiety. (ibid: 173)

The first disposition to consider, thus, is not one that is strictly speaking inherent to play, but one that rather relies on the relationship organisms endowed with a central nervous system can maintain with their environment: those, to which we unquestionably belong, are disposed to play (in its primitive and aggressive forms at first, for sure, but these primitive forms lead to an open space of possibilities) – play is at their disposition and, seizing it, they regulate themselves. But is fighting a game? Yes, because there are rules.

Play, imagination, fiction: the flight and the frame

Because play imposes a set of rules distinct from those imposed by the sociological reality, and because play imposes borders, delimiting and defining it, to enter into play (*in-lusio*, illusion) is a flight from reality, a flight into the sphere of the imaginary. As Roger Caillois wrote in *Man, Play and Games*: “All play presupposes the temporary acceptance, if not of an illusion [...], then at least of a closed conventional, and, in certain respects, imaginary universe.” (2001: 19) In play, “fiction, the sentiment of *as if*, replaces and performs the same function as do rules.” (ibid: 8) Thus we are led to recognize the second disposition of importance, inherent to play this one: play imposes, for the apprehension of reality, *a specifically fictional modality*. This frame of apprehension can be adopted consciously, unconsciously, or nesciently. The flight outside of reality or, to be more precise, the flight into a reframe taking place within reality, the involvement in play, is motivated by the fact that play is structured, unlike the frame fled, “by precise, arbitrary, unexceptionable rules that must be accepted as such.” (ibid: 7) Indeed, Johan Huizinga writes: “No scepticism is possible where the rules of a game are concerned, for the principle underlying them is an unshakable truth.” (1950: 11) Nevertheless, many games do not imply objective, or previously fixed rules. We need only think about child spontaneous pretend-play, or animal play (although in the latter case we can wonder if the rules are not merely inaccessible to us). In some particular cases, we are led to believe that fiction alone imperiously stands for the rule. Caillois is categorical: “Rules themselves create fiction.” (2001: 8) But the opposite is true as well: fiction creates its own set of rules. Lev Vygotsky (2002) observed that there is no such thing as a no-rules game: “It seems to me that one can go even further and propose that there is no such thing as play without rules and the child’s particular attitude toward them. [...] All games with imaginary situations are simultaneously games with rules, and vice versa.” One could always argue that a flight into a reframe of reality is not an actual flight, but more of a partial flight, some might even say it is a mere metaphor; but for all practical purposes, there is no other kind of flight. This flight allows to operate a shift from one interpretative sphere to another, thus changing the relation of an individual to the world, which becomes the relation of a player towards play, of a character towards fiction.

Symbolic thought and the principle of reality

The animal, and human alike, feeds on prejudices and judgments: “It acts upon the acquired experience of what is favourable and what is unfavourable. It obeys its impulses and learning of reward and punishment.” (Laborit 1986b: 206) Any organism is a reservoir of dispositions that govern its actions. These mechanisms are constitutive of our representations of reality – a reality defined by Laborit as a complex ensemble of entangled relations, an ensemble we cannot grasp due to the “narrow filter of our senses”, which does not allow us to apprehend more than “a subset of the ensemble of relations [,which] is immediately deformed by our previous experience, pleasant or unpleasant, in response to our fundamental needs or acquired needs and our affectivity, coming in from socio-culture.” (ibid: 206) This narrow image of the world that is ours, phylogenetically and affectively determined, is the only one that is meaningful to us: it solely motivates our action.

Animals and humans are equally subjected to this law of nature; the *Umwelt* of an organism corresponds to its own reality. What distinguishes the latter, however, is that human adds to the prior factors of impulsiveness and gratification two other factors of no less importance: symbolic language and imagination. “We know that language involves neuronal circuits, the operation of which unconsciously associates nervous automatisms, [and] these associations [...] enable the creation of extremely rich and varied ‘linguistic’ structures.” (ibid: 206) By juxtaposing: 1) the combinatory nature of grammar, and 2) the (unconscious and affective) associative aspect of the

imagination in human, Laborit hypothesizes a motivated origin for our language – a motivation from which, little by little (and necessarily), we would have parted to the profit of abstraction. For Laborit, the emergence of symbolic language (and thought) is concomitant to the formation of abstract, conceptual worlds that can superimpose the reality construed on the sole perceptual and sociocultural factors. And “socioculture”, in return, is extensively enriched by the input of the symbolic thought:

It is this construction of an abstract world that Man could realize with language, *a world of relations and no more of objective images*. While the animal also constructs ‘models’ of the world where it lives and without which it could not act, those are models of images, and not conceptual models. Indeed, the animal constructs models because, like any living system, it knows and memorizes, out of the whole that constitute its environmental niche, only an extremely limited subset of relations, but a subset that still enables it to act, that is to protect its structure. But these relations remain adherent to the images, to the elements of the objective structure that accompany them. What man does in addition to that, through language, is to take distance towards the object and its image to handle only the relations that then constitute the elements of the imaginary ensemble. Thus results of this property, owed to the richness of the associative areas of the human brain, the possibility to *create* new structures. Man adds information to the world environing him, and because of this added information its *action* can transform this world; it shapes it.

Hence, the process of imagination essentially consists in the functional association of neuronal circuits retaining memorized experiences, and in associating them in a way that differs from the one strictly imposed by the environmental experience. (ibid: 207)

Thomas Sebeok and a natural history of language

The same year Laborit published *L'inhibition de l'action* (*The inhibition of action*), Thomas Sebeok published a paper entitled *Toward a Natural History of Language* (1991). In this paper, aside from a few details, Sebeok formulates the exact same theory as Laborit did, but rather than from a neurological and behavioural analysis frame, he chose to explain the emergence of language from an anthropological and phylogenetic point of view. In this paper, Sebeok stresses that because bipedalism, developed by *Homo habilis* about two million years ago, implies the possibility for Man to stare at the horizon, those two factors combined (bipedalism and the long-range vision) most probably favoured the emergence of planning thinking, and with it, the development of a new conception of time that made possible the invention and use of a complex linguistic syntax as well as material tools designed to be used in a foreseeable future.

Following the ecological theory stressed by the French geneticist François Jacob, stating that unless the correspondence between external reality and the self-world model (or *Umwelt*) of a given species is not sufficiently precise that species is doomed to extinction, Sebeok upholds for the human species a precise and deterministic distinction among the animal realm:

While all speechless creatures, as Jacob emphasizes, must model their universe, in order to survive, in fair conformity to “what is really out there” – this is, in the end, the deep meaning of the notion of an *Umwelt* – humans have evolved a way of modeling their universe in a way that not merely echoes “what is out there” but can, additionally, dream up a potentially infinite number of *possible worlds* [...]

This kind of capability is achievable solely by means of a language, such that sentences in that language can be decomposed and recomposed in an indefinite number of ways (given a sufficient number of pieces to start out with); we can do this because all our natural languages possess [...] a *syntactic component*.

By means of such a syntax, we can construct numberless novel narratives, imagine many versions of the past and construct as many future scenarios (including those of our death and afterlife), lie, frame scientific hypotheses [...], including hypotheses about language itself, create poetry – in short, build a civilization. (1991: 72)

What would essentially distinguish the human species, then, is its capacity to conceptualize and use the conditional verbal form, which allows us to adapt to an indefinite variety of circumstances that can therefore be anticipated. “No other animal, so far as we know, has language in this sense,” Sebeok concludes (1991: 72). The conditional verbal form, which entails the possibility to posit non-actual states of affairs (counterfactuals and possible worlds) in diverse syntactic forms, constitutes a definition *a minima* of what Laborit calls the imaginary.

I shall now summarize what has been proposed hitherto. The imaginary, which we must at once associate with play in its simplest and most fundamental expression – the manipulation of concepts —, is primarily defined by one’s capacity to create new structures, to add information to its surrounding world, to shape it and transform it. Therefore, play is quintessentially *performative*. The three dispositions of play, then, are as follows: 1) play is a factor of homeostasis; 2) play entails fiction; 3) play is performative, and this is why, precisely, it is a factor of homeostasis. Play regulates the individual somewhere between boredom and anxiety. Besides, it can provide a sort of feeling that is greatly rewarding: fun. One could ponder this feeling is the minimal requirement to make sense out of this world.

Taking in account this new understanding of the phenomenon, I think it would be interesting to conclude by discussing the symbolic nature of play, which rely on its mimetic character.

Play, mimesis, and performance

Huizinga’s thesis in *Homo Ludens* is a radical one: “Play is older than culture [...] Human civilization has added no essential feature to the general idea of play.” (1950: 1) Often called into question subsequently, this vision of play cannot be falsified, obviously, but it nevertheless remains a rich methodological hypothesis – and one that is coherent with the deterministic vision of Laborit. Just like Rousseau’s myth of the noble savage, Huizinga indulges in the musement of the origins:

Archaic society, we would say, plays as the child or animal plays. Such playing contains at the outset all the elements proper to play: order, tension, movement, change, solemnity, rhythm, rapture. Only in a later phase of society is play associated with the idea of something to be expressed in and by it, namely, what we would call “life” or “nature” [...] but the primary thing is and remains play. (ibid: 17–18)

Only in this second phase envisioned by the author does play become transitive, mimetic. Indeed, for Huizinga, even if the play-world solely forms a totality, a closed reality in itself, play action remains fundamentally transitive; its end is to be found elsewhere. Play happens as a function of something else, it must be related to some biological necessity, Huizinga stresses

(ibid: 2, 7), though without defining those ends.² After Laborit, I shall stress that play happens as an expression of the need for flight and, because it is symbolic, it takes part in the construction and the enrichment of abstract conceptual worlds by which human individuals act upon their environment. Therefore, it is fundamentally performative.

Nevertheless, it is the mimetic aspect of play that fascinates Huizinga the most. This specific aspect of his theory deserves a very special attention, because it presents itself under the canonical (and vulgar) form of the sign in the Latin rhetorical tradition: something stands for something else – *aliquid stat pro aliquo*. In other words, the meaning of play is to be found elsewhere than in its practical manifestation. “The game ‘represents’ a contest, or else becomes a contest for the best representation of something,” Huizinga writes (ibid: 13). “At the origin of the word ‘*imagination*’, there is image,” Laborit reminds us (1986b: 206). To represent is to show, to give to the senses – to give what? an image – through play; that is, a representation of the self as a player, or a representation of the world as play lets us see it through the subjectivity of a player. This conception of play as mimesis, and of mimesis as performance through play, harks back to a very ancient discussion, which in the last 50 years or so has been the object of a renewed interest following the success of the speech act theory and of performance studies. In its introduction to the 1984 *Mimesis in Contemporary Theory*, a multi-author book he edited, Mihai Spariosu emphasizes:

Before the fourth century B.C. the word *mimêsis* appears very rarely in connection with the arts, let alone “philosophy.” The idea of art (in the modern sense) as mimesis, which might have been connected with a special kind of drama (*mimos*) mentioned by Aristotle, was certainly not raised to the status of theoretical principle before Plato and his pupil. Moreover, mimesis as imitation in the liberal arts seems to have been a late development of the concept, if we are to believe Hermann Koller: originally, *mimeisthai* had the Pythagorean sense of *Darstellung* or *Ausdrucksform* (performance, form of expression) and was strictly associated with dance and music, being only later interpreted by Plato as *Nachahmung* (imitation) and (mis)applied to poetry, painting and philosophy. Thus the original meaning of mimesis may have been close to what Heidegger and Fink call the “ecstatic play of the world,” which is the opposite of imitation, and any discussion of mimesis will also have to imply a discussion of the concept of play in our culture. (1984: iii)

This surely provides a telling argument to dismiss the detractors of play, those who consider play as a waste of time, as an unproductive activity. Play is definitely transitive, therefore its action is never limited to the sphere of play itself – despite what appearances let us think sometimes (but then again, not all variants of play are to stand on an equal footing). Besides, Spariosu’s philological argument also seems to favour Huizinga’s hypothesis of play as the origin of culture in our human civilization.

The ecstatic play of the world

By now we have reattained the old debate that links play to representation in the arts. If I took the time to fully share Spariosu’s long quote, it is obviously because I am enraptured by this view

² Let us remember that F. von Schiller, in its *Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* (1794), also hypothesized a somatic necessity for the ludic impulsion (*Spieltrieb*). More recently, Jaak Panksepp found that play seems to be triggered by “spontaneous neural urges within the brain.” (1998: 281)

of mimesis as performance, of which the origins are to be found in the non-figurative arts (music and dance), and further upstream, in the Hindu spiritual tradition. As Spariosu again wrote in *The Wreath of Wild Olive*, “myth will incessantly create history and history will incessantly create myth, until they both melt into what the Hindus call *lila*, or the ecstatic play of the world, in order to be born anew.” (1997: 209) Yet we are gone elsewhere, in some cosmic considerations.

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SEMIOTICS AND NARRATIVE

NEW AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITING: LI NA'S *MY LIFE*

Anita Kasabova
Sofia University "St Kliment of Okhrid"
anita.kasabova@gmail.com

Abstract

Autobiography is defined as: "retrospective prose narrative written by a real person concerning their own existence, where the focus is their individual life, in particular the story of their personality" (Lejeune, 1972, 120). Autobiography, it is said, relies on a pact between author and reader, requiring "identity between the author, the narrator, and the protagonist" (Lejeune, 1982: 193). Autobiography, it is argued, is self-narrative and therefore the self is a narrative construct (Bruner, 1987; Eakin, 2005, 2008).

My claim is that these three views are problematic and, following Maria Popova's proposal for the round table on semiotics and narrative, I suggest that the notion of autobiographical narrative requires further analysis of narratological 'figures' (to use Genette's [1966] term), such as 'first-person narrator', 'character', 'narrative time', 'perspective' (following Bal [1985]), and 'storyworld' (Herman, 2002, 2009). Consider the following passage in tennis champion Li Na's self-narrative:

"In 1998, when I was an idealistic 16-year old girl, a television station in Beijing interviewed me and asked what my biggest dream was. [...] I tilted my sun-darkened face to the lens and said: 'My biggest dream? I hope I can be a top ten tennis player. I know it's extremely difficult, but I'll work hard'. God knows how much courage it took for me to make that statement back then. But now, I wish I could say one thing to that little girl: 'Hey! We made it!'" (Li Na, 2014: loc. 113).

Through which 'I'-perspective does the reader see Li Na? How does the 'possible' storyworld overlap with the 'actual' world inhabited by author Li Na and her readers? I examine these questions by re-defining three autobiographical figures: (1) the 'narrating I' as timekeeper, (2) Genette's [1966, 1972, 1983, 1991, 2002]) figures of narrative time and narrative order as the

narrativetime-space of actions and events and (3) the autobiographical story (-'plot'/μῦθος) as wish fulfillment.

This paper explores how an autobiographical narrative refines the genre. I follow Genette (1999, 39)'s view that autobiography is halfway between diction and fiction. In my analysis of the recent self-narrative by Chinese tennis star Li Na (2013), I test some traditional attributes of the genre: "retrospective prose written in the first person", "non-fictional genre" and "autobiographical pact between author and reader". I suggest that the autobiographical space-time of her narrative appeals to her readers by transmitting values such as *pursuing one's dream* and *dealing with ordeals*.

1. Autobiography in theory and practice

The noun *autobiography* denotes life narratives written in the first person, also called self-referential life writing (Smith & Watson, 2001: loc.88). French structuralist Philippe Lejeune defined autobiography as: "retrospective prose narrative written by a real person concerning their own existence, where the focus is their individual life, in particular the story of their personality" (Lejeune, 1975: 120). According to narratological tradition, autobiography is a non-fictional genre. However, I follow genre-theorists Gérard Genette's (1999) Jean-Louis Janelle's (2006) and Smith & Watson's (2001) distinction between autobiography and *memoir*. *Pace* Holocaust and other documentary accounts in the first person, I focus on autobiography *as a personal life-story* rather than memoirs and this is how I examine Li Na's (2013) text. Memoirs have a public historical significance because they are testimonies of political events and a collective past. Former tennis champion Li Na's life-story, however, is personal and exemplary: having retired from tennis in September 2014 due to chronic knee injuries while ranked as the world's No. 2 tennis player, she is a role model for young Chinese. Nonetheless, her autobiography does not document China's recent history.

Autobiography is contractual (Lejeune 1975), in the sense that writing requires a responsibility constraint: authors of life-narratives tell, as far as possible, who they are, what happened and why they are doing what they are doing, without inventing things. The narrative voice in autobiographies also figures as the protagonist of the story she is telling. Hence autobiography is literary by *diction* rather than by *fiction* and this genre is halfway between fiction and diction (Genette 1999: 35). In life narratives, the narrator is supposed to be identical with the author, for autobiography is said to rely on a pact between author and reader, requiring "*identity between the author, the narrator, and the protagonist*" (Lejeune, 1975: 193).

Li Na's autobiography, however, does not conform to the tri-partite identity between author, narrator and protagonist because it was written as a part of her sponsor Nike's commercial campaign to popularize tennis in China.¹ Therefore it is questionable which '*T*' actually authored it, although that '*T*' testifies to Li Na, the tennis star who exists outside the text. And the text exists and is accepted as an autobiography, and it sells copies precisely because it is a first person account of Li Na's exemplary life-story. Literary tradition assumes that in autobiography, this fictional role called '*T*' has a testimonial function: referring to a person outside the text indicates the source of information (Genette, 1972: 262). This is what Li Na's narrative does, but the testimonial link to the author is merely assumed by the audience, for the '*T*' refers to the audience's idea of Li Na, rather than the 'real' Li Na.

Narrative theory invested the autobiographical '*T*' with extradiegetic powers, although Lejeune admits that autobiography is self-referential (1977, 31-32). Self-reference does not entail a corre-

¹ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_REro-bd7EQ

spondence with the extradiegetic world because it does no explanatory work: 'I' does not explain or justify the use made of the pronoun 'I'. As Barthes (1967, 145) put it, "the 'I' is "nothing more than the instance saying 'I'". Lejeune (1977: 41) points out that, in an autobiography, the protagonist and narrator's perspectives share a common mark: the author's point of view. He argues that the use of the first person masks "the co-presence of a 'you' and a 'he', [...] all referring to the same individual." (1977: 31-32). But "referring to the same individual" neither accounts for the reliability of that individual's narrative, nor for the latter's authorship. Yet the audience engages with autobiographical narratives. I advance a different reason as to why this is so and show how the autobiographical pact could be reformulated, while allowing self-narratives to persist halfway between diction and fiction.

Lejeune himself, in later years, is ambivalent about autobiography as a non-fictional genre: "Telling the truth about the self, constituting the self as a complete subject, is a fantasy. In spite of the fact that autobiography is impossible, this in no way prevents it from existing." (1986: 33). Lejeune's fallacious implication is, that if there is an autobiography, then there is a real person whose life makes true that autobiography, but on this explanation, autobiographies are impossible. What is impossible about autobiography is that readers should believe it to be true by virtue of the identity relation across author-narrator-protagonist, which is made true by the author's signature. What if autobiographies fail to satisfy the condition that 'I' refers to a real person outside the text who is narrating their real life? Consider the following example of an impossible autobiography: if there is a life-narrative by Benjamin Wilkomirski (1995), then there is a person called Benjamin Wilkomirski whose life is such that, necessarily, if Benjamin Wilkomirski exists, then his autobiography exists. Wilkomirski signed his autobiography, so its existence is confirmed. Unfortunately, Wilkomirski's life-narrative is a fraud. His autobiography, *Fragments: Memories of a wartime childhood* (1995) is an invented memoir of a childhood spent in concentration camps. As journalists Gibbons & Moss (1999) write in their review of the ensuing scandal: "he is a damaged individual who appears to believe the extraordinary story he told in *Fragments: Memories of a Childhood* (1939-1948). But his apparent sincerity does not make it true."²

1.1. Reformulating the autobiographical pact

In order to steer clear of Lejeune's paradox, I suggest reformulating the autobiographical pact as an engagement between author and audience, where the author provides an exemplary account of her own life, which the readers can apply to their lives. On this view, an autobiography is not made true by its author, although the author exists, but by the audience's response to and appraisal of his or her tale. The first-person retrospective account of a character's past becomes a prospective account for readers to follow because it is an account they can relate to. Thus the window to someone's personal past becomes a window for readers' personal futures. This window is considered as a reliable testimony not only because of the responsibility constraint, but because there is direct evidence provided by the media.

Autobiographical writing seems grounded in implicit conditions of appraisal, which regulate how the narrator recounts her life-story. In Li Na's case, the evidence consists of Facebook posts, televised tennis matches and interviews, articles about her in the press, as well as public appearances to launch Nike products.³ Her Facebook page is a window for appraisal and feedback from her fans and audience – an autobiography-gone-live, where author and readers virtually interact. When Genette (1999, 39) says that autobiography is halfway between diction and fiction, we might add that, due to digital media, autobiography has become a project in the making. Li

² <http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/oct/15/features11.g24>

³ <https://www.facebook.com/lina>

Na continues her life-story on FB, permitting a trans-medial interaction between author and audience online. There the audience can participate in her autobiography and appraise it by 'liking' it. In this way, her self-narrative involves participants outside the text.⁴ Self-narrative is now less a finished product and more a continuing process or work in progress, for with blogs and FB posts the public receives regular updates about the author-narrator-hero's life and activities.

The main condition of Li Na's life-story is the success of its protagonist-narrator. The goal of a life narrative is to show how the protagonist attains an exemplary level of well being which can serve as an example for others. If the autobiography fulfills this condition, the life-story is successful and receives a positive appraisal from the audience. The pact between author and audience relies on their appraisal of the former's narrative and the sense of purpose it expresses. I suggest the virtual world of the autobiography is relatable to the actual world of author and audience by transposing the value of a life lived well to a model in which the audience can participate in the shared space provided by digital media. This relatability of a self-narrative warrants its status as an exemplary tale, as is the case with Li Na's autobiography.

Her life-story begins in June 2011, the morning after her victory at the French Open.

So, today I'm in Paris, and my impressions of the previous night aren't just some fleeting fantasy. [...]. Today is June 5 2011 and yesterday, at the Roland Garros Stadium I became the French Open women's single champion. To be honest, until this morning, I was more or less in a daze. I still couldn't take in that I'd really won the championship. (2013, loc. 110)

This a-chronic beginning transgresses the story chronology by anticipating the storyline about a young Chinese girl from Wuhan who became a professional tennis player at age 15, retired from the Chinese State system to compete independently at age 26 and became an international tennis champion at age 30. In this way she tells her readers, who know her as a tennis star, where she came from and how she became the Li Na they know, so that they can relate to her ordinary beginnings and follow her example of pursuing her dream. Narrator Li Na regulates the progress (or regress) of the character Li Na on the scale of personal and social values: to become somebody of standing and renown by means of her own actions.

My name is an extraordinarily common one in China. [...] Since my earliest memories, I've always felt that I was nobody special. If it weren't for winning the French Open and everything that it has brought me. I believe I would have gone to my grave feeling much the same. (2013: 60)

Li Na's person and life-story are emblematic for the young generation because she breaks out of the Chinese social model to become someone special. She is a rule-breaker who became a role model for Chinese women. She is "affectionately called "Big Sister Na" (Nàjiě) among Chinese communities and is considered a 'strong, unbending and unyielding' role model" says

⁴ I follow Henry Jenkins (2007, 66), who coined the term "participatory culture" to denote the media relationship between producers and consumers.

Wikipedia.⁵ In her recent article on Li Na, aptly titled “*The meaning of Li Na*” (Time 26.05.2014), journalist Hannah Beecham writes: “[t]he tennis star is more than a global sports icon – she inspires millions of Chinese as a symbol of independence and freedom. [...] Li symbolizes how a young Chinese can achieve personal success even after distancing herself from the party and state. Her willingness to assert herself endears her to the millions of Chinese searching for their unique voices in a collective society.”⁶ Her life-story serves the audience, because it shows how a better life is possible, enabling them to gather evidence.

Since Li Na is a public figure, she is easily recognizable and identifiable outside the text for the autobiographical pact to be valid. These latter can choose whether or not to ‘like’ her particular life-story on Facebook and whether or not they would like to participate in conversations about it in virtual discussions on blogs or forums. Hence her contract between author and audience is validated by the audience’s participation in, as well as appraisal of, Li Na’s tale. The pact holds across the virtual world of Li Na’s life-narrative to the actual world inhabited by author and audience, when the audience responds to the narrative, relates to the narrator and ‘likes’ the protagonist. Li Na relates with her audience by communicating the emotions she experienced on her road to fame.

Tennis has brought me much more than just fame; it's brought me profound emotion. The joy I felt the first time I won a Women's Tennis Association championship; the nervousness of playing in a Grand Slam; the surreal feeling of being watched by more than ten thousand spectators [...].(2013: 69)

Nonetheless, the pact between author and audience is grounded in a deeper relation: transmitting the sense of a life lived well.

I like myself very much now. [...] I'm now thirty-one years old and my life is no longer aimless, my dreams no longer out of reach. I'm satisfied with my self and my life. [...] I just want to earnestly live for each moment and enjoy every day. (2013: 3632)

The appeal of Li Na’s autobiography is due to certain values that remain constant across the divide between traditional narrative and digital media, such as pursuing one’s dream, dealing with ordeals, adapting to change and having a goal and reaching it. These values contribute to the *relatable* content of Li Na’s life-narrative with which a young female audience can identify: to have a dream and to work hard to achieve it. Li Na’s autobiography is relatable because it is not just a biography told in the first person but a storyworld in which she shows us her goal and how she achieved it by dealing with ordeals – loss, obstacles, injuries, defeat – and how she gained self-knowledge. Li Na’s life-narrative is about achieving her dream to become a top ten tennis player. Of course this dream is also a moment of her biography and has biographical significance. But her *biography* does not engage the audience as her *life-story* does, because her first

⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Na. In addition, Li Na is on the cover of *Time 100* in 2013, being appraised as one of the world’s 100 most influential persons. <http://www.si.com/tennis/beyond-baseline/2013/04/18/li-na-time-magazine-cover-100-most-influential>.

⁶ <http://time.com/100575/the-meaning-of-li-na/>

person narrative or *autobiography* is the one that shows the audience how they might get there, by giving them an example or principle for future action.

I determine the above-mentioned values in Li Na's life-narrative by following Bakhtin (1981), according to whom autobiography is a chronotope for ordering time-space between an older narrator and a younger protagonist for the audience. Li Na's autobiography is a chronotope or *space-time* in which the first person signifies by example, transmitting a role the reader can engage with. I think Bakhtin's (1981) notion of adventure-and-ordeal-novel, in particular the system of values and virtues allowing characters to deal with problematic situations is applicable to Li Na's autobiography because the action unfolds between the first-person character-and-narrator's goal and the achievement of that goal by successfully overcoming ordeals. These are the poles of plot movement in autobiography, which, as Bakhtin (1981, 89) writes, "have a biographical significance. But it is not around these that the novel is structured; rather it is around that which lies *between* them." 'Adventure' denotes events about to happen or happenings and in this sense it is applicable to self-narratives, which recount what happened to an author-narrator and what actions and virtues are required to deal with events and circumstances.

The appellative function of Li Na's autobiography lies in how she comes to terms with "*happenstance*" ("*sovpadenie*" 1981: 92), by showing that goals can be updated, while maintaining her dream. Bakhtin's notion of *happenstance* is a chronotopic value, which blends circumstance and occurrence. Unlike a memoir, which has historical significance, an autobiography does not so much testify to the truth of what happened in someone's life, as show how the protagonist-narrator deals with chance events when they happen, as is the case with Li Na's tale. The appeal of her life-story for the audience is that by following Li Na's example, they also have a chance of achieving their dream. The goal-happenstance-actions-ordeals-achievement-balance model seems appropriate for analyzing Li Na's life-story, because it remains constant through changes of narrative context. And narrative context does change in this particular tale, because Li Na's autobiography is a result of sports & media company IMG's creative management in producing content for appraisal and consumption by a target audience.⁷

2. How Li Na's autobiography became an exemplary tale

Li Na's life-story is intended as an exemplary contribution to the actual world of the audience. She writes, that: "if my life and what I'm doing can contribute a little to our planet's supply of positive energy, I'll be very happy, and very honored." (2013: 3279). After her book was published in Chinese, she remembers a student at Beijing University "who said that when he sat for the college entrance exam in 2011, my victory in the French Open spurred him on, helping him to score really well on the exam and get into Beijing University. I knew this was partly said in jest, but it was still very encouraging." (2013: 3268).

The protagonist successfully carries out her personal and social goals, is resilient when facing defeat (as well as facing herself when facing defeat), successfully overcomes obstacles fate or happenstance may have in store for her and her life-narrative ends on a higher level than it started. Li Na provides a recipe for reaching this higher level:

When we want to move to a higher level, we must first defeat the enemy within: our own inner demons. (2013: 1763)

⁷ <http://img.com/news/news/2009/sep/img-signs-li-na.aspx>

Li Na's autobiography is about being able to face failure as well as success and maintaining one's inner balance. Her successes have been accompanied by failures, such as a losing streak after winning the Roland Garros tournament, which she explains as hitting a rut and losing her sense of purpose.

I had no desire for victory and it was humiliating. [...] My mind was a blank. I not only didn't know how to play, I'd also forgotten why I should carry on playing. (2013: 3088)
When you achieve a long-held goal, it's actually the loneliest time in your life. It's a time when fear and anxiety arise, because, with the target reached, you wonder what you should do next. (2013: 3116)

Li Na's life-story has a protagonist that can succeed, fail, recover, waver, fall and bounce back once again, because she has learnt to accept herself. This protagonist steps up the ladder of personal and social values, confronting her limited capacity to predict her own future or evaluate the consequences of her choices and actions from her younger character's point of view.

I didn't know I would make a comeback after bidding tennis farewell, just like I can't judge now whether the two years in retirement were ultimately good or bad for me." (2013: 1107)

In her life-narrative, narrator Li Na transmits the idea of not being able to see her future but believing in it. The narrative's temporal structure is the "meaning-bearer" of her autobiography, because it shows how her dreams and actions connect over time through changes, which may either help or hinder her progress and achievement. Her own arduous training is helped by Nike's sponsorship but hindered by the Chinese state-run sports system, which she quit in 2008. In addition, her career is hindered by injury. She describes her swollen knee condition in the Australian Open in 2010.

To others, 2010 might seem like the year I was basking in the lime-light, but in fact, the most indelible impression that year left on me was pain. [...] Injury is as devastating as a mountain toppling. This time, my knee was in very bad shape. After I got into the fourth round, I had to rest for a whole day after each match because the knee couldn't take more than two consecutive days of exercise. (2013: 2725)

Despite her injured knee, Li Na made it to the semi-finals and into the world's top ten players in 2010. Yet her narrative shows that victory comes at a price.

[A]fter two weeks of play in the Australian Open, I received 3500 points, taking me into the world's top ten. I thought *I'm a top ten player. It doesn't feel quite as good as I expected!* (2013: 2750)

In order to be appraised as successful, the scale of the protagonist's activities does not necessarily follow the proverbial "rags to riches" road. Rather, she should advance in life by earning positive moral qualities or virtues by learning life's lessons, such as that "[v]ictory is not won casually, especially when the game is being played by the world's elite players." (2013: 2762). Li Na writes about how she came to terms with losing in the second round in the Sydney international tournament, in 2010:

My mental state is always up and down, wandering between defeat and victory. When I came to understand this about myself, I became more rational in the face of failure. (2013: 2712)

Narrator Li Na shows the audience how those lessons can be learnt, absence of bad luck permitting. An important virtue is how to adapt to change and update one's goals. As Li Na puts it:

To be honest, change requires a great deal of courage for a thirty-year old woman. She might even lose some of her strong points in changing. Not everyone has the capacity to bear what's going to happen and the possible consequences. (2013: 3419)
According to Chinese tradition, a woman loses her youth at thirty, but I feel I'm still in good shape. [...] Everyone's growth and aging process is unique. (2013: 3214)

Having transmitted the sense of a life lived well by presenting the conditions for a good model the narrator's mind is at peace. If the audience appraises her life-story, as she would like it to be, the transmission is successful, because the author's interests converge with the audience's. Therefore the goal has to be a mutual one, shared by author and audience: to track the retrospective appraisal of the author's life. According to Li Na, "the greatest gift that victory brought, was peace of mind." [...]

I would no longer need to hate myself for every little mistake. My internal referee would let me off the hook, for once. 'Li Na, this time you've done alright,' I said quietly to myself. (2013, loc.122)

Li Na's life-story is relatable to actual worlds of authors and audience because there is a "basic story", or underlying motif, to transmit the sense of a life lived well and this sense is instantiated by her particular life-story. The "basic story" is Li Na's aim for a successful life and it is the instance of a model of the 'events-and-ordeal' type. This aim is exemplary because it constitutes an example for the readers' future actions and hence her narrative is destined for readers, although the narrator's reflections are addressed to her younger and maturing selves.

2.1. Li Na's narrative transmits her message through a reflective dialogue intended for her audience

As Lejeune puts it: "identity is a *constant relation* between the one and the many" (1977: 30). In an autobiography this relation plays out as a constant reflection between an author, a narrator,

a protagonist and an audience. The narrator and protagonist are indicated by various personal pronouns: “I”, “me”, “you”, “she” or “we”). The audience is obliquely implicated by the second person “you”. In her life-story, Li Na reflects on herself as the audience is looking on. Although the addressee is herself (the protagonist), her dialogue is intended for public consumption.

Sometimes I really want to go back in time and tell that helpless little Chinese girl in the midst of a crowd of strangers to cheer up, that everything will be fine. But other times I know it's not necessary. [...] those hardships and obstacles proved to be fate's way of teaching me bravery and fortitude. (2013: 774)

When things aren't going well, two voices sound in my head at the same time, as if I were fighting with myself. (2013: 3135)

Lejeune (1977: 21) points out that the nature of the receiver is double: “if I speak to myself as you, I nonetheless offer this enunciation as a spectacle to the auditor or reader, who is present at a discourse destined for him, even though it is no longer addressed to him.” The meaning of a life-story is reflected through its narrative figures, as well as through the reflective dialogue, which formats the narrative. For example, Li Na engages her audience by sharing her tennis player's “internal debate” as she's “looking for a crack in her opponent's serve” and finding ways to “vent her anger at herself” when the opponent is too strong.

When your opponent's attack is raging like a storm, and your own internal debate is raging without any answers, all you can do is vent your anger on yourself. (2013: 222)

The “you” directly addresses her own self, seen from her vantage point of narrator, but indirectly it provides a window for the audience to engage with the protagonist's fight to win and be appraised as she acquires virtues like braveness and strength.

Those hardships and obstacles proved to be fate's way of teaching me bravery and fortitude. (2013: 774)

The narrative form of Li Na's narrative appears to be a reflective or internal dialogue between various self-perspectives. The ‘pseudo-temporality’ of her autobiography spans across the reflective dialogue between an older narrator-self and a younger protagonist-self who appears in the story. That is why the temporal order is determined by an older narrative voice looking back at a younger protagonist. In *My Life*, the narrative voice is that of a 30-year old tennis champion looking back at her younger self and with whom she dialogues, as she tells her readers about herself in a narrative that ‘lasts’ from the early 1980's till 2013.

In 1998, when I was an idealistic 16-year old girl, a television station in Beijing interviewed me and asked what my biggest dream was. [...] I tilted my sun-darkened face to the lens and said: ‘My biggest dream? I hope I can be a top ten tennis player. I know it's extremely

difficult, but I'll work hard'. God knows how much courage it took for me to make that statement back then. But now, I wish I could say one thing to that little girl: 'Hey! We made it!' (Li Na, 2013: loc. 113).

The time-lines of narrator and protagonist converge, as the tennis star recalls her younger self, wishing she could speak to her in the present (time of narration), rather than speak about her in narrated time (past perfect tense). Hence she uses the conditional to project herself into a hypothetical dialogue, crossing time of events and narrative time (story time) in her mental time travel: "I wish I could say [...] to that little girl: 'Hey! We made it!'" To put it differently, the narrator Li Na speaks about herself in the 1st and 3rd persons and to herself in the 2nd person, as well as the 1st person plural. The narrator Li Na is the sender and the character Li Na the receiver of this message – but they are both aspects of the author who presents herself in the plural in her life-narrative.

This emblematic episode is repeated in the chronological storyline (1998) when the narrator refers to Nike's 2011 "Fuel for Dreams" marketing campaign. Li Na's dream not only has an audience, it became a dream brand for Nike when it was successfully sold to an audience.⁸ The copy "to be in the top ten has always been my dream" engaged China's audience to participate in Li Na's dream and make it their dream, by identifying with her goal to succeed – at least in their imagination. Nike's success as a dream product followed, as a result of Li Na's successful narrative of her success as a tennis champion. The narrator reflects on her young self in the commercial and re-identifies with her dream and the public utterance of that dream 16 years later, after it had come true.

Every time I see that ad, I'm overcome with emotion. I look at my sixteen year old self – green, but with no stage fright – saying to the camera, 'My biggest dream? I want to play my way into the top ten. I know this is very difficult to do, but I'll work hard. [...] I didn't really have the courage to utter my dream out loud, but at that moment, I went with it. (2013: 1024)

The narrative's emphasis on the dream indicates that Li Na's basic story is not her biography translated into a first-person narrative, but her motive for writing it: to show who she is, what she did, how she became successful. And that her success is defined by achieving her dream of becoming a top tennis player, as well as by re-defining her goals once her "internal referee" had "let her off the hook" (2013: 122).

The process of writing a book had helped me know myself better. [...] [N]ow I am able to look at life from a different perspective [...]. I've happily discovered that although I can't forget, I can at least let go." (2013: 3268)

I'm over thirty years now. I no longer need to use camouflage to make myself look strong. (2013: 3684)

⁸ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_REro-bd7EQ

Conclusion

My aim in this paper is to examine a current case of autobiographical writing in search of an appropriate theoretical frame. Li Na's life-narrative is an example of an autobiography, which does not fit into its narratological slot. Hence autobiographical writing may disprove autobiographical theory. On one hand, it seems that generic definitions are not sufficiently subject to revision, while on the other hand there remain many loose threads in narratology, such as Lejeune's relatively un-cited 1977 paper, which could be appropriately used to update theoretical explanations of narratives and, perhaps, to formulate narratological predictions about future narratives.

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TRANSMEDIA AND SEMIOTICS, A STRUCTURAL MODEL FOR TRANSMEDIA DYNAMICS

Oscar Bastiaens
Breda University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands
oscarbastiaens@gmail.com

Hans Bouwknecht
Breda University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands
hbouwknecht@dasym.com

Abstract

Developments in media have occurred at a fast pace since the beginning of the 21st century and, with these new developments, come new challenges and new ways of entertaining audiences. One of these developments has been transmedia storytelling, a new storytelling technique in which a story world is told across multiple media platforms that all give a unique and valuable contribution in the unfolding and understanding of the story world. Jenkins popularized this term in 2006, and many definitions and developments have arisen in the years subsequent to this. Despite Jenkins' success, a structural and dynamic model of transmedia seems to be missing; a model that explains how transmedia structurally works and how we motivate audiences to travel across platforms. This paper will demonstrate that by developing such a structural model, which can explain and illustrate the works of a transmedia narrative, the use of semiotics proves to be a relevant approach. The model is derived by examining the associative relations model of Saussure and re-building this to reflect transmedia standards.

1. Introduction

One of the newest terms in media phraseology seems to be one that binds all types of different media together: transmedia. This enticing word by Henry Jenkins (2006a) has made the media industry realize that they can develop a coherent story world and combine different media platforms, where each platform has a unique and valuable contribution, that has a massive impact on different kinds of audiences and provides them with a greater sense of engagement.

However, Jenkins' explanation of transmedia worlds seems to lack a structural core and it has, therefore, been difficult to clearly define the structure of transmedia. Subsequent theorists have endeavored to follow Jenkins' definition and to build upon it more and more, but even though this has resulted in very interesting world building and narrative techniques there still is no structural approach. This despite the fact that researchers, such as Long (2007) and Scolari (2009), have attempted to use semiotics in order to find a more structural definition.

Moreover, an increase in the development of transmedia franchises by the industry can be noted. Whereas in the past transmedia franchises used to be developed relatively incidentally, due to the initial platform's success, they are now created with intent and purpose and are produced from the outset to enable a greater success for the franchise.

The changing landscape in the industry calls for a more structural model that shows how transmedia works and is consumed. Moreover, it could capture the order in which the audience can navigate throughout a transmedia franchise and will eventually portray a meta-narrative. When fully understanding this dynamic system of meta-narratives and transmedia structure, it can be controlled. This paper aims to use semiotics in order to develop a model that demonstrates how transmedia is read and represented in total to the audience. Semiotics offers a broad palette of theories and structures that are able to strip off all excesses of aesthetic abundance and grasp the essential elements that make up the strengths, weaknesses and reading format for transmedia.

Before heading into creating the model there is a need to comprehend transmedia as a narrative technique; looking into a number of narrative theories regarding transmedia and the building blocks as discussed by Jenkins (2006a) and Long (2008) will provide the basics of defining and creating a transmedia world. To put this knowledge into semiotic perspective the basic model of associative relations by Saussure (1972) will be reviewed, however this model from 1972 needs to be rewritten to make it applicable for works in the digital era. We will address and examine multiple theories on the digitalization of semiotics and review old theories and transform them into the current situation of transmedia dynamics

2. Where old and new differ

Audiences have changed from an analogue to a digital group where the need for information seems to be the highest need of all. We have become information hunters and gatherers.

Now extensive opinions are shared about whatever the audience sees in media; every audience member has become a possible critic with their own *Twitter*, *Facebook*, *YouTube* and blogs. They can be positive, but mostly tend to be critical since their opinion can be given as anonymously as they want, we would like to refer to these quick and imminent opinions as an *audience siege*. Moreover the audience has the possibility to create its own versions of existing content for placement on the web as well as distributing it via media channels like *YouTube* and *Vimeo*, better known as fan fiction. Henry Jenkins researched this change in audiences, which he later referred to as the *participatory culture*.

A participatory culture is a culture with relatively low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement, strong support for creating and sharing one's creations, and some type of informal mentorship whereby what is known by the most experienced is passed along to novices. A participatory culture is also one in which members believe their contributions matter, and feel some degree of social connection with one another (at the least they care what other people think about what they have created) (2006b: 7).

In order to comprehend the ways in which transmedia is built up and created, it is important to understand transmedia narratives and their components. There have been multiple defini-

tions of transmedia and all seem to contribute to an important piece of knowledge. Jenkins was the first to define this new storytelling technique. In his book *Convergence Culture* he describes that “A transmedia story unfolds across multiple media platforms with each new text making a distinctive and valuable contribution to the whole. In the ideal form of transmedia storytelling, each medium does what it does best.” (2006a: 97–98).

Jenkins’ foremost acknowledgment of a transmedia narrative is twofold and places some preliminary conditions. Firstly there is the usage of multiple platforms, ranging from film and television, to books, comics, games and many more media experiences. Secondly it is important to understand that each media platform needs to contribute to the complete understanding of the storyworld created.

Vital to acknowledge here is that even though each platform consists out of their own distinctive and valuable contribution, they have to be consumable as a single platform and enhanced by the others. This is where it gets complex. How can transmedia developers ensure that each platform enriches the knowledge and experience the audience has when it comes to the story world, but remains consumable on its own nevertheless? Here, Jenkins seems to imply to a meta-narrative, one that gives transmedia developers a firm grip on the entire world.

A mistake that is often made is to perceive transmedia as being the same as crossmedia. While the use of different platforms is a broad similarity, there is one vital aspect of transmedia which crossmedia does not possess and the difference between crossmedia and transmedia can be best explained by visualizing both. Robert Pratten has portrayed cross – and transmedia as building blocks and defines them as the old and the new world. As can be seen in figure 1, in the old, crossmedia world all elements combined do not give more a satisfactory whole. In comparison, the new, transmedia, world, sees each element fit right into place to build understanding and comprehension of the entire story world. Each platform, therefore, becomes more interesting to consume because of each platform’s unique contribution to the whole.

Pratten acknowledges one of the key factors of complexity concerning transmedia development, each separate media should be consumable and comprehensible when consumed by itself, but at the same time the sum of all parts, and thus different media platforms, have to consist as a whole, forming the meta narrative. For this he carved out a model to understand transmedia and how it differs from former crossmedia narratives.




Fig. 1: Robert Pratten’s transmedia model.

Besides these two theorists, Long (2007) and Scolari (2009) have examined transmedia and hinted at some possible structural elements that are entailed, with small elements of semiotics they have taken an important step towards finding an exact transmedia structure. Unfortunately they have not offered a complete structural model from which the industry could benefit. Long's definition of transmedia touches upon semiotics. Long states in his master thesis: "Transmedia narratives use a combination of Barthesian hermeneutic codes, negative capability and migratory cues to guide audiences across multiple media platforms" (2007: 3).

2.1 Transmedia dynamics

For a transmedia concept to be a success it is of great importance to make use of the negative capability and migratory cues that Long uses in his definition. Long explains negative capability as: "the art of building strategic gaps into a narrative to evoke a delicious sense of 'uncertainty, mystery, or doubt' in the audience" (2007: 53).

It is not so much about creating tension or excitement, but more about the mystery, which in its turn delivers a hunger for more information. It provides the audience with the feeling of power they can fill in the gaps with their own imagination, here it is of great importance to still leave them with enough curiosity to find out more. Because of our growing need for information has made this a perfect storytelling tool.

Migratory cues are a way to create references to places or things that are not mentioned, explained or shown in the story further. By placing these cues a content developer has the opportunity to expand the story world to an enormous extent. Besides that, it gives the option to the audience to further develop the story themselves, via blogs or forums, which they set up. It creates hints in one media form to look for additional content in a different extension. However, what semiotic definition would these migratory cues have in order to provide them a more solid base for this text migration tool? Here the process of semiosis comes in. Atkin (2006) describes Peirce's semiosis as the process in which read signs, or codes, are translated to produce a meaningful understanding. Important aspects here are, among others, the prior knowledge that the audience has gained. This translation of codes to comprehensible meaning can be strongly related to the consequences of migratory cues, these cues send out specific signals to motivate audiences to travel across platforms by referring to unknown knowledge. When this sign input is given to the audience, the semiosis process cannot translate it into comprehensible knowledge because our memory does not have this information. Therefore the translation leads to either our own interpretation or to suspension of disbelief. On this latter notion, Murray (1997) already stated we are then actually creating belief based on our prior gained knowledge.

Furthermore Long writes that Barthesian hermeneutic codes also are one of the key elements in creating a transmedia world. Roland Barthes, together with other structuralists, has created a classification system, which helps to further define things like migratory cues and negative capability by developing five different codes: hermeneutic, proairetic, semantic, symbolic and cultural.

By using these different codes, it is possible to enhance the relationship the audience has with the story, and because of the improvement of the intertextual connections between the components in transmedia franchises, audiences are more motivated to go from one media platform to another. This relation is set because the codes are relatively similar to the migratory cues, the hermeneutic codes, however, further define the kinds of migratory cues that are used; some of them, like the cultural code, can refer to existing knowledge the audience already has or is able to adapt from simple sources. Its degree of contribution is, therefore, mostly aesthetic and thus, from a semiotic point of view, less interesting. Because this paper tries to create a structural model, using semiotics, the aesthetics are something that will be stripped away in order to un-

derstand the complete core of a possible transmedia model.

When telling your story on different platforms you have to motivate the audience to migrate from one platform to another. A transmedia story world needs different elements to be successful in this, by creating the necessary 'gaps' in the story which can be filled in by the audiences' creativity, or by means of another platform it is possible to generate a lust for more. It is essential to make sure audiences are willing to go from one platform to another, even if that platform is not necessarily their favorite. This is due to the fact that all media platforms are combined in one way or another in the context of transmedia storytelling; in order for the audience to comprehend the entire story world they need to discover and experience each platform. The proposed narratology options by Long show that, by these gaps and references, audiences are motivated to discover more of the world. Even though there are multiple media platforms, in which the audience has to make a choice in what text to read first, there is certain linearity in the discovery.

Now that we have analyzed transmedia from a meta perspective to an operational level, and therefore better understand how transmedia works and is built, one of the most interesting questions is if transmedia producers and developers are able to steer the order, or *preferred reading*, in which the audience reads all different media platforms and thus the discovery of the transmedia world. To answer this question, this paper makes use of semiotic theories to fully comprehend how (digital) media flow and the way in which a line of reading is taken and set, to establish a basis for the building of a structural model, working from the operational level of semiotics to the meta level. Building a comprehensive model that shows in what way transmedia can be used and read when released will provide the ability to answer this question.

3. Associative relations

When analyzing signs and texts and their relation to each other, there are two key aspects that are being used, paradigms and syntagms. Ferdinand de Saussure (1972) has built a semiotic model based on these two basic terms, which he later referred to as the *associative relations* model. When looking into this, perhaps older, form of semiotics we can dissect and amplify the theory to a transmedia scale.

Saussure had a particular interest in the relation between the signifier and the signified: signs versus all other elements of the system, and those between a sign and the elements, which surround it within a concrete signifying instance (Chandler 2007). He described the key differences as being these syntagmatic and paradigmatic forms, and developed a model, that shows the exact implications of these relations and models.

When breaking down these axes to a quite abstract level, we can see that each choice in paradigmatic design has the ability to differ and change meaning according to personal interpretation and preference. Whereas the syntagmatic axis provides this earlier described need for a preferred reading to ensure a logical mental process.




Fig. 2: Saussure's Associative Relations Model, Chandler (2007: 84).

A paradigm is a term that has come from an elaboration on Saussure's *série associative* ('associative series'), which is a set of signs linked by partial resemblances, either in form or in meaning. Saussure described such sets as being established "in the memory" and the item this associated as forming a *mnemonic series* (Cobley, 2001: 233). Paradigmatic relations are functional contrasts, since they involve differentiation.

This means that the paradigm is concerned with the selection of *this-or-this-or-this* (Chandler, 2007: 84). It is about the choice made which media will be consumed at which particular point in time. One of the strong reasons for users to step out of the syntagmatic flow, and step into the paradigmatic axis is to discover more information of the transmedia universe.

When perceiving paradigm as associative it seems the emphasis shifts to sets of signs which relate to one another, again related to the possibilities of substitution in particular positions. When breaking down the term and effect of paradigm it is not merely a set of signs linked by resemblances but it offers the creator and user of the text the ability to change signs and provide his or her own interpretation. This means a text is no longer bound to a set of rules concerning narrative development. It provides a large scale of freedom, as long as the entire text stays in canon. When digging even deeper into paradigms we can see that beyond the point of creating an individual interpretation, the text is coded in such a way that the user or creator of the text offers the possibility to design his own significance within the text. Within this perspective, each choice in paradigmatic design has the ability to differ and change according to personal interpretation.

Syntagms are defined as "a linguistic unit consisting of a set of linguistic forms (phonemes, words, or phrases) that are in a sequential relationship to one another" (Oxford Dictionary 2013). This means a syntagm is always worth more than merely the sum of its parts, it concerns the entire sequence chosen and the (possible) chronology within this string of text. Syntagmatic relations are those into which a linguistic unit enters in virtue of its linear concatenation in a speech chain (Cobley, 2001: 273). It is about the combination of *this-andthis-and-this*. (Chandler, 2007: 84) This order creates a clear and understandable linear path and codes the communication in such a way that users experience certain emotions or intuitive paradigmatic choices at carefully placed times. Setting this within the perspective of free choice, it becomes a lot more complicated. Even though the user has the choice to discover every available medium, the producer has to carefully place enough motivational cues for them to migrate to, or click exactly where the producer wants them to.

When amplifying this concept of a string of signs to more than an example with words, it is possible to apply this to transmedia world discovery. In a way, all transmedia platforms are different texts, with each new text making distinctive contribution to the whole. Moreover, all these text contribute to one large meta-text: the sum of all parts creates a far larger importance than each individually, even though they are created to be sufficient and satisfactory when used as only one text or feature. Another important aspect of syntagms is the (chronological) order. This will provide motivation for the users to travel across features to constantly discover a new (and larger) part of the application. Therefore, the importance of this model lies within the fact that all the elements that make up a sign come from the dynamic and connected or linked illustration of the sign structures by the literature.

But this model has not taken the innovative steps and developments made by technology and media currently into account. Even though this model does seem complete when it comes to producing and understanding meaningful discourse where the signs are words, it does not take the digital revolution into account yet. How do current technological applications, such as databases and transmedia, take this model into consideration? Could they provide a more complete and modern associative relations model?

4. Model contemplation

Saussure's model does not seem to be fully complete in the context of current technological developments: in this time where we see changing behavior and attitudes towards information processing and usage, we have to take these new innovations into account and re-apply them to this semiotic model of navigational possibilities. Nowadays, when databases are packed with information and are constantly expanding, there is the possibility of completely rearranging the way we compose texts. There seems to be infinite possibilities for encoding messages, narratives and media but the importance is the actual encoding of those messages by the database, resulting from the given user input, in order to create valuable discourse with the user.

4.1. A database of possibilities

When looking into the understanding of a computer-system's works when it comes to generating signs and meaning we see that the system is a dynamic machine that makes up the string of signs (code) because of the generated input by the user. This constant importation of information in return generates a complex and tailor-made code back to the user. But the databases accessed by the dynamic machine are infinite and constantly expanding because of the constant import of (new) information by users. It is then due to this that the options become infinite and the order of signs are no longer fixed; they are completely dependent on the input by the user. The order ceases to be prescribed by writers, directors or other content creators. As an example, this paper is a finite document which is to be read in the order as prescribed, however when accessing a system that has unlimited possibilities of which the output depends on the given input, there is no longer a clear understanding of where text starts or ends cleanly. Especially the works of Aarseth (1997) and his notion on cybertext and ergodic literature apply here. However, our thoughts on his works and those in the perspective of semiotics have already been described in Bouwknecht's (2011) earlier works. But the importance of a linear, syntagmatic reading remains to ensure a logic and satisfactory understanding, and options and choices are then influenced by the context revolving around them.

When considering our primary associative relations model, we see that all these paradigmatic decisions and choices can be unlimited, but are limited by developers to provide a clear and coherent service or product. The syntagmatic linearity on the other hand is one that has to be used if developers want to ensure a natural and intuitive design and choice process for their users.

4.2. Addition to the model

Where Saussure expresses different kinds of linguistic features, being words, a newer model taking the digital possibilities has been created by Bouwknecht (2011) in his book, *Beyond the Simulacrum*. He has already highlighted and researched a translation of the initial model to one that is concerned with all possible signs, platforms or even narratives. It is these findings made by Bouwknecht that create a larger understanding of digital media usage and choice.

Here the database of unlimited signs becomes particularly significant once more. Bouwknecht states that the interaction between the user and database is one of the vital aspects when it comes to the usage and understanding of the database. Whenever the user provides the system with input, the system has to encode a specific message. Here it becomes clear that the system relies on the input given by the user and cannot provide meaningful discourse on its own.¹ (2011)

¹ Bouwknecht makes a specific reference to Baudrillard's simulacrum. Since the simulacrum is not applicable for this thesis, but important to understand Bouwknecht's findings. The simulacrum that states there is less and less truth, because we base our reality on something that we (mankind) have devised (in film and media) (1998:

This would mean that even though the media can display all kinds of signs that refer to the state of reality, they could only imply this reality instead of *being* the reality. In order to become the actual reality, media needs the unlimited resource to all possible signs and codes. By making the user information permanent and apparent, databases and the use of these databases are improved to a higher level in which producers and developers are completely aware of the consumption behavior of the users of media.




Fig. 3: Network of signs.

The model of Bouwknecht as shown (figure 3) above is one that shows “whether signs are coded logically by algorithms or coded culturally. All respective levels are related and can influence each other” (2011: 122).

Even though the axes of syntagms and paradigms are replaced with respectively cultural and logic references, we can still view this model as one that could have the same purpose. All individual encoded signs relate to one another in a specific way. The logical, and therefore syntagmatic process is due to the exact and intuitive choices made in paradigmatic options provided to the user. Bouwknecht did see there is an additional level to this already, and how they correlate (figure 4).




Fig. 4: Hierarchy model.

p166). An example of a 'simulacrum' is that everyone knows how a crashing airplane looks like. But we know this because we have seen this on television. The 'knowledge' of this image is not based on our own truth, but the truth is created on TV.

It are these relations and correlations that each individual sign has that contribute partly to the creation of understanding. One could interpret each sign differently, by involving this hierarchy within every sign; the database can exclude those signs with a high risk of misinterpretation by means of mis-encoding messages. The codes here cease to remain superficial and create another deeper layer of meaning when generating strings of signs.

The discussion of Saussure's and Bouwknegt's model of associative relations mentioned before and the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations could very well use an addition. As seen before, each sign or medium refers to known, associative meanings. But there is more to it; each sign or medium does not only reference to that exact point, at the same time it represents the actual transmedia world and its (flow of) design. This would consequently mean an extra axis could be added to Saussure's initial model. This would be the profundity axis that stands for the representation of the actual media channel itself and not only reference to associative meanings. The model would then look more like the following.




Fig. 5: Addition to model.

How does this addition to Saussure's and Bouwknegt's models work in practice? Every square represents a sign or a transmedia media channel. The desired linear, and thus syntagmatic, discovery is determined by the exact paradigmatic choices made by audiences that are motivated to travel across platforms by means of negative capability and migratory cues. Moreover, each medium and reference already represents a deeper understanding of the world; this would explain the addition of profundity to the model and narrative.

When breaking down this model to one code, it is possible to get a firm grasp on the meta-semiotic design and its relation with developing transmedia (figure 6).




Fig. 6: Meta-semiotic design.

Here, square number I represents the apparent design of a transmedia channel. This means it stands for an actual media type on which a story of the transmedia world is being told. Square number II however, is the underlying code that signifies the migratory cues in such a transmedia franchise. It is the subtle reference to other media types and stories to engage as much people as possible.

Most important here, is square number III, which represents the entire model. This is the meta-semiotic design of the transmedia story, which is the driving force to steer the complete transmedia franchise into a logical syntagmatic sequence. Because of the overarching design, the viewer has enough understanding to make the step for another medium.

With this model, Saussure's associative relations model has been translated to the digital world of possibilities and transmedia in particular. This model provides transmedia developers with a structural understanding and it captures the way they are able to steer and navigate audiences across different platforms. Moreover does this model show a practical application of transmedia because it portrays the transmedia meta narrative, a dynamic system that by means of the aforementioned tools can be steered in its discovery.

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ADAPTATION OF VIDEO GAMES INTO FILMS: THE ADVENTURES OF THE NARRATIVE

Maria Katsaridou
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
mkatsaridou@gmail.com

Abstract

In the past, the most common adaptations were first made from literary texts to films and only after that, to video games. Recently, this order started to reverse and more and more frequently, video games are produced first and then transferred to film. The reason that makes games being transferred easily to movies is their many similarities: games incorporate many cinematic features, aesthetics, and narrative. But while there are so many similarities between games and films, there is a big difference, that is interactivity or in the words of Brown and Krzywinska (2009): "...that a game has to be played".

This paper takes as a case study the adaptations of survival horror games into films and more specifically the adaptations of Resident Evil (original title Biohazard, Capcom) video games. Through a Greimasian narratological/semiotic analysis of the Resident Evil's texts, this paper aims first to examine the adaptation of an interactive medium such as games into films, as well as the narratological consequences of the process and second to address theoretical issues concerning video games' narrative.

1. Introduction

In the past the most common adaptations were primarily from literature texts to films and only secondarily into video games. Recently this paradigm has begun to change, as we are witnessing an increasingly growing number of video game adaptations into films, "one of the most immersive forms of adaptation" (MacArthur et al. 2009: xx). This development is not surprising if we take into account the increasing profits of the games industry which often compete with or in some cases overshadow the profits of the film industry. Also, as stated by Brown and Krzywinska (2009: 86) (the increasing numbers of movie-game tie-ins is due to their many

similarities since “Like film, digital games are screen-based, and as such utilize many cinematic features, providing thereby one of the more basic and formal reasons for the increasing numbers of movie-game tie-ins “while in parallel they are stressing out a central difference, which is the games’ interactivity: “yet what defines games generally, distinguishing them from other media, is that a game has to be played.”

Taking into account this difference, this essay examines the adaptation of video games that are belonging to survival horror genre into films and more specifically Resident Evil video game instalments (Capcom 1996-2013) into films which can be considered, at least commercial, very successful: Resident Evil film series have grossed more than \$900 million to date, with each film making more money than the last (boxofficemojo 2014: n.p.). The series also holds the record for the “Most Live-Action Film Adaptations of a Video Game” in the 2012 Guinness World Records Gamer’s Edition.

2. Games as narratives

Recently we have witnessed a heated debate among game theorists as to whether it is legitimate to analyze the games as narratives or not. We will not enter into the details of this controversy as this is not our subject here, but it is useful to point out that even though ludology suggests that video games are radically different from narratives as communicative structures and thus not “eligible” to be analyzed with the use of narratology, not all of the ludologists deny the relation between narratives and video games. For example Espen Aarseth in his book *Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature* (1997) states: „To claim that there is no difference between games and narratives is to ignore essential qualities of both categories. And yet...the difference is not clear-cut, and there is significant overlap between the two“ (Aarseth 1997: 5). Following Aarseth’s reasoning, although this essay analyzes games as narratives, it also acknowledges the necessity of a ludological approach and the input that it has to offer in an analysis

In order to analyze *Resident Evil* texts, we have applied Algirdas Julien Greimas , *actantial model*. Based upon Vladimir Propp’s *Morphology of the Folk Tale* (Propp 1968 [1928]) and his syntagmatic analysis of the narrative structure into thirty-one functions, Greimas (1983 [1966]) replaced it with six *actants* which are abstract elements of the deep structure of the narrative. In other words, Greimas proposed a methodology towards a paradigmatic analysis of narrative structure. Greimas distinguishes the actants into three pairs of oppositional value: subject – object, giver – receiver and helper – opponent. For Greimas *actors* are abstract elements too, but in antithesis to actants which are structures of the general narrative syntax, actors are the manifestations of the actants in a specific narrative. By applying Greimas model, all games from the simpler to most complicated ones can be analyzed as narratives with the gamer in many cases taking the position of the narrator. Given that there are many different types of games that offer various degrees of autonomy to the players concerning their narrative, we could generally say that if we sum up all the individual narratives of the players of a game we acquire the story world of the game or in other words, the semiotic system of the game.

3. Resident Evil games

The first *Resident Evil* video game was released by the Japanese company Capcom (1996) establishing the *survival horror* genre in games and it is also one of the first games to implement the zombie apocalypse. While it is not the first game of the horror genre, in fact the first game of the genre is considered to be *Alone in the Dark* (Infogrames 1992) and it was influenced by many preceding games with a horror theme such as *Sweet Home* (Capcom 1989) and *Haunted House* (Atari 1982), *Resident Evil*, along with *Silent Hill* (Conami 1999-2012) video games, are considered to be the most emblematic games of the genre. After the first release and its huge

commercial success, more than fourteen *Resident Evil* installments were produced with the total number to depend on the game platform we are referring to, such as xbox, playstation, wii, Nintendo etc. and since today five live action and two animation film adaptations were based upon the Resident Evil game series, not to mention adaptations to short films, books, comics and other media.

The games follow the structure and the stereotypes of the horror genre that are based on pre-existing literary sources such as Edgar Allan Poe's (1809 – 1849) and Howard Phillips Lovecraft's (1890 – 1937) texts while the specific stereotype of the undead, the zombies owes much to Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818), Bram Stoker's *Dracula* (1897) and more recently George Andrew Romero's films like *Night of the Living Dead* (Romero 1968).

Survival horror games generally and Resident Evil games specifically, even though they contain action elements, they have as their basic characteristics the feeling of fear that they evoke to the players, the awareness of constant lack of safety, the hostile environment either in the sense of a place that was familiar to the hero before a horrific incident transformed it to something hostile and dangerous or of a place that is totally unknown and perilous and also a strong feeling of weakness and isolation. Combat is part of the gameplay as the players have to confront and win their enemies achieve their goals and survive. Usually they feel less powerful than their enemies due to the limited ammunition, strength and health that the games provide them. Consequently, unlike action games, here the basic purpose of the gamers is not to "kill" their enemies but to survive in this unfriendly, hostile world passing through dark and many times claustrophobic locations full of monsters ready to attack them at any step, any corner. The players have to control their fear in order to survive and finish the game and decide when they have to fight, using their limited ammunitions and when to flee so as not to fall prey to their enemies. The enemies that the players have to defeat are monstrous, unnatural. While they were once people, they became something that should not exist. In other words the natural laws have been violated turning the world into something 'other' and terrifying.

The players also have to do a lot of puzzle – solving and to find items that then are used to unlock their path to new locations. It is important to stress that in survival horror games the narrative is usually very well constructed and has such limitations per se: for example there is a limited number of characters that the players can choose to play with, and even though the gamers can wander around different locations of the game world, they actually have very specific choices to make in order to survive and to end the game. Specifically at Resident Evil games there are very few alternative endings per character in comparison to other games.

3.1 Basic storyline of *Resident Evil* games

The basic storyline of the games involves the creation and spread of artificially created lethal viruses or ancient parasites mainly by the evil company Umbrella Corporation but also by other groups of bioterrorists and in parallel, the effort of the heroes the majority of whom belong to a special team, the Special Tactics And Rescue Service task force (S.T.A.R.S.), to survive and to stop Umbrella and the bioterrorists from destroying the world. In their effort they have to confront various monstrous creatures like zombie dogs, monstrous snakes and spiders, humans infected by the virus who have become bloodthirsty zombies etc. In most of the games the pattern is that most of the citizens of an infected area have become zombies while the uninfected are fighting for their lives in their effort to escape the infected area. At *Resident Evil 4* and *Resident Evil: Code Veronica* we encounter a religious cult that uses a breed of ancient parasites to turn humans into mind-controlled victims. The religious cults is another very common theme in survival horror games, for example it consists a key motif in *Silent Hill* video games.

3.2 *Resident Evil* live film series

Resident Evil (Anderson 2002), is the first movie of the series followed by: *Resident Evil: Apocalypse* (Witt 2004), *Resident Evil: Extinction* (Mulcahy 2007), *Resident Evil: Afterlife* (Anderson 2010), *Resident Evil: Retribution* (Anderson 2012) while the production of the 6th film of the series *Resident Evil: The Final Chapter* (Anderson) has already been announced. The basic plot of the films follows the adventures of Alice which is the heroine of the series, who is trying to survive, stop the evil Umbrella Corporation and restore the natural laws. In the films like in the games, lethal viruses transforms people to zombies. Unlike the homonymous protagonist in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (Carroll 1992 [1865]) who lives her adventures in an "other", fantasy world and finally she returns to her ordinary, familiar world, for Alice in *Resident Evil* there is no way out: she has to confront her enemies in her "real" world, which has transformed into a dystopian place. The heroine has to face zombies, monsters and even clones of herself in her attempt to beat the "evil" and save herself and humanity.

4. What is transferred from the games to the films?

4.1 The viewers

From the big and general pool of the films' viewers there are two categories that stand out: the gamers and the fans of the horror genre. These categories overlap: many fans of the horror genre are also gamers and have played *Resident Evil* series while others are only viewers and had never played any of the game installments. In any case, the gamers and the horror fans comprise a big part of the movies audience which is crucial for the commercial success or failure of the movies. Therefore this is the audience that the production company has to satisfy.

Bearing the specific audience's demands and the variety of the viewers who are both gamers and non-gamers in mind, as well as the basic differences between games and movies, that is, the interactivity, it is quite interesting to examine the choices that have been made during the transfer.

4.2 Analysis

The narratives of the fourteen games and five films were analyzed by applying Greimas' methodology as it is explained above. Unsurprisingly due to the large number of the texts under analysis even though the deep structure of the games and films is the same, the plots are different. More specifically, while the deep structure of the narratives and the functions of the actants coincide in games and in movies, there is no „faithful“ transfer of the plot or the actors of any specific narrative from games to films.

The subject, the hero in the live action movies is Alice and her character does not appear in any game. On the other hand, the games' heroes in some films don't exist at all and in some others have secondary roles. For example the basic actors of the first *Resident Evil* game are: demolitions expert Jill Valentine and sharpshooter Chris Redfield both members of the same team, the *Special Tactics and Rescue Service Task Force* (S.T.A.R.S.). We encounter Jill Valentine at the second movie, while the nemesis character was hunting down the remaining members of the team but Chris Redfield isn't introduced to the viewer until the fourth movie and they find him in the basement of a prison. Apparently, according to the films plot, he was never a member of S.T.A.R.S. and has no idea who Jill is. In the fifth movie they introduced Leon and Barry into the movie franchise. The only problem is that Leon has been a main game character since *Resident Evil 2* and even had *Resident Evil 4* all to himself. In most of the cases the games' subjects are taking the role of the helpers in the films.

Even if the heroes of the games didn't make it to the films, the opponents, the antagonists did. Most of the monsters and enemies have been transferred to the films while the ones that didn't

make it, is probably due to their grotesque nature: for example the live action movies never incorporated the „red head“ zombies, which is what happens to zombies that are not decapitated or burnt. The Umbrella Corporation, which is one of the main antagonists in the series, as it is responsible for the zombie apocalypse, keeps its role in the films too.

The object remains the same in all games and films: survival of the protagonists and saving the world from the evil.

The fundamental antithesis which governs both games and movies is that of zombies versus humans that is the antithesis between the undead and the living, the unnatural versus the natural.

While the unnatural has the negative connotations of evil, monstrous and sinister, the natural on the other hand connotes the good, human and familiar. This antithesis is present in most texts belonging to the horror genre.

Moreover, the game constitutes a world that is absolutely familiar and known to the gamers. The gamers know its laws, its feeling, its aesthetics and what can happen in this world or not. Their characters „live“ and belong to this world. For any film to be considered as a successful transfer for the gamer-viewers, it has to exist within this universe. Even if the film is about another, unknown to the gamer-viewer hero that does not exist in the games, it can be thought of as successful only if the transfer respects the universe and the rules of the game, namely its deep structure that is largely defined by the genre. So, following the rules of the genre, the part of the audience who do not belong to the category of the players is satisfied as well since they belong to the fans of the horror genre generally.

5. Horror genre as a cultural pool.

As mentioned above, *Resident Evil* game series are based upon the already existent genre philology in the already established codes and conventions and the already existent stereotypes. In the same way, the films based on horror games primarily follow the same codes and conventions.

Thus the genre could be seen as a common cultural pool from which both the games and the films draw their material from.

In almost all the *Resident Evil*'s texts the human/alive has to fight the undead/unnatural/monstrous and that is what all the stories is about. The zombies are not alive, not dead, so they are not natural, they are monstrous and thus they shouldn't exist. But in *Resident Evil 4* and *Resident Evil: Code Veronica* the opponents are not zombies but mind controlled people. The change from killing dead, monstrous creatures to killing alive mind controlled humans may not seem much of a change during the game play, but it is a huge difference in the whole universe of *Resident Evil*.

Taking into consideration all the above I argue that genre is important and many times with a shift in genre we get dissatisfied gamers/ viewers. An example from the *Resident's Evil*'s last game proves it: Capcom made a more „action oriented“ turn and even though Capcom characterized *Resident Evil 6* as „dramatic horror“, they got disappointed gamers, and critics: „Resident Evil 6's messy mix of annoying quick-time events and constant set pieces makes it a poor caricature of modern-day action games...this is no survival horror game, certainly“ (VanOrd 2012: n.p) „Is this what Capcom's legendary survival horror series has become? ...Capcom has abandoned any pretense of the survival horror genre and embraced a world of skin-deep Hollywood audacity“. (Sterling 2012: n.p).

The transfers of *Resident Evil* games to films can be considered successful not because they transfer the exact plot or the actors-heroes, but because of the transfer of the monsters, the zombies, the atmosphere of the game and the feelings of suspense and fear, that is the elements taken

from the horror genre. What horror video games — labelled survival or not — actually offer is similar to what the mainstream contemporary horror cinema proffers. To refer to the well-known expression of Isabel Pinedo, it's a «bounded experience of fear» (1996: 25 and 2004: 106). (Perron 2005: n.p). Both the games and the films are based upon the need of the human beings to feel fear, so that when the game or the film ends, they can take a look at their known environment around them and feel safe: The monsters have been killed and the world has presumed its relieving familiarity one more time.

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ANALYSE DU DISCOURS DE LA PIÈCE *PALABRAS VERTICALES (DES MOTS VERTICAUX)* DE RAFAEL LOPEZ MALO

María del Socorro Merlín de Pérez Rincón
Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes y Literatura, México
socorromerlin@hotmail.com

Résumé

Le modèle d'action dramatique de la pièce *Palabras verticales* « Des mots verticaux » de Rafael López Malo, écrivain Mexicain, réalise une combinaison de théâtre et de narration. Les didascalies sont écrites avec un langage à la fois narrative et poétique. Le discours des minces dialogues des personnages (six personnes et un tapis) montrent une charge idéologique investie sur la critique d'Art, le théâtre et les coutumes de l'époque de sa création (1931). L'auteur signale que la pièce doit être jouée derrière le rideau ayant comme seule publique les techniciens du théâtre et les acteurs. En laissant en dehors la figure du tiers comme publique l'activité du Moi du locuteur relaye la relation avec l'Autre de façon inter-subjective ; le Moi de l'auteur joue et est joué dans la relation avec les techniciens et les acteurs (CHAREAUDEAU). Le discours de López Malo est imprégné de métaphores. Le décor est signalé avec un récit poétique redevable d'une analyse sémiotique. Ce récit reflète la relation du Moi de l'auteur avec le monde. La métonymie permet ainsi au personnage « le tapis » d'assassiner le Temps avec un couteau. Cette pièce était très en avance pour son époque, et elle peut être mise en parallèle avec le théâtre « post-dramatique » de nos jours qui refuse le modèle aristotélicien.

J'ai fait la découverte de cette pièce de théâtre à la suite de ma quête d'information pour mon projet de recherche nommé *Le nationalisme des auteurs dramatiques Mexicains du décennie 1920-1930*. La pièce *Des mots verticaux* a été publiée en 1931 dans *Barandal* (tablette d'appui) (López Malo 1931), revue littéraire de courte vie et dont Rafael López Malo (1873–1943) a été le fondateur. Cette pièce a été écrite d'une façon tout à fait différente à celle du théâtre mexicain de son temps.

La méthodologie pour son analyse fait appel au système théâtral, à la rhétorique, et à la figure du Tiers d'après Graciela Montes et Patrick Chareaudeau (2009). Les figures utilisées par le dramaturge sont un recours habile pour montrer son discours politique. La fable s'éloigne complètement de la poétique aristotélicienne.

Les symboles du contexte cachent la signification d'un problème social: la lutte entre dominants et dominés. L'auteur y utilise la satire et l'allégorie. Le titre et le sous-titre: *Des mots verticaux. Drame en deux actes avec six personnages et un tapis* dénote l'utilisation préférent du paradigme diachronique de la langue dans une réalité outre que la quotidienne. La première didascalie annonce que le rideau ne se lèvera jamais parce que l'art doit être réservé aux minorités et ce pour cela que l'écrivain détermine que la pièce est destinée seulement aux acteurs et à la brigade de théâtre (machinistes, décorateurs, illuministes, sonidistes). Il n'y a pas de publique en face du rideau. Néanmoins le Moi de l'auteur s'adresse à un Tiers comme récepteur absent et aux Tiers déjà signalés (les acteurs et la brigade).

Le macro-discours du texte mets en évidence l'idéologie de l'auteur et fait référence au gout du publique de son temps. Les agents du champ théâtral avaient encore, à cette époque, une perception de l'Art tout à fait typique du dix-neuvième siècle. Il met aussi en évidence les relations de pouvoir symbolique qui s'établissaient entre ces agents et les instances culturelles (Bourdieu 2010: 69).

Le théâtre a presque toujours des doubles locutoires et des doubles-allocutaires – dramaturge-acteurs, acteurs-publique. Dans la pièce de López Malo, où le publique est absent, le Moi de l'auteur est le Tiers de la communication des acteurs et il agit par l'intermédiaire du récit des didascalies concernant le décor et les dialogues des acteurs. Le Moi de l'auteur joue et il est joué sur la scène à rideau fermé. La brigade est le Tiers absent-présent (Ubersfeld 2003). Quand les machinistes et les chargés du son s'occupent du décor et des effets du son ils jouent pour l'auteur et pour les acteurs, mais au même temps ils sont les Tiers du discours du premier et des dialogues des seconds. Le récit des didascalies est peuplé par des images qui sont par soi mêmes des actes de parole. Il y a en plus, dans la narration, des verbes qui signalent une action.

Il y a entre les paradoxes du théâtre – comme bien le signale Iuri Lotman – (Lotman 2000) les oppositions de l'existante et le non-existante, le significatif et le non-significatif:

L'espace scénique se distingue pour un haut degré de saturation de signes: tous ceux qui entre dans la scène acquièrent la tendance à se saturer des sens complémentaires par rapport à la fonction objectale directe de la chose. Le mouvement deviens geste, et la chose, un détail porteur de signifié (Lotman 2000: 66).

C'est justement ce qui se passe, avec intensité, dans la pièce *Des mots verticaux*. Le texte commence avec la suivante didascalie concernant le décor du Premier Acte:

Le décor représente un paysage déserteur de l'hiver, deux arbres que l'on voit, bien qu'il y en a d'autres moins visibles; une rivière qui ne se déborde pas tourmentant avec ses voix liquides aux personnages du drame; un divan littéraire ; un verre compact et une corde de violon produisant des sons imaginables, sauf le son surpris dans un cri musical émis par un mexicain dépourvu de tympan. (Acte I)

D'accord avec le récit des didascalies, l'ambiance correspond à un espace champêtre en printemps, avec rivière, arbres et oiseaux lesquels au cours de l'action sortiront en s'envolant de l'ombrelle de la jeune-fille. Au cours de l'action dramatique on écouterà le son

de l'écoulement de l'eau de la rivière et de la corde du violon sur le divan, métaphore de romantisme. Les voix de la rivière et du violon sont des signes de mouvement pas seulement dans le décor mais aussi sur la scène. Même la parole détient une théâtralité (Joly et Moreira da Silva 2013: 226–230).

D'après les signalements de l'auteur, le technicien chargé du son devrait soigner que celui-ci ne soit pas discordant. Ce discours poétique-kitsch, teint de satire, renvoie aux mélodrames de boulevard parisiens qui ont connu un bon succès au Mexique aux années 1920.¹ L'éloignement de l'atmosphère idyllique initiale par cette phrase de la réalité quotidienne renvoie à un actant collectif: les chanteurs de la radio ou «mariachis» qui poussaient des cris avec des voix de stentors.

Le décor du second Acte, qui se déroule vingt ans après, conserve les éléments de celui du premier: la rivière, les meubles, mais peu de bosquet. L'auteur y ajoute un pont comme indication de civilisation, souligne. Ce changement dénote en prospective l'invasion des bâtiments en béton qui a souffert la Ville de Mexico à partir des années 1930. Les brèves modifications du paysage de ce second Acte contrastent avec les changements profonds subis par la société mexicaine pendant ce période.

Les personnages protagonistes de *Palabras verticales* sont des allégories: deux jeunes personnes un homme et une femme que l'auteur nomme par des pronoms: Lui et Elle, et un tapis mis-persane mi-newyorkais qui parle et qui joue à la fin de la pièce pour la clore de façon furtive. Il y a en plus un chœur formé par quatre voix qui jouera une seule fois pour réciter un vers de Jean Cocteau. N'ayant pas l'auteur signalé de quel poème il s'agit, il pourrait bien être le suivant: «C'est la lyre, c'est la lyre, /C'est la lyre du matin, /Qui ne sait pas encore lire, /Pas lire encore son destin.» (Cocteau [1925–1927] 1959: 103). Les voix de ces acteurs que l'on ne voit jamais sont aussi des Tiers absents-présents. Sa seule apparition sur scène est uniquement sonore: le poème est déclamé derrière un paravent à la fin du premier Acte quand Elle acquiert une attitude hiératique.

Les deux personnages se montrent au minime premier Acte comme des jeunes personnes de classe élevée, qui réfléchissent habillés *ad hoc* dans un cadre romantique. En revanche, au second Acte – également minime –, Elle, qui est devenue une dresseuse d'hommes, apparaît avec une fouette tandis que son compagnon, avec le tors nu, reconnaît que sa générosité chevaleresque lui a perdu. Nous sommes devant deux personnages qui parlent sans s'inter-communiquer. Il s'agit d'un parler solitaire d'après Anne Ubersfeld:

[...] un parler qui se contente avec la libération des charges qu'endure l'Ego devant un auditoire anonyme – même absent –, une espèce de libération abstraite que n'attend point de réponse ou en tout cas seule la réponse virtuelle d'une collectivité sans visage ((Ubersfeld 2003: 9–26).

La citation d'Anne Ubersfeld a été prise d'un texte utilisant la sémiotique pour l'analyse des pièces du théâtre français du XXI^e siècle. Il est fort intéressant, donc, de l'appliquer à un auteur

¹ Selon Hélène Kuntz, la satire, à partir des années 1920, avait l'influence de *l'agit prop* de Lunatcharsky, commissaire soviétique de la éducation, qui l'avait qualifiée en 1928 comme «prototype de la vraie satire théâtrale révolutionnaire» (Kuntz 201: 215–218), en allusion au *Mystère bouffe* de Mayakovski.

Mexicain devancier qui a employé des recours dramatiques inusuels pour son temps.

Les acteurs ne prononcent que sept tirades au premier Acte et deux au second. Je les reproduis:

Premier Acte:

Le tapis se présent de profil.

Elle: *(qui retourne à recueillir un clin d'œil qui a laissé oublié lors de sa dernière expédition panoramique)* – Je voudrais voir la rivière convertie en un étang d'insinuations.

Lui: *(en s'arrangeant la cravate somnolente)* – Une voix réveille en moi le souvenir de mon antérieur voyage à ce salon campagnard; je me souviens que je le portais allongé dans les «grottes de la conscience» comme le penserait Gerardo Diego.²

Elle: – Ah! Quelle surprise! Le chevalier des cheveux logarithmiques.

Lui: – Aimée passante, je n'oublie pas les dix yeux agiles de tes ongles.

Elle: *(en ouvrant une ombrelle que laisse échapper quelques oiseaux)* – Je vais consulter le chéquier de tes phrases.

Lui: *(il reste muet. On écoute au fond le son de la corde du violon).*

Elle: *(après une pause qui aura les dimensions du vent)* – Je veux devenir la capitaine des vagues et toi m'en empêches. *(Elle pleure et au lieu des larmes s'écoulent par le versant du visage, comme des chevaux de la pampa, des lettres des affiches lumineuses qui se perdent dans l'obscurité des mots).*

Le chœur, avec une voix qui semble en provenance de l'épaisseur des rayons du soleil, entonne les strophes du poème.

Second Acte:

Elle: – Voici ma philosophie: les hommes peuvent se partager en deux groupes. D'un côté les débiles; à ceux-ci avec un cri on leurs dominant. De l'autre côté les puissants, néanmoins ils ne le sont pas tant parce qu'ils cèdent devant le siège des larmes ou devant le sillon d'une sourire. Je suis un stratège du sexe.

Lui: – La générosité chevaleresque m'a perdu! Mort à la générosité chevaleresque dorénavant!

(Après la dernière tirade une pluie de miettes de pain tombe du toit qu'un machiniste recueille; le tapis se redresse et prenne rapidement un couteau. Il s'adresse alors au divan:

Le Tapis: J'ai accompli ma destinée. J'ai assassiné le Temps. J'ai tué le suprême assassin. Maintenant je peux mourir. On puisse me dépecer, me déchiqueter, me convertir en une corde qu'arrive au fond de la mer. De surface on peut me transmuter en ligne. J'ai tué le Temps. *(Le paysage s'efface. Le rideau reste debout, vertical, un peu fatigué).*

Les dialogues de la pièce de López Malo possèdent un puissant contenu polysémique. Iuri Lotman signale: «La contradiction entre le réel et l'illusoire forme ce domaine des signifiés sémiotiques où vit chaque texte artistique. Une des particularités du texte scénique est la diversité des langages qu'utilise» (Lotman 2000: 69).

Dans les dialogues de la pièce on peut découvrir ces caractéristiques par le langage fort particulier adopté par les personnages au cours des deux Actes et par le contraste des actions des jeunes personnes et du tapis.

Dans le premier Acte, ce n'est pas la première fois que la jeune-fille a été sur ce lieu. Elle

2 Gerardo Diego (1896–1987) poète Espagnol qui a influencé Rafael López Malo.

est de retour au paysage pour recueillir «un clin d'œil oublié». Celui-ci est un signe adressé au récepteur absent et aux Tiers présentes. Le clin d'œil donne un signifié à toutes ses actions; il est une métonymie du discours. C'est la vérité-mensonge de la scène. Elle exprime une phrase qui renvoie au parler silencieux que signifie le désir, comme reflet de sa pensée. Elle fait référence à son interlocuteur bien qu'elle n'adresse pas la phrase directement à Lui. Lui fait de même. Il se souvient de son antérieure visite laquelle restait comme souvenir allongé dans la conscience, phrase qui renvoie au sommeil et au rêve.

Tous les deux ont des souvenirs: Lui des dix yeux agiles des ongles d'elle, signe de son caractère; et celle-ci se souvient des cheveux logarithmiques de Lui, signe aussi de son caractère pratique à lui. Ce sont des métaphores qui ont été dites auparavant parce elles fonctionnent comme le référent du chéquier de phrases qu'elle consulte et emporte avec elle. Puis, la jeune-fille retourne à ses désirs: elle veut devenir capitaine des vagues, c'est à dire la dominante; phrase adressé à soie même et à un Tiers absent, pas à Lui. Ses pleurs signifient sa frustration pour ne pas être la dominante, et sur son visage, signale la didascalie, glissent, comme des larmes, des lettres lumineuses. On peut interpréter qu'il s'agit là d'une métaphore de ses pensées cachées. Les tirades de la jeune-fille sont frappantes tandis que celles de son partenaire sont plus floues.

Dans les tirades du second Acte, il n'y a pas d'intercommunication: les personnages n'attendent pas de réponse, ils personnifient le parler solitaire. Ses mots sont des mises en acte des réflexions des réussites d'Elle, qui enfin est devenue la dominante, et de la frustration de Lui qui est devenu le dominé. Cette transformation a eu lieu au cours des vingt ans que signale l'auteur. Elle est devenue un stratège du sexe parce qu'elle a réussie à cataloguer les hommes et à les traiter comme il convient à ses catégories. Lui se plaint d'y avoir cédé. Les deux personnages sont métonymie des changements constants de la société et des réussites des femmes. La pièce de López Malo paraît renvoyer ici à celles de sa contemporaine, la dramaturge Catalina d'Erzel, qui dans la même époque avait mise en scène des pièces qui prônaient les droits des femmes.

Le tapis, que pendant toute l'action dramatique n'avait pas bougé, devient le protagoniste à la fin de la pièce. Étant donné qu'aucun être humain ne peut assassiner le Temps, le tapis, devenu un symbole significatif du Théâtre, démontre que dans l'espace scénique tout peut y arriver, le réel et le fantastique. La non-existence du Temps qui règle le passé et l'avenir, permet la seule existence du présente – l'ici et le maintenant – du Théâtre. Le tapis est la métonymie des désirs de l'auteur et des Tiers absents-présents. Lotman écrit à ce propos:

Le caractère illusoire du signe tiens à ce que celui-ci paraît désigner quelque chose de différente à son aspect externe. Il faut ajouter à ceci que dans la sphère de l'Art augmente de façon soudaine la polysémie du plan du contenu. La contradiction entre le réel et l'illusoire forme le domaine des signifiés sémiotiques où vive chaque texte artistique (Lotman 2000: 69).

La petite pièce de López Malo possède ainsi plusieurs caractéristiques: il est du Théâtre minimal, la pièce s'éloigne tout à fait de la poétique aristotélicienne. Il s'agit d'un texte polysémique qui combine le récit avec l'action dramatique. Ce recours est apparu de façon profuse seulement à partir des deux dernières décades avec le théâtre dit postmoderne. L'utilisation de symboles et des tropes offre un texte se référant en profondeur à des situations sociales de son temps. La pièce possède un code particulier. Le récepteur, bien qu'il ne se trouve pas devant la scène comme publique, c'est quand même un «autre», une espèce de voyeur qui reçoit l'information au moyen des images virtuelles et des sensations multiples au même temps qu'il reçoit une

provocation à de-codifier la micro-poétique de l'auteur.

Selon Graciela Montes et Patrick Chareaudeau:

L'activité de relations avec l'autre détermine un espace dans lequel le Moi se voit confronté à l'autre de la communication dans une relation d'altérité intersubjective, un autre que peut-être un Toi ou un Lui (2009: 17).

Les personnages de la pièce sont confrontés avec un Tiers plus que d'être confrontés entre eux. Ils sont au même temps des acteurs (Moi) et des Tiers (Toi, Lui) parce que les didascalies, en plus de guider le décor et l'action dramatique, structurent le récit avec un discours politique-social qu'oblige à réfléchir sur le statut de l'Art comme expression élitiste, sur les changements du milieu et des habitudes des jeunes de la ville, et sur la lutte permanente entre dominants et dominés. Les signes du décor sont des réels-non réels, ils sont des métaphores comme les lettres lumineuses qui ruissellent sur le visage de la jeune-fille ou les oiseaux que surgissent de son ombrelle. La métonymie objectivée joue et devienne geste dans le temps et dans l'espace scénique campagnarde et suburbaine.

La pièce de Rafael López Malo a reçu une claire influence du Futurisme italien et du Mouvement artistique Mexicain appelé Stridentisme. (Flores 2010: 37-77). Les deux mouvements avaient un caractère subversif, avaient pris parti pour l'actualité, pour les avances de la science et la technique; ils étaient contre tout ce qui était classique et caduque, ils avaient l'aspiration de rompre avec les modèles des arts. *Des mots verticaux* a aussi influence du Manifeste ULTRA établi par l'Espagnol Rafael Cansinos Assens (1882-1964) que demandait la rénovation culturelle et proposait le concept de verticalité, dont la signification s'adresse à la modernité. Les proclamés et les poèmes de ce mouvement étaient écrits de façon verticale en référence aux tours d'électricité, aux gratte-cieux et aux tours des puits pétroliers.

La pièce analysée doit être qualifiée de postmoderne parce qu'elle possède les mêmes caractéristiques définitoires établies par Hans-Thies Lehmann:

Dans le théâtre post dramatique devient loi l'infraction à la règle conventionnaliste et à la norme de la densité des plus ou moins établi [...] tout comme le rêve appelait à une conception, différente du signe, le nouveau théâtre nécessite une sémiotique «débloquée» et une interprétation «turbulente» (Lehmann 2002: 130-131).

La pièce de López Malo ne fût jamais jouée. Le canon des arts et le gout du publique de l'année 1930 ne l'auraient pas permis. Néanmoins le texte publié, relu avec un regard actuel, nous offre la possibilité de recomposer l'histoire du théâtre Mexicain.

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AUTOFICTION OR WRITING ABOUT ONE'S SELF: AESTHETIC ELEMENTS IN NEW LITERATURE – CONSIDERED THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF HERVÉ GUBERT'S WORKS

Miki Okubo
Universite Paris 8, France
mimi.okb@gmail.com

Abstract

Quant à l'écriture contemporaine, nous sommes fréquemment témoin d'une attitude audacieuse de ceux qui écrivent, même plutôt exhibitionniste pour exposer leur vie intime, non seulement dans le domaine de la littérature mais aussi dans les activités des amateurs. Ce constat phénoménal serait issu de la nouvelle situation environnementale dans notre société de l'information: nous avons souvent des moyens pour publier un texte sur un espace virtuel tels le blog et les réseaux sociaux grâce à l'accès internet, cette ouverture nous encourage de nous engager passionnément dans une activité ludique: écrire sur le moi, ma vie et mon histoire intime.

Comme genres littéraires, le terme d'« autofiction » n'existait pas avant les années 1970. Ce fut Serge Doubrovsky, écrivain français, qui inventa ce nouveau genre littéraire pour définir sa propre œuvre, intitulée « Fils » (1977) dans laquelle l'auteur désira distinguer la fiction autobiographique d'avec l'autobiographie. L'autofiction est donc un terme qui porte un sens transdisciplinaire, notamment ces deux caractéristiques: la fiction et l'autobiographie. Toutefois, la caractéristique de l'« autofiction » elle-même était toujours présente dans les activités humaines à propos de l'écriture.

Par ailleurs, en France, Philippe Lejeune, théoricien de la littérature, notamment spécialiste de l'autobiographie, a publié « Le pacte autobiographique » (1971) dans lequel l'auteur a réalisé ses recherches riches sur une activité historiquement répandue en Europe: tenir un journal intime. Bien entendu, le journal intime n'est pas toujours un recueil des histoires vraies, comme démontra Sophie Calle, artiste française, à travers son ouvrage intitulée « Des histoires vraies » (2002). En jetant un regard sur les lieux de création littéraire, la relation entre l'écriture sur soi comme le journal intime et la littérature contemporaine est interactive et dynamique. À mon avis, il est grand temps de considérer cette problématique: enjeux esthétiques de l'autofiction

afin d'interpréter profondément une dernière tendance puissante dans la littérature.

Dans cette communication, j'analyserai certaines œuvres autobiographiques d'Hervé Guibert et le style d'écriture expérimental d'Hitomi Kanehara, ainsi que son œuvre intitulée « Autofiction » (2006).

1. Introduction

In contemporary writing, we often witness a daring, practically exhibitionist attitude, with authors revealing in intimate detail confidential aspects of their personal lives. Not only in literature but also in amateur writing, this new attitude is remarkable. This is due recent environmental developments in our information society. To be concrete, now that Internet access is widespread, we are able to publish anything we want on supports such as blogs and social media. This possibility of self-exposition encourages us to be passionately engaged in a ludic, but serious, activity: writing about our own lives, selves and stories.

As a literature genre, the term "autofiction" did not exist before the 1970s. Serge Doubrovsky¹, a French writer, introduced "autofiction" into the domain of literature with the publication of an autobiographical fiction titled *Fils* ("My sons", 1977). With this book, the author clearly distinguished autofiction from the autobiography; in autofiction, the author is the narrator and main character at the same time. The appellation of the protagonist can vary like "I", "he" or "she", and so on. Defining a work as autofiction is not a simple task because when a story is deeply based on a person's real life, it is difficult to work out whether it is a fictional or true story. However, when determining a work's literary value, it is not necessarily vital or interesting to know the truth. From a historical point of view, even before the invention of the term "autofiction," these characteristics already were present in literary expression.

In France, Philippe Lejeune, literary theoretician and specialist of the autobiography, published *Le pacte autobiographique* (1971), which detailed important research on diary keeping, an activity historically practiced in Europe. It is evident that a diary is not always a selection of real stories, as Sophie Calle demonstrated through her work titled *Des histoires vraies* ("true stories", 2002). Looking at diverse platforms of literary creation, there is an interactive and dynamic relationship between contemporary literature and literature focusing on "the self" (such as the diary). Let's consider this matter: what are the aesthetic elements of the autofiction as a recent trend in literature?

In this paper, I will analyze certain autobiographical works by Hervé Guibert and his experimental autofiction writing, with the intent of considering the aesthetic purpose of self-writing.

1.1. The life and works of Hervé Guibert

Hervé Guibert, journalist, photographer and writer-diarist, is considered as a pioneer of the literary genre "autofiction".

Hervé Guibert, born in 1955 in Saint-Cloud, France, died with AIDS in 1999, is known for his autobiographic and photographic works. Born into French society after the World Wars, to a middle-class family composed of his parents, a sister and his great-aunts Suzanne and Louise (who played a important role in some of his literary works concerning familial themes, in *Mes parents* ("my parents"), for example), Guibert went on to study drama in La Rochelle in the drama club "*La Comédie de la Rochelle et du Centre Ouest*". He failed the entrance examination for *Institut des hautes études cinématographiques* (IDHEC) at the age of 18. Homosexual, his sentimental life revolved around many men, like Michel Foucault², whom he met for the first time in 1977, Thierry Jouno, director of the Sociocultural Centre for the deaf in Vincennes, and Vincent M., an old friends from his adolescence who inspired his novel *Fou de Vincent*.

Hervé Guibert was diagnosed with AIDS in 1988. Two years later, he published his roman

À l'ami qui ne m'a pas sauvé la vie ("to the friend who did not save my life"), which revealed his HIV status and made him well-known. In 1991, the year of his death, he completed a home-made film titled *La Pudeur ou l'impudeur* showing the last year during his battle against AIDS and pains from the many diseases he acquired. He died on December 27th 1991 and this film was released posthumously in January 1992.

Life with AIDS did not obstruct Guibert from writing, far from that. He became deeply involved in writing up until the end of his life, leaving behind fragments of text about himself, autobiographical articles and diaries concerning his sentimental life.

While Hervé Guibert published some of his early works in 1977, 1982 and 1983, the majority of his novels were published at the end of his life, between 1989 and 1991, that is, after his 1988 AIDS diagnosis.

2. When a real life becomes a fictional story: analysis of the creative process of Hervé Guibert

2.1. The initial purpose of diary

At the interview with François Jonquet, critic of the literature, Hervé Guibert declared:

Very often a written work is born because there is, inside a diary, a theme or character who, becoming too insistent, unshaking or brushing this daily equilibrium—moreover, I do not write in it everyday (I do not date it either). *Mes parents*, for example, is largely an extraction from my diary; *Fou de Vincent* entirely. The diary permits me to bridge between different universes: passing between stories about my great-aunts to erotic tales. My books are appendixes and the diary, the vertebra, the essential part. (Interview with François Jonquet³)

It is important to remark that his "books" are often accessory while the diary is "la colonne vertébrale, la chose essentielle" ("the vertebra, the essential thing").

L'été 76 je passe un été terrible avec mes parents à Porquerolles. Je suis atrocement amoureux de T. que j'ai connu six mois plus tôt ... Il m'écrit de temps en temps et les lettres que moi je lui écris deviennent si nombreuses et si torturées que je n'ai plus qu'à les faire passer sur un cahier. (...) Le cahier aux lettres d'amour est devenu un livre édité (...) : La mort propagande. (*Mes parents*, p.108)

[In the summer of 1976 I passed a terrible summer with my parents in Porquerolles. I was horribly crazy for T. whom I met six months before ... He writes to me from time to time and the letters I myself wrote to him became so numerous and so troublesome that I could not help but put them into a notebook. (...) The notebook for love letters became a published book (...): *La mort propaganda.*]

We can also remark that his diary originates from a kind of message board or love letter platform.

2.2. Intention of the diary publications

Among his many novels, although almost all of Hervé Guibert's works are based on the diary he kept for fifteen years, there are two works based entirely on extracts from his diary. They are *Mes parents* and *Fou de Vincent*. According to his interview with François Jonquet, his diary, considered as "the vertebra, the thing essential" by himself, was later published in 2001, with the title *Le Mausolée des amants, Journal 1976-1991*⁴, ten years after the author's death. The 361 page diary, typed by Hervé Guibert himself, was completed by Christiane Guibert, his successor, who added 35 pages⁵. Hervé Guibert had already been interested in the diary's publication in 1984 and proposed to Hector Bianciotti, editor of Gallimard.⁶ Bianciotti then offered to publish a work inspired by the diary. Their project became *Mes parents* (1986), one of the first works entirely based on his diary.

Two works made up entirely by extracts from Hervé Guibert's diary are, as mentioned above, *Mes parents* and *Fou de Vincent*. Hervé Guibert always appreciated the writing of Kafka and considered him as one of the best writers. Reading the diary of his forefather (*Le journal intime*, Franz Kafka), Guibert dreamed that one day, maybe after his death, his diary would be published and read by future lovers of literature like Kafka's diary. His love for Kafka is particularly remarkable in *La mort propagande*. According to Guibert, it is the first novel originating from the diary. However, from a purely autobiographical point of view, with chronologic investigation, there are several ambiguous points in this novel concerning dates and years as remarked his friend-witnesses and researchers. In this story, as in some other works, the author enjoys incarnating Kafka who also kept a diary. But, there are some notable differences between Guibert and Kafka's use of the diary. While Hervé Guibert used diary extracts directly, Kafka just used his diary for jotting down ephemeral ideas, as a kind of external memory to take advantage of later when weaving stories together.

The novel *Mes parents* is therefore literally a collection of extracts from Guibert's diary about memories of his parents. The first part starts with a scene where his great-aunt Suzanne reveals a dishonourable story from her mother's youth: the secret of the birth of Dominique, her older sister. The work has a strange structure with an autobiographical part and many reprises from other works.

Fou de Vincent published in 1989 is also a work constructed by extracts of Guibert's diary, focusing on the said adolescent "Vincent". In *Le Mausolée des amants, Journal 1976-1991*, Guibert relied on his diary for the realisation of this story. This story starts with Vincent's fall from the fourth floor, followed by his hospitalization, and two days later his death. This last part is fictional and is probably the only element that makes *Fou de Vincent* a fictional work. In this novel, Vincent dies in 1989, and the story covers Guibert's memories of this boyfriend over seven years, from their meeting in 1982 to Vincent's fictional death in 1989. The author assembled fragmented texts about this man, but for the purpose of linking them together, Guibert modified and rewrote many parts of his work.

3. The diary for the "open" writing

3.1. "Open" writing

Traditionally, a novel is not composed by extracts from diaries, but is an entirely invented story. Therefore, that Hervé Guibert wrote his novels based on his real life placed him in a new position within traditional literature. Today, we are used to "autofiction" as an already known literary genre. Modern amateurs, those who read contemporary literature, decode, interpret and naturally understand the relationship between written fiction and an author's personal life through psychoanalytic or psychological explanations. Today, we witness the importance of the autofiction in literature.

The worth of Hervé Guibert's writings awaits in the following questions: why is the diary a literary work? How can we judge extracts of a diary found in a novel? How can we evaluate, appreciate and love this "new" literature?

Let's look at one of his works as an example, *Le Mausolée des amants, Journal 1976–1991*, that I mentioned above.

J'écrivais des lettres à T., je ne les lui envoyais pas, plaçais l'enveloppe cachetée à son nom dans une boîte de bois blanc, et il venait les lire, elles étaient à sa disposition, dans la boîte, (...). Les lettres ont cessé, le cahier a pris le relais, est devenu l'endroit où il pouvait venir lire, à tout moment, dans mon absence. Je lui laissais mes clefs pour qu'il soit plus libre de le consulter. Maintenant j'ouvre la boîte en public, j'ouvre le cahier et je le laisse ouvert, exposé : je peux facilement m'imaginer mort. (reference)

[I wrote letters to T., without sending him these letters, but noted his name and placed envelopes secretly in a white wood box. When he came to read, they were available to him in a box, (...). The letters were over, the notebook replaced the letters, became the place where he could come to read them, whenever he wants to, even during my absence. I left him my keys so that he could consult more freely. Now, I open the box in public, I open the notebook and I left it opened, exposed: I can easily imagine myself dead.]

His writing style and method exhibit the "open-minded" attitude that initiated the new literary genre of autofiction. Hervé Guibert declared that he had nothing to conceal and that his diary was written to publish. He continued writing about himself in order to "substitute" the act of writing for living. For this author, the life is an act of writing and living signifies "keeping his diary".

His way of being a man of letters brings to mind the theory of *l'œuvre « ouverte »*, or « open » work. This attitude is connected in many ways to contemporary writing, such as online or digital publications on different social media. It is possible to imagine that Hervé Guibert would probably be generous in terms of imitation, appropriation and modification of his original texts, even if his writings were transformed and used as a kind of "opened" resource.

4. Artistic interaction

4.1. Sophie Calle and Hervé Guibert

I would like to remark in particular on an interesting resonance seen in a work by Sophie Calle, concerning the way she respected game rules⁷.

Vice, published by Hervé Guibert in 1991, is also based on the diary that he kept in his youth. This novel is composed by two principal parts, and between these two parts Hervé Guibert inserted pictures he took and associated with the story. The page arrangement of *Vice* shares a significant characteristic with the illustrated agenda or diary decorated with pictures. Guibert inserted pictures as if composing photo album pages with text and pictures. What he achieved in *Vice* brings to mind works of his friend, Sophie Calle. Sophie Calle staged her own life in a theatrical manner, especially her intimate memory based on real stories. She concretized her work like Guibert with sentimental and poetic texts as well as self-portraits. *Des histoires vraies* contains one episode (or her message to Guibert) showing their friendship.

4.1.1. *A bed sheet in « Des histoires vraies » by Sophie Calle*

Ma grand-tante s'appelait Valentine. Elle était née le 4 février 1888. A l'âge de quatre-vingt-seize ans elle se sentit fatiguée de vivre. Mais elle s'était fixé un but : devenir centenaire. A l'agonie peu avant ses cent ans, elle revint à la vie pour demander : « Combien de jours reste-t-il ? » Il restait six jours. Elle a murmuré : « Je tiendrai. Je tiendrai. » Elle est morte le 4 février 1988. Pour son faire-part de décès, elle avait choisi ce verset de la Bible : « Elle a fait ce qu'elle a pu. » Avant de mourir elle avait brodé un drap à mes initiales. Je l'offris à mon ami Hervé, alors gravement malade, en souvenir de cette nuit, lointaine déjà, où il avait refusé de partager mon lit. Je l'invitai ainsi à dormir un peu avec moi. Et puis, j'aimais à croire qu'ayant été brodé par une femme devenue centenaire grâce à une volonté farouche, ce drap, auréolé de foi, lui transmettrait sa force. (Des histoires vraies, p. 46–47) [My great-aunt's name was Valentine. She was born on February 4th 1888. At 96 years old, she felt tired of living. But she decided on goal: to become a centenarian. At death's door shortly before her one-hundredth birthday, she returned to the life by asking: "How many days are left?" There were six days. She mumbled: "I will endure. I will endure." She died on February 4th 1988. For her obituary, she chose this Bible verse: "She did what she could do." Before dying, she had hand-embroidered my initials in a bed sheet. I gave it to my friend Hervé, then critically ill, as a souvenir of a night, already faraway, where he had refused to share my bed. I also invited him to sleep a little with me. And then, I loved to believe that the bed sheet, hand-embroidered by an one-hundred-year-old thanks to fierce will-power, haloed by faith, could transmit to him her force.]

Even before this work, Sophie Calle appeared Guibert's novel *À l'ami qui ne m'a pas sauvé la vie*. In Sophie Calle's autobiographical novel titled *Douleur exquise* (p. 72–73 and p. 82–85), she reveals the story of an evening where she attempted to see Hervé Guibert in nude, pretexting the usage of his bath in a hotel. Her plan was failed because of Guibert's shouting. Fortunately they remained friends.

On Hervé Guibert's side, in *À l'ami qui ne m'a pas sauvé la vie*, he wrote about Sophie Calle and their promenade in Kyoto with his friend Aki, a Japanese painter.

J'avais retrouvé Anna par hasard dans le hall de l'Hôtel Imperial à Tokyo, où Albert lui avait fixé rendez-vous. Nous nous battions froid. (...) Je l'avais interviewée avant son départ, pour illustrer l'article elle m'avait confié une photo d'elle à l'âge de sept ans prise par son père, un exemplaire unique auquel elle tenait, m'avait-elle dit, comme à la prunelle de son cœur. (...) la fameuse photo s'était égarée. Anna me l'avait réclamée de façon très désagréable, allant jusqu'à me menacer, alors que j'avais retournée sens dessus dessous les cinq étages du journal dans l'espoir de la retrouver. Nous venions d'entrer avec Anna dans le temple d'Asakusa ; soudain, plantée devant un tabernacle translucide en forme de pyramide où scintillaient des lueurs, Anna me tendit un minuscule cierge en me disant : « Vous ne voulez pas faire un vœu, Hervé ? » A la seconde un gong retentissait, la foule sortait avec précipitation, le Bouddha en or s'éteignait dans sa cage lumineuse, une barre de fer s'encastrait en claquant pour souder les deux battants de l'entrée monumentale, nous n'avions pas eu le temps d'échapper à l'évidence que nous étions enfermés dans le temple. Un bronze nous fit sortir par une petite porte de derrière qui donnait sur une fête foraine.

J'avais été interrompu dans la formulation de mon vœu, mais ce n'était que partie remise, et l'événement dans son étrangeté avait scellé notre amitié avec Anna. (p.122–124)

[I had met Anna again by chance in the hall of the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, where Albert fixed an appointment. We disputed coldly. (...) I interviewed her before her departure, to illustrate an article she had trusted to me, a portrait of her at the age of seven years old, taken by her father, one single original photo of which she cared a lot about, as she told me that this picture was the apple of her eye. (...) the said photo was missing. Anna reclaimed it from me in a terrible way, to the point of threatening me, although I had gone back, going up and down five floors of the newspaper company in hope of rediscovering it.

We had just entered the temple of Asakusa with Anna; suddenly, immobilized in front of a semitransparent tabernacle shaped like a pyramid where a faint light was scintillating, Anna held out a tiny candle while saying: "Why don't you make a wish, Hervé?" The second a gong was vibrated, the crowd went out with precipitation, the Buddha of gold spread out in his luminescent cage, an iron bar fit into the gates of the monumental entrance with a bang. We had little time to escape, being locked in the temple. A bronze let us out by a small back door which led to a fair. I was interrupted while making-up my wish, but it was just postponed, and the strange event sealed my friendship with Anna.]

Anna, the nuisance (*enquiquineuse*), was therefore Sophie Calle, with a substituted name.

In Sophie Calle and Hervé Guibert's writing experiments, we notice the use of *bricolage* and recycle. These are particularities of autobiographical or autofictional stories, that are based on a diary consisting of diverse fragments from different universes. We can conclude that the limit of autofiction comes from the fact that an individual cannot experience so many different worlds. However, this literature is marked by a characteristic transitional phase: the passage to the "character novel". The character novel is a recyclable creation where characters and stories are partially or totally repeated, recycled and developed in other romans written by the same author or different authors. This new "open" writing style, producing writing exchanges as carried out by Hervé Guibert and Sophie Calle, encourages interactive modification in literature, renouncing traditional linear intrigue.

4.2. Influences from "Nouveau Roman"

The "experimental" writing of Hervé Guibert certainly relates to the Nouveau Roman. The Nouveau Roman, according to a journalistic definition, means a movement overturning the "traditional" dramaturgic structure. As opposed to traditional novels ("romans" in French) a Nouveau Roman author plays in the absence of linear intrigue, on sentimental description and the reduced role of characters. In Kafka's writing (especially in *Le Procès*), the main characters lose their important position, are pushed to the background and named only by their initials. We can assume that these features in Hervé Guibert's works are inspired by Kafka, but Hervé Guibert highlighted the diary by inverting the hierarchy between the diary and the novel, so that it was considered as a real work. He radically modified the meaning of self-representation through writing.

5. Conclusion – Autofiction or talking about the "self": aesthetic elements in new literature creation

Let's return to the descriptive introduction of Hervé Guibert in the beginning of *Le Mausolée des amants, Journal 1976–1991*.

[I wrote letters to T., without sending him these letters, but noted his name and placed envelopes secretly in a white wood box. When he came to read, they are available to him in a box, (...). Now, I open the box in public, I open the notebook and I left it opened, exposed: I can easily imagine myself dead.] (reference)

After reading *Le Mausolée des amants, Journal 1976–1991*, we understand Hervé Guibert's views on his own diary. He considered his diary to be as important as those of famous, respected writers in literature history, including his idol Franz Kafka, conserving secrets and introspective thoughts in their pages, thoughts later disguised in plain sight in their published works.

Mana Naito⁸, researcher of European literature, remarked the particular conscience of Hervé Guibert in the face of the act of writing his diary. She quotes certain symbolic phrases that prove that Hervé Guibert always possesses saw himself as a serious writer, and that he believed that his diary would be published and read by people after his death, exactly as that of Kafka.

Quand il m'arrive de relire ce journal, j'ai déjà une impression posthume. (p.86)
[When I reread this diary, I already have a posthumous impression.]

L'idée d'une page parfaite du journal (celle-ci ne l'est pas bien sûr) qui finirait par tout dire, et qui reverrait, comme un miroir, à la place du visage, l'évidence de la mort. (p150)
[The idea of a perfect diary entry (which of course, isn't) which ends up explaining everything, and which should repeat, like a mirror, in the place of a face, the evident nature of the death.]

“Can not we write a novel without inventing a dramatic death (as invented in *Mes parents* and *Fou de Vincent*)?” This question asked by Hervé Guibert himself allows us to share a dilemma that concerns all manners of expression. Contrary to his definition of “photographic writing”¹⁰, Guibert recognizes the importance of fictive events to construct a coherent intrigue.

Take into consideration the works of Haruki Murakami¹¹, Japanese writer. His works are translated into many foreign languages. They are generally defined as autofiction. His protagonist reflects Murakami himself during his teenage years and his stories are staged in a realist manner. However, the events that happen in his works are completely made-up, imaginary to the point of being fantasy. Look at one of his last works titled *1Q84* published in 2009 and 2010 (consisting of three volumes). By minutely reconstructing the contemporary life and Japanese society, the presence of two moons immediately let us thinking of the possible fiction.

Is it absolutely necessary to put spectacular events into a novel? Take for example *La modification* of Michel Butor published in 1957 (considered a chefs-d'œuvre of the Nouveau Roman). In this novel, *La modification*, any event happens, his story of 286 pages tells of nothing but the personal thoughts of the protagonist traveling by train. Without spectacles, without theatrical narrations but banal and realist, this Nouveau Roman anticipates the arrival of a new literary creation like ours, that is at once autobiographical and autofictional. Contemporary authors are the successors of authors such as Hervé Guibert, or of his Nouveau Roman predecessors or even of Kafka.

I would like to conclude this article by evoking a fact that opposes what Hervé Guibert himself declares about his journal. Guibert considered his journal as “photographic writing”, a method

that allowed him to write about things exactly as they are, exactly as in reality. He distinguishes this characteristic with that of novels. For Hervé Guibert, the diary is therefore “first surge writing” (*écriture de premier jet*) (Philippe Lejeune called it “a traditional image of the diary”). However, what this author missed in his hypothesis, produced a confusion in the definition of the literature, obscuring the frontier between the novel and the diary. Narcissist, sentimental and theatrical, Guibert wrote his diary anticipating its future publication. Expressing oneself in the writing, without hiding anything, being conscious the reader, are attitudes shared by today’s writers including bloggers and social media users. The origin of “open-minded” writing is evident in Hervé Guibert’s work.

In my opinion, he was conscious of the nature of diary writing. Otherwise, he would not have said:

Pour moi, en fabriquant un livre, c’est souvent quand le récit prend l’allure d’un journal qu’il est le plus fictionnel. (p.528)

[For me, while fabricating a book, it is often when the story takes on the mood of a diary that it becomes the most fictional.]

The fruit of his experimentation is a new overture to the act of diary-keeping, opening a door to future “open,” exhibitionist writing of “the self.”

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(Endnotes)

¹ Serge Doubrovsky, born in 1928, is a French writer. He is known for autobiography, which contains seven volumes. He defined his autobiographic works as "autofiction". One of his works, "My sons" (*Fils*) is considered as the pioneer work of this literary genre.

² Hervé Guibert revealed his relationship with Michel Foucault in his most famous book, *À l'ami qui ne m'a pas sauvé la vie*. Michel Foucault, called "Muzil" in his works became acquainted with Hervé Guibert in 1977.

³ Interview with François Jonquet

⁴ Gallimard, 2001.

⁵ The ensemble of fragmented memories reached 400 pages before having edited as a book.

⁶ It was in fact the second challenge for come true the publication of his diary after the failure of his first demand to another editor.

⁷ The game rule of Sophie Calle's works often plays an essential role in her artistic expression. In this work, *Des histoires varies*, the artist mixes real and invented stories in various texts describing her autobiographical stories. The way Sophie Calle compose her work with text and corresponding images is shared in some of Hervé Guibert's work, including *Vice*.

⁸ Mana Naito, specialist on European literature, wrote her doctoral thesis at University Paris 8 on the autobiographical writing of Hervé Guibert.

⁹ This question was evocated by Hervé Guibert himself in his diary.

¹⁰ According to his own definition, "photographic writing" is associated with one of photography's characteristics, that is, the capacity of capturing the "reality". Hervé Guibert considered his diary as a kind of the writing describing reality as it is.

¹¹ Haruki Murakami, born in 1949, is a Japanese writer. His writing style is especially appreciated for the ease of its translation into different languages. His recent trilogy, *1Q84*, revealed his critical opinion on Japanese politics and society from 1950s to the present. The protagonist in his works is often a young man sharing characteristics with his personality and experience.

LOGOTYPE AND NARRATIVE

Rumyana Stefanova
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
rstefanova@nbu.bg

Abstract

The aim of this study is to show the semiotic perspective on the denotative and connotative aspects and pathways, including the concept, analysis, design and logo reproduction of a series of elements, which is one of the most challenging and complex tasks for graphic designers. The creation of a bright, recognizable and memorable logo is a difficult project, often requiring multiple recombinations and redesigns to recreate the maximum expressiveness while keeping a certain lightness and elegance. The creative process in creating a particular sign – logo, includes a number of time-consuming stages, mostly in conceptual, creative and narrative plan. The final result incorporates a combination of different graphic elements that express the original idea of the author-artist as a series of stories or narratives: what will the character serve for (including its target group), what provokes at first glance (recognition), the subject of its expressiveness, its form and size (graphic particularities and requirements), etc. All this wide range of features makes logos an extensive semiotic material for analysis and research, which promotes positive understanding of the entire creative process from a different perspective, including the perspective of the graphic designer.

1. Introduction

A *narrative* is a term, which in its loosest sense in literature is used to define in short a story. Bulgarian literature often uses the term *нарация* 'narration'. The term narrative in a semiotic context has a broader definition and is used to describe a series of events that are logically related in temporal and causal way or discourse, which is based on some form of a story.

The purpose of this study is to cast a semiotic perspective (Peirce 1931–1958) on the denotative and connotative aspects and pathways, of which the conceptual design, the analysis, the

design, and their synthesizing into the logotype production in a series of elements, which is one of the most challenging and complex task for graphic designers. The creation of a bright, recognizable and at the same time memorable character is a difficult project (Rastie 2004), often requiring multiple recombinations to recreate and design maximum expressiveness while keeping a certain *lightness* and elegance (Gruev 2009).

The creative process in designing a particular sign – *logotype*¹, includes a number of stages in time, but mostly on the conceptual, creative narrative level (Parker 2004). The final result is a combination of many different graphic elements that express the concept of the author-artist, as a manifestation of a series of stories or narratives: what will the character serve for (its target group of users), what is the first glance impression (recognition), what is the subject of its expressiveness, its form and size (graphic particularities and requirements), etc. The listed range of features makes logotypes an extensive semiotic material for analysis and research that promotes positive understanding of the entire creative process from a different perspective, even the one of the very graphic designer.

The study sets the following goals:

- Defining of the notion logo and its characteristics;
- Semiotic aspects in the stages of the designing process of a logotype.

2. Defining of the notion *logotype* and its characteristics

The term logotype has Greek roots (*Λόγος* ‘word’ + *τύπος* ‘imprint’) and refers to the printed symbol or mark/brand symbol of a company. As a brand symbol the logo is a trademark that is used as an identifier of a given company. It depicts a graphic representation of stylized letters, signs or combined elements (letters and signs).

When the mark has no text, it is essentially a symbol. Those used for communication (index signs) are called pictograms, pictographs.

The marks only made out of text are typographical and they may be comprised of letters, words or monograms (initials, abbreviations or words, company names).

Combinative marks incorporate together texts and characters.

When the mark is registered and protected by the law, it becomes a trademark.

A successful logo is a matter of balancing its many details (McWade 2007a). It must, however, meet a number of criteria:

- to be simple and elegant – an image with fewer elements is more powerful;
- to feel *substantial* and to look *solid* – not too much thin lines unrecognizable in scaling (a logo needs to be identical when scaled down or up – without interlocking lines);
- to correspond to its purpose;
- to be visually different – it should not refer to or remind us of already established brands.

There are a number of characteristics that are associated with the graphic rules when creating the logo (McWade 2007b). The main recommendations are the following:

- to use graphical networks in its building;
- to be able to translate circles and ellipses into a logo is great, because these graphical objects serve as easily recognizable focal points;
- not to use intrusive fonts;
- to avoid too high or too wide logos (follow the golden ratio or the ratio of 3: 2);
- to integrate the sign and the name into one since they *belong* together.

The process of designing a logo contains four steps:

A. Selecting a suitable *dingbat*² – after a conversion to vector tracks, they can easily be broken down into constituent elements and then converted and resized in different forms.

B. Adding a background field.

C. Modifying or transforming.

D. Completing the process, adding a name.

A. Deciding on a shape. According to what they represent, there are three types of logos:

1. Illustrative (iconic) – graphic images of objects.

2. Symbolic – graphic images of already familiar symbols.

3. Abstract – graphic images, disconnected from reality, implying a thought, concept, idea.

These types of logos are used most often when a specific objective is a physically intangible activity or object. Also, when the company is diverse in agendas or projecting future diverse activities. Abstract logos are used when it is desired to impose a suggestion of strength, success, partnership and others intangible qualities. Dingbats are often carriers of such forms.

Very often the same forms suggest different things. Sometimes the goal is to recreate in abstract forms actual physical properties of an object – for example, a circular composition of leaves can mean either circular composition of leaves or symbolically to inspire teamwork, togetherness, cooperation (Romanicheva and Yatsyuk 2000). If the logo is accompanied by text, then it is easy to interpret its meaning.

A. The role of the background – this is the stage that helps the logo:

- to become more solid looking;
- to have a more appealing form;
- to smoothen its edges;
- to strengthen the logo's colors;
- to create a sort of a dynamic tension.

The rules are of particular importance in formulations with uneven outer contour and many sharp edges as well as in the figures of irregular shape.

The simple shapes are circle, ellipse, square and hexagon that easily focus the viewer's attention. More complex ones are the rectangle, the triangle, the polygons and a very flattened ellipse, where the energy is dissipated and distracted.

It is easy and attractive to use a **negative image** and energetic forms. Darker backgrounds suit lighter symbols well. Sometimes this leads to a dramatic effect. Dynamic tension and movement is created by an eccentric placement of a standard shape when rotated. In the end it is most important that the background and the image are well related (Mikhailov 2007).

A. Modification or transformation – conversion of simple forms.

It is best for the already produced symbol to be broken down to its individual parts and reorganized – the components are to be rearranged with one another, some deleted completely, others rotated, etc. Another way is to repose the constituent elements relative to one another in a different order or direction. Another approach is to add two or three dingbats, using parts of the shapes or the entire shape to be duplicated and replaced in a cascade fashion.

B. Adding the name of the company.

The company's name transforms a logo in *the* company logo. It appears esthetically pleasing when it is unobtrusive and minimal. The aligning is done by following sharp contours or axes to the logo. The width is matched to that of the logo, which is achieved after an appropriate transformation and use of the graphical networks. Uppercase letters and bold are appropriate. According to the purpose of the trademark, for example, when there are large objects, the text may dominate the logo, which is important in order to focus on working with the appropriate font and font size. It is necessary to align the graphic character to the text in accordance to strict rules and starting points.

3. Semiotic aspects in the stages of the creative process of logo building

Reflecting on a narrative as a manifestation of structuralism, I follow a theory in particular, i.e. the narrative semiotics of Greimas³ (narrative grammar), and the idea of unlimited semiosis by Umberto Eco (Eco 1993a, 1993b, 1998). According to Eco, the process of infinite semiosis as a system of commutations of reference from sign to sign is a prerequisite for communication (Eco 1997). The logotype as a sign is a collective image for communication, as a recurring element of TOTAL-design in the presentation of a company, organization or association. Therefore, in itself it combines a variety of functions.

The narrative grammar of Greimas studies four levels in semiotic knowledge, focusing primarily on the more abstract of them (Bankov 2004). Applied semiotics is the second level, where, alongside the natural sciences, film, theater, etc., are interpreted on the basis of knowledge from the first level, which studies natural languages. Here is the place of the case in question – the research on the narratives of the logotype. The methodological (the more abstract) and epistemological level are 3rd and 4th in this order, which ensure the scientific perfection of the system of Greimas, described in detail in the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the theory of language*, co-authored with Cortes⁴. According to prof. Bankov, Greimas's most important ambition is of creating “да даде универсална граматика на смисъла или, с други думи, формалните условия на процесите на означаване” [universal grammar to give meaning or, in other words, the formal terms of the process of signification] (Bankov 2001). He argues that meaning is not static but evolves from simpler (abstract) structures to more complex and concrete ones through which at the end comes the text. On one hand we have the skeleton of signification (semio-narrative structures), on the other – filling the skeleton with figurative elements (discursive structures) involved in the generation of meaning. The semio-narrative structures comprise of two levels: deep – fundamental syntax (semiotic square – figure 1) and surface – narrative syntax (Bankov 2001).




Fig. 1: Semiotic square, incorporating positions of opposition, complementarities, contradictory and sub-contradictory⁵.

Each entity acquires real dimensions to denote and mean at a particular moment of time after an analysis following the logic of the semiotic square (Kassabov 2006), the surface -narrative syntax (the actants of Greimas from the narrative program) further enriched with figurative elements of communication (discourse). The structuralist approaches seeks to explain processes and phenomena of life that have little in common between them. The idea of the narrative program of Greimas (comprised of qualification, performance and sanction) is not to give rules, but

to identify the mechanisms which establish the significance on the level of the narrative. Along the lines of this reasoning I analyze the logotype as a manifestation of the narrative discourse.

The actants are difficult to *fit* in the analysis of any logotype, i.e. narrative syntax has no way of implementing when the final version of the logo is made accidentally (a common thing to happen with numerous examples from everyday life and practice). It is a sign of real mastership for the projects to be achieved through the design process. In those cases the actants composing elements (consistently integrated elements of logos in a particular place) play a crucial role in understanding the purpose and meaning of the sign (the meaningful object in the narrative syntax⁶). On the other hand, the story concentrated in the logo reflects to a great extent the dynamics covering its conceptual design, its foreseen purpose and its use, which is a mandatory moment of design. The techniques for implying suggestions are distinct just as the means employed. The in depth – fundamental syntax is the strong side of semiotic analysis here, which then immediately is deployed in an appropriate figurative discourse – the particular image. The logo without a text is often unclear and heterogeneously indexed. The mastery is in the simple but expressive forms without ambiguous messages in the conventions. This would be achieved always, if one is to follow the above mentioned semiotic approaches to the preliminary analysis of each logo.

Very often the conventions of reading logos are intertwined, confirming its complex nature. When there is only one character, most often it refers to familiar symbols of everyday life. When a text is added, the characters become easily recognizable. The mastery is in simple forms that are very appealing to the eye, but extremely difficult to achieve for the graphic designer. World-wide classics in creating such perfect shapes are just a few. Fortunately, on our local stage we have such a master craftsman – the artist-painter Stefan Kanchev. His work is remarkable and renowned on a large international scale. In 1994 Stefan Kanchev was recognized as one of the top ten best masters of logo design in the world and joined the renowned Paul Rand, Milton Glaser and Sol Vas⁷. His prize was awarded by the *International Centre for trademarked logos ITC* in Ostend, Belgium. figure 2 illustrates the personal monogram of Stefan Kanchev, which is beautiful and expressive and yet perfectly simple. It intertwines the initials of the author as C and K, as well as an open eye, illustrating the affiliation of the author as an artist and an artist in the visual arts (Stancheva 2011).



Fig. 2: Monogram by Stefan Kanchev⁸.

The projects of Stefan Kanchev are light and delicate, elegant and memorable. A few generations of Bulgarians have grown up surrounded by his characters in everyday life (figure 3).



Fig. 3: Logos for trademarked companies and brands by Stefan Kanchev⁹.

Figure 4 illustrates the logo of the Bulgarian Government business enterprise company *Petrol* from 1969, created by Stefan Kanchev (now – *Petrol stations*). Its job description brand includes: a beast with a built-in Latin letter *P* and elements of movement and combustion.



Fig. 4: Brand *Petrol* by Stefan Kanchev (sign text and combined sign)¹⁰.

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the elements of the debating club’s logo at New Bulgarian University, which appear to be similar to the actants in a narrative construction. This is a student project which is semantically insightful, well-built and well-presented. The author Peter Nikolov combined the logo of New Bulgarian University, a microphone and two speakers behind grandstands, which summarizes the design idea of the logo: Debating at New Bulgarian University.



Fig. 5: Elements in the logo of a debate club at New Bulgarian University (project)¹¹.



Fig. 6: Design of a logo of the debate club at NBU. Author – Peter Nickolov¹².

There are two more student logos – of a publishing house (figure 7) and a winery (figure 8). Both brands are also sufficiently expressive and abiding of semiotic principles of building. In the version of the publishing house, representing a combination of an ideogram and typography, the following ideas are intertwined: land (a circle crossed by a horizontal and vertical line), a cross (a sign of rich symbolism: an expression of spirituality and materiality, represented by the horizontal line – femininity, and the vertical line – male /phallic, associated with the Sun, the solar circuit), and Enso (a circle painted with a brush in Zen Buddhism freely expressing the current awareness of the painter). The interesting thing here is that the name of the company brings the idea of unexplored *space* as well as ideas presented by the publisher – terra incognita (a strange/unexplored land). It is trendy to place a slogan (motto) to the logo, as you can see in figure 7.



Fig. 7: Logo of publishing house Terra Incognita.
Author – Stoyan Atanasov, New Bulgarian University¹³.



Fig. 8: Design of a winery logo.
Author – Iskra Sabcheva, New Bulgarian University¹⁴.

The project for the winery incorporates as actants the idea of a city built from wine bottles, supported by the text – wine city (the city of wine).

One of the best and most recognized contemporary creators of logos in the world Rand Paul gives several important principles and rules for creating a quality sign¹⁵:

- The meaning of the logotype is determined by the contents of the illustrated object - trademark, company, etc., and not the other way around.
- The content of the logotype does not need to match the scope of activities that it represents – it is essential to be clear, distinctive and memorable.

- The presentation of each new idea in the form of a logotype to the client is one of the most difficult tasks for the graphic designer to make successfully adopted and implemented.
- The simplicity of the sign is not the main goal. It is the result achieved by a revolutionary design and sensible analysis (figure 9).



Fig. 9: Poster for IBM by Paul Rand, 1970¹⁶

Figure 10 shows a selection of the best logos, arranged according to the magazine *Graphic Design USA*. Their creators were Paul Rand, Milton Glaser, Massimo Vignelli and other leading contemporary graphic designers (Yong 2013).



Fig. 10: Selection of the favorite logos from the past half century, according to the magazine *Graphic Design USA*, published in 2013¹⁷.

4. In conclusion

The present article follows the basic rules in building a logotype and its semiotic reflection and interpretation. The narrative semiotics of Greimas, which includes the generative transition of meaning and is intended to carry on the formal method in the study, both in speech activity and on every possible denotative practice helped me to illustrate stages in the constructive process of creating a logotype. The objective is not for graphic designer to delve into semiotic debriefings, but rather on the basis of the presented semiotic discourse to reveal its ideological force in the syntax of the completed form, to face the need for a preliminary structure of elements that makes up the final product, in such a way that it is in a best way possible received by the recipient – the communicator in the overall process of communication and communication through signs and trademarks.

Via analyzing their work in a semiotic fashion and applying this method, even commonplace artists may be successful. The semiotic approach to design is a skillful and punctual tool for creating successful logos and signs, which once again confirms the strength of applied semiotics as an interdisciplinary branch of science.

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(Endnotes)

¹ Logo - in Bulgarian language is also used the term logos, which transfer is a trademark or symbol, often created on the basis of letters (Stoichkova 2008).

² Dingbat is graphic ornamental sign. Most often these are the list markers - bullets (star, hand, etc.) (author's note).

³ Algirdas Julien Greimas - one of the most important French semiotics, founder of the Paris School of Semiotics, linguist, folklorist and literary critic, creator of the program narrative and aktantniya analysis. (author's note)

⁴ Sémiotique, Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage, A.J.Greimas, J.Courtès, Paris, Hachette, 1979.

⁵ Bankov, Christian. 2001. Семиотични тетрадки, част I: Уводни лекции по семиотика. [Semiotic notebooks, part I: Introductory lectures on semiotics.] Sofia: New Bulgarian University. ISBN 9545352507 (part I)

⁶ Value object - an element of the level of narrative syntax associated with the motivation of actants. (author's note).

⁷ Paul Rand, Milton Glaser and Soul Vas - three world-renowned masters in graphic design. (author's note)

⁸ <http://stefankanchev.com/biography.html>

⁹ <http://stefankanchev.com/biography.html>

¹⁰ <http://stefankanchev.com/biography.html>

¹¹ Personal archive of the author.

¹² Personal archive of the author.

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¹⁴ Personal archive of the author.

¹⁵ <http://99designs.com/designer-blog/2012/09/04/4-principles-by-paul-rand-that-may-surprise-you>

¹⁶ <http://eamesdesigns.com/eames-spotting-article/building-a-smarter-planet/>

¹⁷ http://designtaxi.com/news/356821/Favorite-Logos-Of-The-Past-Half-Century/?interstitial_shown=1

IS IT A STORY – OR JUST ARTWORK? GRAPHIC IMAGE AS A NARRATIVE


Silja Nikula
University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland
silja.nikula@ulapland.fi

Abstract

My aim is to define the concept of narrativity in the context of static images. I see the process of image making as visual storytelling, and use my own artwork as an example. I sketch *a model of narrative layers*, combining semiotic concepts and principles from the narrative theory of literary studies.

Graphic images are material, concrete pictures, and all images are based on some kind of resemblance (Mitchell 1987: 10). Within an image space, meanings arise from both the properties of the elements and their composition (Engelhardt 2007). A fundamental strength of images is that they are able to reproduce the appearances in reality. Compositional structures have become established as conventions in the course of history. The study pays special attention to the ways in which metaphoric expression, symbols and the illustration method give rise to connotations and thus increase the variety of meanings construed from a picture.

However, in the final interpretation, the role of audience is salient, and representative pictures have multiple meanings and stay ambiguous. I shed light on images as producers of meanings and as their own kind of language. Because my background is graphic designer's, the discussion is in the domain of visual communication design.



Picture 1. Woodcut. Silja Nikula 2008.

1. Introduction

First I tell the background of my graphic image (picture 1). It is based on my travel experiences in Prague. My aim was to tell about the spirit of the place by visual means: using lines, forms and colours on a two-dimensional surface. *Spirit of a place* is a salient concept in humanistic geography, emphasizing the personal experience of a person staying in the place (Relph 1976). This graphic image I see as a narrative: the *story* is the content of expression, so my experience during travel, and *narrative* or *discourse* is the form of that expression. As a visual storyteller, I arranged my experiences and told about them. This was one of my travel pictures made during the years 2008–2011, and that practice-based research led me sketch this *model of narrative layers*.

I use the metaphor of *layers* to express, not only how meanings can be added step-by-step, but also that each layer is a part of a whole, and the layers work together in meaning making. Still, I don't mean that the first layer is lower or subordinate to the others, but all the layers carry special visual resources to be used in different communication contexts. Sometimes only the first level is justified, but in many cases settling more layers makes the audience see multiple meanings.

The study of narrative structure has traditionally focused on verbal storytelling. In visual modes, it has been adapted to moving picture media as film; meanwhile storytelling practices within static images have been neglected. However, recently Michael Ranta (2013) has built the bridge between narratology and the theory of art, using paintings as examples, and presenting possible criteria for narrativity or *tellability*. I understand these terms broadly: visual representations can serve as descriptions and expositions; they can express the states of affairs, and offer aesthetic experiences. They can also tempt audiences to interpret ideas as an argument.

2. Theoretical commitments

When constructing my model, I combine ideas from narrative theory in literature with the concepts of semiotics.

In defining the concept of narrative, often three criteria are suggested: temporality, causation and human interest (Cortazzi 1993: 85). Within narrative theory, the distinction between the *story* and *discourse* is recognized (Chatman 1978: 19, 23; Ranta 2013: 5; Cortazzi 1993: 83).

A story means the chain of events, or rendered content while discourse is the expression, how something is transmitted (Ranta 2013: 5). I express something that I believe is interesting to a reader, a story to share with my audience. Seymour Chatman (1978: 21, 33) calls this process “transforming”: a story or statement is composed by someone and mediated within the limits of each presentation medium. So it is possible to present a story in different media, but the definition of storytelling has to be modified according to the medium used (Rimmon-Kenan 1999: 15). Seymour Chatman (1978: 20) calls it *transposability*, when meaning that the story remains the same, but one expressing medium or language is transferred to another.

Visual language is different from a natural one, having its own strengths and weaknesses in transmitting ideas. The meanings come through the composition and properties of elements (Engelhardt 2007). In their visual design grammar, Günther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen (2006) already have concerned how narrative theory applies to composition. For example left and right sides in a composition space have different information values, and so do upper and lower parts. *Properties of elements* I understand in two different ways: first, a semantic level, how elements are named on a denotational level – second, what kind of lines, colours and shapes are used as a syntactic level. The illustrator is active in meaning making and transmitting ideas; the properties of elements are connected with the compositional choices.

In adapting narrative theory, my main concern is in temporality, considered as a necessary condition for a narrative. There cannot exist a story without different events happening in the time (Cortazzi 1993: 86). How far it is possible to use chronological order as a criterion of narrative? I discuss here, what kind of visual means may give the viewer the impression of movement.

Charles Peirce’s (1991) three sign classes as semiotic concepts are connected with narrative theory, as defining the properties of visual elements. To sharpen the referencing process in visual storytelling, also figurative tropes metonymy and metaphor are used.

3. The Model of Narrative Layers

3.1. First layer based on iconicity: Imitating reality

Picture 1 was born after my travel to *Prague*. If you have visited there, you perhaps recognize the bridge and the statue, and remember seeing high churches there. The elements refer to the scenery that I saw in my own eyes. Because your eye perception is very similar to mine, you can call back your memories through the visual appearance of elements. Here comes one salient positive property of images, iconicity. All images are based on some kind of resemblance, similarity between elements and their referents (Mitchell, 1987: 10). Through the combinations of lines, shapes and colours, we can imitate optical experiences in the real world (Messaris 1997: 3) – often also give access to emotional responses. Images are able to reproduce those aspects that the image-maker has selected. While in written language the signs are arbitrary, a visual representation has the potential to more closely signify how things appear (Messaris 1994: 117).

My illustration is simplified and does not imitate every detail. However, visual presenting has not to be a precise match between the picture and the reality. Small hints can be enough, because we realize that a picture as a representation only imitates the eye perception. In sketches, audiences can fill the gaps with their imagination, because they are active in the reconstruction of narratives (see Ranta 2013: 7). Also you may imagine this black-and-white drawing as coloured scenery as you have seen in travel magazines, your own eyes or imagination.

I also selected the format of this graphic image, arranging a meaningful area. However, it is broadening over its frames, when the viewers think the scenery continuing. This reference is based on *metonymy*, also a means of creating a realistic impression. When seeing one small part, the bigger whole can be traced, which is the kind of the most common metonym, called *synecdoche* (van Leeuwen 2005: 34; Mitchell 1987: 27). The viewers use their own subjective

imagination to interpret what kind of idea is represented.

However, iconicity does not mean that the object really exists. Even unnatural objects can be presented in a very realistic way. Using linear perspective emphasizes reality. The hegemony of this perspective is in the way it lays claims to being a “natural” representation (Mitchell 1987: 37; Goodman 1976:10). In my woodcut, you assume that the bridge is nearer than the scenery, because it is shown bigger. Three-dimensionality is one criterion in creating credibility (Goodman 1976: 34–35), which also van Leeuwen (2005: 167) argues in his concept of *modality*. When colours are natural, depth is arranged, details included, we often count on the happening existing in real life. So, changing colours unnatural is one possibility to violate reality. Including details also gives the impression of a documentary representation, in spite those details were irrelevant to the basic content idea or message (Barthes 1993: 99–108).

3.2. Second layer: Living creatures make it an event

3.2.1. Expanding the properties of elements

The picture also extends beyond its frame in another way: an event before and after this arrested moment can be seen. Even on pure scenery, a chain of events may be seen, as a flow of seasons or different times of day. Still according to the narrative theory the living creatures are essential. Seymour Chatman (1978: 34), for example suggests that one cannot account for events without recognizing the existence of the things causing them, or being affected by them. So when I put a human character on my picture space, I made it possible to see more meanings. Also there is at least one other living creature: the bird flying in the sky. Now, there comes a reference to a chain of events and time passing by (see Ranta 2013: 7; Mikkonen 2005: 21). Something is happening before and after this arrested moment.

Not only actions are interpreted through people represented. Gestures also serve as the hints of an emotional state. As Russian psychologist Alfred L. Yarbus has proved, our eyes fix first on those features that can help identify the person, and the fixations tend to cluster around the eyes and the mouth (Cairo 2013: 103). Eyes are not only physical features; they often indicate intention and give rise to connotations. In this way, iconicity can give access to a broad spectrum of emotional responses, because viewers can, in their mind’s eye, combine the visual representation with their real-life experiments (Messaris 1997: xiv–xvii). In my picture, the person’s mouth is open, messy movement and shouting going on.

3.2.2. Making meanings with composition

The idea of movement is supported by the means of arranging visual elements. The choices in composition are resources in telling and making meanings. Visual structuring creates a meaningful proposition by means of visual syntax (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006: 47). In their grammar of visual design Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) define narrative images having vectors, which are lines to show, what kind of action there is going on. Vectors show the directions of movements and can lead our eyes, even indicate the order in reading the elements. However, there are no certain rules for that. In my example picture, there is a vector between the flying character and the statue. The horizontal shape of the bridge emphasizes the same direction.

The information values of left and right are conventions to produce meanings and can be seen as narrative resources. In western countries, the left side is the old one, while right has something new. (Kress & van Leeuwen 2006: 179–185.) I put more speed by fading speed lines that are conventions people interpret as moving (see Hietaharju 2006, 91). Still here I made a mistake: Because the carving was made in a very spontaneous way, I did not think that the final picture would be turned as its mirror image when printed on paper. Also the direction of movement was changed, and according to the information values, I am now returning home. The

purpose was vice versa; the idea was to face the challenges of the future.

Kress and van Leeuwen (2006: 4, 179–193) also concern top and bottom in their visual grammar: whereas the bottom is seen as a real world, the top is imaginative. Fictive elements are often settled on the upper side of the composition area. In my image, the bridge at the lower part is dark and seems to be heavy. There is clear contrast between steady ground and the light sky. Flying naturally takes place in the air in real life, so the bird and the clouds are settled on the upper part of the picture. However, there is also something irrational, because one of the flying creatures is a human being. I tell the reason later.

When trying to express movement in a static image, causes problems. Still if we think about an entire static image broadly, different stages of happenings can be put on the same surface. Placing legs in different positions on a picture surface, for example, makes us interpret them as moving. The movement is going forward if the direction is from left to right – within most western countries. Also when the same characters are settled on the same surface several times, viewers perhaps think that there is an action going on, and time is passing by. Also a path, river or a road, can serve as an analogue of time-flow, for example starting the story from front part and going back part (Mikkonen 2005: 171, 203). However, we can't be sure how the composition is interpreted. In my example picture, "speed lines" can be seen, because the direction of carving is horizontal like the movement. It is also a natural and easiest way to make it, because the wooden block directs the carving. Also the fading style in colouring is a hint to see this lady flying. These are conventions that viewers might interpret as a movement. Added to that, many small different carved elements that follow the flying person, arrange chaos, and might even strengthen the idea of uncontrollable movements (see Gombrich 1982, 55).

3.3. Layer of comment: Iconicity based on metaphor

Is my presentation outside reality? Well, in Prague we were walking along the streets and bridges, then there came a rain and strong wind, and my umbrella was turned around. However, people don't normally fly, and nor did I in Prague. In that sense, this is fiction. But it is true in a metaphorical sense. Often the meanings given to a travel are more important than the place itself. We actually live our stories and organize our experiences and knowledge about the world (Bruner 1987). That happened in my picture. I *put a layer of comment* as Nelson Goodman presents (1976: 8), meaning that the attitude and opinion are strongly seen in the picture. In visual representations commenting can be made through metaphor, often presenting an abstract concept by using concrete things or a physical situation (Messaris 1997: 9).

In my first layer, I concerned with iconicity based on eye-perception. Another type of iconicity is metaphoric, where similarity is based on analogy. In my Prague picture, I presented myself flying over the bridge, towards an old statue of the medieval town. Contrast between the flying character and the statue can be seen: first one is messy, the other one staying static and steady. This image became a metaphor for my research that I had just started. This was one of the first pictures connected my dissertation. The research was practice based and my own background was not traditionally academic. That made the start challenging.

Mitchell (1987: 10, 13) classifies metaphors as *verbal images*, defining them as short descriptions, "sometimes suggesting nothing more than a recurrent abstract idea". Metaphors are based on associations in mental imagery (Fiske 1994: 127–131). As a multimodal concept metaphor can be applied to images. In presenting, some aspects are highlighted, others neglected. (van Leeuwen 2005: 30, 34.) The resemblances are the grounds for the metaphor, but still metaphoric images stay ambient and suggestive. Based on certain hints, the audience thinks that metaphorical interpretation is preferable than a literal one. For example, combining items in different scales, putting usual and unusual elements together or manipulating the colours unnatural can

emphasize the feeling of another reality. Still, you perhaps fulfil my one-coloured drawing in your imagination and think in colour. I used only one colour as a purpose to create coherence between wide varieties of elements.

For visual communication designers, creating new kinds of reality through metaphor is interesting and challenging, because the representations have to be somehow understood, still remain surprising and fresh (Messaris 1997: 9–10). They have special power in persuasive use, because they are suggestive (Messaris 1997: 219–225). However, to serve as arguments, they need an interpreter to complete the argument by drawing the conclusion.

3.4. Symbols compressing meanings

The sign categories, icon and symbol, can work together in one element and the final character is defined by the context and the interest of the viewer. Here the bird and the bridge might be interpreted as symbols, but if they are interpreted so, we don't actually know. Symbols are signs when used and understood as such (Fiske 1994: 121; Kress & van Leeuwen 2006: 8). Without defining the using context and audience we can't be sure. As illustrations in cemeteries for example, birds may be symbols of soul or spirit, flying away from body.

Symbols are in many cases useful within communication purposes, because they compress meanings. With using one small element, a great number of ideas can be told. Based on subjectivity and ambiguity, symbols give rise to connotations. On the other hand, they can limit the space of possible meanings. Within one cultural area, meanings are common because they are based on a habit, convention or agreement. Symbols designed for information at the airports reach for one exact meaning, while the bird increases tellability in my picture, because it has multiple meanings, based also on individual interpretations.

3.5. Illustration method giving rise to connotations

Some connotations surely derive from the contents, but also the formal properties of elements affect interpretations. An image works in a system that is loaded at both a syntactic and semantic level (Goodman 1976). For example the shape, thickness and roughness of a line, or colour saturation carry meanings on a syntactic level. Here I also concern with the third sign class, indexicality. Indexical marks can be seen on the surface of my graphic image, referring to the process of constructing the image. If in a photograph indexicality is an unseen frame, not having content of its own (Laakso 2003: 132), in my drawing it is a part of the content, carrying an expressive charge and intensifying the message (Nikula 2014: 76).

In my final artwork, can the material surface, carving and colouring style be seen. The clouds are soft and have lighter shade, as the flying person is expressed in sharp shapes. Brushstrokes, carving or other traces of making often enhance the attractiveness of visual representations and perhaps viewers' attention is held for a longer time. Through expression styles, the artists' emotions can be transferred.

When artwork is made by drawing – not a detailed photograph, it contains only meaningful elements selected by the illustrator (see Barthes 1986: 82). In visual communication context that means paying attention to the most important parts of the message. Distilling the essential features of a complex object is informative.

4. Final interpretation: viewer filling the gaps

I see a *layer* as an appropriate metaphor and it has also been used earlier to describe the visual resources within communication use. Not only Nelson Goodman (1976: 8) uses it, but also Roland Barthes (1986: 71–92) describes the denotation and connotation as two layers of meaning. Whereas the layer of denotation is the layer of what or who, the layer of connotation says, what

ideas or values are expressed through the way they are represented (van Leeuwen 2005: 37).

However, the role of audience is active in the process of interpreting a representative image, because it gives indirect suggestions for meaning making. The narratives include gaps and demand the active efforts of meaning making (Ranta 2013: 8). The meanings are individual and subjective, but culturally shared. Pictorial media lacks narrative precision compared with verbal ones (Ranta 2013: 7–8). Because perceiving is selective, it depends on the needs and interests of audiences, how different viewers notice different affordances. From the point of view of designer's, the images offer potential for meaning making. Based on the perceivable properties of the objects, this potential may be recognized – or stay latent, if not noticed. (van Leeuwen 2005: 273.)

I see my *model of narrative layers* as resources for visual designers, to be taken use, varied and adapted to different communication situations. It was created for representational still images that are open to interpretation – not for diagrammatical or conventional images like traffic signs. I argue that certain kind of realism is needed for tellability, to establish the connection with the mental images of the viewers'. Also the border between design and narrative has to be studied. When stylised, the picture becomes a description of description and loses the referent in reality (Uspenski 1991; Nikula 2014: 77). Also Wendy Steiner (2004: 155–157) sees, that realism in narrating makes the audience see more meanings.

This model was based on my own artwork production during the years 2008–2011 and the final dissertation was published in the year 2012. Now I am testing how it could be adapted in real communication contexts and other illustration methods, as photographs.

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DANCE NARRATOLOGY (SIGHT, SOUND, MOTION AND EMOTION)

Smilen Antonov Savov
UNESCO International Dance Council Member
smilen.savov@abv.bg

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to focus on some narratological issues of understanding and interpreting the “dance language”, or “dance text”. Is dance an abstract medium or literal description of events, myths, stories, and feelings? How can we convey such an emotional impact upon the spectators that remains deeply in their hearts? Using the “language of the body”, or “body language”, and gestures, the folk dance and modern dance today become a universal medium of communication. But is it modern? The answer is NOT, because the dance is known to be “the first form of non-verbal communication” before the verbal language communication. However, the dance tells stories and communicates to us via its “non-verbal code”, but we still need to educate the viewers how to interpret its code, secretly hidden in the “dance narrative”. Point of view is that dance is an incredible source for semiotics material research subject, since in dance there are always present: source codes, various signs, interpretants, interpreters, and rich meanings.

The dance is known to be „the first rational form of non-verbal communication” before the verbal language code of communication was discovered. This semiotics research on dance narratology is based on some of Elizabeth Hayes, Adam Kendon, David McNeill, Greimas, Joseph Campbell, and Vladimir Propp’s theories of narratology and narrative. The focus of this paper is how we narrate in dance and the notion that some type of dances have strong narrative, little narrative, or lack narrative structure at all. When we mention the term „narratology” (story telling), we assume some text, discourse, story/plot, theatre drama plays, novels, or action movies. Narrative forms combining a variety of semiotic channels have existed since the dawn of the Civilization. Dance has always been stamped with the „Entertainment” category and is considered marginal to the narratology concept. But is it true? Watching dance performance being a

„*Sign Vehicle*” (*Representamen*), one encounters signs full of symbolic meanings that are interpreted and are compared to „*Moving Pictograms*”. „Moving” because dance is characterized by sight, sound, and motion that evoke emotional responses.

Dance is considered the oldest way of communication and „narration” between humans. *Roland Barthes* talks about the meaning of narrative and says: “Uncountable are the narratives of the world”. He also uses a term „*Narrative Symbolic Code*”, which we can attach to the notion of dance narrative. Before inventing languages, humans communicated with *non-verbal codes as part of the gestures, postures, facial expressions, sounds such as yells, moans, roars, and cries*. Dance was used in all forms of human communication and especially for Gods Worship, in Religious rituals (weddings, funerals), Shaman ceremonies (Witch doctor healings), War dances (*Cretans* danced Pyrrhic War Dances before battle & also *Trojans*, and *Maori* in New Zealand), Blessings ceremonies, Celebrations (harvest fests, hunt), Love-dating dances (a Masai in Africa jump high to get the best bride), Rites of Passage rituals (initiation ceremonies), and Fertility rituals. *Walter Sorell*, a dance historian, recognized a strong presence of dance narrative into Asian cultures. He states: „The Oriental dance is essentially a gesture dance. Through their idolization of God, the Asians turned the human body into an instrument of gesture and symbol.” (Walter Sorell : 50) In India four types of dance/mime narratives are popular such as: *Bharata Natyam* (*Devadasis*-temple dancers), *Kathakali* (*male dance*), *Kathak*, and *Manipuri* (*female dance*). *Kecak* is upper torso *Monkey chant dance*, and *Barong* is a *mummer’s dance*, based on Bali Island. *Walter Sorell* explains: „Probably in the fifth century, the sage Bharata established artistic principles and a system of training—the rigid rules for the dance language called the *Natya Shastra*. Sanskrit has a single word for dance and drama: *Natya*. Bharata speaks of *Nritya*, the expressive dance, which tells a story through pantomime; *Nritta*, the pure dance, dance for the sake of dancing giving itself up to intoxicating rhythm; and added to this are *Gita*, the song, *Vachika*, speech, and *Vadya*, the musical accompaniment. There are 24 movements for single hands, 13 for combined hands, 10 arm movements, 5 chest movements, 5 movements each for the waist, thigh and hip, there are movements for neck and eyebrows as well as 36 glances to express different feelings. The gesture language of the hands, the *Hasta-Mudras*, is the most beautiful in the complexity of its symbolism.” (Walter Sorell : 52) Every gesture of the *Shaman dancer* has a symbolic meaning, like a „word” or „expression”. In the Bible’s Old Testament, *King David* is the oldest known „dancer” who danced before the Arc of the Covenant and praised the Lord. *Walter Sorell* explains again: „David dressed in the official robe of the high priest, danced in ecstasy before the Deity. It was a rotary dance rich in gesture; accentuated by violent leaps... His wild dance was expression of religious joy”. (Walter Sorell: 19)

Dance is the only art form that uses complex sign language to portray „words”, phrases, fragments, metaphors, language sequences, sentences that directly affect human emotions. *Ballet* uses various postures (*Arabesques*, *Attitudes*, *Croisee’s*, *Ecartee’s*), jumps, floor turns, air pirouettes, „*Pas de deux*”, „*Pas de trois*”, and Ensemble narratives. Ballet incorporates folk dances, that we call *Character Dances*. The *Symphonic Ballets* are narrative structures, based on the musical score – symphonies of Tchaikovsky. In „*Swan Lake*” the *Syntactic* (Syntax as sign vehicle), is being identified as relationships of managed word sentence units. Syntactics is being compared to the concept of *Paratactics* (*Parataxis*), which is „beyond the sentence” total unit management. The reasonable deduction is that the Syntactic of paragraphs is a variant of the Symphonic Ballet Dance – binding relationship of *Ballet Variation – Image*. In ballet narratology we use *metaphors*, describing abstract ideas, which is a gesture usage similar to *Iconic* (gestures that depict concrete objects). It has a stronger performer (*addresser*) to audience (*addressee*) communication. *Quintilian* will exclaim: „The eye is stronger than the ear!” meaning that observing a dancing body could be more convincing than spoken word. The gestures of the female dancer,

for example, represent a girl trapped in a swan body. Instead of using the costumes the focus is on choreography of body gestures. *David McNeill* also says: „Gestures open a „window” onto the mind...taking gesture into account, we see patterns not revealed by speech alone and see more comprehensively how meanings are constructed. Gesture is not only a display of meaning but is part of the act of constructing meanings itself, adding a „material carrier” that helps bring meaning into existence.” The *FBI agent Joe Navarro*, talks about the body language and gestures as an important complex sign system that can reveal our internal world, fears, and emotions. The scientists associate the body language with the *Limbic brain system function*. Legs and feet are most „honest” and start „dancing” (with rapid movements, tapping, shakes), when people are not honest, and start pointing at the door when they want to avoid an unpleasant situation. In ballet we are able to make sequences of mute dramatic actions more comprehensible. *Elizabeth Hayes* says: „The ultimate goal in choreography is to create dances that objectify thoughts, feelings, or mental images...” (Hayes 1993: 119) And choreography is using the gestures for this purpose. Hayes states: „Once gesture had become recognized by the ballet as a means to communicate meaning without the aid of dialogue or song, it became necessary to formulate ways to ensure that audiences could decipher the gestures so that they would get the point of performance. This is accomplished by incorporating *narrative* into choreography to organize gestures in a manner that would enable the viewer to make sense of the performance as a whole as opposed to a disconnected sequence of movements. In literature writers use narrative to create complicated stories, but within dance it must take a simpler form to ensure success.” (Hayes 1993: 122) The narrative stories used in famous ballets are themes borrowed from the folklore, myths, and fantasy world: „Sleeping Beauty”, „Copelia”, „Swan Lake”, „Giselle”, and „The Nutcracker”. Elizabeth Hayes’ research focus on how to communicate a narrative effectively via the usage of the following elements: *Sequence, Climax, and „Dance of Characterization”*. Through these three elements of dance narratology we communicate better the story of the ballets to the audiences. Narrative element *Sequence* is a logical and chronological placement of the gestures. Gestures follow a continuation of movements. Elizabeth Hayes’ defines her *Climax* as the equivalent to „the moment of complete suspense in a play or mystery novel” (16). The way to achieve climax is to ensure that the sequence leads up to this moment. Strategies include increasing the musical tempo, enlarging the movement range, and increasing or suspending movement dynamics (17). Hayes defines the third narrative element of „*Dance of Characterization*” as an attempt made by the choreography to choose specific movements to portray specific or general types of personalities that can be identified by the audience (17). Gesture becomes a means of creating *Visual Personifications* in dance. Dance narrative also relies on the important *Visual Elements of: Color, Costume, and Fabric*. Color of the costume of the character portrays a villain, hero or lover. In „Swan Lake” we have black (bad) and white (good) characters (swans). In costume the lines, forms, and shapes are important, and their fabric could be light, heavy, transparent, and rough. Costume is angular and heavy for the villains, and light and transparent for good characters, supernatural willis and angels. Hayes states that color psychologically affects the viewer’s emotions, such that white can serve to soothe and calm whereas black in its intensity serves to excite (Hayes 1993 : 173).

The dance narrative is also based on metrical rhythms of the dance *musical score*, and performers follow the musical beats and phrases precisely. When the rhythm increases and music gets louder (*Allegro Vivace*) we expect a catastrophe, and on the contrary when the music is slow (*Andante*), soft, quiet, and gentle, we enter the world of pleasures and happiness. *Pantomime* and *Emblems* are also part of the dance narratology complex sign system. Pantomime gestures communicate stories without speech. Emblems are gestures used at social events: handshakes, wedding ceremony kneeling before the bride. The pantomime and emblems are able

to narrate through the kinetic means of dance gestures and facial expressions. A narrative researcher *Marie-Laure Ryan*, compares various narrative systems, where text is present to narrate the story in silent era films. „A pantomime could for instance tell the story of a scorned lover who becomes depressed and attempts suicide, but suddenly regains his lust for life when an attractive woman walks by. Narrative is about evolving networks of human relations; and gestures and movement, by varying the distance between bodies, are reasonably good at representing the evolution of interpersonal relations, as long as mental life can be translated into visible body language.” (Marie-Laure Ryan, 2011)

The dance narrative is what makes the story vivid and dramatic. It is important to have a „significant event that provides a disturbance that give rise to a disequilibrium between the two characters. This disequilibrium is what leads to drama”, tell us *Sean Hall*, a semiotician scholar. If story presents a problem and series of tasks to be overcome, (Propp’s functions and obstacles) this will sustain the viewer’s interest. So the dance narrative of „*Romeo and Juliet*” could be narrated differently, depending from the choreographer’s intentions. For example: Romeo meets Juliet; Romeo loses Juliet (unhappy); Romeo wins Juliet back (happy), but the story can be reversed: Romeo meets Juliet; Romeo wins Juliet (happy); Romeo loses Juliet (unhappy). The dance narrative, as a discursive construct, is a dynamic and vital and tells the story through actions (or functions). *Vladimir Propp* first analyzes the role and functions of the heroic narratives part of the *Magical Fairytales*. The stories are sequences of events and include the following elements: personages (heroes and helpers), magical tools (supernatural aids), evil antagonists, obstacles, loco motions, awards (the ultimate boon), and 31 functions (actions). Vladimir Propp talks about the „*Closed Model*” of narrative. In dance narratives this model is also applicable. There are mythological narratives according to *Joseph Campbell*, which are universal to all Humankind. In the myths we find eternal narratives collected from ancient times that represent what our “*Collective Unconscious*” is hiding. *C.G. Jung’s Archetypes* are basic powerful images of ritual, mythology, and vision that are part of the dance narrative structures that inspired us, throughout the entire human culture dialectics. Joseph Campbell continues: „The unconscious sends all sorts of vapors, odd beings, terrors, and deluding images up into the mind-whether in dream, broad daylight, or insanity; for the human kingdom, beneath the floor of the comparatively neat little dwelling that we call our consciousness, goes down into unsuspected Aladdin caves.” Watching a dance performance, one is submerged in darkness and focuses only on the proscenium arch square. It is like watching a “colorful dream spectacle”. The viewer witnesses magic narrated through movement, composition, music, lights, rhythm, and décor. Dancer’s body is fine instrument tuned to a symphony of signs, and dancer executes the memorized steps and compositions in a narrative sequences, composed of postures, combinations, phrases, variations, and acts. And the opposite effect is achieved for the spectator: Reality (dance) enters the Dream world (observer’s mind) and becomes one. The important characteristic of dance narration is the action and the impact from it, inflicted on viewer’s subconscious minds. Using Propp’s words: „The constant, enduring elements of the fairytale are the functions of the personages, despite whom and how it’s performed. They organize the basic content parts of the fairy tale”. When we watch film or drama play; we don’t remember actor’s words but their actions. Overall, the functions of Propp and theory of Campbell are applicable to narratives and especially for dance narratives.

The *Stage Semiosis* is conditional, and non-verbal dancing narrative takes place in a formal space and time. The dance performance is a *semiotic construct of signs and semiotic formations*, and is basically a *defined set of codes combined with the secondary sign systems*, such as mythology, literature, fine arts, music, and religion. *De Toro* states that: „Performance codes (sign systems) in the show function usually on a *Simultaneous Principle (Paradigmatic)* or *Linear (Syn-*

tagmatic), in such a way actively producing signification". (De Toro 1995: 52) A dance narrative is combined not only of its elements but also is a compilation product of mimic, gestures, body flexibility (plasticity), music, and costumes. According to Jakobson, the non-verbal performances are complicated structures where: „a complex visual signs involve a series of simultaneous constituents." (Jakobson 1966) The dance narratives are composed from various signs and sign systems, having spatial and time dimensions, which form and support the specific dance language. The communication line starts from the *dancer (addresser)* and aims towards the *audience (addressee)*. Umberto Eco also accentuates on the movement of the body as part of the dance narratology: „The human body, with its conventionally known characteristics, surrounded or supplied with myriads of objects, incorporated in one physical space substitute something for the audience' reactions. In order for this to happen, it has been structured into a gaming situation, stating that it has to be accepted as sign." (Eco 1977) *Semiosis* is a cooperation of three elements: *sign, object, and interpretant*, according to Peirce. In dance narrative we rely heavily on these triadic relations, and the expressiveness of the human body (as sign) applied into choreography of the *movements (sign system)* that convey messages to the *viewers (interpretants)* and *objects*. The choreographer's *Meta sign* is combined of dancer's *technique sign*, music dramaturgy sign, visual sign, and the emotional sign. Erica Fisher-Lihte makes the connection between various narrative personages and the dancer's body as sign: „If we use the human body as sign for some character—for example demon, mythological figure, animal, spirit, Archetype-Father or other human, then this process not only interprets the body as sign, but also uses it as sign." (Erica Fisher-Lihte) The dance narrative is a construct of multiple *sign vehicles-imagery* (pictures projected on screen), *material objects* (soil, wood, sand), *sound effects and noises*, *dancers*, and the *stage space*. All of these components are mediums (mediators) between two and more signs in one or multiple sign systems, where the communication amongst them creates the basic narrative language of the dance show. That is why these heterogeneous signs are easily organized and composed into *multimedia environment*, where signs from one sign system correspond and translate to different sign systems (*Representation system*) via one or more sign vehicles. Dance is a visual art (uses Visual Signs) and relies entirely on body language (Sign Language), movement, composition, music, light contrast, shadows, space, and colors. In the present Post-modern life, we frequently observe dance theatre performances where *Actants* (dancers) utter short phrases, shouts, cries and whispers. All these „innovations" in the sign language of dance „improve" the non-verbal communication and add even „*New Media feel*" with *Video & Multimedia art screens installations* (new sign system) viewed by the audience simultaneously, while dancers film each other on stage. This new creative approach using the film language, combined with the dance narratology becomes part of the new media film genre: *Dance Films* or „*Dance for Camera*" films. *San Francisco International Film Festival* writes about the dance films: "No art form has shown more vitality or great innovation in recent years... This is a sample of what's been happening." In these films the narratology concept is preserved and enhanced with story, conflict, protagonists as dancers and also another important participant: *Spatial Dimensions – architectural interiors and exteriors, and nature*. Dance is „freed" of its form and space, broadens its space dimensions in time (film montage-ellipses, jump cuts, transitions, manipulation of motion and speed). "But in contrast to still pictures, language, and film, the live performance of gesture narration is incapable of skipping a moderate period of time. It is only when gestures are recorded through film and the footage put together through film montage that it becomes possible to create ellipses of any length in the development of a narrative action." (Bordwell & Thompson 2009). *The camera* also „dances" in *Dance Narrative Films*. The dance films borrow energies from the dramaturgy, fine arts, psychology of visual perception, and the processes of fine arts. As Eisenstein's concept film theory for „*Montage of Attractions*", borrowed from the

theatre and circus performances, the dance narratology editing is created by manipulation of emotions and juxtaposition of powerful imagery, with various POV (Point of View) shots, angles, subjective camera shots, and spatial dimensions. On the screen, because of its visual nature, the *film shot becomes a new quality unit, a sign*. But this sign has the complicated image construction and symbolical meaning of the *hieroglyphics or pictograms*. The juxtaposition of two „simple” actions in hieroglyphics bears a new „complicated” meaning. For example: water and eyes become „crying”, mouth and kid is „yelling”. „That’s montage!””, explains Eisenstein. Compared to dance gesture emblems in *ballet „Giselle”*, the gesture of the prince touching his chest, followed by a raised arm with two fingers pointing to the sky, means „I swear!”. Eisenstein talks about the duality nature of the shot, and his understanding is overlapping with the modern linguistics concept of the nature of signs, having a *Saussure’s dual structure of - Signifier/Signified*. This is also the Saussure’s concept of sign that has *Dyadic Model Characteristics*. From one side the film shot, similar to hieroglyphics, serves to signify or to „create literature imagery”. Having a visual nature, the shot is able to evoke „amazing expressive skills!” One of the pioneers of the modern dance *Martha Graham* is influenced by the visual semiotics signs, fine arts field, and music. *Jean-Luke Nancie* in his „Corpus” writes about the complicated world of dance narratology the following: „The convulsion of the meaning rips the whole body from the body – and leaves the corps in the cave...Despite its meaning of „duality of the soul” and the body, monism of the „flesh”, cultural or psychoanalytical symbolism of the bodies, the body always is structured as of pointing at the meaning. Personification is structured as flesh-less...*The signified body* – the whole corpus of the philosophical, theological, psychoanalytical and *semiological bodies* – signifies only one thing – *absolute controversy not to be a body, without being a body of one spirit, that makes it body-less.*” The „body-less state” is achieved by „*Dance Theatre*” of *Pina Bausch*. She reaches the state of „flesh-less bodies”, transforming it into a spiritual happening. Pina Bausch uses *index signs* for intensified emotional aura, such as mud, water, soil, and hay. Her moving pictures are also an *iconic signs* filled with rich symbolical meanings. The observer is using, deconstructing and reading the *narrative signs* of Pina Bausch. German dance theoretician *Norbert Servos* adds: „All simple attempts for deciphering of the play through pure intuitive or didactic processes are failing. Here the meaning of word is transformed in body signs, total expression of movement, mimic, gesture. Only when the bodies present on stage, and their self-consciousness enter into connection with viewer’s daily life experiences, a sensible context is reached.” These two narratives, dancers and the viewer are mixed together into a „mental dance”. The stage is the meeting point, and the choreographer is some kind of medium giving „green light” to viewer’s conscience to join the dance. The narrative is achieved through usage of „pieces” or „fragments” as film shots glued together by the story described. Using the repetition as unique way of storytelling, Pina Bausch achieves the *Brechtian Effect of alienation*. According to one of the greatest film directors, Fellini, the Pina Bausch performances are: „Dream visions, ceremonies, predictions, and revelation...”

In the Japanese theatre *Kabuki and Noh*, dance and movements are precise and organized according to the drama text, Zen Buddhism philosophy, gestures, mimic, and body expressiveness of the *dancers (actants)* and are fundamental of the main concept of this dance narrative code. The Japanese dance narratives (in the stage performances, are part of *Pluricoded („Repertoire of Signs”)* environment: „Those physical movements can also have a history, a precedence against which textual structures (Syntactic) might be applied (or not). Physical, gesture activity (mime or other) can construct, finally a space that develops in a parallel or indeed even opposite direction to that which might arise from the imaginary of the text.” (Ubersfeld 1999 :112) *Butoh Dance („Dance of Darkness”) of Japan* is extremely emotional, confusing, expressive, and overwhelming dance narrative form. Mila Iskrenova tells us about it: „Men, painted in white,

mainly bald-headed and naked, acted dumbfounded on a first glance. They either did not move at all, or they moved extremely slow, or were hanging for hours upside down from a bridge, or executed circular turns until they totally went off the rails..." But where do we find the meaning in this strange dance narrative sign labyrinth? Mila Iskrenova continues: „The world of „Dance of Darkness” are sex, death, „archaic memory” (collective unconscious), and primitive impulses...it is nourished in its roots from „the literature of damnation” of *Marquise de Sade*, passing through *Jeunet and Artaud*, and through the German expressionistic dance...The Butoh dance is situated on the margins of the environment-those of death, of the unconscious-individual and collective, of life’s challenges. Butoh characterizes ritual in „shocking, provocative, physical, spiritual, erotic, grotesque, cosmic, nihilistic, cathartic, violent, and mysterious” kind.”

The dance narratology is enriched by various gestures part of the folk dance traditional dances. In *Bulgarian folk dance* we see the dancers carrying a sack of wheat, ploughing the earth, planting seeds, imitating tailor’s scissors usage, and potter’s wheel. All of these gestures or dance steps represent various traditional crafts and work labor of the village people. Every gesture is a sign and narrates a specific labor and skill. In the *Middle East* the dance of the waist, called „*Belly Dance*”, is focused in the lower abdominal area and the erotic and seductive movements of the hips are combined with semi-nakedness of the dancer for more visual stimulation. The music with its specific Oriental tunes of „*Makams*” is in perfect relation with the dance narratology complicated sign system to produce seductive and sexual feelings in the viewer’s minds. All folk dances, with exception of the tribal circle dances of the Aborigines, are executed towards the viewer but there is also a multi-faceted space dimension of the modern dance of *Merce Cunningham*. Here dancers are facing the whole stage directions and various spatial dimensions. Here we have a significant alteration of the dance space which becomes a *three-dimensional sign* that narrates with more complicated sign system language code. Finally, the dance tells stories and communicates to us via its „non-verbal code”, but we still need to educate the viewers how to interpret its code, secretly hidden in the „dance narrative”. Dance is an incredible source subject for *semiotics material research*, since in dance choreography there are always present: narration, source codes, various signs, interpretants, interpreters, and rich sign meanings.

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SEMIOTIZING HISTORY

Taras Boyko
Tartu University, Department of Semiotics
taras.boyko@ut.ee

Abstract

The article glances over some milestone works and ideas which appeared in the 1970-1980's as an attempt to bridge history/historiography and semiotics.

In the 1970's and 1980's semiotics in many ways appeared to be (or at least occasionally was presented as) discipline/approach with almost unlimited potential and widest academic reach. Perhaps it is possible to say that during this period semiotics was clearly "in trend", and even more remarkably, it was in trend not only among the scholars representing various fields of humanities. As not a surprising outcome of this almost overwhelming popularity of semiotics related approaches, many semioticians and scholars who tended to propagate semiotics or semiotic method(s) often allowed themselves to transgress traditional disciplinary boundaries and, in some sense, extend the sphere of applicability of semiotics to neighboring and academically distant areas of scholarship. For the most part, such transgressions or diffusions presupposed spotlighting of those numerous "new" research directions and horizons which semiotics presumably promised to open for the "old" disciplines. When looking at the situation from the history of ideas stands, perhaps makes sense to mention one such example of transgression – case which concerns a number of tries to "semiotize" historiography and studies of the past, or at least make some attempts to somehow bridge semiotics and historical studies.

Influences of semiotics on the field of history in general and professional historians in particular for the most part tended to be not as visible in comparison with the ones semiotics happened to have on areas like literary studies, linguistics or culture studies. But nevertheless these interactions between semiotics and disciplinary history can serve as rather illustrative episode, perhaps even a separate chapter, in the history of the 20th-century humanities textbook. This

very topic of cross-disciplinary interaction deserves some special attention also due to the fact that these attempts to semiotize history occurred roughly at the same time and more or less independently in very different academic environments, thus once again proving that with some scholarly ideas certain thoughts are simply in the air. By these various academic environments meant what can be called “West” and “East”, and “East” here represents Soviet academic *milieu*. Thus the general intention behind this paper is to trace some of these attempts as well as make a try identify similar (or different) ideas stemming from 1970-1980’s tries to bridge history and semiotics.

“West”

In the west one of the first platforms for the debates on the topic of history and semiotics happened to be journal *Semiotica*. For any reader interested in the earliest stages of the discussion, a major point to start perhaps should be the issue №40 ¾ from the year 1982 with Peter Haidu’s article *Semiotics and History*. This piece by the US professor is followed by a commentary and in some sense reply from another North American scholar Marike Finlay-Pelinski. Her article has a bit more nuanced title – *Semiotics or History: From content analysis to contextualized discursive praxis*. These contributions by Haidu, scholar of medieval literature and critical theory, and Finaly-Pelinski, scholar who came from communication and English studies, nicely set the stage and, what seems to be even more important, in many ways outline those crucial points and discussion knots for the following debate to come.

Professor Haidu’s opening argument is that technicity and formality of semiotics renders it to be appropriate for the analysis of texts as repositories of historical meaning (Haidu 1982:187), while the very model of textual functioning which comes from semiotics is capable of identifying levels of sociohistorical structures (Haidu 1982:188). At the same time major concern, as Haidu calls it, is “coordination of semiotics and history”. But how does he proposes to coordinate the two? Suggestion is that:

...semiotics must consider history, not as phenomenal event, but as an entity producing meaning, as a signifier capable of being assigned a signified. The events of history, that is, must be considered as ‘event-messages’; it is their meaningfulness that allows the imposition of semiotic analysis...It is only when the question of ‘signification’ or ‘meaning’ comes up, and hence the possibility of dealing with semantic values, that semiotics can enter the picture. When it does, it takes history as text. (Haidu 1982:188-189).

The formula “history as text” deserves some particular attention and emphasis. From a surface level it is very traditional and exists more or less from the earliest beginnings of historical writing, simply because one of the basic pillars of historiography is dependence on availability and access to some type of written source(s). But what Haidu reminds us about is the problem of the historian who is concerned with establishing the correct model of the interrelations in material (-> sources) him or her studies. Formally, says Haidu, it is identical with the semiotic problem of determining the correct hierarchical organization of various codes (Haidu 1982: 196). Moreover, codes in this context can identify social, political, and economic categories at play in one or the other situation.

Another reason semiotics should “work” with history is enclosed in the attention to such key element as value(s). For Peter Haidu:

Values' are the units of content to which semiotic analysis addresses itself: 'values' are the semantic 'bits' that, when assembled, make language and other semiotic systems meaningful [...] 'Values' are what actions are about: their creation, captation, or exchange. History and narrative are the incorporation of 'values' [...] And history as the narrative of human values being created, transformed, captured, or exchanged, and narrative as a history of such events, are the entirely 'natural' objects of analysis for a narrative semiotics (Haidu 1982: 191)

With such emphasis on values inevitably comes attention to ideology. On this matter Haidu does not go too far and repeats a well-known catchy formulation of Valentin Volosinov – “whenever a sign is present, ideology is present, too”¹. And since everything ideological possesses this semiotic value, semiotics turns out to be a privileged instrument for the analysis of ethical, aesthetic, religious, scientific etc. functions included in the domain of ideology (Haidu 1982: 210). While history, as the narrative of these values, tends to be an object *par excellence*, both on practical and theoretical levels. Haidu is also fascinated with the level of deep structures that generate both historical phenomenality and semiotic textuality. For him attention to deep structures is precisely the point of connection between semiotics and history (here Haidu brings examples of Marxist and Annales School historians as those opposing punctual history that worked and continues to work on the level of particular historical events) (Haidu 1982: 223-224)

Marika Finlay-Pelinski on the other hand suggests that there exist a number of problems with combining so easily Saussurean-oriented semiotics² and history, mainly because such type of semiotics “[...] have a limited view of history [...] the very analytical tools of semiotics, taken as a critical metalanguage [...] have an epistemological foundation that is profoundly and irremediably ahistorical [...] Saussurean-oriented semiotics presents fundamentally ahistorical view of language or text” (Finlay-Pelinski 1982: 229). Texts, according to the Canadian scholar, resist the analytical categories of binary semiotic and instead they “accentuate their own historical and contextual nature as a communicational act and as sign-production” (Finlay-Pelinski 1982: 234).

For Finlay-Pelinski history can be defined as an act, event, practice and, on more materialistic stands, even as interaction or contextualization of all production by certain conditions of production (Finlay-Pelinski, 1982: 230). Moreover, with voicing such an approach she basically juxtaposes these two histories – history as acts, facts and events, and history as a discursive act. It is quite clear for Finlay-Pelinski that: “Since Saussure’s revolt against philology and etymology, many semioticians [apparently pointing first of all to Haidu] have insisted that historical analysis is impossible and that we should concentrate on immanent textual analysis instead” (Finlay-Pelinski 1982: 231).

A few years later the debate on relations and interrelations between sphere of history and semiotics continued in *Semiotica* issue 54 ³/₄ (1985). In the case of this volume, the article to pay attention to should be *What has history to do with semiotic?* by Brooke Williams (Deely). For Williams, a professional historian herself, it is history, viewed and perceived as the logic of historical becoming, what lends the foundation of existential concreteness to the question of how and why sign systems change (Williams 1985: 268). “History [...] addresses the interaction of

¹ From Volosinov’s famous work *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (1986: 10)

² Finlay-Pelinski here basically equates Saussurean-oriented semiotics with Haidu’s perspective, which defines history as a sort of transformation of variables within semiotic structures, throughout the sequentiality of the diachronic axis of the text (Finlay-Pelinski 1982: 229)

nature and mind through the semiosis that transmits human culture [...] history in its proper being is not first of all a discipline, but precisely is the anthroposemiotic transmission and generation of culture wherein nature and mind mutually influence each other in the shaping and constitution of ‘reality’” (Williams 1985: 281).

And at the same time Professor Williams admits that “...human being as both product and producer of culture transcends the physical environment by creating a cognitive map or Umwelt, in which the past subsists and shapes the very sign-configuration of present reality long after physical interactions we define as past have ceased to exist” (Williams 1985: 274). Meaning that what present semiosis does is that it continuously screens for signification of the receding past in light of a constantly advancing current situation, thus clarifying the idea that the whole conversation should be about transmissibility of the past as the creation of this present semiosis as well as about anthroposemiotic understanding of history. Another important idea, and in some sense a proposal, from Williams lays on the lines that:

[...] mediated process of constructing the ‘historical past’...needs to be reconceptualized in the perspective of semiotic, which would account for both the so-called ‘real’ – or mind-independent aspect of history – and the so-called ‘ideal’ – or mind-dependent aspect of history – as these two are distinct but not separate in the semiotic transmission or ‘construction’ of the past through time wherein real and unreal relations commingle precisely as history (Williams 1985: 316)

Finally deserves some special attention one of the culmination points of the article, where Professor Williams notes: “History is always being rewritten because that is its semiotic role in culture...” (Williams 1985: 321).

“East”

On parallel course semioticians who worked in Soviet Union also started to pay attention to some issues and challenges associated with history, historical writing and even historian’s craft *per se*. For instance, in the early 1980’s Yuri Lotman on a number of occasions addressed one of the crucial historiographic problems – a problem of historical sources. For the Tartu professor, it is evident that any historical document potentially can have varied semiotic nature. And in perspective such type of variability significantly influences what can be so-called “distortion factor” of the overall picture portrayed in the document at stake (Lotman 1982: 44). As an example here Lotman discussed “texts with a strong degree of mythologization”. The later rather often have an apparent predisposition towards hyperbolization and idealization, and Yuri Mikhailovich considered these potential tendencies to hyperbolize and idealize to be some sort of rituals of text composition, which, in his opinion, aren’t always taken into consideration by scholars. Continuing this line of thought Lotman suggest to turn to semiotics and try to apply semiotic analysis to each particular source historian intends to base his research on (Lotman 1982: 45).

Towards the late 1980’s Lotman happened to be even more interested and concerned with these sets of issues and problems associated with history and historical writing(s). For instance, in one of his most important books of the time – *Universe of the Mind*³ – Tartu professor stated that historians, whether they want it or not, condemned to deal with texts, texts being as a sort

³ The book was first published in English in 1990, but originally written in Russian language during year 1988-1989

of *intermediary agent* between an event as it happened and a historian who investigates this event. Besides being an intermediary, text also turns out to be the most biased element in the entire set of procedures associated with historical investigative practices, mainly because text is always "...created by somebody and for some purpose, an event appears in it in some encrypted way" (Lotman 1990: 217). According to Lotman, the outcome of such a situation for historians is that their starting point in any research narrows down to the need to deal with a potentially misrepresenting element, a necessity to decode this or that text. Moreover, to some extent, even to create a fact while trying to extract some extra-textual reality from the analyzed text and event from a story about this event. Based on such an understanding of the situation in historiography, Lotman proposes to pay more attention to reconstructing the set of codes used by an author (whether it is a chronicler, ancient historian, etc.) of the investigated source text, while at the same time correlating it with the codes used here and now, meaning codes of the particular historian or perhaps even an ordinary reader, as well as bear in mind the difference between the synchronicity and asynchronicity of descriptions. The whole project is basically to find out what was considered to be a fact for the author of this or that analyzed text and only afterward make any attempts to establish fact(s) "for yourself" – a sort of ground zero for outlining the range of the potential interpretations of this fact (Lotman 1990: 218).

Lotman as well talks about another important issue – he points out inevitable structural unity brought along with the narrativization of events. Such type of unity organizes materials in the system of temporal and causal coordinates. What seems evident for Lotman here is the presence of rhetorical and ideological levels, which accompany a variety of narrative structures. Thus genre based, ideological, political, social, religious, philosophical, and other codes should necessarily be taken into consideration as unavoidable elements of any narrative based source. (Lotman 1990: 223)

Another prominent member of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics – Boris Uspensky – began to write about historical matters even earlier than his colleague and friend Yuri Lotman. Already in the mid 1970's appeared Uspensky's classic and widely cited piece titled *Historia sub specie semioticae* (Uspensky 1976⁴). In this work Moscow professor noted that:

From a semiotic perspective, the historical process can be conceived of as a communication process in which the new information that is constantly being received conditions a reciprocal reaction on the part of the societal addressee or social group. Some "language", understood in a broad semiotic rather than a narrow linguistic sense, determines perception of both real and potentially possible facts in the corresponding historical-cultural context. In this way, meaning is attributed to events: a *text* of events is *read* by a social group. We can say, then, that in its rudimentary phase, the historical process is a process of generating new "sentences" in some "language" and of having them read by a societal addressee or social group. (Uspensky 1976, 286)

More than a decade later Professor Uspensky continued with the topic and stated: "History is semiotic in its nature... it involves certain semiotisation of reality – transformation of non-sign into sign and non-history into history" (Uspensky 1988: 69). For Moscow scholar the unfolding of events in time implied "language" level (-> semiotics of language), while perception of history – sign level (-> semiotics of sign). And altogether such combination, along with conditions of temporal sequence & cause-and-effect relations, ensured semiosis of history.

⁴ To be entirely correct, first time this paper was presented by Uspensky even earlier – at the First All-Union Symposium on Semiotics of the Humanities in Tartu (1974). And the version of this presentation appeared in the book of symposium proceedings, but the full-scale publication of the work happened only in 1976.

Some conclusions...

Any history of ideas research is always very challenging because it is never enough just to analyze emergence and circulation of a certain idea. It is also necessary to try and trace possible inspirations for one or the other author/scholar in his or her elaboration and use of this idea. But in the case of the described attempts to semiotize history the task seems to be a bit easier, because Western scholars (Haidu, Finlay-Pelinski, Williams) did not quote directly or indirectly Lotman or Uspensky⁵. While the Soviet scholars do not list any works of their North American colleagues at all. So this type of almost absent “communication” between the two camps makes it even more remarkable how similar their academic findings and proposals happened to be at the end.

For instance, it is particular emphasis on the idea of history being some kind of narrative that is open to and even invites semiotic analysis. Both Haidu and Lotman dedicate a decent part of their articles to explanation of how this functioning of history as narrative works, importance and variability of codes in it, etc. Or the idea of history as some type of message (Haidu) or communicative act (Uspensky), a set of messages, once again both entirely fitting into semiotician’s world view. And the notion of text (that was important for almost all the western and soviet scholars) being central axis for both historiography and semiotics. The idea of transmitting human culture, which is clearly visible with Lotman (perhaps one of the first propagandist’s of semiotics of culture) and Williams, who sees history as crucial culture generating force. Finally, expressed in very similar manner by Uspensky and Williams idea about past being a product of some present semiosis, and so on.

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⁵ Although to be fair, it makes sense to mention that for instance Peter Haidu and Brooke Williams does list in their bibliography some works of Lotman and Uspensky translated into French and English.

SOCIO-CULTURAL SIGNS IN POLITICAL DIALOGUE

Veronica Azarova
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
kunsttrans@yahoo.com

Abstract

When people are involved in a political dialogue as part of the delegation of their own country, very often they reproduce the ancient archetype of socio-cultural differentiation 'we-they'. The socio-cultural identity of the individual implies a stereotypic range of characteristics – behavioral, symbolic, and objective, which have been rooted in the 'political' behavior of people belonging to various civilizations. In this sense exactly, one can distinguish between the Western negotiation style and the Eastern negotiation style. Or, for example, certain religious tenets are especially strictly observed in negotiations and negotiators are particularly sensitive to issues related to national and religious independence. The category of national identity enables us to see the connection between the individual and the socio-cultural determination of their actions at the table of negotiations.

Within the context of the subject of political dialogue, the category of identity helps us perceive the connection between the individual and the socio-cultural determination of their actions at the table of negotiations. It encompasses the psychological and sociological dimensions of the process and creates the connection of objects – symbols – information – interpretation – evaluation.

The socio-cultural identity of the individual implies a stereotypic range of characteristics – behavioral, symbolic, and objective, which have been rooted in the 'political' behavior of people belonging to various civilizations. As early as the Antiquity, Herodotus, Hippocrates and Pliny sought to explain the peculiarities of 'political character' with the variations in climate, geographical and historical conditions.

More recently, with the evolution of ethnography and of semiotics later on, 'more modern' arguments for the analysis of political phenomena and their relation to national culture have been employed. Charles Montesquieu and John Locke also wrote on the 'national spirit', which was shaped by the respective climatic and geographical factors.

When people sit at the table of negotiations as part of the delegation of their own country, they logically reproduce the ancient archetype of socio-cultural differentiation 'we-they' at 'a new historical level'. Therefore, the stereotypes of national character and style, which in homogeneous socio-cultural environment would remain in the background, emerge without necessarily being demonstrated here.

With the advances in civilization, more complex, and, in a sense, hierarchically ordered, levels of socio-cultural identity have formed. These are mentioned briefly below:

- I-identity: the individual idea of oneself as a member of the community;
- subjective socio-cultural identity – the notion of the individual herself in situations of social interaction with the community;
- demonstrated public identity – the reaction of the surrounding socio-cultural behavior of the individual. The person – seen through the behavior of other members of the community;
- objective socio-cultural identity – a set of psychological and socio-cultural patterns of behavior that occur in situations of social contacts.

When representatives of different cultures sit at the table of negotiations, the precise interpretation of the peculiarities of the national style of dialogue is essential. Under the 'national style' here I mean the devotion to particular cultural values, traditions and customs, the orientation towards specific mechanisms for decision making, and the compliance with certain rules in political negotiations, which are deeply rooted in the national culture.

There are hundreds of examples of extreme oppositeness in the perception of some or other actions, words and behavior. For representatives of the Eurocentric culture – Europeans and Americans it is quite natural to sit with their legs crossed especially during an informal meeting, while for Arabs this is deeply offensive. In Arabic, for example, the word 'intermediator' has a very negative connotation — 'an impertinent person who intervenes between the negotiating parties' and therefore the word, which is generally acceptable in other situations, should be avoided in the negotiating vocabulary. Thus, like the prince from the Taoist parable, who despite his best intentions killed the seabird due to his ignorance, a negotiator who is not sensitive to the otherness might destroy the possibility of success of the negotiations quite too soon.

It is recommended that the analysis of the national negotiation style focuses on several key parameters:

- orientation of values, religious customs and norms, ideological propositions;
- mentality specifics related to the specific perception of the world;
- mechanisms for political decision-making – individual and collective, degree of freedom and autonomy in decision-making;
- behavioral characteristics associated with non-verbal communication.

In general, the national negotiation style can be subdivided into Eastern and Western. This criterion, undoubtedly, stems from the subdivision of modern 'political cultures' to the extent that any national political culture is reflected in the individual negotiation style of its representatives.

The following comparative analysis of *the Eastern* and *the Western* way of conducting political negotiations can be made, based on several criteria:

Dominant value orientation of personality

The West: material value priorities, inviolable private property. The political sphere is almost independent of moral and religious traditions, which stems from the separation of the church from the state.

The East: sacralization of political power, religion in most cases is an integral and official part of the state's political tradition, inheritance and 'ownership' of power; politics and moral norms are, in a sense, much more connected.

Mentality specifics

The West: anthropocentric principle of argumentation. The person is the 'center of the universe', who endeavors to subdue nature, the world, and anything that, according to him, has not been conquered. Orientation to a rational path towards the truth.

The East: theocentric principle of argumentation. The transcendent will, which man must obey, is at the heart of the universe. Respectively, the main task of the person is to recognize this will and act in accordance with its principles. Orientation to an intuitive path towards the truth.

Dominants of political behavior

The West: tendency to use extreme transforming and modernizing techniques in politics. Sense of a linear course of time, including political time, which flows to infinity without disturbing its rhythm and course. Orientation to the future – their own, that of the future generations, of their nation, of mankind.

The East: tendency to use of 'soft' techniques in diplomacy and politics which are not conflicting with natural and moral laws. Sense of cyclical time, including political time, which suggests the possibility of variation in each new cycle. Orientation to the standards of political behavior in the past – that of their ancestors, of their nation, of mankind.

Basic archetypes in the public mind

The West: the archetypal image of a conquering hero, 'Prometheus unbound', who subdued the whole world to his will.

The East:

- the archetypal image of the hero-liberator, who saves the world after the struggle with evil and restores global justice and social harmony in Orthodox Christianity;
- the archetypal image of the 'noble man', maintaining order and harmony in society in Confucianism;
- the archetypal image of the dancing Shiva, the metaphor of 'cosmic dancer', symbolizing the mystery of the universe and its harmonious dynamics in Hinduism;
- the archetypal image of the warrior, fighting to death for the faith in Islam.

Socio-cultural identity

The West: 'blurred' socio-cultural identity due to the belief that in an era of globalization the person is a 'citizen of the world', in which national and cultural differences disappear gradually, as the individual stands in the foreground.

The East: 'strengthened' socio-cultural identity because of the belief that in an era of globalization it is important to protect one's cultural identity, which is a guarantee for success and progress in the world of competition between different cultures.

Ethos of the culture of negotiation

The West: the ethos during negotiations unfolds the idea of 'morality of success' – striving for

victory, prosperity and progress in all spheres of public life.

The East: the ethos of the culture of negotiation combines the pursuit of keeping harmony in the world, in nature and in society. This is achieved through:

- the path of service in Orthodox Christianity;
- the path of reverence for life in Hinduism;
- the path of the golden rule in Confucianism;
- the path of Allah's wars in Islam.

In this sense exactly, one can distinguish between the Western negotiation style and the Eastern negotiation style. For example, the first criterion – the one related to value orientation and influence of religious norms, has a very strong influence on the national negotiation style in Muslim countries. Certain religious tenets are especially strictly observed in negotiations and negotiators are particularly sensitive to issues related to national and religious independence.

Japanese negotiators following their value norms strive to avoid conflict situations at all costs. This is the reason why one will never hear a distinct 'no' spoken by a Japanese diplomat even if the options discussed are completely unacceptable for them. "I will do everything that depends on me", uttered by a Japanese politician, does not mean consent but rather polite refusal.

West European and American diplomats do not adhere to religious, moral, or even ethical norms to such an extent. Respecting basic business etiquette, they too quickly, according to Eastern criteria, address the essence of the negotiations and endeavor not to burden them with issues of minor importance. As the Western political culture is based primarily on formal logic, it strives towards 'rationality' of the negotiation process and its 'alignment' in the most straightforward way to reach the goal set.

Therefore, clear definitions and proposals as well as compliance with the agreed deadlines and strict implementation of the agreements reached are extremely important for Western negotiators.

The Eastern culture of negotiation is not as 'formalized' as the Western, and one of the main concerns is to establish personal relationships because of the belief that they are more important than individual specific arrangements. And of course, Eastern negotiators focus on rituals and ceremonies, which can sometimes have a sacred meaning and yet remain completely misunderstood by Western negotiating partners.

In terms of degree of freedom and autonomy in decision-making, the Western negotiation tradition gives many more alternatives. The Eastern culture of negotiation is very clearly based on the collectivist spirit and participants in the political negotiations cannot make a decision unless it has been discussed by everyone else.

In the age of globalization and intense international contacts the skill of reading "body language" and the sensitivity to cultural peculiarities and differences are of crucial importance. In particular, cultural barriers can sometimes be a major obstacle to reaching an agreement even when much more substantial issues have been resolved.

**NEW FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE,
OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND OF
ECONOMIC VALUE IN THE AGE
OF THE INTERNET**

TOWARD SYSTEMATIZATION OF BASIC SEMIOTIC DISCIPLINES

Ivan Kasabov
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
ivankassabov@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper is not a survey of historical development of semiotics. It has nothing to do with diachronic research of semiotic ideas and schools. This text is *par excellence* structural schematic systematization of semiotic disciplines as dealing with different aspects of the sign in their interrelations and hierarchy within immanent paradigm of the sign itself.

Every single sign could be considered in terms of its form, in terms of its existence and in terms of its significance. The well-known Peircean signs' division into three trichotomies and three correlations with reference to 3 types of signs in their 3 correlations (cf. Peirce 1992-1998: 296) can be jointly presented in one matrix. A similar nine-box matrix – named as *the semiotic nonagon* – has been elaborated (especially for the sign *treatment of color*) by Claudio Guerri (2009: 7). This matrix illustrates clearly the three types of sign existence, namely: of imaginary form, of actual existence and of symbolic values – each intersecting with three correlates (theoretical possibility, economical praxis and cultural strategy). Thus, we have to single out three interconnected but different levels of sign existence: of theoretical form (as architectonics or theory of sign possibility), of actual existence (as praxis), and of socio-cultural values (as knowledge or sign-language competence). Following Peirce's famous *Classification of Signs*, the proposed matrix scheme allows for a more detailed study of the relationship between the components of the sign. Each of the matrix sub-signs (items from 1 to 9) can be tripled (as iconic sign, sign-index and sign-symbol) and thus obtaining (9 x 3 =) 27 sign possibilities and their corresponding types of values and their significance and meanings in the detailed and complicated matrix representing the semiotic model of sign with 27 positions.

Based on the matrix (Table 1), representing the semantic model of the sign to its possible,

actual, and real existence, it appears appropriate to propose a particular kind of distribution for semiotic disciplines in the respective positions.

SIGN	1st. <i>TRICHOTOMY</i> : In relation to itself (as a <i>type</i> of sign)	2nd. <i>TRICHOTOMY</i> : In relation of the <i>Sign</i> to its <i>Object</i>	3rd. <i>TRICHOTOMY</i> : In relation of the <i>Sign</i> to the <i>Interpretant</i>
1 st . CORRELATE <i>First-ness</i>	1. QUALISIGN	2. ICON	3. RHEME
2 nd . CORRELATE <i>Second-ness</i>	4. SINSIGN (SIGN-TOKEN)	5. INDEX	6. DICENT (PREDICATIVE SIGN)
3 rd . CORRELATE <i>Third-ness</i>	7. LEGISIGN (SIGN-TYPE)	8. SYMBOL	9. ARGUMENT (<i>interpretative sign-symbol's understanding</i>)

Table 1: An integrated matrix scheme of the sign

A similar matrix – named as *the semiotic nonagon* – has been elaborated by Cl. Guerri (2009: 7 – Table 2).

SIGN	1st. <i>TRICHOTOMY</i> : COMPARISON POSSIBILIITY <i>IMAGINARY FORM</i>	2nd. <i>TRICHOTOMY</i> : PERFORMANCE ACTUALIZATION <i>REAL EXISTENCE</i>	3rd. <i>TRICHOTOMY</i> : THOUGHT NECESSITY <i>SYMBOLIC VALUE</i>
<i>Form</i> 1 st . CORRELATE <i>THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY</i>	1. <i>Form of Form</i> <u>DIFFERENCE</u> QUALISIGN	2. <i>Existence of Form</i> ICON	3. <i>Value of Form</i> RHEME
<i>Existence</i> 2 nd . CORRELATE <i>ECONOMICAL PRACTICE</i>	4. <i>Form of Existence</i> SINSIGN	5. <i>Existence of Existence</i> <u>DIFFERENT</u> INDEX	6. <i>Value of Existence</i> DICENT
<i>Value</i> 3 rd . CORRELATE <i>CULTURAL STRATEGY</i>	7. <i>Form of Value</i> LEGISIGN	8. <i>Existence of Value</i> SYMBOL	9. <i>Value of Value</i> <u>DIFFERENTIATION</u> ARGUMENT

Table 2: The matrix of the *semiotic nonagon*

This matrix illustrates clearly the three types of sign's existence, namely: of imaginary form, of actual existence and of symbolic values – each intersecting with three correlates (theoretical possibility, economical praxis and cultural strategy). For our purpose here it is important to emphasize the left to right diagonal positions (*difference – different – differentiation*) in the matrix and to suggest giving more attention to the right to left diagonal positions (cf. Kasabov 2013: 160). In the following matrix scheme these positions are marked *congruence (systematization) – different – type of sign forms*, respectively:

SIGN	1st. TRICHOTOMY: COMPARISON POSSIBIILITY IMAGINARY FORM	2nd. TRICHOTOMY: PERFORMANCE ACTUALIZATION REAL EXISTENCE	3rd. TRICHOTOMY: THOUGHT NECESSITY SYMBOLIC VALUE
<i>Form</i> ^{1st} CORRELATE <i>THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY</i>	1. <i>Form of Form</i> <u>DIFFERENCE</u> QUALISIGN	2. <i>Existence of Form</i> ICON	3. <i>Value of Form</i> <u>SYSTEMATIZATION</u> RHEME
<i>Existence</i> ^{2nd} CORRELATE <i>ECONOMICAL PRACTICE</i>	4. <i>Form of Existence</i> SINSIGN	5. <i>Existence of Existence</i> <u>DIFFERENT</u> INDEX	6. <i>Value of Existence</i> DICENT
<i>Value</i> ^{3rd} CORRELATE <i>CULTURAL STRATEGY</i>	7. <i>Form of Value</i> <u>TYPE-FORMS</u> LEGISIGN	8. <i>Existence of Value</i> SYMBOL	9. <i>Value of Value</i> <u>DIFFERENTIATION</u> ARGUMENT

Table 3: The matrix of the *semiotic nonagon* in further development

It is possible to develop the matrix in Table 3 using some of the most popular scientific terms for proposing a schematic systematization of the basic semiotic disciplines. The developed matrix is presented in Table 4.

SIGN	1st. TRICHOTOMY: COMPARISON POSSIBIILITY IMAGINARY FORM	2nd. TRICHOTOMY: PERFORMANCE ACTUALIZATION REAL EXISTENCE	3rd. TRICHOTOMY: THOUGHT NECESSITY SYMBOLIC VALUE
<i>Form</i> ^{1st} CORRELATE <i>STRUCTURAL SEMiotic THEORY COGNITION – EPISTEMOLOGY</i>	1. <i>Form of Form</i> <u>QUALITY</u> COGNITIVE SEMiotics	2. <i>Existence of Form</i> <u>ICON</u> GENERAL 'Meta' SEMANTICS (Phenomenology)	3. <i>Value of Form</i> <u>RHEME</u> <u>LINGUO-SEMiotics & SEMIO-AESTHETICS</u> (Syntactics)

<i>Existence</i> ^{2nd} CORRELATE <i>DESCRIPTIVE</i> (& <i>EXISTENTIAL</i>) <i>SEMIOTICS</i> <i>SEMIO-PRACTICE</i>	<i>4. Form of Existence</i> <u>SINSIGN</u> SIGN-VEHICLE'S THEORY	<i>5. Existence of Existence</i> <u>INDEX</u> THEORY of PROPOSITION & SIGN-CATEGORIES	<i>6. Value of Existence</i> <u>DICENT</u> FUNCTIONAL SYNTAX of the SIGN (Pragmatics)
<i>Value</i> ^{3rd} CORRELATE <i>SEMIOTICS</i> <i>OF CULTURE</i> <u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	<i>7. Form of Value</i> <u>LEGISIGN</u> THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION	<i>8. Existence of Value</i> <u>SYMBOL</u> THEORY OF MEANING	<i>9. Value of Value</i> <u>ARGUMENT</u> <u>SEMIOTIC RHETORIC</u> and <u>HERMENEUTICS</u> (Semantics)

Table 4: The matrix of the *basic systematization of semiotic disciplines*

Consequently we can establish the places of structural, constructive and combinatorial semiotics. They should be located in the area *Form of Form* (internal form) of the sign under cognitive semiotics in our matrix (intersection 1 in Table 4) in detailed systematic presentation in Table 5 (and in further detailed presentation in Table 6 below). The area *Existence of Form* (intersection 2 in Table 4) may be described in more elaborated way too. A proposal of such a description is presented under general 'meta'-semantics for structural (visual), constructive (topological) and iconic-associative semantics in Table 5 and given in further detailed presentation in Table 7. As to the area *Value of Form* (intersection 3 in Table 4) where under linguo-semiotics and semio-aesthetics are located systemic-structural aesthetics with linguo-semiotics, systematic constructive semiotics and derivational-combinatorial semiotics.

SCIENCES of <u>Sign-Form</u>	FORM of FORM	EXISTENCE of FORM	VALUE of FORM
<i>STRUCTURAL SEMIOTIC THEORY</i>	1. COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS	2. GENERAL -'Meta' SEMANTICS	3. LINGUO-SEMIOTICS & SEMIO-AESTHETICS
<i>Iconic functions</i>	1.1. <i>STRUCTURAL SEMIOTICS (of Basic Articulations – Theory of Sets)</i>	2.1. <i>STRUCTURAL SEMANTICS (of 'Visual' SEMIOTICS – Iconic Representation, Conceptual Structures)</i>	3.1. SYSTEMIC-STRUCTURAL AESTHETIC & LINGUO-SEMIOTICS (<i>Glossematics, Theoretical, General Grammar</i>)
<i>EPISTEMOLOGY</i>	1.2. CONSTRUCTIVE SEMIOTICS (<i>of Construal's; 'Plastic Invariants' in DESIGN</i>)	2.2. CONSTRUCTIVE SEMANTICS (<i>Topological Morphology; Theory of Groups</i>)	3.2. SYSTEMATIC-CONSTRUCTIVE SEMIOTICS (<i>Anthropocentric Sign-Semantic Systematics</i>)
<i>THEORETIC COGNITION</i>	1.3. COMBINATORIAL SEMIOTICS (<i>'Catastrophes' Theory; Actants' Theories</i>)	2.3. ICONIC-ASSOCIATIVE SEMANTICS (<i>Etymological Combinatory</i>)	3.3. DERRIVATION-COMBINATORIAL SEMIOTICS (<i>Ontological Systematics</i>)

Table 5: A detailed Systematization of Semiotic Disciplines about FORM – 1 Correlate

SCIENCES of Sign- <i>Form</i>	<i>1st. TRICHOTOMY: 1. Form of Form – COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS – POSSIBLE ESSENTIAL QUALITIES:</i>
<i>1st. CORRELATE</i>	<i>1.1. - From Structural Relations: Positive(‘+’) / Negative(‘-’) or <u>between points: Positional (‘+’) / Oppositional (‘-’); - From</u></i>
<i>EPISTEMOLOGY</i>	<i>Proportional Relations: between couples of points – lines and measure (between the parts and the whole);</i>
<i>THEORETICAL COGNITION</i>	<i>1.2. From Symmetric Relations: between twin-parts and formations towards line, plane, center; <u>a/ Corporeal qualities:</u></i>
	<i>- Visual (and tactile supported) distinction: space-objectiveness, +/- volume (capacity, containment), roughness /smoothness, hardness / softness (solidity / non-solidity); <u>b/</u></i>
	<i>Objectual-qualitative perceived (wavy-iterative-periodic) qualities: <u>-</u></i>
	<i>- Visually distinguished: lightness / darkness and between colors’ oppositions and gradations; <u>-</u></i>
	<i>Auditory distinguished – Acoustic qualities: sonant / consonant (noisy) and between tones, accents, melody and oppositions and gradations on vocalization / sonority;</i>
	<i>1.3. Qualities from another type objectual-qualitative perceived distinctions such as for example of: dynamic / static; <u>-</u></i>
	<i>Gestural-mimetic and body positional distinctive features;</i>
	<i>-Taste-olfactive distinctive qualities: +/- smell, +/- sweet, +/- piquant.</i>

Table 6: A detailed representation of Form of Form: 1. Correlate (intersection 1 in Table 4)

As a result of such a systematic analysis of signs’ semantics, it is possible to extract main semantic invariant features, or marks, as named substantiated qualities (such a *sonority, lightness / darkness, corporality and animate, spirituality, personification, etc.*) in their constructive functions as signs’ iconic *semantic invariants* or *etymons*. However, it would not be possible to define these *structural* invariants without any reference to connotations, discussed above as cultural symbols’ interpretations founded on modal basis (cf. Kasabov 2012: 167-168; Kasabov 2013: 171). On these grounds – on the grounds of sign’ meanings – is possible to build lexicon-semantic architectonic categorization and systematization and to understand lexicon-semantic development of values, transformations of meaning and sign-formation processes.

SCIENCES of Sign- <i>Form</i>	<i>2nd. TRICHOTOMY: 2. Existence of Form – OBJECTUAL ICON (EIDOS) – GENERAL SEMANTICS</i>
<i>1st. CORRELATE</i>	<i>2.1. Intuitive articulate (distinguished) “outlined” (silhouette) schematic imaginary Forms: Cognitive schemes, mental Diagrams;</i>
<i>EPISTEMOLOGY</i>	<i>2.2. Figures of imagination (on focus, with back-grounds): ‘Gestalten’ with common ‘formal quality’ (Gestaltqualität) and with specific formal iconic qualities such as of: Object, Place, Situation, Action, Vivid / Animate / (personificated) Spiritual being & with qualitative definiteness such as of: Colors, Tones, Sounds, Noises, Voices, Gestures, Mimes, Poses;</i>
<i>THEORETICAL COGNITION</i>	<i>- Configurative-compositional and (con)textual connected Frames (in certain perspective); <u>-</u></i>
	<i>Objectual-acoustic-iconic associative Forms (from poetic type);</i>
	<i>2.3. Figurative (metaphorical) and Combinative (fantastic) Forms in synesthetic iconic-acoustic (and tactile-taste) associations.</i>

Table 7: A detailed representation of Existence of Form – Semiotic Invariants concerning semantic disciplines about FORM: 1. Correlate (intersection 2 in Table 4)

The interpretative understanding of object's essence of the sign has much in common with the actualized concept of construals, being either an "interpreting" (in the case of facts, data, a statement) or "interpretation" (here genealogy and taxonomy rest partly on admitted facts, but partly on the construal of facts: cf. Kröber 1923, 1939). Similar to the problems of construals are the problems presented by the modern concept of so-called plastic invariants (or figural expressive and content differential features of structure, colors, and forms), investigated in the field of visual semiotics (cf. Floch 1990,1995; Levi-Straus 1979), where the distinction is made "between two levels of analysis in visual texts: the figurative level, which uses some objects of the real world in order to create a fictional world; and plastic level, where no object of real world is recognizable". Hence, the main problem is to single out the constitutive and constructive elements of the sign, or the invariant sign's construals. These semantic invariants (cf. Kasabov 2012: 168; Kasabov 2013: 172) as network of non-figurative features in their oppositions and relations, such as: between couples of points, lines and measure (between the parts and the whole and as lightness / darkness, dynamic / static, are located in the area of Form of Form or internal form) of the sign in our matrix (Table 6: intersection 1 in Table 4). Possible Forms and Figures, such as: diagrams, objects, places, actions have been presented in the previous scheme of Existence of Form (Table 7: intersection 2 in Table 4).

Very similar to the problems of disposition of semiotic disciplines about sign's form (1 correlate), presented in Table 5, are the problems connected with singling out semiotic disciplines about sign's existence (as development the row of second correlate in the sign's matrix (intersections 4, 5 and 6 in Table 4) presented here in Table 8.

SCIENCES of <u>Sign-Existence</u>	FORM of EXISTENCE	EXISTENCE of EXISTENCE	VALUE of EXISTENCE
DESCRIPTIVE & EXISTENTIAL SEMIOTICS	4. SIGN-VEHICLE'S THEORY	5. THEORY of SIGN -GRAMMATICAL CATEGORIES	6. FUNCTIONAL SYNTAX of SIGNS
<i>Indexical functions</i>	4.1. <i>ACOUSTIC-OPTICAL SIGN-VEHICLE SEMIOTICS</i>	5.1. <i>THEORY of DEIXIS</i>	6.1. <i>THEORY of SPEECH ACTS (Semiotics of Discourse)</i>
<i>PRAGMATICS</i> <i>SEMIOTIC PRACTICE</i> <i>Physical PRACTICE</i>	4.2. <i>PROSODIC-PRESENTIVE SIGN-VEHICLE (Accentual-Intonational) SEMIOTICS</i>	5.2. <i>THEORY of PROPOSITION (and PARTS of SPEECH-Grammar Categories)</i>	6.2. <i>THEORY of ACTUAL DIVISION of the SENTENCE (Information-bearing Propositional structure)</i>
<i>Material-(Human's Technical) Environment (Physiological Properties)</i>	4.3. <i>ARTICULATORY and POETIC SIGN-VEHICLE (Contrast-Emphatic) SEMIOTICS</i>	5.3. <i>THEORY of CASE, (GB and θ-roles)</i>	6.3. <i>RHETORICAL-POETIC SYNTAX</i>

Table 8: A detailed Systematization of Semiotic Disciplines about EXISTENCE – 2 Correlate

For the purpose of this paper it is not necessary to comment in details all the relations between recently outlined semiotic disciplines. Instead, which seems to be much more interesting, let us apply further sign's division to expand the description of the third row (3 correlate: intersection 7, 8 and 9 in Table 4) presented here such as in Table 9.

SCIENCES of <i>Sign-Value</i>	FORM of VALUE	EXISTENCE of VALUE	VALUE of VALUE
(CULTURAL) SEMANTIC SEMIOTICS	7. THEORY of SIGNIFICATION <i>(Onomasiology)</i>	8. THEORY of MEANING <i>(Semasiology)</i>	9. SEMIOTIC RHETORIC and HERMENEUTICS
<i>Symbolic functions</i> <i>KNOWLEDGE</i> <i>SEMIOTICS OF CULTURE</i>	7.1. <i>ETHNO-SEMIOTICS</i>	8.1. THEORY of METAPHORIC-FIGURATIVE DERIVATION of MEANING	9.1. <i>SEMIOTIC ETHNO-IDIOMATICS</i>
	7.2. <i>SOCIO-SEMIOTICS</i>	8.2. <i>THEORY of METONYMIC DERIVATION of MEANING</i>	9.2. <i>SEMIOTIC FUNCTIONAL STYLISTICS</i>
	7.3. <i>ANTHROPO-(CULTURAL) SEMIOTICS</i>	8.3. THEORY of ALLEGORIC-SYMBOLIC DERIVATION of MEANING	9.3. <i>SEMIOTIC RHETORIC</i>

Table 9: A detailed Systematization of Semiotic Disciplines about VALUE – 3 Correlate

Thus, for area *Form of Value* (intersection 7 in Table 4) might include three sub-trichotomies (being three types of *legisign*): type objects' associated forms, type words' associated forms and type words; and three sub-correlate: ethnological prototypes, socio stereotypes and anthropological archetypes (detailed presented in Table 11: intersections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3). In this way, as we can see in Table 10, it would split into nine, more specifically determined areas (from intersection 7.1 to intersection 9.3 in Table 10).

<p>SCIENCES of <u>Sign-VALUE</u></p>	<p><i>1st TRICHOTOMY:</i> 7. <i>Form of Value – THEORY of SIGNIFICATION: (Onomasiology)</i></p>	<p><i>2nd. TRICHOTOMY:</i> 8. <i>Existence of Value – THEORY of MEANING (Semasiology)</i></p>	<p><i>3rd. TRICHOTOMY:</i> 9. <i>Value of Value – SEMIOTIC RHETORIC and HERMENEUTICS</i></p>
<p><i>3rd. CORRELATE</i></p> <p><i>Autonyms:</i> <i>nomen omen, numina-nomina (sacral↔profane)</i></p> <p><i>Symbolic Functions (Values Objectives)</i></p> <p><i>Heteronyms:</i> <i>homonyms, proper↔common names</i></p> <p><i>KNOWLEDGE SOCIO-CULTURAL SIGNS' FUNCTIONS</i></p> <p><i>Paronyms:</i> <i>diminutive, augmentative, exotic, poetic signs</i></p>	<p><i>7.1 ETHNO-SEMIOTICS</i></p>	<p><i>8.1. THEORY of METAPHORIC-FIGURATIVE DERIVATION of MEANING</i></p>	<p><i>9.1. SEMIOTIC ETHNO-IDIOMATICS archaization, neologization.</i></p> <p><i>Ethno-Connotations</i></p>
	<p><i>7.2 SOCIO-SEMIOTICS</i></p>	<p><i>8.2. THEORY of METONYMIC DERIVATION of MEANING</i></p>	<p><i>9.2. SEMIOTIC FUNCTIONAL STYLISTICS</i></p> <p><i>Stylistic-synonymous: social status-slang. Sociolectal-Subcultural Connotations</i></p>
	<p><i>7.3. ANTHROPO-(CULTURAL) SEMIOTICS</i></p>	<p><i>8.3. THEORY of ALLEGORIC-SYMBOLIC DERIVATION of MEANING</i></p>	<p><i>9.3. SEMIOTIC RHETORIC</i></p> <p><i>Rhetoric innovative expressions, inverted and transformed signs (parody); tropes, figures, irony. Stylistic cultural & personal preferences - “sense of language”. Cultural-value motivated connotations</i></p>

Table 10: A detailed representation of *Existence of Value and Value of Value – concerning disciplines of Meaning and Rhetoric about VALUE: 3. Correlate (intersection 8 and 9 in Table 4)*

SCIENCES of Sign-VALUE – CULTURAL SEMANTIC SEMIOTICS	1 st . TRICHOTOMY 7. Form of Value – <u>THEORY of SIGNIFICATION:</u> (Onomasiology)	2 nd . TRICHOTOMY 8. EXISTENCE OF VALUE	3 rd . TRICHOTOMY 9. VALUE OF VALUE
3 rd . CORRELATE <u>Autonyms:</u> <i>nomen omen, numina-nomina (sacral↔profane)</i>	ETHNO-SEMIOTICS 7.1. <u>Type-object of magic, mystic imaginations, divinations, superstitions:</u> <i>taboo, mana, totem, fetish, idol, sacrifice, wonder, God</i> <u>- Ethnological Prototypes</u> <i>euphemism, exorcisms, ethno-pseudonyms, proper names</i>	8.1	9.1
<u>Symbolic Functions (Values Objectives)</u> <u>Heteronyms:</u> <i>homonyms, proper↔common names</i>	SOCIO-SEMIOTICS_ 7.2. <u>Functional-objective type and personal names as social Emblems for groups of people at large:</u> <i>gift, relicts, attributes, argot, brands, icons, divas, pop-stars, slang, hero(is) jargon,</i> <u>- Social Stereotypes</u> <i>socio-pseudonyms, eponyms</i>	8.2	9.2
<u>KNOWLEDGE SOCIO-CULTURAL SIGNS' FUNCTIONS</u> <u>Paronyms</u> <i>diminutive, augmentative, exotic, poetic signs</i>	ANTHROPO- (CULTURAL) SEMIOTICS 7.3. <u>Type-objects' transformations, provoking emotional reactions and, beliefs, manipulating emotions of individuals or groups:</u> <i>Hero, persona (shadow), animus, anima</i> <u>- Anthropological Archetypes</u> <i>anagrams, acronyms, puns (calembours), emotional-expressive words-compositional variants, calks</i>	8.3	9.3

Table 11: A detailed representation of Form of Value – concerning cultural disciplines of signification about VALUE: 3. Correlate (intersection 7 in Table 4)

One of the general peculiarities of the sign-systems like language is rooted in the dynamics of objects' and sign's transformations from the forms of the sacral (such as *totem, fetish* and *idol*) to the forms of the profane in everyday language vocabulary and vice versa. For example, to realize the semantic relevance of idiomatic idiolectal stylistic connotations one needs to have in mind *ethnologically prototypical* magic and mystic prejudicial forms like *mana, totem, idol, fetish* and the so-called *nomen-omen* or *numina nomina* together with their corresponding language forms (*taboo, euphemism* etc.) of still undistinguished syncretic word-objects. Similarly, in order to understand *social connotations* we have to investigate *emblematic social stereotypes* like *heroes, (stage)-divas* and *(movie)-stars, attributes* and *brands* with their corresponding language forms like *slang* and *argotic* words or *pseudonyms*. For the understanding of *metaphors* and other *rhetorical tropes*, we need to deal with *archetypically anthropological symbolic forms* like *gifts* or *sacrifice*) and language forms like *acronyms, anagrams, puns (calembours, paronomasia)* or *paronymous, exotic* and *poetic* word-forms (cf. Kasabov 2006; Kasabov 2012: 170-172; Kasabov 2013: 173-189).

Here proposed systematization, as any given classification, has schematic and preliminary, but not final character. There is no need all the positions in our matrix schemes together with the

names of outlined disciplines to be taken in too much personal partiality and branch-pertaining jealousy. The aim here is just to give a panoramic scape on the field of semiotics from the point of view immanent to the sign itself.

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CONSUMER RITUALS IN FACEBOOK

Kristian Bankov
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
bankovk@gmail.com

Abstract

In this paper I shall examine the new forms of consumer rituals that have emerged after the advent of the world's biggest social media. I use as a point of reference and a theoretical model the classification of the consumer rituals as "instruments for meaning transfer", as describe in the famous book by Grant McCracken *Culture and Consumption* (1988). His classification includes four types of rituals for transfer of meaning from the goods to the consumer, namely rituals of possession, exchange, grooming and divestment (72 ff.). If we examine the expression of the consumer behaviour in Facebook we can, as a first thing, note that the whole process of consumption has entered a new phase, almost entirely virtual, i.e. with very weak relation to the material, tangible phase of the consumption process. The whole platform encourages its users to apply their creativity in completely new forms with which they transfer meaning from their favourite goods, services, brands and lifestyles to their identity/profile. I am offering a list of the various options that Facebook offers for the consumer rituals, ordered by their semiotic impact in the process of the transfer of meaning. Such options are the name, the profile picture, the family state, the timeline, albums, etc.

1. The Rise of Brands

In the seventies and eighties of the XX century the companies (those with big brands) became the main semiotic mechanism for attributing symbolic value to goods and services. If traditional marketing paradigm started from the position that there are objective consumer needs and that companies using the marketing mix, compete to satisfy better and better, then after a certain saturation of the market supply in certain product categories, becomes clear that this is not enough. *Brand management* enters as a common practice in systematic creation of distinc-

tive value to brands when the conventional tools of marketing are not enough anymore. There were many remarkable brands even before, but the new thing with brand management is not so much that the product works for the brand, but rather the brand, loaded with strong, unique and favourable associations, works for the product success. In the new phase brands begin to function as an autonomous cultural institution, they begin to put into circulation within the collective imagination themes and messages that rise consumption to the spiritual sphere (but with the same success we can say vice versa – throws spirituality in the field of consumption). Consumption began to be stimulated with messages that associate it with love, freedom, creativity, adventure, faith, madness, euphoria, etc. *The advertising*, the “armed wing” of consumerism, during those years begins to transfer to consumption meaning and messages from sociocultural areas, which had previously been occupied by religion, nation, history, literature, cinema and many others. The brand fetishism is born, some brands become icons of mythological value for their consumers-worshippers, the attitude towards them becomes religious in the full sense of the word – it is enough to mention only Apple, Harley Davidson and Chanel, although the list can continue for a long (Vincent: 2002). And that phenomena does not remain visible only for the cultural analysts. During the eighties begins the financial evaluation of the brand equity, completely independent of the fixed assets of the companies and their actual capitals in the banks and stock markets. For example, for 2014 the mere “sign” Apple is estimated by the agency Interbrand at about 118 billion (!) Dollars, followed by Google, Coca Cola, Microsoft, etc. with the value of the same order. Contrary to classical marketing logic, this fact means only one thing – the sign is more important than the product, the same product is sold in a different way depending on whether it is branded or not.

The extraordinary power of brands in the last decades of the XX century has overturned the interdependencies between brands and lifestyles. Originally companies needed lifestyle/ psychographic segmentation of the market in order to formulate their messages according to the actual values and attitudes. Later the way in which the companies were encouraging the culturally significant consumption begins to form a new type of values and attitudes – new lifestyles already modelled by them. The very notion of “lifestyle” enters in crisis, as far as it means a long term belonging to a stable social group. The new patterns of behaviour presuppose the simultaneous combination of many styles. In this period from academia come new and more sophistication models, reflecting a much more dynamic social reality. For example, this is the model of the *microtrends*, introduced by Mark Penn (brilliantly applied to Bulgaria by Mila Mineva, 2009), which captures the emergence of small groups, destined to have a growing influence in society. If the number of lifestyles in the first model of Mitchell is 9 and in general this approach had reached no more than 15-16, the microtrends of Mark Penn are 100.

Another equally important approach for the analysis of the new forms of consumer society comes from the Italian sociologist Egeria Di Nallo (Di Nallo 1998, Bankov 2009: 175). She remains entirely in the sociological paradigm and her contribution is based on an observation of Gerd Gerken that already marketing people can not rely on stable consumer groups, but rather on consumers, grouped around certain consumer practices that could be permanent. Di Nallo suggests that it is a more appropriate research orientation not to see people belonging to a lifestyle, but rather to identify *styles of consumption*, a unifying (even temporarily) form of social interaction. It is based on many observations on the postmodern identity and thus likens the social function of consumption with a *meeting points* (or a bubbles of demand), which in any case are more durable than the individual whims of modern consumer. The contribution of Di Nallo mainly refers to the new consumer practices in Western Europe after the “rise” of the giant malls and shopping centres, real cathedrals of the big brands, but undoubtedly cyberspace and especially social media are as well “kingdom” of this type of logic of consumption.

2. Practices and rituals

With the contribution of Di Nallo the panorama of the evolution of consumer culture meets the evolution of the consumer practices. We may observe that the available literature on the consumer practices and the fieldwork is infinite, while the writers who construct theoretical models based on that practices are not many. In an in-depth review of these authors (Bankov 2009: 103-104, 177-178) I refer to Michel de Certeau, Mary Douglas, Colin Campbell, Bernard Cova and Grant McCracken. All these authors have modelled the consumers' invention of everyday life; subject of a separate study would be tracking the evolution of the practices described by them in the social media. For the purposes of this study I shall base my analysis on the model of one of them - Grant McCracken and his typology of the consumer rituals.

What makes the model of McCracken (1988: 76 ff.) particularly suitable for the analysis of the consumer rituals in FB is its starting point, namely, how exactly happens the transfer of meaning from the goods / services to their consumer. *According to my preliminary hypothesis that process is growing at an unprecedented rate in the age of social media.*

McCracken lists four main types of rituals that live in the real life in many varieties and combinations. These rituals are *possession, exchange, grooming and divestment*. But in order to have the potential to emit meaning, goods and services are subject to other, more centralized transfer - this from the cultural space to them. While that is not limited to, the most emblematic "machine" for this stream of significance are advertising and the fashion system. The huge daily "cultural resource" that these two institutions emit in the cultural space is intended to fight the entropy of consumer culture. Entropy comes from the endless creative invention of everyday life, in which each of us uses the meaning of the components of his own "shopping cart" for his own identity or for the micro-strategies of self-affirmation in the social environment. Left only to those processes, consumption would have taken unpredictable directions of development, elusive from the control of the production system. Therefore, in the highly competitive and hyper mediatized social space more and more the basic effort of corporations is the transfer of discernible meanings in their brands (Rifkin 2001), which introduces into circulation fresh creative images/ideas served as a ready-made patterns on the market of identities. These images/ideas (or mimes) in the initial phase after their launch compete with the existing in the popular culture but already out of the control of the corporations meanings and influence consumer choice, and this cycle seems frenetically repeated after each semiotic "wearing out" the new images/ideas.

Consumer rituals reflect precisely this phase – how in practice we "capitalize" on behalf of our identity the meanings (images/ideas), inscribed by the companies in their goods and services. The first and perhaps most important ritual in the system of McCracken is the *possession*. He carefully distinguished it from the actual legal ownership of the goods, which does not transfer any meaning. The ritual consists in the communicative act of publically announcing the ownership – stop at the restaurant with the brand new car, or inviting friends at home to show them the new home theatre system, walk the new branded sexy cloth in the shopping mall, and so on. Complementary ritual of possession is that of grooming. Tuning the car, working on it to refine some detail in front of the condo; upgrading home stereo in such a way that the neighbours understand thereto; having excessive care for cleaning the pipe, having previously attracted the attention of the visitors of the cafeteria with the smoke of the branded tobacco... and thousands of other practices with which we "declare" our relation with the goods and in consequence of this act the "gain", at least temporarily, of its symbolic value.

The ritual of *exchange* is based on no less basic archetype than this of possession. After the classic work of Mauss on the gift (Mauss 1954) is opened a whole research program, an important part of which is the exchange of gifts in a consumer society (McCracken 1988: 85). The gift

is an extremely powerful tool for interpersonal influence and it is based entirely on the complex transfer of meanings, which connects the product to the giver and the recipient. Ritualized gift is the engagement ring, which act sanctions extremely important relations, but even the giving of a garment already projects a vision for the lifestyle of the recipient which is imposed in oblique way. Giving services is another inexhaustible semantic universe. People who have developed the art of the gift can practically “say” everything through this consumer ritual, not to mention that since the time of Mauss to this practice belongs also the feast.

The last and least relevant of McCracken’s rituals for the purposes of this study is the *divestment*. It reverses the direction of the transfer of meaning, or rather it is the ritual with which we weaken the already established relations between the user and the good. For example often functional reasons bring us to change part of our home furnishings. When it comes to pieces of furniture, for which we prove kind of affection and on which has passed important moments of our lives, it is normal that a person cannot easily separate with them, although the rational decision to do it. Ritual happens when we bring the respective item in the basement or the attic and so keeping possession, albeit without use. Thus comes a cooling of our relationship with the object and after varying periods of time we already see this piece of furniture as unnecessary and therefore we can throw it away. Another type of symbolic divestment is before we sell it to take away from the car all the customization we have done, as if we do not want that the new owner get access to our piece of life which took place there.

3. E-consumption in Facebook

I will not dwell on the list of reasons for the phenomenal success of the social network *Facebook*, which gave the status of media of this category Internet platforms and which brought concepts as “society” and “human relations” to acquire a whole new meaning to new generations. There is enough literature on this topic, but I have not got yet an established list of accepted reasons. For us it is important that all the exposed above evolution of the consumer culture leads to an extended integration of the symbolic part of the goods and services in the interpersonal relations and for this reason inevitably enters a new phase with the rise of the FB. *The aim of this study is to bring some level of systematic modelling of the processes of transfer of meaning from goods and services to consumers in FB, by analogy with the consumer rituals of McCracken.* Purpose, which is proportional to the novelty of that matter and to the objective inability to follow what is happening in FB on a sufficiently representative level. For the pioneering nature of the study speaks the fact that I did not come across any previous study of this topic, and about the impossibility to reach enough relevant sample speaks the statistics that in FB, especially after the explosion of the selfies, has been uploaded about 90 billion photos!¹ The 2-3 thousands of photos that I have seen as a “fieldwork” for this study are 1/10.000 of the percent of the available portfolio!

Yet we, academic scholars, are hunters of invariants in any spiritual and social reality, and we cannot remain indifferent to a universe such as FB. Although there are no studies on the consumer rituals in FB so far, there is one on the FB rituals in the new forms of romantic / intimate relationships. The study was based on an area of seven semi-structured in-depth interviews among Irish students (Mod 2010), but this did not prevent the author to draw a typology of the rituals and some important generalizing conclusions. The analogy with the rituals of McCracken is visible at first glance, although there is no reference to his book. For example, the act of changing the publicly announced Relationship status has analogy with the ritual of possession. In debriefing the interviews becomes clear that for the partners in the relationship, after the act of public disclosure of the commitment, this has a lot in common with fencing of “own” territory (69). After this act, public flirting or sexual advances by third acquire quite another meaning.

FB also gives conditions for the ritual of public displays of affection, completely analogous to the ritual of grooming in consumption. The ritual can be fulfilled verbally, with written messages, with images of tender moments of the couple, as well as through countless applications.

One of the most important conclusions of the author are related to what the specifics of FB publicity differs from that in life offline. The fact that after the communicative actions of the ritual remains a lasting example makes the disclosure of an engagement much more efficient than the usual ceremonies, which, in the words of the author, hardly will invite 150 people (67). Efficiency is not expressed in the momentary impact, which is certainly stronger in the living presence, but it is far more effective at quantitative level, as far as the act becomes known to thousands, and mostly because of the registered public feedback, which can visualize the scale of the impact and record a countless nuances of human relations, to account for the range of cultural and social capital of friends and relatives, taste, lifestyle and so on.

These findings make us propose a strong semiotic hypothesis on the consumer practices derived from the comparison of verbal speech and written text. Elsewhere I have developed a detailed theory (Bankov 2014), but here I would only stress that the difference in the structure of the building of possible worlds is radically different. Therefore, the structure of consumption rituals in their offline version, as described by McCracken, coincide with the statements of verbal speech, while the same rituals carried over FB become carriers of the structure of the written text. Like in the case of the engagement, also for the conspicuous display of the new car would be difficult to find a place which can gather all friends (and significant others), while posting an image in FB notifies the acquisition of the items to all major addressees and opens platform for the inevitable ritual greetings, wishes and all sorts of comments. Thus starts the “novel” of this remarkable event, which later everyone will be able to find in the archives of the profile.

Therefore we can conclude that *the degree of semioticity of the FB mediated consumption is higher than that of the standard offline practices*, being this process partially offset by the super-saturation of updates to all sorts of consumer acts which at one point we stop to have the physical ability to respond adequately.

Another important conclusion at this phase of the study is that the narrative form of the feedback makes it impossible typologize FB rituals. We can certainly meet with samples identical to the types of McCracken (as publishing a photo of the receipt of the first purchased iPhone 5 in Bulgaria), but generally speaking social media, mobile communication and entertainment industry has long erased the clear boundaries that separate the consumption from work, communication and entertainment. By contrast, however, we can find semiotic invariants on the platform that concern the way it provides conventionalized tools for ritualized consumption. The list is in order of the power of the “semiotic” impact of each item.

3.1. The Name

After the case of the football fan from the Bulgarian city of Svishtov who, after 15 years of legal proceedings, changed his name from Marin to “Manchester United”, undoubtedly a taboo has fallen. This fact draws the attention to how huge is the potential for the transfer of meaning that a person’s name can have. True is that in the above example we have a pathological case, especially after the guy has tattooed the logo of Man United on his forehead. But this event directs us towards another practice – without resorting to a court to replace our name in our FB profile with a brand, product or service name. Many people during political protests did this in a sporadic way with political messages and the efficacy of this communicative act of our identity has been proven. The strong semiotic effect is based also on the unusual nature of the change of this field of the FB profile, unlike the case with profile photo, cover, status and so on. In my research I came across a classical case from Sofia, a male, working at HP, with “Harley David” inserted

instead of his real name. Another case – a person from the village of Peturch (near Sofia) wrote as a name “Мерцедес Бенз” which is Mercedes Benz in Cyrillic letters. Actually, there are more than one profiles with different variations of the use of the legendary German brand, as well as “Тихомир Беемветоо” (Tihomir the BMW), “Пламен Ауди Стефанов” (Plamen Audi Stefanov), “Ники Найка” (Nikki the Nike), „Виктория Сикрет“ (Victoria Secret) „Ваня Версаче“ (Vania Versace), „Мис Диор“ (Miss Dior), etc.

3.2. Profile picture

Unlike the name, the profile picture is very actively used by a large number of users for acts of strong identification with all sorts of things, including brands. Perhaps the automotive industry holds the championship, but football is not much inferior. Among the female community was expected underwear and shoes to lead, but in the actual search the brand references were balanced in all sectors and relatively lower number of examples compared to the male audience. The profile picture is communicative medium that makes possible the transfer of meaning not only of the “classic” rituals of possession and grooming, but also various forms of worship, lifestyle, parody and more. The simplest form of ritual identification is when the user puts the logo of the brand without any modification. So the transfer of values is complete and entirely in line with the corporate identity. However, the profile picture may explore the brand value in its capacity as representative of a certain lifestyle: playing golf with Lacoste, riding the favourite motorcycle (as in the mentioned profile of Harley David), and so on. Or self-ironic representations, with cheap bottle of beer Ariana among the ultra supporters at the stadium. Profile pictures are almost never used entirely for consumer practices, but at the same time they are seldom completely independent of them.

3.3. Family and relationships

One possible manipulation of the platform, about which I was suggested by students of the course “Culture and semiotics”, is to register a fake profile of your favourite brand and enter into marriage, engagement, kinship, love or friendly relations with it. Like the use of the name, such trick can have a strong impact if used successfully. This is a rarely used semiotic resource, whose creativity makes it difficult to be classified. Yet every woman would be impressed by a marital status “Married to Manolo Blanik” or “in Love with Christian Dior”!

3.4. Cover photo

This communicative attribute of FB was hardly adopted after its introduction 2-3 years ago, due to the unusual proportions of the image, but then started to be successfully integrated into the profiles. From the many examples reviewed, I have noticed that the cover is a space used to express the aesthetic attitudes of the users on the axis nature – culture. This means that in 90% of cases there are natural landscapes or tourist attractions, architecture or a work of art. In the few cases in which the cover is used for ritual homage to a brand, product or service, the latter is represented in a design or aesthetic light. If, for example, as a profile picture is placed the logo of Mercedes Benz, then on the cover is presented a magnificent model of the German corporation (the example is of an account of a colleague from New Bulgarian University).

3.5. Timeline / Status

Any change of our profile goes automatically as a live feed to the profiles of our friends, which is the purpose of the timeline, but still the very semiotic tool that is in our control is the status. Status most approximates FB to the verbal speech communication, but with the great advantage that instead of words there can be integrated any media. We share our life in real time precisely by the status. Therefore, there one finds the whole phenomenology of consumer practices, of

course with much lower impact factor than the previous examples because of the high turnover of information. Food and drinks consumption, led by the relentless regularity of physiological needs, motivate millions of status-shares and posting food pictures has become a trend, comparable and partially overlapping with the selfie mania.

3.6. Likes

Like-ing is the most common FB ritual for universal use. That is why its semiotic potential is quite limited. Meanwhile the Like-s became a marketing industry in the e-economy and companies pay to those who can guarantee them a large number of likes. Companies pay for databases, containing people who have liked goods and services similar to theirs. This fact further devalue the semiotic impact of the ritual. Something that increases yet the importance of the Like-s for the consumer practices, is the sum of everyone's likes, which is a separate chapter in the information in each profile (after Photos, music, places, films, books, etc.). As one usually Likes large number of things in this chapter typically remain those with commercial orientation. If one bothers himself to check how his likes are presented to the other users could rethink whether or not to likes commercial pages.

3.7. Albums

In the study of the influence of FB rituals on intimate relations, it turns out that the old albums with images from previous relationships are a strong premise for jealousy and discord in the couple (Mod 2010: 72). However, all photos with consumer practices that simply are somewhere in photo albums of the users in the logic of this review are semiotically the weakest medium for ritualized consumption.

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(Endnotes)

¹ <http://www.quora.com/How-many-photos-are-uploaded-to-Facebook-each-day> (accessed 6 September 2014)

MATHEMATICAL SEMIOTICS: A CHALLENGING MEETING PLACE

Paolo Rocchi,
LUISS University, Roma, Italy
procchi@luiss.it

Abstract

Semiotics provides fundamental contributions to illuminate the present ‘information revolution’, however a certain distance seems to separate semioticians from the experts of digital technology. In the past centuries, cultural divisions occurred between philosophers and experimentalists in other scientific fields too, and later their positions got closer. This paper holds that also the stances of semioticians and electronic engineers could approximate. They could meet in a terrain of study – herein denoted as ‘mathematical semiotics’ – that translates basic semiotic concepts into the mathematical language. In turn the mathematical expressions can clarify some misconceptions and false impressions. As a case study, we shall define the notion of signifier in formal terms and show how this definition spells out some aspects of the digital and analog technologies, and can answer to some philosophical issues.

1. A special divide

Let us begin with a pair of remarks.

In 1897 Joseph John Thompson discovered the electron, and inaugurated a period in which there was considerable speculation about the atomic particles existing in nature (Yang 1963). Nearly a decade later Ernest Rutherford performed a fundamental experiment to test the inner structure of the matter. This evidence and other finding led scientists toward the complete understanding of the atom which includes three fundamental particles: *electrons*, *protons* and *neutrons*. All those researches – backed up by abundant equations and calculations – opened the way to modern atomic physics and to the atomic energy appliances created for military and civil purposes (Cantelon, Hewlett and Williams 1992), (Lavine 2013).

Semioticians discovered the ‘atomic’ parts of signs. They became persuaded that a sign is equipped with three basic elements: the *signifier*, the *signified* and the *referent* (Morris 1938), (Thibault 1996). Richards and Ogden (1989) formalized them into the *semantic triangle*, however semiotics did not usher in the digital revolution.

The ‘atomic age’ stemmed from the studies of physicists who are still driving this event. By contrast, semioticians did not play a leading role in the launch of the ‘information age’ even though semiotic notions lie at the heart of electronic equipment. Why this difference?

As second, we observe that digital images, sound, film movies and other forms of data can be stored by any number of methods: magnetically, optically, electronically or even otherwise (Wang and Taratorin 1999). Cathode-ray tube, liquid crystal display, light {XE “light”} -emitting diode {XE “LED”}, touch screen and gas plasma exhibit ever better images (Castellano 1992) {XE “images”}. Researchers look into the physical properties of signs such as Leo Szilard who envisioned a theoretical engine to seek out the *minimal sign* available in nature (Devereux 2003). Quantum physicists calculate the information conveyed by atomic particles. We mention this variety of studies just to say that the researches on {XE “technology”} signifiers are progressing in the information and communication technology (ICT) and are so successful as they transform the lifestyles of people worldwide.

Scientists coming from various fields work on semiotic elements all the day long, but are not inclined to quote semiotic literature. The doers of digital systems rarely study semiotics and utilize the semiotic notions in a rather intuitive way. Why does semiotics, which establishes fundamental tenets, is felt as a foreign discipline by ICT experts?

It is not necessary to make a special inquiry to put forward an answer to the previous two queries. As long as one examines the work-styles of semioticians and technicians, he can note some blatant differences between the two groups. The latter focuses on the material properties of signs that describes in terms of numbers. Engineers adopt graphs, diagrams, and the mathematical language to calculate machines and products. By contrast, the former group does not employ mathematical expressions even when it examines the material side of communication. Great semioticians – e.g. Whitehead, Wittgenstein and Peirce (1992) – had strong background in logic, mathematics, and science, but prefer to look into the full complexity of language rather than into technical applications. Semioticians concern themselves with the interpretation of signs in accordance with the human knowledge. They investigate global phenomena originated from the mind in all aspects.

Semioticians use verbal descriptions. Engineers use formal expressions. Nowadays a special *digital divide* which is essentially a *cultural divide* separates semioticians and engineers.

2. History repeats itself

In the past, thinkers and technicians often worked about the same area following distinct directions. The two groups eventually found out consensus of opinions and succeeded in cooperating. For instance, the idea that matter is composed of discrete units and cannot be divided into arbitrarily tiny quantities emerged early since the 5th century BC with Leucippus, whose student, Democritus, systematized his views (Pullman 1998). In particular Democritus coined the term ‘ἄτομος (atom)’ and in the 19th century the scientists who detected the elementary components of the matter retained the term ‘atom’ coined by Democritus to underline the continuity extant between ancient thinkers and modern experimentalists.

In 1687, Isaac Newton published “Philosophiæ Naturalis, Principia Mathematica” a book which states the foundation of classical mechanics. This title means to say that the mathematical principles – *principia mathematica* in Latin – state broad topics pertaining to the philosophy of Nature – *philosophiæ naturalis* in Latin. In an indirect manner, Newton recognizes how

philosophers and mathematicians have acted together down throughout the centuries. They worked toward a common goal. Historians assign major authors such as Aristotle, Galileo and Lagrange to this broad movement, and minor thinkers such as Sébastien Basson whose work ([1621] 2009) has been recently republished.

It is our opinion that something like should be established in the present information society. A bridge should connect humanities and engineering. The semiotic notions – especially the formal definition of the signifier that technicians manipulate all the day long – should be translated into the mathematical language. That is why we are inclined to call this bridge *mathematical semiotics*.

3. Analyticity & mathematics

Factually modern technicians concentrate on tiny components including electric impulses, dots of ink, pixels (picture elements) in the display screen, infinitesimal pits on the surface of a compact disk, holes in the computer cards and so forth (Pohlmann 1992)(Saffady 1990). The astonishing performances of electronic systems are based on the physical properties of Lilliputian components which seem trivial elements to a humanist. As electrons, neutrons and protons ensure the enormous power of an atomic power unit, in a similar manner microscopic signifiers ensure the astonishing performances of electronic appliances and play essential roles in ICT. As an example, figure 1 exhibits four signifiers devised at different times that provided evident benefits to a large number of users.




Fig. 1: The digit 8 with the Morse code **a)**, the bar code **b)**, *American standard code for information interchange (ASCII)* **c)** and the seven-segment code **d)**.

Technicians reject philosophical systems in favour of attention to details. They tackle practical problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. They follow an analytical method of study which is appropriate to the mathematical language. It may be said that analyticity implies mathematics and vice versa.

3. Elementary signifiers

The so called *mathematical semiotics* can but share the analytical approach typical of engineering and we can but begin with looking into the tiniest signifiers.

An *elementary signifier* or *sense datum* can be analyzed at ease because it does not have any structure or pattern. An elementary signifier comes to life by means of a detecting action. Detection consists in perceiving a physical value and does not require any recognition, realization or interpretation.

An elementary signifier is perceived by a small artificial probe, a simple biological receptor, a sensor or something like which we call 'referent' or 'observer' R . Experimental observations demonstrate that the necessary requisite for R to sense the elementary signifier E is that E is clear respect to the signifier E^* that may be the background, the context or any close entity. One can even establish a scale to measure the quality of being distinct for E . When E contrast with E^* , E

is a perfect signifier. If E and E^* partially overlap, than E is low quality. Finally, if E is completely confusing, it disappears and in consequence there is no sign. Factually a sign does not exist and does not carry on any meaning when the physical base E is not distinguishable.

Universal experience shows how sharpness is the fundamental character of signifiers, and in turn of signs. This physical property waits to be translated into a mathematical expression and we put forward the following way (Rocchi and Gianfagna 2006).

We tell that the object E is a signifier if E is not equal (literally with the symbol 'NOT=') to the adjacent entity E^* with respect to the observer R

$$E \text{ NOT}=_R E^* (1)$$

This statement entails that whenever (1) is true, the object E is a sign. If the inequality (1) is false, E remains an object without any semiotic property.

The inequality (1) could be called the *principle of sharpness* and ferries the semiotic notion of signifier to the engineering domain.

Engineers do not recognize (1) in formal terms but apply (1) in the communication and information technology on a somewhat intuitive basis. Technicians recognize that signals are to be sharp using an empirical criterion. Let us examine a noteworthy case.

Circuits exchange electric values which are elementary signifiers. In fact, engineers use the high-level voltage V_1 and the low-level voltage V_2 – called *bits* – which are distant. Technicians describe electronic bits using this equation (Plant 1990)

$$V_1 \neq V_2 (2)$$

The symbols ' \neq ' is equivalent to 'NOT='. Bits conform to inequality (2) that is identical to (1) with the difference that (1) has general meaning, instead (2) regards only electrical voltage values. The inequality (2) clarify that digital technicians employ discrete elements because discrete elements turn out to be distinct one from the other and ensure the appliances to run effectively. Engineers pay great attention to the separation s of bits that they derive from the inequality (2)

$$s = | V_1 - V_2 | \neq 0 (3)$$

Factually, environmental disturbance and interference intrinsic to the electrical circuits affect the bits. The voltage values vary during the time and the signifiers V_1 and V_2 risk to overlap and to become confusing. The difference between ideal bits and real bits appears in figure 2 and 3.




Fig. 2: Ideal form of bits.

Minor disturbances bring V_1 and V_2 nearer and engineers determine the separation s so adequately that the digital signifiers remain distinguishable due to a residual distance. Even if the

high-value V_1 and the low-value V_2 fluctuate, the bits continue to be distinct because of the prudently chosen size of s .




Fig. 3: Minor distortion of bits.

Obviously the larger is the separation s and the higher are the energies spent for capturing, recording, processing, storing, and transmitting signals. Engineers tune up (3) with respect to effectiveness of appliances. They balance s against insulation, power supply and other involved electrical parameters.




Fig. 4: Major distortion of bits.

The prudent size of s cannot impede that major electrical disturbance upset the rule (3). Heavy interference results in a new voltage value that occurs in the place of regular bits. For example the wrong value V_K appears in figure 4.

Engineers are aware of this type of situations. They guarantee the stability {XE “stability”} of the binary alphabet in that electronic appliances do not accept an altered value but associate it to the bit V_1 or otherwise to the bit V_2 . The receiver handles regular bits anyway.

4. The philosophical side of a mathematical expression

Semioticians tend to overlook the efforts made by engineers to set up bits and to make bits running under the worst situations. Humanists are not inclined to go deep into the technology and thus they discuss ICT from a view point which may be defined as ‘external’ to technology. They observe devices from the outside. For example, several commentators conclude that the digital offers representations rather unnatural while the analog signals are more natural and closer to something that happens elsewhere (Blachowicz 1998).

The mathematical study of semiotics conducted in the previous section demonstrates the contrary is true.

Digital signals are absolutely neat. It may be said that bits are authentic signifiers which comply with the principle of sharpness even under challenging situations. Instead, analog signals are frequently imprecise and fuzzy, they cannot be classified as reliable elements.

Bits are able to represent whatsoever object, entity, or text. Digital signs are flexible in semiotic terms; hence one should conclude that they are very good signifiers and conform to *the principle of arbitrariness* by Saussure ([1916] 1983). The analog does not convey intentional or symbolic meanings in the so easy manner as the digital can do. Frequently the sense of the analog signal is obligatory, in that significance is motivated by the physical aspect of the signal. For instance growing electrical values cannot represent a decreasing physical event.

Discrete signals provide faithful reproductions even in terms of realism. The digital camera stores a sequence of bits in an electronic chip and then a computer printer provides the final image – consisting of discrete elements – which appears identical to the portrayed original. A high-quality digital image – say an image including over 2000 dpi (= dots per inch) on paper – appears absolutely realistic and no one would be able to distinguish between the computer print and the traditional analog print. Discretization demonstrates to be in keeping with the reality in the most perfect way (Rocchi 2012).

In conclusion, discrete signals offer accurate reproductions of sound, images, film movies etc. The digital turns out to be *more natural* than the analogue in the sense that digital signs comply with basic laws which are the sharpness and the arbitrariness principles.

The principle of sharpness tells that the object E is a good signifier when it shows blatant dissimilarities with E^* . The object E is a lower-quality signifier when differences diminish. Finally the sign E does not exist if it coincides with E^* , or it is fuzzy or anyway it is not distinct. The principle (1) sustains the material aspect of signs moreover it provides novel cues on vexed philosophical arguments about the physicalism of signs.

Some authors put forward some paradoxes to disprove the physical nature of signs. For example Wiener (1961) raises this conundrum:

When people always get the same signal, why this becomes inessential and nothing may be transmitted with the same result?

Others who deny the material base of signs pose the following queries:

Nothing (that is to say an empty space or a silence) convey meaning; how can one assert that signifiers are concrete if signs are bodiless?

A sign is extant provided that it is perceived and no longer exists if nobody detects it; if a sign has a material origin, how can it come to life and perish?

The discussion of the previous philosophical arguments goes beyond the scopes of the present work. However it may be showed how the inequality (1) can provide innovative answers to the above listed question points (Rocchi 2012).

In sum, the mathematical language does not confine us to handle minute elements which provoke negligible consequences. Instead the calculus of tiny digital signifiers accelerates the pace of mankind progress, and also aids thinkers to tackle broad philosophical arguments.

5. Conclusion

This paper means to stimulate a discussion on the cultural gap extant between semioticians and ICT experts. One can learn from the history of science how this gulf is not impossible to fill provided that both the circles of scholars advance toward each other. We believe that humanists and engineers could meet in the *mathematical study of semiotics* whose introductory traits have been summarized. The previous pages demonstrate how this cultural encounter could come into effect.

Presently, ICT experts adopt empirical approach, and resort to occasional ideas. Instead they could obtain solid principles for digital systems on the condition that they study semiotics in deep. They could improve the methods of work and could clarify a series of issues. On the other hand, humanists could discover the substantial impact of some technical factors that they deem

negligible so far. Even philosophers could benefit from the mathematical description of semiotic concepts that suggest innovative cues.

In summary, the mathematical definitions of semiotics could provide an exhaustive theoretical base to digital technologies, and semioticians could become able to play more significant role in the present information age, which is technology based.

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THE IMPACT OF STUDENTS' CREATIVITY ON BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL MARKETING COMMUNICATION OF A BRAND IN SOCIAL MEDIA

Yagodina Manova
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
yagodina4@gmail.com

Abstract

The influence of social media marketing is increasing and the marketing departments now plan it as an important part of their integrated marketing communication. The focus of the on-line communication is not only on the corporate website but also on the brand presence in social media (primarily in Facebook and YouTube but also in Twitter and Pinterest). At the same time it is a relatively new communication channel and the marketing experts are still gaining expertise in the field. Moreover the marketing departments have so many tasks that there is a great danger of underestimating the seriousness of building the brand image in social media. These are only few of the reasons why most of the companies outsource the online communication to freelancers or digital agencies.

At the same time students could be a valuable source for the companies. They have theoretical background but their creativity is not limited to the corporate guidelines and standards. Even if the students do not have any experience in the marketing field, they are open-minded and could come up with successful solutions. Besides most of the students are heavy users of social media in contrast to the marketing experts who consider social media as a "job task". This could be a great opportunity for the students to gain experience and to practice what they have learned. This will give them an advantage when they apply for marketing positions and will help them in their future work as advertising experts.

Although this partnership could be really useful and valuable for both sides, there is a great deal of challenges and milestones that should be faced. The companies could be disappointed if they receive creative ideas that do not match their expectations, whereas students could be discouraged if they do not see the implementation of their ideas. The success of this project depends on the clear methodology – a set of methods of work and rules for both parties. The

concept of building an online platform for cooperation with clear briefs and instructions for both parties is part of the project which I will present.

1. Introduction

In the recent years various important changes influenced the way customers think, behave and choose their preferred brands. The main ones are the increasing penetration of Internet, the growing information resources, the advance of the technology, the increasing usage of home computers and smartphones. These developments have resulted in new ways marketers can communicate with consumers and interact with them in order to build a strong and successful brand. Most of the brands continued their live on the Internet in order to be relevant to the changing market environment. The changes were happening fast and the consumers adapted them quickly and willingly, faster than some of the marketers could develop their professional skills to evolve the brands accordingly. Another challenge is that the traditional marketing tools and tactics cannot be applied directly to new media. This discrepancy resulted in the business need of new approaches to brand building.

The goal of this paper is to examine the possible ways in which students could collaborate with companies and could contribute to the development of a successful marketing communications in social media. The focus is on social media because on one hand it is the most interactive communication medium, the channel through which consumers and brands have direct communication thus making it one of the most challenging marketing tools. On the other hand the increasing importance of social media for the brand development has intensified the need of finding new creative and effective strategies. One of the possible sources of inspiration for the companies is the University. Students could be a source of ideas and relevant proposals because they have no previous experience with traditional media rules, they are open-minded and have significant social media experience. Special attention is paid to the possible obstacles and their solutions in order to develop a fruitful partnership for both parties. Although the methodology presented in this work could be implemented by students of marketing, advertising, media, etc. it is emphasized on the impact that students studying semiotics could have because of the extensive use of signs in social media and the power of storytelling to provide meaning to the brand.

2. Social media

Social media is a broadly discussed topic and there are many definitions and research done about it. One of the descriptions is presented by Giorgi Bagaturia and Margaret Johnson: "Social media is a collection of online platforms and tools that people use to share content, profiles, opinions, insights, experiences, perspectives and media itself, facilitating conversations and interactions online between groups of people." (2014:6) Customers become media themselves. The focus is on interaction, the exchange of thoughts, preferences and signs. The essence of social media is to serve as an online platform where people relate to other people or to brands. In brief people interact with brands in social media in the following ways:

- Provide feedback: express their positive attitude towards the brand or share their negative opinion or experience with the brand.
- Learn more – about the product, its usage, its distribution, current promotions, etc.
- Join brand fan communities: be part of a like-minded community sharing same interests/ taste.
- Participate in activities – games organized by the brand, events, etc.
- Leverage promotions and sweepstakes.

Customers could be inactive and make no interaction with the brand or they could participate in online activities with the only intention of winning prizes but this is not the communica-

tion and relationship which the brand wants to build. The primary goals of social media marketing are to build a relationship with customers and prospects and to influence their behavior in an effort to increase brand awareness, strengthen brand loyalty, increase sales or achieve other business goals. Some of the key characteristics of the customer – brand communication in social media are:

- Interaction: social media encourages the sharing, commenting, voting, tagging, etc.
- Two-way conversation: the brand is not broadcasting as it does in traditional media but is an active side (in the best case) in the conversation with the customer.
- Transparency: most of the conversations are public.
- Continuousness: the communication is ongoing and in most of the cases it is in real time.
- Engagement: the ultimate goal of every brand is to engage the customers with the brand and enhance consumers' connection with it.

In social media the brands need to understand why customers are behaving in a certain way and what are their primary needs in order to build an effective communication with them. In 2013 the global media agency UM presented the results of a 7-year survey conducted in over 65 cities which investigated the social behavior in media. As a result 5 real human and fundamental needs underpin the customers' social media behavior and the values they are seeking in the communication with the brands:

- Diversion is the need state that most drives desirability for brands. 40% of people who say they want entertaining experience from brands say that these experiences make the brand more desirable.
- Recognition is the key need state for making consumers loyal to brands. 65% of people who want brands to respond to their complaints say that it makes them feel valued as customers when they do.
- Progression is the key need state for encouraging people to spend more time with a brand. 37% of people who want brands to help them develop their own skills and abilities want to spend more time with the brand as result.
- Relationship is the key need state for driving recommendation. If a brand enables someone to help others they are also more likely to recommend it to others.
- Whereas to drive sales a combination of Recognition and Learning is key. Educating people about the product whilst at the same time listening to their own needs makes consumers far more likely to buy the product.



Fig. 1. UM survey reveals the social needs of customers in 65 countries which the brands should take into consideration in order to meet the customers' expectations

One of the main messages for the marketers is that they need to find a way to reveal the needs of their customers, understand their motivations in order to provide them valuable conversation in social media that could have impact on their behavior.

3. The challenges for the companies

The influence of social media marketing is increasing and the marketing departments now plan it as an important part of their integrated marketing communication. The focus of the on-line communication is not only on the corporate website but also on the brand presence in social media (primarily in Facebook and YouTube but also in Twitter, Pinterest, etc). At the same time it is a relatively new communication channel and the marketing experts are still gaining expertise in the field.

Effective use of social media can bring opportunities for the brand – build image, increase sales, improve customer relationship management, etc. But it is also a challenge which needs careful planning and deep analysis. Social networks are powerful media but their characteristics differ from traditional media and that is why developing an online strategy taking into consideration all the specifics is essential. Set Godin says “The Internet is the first medium invented in 100 years that wasn't invented to make advertisers happy. The connection between running ads and making money is broken, probably forever.” (2014) In order to build successful brand communication you can't interrupt the consumer with advertising anymore, you have to attract his attention, find a way how to keep it and make them talk about the brand.

Besides skills developing the online brand presence requires time and effort. Small companies might not have the resource. The marketing departments of big companies have so many tasks that there is a great danger of underestimating the seriousness of building the brand image in social media.

4. Students as effective source of ideas

Students could be a valuable source of ideas and inspiration for the companies. They have theoretical background but their creativity is not limited to the corporate guidelines and standards. Even if the students do not have any experience in the marketing field, they are open-minded and could come up with successful solutions. Besides most of the students are heavy users of social media in contrast to the marketing experts who consider social media as a “job task”. This could be a great opportunity for the students to gain experience and to practice what they have learned. This will give them an advantage when they apply for marketing positions and will help them in their future work as advertising experts.

4.1. The main benefits of the collaboration with students for the company:

- **Enthusiasm:** if the students are well motivated they can contribute to the project with their passion and enthusiasm which can lead to inspiration.
- **Unspoiled creativity:** the students can come up with creative ideas because their mind is not limited to past experience with the brand or corporate guidelines. That is why they can think out of the box.
- **Cheap or even free source of ideas:** this is a great opportunity for the company to receive valuable information about their target and competition from all the research work of the students. On top they will receive ideas and solutions with almost no efforts or investment from their part.

4.2. The main advantages of this collaboration for the students:

- **Experience:** the focus is on the real market experience they will gain working on real projects.
- **Opportunity to work in different fields:** the companies will have different products, targets and goals. This will help the students on one hand to gain expertise in different areas. And on the other to find out what will be interesting for them, in which field they would like to continue their career.
- **Self-confidence:** when they see the results of their work, the implementation of their ideas, students will increase the trust in their own abilities.

5. The importance of students' semiotic background

Students studying semiotics have the ability to inspire meaningful changes in the online marketing of a brand or to build an effective strategy of online brand development. Semiotics is one way of analyzing and exploring the communication in social media – the images, the symbols, the specific language used in every social media. Exchanging signs is the primary way of communication in social media. Choosing the most appropriate ones for the specific brand communication is essential for the success of the brand positioning. Having the theoretical background of how to interpret signs and how to analyze different code systems used by the customers is very important. One of the keys to success is to get the attention of the customer and reach with them on emotional level. People do not care about the brands and their messages, they care about themselves and their needs. That is why they are willing to connect with brands that talk like them and look like them (or the way they want to talk and look) and that give them something valuable. This requires deep knowledge and understanding of the consumers' behavior and expectations.

Since internet marketing makes extensive use of symbols (both in the form of text and visual elements), semiotics is a very effective tool for interpreting it. As Kress and Robert Hodge state: “Each producer of a message relies on its recipients for it to function as intended” (1988:4).

Customers may receive the brand message but they decide how to interpret it, to comment it and to pass it on to their friends and acquaintances. Social media makes it easy for customers to express their opinion, to share information with thousands of people and thus have impact on the brand image. The brands are not in control of customer's opinion and perception as it was in traditional media. Customers build their new social personalities online and need to relate to brands which appeal to them. If the brands build an effective image they become part of this personality. They pin their photos, retweet their messages, share their photos as a way of identifying their social style. That is why analyzing the process of meaning-making and identifying the possibilities for creating the brand mythology is essential for developing a successful online strategy. For their analysis students could practice what they have learned about social and cultural semiotics, the way of creating significations in the specific digital environment of social media. In their work students will have to find the socially accepted meanings in the specific business areas, to analyze the signs used by the customers to identify their needs and the way they design and interpret meanings.

6. Possible problems

Although this partnership could be really useful and valuable for both sides, there are challenges and milestones which should be overcome. The companies could be disappointed if they receive creative ideas that do not match their expectations, if they are not relevant for their business or if they do not comply with the initial brief. Students could be discouraged if they do not see the implementation of their ideas or if the company modifies the initial idea too much. The success of this project depends on the methodology – a clearly defined working process and rules for both parties.

7. The solution – an interactive online platform

One way of overcoming the obstacles is by building an online platform where the company and the students can communicate with each other and complete all the steps needed for the development of the project. This platform will help all the participants to have clear guidelines what they should do, how they can do it and the respective deadlines. The focus is on clear rules and interaction between the participants. The main features of this website are:

- Brief template
- Useful information for the students to help them generate ideas
- Online sharing tool for brainstorming
- Rating system for the assessment of the ideas
- Project passport: additional information and ideas
- Profiles of the students

7.1 The first step – the company brief

The first step is to do a complete and precise brief which will be the starting point for the students. The most important tasks of this brief is to answer the following questions:

- What will be the communication about – product, service?
- What are the main benefits of the product/service?
- What are the goals of the communication?
- How will they be measured?
- What are the obstacles of achieving them?
- Who is the target?
- What do you want them to do/think?
- What are the budget and timing?

The client has to fill in an online brief form which consists of the following fields:

- Company name
- Field of industry
- What will be communicated: description, main advantages and weaknesses
- Target group – who they are, what they do, how, when and why they buy the product
- Main competitors: who they are, what are their weaknesses and advantages, how they communicate
- Objectives of the communication: to build a page (profile), to develop an existing page (profile), to run a successful campaign in social media, etc.
- Measurement: how will the success of these goals be measured
- Difficulties: what are the obstacles which stand in the way of achieving the goals until now
- Examples of previous campaigns: successful and unsuccessful examples, any relevant background information
- Guidelines of the company: mission, vision and values, tone of voice
- Communication plan: will there be any other support – online campaign, blog article, etc.
- Budget
- Timing

The brief must be written by the product manager (brand manager) or the marketing manager. There must be one person from the company who will be the contact person for additional questions. He will have to answer the questions of the students which may arise during the work process.

7.2 The process of students' work

When the company submits the brief, the students assess the task – if it is rather interesting for him/her, if it is rather not interesting or they do not have opinion. This must be done because everybody has personal preferences and they usually affect the creativity. After that a coordinator divides the students into groups in which there must be people who are excited about the topic and who are not that involved.

7.2.1 Debrief

The groups have to fill in a template with more information. The main questions which the students should answer are:

- What do customers think about the company/product?
- What is the most valuable thing related to the product for the customers?
- Who is the target customer – how does he look, act, talk, buy, etc.? How many buyer personas are there?
- Who are the main competitors – how do they communicate with the prospects and is there something useful which we can adapt?
- What is the main challenge for achieving the goals, what was not done right until now?
- How can they be achieved?

The required fields are:

- Company information: what is the company known for, how the customers perceive it
- Product information: what do the customers say about it, what is the image, which features could be used to build the product story
- Target information: attitude, verbal and visual signs they use, how can we reach and engage them
- Digital footprint of the product: what is the online presence of the brand

- Competition information: the signs they use, their communication, campaigns they have organized, the customers' opinion about them
- Best practice and common mistakes from the same industry field
- Main challenge of the communication
- Insight: how will we overcome the obstacle
- Social media strategy: which are the most appropriate social medias for the communication/campaign and how we will use them

For every point of this additional work on the brief the groups must assign responsible person and set a deadline. They could ask the representative of the company additional questions which the client receives on his email. For this research the students have 2 days.

7.2.2 Brainstorming

After collecting all the necessary data the groups start the brainstorming. They think of different ideas how to accomplish the goals of the communication. The online platform will have a section with useful information about different brainstorming techniques. The brainstorming can be done in person or online via sharing tools.

Every group uploads information about the 3 ideas which they find best – short description and an argumentation how the idea will help the company to accomplish the goals. They can upload visualization or reference. For this stage the groups have 3 days.

7.2.3 Assessment

All groups vote for the best 3 ideas – they can give three, two and one point. They can also add remarks to the ideas and make suggestions how to improve them. The groups have 2 days for this stage.

The coordinator selects the best 3 ideas. The criteria are the selection of the students and the personal judgment of the coordinator which ideas meet the goals of the company. The role of the coordinator is needed – he has to be experienced and to be the mediator between the company and the students. It will be best if he has marketing experience so that he will be aware of the company needs but at the same time will help and inspire the students.

The coordinator and the groups whose ideas are chosen have to prepare a presentation. It should show the client why and how the selected ideas will help him achieve his goals, how they can be implemented, what is the budget. This stage requires 4 days. The best way is to present the idea personally to the client.

The whole process can take up to 14 days but the timings are set upon the requirements of the company.

The company can have access to all the ideas that were generated during the brainstorming for a certain period of time. It is recommended that the responsible person from the company gives feedback in the online platform about the selected ideas and the decision if they will implement them or not and why. This feedback is essential for the development of the students and the experience they gain.

7.2.4 Gamification

In brief gamification is the implementation of game elements in non-game situation context. "Individuals naturally (based on the inherent reward structure of nature) strive for achievement, and when rewarded, will continue to strive for more and greater levels of success" (Chapman 2012:2). It is a powerful motivational tool which can not only stimulate certain behavior but can also increase the satisfaction of the task. It will be used in this online platform to motivate and to engage more the students. Every student will have a profile with the ideas his group has

generated, the points they have gained and if they were approved by the company. There will be different levels of points which will be rewarded with badges. The score of the students will be shown on the home page. The best performing students could be rewarded with grades that reflect their final exams. This will be an additional motivation for the students to give their best in the projects.

8. Conclusion

The markets are constantly changing – technology development affects the way customers and companies interact, the oversupply makes it essential for the business to find a way to effectively reach the target, the growing popularity of social media changed the expectations of the customers – they want brands that are active, consistent, helpful, brands that build long-term relationships. Understanding the customers is the key to meaningful brand performance in social media – how they convey meaning, how they use signs, how they interact with brands. The new market requires new sources of ideas and inspiration. This new source could be the partnership between companies and students. Not only business could help the universities offer market-oriented education and prepare the students for their future job but students could help them perform better. Their creativity, knowledge and enthusiasm could be the key to problem-solving business issues in social media. Building an online platform for collaboration could be the key to meeting the expectations of both students and companies.

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**PENSER SÉMIOTIQUEMENT
LE PRÉSENT À L'ÉPOQUE DE
L'EXPLOSION**

SEMIOTIC ENGINEERING

Assen I. Dimitrov
Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge,
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
assen.dimitrov@gmail.com

Abstract

Semiotic engineering is designed to transform the natural hierarchy of signs and meanings – so as to gain effective control on individual and mass consciousness and action. First, through several social illustrations, we'll consider how symbols are converted into meanings, or what are called “magic signs”. Next, we'll see how meanings degrade into mere signs.

This presentation is somehow remote from the focus of the current Congress panel; yet, not desperately remote; because, it also has to do with the breaking of boundaries; this time – of the boundaries between symbols and reality; or in other words – between signs and meanings. We shall see here:

- First, how signs mutate into meanings and
- Second, how meanings devolve into mere signs. But we shall start with.

1. Semiotic determinism, or the natural hierarchy of signs and meanings

In physical determinism an object directly produces a causal effect.




Fig. 1 Physical determinism: schematic representation

From semiotic point of view, however, the agents that act upon us should not be considered as mere physical objects, but as signs. The interaction with these semiotic agents is not a mere physical process, but a process of communication. This communication does not result into an immediate causal reaction; communication starts with an act of semiotic interpretation, which discloses the agents' meanings.




Fig. 2 Communication begins with an act of semiotic interpretation

Our reaction is not determined by the physical nature of the signs that act upon us; our reaction is determined by their meanings.

In semiotic determinism:

- first, a sign induces an interpretation;
- next, its meaning produces an action (effect).




Fig. 3 Semiotic determinism: schematic representation

An example:

Let us imagine that in the bustle of a crowded city street or on public transport, one of the nearby bystanders or passengers has unintentionally collided with me, or has stepped on my foot. – If things develop in a causal physical reality, my reaction would be either to fall or swerve out of the way, i.e. I'm also supposed to counteract in a mechanical manner. In practice, however, nothing like that happens. Most often the guilty bystander or passenger apologizes for the offense, and the victim politely accepts the apology without undertaking any physical response.

Another example:

The same occurs when we are exposed to extreme physical effects, e.g. heat or cold. Or rain. We may completely ignore these physical agents, especially when our mind is focused on a completely different matter than weather. But one can experience a sense of frost or even pain, or pleasure, or horror, if one reads an exciting description or watches the same experience on the TV screen.

Thus we come to the natural semiotic hierarchy of signs and meanings. – Our behaviour is not controlled by the physical impact of the symbolic material structures with which we directly communicate, but by the meanings that we assign them in their conceptual interpretation. Or,

to put it shortly: Meanings have priority over signs. Or, still in other words:

Meanings are deterministically superior to signs.

This immediately takes us to semiotic engineering and its chief objective. Semiotic engineering is designed to transform the natural hierarchy of signs and meanings – so as to gain effective control on individual and mass consciousness and action.

We'll consider first how symbols are converted into meanings, or what are called.

2. Magic signs

As an illustration, we begin with

2.1. The ancient symbols of power as tools for the production of social dominance:

2.1.1. The crown

The crown is a kind of business accessory – say, something like a ritual uniform cap. In point of fact, it hardly owns some of the functional amenities even of a simple hat. By contrast, however, the crown is breathtaking; it is made out of gold, studded with precious stones, it is a masterpiece of fine jewellery; gold is a precious, a noble metal, it screams to the hierarchically subordinated community – “The bearer of this is the supreme lord!”

Besides, if the head is the main attribute of the hierarchical symbolism of mass consciousness, the cap is not only its pragmatic or aesthetic enhancement, but its indexical sign; a sign that indicates the presence and magnitude of a social persona. This is true equally for VIP persons, and for the regular social individual.

In this sense, if the cap is a natural indexical sign of personal hierarchical value, it is with much greater reason that we can affirm that the bearer of the gold crown is nothing else than the *Capo di tutti capi*.

2.1.2. The throne

Unlike the crown that may be too “heavy” or even be “made out of thorns“, the throne is a very comfortable chair; besides that it has all the aesthetic and suggestive effects of the crown plus the already mentioned functional comfort, the throne acts as a semiotic tool for the production of social superiority and subordination in a very literal way. I mean, it is literally lifted and usually marked with unapproachable designation strips separating its beneficial owner from the community with which he communicates.

2.1.3. The sceptre

The sceptre can be a comfortable or uncomfortable, but in any case a very stylish stick, or rod, like how you call it. But the most significant about the sceptre is depicted by its handle; so overall, the sceptre is not just a stick or a rod, but one whose handle depicts a snake. – Which may not bring very comfortable associations to the uninitiated user of this accessory, but to those more or less aware of the story of the biblical prophet Moses and the Egyptian priests, all of them able, just with a click of the fingers, to convert rods into snakes and vice versa, things look differently.

2.1.4. The orb

“The globus cruciger (Latin, [cross-bearing orb]) is an orb (lat. globus) topped (lat. gerere = to wear) with a cross (lat. crux), a Christian symbol of authority used throughout the Middle Ages and even today on coins, iconography and royal regalia. It symbolises Christ's

(the cross) dominion over the world (the orb), literally held in the dominion of an earthly ruler (or sometimes celestial being such as an angel).” (Globus cruciger...2014: n.p.)

And, another quotation from the same source:

“A crystal ball is a crystal or glass ball believed by some people to aid in the performance of clairvoyance. It is sometimes known as a shew stone (or show stone— “shew” is an archaic spelling of “show”). A body of water, either in a container or on the ground, used for this purpose, is called a scrying pool. (Crystal ball...:2014 n.p.)

Isn't the royal orb also an analogue of the magic crystal ball; a symbol of the monarch's magic clairvoyance and strategic vision of the state's and the nation's fortune: their historical past and future, the connection with the magic powers that drive the universe; a smart tool for encrypted direct optical communication with them?

2.1.5. The letter of authorization

Such semiotic tool, having the same magical power to produce the superiority of its bearer in the face of its addressees can be not only a natural or an iconic symbol, but also a very conventional plain text. In fact – every document. We might consider any document, any power of attorney, any authorization, but let's for fun recall that described in Dumas' “The Three Musketeers”, which reads something like that:

“Dec. 3, 1627 It is by my order and for the good of the state that the bearer of this has done what he has done. *Richelieu*” (Dumas. The Three Musketeers...:2014 n.p.)

2.2. Magical symbols

These are symbols that have the power of their meaning. They are tantamount to their meaning, and sometimes, stronger. They can substitute their meaning and the actions performed on them have existential significance to the object they indicate.

Thus, in Spielberg's, “Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom”, the young film hero (Short Round) became a target and a victim of such magic manipulation produced by a devotee of Goddess Kali. The magic consisted in that the shaman made a doll image of the addressee of the sinister message and began physical assault on the doll that was instantly projected onto the corresponding body points of the hapless prey. – The magic; its impact, its direct action upon the sign, were depicted with algebraic precision upon the referent.

The conception of the magical signs is developed by Bronislaw Malinowski (1884 – 1942) in a number of his studies in semiotic ethnography. (Malinowski 1922)

An excellent introduction to the concept of the magic function of language could be Malinowski's insightful observation of on the role of language in infancy. Already in the first months, the infant discovers the magical role of words as a tool to induce its needful conditions and events. The infant understands how the very mention of a word is enough for the indicated object to appear, and the unwanted – to disappear as if by magic wand.

“Words are to a child active forces, they give him an essential hold on reality, they provide him with the only effective means of moving, attracting and repulsing outer things and of producing changes in all that is relevant.” (Ogden and Richards 1927: 321)

“[...] we are made to realize how deeply rooted is the belief that a word has some power over a thing, that it participates of the nature of the thing, that it is akin or even identical in its contained ‘meaning’ with the thing or with its prototype.” (Ogden and Richards 1927: 322)

“The word gives power, allows one to exercise an influence over an object or an action.” (Ogden and Richards 1927: 322)

Of course, that today’s social elite has a number of residual from the past, rudimentary symbols to produce meanings of social dominance, especially in the face of the common people: a car produced in Bavaria, brand clothing and accessories at the same unit price, gold trinkets, smart phones, tablets and the like gadgets... Still, the very holders of such rudimentary symbolic inventory impeccably understand that their hierarchical power has nothing to do with it. They well sense, or rather feel that it comes from the magical abuse of their social status. What is really important is power itself, the very possession of the power position, its magic.

However, the position of power is merely an ultimate sign of power, but it is not power itself. To identify the power position itself with its actual meaning, with the real social status and function of its holder, means to attribute a magical function to this position; this means to identify this particular social symbol with its actual and functional meaning.

3. How meanings degrade into mere signs

We first saw how signs turned into meanings. Now we’ll see how meanings degrade into mere signs.

It is the second magical abuse that is done nowadays by the bearers of the semiotic tools of power, the inhabitants of the highest political and administrative positions. – The authoritative position turns into an end in itself – alien to the quality, content and expertise that lie behind the symbols of their status.

The acquisition of power is not only the alpha, but alas – the omega of modern political practice. Serious policy ends with the acquisition of power. Election victory is a symbolic act that in the rulers’ view is equivalent to the solution of all social, national and global problems. Their political practice is indeed magical as it identifies the acquisition of political power with the practical realization of their (election) political platform.

There are two ways of violating the natural semiotic hierarchy of signs and meanings, or in other words – of putting signs above meanings:

1) Magic signs, i.e. signs which have mutated into meanings; the crown *is* the king’s supremacy;

2) Devolution of meanings in which they degrade into empty signs; the election victory is the realization of the election program; the meaning of the symbol is depleted with it, itself.

It is worrying that modern science does not stand aside from this alarming semiotic devolution. One sometimes feels that modern scientific practice has also lost its meaning and has been reduced to a symbolic ritual for the acquisition of signs of social dominance and prestige. It seems sometimes that it is no more a quest for knowledge; rather it is a hunt for positions, for titles, for omnifarious signs of social dominance and their conversion into financial and even political capital.

Scholarly debates often seem not to be connected with a real change in the vector of scientific research; they rather seem to be no more than a master exercise of the potency of the purely symbolic, ritual, magic side of the scientific position; the aerobatics of the mages and the weird sisters of modern science.

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**THE SENSE OF ACTION:
DIALOGUES BETWEEN
SEMIOTICS AND
ANTHROPOLOGY**

DOSTOYEVSKY IN CAPE TOWN

Giovanni Spissu
University of Manchester, UK
spissugiovanni@hotmail.com

Abstract

Mikhail Bakhtin considered Dostoyevsky the creator of the polyphonic novel. The uniqueness of Dostoyevsky's literary style was in his ability to give voice to his characters, making it so they could almost be considered the authors themselves. Taking inspiration from Dostoyevsky's literary style and Bakhtin's analysis, we can imagine a kind of ethnographic observation of urban phenomena in which the city is compared to a literary text and its inhabitants can be compared to its characters-authors. In "*Dostoyevsky in Cape Town*" I sought to represent post-Apartheid Cape Town by comparing it to a novel build by interweaving its inhabitants' individual voices. Like in Dostoyevsky's novels, Cape Town was taken as a polyphonic entity made up of different independent voices that weave into a single narrative body.

Summary

Mikhail Bakhtin explained how when he became familiar with the voluminous literature about Dostoyevsky, he had the impression that it wasn't about a single author who had written novels and stories, but rather a series of philosophical statements made by several thinkers (Raskolnikov, Myshkin, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov, The Grand Inquisitor, and so on). Bakhtin noted that for some authors Dostoyevsky's voice merges with the voice of one or another of his characters. Other authors see it as the peculiar synthesis of these ideological voices; yet others considered his voice simply drowned out by them. (Bakhtin). In Dostoyevsky's novels, the voice of the character (the hero) is ideologically authoritative and independent. He is perceived as the author of a fully weighted ideological conception of his own, and not as the object of Dostoyevsky's finalizing artistic vision. I argue that by translating Dostoyevsky's literary style and taking inspiration from Mikhail Bakhtin's text analysis, we can envision a particular type

of ethnographic observation in which the city is compared to a text and its characters to actual authors. In March 2011 I went to Cape Town in order to observe processes of signification in post-Apartheid Cape Town. My research's goal was to observe the process of signifying urban places through a multi-perspective method to be able to represent the city through its differences. Taking inspiration from Dostoyevsky's literary novels, I compared Cape Town to a polyphonic text made up of different independent voices that form the metropolis' narrative plot in their intersection.

From the polyphonic novel to the discovery of the city

Bakhtin noted that "a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoyevsky's novels." Bakhtin explains how the main characters in Dostoyevsky, by his creative design, are truly more than objects of the author's word; they are "subjects of their own directly significant word." (Bakhtin 1984:13). The word of the hero is never only explicated in the usual descriptive and pragmatic-narrative functions and "as a vehicle for the author's own ideological position (as with Byron, for instance)." (Bakhtin 1984:14) The hero's consciousness is given like another consciousness, but, as Bakhtin notes, "at the same time it does not reify, it does not close itself, and it does not become a mere object of the author's consciousness." (Bakhtin 1984:15)

According to Bakhtin, Dostoyevsky is the creator of the polyphonic novel. His work does "not fit any of the preconceived frameworks or historico-literary schemes that we usually apply to various species of the European novel." (Bakhtin 1984:15). Bakhtin explains that in Dostoyevsky's works heroes appear whose voice is constructed like one would construct "the author's voice in an ordinary kind of novel" (Bakhtin 1984:18). The word of the hero about himself and his world is fully autonomous "as the author's word usually is" (Bakhtin 1984:18). It cannot be subject to the hero's objectified image or "serve as a mouthpiece for the author's voice" (Bakhtin 1984:18). The character's voice has absolute independence within the work's structure and "sounds, as it were, alongside the author's word" (Bakhtin 1984:18) in a special way combines both with it and with the full and equally valid voices of other characters. (Bakhtin 1984:18)

According to Bakhtin, the fundamental characteristic of Dostoyevsky's novels is that they contain voices and independent, unmerged consciousnesses. The novel is not the fixed object of the author's explicit intention and fully artistic decisions, but a polyphony of fully independent voices. Dostoyevsky carefully avoids describing his characters' biographies in an analytical way, but allows them to emerge in fragmented form as the novel is written. Something which could be simply considered a stylistic choice conceals a deeper intention on the part of the author: that of retaining the individual subjectivity of his characters. Dostoyevsky's characters are themselves creators, in addition to being created by their writer. Each one has his own philosophy within the novel.

Taking inspiration from Bakhtin's analysis, I argue that we can transfer Dostoyevsky's literary style to the ethnographic observation of the city. We can adopt a particular mode of ethnographic representation in which the ethnographer/author's voice is set alongside that of the city's inhabitants. I also argue that we can compare the city to a polyphonic novel made up of different independent voices that intersect and overlap with each other to form the metropolis' narrative plot.

In his research in Sao Paulo Massimo Canevacci compares the city to a polyphonic text with different autonomous voices. The title of his book "*La Città Polifonica*" [Polyphonic City] (1986) is meant to signify that "the city in general and urban communication can be compared to a choir singing a multiplicity of autonomous voices that are crossing, relate to each other, overlap, isolate each other and contrast with each other." (Canevacci 1986:17)

The analogy is clear here with Dostoyevsky's textual construction and Bakhtin's ideas which Canevacci cites only sporadically. Nonetheless, the parallels between the city's textual construction and the narrative construction of the novel emerge powerfully. Like Dostoyevsky's heroes/characters, Canevacci identifies individual voices in the city's places that the author/researcher never drowns out through a single-voiced, levelling interpretation, leaving them free to express themselves through the writing. Canevacci takes the operation of writing the city as a *montage* work in which the voices of the author and those of the object of study (seen in its subjectivity) intersect and unfold side by side. Like Dostoyevsky's characters, the city's places (considered as an ethnographic object of study) do not appear as silent slaves of the author's interpretation, emerging in their total autonomy and freedom. The places of Sao Paulo, its squares, streets, shopping centres and museums, are seen as subjects that have their autonomy voice that the researcher can narrate without drowning them out under an authorial viewpoint.

Unfortunately, though Canevacci recognized the metropolis' polyphony, he stopped at narrating the city through his voice alone. This gives rise to the paradox of the polyphonic city narrated only through the voice of one person (who sets himself up as the translator of different voices). In his writing, the voices of the city's inhabitants in their singularity are almost absent. Canevacci emphasized how the city is imbued with the memories of its inhabitants' temporalities (their memories, hopes and imaginations). Yet he limits his text to the places of the city seen as keepers of temporality. He does not extend his observation to the point of examining how these places were experienced, imagined and remembered by them.

Dostoyevsky's literary style can be associated with another work about post-Apartheid Cape Town. *Imagining the City* (2007) in which Sean Field, Renate Meyer and Felicity Swanson represent the city through a plurivocal viewpoint made up of the intertwining of the different viewpoints and voices of its inhabitants. The book is organised in eleven chapters in which the authors describe Cape Town taking different vantage points on it. Field explains how through this project the authors sought to give voice to the city's regular people whose perspective has been neglected amidst the broad generalisations of those looking at the post-Apartheid period. Cape Town is recounted through the eyes of township inhabitants, former residents of District Six, survivors of the terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2000, and through the eyes of immigrants, musicians, hip hop music lyricists and rugby players. In some passages, the voices of the city's residents join those of the authors who intervene in the text with their interpretations. In other cases the authors leave the stories and images 'to speak for themselves'. Cape Town is represented in this work as a complex organism, made up of a discontinuous collection of viewpoints and voices overlapping and interweaving into a single narrative structure.

In the introduction Sean Field explains that they chose this particular methodological approach with the goal of suggesting an alternative to all of the uniformising generalisations of many works about post-Apartheid South African cities. Citing Nuttal and Michael, he notes how theorizing South Africa has been characterized by "the overriding analytical weight given to politics, resistance struggle and race as determinant of identity." (Nuttal and Michael in Field 2007:7). Field explains that, despite "stories about political resistance struggles" are issues discussed in the work, they are not its central focus. He wrote: "We explore rather the neglected significance of popular imagination in shaping memories, identities and agency. We assert the centrality of attempts of people to construct, contest and maintain a material and emotionally secure sense of place and identity in Cape Town." (Field 2007:7). The insistence of the centrality of the imagination and memory of individuals and their ability to create their own rapport with the city's urban spaces is set in open antithesis with the instrumentalist and developmental tendencies of many studies about the post-Apartheid period that took the city as "a problem to be solved." Mbembe and Nuttal noted how post-Apartheid cities were often observed through the

lens of a single development paradigm (Murray 2007:8) and are more concerned “with whether the city is changing along vectors of institutional governance, deracialisation of service provision and local politics than with citiness as such” (Mbembe and Nuttal 2004 in Murray 2007:9). Field rejects the monological, uniformising perspective of a top-down approach and contrasts it with a decentralized and polyphonic viewpoint in which the post-Apartheid city is seen through the many pathways of its inhabitants’ memory and imagination. “It is through the ways people imaginatively frame and place of memory that the disparate narrative threads of this book are linked and speak to multiple senses of the city.” (Field 2007:7) Starting from these bases, I sought to adopt a particular method to observe the city from a multiple perspective. My primary objective was to observe the process of signifying Cape Town, seeking to explore how it was perceived by individuals in their individuality and their idiosyncrasy. In this way I strove to observe, understand and represent this process of signifying urban places, seeing them not only as a shared public expression of the city, but primarily as intimate, private experiences.

Taking inspiration from this and other works, I decided that I could represent post-Apartheid Cape Town from a polyphonic viewpoint too, in which the city could be told through the memories and imaginations of its inhabitants. Comparing the city’s ethnographic description to a polyphonic novel, I could consider the city’s inhabitants as authors who interpreted and “created” their social worlds in different ways. There is no human (and social) world with its own truth; it possesses no independent character. The human world is subject to a plurivocality of interpretations; “the world can be interpreted equally well in innumerable, vastly different and deeply incompatible ways” (Rapport 1997:47). Based on these assumptions, the social world can be understood as the contradictory, unstable sum of these interpretations. As in the novel understood by Bakhtin as a pluridiscursive reality in which the different voices (of the author and narrating voices) are taken as parts of a whole but do not coincide, in the world as “artwork”, human beings are simultaneously an essential part of the whole and autonomous voices that cannot be reduced to it. Though they are part of the whole, they scrutinise it, interpret it, and create it: “Human beings may themselves be part of the world, may be viewing in from situated, interested and partisan perspectives, but nonetheless, it is they who created the world, create themselves, and their perspectives in their interpretations” (Rapport 2000:86). Taking inspiration from Bakhtin’s literary analysis we can compare ethnographic, textual construction to that of a novel and to the city as an artwork. This means that each social actor can be conceived as a creator and a co-author who writes, interprets, and creates a particular meaning.

Taking inspiration from the research method used by Andrew Irving in his study on HIV-positive individuals in London, New York, and Kampala, I decided to adopt a multiple viewpoint of the city. I asked my interviewees to identify places in Cape Town that had a particular meaning because connected to certain events in their lives. Moving through Cape Town’s different places, photographing the city’s spaces and recording the interviews, I observed how they reconstructed the events of their lives putting them in relationship to the city’s urban spaces. Each stop in the city can be considered a mnemonic and emotional area in which the interviewees reconstruct part of their narrative.

Conclusions

In *The Conquest of America* (1982), Tzvetan Torodov chose a particular narrative style to represent the 17th-century conquest of America, overlapping the different life stories and perspectives of the protagonist, including Columbus, Cortes, Montezuma, Las Casas, Cabeza de Vaca, Duran, and Sahagun. Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan explained how in this way the author sought a particular way to relate with otherness and found it by telling their stories. Vulcan wrote: The “exemplary” nature of the narrative, in Todorov’s sense, lies not in its claim to universality, but

precisely in its specificity and singularity. Todorov is not concerned with History in the upper case, but precisely with the lower case mode: with particular and diverse histories of the relation to the other. Vulcan explains how this particular mode of representing the story can be compared to what Bakhtin called a character zone:

These zones [which] are formed from the characters' semi-discourses, from various forms of hidden transmission for the discourse of the other, by the words and expressions scattered in this discourse, and from the irruption of alien expressive elements into authorial discourse (ellipsis, questions, exclamation). Such a zone is the range of action of the character's voice, intermingling in one way or another with the author's voice. (Bakhtin in Vulcan 2007:155)

Vulcan notes how in this way Torodov achieves surprising results, upsetting the "*monolithic picture*" through which historic periods were often represented, "such as the "worldview of the Victorians" or the "Elizabethan world picture" (Vulcan 2007:155). Adopting the "voices" of the different protagonists, Torodov can observe the phenomenon he is studying through a multi-perspective viewpoint. "The significance of the work as a whole may be perceived in the various permutations and intermediate nuances of all these options, in the interstices of these relations with the other." (Vulcan 2007:156) Vulcan explains that in order to understand the book we must relate it to Dostoyevsky's literary style and particularly its analysis by Bakhtin.

The best exotopy is precisely the one Dostoevsky practices, insofar as it does not confine the character in the consciousness of the author and puts into question the very notion of the privileging of one consciousness above another. A character in Dostoevsky is an unaccomplished, incomplete, heterogeneous being, but that is the reason of its superiority, because we are all, as we have seen, subjects only in unaccomplishment. [...] Dostoevsky's characters are like us; that is, incomplete, they are like so many authors, rather than the [finalized] characters of ancient authors. (Bakhtin in Vulcan 2007:156)

Vulcan notes how the narrative mode that Torodov adopt and his decision to follow the cue of Dostoyevsky should be seen both as a stylistic choice and as an ethical choice, to which I would add an epistemological choice. "At the core of this project there is a yet implicit but powerful connection between the way we get to know or understand the other and the ethical choices we make. What leads to this realization is a direct reference to Bakhtin's "exotopy": "an affirmation of the other's exteriority which goes hand in hand with the recognition of the other as subject" (Torodov in Vulcan 2007:156)

Like Torodov, in this article I sought to borrow Dostoyevsky's literary style and take a cue from Bakhtin's ideas in order to observe post-Apartheid Cape Town. I thereby sought to observe the city through its residents' intimate, private experiences. We noted how many scholars of the post-Apartheid phenomenon have underscored the need to adopt new approaches based a multiple perspective observation of the city. Having abandoned the top-down, elite view in which the only viewpoint on a city coincides with that of its planners these new approaches consider the possibility of observing the city from different vantage points. Field wrote:

Views, whether they are of urban landscapes, politics or conceptual paradigms, can be misleading. What do you see from where you are positioned? How does this shape your outlook on life? How does this shape your memories of spaces and places of this city? The

crucial significance of vantage points is that they are shaped by who you are, where you are, and when you are experiencing and constructing this view (Field 2007:7).

Taking inspiration from Dostoyevsky's novel, we can imagine a type of observation of a city in which each voice of the city can be understood as the creation of a different author. From this perspective, the role of the ethnographer is to avoid levelling the voices of the different authors, freeing them and letting them express themselves each in their own way.

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CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE AND THE SEMIOTIC PARADIGM: NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM ANCIENT SPACES

Matteo Baraldo
University for Foreigners, Perugia

Abstract

This paper acknowledges a small yet significant contribution to semiotics made by an obscure Ethiopian literate called Alemayehu Mogos. The textual fragments under analysis represent some pioneering findings deriving from a preliminary probing into the field of Ethiopian humanities. The sources range from the IV century text, a philosophical work from the Greek, the *Fisalgwos* (aka the *Physiologus* in the classical world), written in ancient Ethiopic, to a more recent dissertation on *qəne*, a pseudo-rhetorical-philosophical form used in Ethiopian tradition. This was described in greater detail by Alemayehu Mogos, and presented at a conference in Addis Ababa in 1966 (Mogos, 1966).

The specific aim of such deep delving into texts is to unveil the autochthonous speculations on semiotic concepts and studies.

The result of the research aims at highlighting a specific semiotic paradigm in the form of cluster of pre-philosophical practices (medical, magical, poetical, rhetorical, and anthropological) blended with explicit sign theories as those specifically elaborated by philosophers (Manetti, 2013).

Conversely, there are scholars such as Lagopoulos and Stylianoudi who, to a certain extent have already offered their contribution, systematically analyzing some specific features derived from Ethiopian historical data, identifying a system of correlations between the organization of meaning and space (Lagopoulos and Stylianoudi, 2001), thus paving the way in terms of method to implement research framework.

In the approach and method adopted by our survey we have redefined the nature of the above-called 'certain aspects' (i.e. the space-related concepts and ideas) into a series of key words about semiotic-related terms, concepts or assumptions.

In this paper we present some findings about qəne, a specifically Ethiopian sign system using a linguistic language as its medium which seems to perfectly represent one item from the cluster of above mentioned practices. The item is then consequently structured to configurate the space necessary for the construction of the semiotic paradigm.

The non-secondary level of reflection is, conversely, to assess the possibility of existence of an ‘Ethiopian semiotics’ (i.e. what we referred to as ‘specific paradigm’), whereas its merely possible contribution to theories on signs at global level, would be equally impacting.

The two positions are not self-excluding, and, as to the level of their combination, more definitive answers may be given as the digging into textual corpora progresses and comes to conclusive phase. This clearly calls for the emergence of wider studies, particularly conducted by local researchers in the challenging scenario of global semiotics, nowadays heavily overbalanced towards the Western concepts and practices. To put it more simply, in terms of questions and answers, must we rely on a local epistemological grid when dealing with interpretations of local and native sign systems? An example will be given by comparing the etymology of the lexeme /mystery/ in Greek and Geez (ancient Ethiopic) languages, highlighting the different semes. In the case of Greek, significance is related to ‘something unspeakable’ from $\mu\upsilon\epsilon\omega$ (‘I close the eyes, the mouth’), while in Ethiopian context – or grid – it is to be considered as leading to a thousand possible interpretations (ýamästäřä [säřäřä] thus conveying the meaning of interpreting to something which is speakable to some extent, albeit covering many different aspects. The case of qəne itself may well epitomize the difficulties one encounters, from rendering the word qəne to a transleme or translational equivalent (either literal and semantic, or pragmatic and dynamic), in any language, when dealing with such intriguing and totally Ethiopian texts.

Starting with the analysis of some fragments from the work of Ethiopian scholar Alemayehu Mogos, acknowledged by the authors as the first Ethiopian semiologist, the following observations are aimed at presenting the initial stage of the process of exploration of factors and data-mining, the consequent conceptual framework, and some preliminary directions and findings related to semiotics as gathered from within Ethiopian written culture.

1. The *elsewhere*: between tradition and innovation

As recently argued by Manetti (2010: 13), a comparison between the modern concept of semiotics and its sources of origin entails a radical change within the current paradigm of the discipline. Diachronic shifts and variational dynamics are likely to elicit innovative responses. In this sense then, a comparison with the notions set forth in the past could influence the current definition and the declarations of intent of semiotics. The same could, however, be true if referred to spatial perspectives and space-bound orientations. Moreover, furthering understanding of the concept of sign and signification, as represented and perceived by different cultures and organizations of systems of meaning, is the other key factor to innovation. Even if these cultures do not frequently appear to be part of the current Western-oriented debate because of linguistic barriers and lack of translation, they could stimulate innovation while preserving heritage. Something new could thus emerge not from the distant past, but from a culturally-remote space *elsewhere*. It is the case of Ethiopia and the unknown semiologist whose thoughts we shall discuss.

2. Drafting the semiotic paradigm

2.1. The practices and the paradigm

In order to prevent dialectics and diverging points of views from leading us astray from the objectives of the present paper, it is useful here to introduce the notion of paradigm. We shall discuss first of all how a paradigm can be reconstructed. Pre-theoretical practices related to the

domain of magic, rhetoric and poetics have certainly had a role in building paradigms. It is also clear how much the discipline of signs is indebted to its roots (Manetti 1993: xiv-xv). The most convincing factor is that the ancient practices have often prepared and moulded the lexicon of semiotics upon which theoretical speculation has been exercised. Consequently, in order to draft and enucleate a paradigm, semiotic practices are amongst the most important materials to recuperate. In the course of our researches undertaken in Ethiopia, several practices were observed. Such activities and interactions actually range from ritual neck tattooing considered as a preventive treatment against iodine disorders, to the direct or indirect use of medico-magical treatises to empower spells. The habit of wearing magic scrolls, such as written amulets hung on the neck for protection, is a widespread practice, like other practices primarily involving verbal languages and ritual oral formulae. Such practices and rituals which form part of our collected data, even if not mentioned here, seem to converge on one factor, i.e., the incidence of different systems of signs acting upon the Physical World. Needless to add how in the Western tradition, rhetoric has been considered for a long period as a determinant factor acting through the medium of words, and a strategy of persuasion. The choice of a practice linked to rhetoric, therefore, seemed a valid reference to the present orientation. Among the possible choices related to a range of practices, the Ethiopian *qəne*¹ was our first choice and priority. Following field research, we also started the study of some fragments by Alemayehu Mogos, an Ethiopian ecclesiastic scholar. The religious man may have applied a kind of semiotic glance and perspective in Ethiopia, specifically when dealing with the issue of the nature of *qəne*. The present paper relies on the assumption that ritual and cultural practices can represent an interesting indicator to direct researchers to anthropological, philological and bibliographical data mining, towards definition and comparison of non-Western semiotics.

2.2. A religious practice. Brief introduction to Ethiopic *qəne*

Qəne has been a discipline and vital subject in the religious education of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. It is a shared opinion that unless someone studies *qəne*, one will never be able to understand biblical interpretation. Ethiopian history and hymnal books with all the hagiographical works from different eras are preserved in Gəəz (ancient Amharic) *qəne*. The word *qəne* derives from a Gəəz root *qänəy/qänəyot* which means ‘to direct a form of melody with cantillations emphasizing rhythm, philosophical concept and reflections’. Gəəz *qəne* is also a form of oral literature that relies on emphasis and stresses rhythm. As a form of literature, it is also known to be constructed over the figure of speech called *sam-na-warq* ‘wax and gold’. There are conflicting argumentations and historical observations as to the origin of *qəne*. Some traditional and orthodox Ethiopian scholars believed that its source derived from universal concepts taken from the Graeco-Roman philosophy. Other scholars argue that a person by the name of Yohannes Geblawi went for a spiritual retreat to a place called Sayint, near Debre Tabor in 1450. There he would have asked the Almighty the grace to reveal to him the method of Gəəz *qəne* and eventually his wish was fulfilled. Other scholars from Gojjam claim that a person by name of Tewaney went to Greece. There he would have studied the philosophical usage of language and from Greece he would have returned, after having acquired seven kinds and methods of wisdom. One of these methods was the *qəne* (Galaw 2009: 2-3; 235). There are currently more than 187 methods and typologies of Gəəz *qəne*. *Qəne* has an important function in different ceremonial Performance in Ethiopian Orthodox Tewado Church, for instance during the melodious order of Anthem (ሥርዓተ መወደስ) at least ten stanzas of Gəəz *qəne* are chanted. At least forty verses are presented in the services of vigil (ሥርዓተ ዋክሃ). During the service of Matins of regular days (ስብሐተ ነግሠ ዘዘወትር), four stanzas of Gəəz *qəne* are presented and chanted. During the same service on Sunday, at least fourteen stanzas of *qəne* are presented (see fig.1).



Fig.1 Church ceremony in Lalibela

Qəne, however, has not only a religious content. It also offers philosophical contributions in order to introduce ideas and cultural features.

2.3. What is *qəne*. Approaching the verbal text

The following couplet stands as an example of Ethiopic *qəne* under the verbal point of view.

- (1) ተ መ ሰ ለ ወ ል ድ ር እ ሰ ገጸ አ ዳ ም ቅ ድ ስ ተ
 እ ን ዘ መ ዓ ል ት የ ሐ ው ር ወ እ ን ዘ ይ ከ ው ን ሌ ሊ ተ
 [The son resembles the head of the complexion of Adam
 While the day is going, and the evening is happening]

In this particular case, the double acceptation is based on the signifier both rhythmically and visually. There are two possible ways of interpreting the text. If one considers “the son” with the small letter, as a simple member of human society, the literal meaning will be the *denotatum*, in line with its referent in the Physical World. It is called “the wax”. There is yet a further hidden meaning called “the gold”. The second meaning is given by considering the Son with a capital S. Christ, during the exact instant of His death by crucifixion, has both a human and divine nature. Amongst the shapes of the letters, one can clearly see the shape of a cross that way of seeming a T-shaped letter on which the double meaning is based on (see fig. 2).



Fig.2 The shape of the cross in the Amharic alphabet

The word *tāmässälä* means also ‘seemed’ and in addition it carries the meaning of *tä-mässälä* or ‘seems T’ by interposing a brief break while reading. The lexical meaning is changed by inserting a pause inside the word where it is usually not expected. In this way one can perceive a resemblance with the line of Adam and a cross, symbolizing Christ’s sacrifice to redeem mankind. The hidden meaning carries theological and philosophical points for discussions or even opinions. In addition, the moment wherein action takes place is culturally relevant. The shift from day to night is referred to the darkening of the skies during Christ’s crucifixion as related in the Gospels. As in many Western and Mediterranean traditions, in the Ethiopian culture it

is considered the climax of transformation. This moment may also be the peak-moment unleashing the evil black powers of sorcerers and spellers who in the dusk and darkness turn into hyenas.

We shall not pursue here any in-depth textual and contextual analysis since the aim is not to expound textual meanings inside this specific example. Our attempt was simply to introduce the nature of the phenomenon to ease the understanding of the verbal-text involved in the semiotic process and only a brief recognition of the cultural context.

What is *qene*. Approaching the religious practice

A different perspective from the didactic one we have examined so far is to ask oneself what is *qene* beyond the borders of the verbal dimensions. In other words: what is apart from being “a verbal meaning”? An obvious assumption would be that is all about poetry. Alemayehu Mogos denies this possibility since “the exact equivalent of poetry is *getem* and *mazmur* combined” (Mogos 1970: 57).

The second hypothesis is to consider it as a rhetorical artifice, with which it seems to share a lot, at least at surface level. Here again, however, our Ethiopian scholar insists on the impossibility of a translation word-by-word. He defines the object of discussion as “invented by an isolated Ethiopian mentality”. He adds that it will “remain a mystery until it is thoroughly taught and adequately understood in other foreign countries and languages” (Mogos 1970: 56).

In 1950, Alemayehu Mogos launched an appeal to the international community, inviting to translate the word *qəne*. It was addressed in particular to individuals with linguistic knowledge. In fact, Mogos does not believe in the possibility of a linguistic translation, not only terminological or at word level, but also at textual level. He claims that “if any translated text gives some idea, it is something else but *qəne*” (Mogos 1970: 55). Mogos speaks about “drastic destruction” or “dilution” which even makes it to “cease to be *qəne*.” (Mogos 1970: 55). Here the scholar seems to enter into one of the more thorny and tight conceptual corners. The controversy whether, if in the interpretation of localized and culture-bound sign-systems, one is to depend upon a local epistemological grid to avoid misrepresentation of the phenomenon under scrutiny.

2.5. The “mysteries” of *qəne* explained

It would be important here to digress to reflect on the lexeme /mystery/ which can add some elements to this discussion. Accordingly, interpretation grids should eventually originate from the very same cultural context intended to be analysed.

The lexeme /mystery/, in Ethiopian culture and philology, is entirely different from Greek *μυστήριον* that refer to ineffability from *μυω* ‘I close myself; I am closed, locked’ (Rocci 1957: 1263). The issue is controversial to such an extent that Bornkamm (1971: 645-716) in the homonymous lemma in the New Testament Lexicon declares that “the etymology of *μυστήριον* is a mystery itself”

Opening the New Amharic Dictionary Desta Tekle Wold (1970: 860) one can read the lemma አ መ ስ ጠ ረ (አ ጠ ረ), *amäštärä* (*sätärä*):

አ መ ስ ጠ ረ (አ ጠ ረ) = አ ረ ቀ ቀ ነ ጽ ር ኬ ዘ ከ መ አ መ ስ ጠ ረ እ ሎ ንተ በአ ሐ ቲ ቃ ል ፤ በ ተ መ ሳ ጥ ሮ እ ት ና ገር ም ስ ሌ ከ

[He (someone) gave a deep interpretation = He (someone) gave the details. Example: look at that he (someone) interpreted these deeply in different ways within a single word. He (someone) has given a detail of interpretation.]

Grids may provide a useful tool for a comparative and cross-cultural analysis. In fact, Mogos

tries likewise to circumscribe some generic characteristic, some analogies it shares with other phenomena. He defines *qane* as undoubtedly ascribable to the class of means of communication, to specify it better later on as being an art functioning through a language. The Ethiopian scholar proposes the definition of *qane* as a means of communication whose expressive form is precisely a language. He argues that “since it transmits ideas from speakers to hearers, it is a language, an oral expression system and since it is not a collection of words but the code of the position and composition of, then it is an art” (Mogos 1970: 55). As means of expression its real *raison d'être* is to clarify: “it is a means of clear expression, as such it is an oral² art of communication just as music and painting” (Mogos 1970: 55).

In a conclusive statement, to be more explicit, he defines *qane* as “an instrument to adequately elaborate an idea whenever words of language fail to do so” (Mogos 1970: 55).

Understanding a local meaning

Lastly, a passage appearing in two different essays by Alemayehu Mogos must be quoted at length. It may well confirm an attitude to conform to a linguistic-semiotic *forma mentis*. The fact that it even appears twice, exactly in the same expression, make this concept of meaning relevant in indicating a sort of epistemic recurrence of the semiotic conception of the scholar.

እንደ ኮረንቲ ሸቦተጠ ማምሮ እንደ ገመድ ተሸራርቦ የሚሄደውን የቅኔ አቸንን ምስጢር አገኛለሁ ማለት ከመሬት ቁጭብ ለሰማይን ደግፎ በግራ እጅ ከዋክብትን መግፋት ሆኑን።

[To a person who intended to know the mysterious concept of our *qane* ‘poem’ which is twisted like electric wire and like the interlaced cord, it seems to sit on the ground to hold the sky with his right hand and to push the stars with his left hand (Mogos 1958: 7, 1960: 115).]

These words would very perceptibly imply that it seems difficult to read *qane* separated from its religious and spiritual substrate (Lemma 1988: 729). Furthermore, in a more general way, it is coherent with the ongoing analysis: i.e., that content cannot easily be separated from context. It is like dividing stars and sky while sitting on the ground; Mogos says. Stars and sky form already an inseparable continuum. Moreover, the image of a man trying to reach the sky while he is sitting on the ground magnifies the idea of the impossibility of such a task.

Sense (as a justified interpretation) is an indissoluble unit of content and context, which cannot be negotiated outside its borders and limits. In Alemayehu Mogos’ comparison, the term must be understood in the literal sense. There seems to be a lot of potential materials to be unearthed, and the phenomenon is worthwhile to be investigated. One can infer that our Ethiopian author treats *qane*, according to a tradition that most likely Alemayehu Mogos could not know, as a cultural factor, almost “semiologically”, as it were a language.

3. Conclusive remarks

To individuate a semiotic paradigm, understood as a specific form of reflection, the practice was taken as a vital link mediating between action and theory. The assumption made was about the fact that elements for a semiotic paradigm could be discovered just starting from such practices and the associated semantic fields. Ethnographic tools for social and anthropological works are a resource for our research on significance and meaning. However, an integrated approach based on semiotics seems to be more advisable here. The author we have considered is one of the first theoreticians, producers of autochthonous discourses, to whom one could eventually as-

cribe the birth of a local semiotic studies field. Does semiotics reach maturity when criticism comes into action, after being stirred by verbal and somatic behaviors, as a type of meta-action? Studies on local discourse and patterns of communication are fully functional and consistent with the analysis of the semiotic paradigm itself. This could also configurate a *global* semiotic form of reflection³. This research needs to receive supportive investment, in order to provide systematic evidence and compare results.

Alemayehu Mogos' notes offer a contribution to the debate about the history and theories of semiotics. This discussion could be enhanced by a wider participation of cultural communities at a global level. Alemayehu Mogos, an Abyssinian scholar of the second-half of the last century, has been here introduced in a provoking way as the obscure and unaware semiologist. He actually has turned out to be the first voice in a local re-construction of meaning. And this is matter for new reflection about other possible echoes that could be tracked elsewhere in the world.

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(Endnotes)

¹ For a complete description of *qəne* see 2.2

² During the discussion at the 12th World Congress of Semiotics, Antonio Perri pointed out the link between orality, music and painting as a peculiar characteristic in several traditional cultures worldwide. As a hypothesis one could connect oral and visual arts with others « semiotics built starting from Physical World » as intended by Greimas (Greimas-Courtés 1979: 363).

³ In comparing Buddhist texts with Derrida's deconstructionism, Youxuan Wang (2001: 221-226), observes: "It is just an accident that the East and the West have come up with some similar ideas?"

HABIT, NORM, RITUAL IN THE LIGHT OF CHARLES PEIRCE'S PRAGMATISM

Reni Yankova
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria
reni.iankova@gmail.com

Abstract

Although drawn as an idea from Charles Peirce's philosophy, the triad "habit-norm-ritual" is not present in this exact formulation within the named. Peirce develops a thorough concept of habit as an element of the rational thinking, states theses on the norm and mentions the ritual only en passant within his thoughts, concerning the forms of thinking. The present study keeps the spirit of the pragmatic doctrine, which is recently named to be "the philosophy of the future", looking for the applications of the drawn triad not only within the anthropological theory, but also within the terms of the everyday living.

The ritual as a phenomenon is historically related to the semiotic researches and mainly to those of the French structuralism from the beginning of the XX century. In this period, facing numerous theoretical issues, anthropology starts "borrowing" research methods from different humanities. Mary Douglas (1921 – 2007) for example uses Basil Bernstein's (1924 – 2000) linguistic code theory for reaching the conclusion that the ritual practices are created for regulating the social relations within a community, which turns them into a medium for control. Maurice Bloch (1939) emphasises that the ritual, being a formalisation of beliefs, is an effective mean of control in the societies where authority is traditionally dominant. He clarifies that such groups are too often "depressingly hierarchic" (Bloch 1975: 3). The quest of finding semiotic perspective over the matters of culture and anthropology is tactile at its most at the beginning of the 60s in the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss (Claude Lévi-Strauss, 1908-2009), who spares considerable room for the ritual in his researches. This "opens" the science of signs up to the field of culture studies. It is an indicative fact that today, even in purely lingual terms we are used to talk about "symbolic nature" of the ritual activity. Yet, the works of Lévi-Strauss lean to the dual tendency in semiotics, while in the current research fruitful relations between the ritual and the triadic

concepts of Charles Peirce (1857 – 1913) are sought.

Peirce's pragmatic model for determination of meanings is used in the present paper in the quest of answering the fundamental anthropological question "what is ritual", which remains unsolved in a definite way in the anthropological literature up to the present day. And the basis of the pragmatic analysis herewith will be the triad habit-norm-ritual. If only the first term – habit – is to be taken, it is indisputably Peircean one; the second one – norm – is considered in the specific meaning, attached to it by Peirce, bearing in mind the named is more of a secondary unit within his philosophy; and the third term – ritual – is taken from the field of anthropology entirely. Revealing the connection between the anthropological view of ritual and the Peircean concept of habit is one of the main aims of the present paper. Then the function of norm, as a gravitational centre able to keep the defined meanings while at the same time remaining subject to change, will be analysed. A *Triadic structural model of ritual*, drawing the frame of the named as a phenomenon on which different and at times exceptionally complex sign systems could be built, will be suggested as the ultimate point of the current research.

The main hypotheses, giving the start of the analysis could be formulated as follows:

1. The ritual contains in its kernel a mental habit, yet it is upgraded as a structure, so that stability in the group to be created and the knowledge of importance for that community to be preserved. And the habit, as an essential part of the ritual, functions as a "reliever" of mental energy which is to be used for reaching new knowledge.
2. Before turning into a ritual a norm, or otherwise – fixed layer of habits, pertaining to one and the same category, is formed around the habit. The norm itself is a phenomenon which simultaneously welds together and preserves the knowledge by creating dynamics as well. It is the norm assuring the two main functions of the ritual – transmission of the gathered knowledge and the vouch for the dynamics and the transformation ability of that knowledge.
3. Around the mental habit, upgraded to a norm, the creation of an outer circle of ritual objects is needed; the latter being more modifiable, as often it is the outer circle's dynamics to ensure the social stability of the inner layers, which contain the habit and the norm.

Clarity overlooked

One of the easily determinable issues in anthropological research is the lack of consentience and terminological clarity in regards to the ritual. Most of the researchers, such as James Frazer (1854–1941), Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), Victor Turner (1920–1983), Claude Levi-Strauss are focused on describing ritual practices without explicitly addressing the fundamental theoretical question "What is ritual?" Only here and there within the researches partial, unclear and even contradictive definitions of the phenomenon are being provided. These definitions outline ritual's frame only as a mythologised act, expressing community's primitive beliefs, related to fruitfulness and to the existence of controlling supreme forces. Later on these borders of the ritual are being widened to the religious practices, their cultural dimensions and the meanings of the signs used. Turner is the first to attempt forming a definition:

"First let me comment on the difference between my use of the term "ritual" and the definitions of Schechner and Goffman. By and large they seem to mean by ritual a standardized unit act, which may be secular as well as sacred, while I mean the performance of a complex sequence of symbolic acts. Ritual for me, [as Ronald Grimes puts it], is a "transformative performance revealing major classification, categories, and contradictions of cultural processes" (Turner 1987: 75)

Another definition of his states that the ritual is „prescribed formal behavior for occasions

not given over to technological routine, having reference to beliefs in mystical beings and powers” (Turner 1967: 19). Points of view different to those above or often even contradicting to them are stated by each and every succeeding researcher. This leads to the constant increase of possible definitions but not to a theoretical unanimity. In her book *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (1992), named to be the most significant study of the ritual in the XXth century by the editors of Oxford University Press, Catherine Bell (1953–2008) underlines that:

“There is little explicit consensus concerning the intrinsic features of ritual, and some do not believe there to be any features intrinsic to ritual. Nonetheless, certain features – formality, fixity, and repetition – have been consistently and repeatedly cited as central to ritual and ritualization” (Bell 1992: 91–92).

Despite of the disagreements between the different scholars, at the end of the XXth century anthropology formulates several generally valid characteristics of the ritual, which will be used as a starting point for the application of the Peircean pragmatic method. These characteristics are namely:

- The ritual is a sequence of repeated acts, related to the stable beliefs of a group (and more rarely to individual ones).
- The ritual transmits knowledge and experience important to the community. This fact turns it into both a structuralizing element of every social group and respectively – into a research subject for the contemporary humanities.
- The ritual is repetitive and bears features, which are demonstrative of the culture of the respective group.
- The ritual is structured over a set of defined, stable beliefs on both social and emotional levels.
- The ritual is always subject to periodicity (calendar), which means that it functions as a law within the community.

These general conclusions on the essence and functions of the ritual make it strongly akin to Peirce’s concept of habit, yet here the clarification is needed that habit as part of the Peircean philosophical system should not be in any way mixed up with the same term, used in the everyday life. Peirce considers the habit as a firm structure, which makes the thinking process easier; the habit being similar to a furrow through which the thought flows before casting itself in the moulds of the interpretants (its interpretations). It can be likened to a stereotype block or model, a form arisen out after a long use of repetitive thoughts which blaze trails in the mind through which it reaches the conclusions for the interpretations easier. The habituation is potency, inherent in every new thought, which after some time gets hardened and trampled as a path ready for future usage. Thus, every fluent verbalization of a thought means that the mind has taken advantage of a habit for thinking. The arisen of habituation in an initial chaos signifies the beginning of a process for realisation of the nature of this form of existence – a beginning of the formation of habit for certain way of thinking.

Controlled chaos

The correlation between habit and ritual is found even in the initial stage of the analysis. The ritual is defined as „thoughtless action – routinized, habitual [...] physical expression of logically prior ideas” (Bell 1992: 19). This statement is connate to the Peircean understanding of habit. Alike the habit, ritual could be defined as a belief vested with action. In numerous cases people repeat the habit mechanically as it stops being subject of thinking in time and instead takes the form of a tag action which saves mental energy and transmits a firm meaning. Edward Shils (1910–1995) emphasises that beliefs can exist without rituals but not vice versa. Evidently the ritual is built around a belief which transfers knowledge important to the community. Yet

the belief, in the Peircean view, develops naturally into habit in order to save mental energy in the everyday life. Thus, namely habit, harmonizing the outer reality, is to be found in the kernel of the ritual. The named thesis is supported by the ritual's characteristic of the slow change of the ritual acts. The ritual provides "life" to the habit-beliefs in the community, linking the collective belief and the private experience. In rare cases the ritual could be private, devoid of social significance. In his essays Peirce considers as well the habit's role as a regulator of the thinking and behavior within the group:

The gentleman is imbued with conservatism. This conservatism is a habit, and it is the law of habit that it tends to spread and extend itself over more and more of the life. In this way, conservatism about morals leads to conservatism about manners and finally conservatism about opinions of a speculative kind. (CP 1.50)

From the above another important aspect of habit becomes evident – it is always a result of personal thinking and belief. Gradually, following the tendency for habituation, the habit widens itself gripping more and more similar concepts, becoming in the end a major factor of thinking and behavior upon "specific type" of issues. Could then be claimed that the ritual is built on a collective habit? Evidently Peirce considers moral namely as a system of such collective thought schemes and actions. This system he calls "social conscious" or "social spirit", remarking that it is not exactly the same in people and is neither an independent state of the separate individual. „Conscience has been created by experience just as any knowledge is; but it is modified by further experience only with secular slowness" (CP 1.56). Thus Peirce suggests that it is not only the individual who can create and follow their own system of rules, but a group can do it, as the group's evolution depends on the availability of habits and free mental energy to be used for new discoveries.

The habit is a major element of almost every Peircean study, including his pragmatic method formulated as follows:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (W3: 266)

In another essay Peirce reformulates the pragmatic dictum, as quoted above, in accordance to habit:

To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. Now, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act. (W3: 265)

Obviously Peirce not only sets the fixation of the meaning in the centre of the habit but also grounds the conclusion that „the whole meaning is the full set of habits contained in a certain affirmation" (Murphey 1961: 315). If the pragmatic approach is applied to the so-described characteristics and functions of the ritual, it could be easily concluded that the latter appears to be an effect of collective habit.

In anthropology Durkheim scrutinizes the ritual practices as generating collective experience, summarized with the term "socioempiricism". He points out that within the ritual acts the ideas of existence are both expressed and perceived emotionally, while the joint experience gives the feeling for social power and security in regards to the circumambience. Thus the ritual turns to be a mechanism for sustaining the group's continuity by including the individual habits and beliefs in a common cosmology. Actually Durkheim's thesis does not conceptually differ from the one formulated through Peirce's ideas, namely that the ritual is built around the kernel of a collective habit. Still, the understanding that the ritual is a complex multilayered phenomenon,

non-existent if not into generalized form, is to be emphasized. The habit found in the ritual's kernel is a consequence of a collective belief while the ritual itself is consequential to a mental habit, transmitting knowledge of essential importance to the community. In order to relay the knowledge from its kernel, the habit covers similar concepts and creates a layer of fixed principles or otherwise – a norm. Dynamic “outer elements” (ritual items), gravitating in a changeable orbit, are then attracted to that concepts. This is the way in which the collective habit first develops into a norm, and then into a complex phenomenon called “ritual”.

Stability and resistance

At the beginning of the current paper the hypothesis that ritual, although preserved for centuries, still changes in time thanks to the norm which is essentially stable and dynamic at the same time, was assumed. The need for the processes of thinking to be confined by rules, which to ensure understanding, takes shape already within the school of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834). This is how the normative sciences emerged, corresponding to the ideals for truthfulness, beauty and good, named respectively logics, aesthetics, and ethics. The term “norm” itself is derived from the named sciences, and is widely used, bearing the general meaning of “a rule”, not only in scientific discourse but in the everyday speech.

“There is a family likeness between Esthetics, Ethics, and Logic. All three of them are purely theoretical sciences which nevertheless set up norms, or rules which need not, but which ought, to be followed. Now in the case of taste, it is recognized that the excellence of the norm consists exclusively in its accordance with the deliberate and natural judgment of the cultured mind” (CP 2.156).

But why norm should be scrutinised in the context of a particular science or activity? In finding the answer of the so put question, determination of the function of the norm in the cognitive process is needed first. In bracketed note, Peirce gives a brief but important definition: „I never use the word norm in the sense of a precept, but only in that of a pattern which is copied, this being the original metaphor” (CP 1.586). Due to its wide spread most researchers do not clarify the meaning and function of the term in question, but rather using it directly in its meaning of a mental scheme, model or pattern of behavior, transferred between situations similar to each other. Obviously the norm is a phenomenon of generalizing nature able to attract and keeps in its orbit meanings stable in time: “When within a formation a norm is set all components are directed towards that norm” (Mladenov 2011: 37).

According to Peirce the norm has the power of “legitimizing” the new meanings by including them through the process of rationalization in the chain of knowledge. Yet, the conclusions for which a fixed belief is at hand get themselves fixated into mental habits, in order to release mental energy in the everyday life. Since the sustainability of knowledge is possible through the habits of thinking, in order for the norm to function as a generalized mental model which can be applied to considerable fields within the existence, such as those of morals and beauty, it should be able to withstand within its orbit not only one or two but a whole class of rational habits. As an example, if we need to assess whether an unknown object falls under the beauty norm, not only a single settled criterion (such as form) but a whole set of fixed concepts (form, colour, size, position in space) will be applied to it and their correlations considered. The norm is not a collection of random mental habits but suggests definite relations between the habits to be settled, so that they can form a cognitive category which is referred to as “beautiful”, “good” or “right”.

If the norm is agreed to be a phenomenon, containing a set of habits from the same class, then its stability is ensured by the very nature of habits, which can remain constant for long periods of time. What is in this case which makes the norm to be dynamic? In case this phenomenon is considered a chain of separate habits, then its change should be brought to habits drop out of or

added to the chain. Rejection of a habit does not have the power for destructing the norm but changes it at any rate. For example, for ages Africans were out of the scope of the Western norm for beauty due to their dark skin colour. The habit dark skin to be thought of as a physical flaw died out to date, so that people bearing this characteristic fall naturally under the category for beautiful, provided that they meet the rest of the criteria set in the beauty norm.

The norm is able to sustain a common kernel of meaning, consisted of a whole class of mental habits, without the named to affect its inner mobility and mutability. Similar to the Peircean concept of the habit-taking tendency, which a continuum containing all habits already settled, the norm is a tendency withstanding the habits of a specific class. The difference between the single phenomenon (the habit) and the tendency (the norm) is that the latter has the natural ability of resistance. Namely, it is changed upon a habit being added to it or drops out of it, as in most of the cases this process does not affect the other habits within the norm. This is proven by the change in the Western beauty norm out of which the criterion of the light skin drops gradually through time. The presence of the norm within the complex structure of the ritual ensures two of its most important characteristics – its ability to transmits for centuries the knowledge important for the group by remaining at the same time dynamic and open to change.

Gravitation

Being a dynamic set of habits the norm is an important part of the ritual and can shed some light on problematic aspects from the anthropological theory. The two most essential characteristics of the norm were mentioned above as being dynamics and resistance. Most of the difficulties and contradictions in defining ritual practices arise namely from the abovementioned characteristics. Provided that the norm is a kernel, keeping a whole class of meanings but allowing at the same time the possibility for change, it can be assumed that the named is present in the ritual for preventing meanings dispersion. The ritual needs a dynamic center of meaning to exist, as otherwise it would collapsed with the beliefs it summons turning into the receiving end of doubt. Just to fulfill its functions on the social and emotional levels, the ritual needs to be stable. On the other hand, though, it is evident that the ritual practices are changing in time and there is not a single one that remained the same as at the time of its formation. In each ritual particular elements that are taken away, and such that are being added could be listed. In his book „The Golden Bough” (1890) Frazer describes an important change in the spring ritual dedicated to Cybele:

We can assume that from the beginning it was regularly used to hang or somehow to mortify the priest on the sacred tree while he was named and played the role of Attis, in the spring celebrations of Cybele, much later the barbarian custom was transformed the way it is known in later times, when the priests just cut himself to blood under the tree and instead of him they hang his dummy on the tree. (Фрейзър 2006: 341)

The change in the ethic norm that leads to change in the ritual practice is easily distinguishable in the above example. And although in the example at hand the norm is fundamentally developed by the added value to the individual's life, instead of the previously valued group's welfare, this does not break the ritual down. The ritual just gets adapted to the new fixed belief that the life of the individual is valuable, which discards this type of offering. Thus the beliefs dynamics can lead to considerable changes in the thinking habits, respectively to changes in the essence of the ritual without the latter to collapse. The stability and dynamic of the ritual can be explained exclusively through the presence of a norm around which the meanings assemble.

After clarifying the relation between habit and norm as structural elements of the ritual, which insure its steadiness along with its ability to change, a Triadic structural model of ritual, based on the Peircean pragmatic perspective could be drawn.




Fig. 1 Triadic structural model of ritual

The so presented model represents the structure of the ritual act through three inscribed circles, different in their level of dynamics, and therefore in the power with which they keep the meanings. The first, most inner circle contains the main rigid belief with its subsequent habit for action. The ritual for rain evocation, existing in different forms in numerous different places in the world, can be taken as an example. In the core of the named ritual a stable belief is always to be found – the one that through his actions a man can have influence upon the natural power, evoking it in a specific place and time. This belief is so strong and so greatly important for the lives of certain groups of people that by time it has grown into habit for thinking, so that each and every time the community faces a long drought period they resort to that habit as an opportunity for resolving the issue.

The second circle within the ritual's structure contains a norm, formed through the repetition of the habit and the gradual adding of more habits from the same class. The norm in the second circle of the ritual's structure could be referred to as the centre of the ritual since it functions as a social law or taboo which regulates the life within the community, decreasing the probability for deviation. It is a centre of meaning of the ritual act with its own "gravity" which keeps the meanings and decreases the probability for them to change or drop out. Fraser describes the following rain ritual:

"When in the villages around Derpta [...] had great need of rain, three men climbed in the pines of the ancient sacred forest. One smashed the hammer on the boiler or a little barrel to mimic the thunder; the other banged into each other two firebrands and that produced sparks and thus resembled the lightnings, and the third, whom they called the "rain man", sprayed around with water using a bundle of twigs" (Фрейзър 2006: 63).

In order the specific elements of the ritual kept by the second circle of the model (the norm) to be determinate, two more examples provided by Fraser will be given. He describes the rain ritual in New Guinea where the sorcerer evokes the natural phenomenon by steeping a twig from a particular tree into water, dispersing it then on the ground. In New Britain a man from the tribe is chosen to be the "rainbearer" who buries a bundle of wet leaves, recreating then with his mouth the sound of the rain swash (*ibid*). These three examples prove considerable similarity between the elements of the ritual as conducted in different places across the globe, which points to the presence of a norm in the ritual, premising the similarities. Thus it becomes evident that gradually additional beliefs and their adjoining habits have been added to the main belief regarding rain, namely, that man can evoke it. The norm in the rain rituals contains the habit for the natural phenomenon to be recreated through people's actions. Yet, in line with the same norm not everyone is eligible for conducting the ritual. Another habit, which became part of the latter norm, is the use of plants, mandatorily made wet or used for dispersing the water symbolizing rain. These essential ritual elements are kept unchanged in time by the norm, being as well unsusceptible to the differences in terms of various locations.

Going back to the stability of the habits in the norm's kernel, mutable and easily changeable elements are found in the third, most external circle of the ritual. Such are mainly the ritual objects or certain technical requirements. The elements of the outer circle are far more dynamic and as a result replacement of one ritual object with another is often observed in a ritual, without such an exchange to influence the meaning of the rite conducted. As mentioned above, the tool used for water dispensing during the rain ritual could be a twig, branch or even the mouth of the rainbearer himself. Thus, even though each group has chosen a particular ritual object, the named could be replaced with another, without the ritual's impact to be affected. Therefore the greatest dynamic is found in the third, most external circle of the ritual.

What is, though, causing the differences in the ability for change innate in the three structural layers of the phenomenon? The habit of thinking, occupying the most inner circle, is essentially summarized, containing a fundamental belief for the reality, e.g. the belief that man could evoke the natural phenomena or that the High God could be placated. This habit is stable and its change would be related to going again through the whole cognitive process, as described in the pragmatic essays of Peirce, involving an initial doubt about a certain proposition, followed by the conduction of a research for abolishing the teasing doubt, and the final settlement of a new belief. Yet, the so-described process requires considerable amount of mental energy to be spent. This is namely the reason for such habits to be so stable and needed to the mind, for their change being consequential to a cataclysm or a serious collapse, which to raise a strong doubt. The second circle – the one of the norm – is stable since it contains a complete class of thinking habits. It keeps the knowledge in the form of laws or taboos, needed for the existence and functioning of the community. Nevertheless the norm is not fixed in a definitive way, bearing inner dynamics and the ability to change. Having the nature of a tendency, the norm allows some of the established habits to fall out and new ones to be added without these processes to destroy it. And the elements from the most external circle of the ritual are dynamic and mutable since their change does not lead to the community's beliefs alteration. Thus, they can even be a result of a fashion, a trend since their purpose is to bring comfort to the participants, making the ritual act more relevant to their lives. Thereby the outer dynamic of the ritual ensures its inner stability. The propinquity of the external elements, such as leaves, branches, utensils, which become sacred during numerous rituals, does not break the rite's holiness but quite the contrary – reconfirms the values, set by the norm, decreasing this way the probability for a doubt to arise. That's why it is a natural process for the rituals to change their external form, in order to preserve the stability of the normative meanings in the center. Fraser provides numerous examples of such

external changes in the rituals, which aims at the preservation of the beliefs and norms set. This is the case of the pagan cult to the sun which in time gradually becomes part of Christianity. This is namely the case of the ritual for celebrating the winter solstice being transformed into the currently well-known Christmas celebration, happening on December 25th.

According to the Julian calendar, 25 December is considered the day of the winter solstice and the birth of the Sun, because after this turning point in the year the day gets longer and the Sun is getting stronger. The ritual of the Sun birth as it celebrated in Syria and Egypt, is remarkable. Revelers retreated in some domestic chambers and at midnight went out shouting: "The virgin gave birth. Light becomes stronger!" The Egyptians even pictured the newborn Sun in the image of a baby [...] without a doubt the Virgin, conceived and gave birth to a son on December 25, is the great Oriental goddess [...] the Gospel says nothing about the day of Christ's birth and in this situation, the Church does not celebrate it at first. With time, however, the Christians in Egypt started to celebrate January 6 as the day of the birth [...] at the end of the third and beginning of the fourth century the Western church which never had recognised 6 January as the day of Christ birth, took December 25th for the true date of birth [...] Apparently the Christian Church chose to celebrate the birth of its founder on 25 December to transfer the devotion of the pagans to the Sun to those who was named Sun of the virtue (Фрейзър 2006: 345–346).

If we today's ritual for celebrating Christmas is compared to its pagan prototype, as described by Fraser, it becomes evident that the differences are far more than the similarities. Namely, celebrators' solitary retreatment and the rapturous announcement of Christmas have fallen out, being replaced by today's ritual, which is full of elements in the outer circle, added through the centuries as a result of the interaction with other rites or in order to make the ritual more relevant and acceptable for the present society. Such new elements, related also to the development of the consumerism culture, are the sumptuous, florid decorations of the private homes and public spaces before the date of celebration, the Christmas tree, the inclusion of certain mandatory types of foods, and even the usage of certain colours. All these contemporary elements are missing from the prototype of the ritual, being part of the outer circle (the one of the rite's objects) and as such – being added in time with the purpose (among others) to support the fixed habits of thinking and the norm, which are settled in the two inner circles of the ritual act.

The ritual is a complex phenomenon of a complicated sign-full nature and that is why the studies related to it are more often rather bringing questions to the table, instead of providing answers about its essence and functions. The present paper is unable to cover all the aspects of the topic, yet proving the validity upon application of the triad habit-norm-ritual, thus turning the latter into a crossing point between the Peircean triadic branch in semiotics and the anthropological theory. *A triadic structural model of the ritual* was derived through the analysis of the phenomena in question. This model gives an explanation of the ritual's structure without the named phenomenon to be restrained by factors such as time, location and complexity of the act of rite itself. By considering not just the phenomenon of ritual but its effects and manifestations, the present paper sheds some light on some major anthropological questions – those referring to the structure of the ritual, the simultaneous dynamics and the fixity of the phenomenon.

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NOW HE TALKS, NOW HE ACTS. VOICE, ACTION AND SUBJECTIVITY IN TWO CASES OF ASYLUM CLAIMING IN ITALY

Tommaso Sbriccoli
SOAS University of London, UK
tommasosbriccoli@gmail.com

Stefano Jacoviello
University of Siena, Italy
stefano.jacoviello@gmail.com

Abstract

This contribution draws on the interdisciplinary work carried out by an anthropologist (Tommaso Sbriccoli) and a semiotician (Stefano Jacoviello) on a contemporary category of subalterns in our societies: the migrants. Our presentation will follow a group of them, asylum seekers, through the procedure of claiming their status as refugees in Italy. In what follows, we will focus on *voice* both as a discursive category and as a textual clue and we will try to show how voice can be used as an analytical indicator of the efficacy of someone's action. Searching for voice within the texture of discourse, we will thus construct a model to describe the actions, both enacted and suffered, by asylum seekers. As a result, we will be able to reflect on the relation between agency and subalternity and to the one, which runs in parallel, between subject, subjectivity and identity.

In this way, we hope that our work at the crossing of anthropology and semiotics will provide a set of analytical tools and a particular perspective to contribute to the debate on the relationship and possible collaborations between the two disciplines and on the meaning of action.

1. Introduction

Few years ago, in 2009, we found ourselves almost accidentally talking in a pub about some interesting field materials Tommaso Sbriccoli had collected on asylum seekers from Bangladesh and Pakistan who were hosted in an emergency welcome centre in the south of Tuscany. This material comprised life stories, a detailed ethnography of the life in the camp, personal interviews

to some of the asylum seekers, and various documents related to the procedure for claiming asylum, like transcripts of the asylum seekers' interviews with the Territorial Commission, the institution responsible for granting asylum in the first stage of the procedure; a lawyer's dossier for one of the Bangladeshi asylum seekers; the final decision by the Court of Appeal of Florence on his case. While discussing about this case, we realized that the different analytical tools and perspectives through which our two disciplines would have studied these materials could have been fruitfully paired in order to build the object of enquiry more consistently and reach a better understanding of it. We thus engaged in a collaboration that is still going on and from which two papers have come out so far (Sbriccoli & Jacoviello 2009, 2012). We think it is important to state here that in our approach the category of discourse can be considered as terrain of encounter for the two disciplinary analytical perspectives. This is so because, in Foucauldian terms (Foucault 1972b), discourse is the framework within which identities are established. Consequently, the process of identity constitution can be described by analysing the traces it leaves on the discursive level of texts (Greimas 1982; Greimas & Courtés 1979).

In what follows, we will focus on one specific issue which has been central in our analysis, that is, voice. In this way, we hope to show how the dialogue and active interdisciplinarity between semiotics and anthropology can bear interesting and valuable fruits, which would be otherwise unlikely obtained if each discipline worked independently on the same object.

2. Voice and subjectivities

Before we present our cases we deem necessary to make a distinction between two ways in which voice can be analytically understood and utilised.

The first refers to *voice as speech*, as an utterance which is ascribable to an empirical subject, or an individual. In this case, voice as speech works as a symptom and can be considered as a tangible document of an individual's presence.

Differently, voice can be understood as a *discursive effect* that manifests subjectivity, in itself a discursive construction. Thus, voice is an emergence on the surface of discourse and refers to the subjectivities built within it. In this second meaning, the relation between voice and the individual is neither direct nor natural. On the contrary, it can be analytically reconstructed within discourse. Voice is conceived here both as trace and result of specific efficacious strategies.

These two meanings of voice can sometimes coincide, as in the case in which the individual manages to constitute and express her own subjectivity and act successfully within discourse through her own voice. Consequently, according to this double meaning, we see voice as pertaining both to the individual and to subjectivity (Benveniste 1966).

Though, voice is not always the expression of an individual, and subjectivities are always the discursive products of a series of combined sanctions depending on different epistemic instances. Furthermore, these epistemic instances reflect the positions of subjects and institutions competing for power in an often unbalanced way. By detecting voice and describing the operations it goes through within the legal procedures of two asylum claiming cases, we will try to show how subjectivity is produced and constituted within discourse, and the way it is related to individuality. Or, sometimes, the way this relation is denied.

3. On the border

The two cases we will discuss are those of S and C, two Hindu Bangladeshi men who arrived in Italy in 2008 and applied to be recognised as refugees on the basis of political and religious discrimination in their home country. We have presented and analysed their cases in two articles, respectively Sbriccoli & Jacoviello 2009 and Sbriccoli & Jacoviello 2012. We thus refer to these works for those readers who intend to get a complete idea of the cases.

S and C were both hosted at the Emergency Welcome Centre established in Follonica (South of Tuscany) through a financial agreement between Italian Government and a private-owned touristic camp¹. In both applications, Tommaso Sbriccoli, because of his competence as an anthropologist of South Asia and of his knowledge of Hindi, helped the two men in preparing their interviews to the Territorial Commissions (TCs). TCs are chaired by an officer of prefecture and composed of a police officer, a representative of territorial institutions and a representative of UNHCR. Interviews of applicants should be carried out by all the members of the commission together, although often, in order to speed up the procedure, only one is present. Idiosyncrasies of individual officials are thus amplified. The risk of this happening increases if we consider that applicants almost never have the chance to hire a legal representative to support them in this context².

In his work as consultant to the asylum seekers, the anthropologist has collected their life stories. Engaged in a complex negotiation of their meaning, he has eventually translated their speech into a voice to be spoken before an audience, the Commission, provided with cultural categories different from the applicants' ones. This process of translation inevitably implies also the reconstruction of the applicants' subjectivities within the new discursive categories so as to faithfully portray their individuality. These portraits can be seen as the applicants' introduction to the new country.

But, while their stories were quite similar³, C easily obtained the status of refugee, while S's claim was rejected and he had to appeal to a Civil Court. Why such a different outcome for two very similar applications? An analysis of the two interview transcripts will allow to understand this differential outcome and to develop our argument.

3.1. A subject's voice

In the average, the transcripts of the Rome Territorial Commissions interviews we have had the chance to analyse are presented as a faithful translation of the applicants' words. The presence of an interpreter, certified at the end of the document by a signature, guarantees the accuracy and veracity of its content. The texts show applicants' translated words, in a regular font, interrupted here and there by questions written in italics. At first sight, the transcripts of C's and S's interviews might appear similar. Though, the successful one is much shorter, and the questions interspersed in between applicant's narrative much less numerous. Here it will suffice to analyse the first few lines on C's interview transcripts to make our point.

At the beginning of the interview the applicant points out that he finds it difficult to carry out the interview with a Muslim interpreter. He is told that the interpreter is a professional and that religion does not affect the way he performs his job. The applicant accepts to do the interview⁴.

By asking the Commission for a different translator, C acknowledges and attributes to the one present a quality, his Muslim-ness, identified as different from that shared by both him and the interviewer. In this way, C neutralises his own specificity⁵ as Hindu and implicitly defines himself as non-Muslim, an attribute shared with the interviewer. He thus draws a new border between the participants in this small social drama. According to Lotman's perspective (2009, 2005), C locates himself at the centre of the semiosphere and determines his position as *a-specific* (see Lotman 1985 and 1994). This is the result of a translation of his own identity that enables him to cross the former border and find a new position in the new system. In many

episodes of his journey to Italy and in the following events of his life that we recorded, C demonstrates his ability in managing a number of correlated systems of pertinence. Those planes of pertinence have a point in common: where their borders intersect. This is the place where C locates himself, as he can translate his diverse systematic determinations from one plane to the other and deal with a multidimensional identity.

Therefore, in this case, C places the translator outside the new system he organises: one in which he occupies the centre and the interviewer is welcomed. In modelling this new system, C affirms an axis defining an inside and outside. He does so by establishing an analogy between the oppositions Hindus–Muslims and Christians–Muslims and by taking advantage of the latter’s axiological values. In this way, he identifies the translator as the enemy. At the same time, C situates the interpreter-cum-enemy within their common place of origin, Bangladesh: that is, the country which has been the setting for his persecution because of his faith. Inside the interview room, the interpreter has thus become the real and present evidence (an exemplum) of the faraway situation C is about to narrate. Though the official re-establishes the guarantee of the Italian legal system – stating as he does that the religion of the interpreter is, in the venue of the hearing, not pertinent – the support for the effectiveness of C’s story nevertheless stands, as does its tangibility as evidence. The venue of the interview thus turns into the scene of a trial where C’s role changes from that of a witness to his own identity to that of a witness to someone else’s guilt. Through this strategy, he has been able to create a new subjectivity and a new position for himself on the discursive plane, reconfiguring all the relations within the trial. C has projected another epistemic stance which the officer can share with him. In this way, the officer is invited to assess, together with C, the guilt of Muslims understood as the Others.

Thanks to this trick, the interviewer can no longer neutralise C’s subjectivity and is forced instead to hear his voice: everything he says could, in fact, be distorted by the interpreter. C compels the Commission to listen to his speech. His story is no longer a set of clues to be verified, but is rather a narrative to be heard in its own terms.

This point clearly emerges if we compare C’s interview with transcripts of other applicants’ hearings, where usually asylum seekers’ voices appear as fragments emerging upon the surface of a text organised according to the norms and discursive style of the Commission’s officials. With C, however, voice occurs as authoritative answers that distinctly evince the subjectivity of the subject producing it.

Voice can be understood here at the same time as a means, an effect and a trace. A means to produce one’s own subjectivity. An emergence on the discursive plane attesting to an effective strategic action. A trace of the presence of an individual.

3.2. Voice as an object

When we move from this transcript to the one of S’s interview, we can detect many differences. S’s testimony, although told in the first person, appears quite impersonal and focuses almost exclusively on issues related to his political and party affiliation. At one point, to the question on “reasons for leaving the country”, S answers:

*for the above mentioned reasons, political problems – I have been attacked many times, even in my place of cult I’ve been threatened and money has been extorted from me [emphasis ours]*⁶.

This answer nullifies the strategy of claiming asylum on the grounds of persecution for re-

religious reasons. After the long discussions we had with S on the importance of focusing on the religious persecution he had suffered, this answer compromised his entire case. Nonetheless, the second part of the answer seems to show the attempt made by S in shifting the discussion towards a part of his narrative which had until then been completely disregarded. The reported answer, indeed, clearly mixes two opposite registers: the legal jargon interwoven with traces of S's direct speech. Throughout the entire interview transcription, the applicant's voice is often concealed by the Commission's, which stands out in bureaucratic formulae difficult to ascribe to an applicant's discursive style. In the analysis of the Commission's interrogation we carried out elsewhere, we have detected a *semiologic attitude* on the side of the interviewer. This attitude works by falsifying a series of individual clues and neutralising applicants' subjectivity. Its aim, in fact, is to demonstrate that the identity of the subject built within discourse does not belong to the narrating individual. Semiologic attitude is opposed to what we have defined as *semiotic attitude*, with which we will deal later in the article.

In this particular instance, the neutralization of the asylum seeker's subjectivity is suddenly interrupted by an instance of *heteroglossia*, which reveals two heterophonic voices (Arnold 1998). This linguistic fracture in the text points to the presence of the speech of a subaltern individual, who tries to establish his subjectivity within discourse. Consequently, heteroglossia, as any other stylistic discontinuity, is a clue, or a window, that allows to open the text toward a double possible movement. On one side, it permits to start a process of reconstruction of this individual's life, of his historical reality, and of his memory. This is, for instance, the way in which Carlo Ginzburg has utilized it in his work on Italian witchcraft (Ginzburg 1966, 1976, 1989)⁷. On the other side, it could trigger a work of analysis of the subject's consciousness and his positioning in relation to the events narrated in the very transcript. In this case, principally, about the way he strives not to confirm the clear-cut division between politics and religion in his own story made by the interviewer. This perspective has been fruitfully developed by the School of Subaltern Studies in history and anthropology (see Guha 1982, 1983a, 1983b and Spivak 1988).

In the case just presented, applicant's voice is assimilated by a ventriloquist interviewer and the fragmented speech highlighted by heteroglossia shows the denied identity between voice and individuality.

After the rejection, S contacted a lawyer to appeal the Commission's decision in the Florence Civil Court. The lawyer's file on S's case is twenty pages long and, enacting a semiotic attitude, builds a complex narrative by rearticulating the facts that emerged in the Commission's interview. The syntactic order, which arranges the evidence by *causality*, gives a new form to S's life story and establishes the applicant's subjectivity as objectified within the discourse. This objectifying process is achieved by the means of a complex system of narrative devices dealing with the constitution of S as a narrative subject. If compared to the Commission's interview, where the attempt was to produce *casuality* and fragment applicant's narrative, the lawyer's file sets all the events on spatial and temporal dimensions, which allows him to express the aspects of S's experiences. His movements configure a *topography* so that distances between visited places in Bangladesh become intelligible and come to form a *topology* (Greimas 1983): spatial articulation is related both to events and to the social relations of S in order to make explicit the reasons for his movements. In the lawyer's narrative, S is constituted as an actor provided with a positive modal competence (being-able-not-to-do and knowing-how-not-to-do [see Greimas 1983]) that at the discursive level can be understood according to the thematic role and figurative traits related with [independence]. The lawyer acts in part as a humanist historian, producing S as an emblematic case, and makes also use of classical models, comparing for instance S's travels to an Odyssey. Thus, the action of *mise en discours* ascribes the *dimension of event*

to the narrated facts, setting the story as the place of convergence on which multiple points of view, experiences and related temporalities meet and cross (Foucault 2001; Jacoviello 2012).

During the last hearing, while S was telling his story to the judge, the lawyer pointed out the trembling hand of the applicant, treating it as a *symptom* of the fear still provoked by remembering the traumatic events which occurred.

With this key move, the discursive subjectivity which has been *objectified* in the lawyer's file is re-attributed to the speaking subject, the one who shivers. Consequently, his speech expresses the subjectivity that has been constructed within discourse and manifested through voice (as effect). Therefore, the use of tremor as a symptom provides the verification of the coincidence between subjectivity and the individual: his voice is finally allowed to be listened to. This circularity, though, makes speech and voice as discursive effect overlap. In the very moment in which the subaltern is heard, thus, what he says cannot but correspond to the subjectivity already set for him⁸.

In the judge's final decision the historical and political background acquires a predominant position. According to the judge's evaluation, the episodes to which S was subject are credible because Bangladesh is notorious for events such as these happening to Hindu citizens. The adequacy of S's story to such a context has made possible the legal generalization that transformed S's story into a prototypical case, which deserves international protection.

The applicant's case and the knowledge of the *objective evidence*⁹ concur therefore in producing a historical framework in which S's story itself is finally projected. The historical context, in which the case of S is inserted, is reconstructed so as to be rendered pertinent to the features of the case itself. Through this circularity, legal decisions not only can be seen as "creators of fact" but also become creators of history. Moreover, within this epistemic process, S's subjectivity assumes a historical dimension at the same time as it is reified in a category. The final verdict, ascribing what pertains to S's individuality to the generality of a category, has overlapped, once and for all, the 'voice of the law' to that of the applicant. The judge's decision is indeed the only written text analysed where S's voice is presented in the form of direct speech quoted between quotation marks, in a process we would define of *appropriation*. By this device, the emerging of the voice produces the effect of a witness testifying the truth of the judge's reconstruction.

4. Discursive effects and semiotic acts

By referring to our previous work on asylum seeking procedure in Italy, we have initially identified a double meaning of voice. On one side, voice as speech, and as such as directly related to an individual. On the other, voice as a discursive effect. Following from this assumption, we have analytically investigated the relation between voice and subjectivity on one side, and the one between subjectivity and the individual on the other side.

Within this kind of legal procedures, voice is almost never expression of an individuality. Voice and speech coincide only when the subject is able to directly intervene in the discursive production of the forms of his subjectivity, as in the case of C. Here, though, his very subalternity is put into question.

In the case of S, instead, subjectivity has been the object of many operations, thus producing different manifestations of voice. The one assimilated in the interrogation by the Commission and appeared as speech through heteroglossia. The one subsumed by the lawyer and then re-attributed to the individual during the court hearing. Finally, the one appropriated by the judge in the decision.

Acting through voice can be understood not simply as a speech act – relating to its psychological effectiveness: it has to be considered as a *semiotic act*. As such, it influences the discursive forms of a society and gives shape to the way one can know the world and structure culture.

Though, producing oneself autonomously within discourse is not the same as producing an autonomous subjectivity for oneself. As we have tried to demonstrate by comparing two apparently similar but structurally very different cases, it is only when a subject manages to autonomously produce at the discursive level a subjectivity endowed with a modal charge, a thematic role and a complex figurative role, that this very subjectivity manifests itself through voice and finds its way to be attributed to the subject's individuality. In this case, rather than being forced to adhere to a subjectivity pre-set within the discursive and socio-legal categories of a society, as in the case of S, a subject acts in an efficacious way, as C did, so as to produce for himself a subjectivity that he can "handle", being the result of translation processes he enacted in the first place. In fact, as our analysis has shown, in legal contexts as the one presented, we are dealing with forms of production of the Other based on translation processes. But, every translation entails also a part of oblivion.

In this paper, in adopting a discursive approach, we have combined our different competences in order to constantly verify the dialogue established between the documents analysed and the ethnography carried out. Throughout the entire analytical process we have therefore tackled the object of enquiry by continuously trying to fuse together the methodological and theoretical backgrounds of our respective disciplines, rather than by juxtaposing them. We hope the results of such work have demonstrated how productive this way of proceeding can be for both the disciplines and for a better understanding of the objects selected for enquiry.

Note: A first version of this paper has been presented in March 2014 by the authors at the Queen Mary University of London at the workshop "How Historians Think". We would like to thank Kim Wagner, convener of the workshop, and Carlo Ginzburg, Miri Rubin and John Arnold for their comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Tatsuma Padoan and Franciscu Sedda, conveners of the panel "The Sense of Action" at the AISS Conference 2014, and the other participants to the panel, for their useful comments on our work.

In order to comply with the requirements of Italian academia, which for the evaluation of co-authored works establish that authors have to make explicit what their specific contribution to an essay/book is, we have here to unnaturally divide what is the fruit of a real work of interdisciplinarity and co-writing. Therefore, abandoning ourselves to this spirit of calculations, and attributing each of us to himself half of the paper, we state that Tommaso Sbriccoli has written the first two sections, while Stefano Jacoviello has written the last two.

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(Endnotes)

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² For studies on the working of the Italian system of asylum claiming see Sbriccoli & Perugini 2012, Vacchiano 2005 and Sorgoni 2011.

³ It is important to stress the fact that both applicants strongly believed that their being Hindus and their being involved in party politics in Bangladesh were a sort of combined reason for their persecution, not two different aspects of their stories.

⁴ Transcript of C's interview to the Rome Territorial Commission. Translation from Italian is ours.

⁵ This strategy, often enacted by C, is what we have defined elsewhere as a "Creole Attitude" (Sbriccoli & Jacoviello 2012).

⁶ Transcript of S's interview to the Rome Territorial Commission. Translation from Italian is ours.

⁷ See also Wagner (2004, 2007) for other historical works in this direction. For anthropological approaches that adopt a similar perspective see Piliavsky 2013.

⁸ The case discussed by McKinley (1997) is a perfect example of the way these textualized subjectivities have to be appropriated by asylum seekers in order to conform not only with normative expectations, but with moral and cultural expectations as well.

⁹ For a presentation and discussion of the contemporary legal categories in European asylum law see Good 2007.



**NATIONAL
AND REGIONAL
SEMIOTIC SCHOOLS**



Chinese-Western Semiotic Dialogue

Chairmen:

Jie Zhang (cnnjsasha@163.com)

Nanjing Normal University, China

Yongxiang Wang (nshdyxwang@163.com)

Nanjing Normal University, China

Haihong Ji (jhhforever@hotmail.com)

Nanjing Normal University, China

Tartu School: old and new

Chairmen:

Kalevi Kull (kalevi.kull@ut.ee)

University of Tartu, Estonia

Peeter Torop (peeter.torop@ut.ee)

University of Tartu, Estonia

Lauri Linask (lauri.linask@ut.ee)

University of Tartu, Estonia

Semiotics of Pop-culture – Focusing on the analysis and effects of the Japan Pop

Chairman:

Hisashi Muroi (hmuroi@ynu.ac.jp)

Yokohama National University, Japan

**CHINESE-WESTERN
SEMIOTIC DIALOGUE**

A SOCIO-PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS OF CHINESE-ENGLISH CODE-SWITCHING IN ADVERTISING DISCOURSE

Xin Bin, Liu Mimi
Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, P.R.C.
13770501252@163.com

Abstract

Code-switching is a phenomenon arising from language contacts. Since the implementation of China's reform and open-door policy, Chinese-English code-switching is a more and more frequent phenomenon in mass media, especially in magazines and newspapers, which has drawn much attention from linguists. Since the 1970's, linguists both at home and abroad have been researching code-switching from the perspectives of sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, conversational analysis and so on. This paper intends to study the Chinese-English code-switching in advertising discourse mainly from the perspectives of sociolinguistics and pragmatics.

The Chinese-English code-switching in Chinese advertising discourse can be structurally categorized into inserted code-switching, alternative code-switching and diglossia code-switching and the inserted code-switching can be further divided into phonological insertion, lexical and phrasal insertion, clause insertion and discourse insertion. There are mainly two general motivations behind the use of Chinese-English code-switching: adaptation to the linguistic reality of Chinese and English and adaptation to the social and psychological state of modern Chinese society.

1. Introduction

Code-switching has been a permanent topic in sociolinguistics and studies of cross-cultural communication. After more than thirty years of economic reform and the open-door policy in China, code-switching has become such a common phenomenon in Chinese communication that we can find it almost in every type of discourse such as daily conversations, pop songs, news reports, advertisements, leaflets and television programs and so on. Among all the foreign languages that have been learned in China, English has been the most important medium through

which the Chinese people have come into contact and communicate with the outside world. As a result, code-switching between Chinese and English has been most frequent and even prevalent in China nowadays, both written and spoken discourses. The present paper aims to study Chinese-English code-switching in advertising discourse from the perspectives of pragmatics and sociolinguistics, focusing mainly on the features of different types of code-switching, the motivations behind and the rhetorical effects of code-switching in this discourse type.

The analysis in this paper is both quantitative and qualitative and the data analyzed are all selected from fairly popular and well-known Chinese magazines, newspapers and TV programs, including *China Newsweek* (中国新闻周刊), *Finance and Economics* (财经), *South People Weekly* (南方人物周刊), *Info Club* (环球时尚资讯), *Cosmo* (时尚), *Ruili Beauty* (瑞丽妆), *Ruili Deco* (瑞丽家), *Motor Trend* (汽车族), *Digital Frontline* (数码前线), *Mina* (米娜), *Yangtse Evening Post* (扬子晚报), *CCTV2* (中央二套). The data were first collected, then classified and finally analyzed to figure out the different types of Chinese-English code-switching, the specific motivations behind it and the different rhetorical effects it possibly produced.

2. Defining code-switching

Code-switching is the result of bilingualism and multilingualism and it has been defined by many linguists from different perspectives based on their own research focus and the data they use. Grosjean (1982:145) defines code-switching as “the alternate use of two or more languages in the same utterance or conversation”; any single word, a phrase, a sentence or several sentences can be code-switched. Gumperz (1982:59) defines code-switching as “the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems”. Myers-Scotton (1993a:3) sees code-switching as “the selection by bilinguals or multilinguals of form from an embedded variety (or varieties) in utterances of a matrix variety during the same conversation”. In the case of Chinese-English code-switching in Chinese advertising, the matrix language is Chinese and the embedded language is English.

It is easy to get confused between Code-switching and several other similar or relevant terms, such as *code-mixing*, *borrowing* and *diglossia*; hence some preliminary distinctions and clarifications are needed.

Code-switching and code-mixing: It has been controversial whether there is any distinction between code-switching and code-mixing. Kachru (1986) insists that there exists some difference between code-switching and code-mixing. He believes that code-switching is mainly inter-sentential in that it usually happens between clauses, while code-mixing is generally intra-sentential in that it often occurs within the same clause. However, it seems there are more scholars who maintain that there is no distinction between the two terms. Myers-Scotton (1993a) believes that code-switching may take place on any linguistic level and it can be either inter-sentential or intra-sentential. Verschueren (1999: 119) points out that “code-switching, a cover term for language or code alternation, is an extremely common occurrence and a flavored strategy, especially in oral discourse. It may serve many different functions.” Evidently, this definition does not suggest any distinction between code-switching and code-mixing. The present paper will adopt the “no distinction” view and use “code-switching” as “a cover term for language or code alternation”.

Code-switching and borrowing: Just as the distinction between code-switching and code-mixing, there has been no consensus so far as to whether there is any distinction between Code-switching and borrowing. Poplack (1984) believes that code-switching and borrowing are quite distinct processes in that they are subject to different constraints and have quite different surface characteristics. According to Poplack (1984), code-switching is the juxtaposition of sentence or sentence fragments, each of which is internally consistent with the morphological and syntactic

rules of the language of its provenance. On the contrary, borrowing is the adaptation of lexical material to the morphological and syntactic patterns of the recipient language. Myers-Scotton (1993a, 1997) maintains that code-switching and borrowing share more similarities than differences and that it seems their difference only lies in their frequency of occurrence with borrowing occurring more frequently than code-switching.

Code-switching and diglossia: The term “diglossia”, first used by Ferguson in 1959, concerns two functional varieties of a single language; one of them (the High variety) is normally used in formal speech, and the other (the Low variety), is often used in informal speech. That is to say, the two varieties have alternative roles to play in the diglossia situation. Thus, code-switching and diglossia on the one hand have something in common in that they are both the employment of two (varieties of) languages in a single speech community or speech situation. On the other hand, code-switching and diglossia are different in that in the diglossia situation only one language or variety is used at a time and the choice of variety is mainly determined by the immediate context of situation in which it is easy for the participants to become aware of the switch from one variety or language to another. There is a one-to-one relationship between language and function in diglossia. However, in the case of code-switching, elements from two different languages occur in a single sentence or stretch of speech and the participants are not often conscious of the switch between different codes.

3. Types of code-switching

There have been many attempts at classifying code-switching and here we will only mention a few of them. Gumperz (1982) identifies two types of code-switching: situational code-switching and metaphorical code-switching. Situational code-switching refers to the switching from one code to another caused by the change of extra-linguistic situational factors, so it is the result of the change in social situation, which involves the change of participants, the change of the communicative situation and the change in the formality degree of the conversation. Thus this kind of code-switching is closely related to the social situation. Metaphorical code-switching occurs when a change of topic requires a change in the language and so it is closely related to particular topics or subjects rather than to changes in situational factors. Auer (1998) also classifies code-switching into two types from the perspective of conversational analysis: discourse-related code-switching and participant-related code-switching. The former is speaker-oriented and it works as a resource for accomplishing different communicative acts, while the latter is hearer-oriented and it takes the hearer's linguistic preference or competence into consideration. But Auer also points out that there is no clear boundary between the two types and they often overlap.

Muysken (1995) classifies code-switching into three types based on its structure and function: alternation, insertion, and congruent lexicalization. Alternation refers to a switch from one code to another which may involve entire sentences, clauses or some peripheral elements. Insertion is a case in which a linguistic element from one language is inserted into the linguistic structure of another language and the inserted element may be either a phrasal constituent or a single word. Congruent lexicalization refers to the situation in which two languages share a grammatical structure that can be filled with lexical elements from either language.

Poplack (1993a) classifies code-switching into three types: inter-sentential, intra-sentential and tag switching. Inter-sentential switching refers to a switch at a clause or sentence boundary, where each clause or sentence is in one language or another, which coincides with sentence boundaries. Intra-sentential switching involves switching between languages within a sentence. Tag switching involves the insertion of a tag phrase from one language to another language and a tag phrase can be interjections, fillers and quotations, which may also be moved freely within a sentence without violating any grammatical rule.

Myers-Scotton also holds that “CS may be either inter-sentential or intra-sentential ... inter-sentential CS involves switches from one language to the other between sentences: a whole sentence (or more than one sentence) is produced entirely in one language before there is a switch to the other language(s) in use in the conversation...intra-sentential switches occur within the same sentence or sentence fragment.” (1993a:3) In the analysis of code-switching, Myers-Scotton (1993a, 1993b) puts forward the matrix language frame (MLF) model in which the main language in code-switching is referred to as “the matrix language (ML)” and the other language involved in code-switching as “the embedded language (EL)”. The EL elements can be of any size, from a single morpheme or lexeme to several constituents including the sentences. According to Myers-Scotton (1993a, 1993b), there are three types of constituent patterns or structures in code-switching: ML+EL constituents, ML islands and EL islands. The ML+EL constituents consist of content morphemes from both ML and EL, but have a grammatical structure of the ML. ML islands are cases in which all the morphemes involved in code switching come from ML. The ML islands conform to the ML grammar and show internal structural dependency relations. In contrast, EL islands consist of only EL morphemes obeying the grammatical rules of EL and, as ML islands, they also show clear relations of internal structural dependency.

4. Types of Chinese-English code-switching in advertising discourse

Our analysis of Chinese-English code-switching in the Chinese advertising discourse is mainly based on Muysken’s classification and Myers-Scotton’s MLF model. We may identify three major types of Chinese-English code-switching in the data analyzed in this paper: insertion, alternative code-switching and diglossia.

4.1. Insertion

According to Muysken (1995), insertion is a case in which a linguistic element from one language is inserted into the linguistic structure of another language and the inserted element may be either a phrasal constituent or a single word. In inserted code-switching, there are three types of constituents: ML islands, EL islands and ML+EL. In the situation of Chinese-English code-switching, Chinese is the matrix language and English the embedded one. From a linguistic perspective, insertion can be divided into phonological insertion, lexical and phrasal insertion, clausal insertion and discourse insertion.

4.1.1. Phonological insertion

Phonological insertion is the case in which English letters or sounds are inserted into a Chinese phrase or clause:

(1) 轻松生活从此开始!

北京银行网上理财——帮您将财富e网打尽。安全、高效、便捷的网上理财服务为您实现理财神话。

(财经, 2009年刊, 133页)

In this example, the matrix language of this ad is Chinese and the single English letter “e” is the embedded language, and hence the phrase “e网打尽” is a ML+EL constituent. As the English letter “e” is homophonous with the Chinese morpheme “一” in the idiom “一网打尽” (capture all in one net), the clause “帮您将财富e网打尽” means “internet financial management will help you to capture all the wealth in one net” and the intended meaning of the whole ad may be easily understood as “the Bank of Beijing will help you manage your finance successfully and perfectly”. The following is a similar example except that the EL element is a morpheme or word rather than a letter:

(2) 聚焦时尚新装 明媚春季风尚

第16届“广州（锦汉）服装、家纺及面料展览会”——品牌发布SHOW场
（环球时尚资讯，2010/08/15，第48期，33页）

The ad is about an expo which would be held in Guangzhou. Here, the inserted English word “show” is homophonous with the Chinese character “秀”, so “show 场” means “秀场” in Chinese, which refers to a place to exhibit the products. As the Chinese character often collocates with “作” in “作秀” (show off), the ML+EL constituent “show 场” makes this advertisement a bit ironical and funny.

4.1.2. Lexical and phrasal insertion

Lexical and phrasal insertion means that the inserted EL element is a word and phrase. For example:

(3) 信赖 经得起时间考验

我信 我选acer电脑

（中国新闻周刊，2010/09/06，41页）

This is an ad of acer computer in which the matrix language is Chinese and the EL element is “acer” which is the brand name of the computer. The following is another example:

(4) go. 到全世界，收集每一个国家

go. 是一个动词，简单，却蕴含着无比强大的能量。

（南方人物周刊，2009/03/23，第12期，41页）

It is an ad for VISA. The English word “go” is embedded here to enhance the dynamics of the Chinese text and the power of the product and/or service promoted by the ad: visa is everywhere in the world, and people can use visa wherever they are.

In the above two examples the inserted EL elements are both English words. Nowadays in China, it is a common practice, especially in the advertising enterprise, to insert English names or set phrases in Chinese discourse. For example:

(5) Grand Cherokee 在国内俗称大切诺基或大切，算起来他应该是起源于1083年 American Motors 设计的Jeep Cherokee XJ（曾被国内玩家们亲切地称为小切）。1987年American Motors 被克莱斯勒收购以后，经过5年的努力，终于在1992年推出了第一代Grand Cherokee，并于一年后投产。据Motor Trend 统计，持续5年的生产使第一代Grand Cherokee 取得了将近170万的销量。

（汽车族，第56期，29页）

This a promotional discourse for the car named “Grand Cherokee” in which, “Grand Cherokee”, “American Motors”, “Jeep Cherokee XJ” and “Motor Trend”, as English phrases, are inserted intact into the Chinese discourse. Sometimes, an ad may employ lexical and phrasal insertions at the same time. For example:

(6) 日本的KAWA II 从这里发源！

“Kanebo Tokyo”柜台于4月16日盛大开幕，这里将成为史无前例的展现KAWA II 特色的柜台。柜台由Kanebo 旗下的 COFFRETD’OR、SUI SAI、DEW SUPERIOR 三个品牌组成。开放式的柜台，顾客还可以在柜台够自由体验商品，受过专业培训的美容顾问提供适合每一位顾客、并为之解决肌肤烦恼的护肤及彩妆技巧上的建议，传达来自Kanebo佳丽宝的最先端护肤技术和日本的最新彩妆趋势情报。

（瑞丽妆，2010/06/10，第49期，94页）

In all such cases, the names or set phrases are usually very well-known to the target audience and, to save the trouble of translation, the advertiser is only too ready to insert the EL elements into the Chinese grammatical structure giving rise to, many instances of ML+EL constituent.

4.1.3. Clausal insertion

Clausal insertion is a kind of code-switching in which one clause or sentence from the other language (EL) is inserted into the matrix language. In the case of Chinese-English code-switch-

ing, this means the insertion of an English clause or sentence into a Chinese discourse. This kind of code-switching is very similar to what Myers-Scotton refers to as the inter-sentential code-switching in her MLF model. See the following example:

(7) How to wear leather now

黑色精灵

09秋季, 皮革以经典的方式回归, 以一副复杂巧妙的姿态出现在我们面前, 在这里, 皮革几乎可以成为百搭面料。

(环球时尚资讯, 2009/10/22, 第28期, 17页)

This ad tells the popularity of leather and how to wear leather beautifully. According to Myers-Scotton's MLF model, the sentence "How to wear leather now" is an EL island which consists of EL morphemes or words only and which obeys the rules of the EL grammar. Here is another example:

(8) 无油新生魅力蜕变

R U ready?

(米娜, 2010/11, 15页)

It is an advertisement for the cosmetic "Clean clear". The EL island "R U ready?" is the short for "Are you ready?"; and the whole ad means the cleansing foam of "Clean clear" will make your face not that oily and hence more charming. And so are you ready to have a try?

4.1.4. Discourse insertion

By discourse insertion we refer, in this paper, to the situation in which an English discourse, as an entire EL unit, is inserted into a Chinese (ML) discourse. For example:

(9) 格纹男装——格纹早已不再是90年代摇滚手的专利了, 在时尚的演变中, 格纹逐渐拥有了一种独有的亲和力, 成为男装上的热门元素。

Plaid reaches its nirvana

Plaid is no longer just for 90s grunge icons like Cobain-it has now reached a level of sophistication in men's fashion.

(环球时尚资讯, 2009/06/16, 第4期, 16-17页)

The ad in (9) introduces the fashion trend of men's dressing in which the Chinese and English discourses form the ML islands and the EL islands obeying their own grammatical rules respectively. Though the whole ad is almost half Chinese half English, considering the context in which it occurs, Chinese is still the matrix language and English the embedded language.

Though we have been giving a separate illustration and discussion to each type of insertion, advertisers often mix different types in a single ad. Consider the following example:

(10) 点亮你小小的梦想

Emo+ Brings You Selected Design

Emo+ 生活概念馆? 这是一家并不大的小店, 坐落在SOHO现代城。

这里闹中取静, 聚集了店主人精心挑选的来自世界各地的设计名品: 从意大利的Alessi 到美国的Suck UK; 从英国的Josephjoseph到以色列的M&B; 从芬兰的Tonfisk到香港的Twemco、Monoone等等。

想要什么, 单看你想为你的生活点亮怎样的梦想。

(瑞丽家, 2010/05/30, 第44期, 85-86页)

In (10), the Chinese-English code-switching shows insertion on nearly all linguistic levels, including phonological ("M&B"), lexical ("SOHO", "Alessi", "Josephjoseph", "Tonfisk", "Twemco" and "Monoone"), phrasal ("Suck UK"), and clausal ("Emo+ Brings You Selected Design").

4.2. Alternative code-switching

Muysken (1995) defines alternation as a switch from one code to another which may involve entire sentences, clauses or some peripheral elements. In this paper, alternative code-switching

refers to the case in which more or less complete utterances from two or more languages appear alternately in the same advertising discourse. For example:

- (11) Girl: 我的宝贝——旺仔QQ糖!
 Boy: Come on, baby! Come on, baby!
 Girl: 你也要吃一粒吗?
 Boy: Yes!
 Girl & Boy: 旺仔QQ糖——旺旺!
 (CCTV2, 2009/11/15, 22: 56)

The ad in (11) is in the form of a conversation between a girl and a boy. The code-switching happens between Chinese (ML) and English (EL) and the two languages are employed alternately to produce the rhetorical effect of enhancing the popularity of the candy promoted in the ad. Sometimes, the alternation is merely between Chinese utterances or texts and their English translations:

- (12) 第九届中国（深圳）国际批拍服装服饰交易会
 The 9th China (Shenzhen) International Brand Clothing & Accessories Fair
 2009深圳国际孕·婴·童产业博览会
 2009 Shenzhen International Maternity & Clothing Expo
 2009深圳国际纺织面料及辅料博览会
 2009 Shenzhen International Trade Fair For Apparel Fabrics And Accessories
 2009年7月9日-11日/July 9-11,2009
 深圳会展中心
 Shenzhen Convention & Exhibition Center
 (环球时尚资讯, 2009/04/17, 第32期, 34-35页)

This type of code-switching may also be called “diglossia code-switching”, by which we mean, in this paper, stretches of Chinese, each with its English translation, occur alternatively in the same advertising discourse. The following is another example:

- (13) 2010第十届上海纺织品面料、辅料博览会
 The 10th Expo for Textile Fabric & Accessories Shanghai 2010
 2010年12月16-18日
 December 16, 2010 -18 Day
 上海世贸商城
 Shanghai Mart
 上海励新展览有限公司
 咨询: 021-57633170
 (环球时尚资讯, 2010/10/20, 第50期, 50-51页)

5. Motivations behind Chinese-English code-switching in ads

Verschueren (1999: 58) points out that it seems that at least three, hierarchically related key notions are needed to understand the process of ‘making choices’ as the base-line description of language use. The first notion is variability which is the property of language that defines the range of possibilities from which choices can be made. The second notion is negotiability which is the property of language responsible for the fact that choices are not made mechanically or according to strict rules or fixed form-function relationships, but rather on the basis of highly flexible principles and strategies. The third notion is adaptability which is the property of language which enables human beings to make negotiable linguistic choices from a variable range of possibilities in such a way as to approach points of satisfaction for communicative needs. This last notion is especially useful for us to account for code-switching in advertisements. Thus we may see the motivations behind the various types of code-switching discussed

in this paper as adaptation to three factors: the linguistic reality, the social and psychological state of contemporary Chinese society.

5.1. Adaptation to the linguistic facts of Chinese and English

Adaptation to the linguistic facts here refers to the adaptation to the linguistic properties of Chinese and English either for accuracy or for convenience of expression. Chinese and English are very different languages, with the former being a Sino-Tibetan language and the latter an Indo-European language. Due to their own specific geographical positions, natural environment, social and cultural practices, each of the two languages has its own unique linguistic facts and it is often very hard to find exact or accurate equivalents in translation, and this gives rise to many instances of code-switching in advertisements. For example:

(14) 宝岛眼镜2010秋冬
结合四大专业权威及时尚
彩片品牌,
为你的精彩PARTY,
画龙点睛!
(米娜, 2010/11, 203页)

In (14), the advertiser inserts an English word “party” which in English refers to a social event often held at home where friends or neighbors get together to enjoy themselves by dancing, drinking, singing, talking and tasting delicious food and so on. Party is a very normal social activity in the western culture and its main purpose is for entertainment or fun. The nearest equivalent of “party” in Chinese is “聚会”. In China, the word “聚会” is traditionally a much more formal occasion where people get together for a specific purpose. There are some other Chinese expressions such as “聚一下”, “聚一聚” or “小聚” which are all verbal phrases. When we hear someone say “咱们几个今天晚上聚聚吧”, we would normally think that we are going to have a meal together tonight. Nowadays, with the increasingly frequent contact between the Chinese and western people, the Chinese phrase “聚会” has acquired a western flavor and many Chinese young people like to have a party where they can dance, eat, drink, talk, play games and so on. Nevertheless, in this ad, the advertiser still prefers the English word “party”, probably so as to sound exotic to the young people. The following is a similar example:

(15) Summer Bathroom Cool plan
卫浴间锁定海洋格调
最热的盛夏, 没有哪种颜色比海洋感的蓝调, 更适合卫浴间……
(瑞丽家, 2010/08/30, 第47期, 103-104页)

It is very hard to find a Chinese equivalent for the English word “cool”. Though many people use the Chinese character “酷” to represent the meaning of “cool”, the two has nothing in common except their pronunciations. In Chinese dictionaries, “酷” means (1) cruel, brutal, oppressive, and (2) very, extremely; neither of the meanings has anything to do with what “cool” means in English. Therefore, the best choice for the advertiser is to switch to the English “cool”. We may account for the use of “vs” in (16) in the same way:

(16) 泡沫洁面VS 无泡洁面
哪种更好用?
(瑞丽妆, 2010/07/30, 第50期, 13-14页)

The English word “vs” (the short form of “versus”) has the meaning of “PK” or “competing against” and it is still very difficult to find a Chinese equivalent to substitute “vs” here in this ad.

When composing the advertising discourse, the advertisers have to take space and cost into consideration. To achieve the best effect with low cost, the advertiser usually prefers the ad to be as concise and succinct as possible. Chinese-English code-switching can often help the advertis-

ers to achieve this goal. Consider examples such as the following:

(17) 消费者心中的理想价位?

399元MP4导购

目前MP4市场销售火爆，厂家众多，优秀产品也不在少数。

很多消费者也把MP4列入了自己的购买计划中，但不少消费者犹豫在产品价格的定位上，100-200元的怕质量、做工和操作感不好，500以上的又觉得贵而没有必要，这款纽曼A36HD是个不错选择。

(数码前线，2010年09月上，第93期，15-16页)

A lot more words and space would have been needed if the advertiser of (17) had used the Chinese translations of “MP4” and “HD”: “便携式媒体播放器” and “高清晰度”. As “MP4” and “HD” are so familiar (actually more familiar than their Chinese counterparts) to Chinese people, the use of these two terms saves time and money not only for the advertiser but also for the potential consumers.

5.2. Adaptation to the social and psychological state of contemporary Chinese society

As we all know, language is the product of society and all language use takes place in specific socio-cultural context. As a result, any particular language and its use are bound to be determined by and reflect the geographical, political, economical, and cultural facts of the language community. The Chinese-English code-switching discussed in this paper is no exception and, on the one hand, it has to conform to the rules and conventions of ad as a discourse type and, on the other hand, it reflects the popularity, prestige and prevalence of the English language in the present Chinese society as a result of the more than 30 years economic reform and practice of open-door policy. Consider the following example:

(18) Canon

Delighting You Always 感动常在佳能

EOS, 创造单反相机的传奇。

(南方人物周刊，2009/06，第24期，总第165期，4页)

It is the ad for the digital camera “Canon”. Chinese consumers are quite familiar with both its English name and its Chinese name “佳能”. The English word “Canon” has several meanings, such as “standard, rule, norm, principle, tenet; list, catalog”, and none of them is very interesting to the consumers. However, its Chinese translation “佳能” sounds very pleasant and attractive. The ad in its Chinese context should have every reason to have chosen “佳能” instead of “Canon”. It seems the most possible explanation is that the advertiser is trying to attract people who like anything exotic and fashionable.

With the development of economic reform and globalization, more and more foreign products are entering the Chinese market. In the increasingly fierce competition, producers are eager to promote the sale their products by all means. As English is nowadays a symbol of gentility, elegance, wealth, being well-bred and well educated in modern Chinese society, an English name almost always sounds modern, fashionable and more attractive. And that explains why advertisers often prefer to keep the original English brand names of foreign products in their ads. Consider the following example:

(19) Dior

<http://www.dior.com/>

北京百盛购物中心一层

上海梅隆镇广场

(瑞丽妆，2010/03/10，第46期，106页)

“Dior” is a very well-known cosmetic product and it is so popular in China that if the advertiser had used its Chinese translation he or she would not have been able to convey all the social

meanings and values associated with the brand name in China. There are many similar examples in the data we analysed:

(20) 冲上的是素颜感裸装，眼线也绝对不会特别地突出，只是试用眼线笔描绘内眼线就OK了！

（米娜，2010/11，145页）

(21) 低碳Lifestyle

在生活中推崇简单却不失精致的低碳生活方式。

摒弃多余的纷繁冗杂，用lohas 的态度来装扮和点缀生活，平凡的日子也变得生动起来。

（瑞丽妆，2010/05/10，第48期，17-18页）

The motivation behind the use of the English word “OK” instead the Chinese equivalent “好的” or “可以” in (20) is very similar to the use of “Dior” in (19), that is, to add some foreign flavor to this advertising discourse. In (21) is an ad to advocate and promote the lifestyle of low carbon. There are two instances of Chinese-English code-switching to “lifestyle” and “lohas” with the latter specifying the former. The word “lohas” is a newly coined word in English which refers to a healthy and sustainable lifestyle. The Chinese translation of “lohas” is “乐活族”，which is also a new word in Chinese and which is often used to refer to a group of people practicing a healthy low carbon lifestyle and advocating a positive attitude towards life. The insertion of the two English words in the Chinese ad evidently has the effect of enhancing the modernity and universality of the lifestyle.

6. Conclusion

Chinese-English code-switching is a common phenomenon in contemporary Chinese advertising discourse, but it has received only sporadic studies. Though in the present paper we have conducted an analysis of the different types of code-switching and the general motivations behind them in the context of modern China, it is still a very humble investigation which can only provide a partial picture of the employment of code-switching in modern Chinese promoting discourse. It is especially so because of the relatively small amount of data analyzed which can only offer the analysts a very limited vision of the facts of code-switching in Chinese advertising discourse. Besides, this study mainly focuses on the classification and motivations of Chinese-English code-switching from a synchronic perspective; but there are many other important code-switching issues waiting to be investigated, for instance, code-switching between Chinese and languages other than English, comparative studies from a diachronic as well as synchronic perspective.

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**TARTU SCHOOL:
OLD AND NEW**

TOWARDS THE CULTURAL BRANDING MODEL OF THE BRANDOSPHERE: FROM SHARE-OF-MARKET TO SHARE-OF-CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS

George Rossolatos
disruptiVesemiOtics consulting agency, Greece
georgerossolatos123@gmail.com

Abstract

The aim of this paper is twice foundational. First, it aims at providing a sketchmap for a semiotically informed model of cultural branding that is currently lacking and second to identify how this model could be fruitfully applied for managing a brand's share of cultural representations, over and above its market share, as well as the textual sources of a brand language as (inter)textual formation. The propounded cultural branding model of the brandosphere is of inter-disciplinary orientation, spanning the relevant marketing and semiotic literatures. The brandosphere is envisioned as a marketing semiotic contester to the almost monopolizing cultural branding model of Douglas Holt (2004) in an attempt to demonstrate that marketing semiotics may constitute a standalone discipline that is capable of addressing, both conceptually and methodologically, various marketing-related research areas, rather than an ornamental add-on to consumer research.

1. Lotman's cultural semiotics as conceptual platform for edifying the brandosphere

"Cultural semiotics has broadened the meanings of the terms 'text', 'language' and 'reading' to include almost everything perceived as partaking of a sign-relationship understood in terms of inter-subjective communication" (Orr 1986: 812). "If one designates the totality of all sign systems in the world as the 'semiosphere' (Lotman 1990 and Posner 2001, 2003: 80 ff), one can say that cultural semiotics studies cultures as parts of the semiosphere" (Posner 2004: 2).

Yuri Lotman is perhaps the most prominent figure in the cultural semiotic discipline whose work is largely under-explored in cultural studies (outside of semiotics), not to mention Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) and approaches to cultural branding that have been voiced therein.

Lotman's thinking deployed in various phases, as is characteristic of great thinkers. The semiosphere, a considerably multifariously defined and operationalized concept (see Kull 2005; Nöth 2014; Rossolatos 2014b) constitutes an umbrella concept or metaconcept that designates a semiotic space that is made of various interlocking spheres with identifiable boundaries. "In defining the semiosphere Lotman is making a clear shift from the level of individual signs and their functioning in semiotic space toward a higher level of network semiosis and system level phenomena" (Andrews 2003: 34). As argued repeatedly in the relevant literature (e.g., Kull 2005, 2011) the semiosphere is a multi-level and multi-faceted construct that seeks to delineate how cultural spaces are produced as multi-level inscriptions in an all-encompassing semiospheric hyperspace, like *matryoshka* dolls within dolls. "The semiosphere is heterogeneous space (or communicative medium), enabling qualitative diversity to emerge, to fuse, and to sustain" (Kull 2005: 185). "Lotman especially stresses that the semiosphere is not just the sum total of semiotic systems, but also a necessary condition for any communication act to take place and any language to appear" (Semenenko 2012: 112). Each sphere in a semiospheric space is in a constant dialogue (a point of intersection between Lotman and Bakhtin's notion of dialogism; cf. Beta 1997) with every other sphere in varying degrees.

Furthermore, each semiotic sphere has its own language, from simpler to more complex, and from strictly formalized to more fluid. "These languages are not equivalent to one another, but at the same time are mutually interprojected and have various degrees of translatability" (Semenenko 2012: 113). According to Semenenko, meaning is generated in communicative acts precisely through the tension that exists among the various languages that make up the distinctive spheres of a semiospheric space. "This makes the semiosphere the universal mechanism of meaning generation" (Semenenko 2012: 113).

2. The principal aims of the cultural branding model of brandosphere

In an era that is marked by excessive connectivity among social actors on an international scale, enabled by increasingly rapid electronic communications, the rate whereby texts and cultural units migrate from periphery to center, but also the scale on which such migrations are effected, could be characterized as being of unparalleled proportions compared to previous historical periods. "Cultural dynamics consists in this fact above others: that nucleus and periphery can change places. What used to be central is now peripheral, and vice versa" (Zylko 2001: 402). Lotman's conception of the dynamic interplay between the centre and the periphery of a culture and the relative salience of various textual sources in a semiosphere is most pertinent for the brandospheric model, however it rests at a level of abstraction that awaits to be further qualified in empirical terms in order to be rendered managerially salient.

The accelerating interplay between cultural center and periphery mandates even more urgently the need for a model and a methodology of cultural branding whereby multidimensional dynamic changes may be mapped with view to enhancing the predictability of emergent cultural trends and the impact such trends may have on the semantic nucleus of a brand and its periphery. "If we follow the semiospheric approach, culture takes the shape of a heterogeneous whole bustling with multiple rhythms of development and transient domains" (Zylko 2001: 400).

Lotman's semiospheric approach, by combining the micro-cultural or micro-structural with the macro-cultural or macro-structural points of view in the determination of the flows of dynamic cultural change, also affords to pose considerable challenges both to cognitivist approaches in consumer research (cf. Van Osselaer 2008) and cognitive semiotics which assume as their point of departure and ultimate point of reference an ego-centric cogito. By situating the cogito in a wider inter-textual semiospheric trajectory, without suppressing its significance and without rendering the functions of cogito redundant, the semiosphere affords to shift focus

from a conception of the individual as autonomous processing unit (the AI metaphor) towards the ineradicably textual embeddedness of the subject in a nexus of cultural texts whose relative salience constantly changes. “Texts serve to select that which is to be remembered or forgotten, thus changing the concept of ‘facts to be remembered’” (Sonesson 1998: 105). Hence, cognitive approaches with regard to how messages are processed, stored and retrieved in memory should be addressed in the brandospheric model, however from a point of view where memory is considered to be part and parcel of a collective cultural ethos (cf. Ricoeur 2004) that spreads through contamination and through the conditioning of subjects in mutually recognized aspects of seeing.

For the Lotmanian school of cultural semiotics culture is far from an objectively identifiable plenum of acts of human expression. As Segre (1989) points out, what appears as a rigidly structured system in fact constitutes a reserve that maintains in its contours traces from different epochs and multiple permutations. This posits a particular challenge to the formulation of a cultural branding model in terms of demarcating the historical boundaries of specific cultural spheres, texts and signs that make up a brandosphere. “Culture is made of a web of semiosis, a thick tapestry of interwoven sign systems. This web is not perfectly smooth and continuous, however, and cultural semiotics finds its way into the sign system of a culture through the discontinuous, the breaks and gaps, the unexpected, the ambivalent” (Orr 1986: 813).

Mapping out the dynamic interplay between cultural centre and periphery which is responsible for infusing ‘life’ into a culture is crucial for (i) understanding which currently peripheral cultural spheres in a brandosphere may assume central importance for consumers in a mid-to-long term horizon (ii) which textual sources and textual forms make up distinctive spheres (e.g., cinema, politics, popular press, leisure activities) and how their relative salience shifts over time (iii) what types of signs, in terms of concrete representations, as well as modalities make up each textual form and how their importance shifts over time. These three interlocking levels for addressing how a semiospheric environment, and, concomitantly, how a brandosphere mutates over time, even at a sketchy level in the context of this presentation, are suggestive of the all-encompassing character of Lotman’s semiotic conceptual model of culture that combined the macro-cultural with micro-cultural outlooks in a uniform perspective.

Yet, the adequate operationalization of these three analytical levels by recourse to the Lotmanian corpus is in need of both considerable scholarly elucidation, insofar as Lotman did not offer a strict blueprint of levels and units of signification akin to Greimas, for example, save for examples of what such levels and units would consist of (e.g., Lotman 1976), but also in the face of post-Lotmanian advances in the delineation of multimodal discursive units and their quantification with the aid of content analytical tools (see Rossolatos 2013a, 2014c). The above are compounded by the aforementioned precariously multifaceted definitional scope of the very notion of semiosphere which must be meticulously qualified prior to venturing into further segmenting a brandosphere into units and levels (see Rossolatos 2014b).

Therefore, the primary task the brandosphere seeks to accomplish consists in a conceptual model of how a brand as sign-system mutates dynamically through time alongside the above-mentioned three levels of cultural analysis, while paying heed to how the macro-cultural point of view is reflected in the micro-cultural and how culture is in turn enriched by the texts that are produced on a micro-cultural level.

The generation of distinctive brandospheric clusters based on the above three levels of analysis will allow for a systematic approach to the management of the textual sources that feed into the cultural imaginary of specific brands in specific categories, while also allowing for comparison across categories and for the generation of ever ramifying and more elaborate typologies, thus enhancing the predictability and hence the effectiveness of future communicative activities.

From a cultural semiotic point of view, and this is a key point of differentiation with regard to the consumer research vernacular, the focus is laid on mapping out the textual sources that make up a cultural reserve and how these sources are transformed, as above noted, in distinctive cultural spheres that make up a brandosphere. The ability for managing dynamically these sources will essentially endow brand and advertising planners with a conceptual toolbox and a concrete methodology for predicting which aspects of a cultural/textual reserve are more likely to migrate from the periphery towards the center of a brandosphere and hence of maintaining relevance of their communications to their targets.

“Lotman (1970: 64–77; 1981: 34–48) bases his approach on the broad concept of text according to which every artifact with a function and a coded message can be regarded as a text; he notes, however, that every culture selects from the set of these texts a small subset which its members consider important for their cultural identity” (Posner 2004: 118). Lotman’s emphasis on the criteria for textual selection (and, furthermore, of particular signs from distinctive texts) is most pertinent for a cultural branding model that is intent on managing dynamically sources of a brand’s textual formation. “The function of a text is defined as its social role, its capacity to serve certain demands of the community which creates the text. Thus, function is the mutual relationship among the system, its realization, and the addresser-addressee of the text [...] In this sense it may be said that culture is the totality of texts or one complexly constructed text” (Lotman, Uspensky, and Mihaychuk 1978: 233). Hence, strictly speaking from a Lotmanian point of view, what we are primarily concerned with is not acts of ‘co-creation’, as has become common meta-linguistic currency in consumer research, but what may be called modes of (inter)textual co-conditioning between brands and consumers (insofar as a text is always another text’s inter-text; Orr 1987: 814). In the context of addressing these modes of textual co-conditioning particular emphasis should be laid not only on where the identified texts and their cultural units are situated in between the center and the periphery of a brandosphere from a synchronic point of view, that is based on a descriptive snapshot of their situatedness at a particular moment in the infinitely developing autonomous life of signs, but, even more, how the same cultural units are constantly desemiotized, in Lotman’s terms, and resemiotized in discrete communicative contexts or how they are continuously re-appropriated by distinctive agents of cultural production (brands and consumers).

3. Why draw on the semiotic conceptual heritage for edifying the cultural branding model of the brandosphere, rather than use a cultural branding model already on offer in the marketing literature?

The cultural branding approach in the marketing literature “emphasizes the cultural forces in society and how these can be used to build iconic brands as well as the impact of branding practices on the globalized culture and marketplace” (Heding, Knudtzen, and Bjerre 2009: 208). “Brand meaning is not wholly derived from the market. Culture, aesthetics, and history interact to inject brands into the global flow of images” (Schroeder and Salzer-Morling 2006: 4). “In the cultural approach, the brand is analysed as a ‘cultural artifact moving through history’ (Holt 2004, p. 215)” (Heding, Knudtzen, and Bjerre 2009: 210). Holt’s cultural branding model draws, in part, on McCracken’s cultural anthropological model of symbolic consumption that originally surfaced in 1986 and was later revised. According to McCracken’s symbolic consumption model meaning is transferred from culture to brands to consumers.




Fig. 1: McCracken's model of movement of meaning (Heding, Knudtzen, and Bjerre 2009: 215).

Both authors have imported semiotic concepts in their terminology (see Heding, Knudtzen, and Bjerre 2009: 216: "This conceptualization of the transfer of cultural meaning draws heavily on semiotics"), albeit in a non-scholarly fashion, that is by employing heavily researched (in the semiotic tradition) terms, such as 'cultural code', without acknowledging the terms' semiotic sources.

McCracken's co-creation model was expanded to the territory of consumer co-creation which "concerned the adaptation of culturally shared meanings of the person's unique circumstance for purposes of individual communication and categorization" (Fournier, Allen, and Miller 2008: 785). Despite the wide endorsement of McCracken's model by consumer researchers, three identifiable limitations offer fertile ground for the construction of a semiotically informed brandospheric model of cultural co-creation (or intertextual co-conditioning).

First, McCracken's model is not semiotically informed, despite the fact that it is allegedly geared towards an understanding of meaning making processes. By definition, the discipline that examines meaning making processes is semiotics, hence this undue focus on semiotics constitutes a major limitation. Secondly, McCracken's model only furnishes static descriptions of a cultural co-creative predicament between brands and consumers. The proposed brandospheric model may account for the diachronic evolution of brand discourses.

The mission of Holt's alleged 'cultural branding' model which he also sells to clients via his agency aims at offering step-wise solutions whereby brands may be transformed into what he calls 'iconic brands'. The model of iconic branding is "is a set of principles that structures how firms seek to build their brands. These principles work within the axiomatic assumptions of the extant consumer culture" (Holt 2002: 80). "A cultural icon is a person or thing regarded as a symbol, especially of a culture or a movement – a person, institution, and so forth – considered worthy of admiration or respect" (Holt 2004: 11). Apparently a major criticism that may be launched against this definition concerns *prima facie* the conflation of icon with symbol. Ac-

ording to Holt, iconic brands perform myths that symbolically resolve the identity, desires and anxieties stemming from an important cultural tension, a resolution of opposites mechanism that lies at the very foundation of Levi-Strauss's original conceptualization of the function of mythic structures (and which has been quite extensively criticized ever since).

Holt further seeks to exemplify his model by recourse to a 'genealogical' reading of various brand discourses, including Corona beer's rebranding in the U.S. market. In the genealogical account of Corona beer's re-branding (Holt 2005: 281–284) Holt argues for the key success factors behind the brand's leadership as lying not with attaining to carve a unique associative territory in consumers' minds (as per the tenets of the traditional CBBE perspective), that is in terms of abstract concepts, but with a specific qualification of the semantic nuances of such associations. In this context, even though Holt rightly claims that associations are the outcome and not the cause of brand strength, he does not fully account for the modes of formation of brand associations (e.g., PDP processing and how schemata are formed based on gestalt psychology), save for engaging on a top-line level and *in abstracto* with Keller's CBBE perspective, while being oblivious to the bulky literature on the modes of formation of brand associations (cf. Rossolatos 2014a). For example, by claiming "in so doing, the brand didn't represent relaxation in a generic way, as an abstract concept stripped bare of connotations, reduced to its dictionary definition" (Holt 2005: 284), Holt implies that abstract concepts by default are not accompanied by connotations and that the semantic scope of abstract concepts is exhausted in dictionary definitions. Obviously, both assumptions are edified on shaky ground. From a practitioner's point of view, the qualitative exploration of the semantic nuances of abstract concepts has been standard practice in branding research since time immemorial. In this instance, Holt conflates how brand image is explored quantitatively as battery of image attributes (abstract concepts), without further qualification as to the differential connotations these concepts may carry for single members of a respondents' pool, with qualitative research where consumers are customarily probed extensively regarding how they perceive such concepts, in terms of brand usage by occasion, day-part, etc. It is against such comprehensive consumer insights that research agencies usually venture into accounting quantitatively for the relative mindshare of abstract concepts and not (or not only) against the background of standard lexicon definitions. The second counter-argument that may be raised apropos the above case-study concerns the over-reliance as explanatory ground behind the success of certain branding endeavors on mythic structures (as narratives that cater for a resolution of paradoxically co-existing opposing social forces). Usually brand mythic structures point to deeply laden drivers behind a manifest belief system. The prospective resonance of such structures for positioning purposes in a branding context is dubitable beyond the province of already established brands which cherish high levels of awareness, heritage, trust. Raising myth-making to a predominant paradigm for successful positioning, regardless of current stature in terms of, at least, presence and awareness, is at best a precarious claim in terms of consumer credibility. In other words, a mega brand or major player in a category are more likely to be credible when raising claims of mythic proportions, compared to an unknown brand or to a new entrant. The same holds in the case of capitalizing on a sub-cultural movement (which lies among Holt's 'axioms' of cultural branding). Provided that a brand always speaks *ex positio* a mega brand that leverages a sub-cultural trend is likely to be perceived as hip and (depending on the execution of such endorsement activities) positive associations are likely to accrue in terms of modernity, keeping up with changes in consumer trends, etc. However, the pursuit of the same strategy by a new entrant is likely to force a brand into a niche territory. Finally, the examples usually offered by Holt as brand genealogies are dissonant with the essence of genealogy that grew with Nietzsche and ripened with Foucault (cf. Foucault 1977). For the latter, who drew inspiration and guidelines from the former, a genealogical reading differs from a

historiographical account primarily on the grounds of unsettling illusions about myths of origin and presumptuous objective temporal identifications of seminal turns in the evolution of social movements. Holt's 'genealogical' accounts are genealogical only nominally. In essence, they constitute standard historical accounts that is selective narrative crystallizations of the evolution of a brand through time. The managerial import of the presumed genealogical approach is framed vaguely: "genealogical mind-set: the managerial worldview necessary for the management of identity brands" (Holt 2004: 11). Bringing into the interpretative canvass wider societal/cultural forces and attempting to shift the interpretive focus behind brand success towards the effective leverage of shifting consumer trends does not constitute a genealogical reading, but the narrative fabrication of a historical context in order to enhance the credence of brand-related narratives. Furthermore, such interpretive gestures are usually enacted in a descriptive manner that is not informed by a blueprint regarding, at least, elementary semiotic methods for correlating semantic content with surface expression (e.g., commutation tests, textual coherence) in a competitive context and diachronically (as undertaken in Rossolatos 2014a). On the contrary, the genealogical accounts offered by Holt are interspersed with random remarks about abstract concepts, social forces, brand expressive elements, without a systematic account of how such discrete levels and layers of brand meaning generation are interlinked (an issue that was pointed out earlier with regard to the identification of levels and units of analysis in Lotmanian semiotics). This is a key task that is usually undertaken by semiotic readings and a significant opportunity for a cultural branding model that is edified against the background of a robust semiotic conceptual armory and methodological framework. This guideline simply resonates a basic task of scientific investigation that is the need for employing a metalanguage, rather than regurgitating intuitively practitioner lingo, invested with an aura of scientificity.

Then, there is a perhaps disorienting pre-occupation with the concept of 'brand symbolism'. It is precisely due to the lack of semiotic import that such heavily abused concepts still populate the marketing vernacular even when their pertinence is minimal in applied research. The term symbol is used in consumer research as a proxy to pretty much anything that may be assumed as explanatory ground for intangible associations (i.e., symbolic). Semiotics has made considerable strides into symbolism-related research, while, as I have been repeatedly emphasizing (cf. Rossolatos 2014a), emphasis on semi-symbolic structures (as a more nuanced approach to the *en masse* treatment of the symbolism issue) has been a key pre-occupation of structuralist semiotics. Unfortunately, none of these advances has made a considerable impact either on marketing theory or practice which has resulted in a regurgitation of the term 'symbol' where no instances of symbolism are present (e.g., in advertising imagery, where the term 'brand symbolism' is often used in lieu of brand or advertising imagery, in oblivion of the process and the steps involved in turning imagery into symbolism). This unfortunately undue emphasis on the difference between symbolism and other types of signs (in which case it would be more pertinent to lay claim to brand sign typologies, rather than brand symbolism) has been propagated by Holt's (2005: 273) cultural branding perspective.

Complementary to the above it merits noticing that the impact of culture on consumer behavior has become increasingly recognized in the marketing literature over the past 20 years, which recognition has spawned the research stream of CCT (consumer culture theory) and two academic journals that address consumer culture issues from the point of view of cultural studies, however chaotic and multi-perspectival this field may be: "CCT research draws from an interdisciplinary body of theory to develop novel analytic theoretical frameworks that can illuminate the sociocultural dynamics that drive the consumption cycle" (Arnould and Thompson 2005: 870).

Undoubtedly, there have been exceptionally brilliant scholars in the CCT movement who

have offered monumental research pieces. However, at least to my (extensive) review of the concerned collective volumes and journals on CCT, I still haven't come across an explicit recognition of the sheer diversity of semiotic schools and, concomitantly, their differential impact on conceptual and empirical approaches to consumer culture phenomena.

The orientation of the proposed brandospheric model aims at reinstating controllability of textual sources of brand associations from an internal marketing point of view, rather than giving in to somewhat defeatist claims (and surely non-managerially salient), such as those made by Fournier, Brunel and Lawrence (2013) regarding the loss of control of brand meaning by marketers with the advent of new media and the proliferation of brand communities.

4. Expected contributions of the brandosphere to the extant marketing (semiotic) literature and practice

The brandosphere may contribute to the extant literature in marketing and marketing semiotics with the following. On a conceptual level by furnishing a cultural branding model that draws on a specific semiotic school of thinking (i.e., Lotman's cultural/textual semiotics) with rich heritage in the concerned field of study. On a methodological level by applying the conceptual armory of the resulting brandospheric model in the context of interpretative cultural analysis, while focusing on how the cultural analysis and the output of complementary quantitative content analyses may aid in strategic decisions about alternative routes for designing future marketing communications, while taking into account a brandosphere's constantly shifting cultural center and periphery and by drilling down into specific textual sources and cultural units/signs that make up each sphere in the brandosphere. The resulting output will allow brand planners, from an applied point of view, to focus on the systematic management not only of sources of market share, but, equally importantly, on share of cultural representations.

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**SEMIOTICS OF POP-CULTURE –
FOCUSING ON THE ANALYSIS
AND EFFECTS OF THE
JAPAN POP**

TRANSLATING JAPANESE-STYLE REPRESENTATIONS IN MANGA AND ANIME TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE WESTERN CULTURE

Hristina Ambareva
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
ambareva@yahoo.com

Abstract

The text presents several examples of the influence of the Japanese animation on Western movies. It will discuss the differences between the Japanese and Western style representation. The analyses of the concept of “kawaii” and bishounen/moe style images will point to the semantic difficulties in their cultural translation.

The analysis in this paper started from the question why in the so called “western cultures” (European countries and the USA) there seems to be a marked preference to live-actor movies over animation. On the Internet one can find anime fans, saying: “I wanted to get my girlfriend to watch a great anime drama and she just said: “Oh, I only watch shows with real people, not cartoon.” (Real Otaku Gamer: 2011 n.p.). This is a rather common response to the medium of animation. Animated stories in Europe and USA are often referred to as a medium for children and/or its target audience is predominantly male. On the contrary, in Japan, the anime is very popular among all age groups, it attracts the female audience as successfully as the male audience, and there are many genres and subgenres of animation and anime movies building on serious and even philosophical conversations.

Japanese cyberpunk animation presents a good example of how imaginative and vanguard stories can produce a remarkable effect after being transformed from animation into live-actor western-style movie. The Wachowskis, for example, have acknowledged Japanese animation influence to the ideas of their feature film “The Matrix” (1999) (The Guardian: 19 Oct. 2009, n. p.). Significant influence came from the anime “Ghost in the Shell” (1995). The story in the “*Ghost in the Shell*” is driven by the Cartesian question are mind and body separate entities and how memory and thoughts exist in relation to the body. The phrase “ghost hacking” is used there

to describe the substitution of memory with a simulated experience, something we see in the concept of “The Matrix” later. In “*The Matrix*”, artificial intelligence is presented to evolve and become independent of humans, and able to develop its own identity. This led to the creation of a fantasy-world, inhabited by people’s minds. The discovery what is real and what is a simulated experience suddenly changes the view point of the audience and raises the question how we can ever be sure about what is real and what is a fantasy.

The major concept in the above mentioned movies is that the world exists as neuro-interactive simulation where our brains are unable to distinguish between reality and illusion. Another common concept is that AI could become a sentient being with its own identity. The visual similarities between “The Matrix” and the “Ghost in the Shell” are well-known to the fans and broadly discussed on the Internet (A Matrix and Ghost in the Shell...: 2006 n. p.).

These great science fiction stories testify for the interaction between “western” and “eastern” ideas. The Japanese manga writer Masamune Shirow has said that he read a lot of European literature and the very name of his manga “Ghost in the Shell” (1989) is a replica of the “Ghost in the Machine” book (1967) of Arthur Koetler, discussing the Cartesian mind-body dualism. In such a way, European philosophy, the dualism body-soul theme, have given important contribution to the creation of the Japanese manga series, and the “Ghost in the Shell” manga-based Japanese animation has in turn given the inspiration and ideas for the creation of one of the most popular western movies around the turn of the century.

Nevertheless both the “Ghost in the Shell” and “The Matrix” present excellent stories, only the latter is well recognized as a groundbreaking movie; it became a blockbuster, and is among the most admired western movies in the world. The Japanese masterpiece anime remains popular mainly within the borders of the anime subculture. Two questions arise from here:

1. Why manga and anime proliferated so successfully in Japan? They were used to present adult-oriented and serious content, even philosophical and scientific ideas, in time when the western animation was mainly telling fairytales and all great science fiction ideas were represented by live-actor movies?

2. Why animated movies can’t reach the same status, variety and recognition among western audience? The mainstream movies watched and produced in Europe and USA are live-actor movies.

The hypothesis I want to suggest here is that the audience preferences in Europe and the USA to the live-actor movie form and the audience preferences to the animated stories in Japan reflect differences in the visual culture that may be traced back to the traditions of visual arts, respectively in Europe and in Japan. The existence of two different paradigms of visual art, historically influential there, could be followed far back in history. The first paradigm is “*the paradigm of art as resemblance*”. It describes the development of the visual art of the tri-dimensional illusion that prevails in Europe and the USA. The second paradigm, “*the paradigm of art as expression*”, describes the creation of the expressive art of the flat picture and is characteristic of the visual art tradition of Japan. In the course of presenting these two paradigms, arguments are suggested that the Japanese content industries (anime, manga) are predominantly carriers of the *expressive* paradigm of visual art, which for centuries and increasingly now in Europe and around the world seems to be dominated by the resemblance paradigm.

The paradigm of art as resemblance: art is mimesis

The paradigm of art as resemblance became popular after the 4th century BC through the philosophy of Plato (Rep., Book X), who taught that art is an imitation of life. The very representations of Plato by Silanion (370 BC) or Raphael (“*The School of Athens*”, 1509–1510) are done according to this paradigm which gives priority to the principle of realistic representation of the

human body. One of the most influential and admired authorities of this tradition was Leonardo da Vinci. He was famous for his perfectionism and the profound ambition of this perfectionism was the achievement of the illusion of life in his paintings. Leonardo believed that the artist is a scientist who has to learn various sciences in order to draw the objects as if alive (Leonardo: 1914). That's why he described the art of painting as a science and the painter as a scientist, who should also be fluent in geometry, mathematics, anatomy, chemistry. In details Leonardo (Leonardo: 1914) described the rules of applying the aerial perspective, the influence of the source of light on the representation of objects, the rules for the proper representation of trees, clouds, distance, reflected light and etc. Knowledge of geometry was necessary for the artist to apply well geometrical perspective. Mathematics was necessary for the correct calculation of proportions; anatomy – for the truthful representation of the human body; and the importance of chemistry was for the proper usage of the chemical qualities of the ingredients and materials. Sfumato was the famous technique used by Leonardo to draw the face of Mona Lisa, where no lines are used – alike the real human face. It seems that Leonardo believed that the work of the artist, who recreates the world on a canvas, is similar to the work of God. He wrote: “*The works of God are appreciated best by other creators.*” (Richter, 387). The art of God only stays higher, because his creation not only *looks like*, but *is actually* alive. All the rules of Leonardo about art and science of painting in his “*Trattato de la Pittura*” are devoted to the art of creation of the best illusion of life on the canvas.

The mimetic theory of art was the main and the most influential theory of art in Europe until the end of 18th century. Thus, after Plato and during the Renaissance resemblance was considered the main quality by which to judge a picture.

In the middle of the 19th century a kind of revolution happened in French art. This revolution came as a result of a wide range of factors – from French revolution to the invention of photography. Among the most important factors, influencing art history was the import of Japanese artifacts in Europe starting from 17th century. In the middle of 19th century was the apogee of the ukiyo-e fashion in Paris. A single Japanese art-dealer there, Hayashi Tadamasu, had imported in France more than 156 000 ukiyo-e prints (Krahn 1991) and among his main clients were artists like Degas and Monet. At that time (1886-1888) Van Gogh also lived in Paris. This period marked the active adoption of Japanese style painting in Europe. The artists and the public had the opportunity to enjoy visual art, which demonstrated a different approach towards the purpose of art and followed different conventions of representation. The invigorating influence of Japanese art on the European visual arts changed the very way artists thought about the possibilities of art. As photography was gaining popularity, European artists had to re-think and re-justify the purpose of their portrait works, landscape drawings and etc., not in terms of mimesis, but in terms of “expression”, “impression”, and eventually into the modern concepts of art as an “abstract form”, “convention” or “symbolic language”.

The first wave of what became to be known as Japonisme was very liberating for the arts while the technological inventions and art experiments suppressed the leading role of the mimetic theory. One can imagine the tradition and authorities the impressionists were ignoring: as a result, they were mocked, they did not have access to galleries to present their pictures and the art-critics were relentless.

Meanwhile, the ambition of the real-life illusion started a new life through the medium of cinema.

The paradigm of art as expression

In order to understand the second paradigm of art, the one which it is assumed here to prevail in the visual arts in Japan, Japanese sumi-e and ukiyo-e painting styles can be taken as an

example.

Japanese ink-wash painting, *sumi-e*, was a style of painting popular in Japan around 14th and 15th century. It developed under the influence of Chinese paintings and the philosophy of Zen Buddhism which are believed to have profoundly influenced Japanese aesthetics since then. In contrast to European artists, who were considered craftsmen or scientists, initially the artists of *sumi-e* were monks. Within the Zen-tradition this visual art fulfilled meditative and mental purposes. The final goal of the artistic practices was the spiritual self-improvement of the artist himself. The artist was taught to consider his task as a way, and the work of art – as a spiritual goal. The way was the process of self-perfection, guided to insight, and its ultimate target was the artist himself. Ideally, the Ink-wash painting was performed in the state of “no-mind” (reaching an understanding of the “emptiness”) and the teaching of Zen harmonized with the belief that when you pull the string, the target of the arrow lies not in front of you, but it is actually you (Herrigel 1953).

Within this paradigm of the Japanese visual art, defined here as “expression”, the artist’s aim is not to imitate or reproduce the real object as it is, but to catch its essence or spirit. The main quality to judge a picture by, therefore, was not resemblance, but to catch the essence of the object with as little strokes as possible. The most important lines were accentuated and the unnecessary details were abandoned. As a result, the art of the *sumi-e* paintings looks simplistic, with a lot of negative space and it is in sharp contrast to the prevalence of positive space in European painting art created in accordance to the principle of resemblance to life.

The philosophy behind *sumi-e* ink-wash paintings is very different from the craftsmanship behind the European mimetic tradition of art. The status of the artist (monk vs. craftsman/scientist) and the purposes of the art-works to catch the invisible (mood and feeling) vs. the visible world (illusion) on the canvas are different. The materials are also contrasting: delicate, almost intangible silk and ink vs. heavy, tangible materials – wood, canvas and oil-based paints. *Sumi-e* combines the spiritual aim (self-improvement, insight) with an emphasis on search for mood and feeling. The contribution of Zen-Buddhist philosophy to the education of taste in this sensitivity to the expressive lines and mood is substantial. And the influence of Zen went far beyond the drawing art of *sumi-e* paintings towards many other traditional Japanese arts, Japanese culture and society as a whole (Suzuki 1988).

The painting style of *ukyu-e* woodblock prints gives another point of view to the relation between tradition and the popular art in Japan today. *Ukyu-e* represents scenes of the everyday life, quite similar to the manga stories today. The objects are usually caught in movement and a certain level of resemblance to real, existing objects should also be admitted as, for example, in the series “The Fifty-three Stations of the Tokaido” (1833–1834, Utagawa Hiroshige), representing the fifty-three post-stations along the East Sea Road connecting Edo (Tokyo) and Kyoto in the Edo period; or in the *ukyo-e* which presents a portrait of the actor Otani Oniji II and is named after it “Otani Oniji II” (around 1794, Toshusai Sharaku). In the *ukyu-e* the specific convention of art results in a very decorative style of painting (see for ex. “Beauty looking back”, by Hishikawa Moronobu, 17th century, or “Poppies”, by Katsushika Hokusai, c. 1833–34). The images in the *ukyo-e* are stylized, the accent is on the most important features and many details are omitted; there is a lot of negative space. What brings closer contemporary manga and traditional *ukyo-e* prints are several features, all of them present in the both types of art: the usage of clear lines, the application of areas of clean and strong colors, accent on face expression and focus on the depiction of movement and emotion. The visual style of *ukyu-e* woodblock prints favors expression and feeling much more than the illusion of the real form. Although the famous sketches of Hokusai (see for ex.: Takaoka 2011) don’t have text and story-line, the path from *ukyo-e* painting style to manga is palpable there.

Manga and anime as successors of the tradition of the flat-picture expressive style drawing *Why manga and anime proliferated so successfully in Japan?*

Sumi-e and ukyo-e paintings tell about a non-illusionary tradition in the Japanese visual arts. Manga drawings develop the graphic language of this rich, flat-picture convention and build up the code of the motion, emotion and speed lines. In view of the Japanese visual arts tradition, it is evident that manga and consequently manga-style animated images do not appear after the Second World War only from the scratch of demolition, the post-war pain, or American comic books and Disney animation, as sometimes it is accentuated. Long before Osamu Tezuka, the famous “father of manga”, to start writing manga, the Japanese culture have had the flat-picture tradition in visual arts cultivated, including the sophisticated aesthetic taste of the audience to the few, but telling details, and the trained artists who were able to produce them. All the necessary conditions were present anime and manga to proliferate successfully after the war: the audience, the tradition, and the creators. It can't be denied that the active contacts with the American pop-culture after the end of the Second World War significantly contributed to the development of manga and animation, but the reason they to become a hallmark of the Japanese popular culture could be that these arts inherited and grew out of the own, Japanese cultural tradition, which was well-known to the audience and the supply of well trained and familiar with the medium artists was easy. It just needed time and creativity this popular art to mature, and the art of the popular Japanese culture to gain recognition around the world. The uniqueness of the Japanese manga and anime as a medium came from their connection with the history of the visual arts in Japan, which favored the expressive features over the purposes of resemblance. Furthermore, as a form of painting art, it was based on philosophy and culture very different from the western world.

The differences between the purposes of illusion and expression could explain why images in manga/anime are not relevant to what they represent and the western viewer is often being upset by the images of twelve-year old girls (*moe*), who should be “actually” represented by the image of a young women. A possible key to the understanding of this representation is the fact that the art of “moe”-style images of girls does not aim to produce a visual illusion of woman. Although the word “moe” is often associated with a girl, it describes a *feeling* or *mood* of youth and cuteness and visually “moe” could be a cat or a robot as well. Moe images in the west however are often perceived in their surface value. The leading of perception by the paradigm of resemblance tends to change the (may be) non-illusionary expression of mood and feeling into underage sex representation. Nevertheless, the objection against “moe-Lolita” images now seems to be justified as far as on the market the resemblance paradigm is stronger and the audience ability of perception is mainly cultivated within it. The export of the Japanese pop-art content to other countries destroys the Japanese usually vague context of perception and allows interpretations, which are direct and literary.

Therefore, the right translation of the Japanese animation to the western audience could be thought as a delicate process of reducing the importance of “visibility” and raising the importance of “feeling”. This “rule” applies to a wide range of Japanese cultural phenomena like moe, and includes the may be the most famous among them – the *kawaii* concept.

Similar to the concept of “moe”, *kawaii* has numerous visual appearances and cannot be considered an object. Cute and small things like Hello Kitty are defined as *kawaii*. “Kawai” could be also clothing, accessories, fantastic creatures like Doraemon, pink color, stupid smile, and unexpected combination between stupid and unserious. The power of *kawaii* is the power of expression. The essence of *kawaii* is the positive experience which makes one feel relaxed. The *kawaii* images are very powerful in reducing anxiety. Children feel comfortable with them – many *kawaii* images look safe and make children feel cozy. Adults feel comfortable with *kawaii* too,

because the kawaii childish and sometimes stupid appearance gives a feeling of temporary release from the social norms. The kawaii fashion is a good example of the favorable environment in Japan for the sophistication of the art of expression through images which bear no or only a vague resemblance of reality. The numerous cases when this fashion turns into kitsch could be explained with the failure to catch the feeling of kawaii and by the reliance on the visual idea of kawaii appearance.

Illusion vs. expression

Why animated movies can't lead the mainstream culture of the motion pictures?

In terms of the two art paradigms, it seems that the illusion paradigm has much broader demographic base today. Since the 19th century, cinema took the lead in the illusionary functions of art and developed the preference to the perfect resemblance. The inner connection of the live-actor movie today with the illusion paradigm cultivates the taste to the perfect illusion. The passion for 3D and 4D experience is led by the search for the illusion of the perfect resemblance and the super-realistic visual effects measure the mastership of the commercial movie creators. At present, animation in the west is also produced in 3D. In Japan a technology is developed for 2D anime to be presented in 3D (Gizmodo: 2012 n.p.). These technological innovations describe the process of how the visual illusion paradigm is getting prevalence over expression paradigm internationally. This international and technological shift to the visual paradigm seems to be crucial for the future of the flat-picture representation. Providing that the mainstream culture is defined by the illusion paradigm, everything that is different from the mainstream could be expected to survive as art - or may be a subculture.

Japanese animation is said to be Americanized in the last decades. It appropriates western elements from fashion and architecture; it complies with the western standards and sensitivity to themes of religion, violence, sex and identity. The observance of the western tastes and culture leads to really spectacular movies with elaborate animation like Hayao Miyazaki's productions, which have greatly emphasized the visual qualities of the films.

The popularity of the illusion paradigm today could be explained by the higher complexity of expressive and illusionary qualities, but also by the lower level of conventionalism in it. Practically, everybody who can see can enter the visual illusion. The expression paradigm in the Japanese flat-picture expressive style drawing in manga and anime offers less of the illusion and more of the convention; like in the sumi-e, the successful perception requires the ability to "catch the spirit" and more emotional/spiritual engagement is needed to decode and enjoy the medium.

The translation

The transfer of cultural content from one culture to another is a difficult task. It means that the content will be interpreted not by the code of the visual language of the exporting culture, but by the code of the visual language of the importing culture. The cultural content will be actually taken from its original context and interpreted into the host-culture according to its values and principles. If we think about the two paradigms of art, the process of translation of the Japanese pop-culture to the language of the western audience should mean to understand that a medium, which is very expressive, is interpreted as a medium, which is mainly illusionary.

The specifics of the introduction of the Japanese popular culture – manga and anime - to the western audience, historically, were in the several steps "translation".

1. The first step was the manipulation of the original content. It includes the routine editing of Japanese anime (or video games) in the 70s, 80s and 90s. Culturally sensitive or inappropriate messages had to be erased.


2. The second type of translation concerns the appropriation of ideas and creation of cultural hybrids: like the “Matrix”, or American movies representing Japan, or Americanized Japanese animation, all of which are accepted with varying levels of approval by the international and Japanese audience.

3. The third type of translation describes the movement and change between the paradigms, and interpretation is a question of choice of a semiotic system. It reflects the flexibility and adjustment of perception to the conventions of art and the creation of the international subculture of anime and manga fans. Here Japanese pop-culture content reveals authentic and meaningful universe behind the non-resemblance art and opens valuable space for communication of ideas, for enjoyment and semiotic studies.


The existence of the anime subculture in the west today is a sign for a search of experience outside the mainstream culture. The very success of the Japanese kawaii fashion in the west testifies for the search of emotional expression, beyond the visual. Anime makes a difference in the western culture, which is seen in the fact that it is clearly distinguished from animation. It is a remarkable fact also, that the international subculture of anime creates a distinctive demand for Japanese speaking anime with English subtitles, which acknowledge the inimitable expressive qualities of the original video. This suggests that “Americanization” or “westernization” of anime is a process which should not pass certain limit, because somewhere beyond this limit Japanese anime could face the loss of its distinctive and valuable specifics – the expressive spirit and the unique artistic form of the Japanese flat picture drawing.

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**SEMIOTICS
AND ITS
MASTERS**



Greimas International

Chairmen:

Anne Hénault (anne.henault@beaurecueil.org)

École Normale Supérieure, Paris

Massimo Leone (massimo.leone@unito.it)

University of Turin, Italy

The roots of semanalysis; Julia Kristeva's masters in semiotics

Chairman:

Marga van Mechelen (m.k.vanmechelen@uva.nl)

University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

Sebeok as a semiotician. Thomas A. Sebeok

(Budapest 9 November 1920 – Bloomington 21 December 2001)

Chairman:

Vilmos Voigt (voigtbudapest@gmail.com)

**GREIMAS
INTERNATIONAL**

LA QUETE DES MANIFESTATIONS DE LA STRUCTURE ELEMENTAIRE DE LA SIGNIFICATION (QUELQUES REPERES)

Mariela Crivat-Ionesco
Fédération Nationale des Travaux Publics, Paris
ionesco@crivat.info

Emmanuel Crivat-Ionesco
Ecole Spéciale d'Architecture de Paris
ionesco@crivat.info

**Hommage à Algirdas Julien Greimas,
Solomon Marcus,
Umberto Eco et Jean d'Ormesson**

Au mois d'août de l'année 2013 nous avons rencontré à Bucarest notre ami Solomon Marcus et nous avons évoqué ensemble les débuts de notre aventure sémiotique.

En 2014 cette aventure aura duré 40 ans.

Ceci a commencé en 1974 avec «*Unités minimales dans le Nouveau Roman*», la thèse de licence de Mariela Crivat Ionesco, à l'Université de Bucarest, la Faculté de langue et littérature française, sous la direction de Paul Miclau : «Il s'agit d'un travail de synthèse, original, basé sur un appareil formel personnel, qui s'approche du niveau d'une thèse de doctorat. Description structurale accompagnée de l'élaboration de modèles mathématiques, particulièrement topologique ; la formalisation obtenue sur la base de la théorie des graphes et très convaincante, constituant une des recherches les plus vigoureuses dans ce domaine... Des analyses statistiques qui offrent la possibilité de comprendre concrètement les structures de certains romans. L'analyse dépasse le niveau d'une simple appréciation littéraire des unités minimales et des structures ; elle utilise des éléments de la théorie de l'information, de l'esthétique moderne. L'information de l'auteur est extrêmement variée allant de l'histoire littéraire jusqu'à la logique et aux mathématiques.»

Création du Groupe Roumain de Sémiotique (GROMS), à l'Université de Bucarest en 1975.

Recherche des unités minimales pour une analyse logique et mathématique du roman contemporain et de l'architecture.

« Texte et Architecture », publié dans les Cahiers de sémiotique n°1, en 1977, et « Image et Architecture », dans les Cahiers de sémiotique n°2. Bucarest, 1978.

De cette atmosphère fertile aux études interdisciplinaires nous avons commencé à penser ensemble une sémiotique de l'architecture.

Nous avons quitté la Roumanie quelques années plus tard pour rejoindre A.-J. Greimas et l'Ecole sémiotique de Paris, en passant par le congrès de sémiotique de Vienne en Autriche.

Le magot - introduction à la théorie de l'architecture: mémoire présenté à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1981

Du texte architectural: mémoire présenté à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1982

Le creux bâti - contribution à une sémiotique de l'architecture à Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris III, 1985

Nous avons travaillé dans le vaste domaine de la conception et de la communication, en particulier la conception architecturale et la transmission du savoir dans le domaine des arts et des sciences sociales.


Tout chercheur rêve au début de sa carrière de trouver l'Idée, la démonstration d'un théorème ou la formule magique qui marquera toute sa vie scientifique.

L'Idée qui a nourri notre travail est la démonstration du bon fonctionnement du mécanisme de la signification (le carré sémiotique), la découverte des structures élémentaires de l'architecture comme langage de conception de l'espace.

Notre premier cours à l'Ecole d'architecture de Paris La Villette s'intitulait: ***Elémentaires terrestres d'une architecture cosmique***.

Les idées restent et s'imposent quand, esthétiquement, elles ont du caractère, elles sont belles.

De nos idées, celle qui marque, et qui représente notre travail commun, est l'investissement de la structure élémentaire de l'architecture dessinée par Emmanuel et habillée de mots d'une phrase célèbre d'Henri Focillon dans « *La vie des formes* », par Mariela ; démonstration du fonctionnement de la syntaxe élémentaire sur le carré sémiotique et la manifestation de cette structure élémentaire.



Ainsi le **constructeur enveloppe** (1), **non** (2) le vide (3), **mais** (4) un certain séjour des formes (5), **et, travaillant sur l'espace** (6), **il le modèle** (7), **du dehors** (8) **et du dedans** (9), **comme un sculpteur** (10). Il est géomètre quand il dessine le plan, mécanicien quand il combine la structure, peintre pour la distribution des effets, **sculpteur pour le traitement des masses**. Henri Focillon, « Vie des formes, Éloge de la main », Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1934.

Dans ce long parcours nous nous sommes exprimés, nous avons « couché sur le papier » nos réflexions, passant d'une machine à écrire Remington de 1930 au texte électronique, dans l'harmonie de la fabrication des livres.

Précurseurs dans l'utilisation des ordinateurs individuels, des échanges sur Internet, de la conception assistée par ordinateur, des outils mathématiques et statistiques pour la communication institutionnelle, de la création des sites Web et nous avons même créé des blogs et des tweets...

Notre cours « *Maquettes virtuelles et gestion du projet architectural* », à l'École Spéciale d'Architecture de Paris, utilisait un logiciel informatique dont nous avons participé à l'élaboration et au développement.

Bien sûr l'idée originale subsiste toujours, mais dans des circonstances exceptionnelles nous avons eu la chance de trouver une autre.

Peu de temps avant Noël, Emmanuel écrit un SMS à Mariela (le texte original est en roumain, nous l'avons traduit en français):

*Tout mon être est rempli de Toi,
Où il y aurait-il encore de la place pour Moi ?
La seule place est en Toi!
J'essaye de me nicher ou je peux.
Je t'aime !*

Mariela répond :

Je t'adore mon amour et je ne sais pas le dire d'une si belle manière.

Je tremble toutes de ton amour

Vu l'éphémère existence des SMS, Mariela écrit le poème sur son cahier... Emmanuel l'écrit à son tour sur le sien.

Nous nous sommes dit l'un à l'autre le poème...

En bons sémioticiens que nous sommes, nous avons pensés qu'il y avait quelque chose d'élémentaire dans ces quelques vers et que ce « **Je suis Toi** » est universel, la définition d'un amour sans fin... Et que nous sommes en train de devenir une légende.

Ci-après vous trouverez la traduction du Poème, du roumain en français, anglais, espagnol, italien et allemand.

Si vous aimez, traduisez le Poème et envoyez nous un message.

Mariela CRIVAT-IONESCO

Sémioticienne, philologue

Chargée de communication à la Fédération Nationale des Travaux Publics, Paris

Emmanuel CRIVAT-IONESCO

Sémioticien, architecte

Professeur à l'Ecole Spéciale d'Architecture de Paris



Émergences sémiotiques

ionesco@crivat.info


Naissance de la légende de l'amour sans fin

Le poème fondateur

*Tout mon être est rempli de Toi,
Où il y aurait encore de la place pour Moi ?
La seule place est en Toi!
J'essaye de me nicher ou je peux.
Je t'aime !
Moi aussi Je t'aime !*

*My whole being is full of You,
Where could I find a place for Me?
The only place is in You!
I try to find a nest wherever I can.
I love you!
I love you too !*

*Todo mi ser está lleno de Ti,
¿En donde quedará un lugar para Mi ?
El unico lugar está en Ti !*



*Toata fiinta mea e plina de
Tine,
Unde ar mai fi loc pentru
Mine?
Singurul loc este in Tine!
Incerc sa ma cuibaresc
unde pot.
Te iubesc!
Em.*

*Trato de abrigarme en donde puedo.
Yo te quiero !
Yo también te quiero !*

*Tutto il mio essere è pieno di Te,
Dove ci sarà ancora posto per Me?
Il solo posto è in Te!
Cerco di 'nidificare' dove posso
Ti amo!
Anch'io ti amo!*

*Meine ganze Lebenwesen ist voll mit Dir,
Wo kann ich noch Raum fuer mich finden?
Mein einziger Raum bist Du!
Ich versuche ein Nest zu finden woimmer ich kann.
Ich liebe Dich!
Ich liebe dich auch !*

Toată fiinta mea e plină de
Tine,
Unde ar mai fi loc pentru
Mine?
Singurul loc este în Tine!
Încerc să mă cuibăresc
unde pot.
Te iubesc!
M Em

Toată fiinta mea e plină de
Tine,
Unde ar mai fi loc pentru
Mine?
Singurul loc este în Tine!
Încerc să mă cuibăresc
unde pot.
Te iubesc!
Em

Toată fiinta mea e plină de
Tine
Unde ar mai fi loc pentru
Mine?
Singurul loc este în Tine!
Încerc să mă cuibăresc
unde pot.
Te iubesc!
M

ON DEPTH: ONTOLOGICAL IDEOLOGIES AND SEMIOTIC MODELS

Massimo Leone
University of Turin, Italy
massimo.leone@unito.it

Abstract

The proprioception of space is a major matrix of cognitive and conceptual metaphors. Scholars too often resort to spatial metaphors in order to “place” and “visualize” their theoretical insights. Semiotics is not an exception: on the opposite, given the abstractedness of the semiotic investigation, semioticians have often coated their theories in spatial *imaginaire*. Peirce’s semiotics could not be conceived without its triangular insistence, the superposition of a representamen upon an object through an interpretant, diagrams, and graphs; Lotman turned space into a meta-language, but was himself thinking semiotics in spatial terms (the semiosphere being the epitome of spatial theorization); as for the trend of semiotic scholarship that develops from Saussure through Hjelmslev to Greimas and beyond, the preeminence of “spatial thought” (perhaps a consequence of the “diachronic primacy”) is evident since the first model of sign, wherein the signifier and the signified are *situated* in a specific, hierarchic topology. The paper will claim that not only each school of semiotics, and perhaps each semiotician too, refer to a characteristic spatial *imaginaire*, but also that this theoretical topology interacts with what could be called an “ontological ideology”: in each sociocultural group, at a given moment of its history, a certain conception of being is given preference over the others, generating a spatial *imaginaire*.

The paper will therefore seek to retrace the intellectual trajectory of Algirdas J. Greimas’s semiotics in relation to one of these ontological ideologies and its spatial figure: depth. Greimas’s theory on – and model of – meaning became international acclaimed – the paper will argue – because successfully intercepted an ontological ideology predominant across societies and cultures in the 1960s and 1970s: according to it, what matters does not lie at the surface of things, but in their depths; in order to reach value, one must dive into this depth, equipped with

a suitable methodology, and unveil the essential that is hidden behind several layers of inessentiality. Greimas's "generative path" [*parcours génératif*] epitomized the theoretical triumph of such "topological ideology". With this hypothesis in the background, the paper will seek to explain why the Greimasian method became so acclaimed, why it was subsequently so denigrated, and why and in what guise it should be rediscovered in present-day international semiotics.

A topology is intrinsic to the idea of sign. Various defined first by philosophers, then by semioticians, the sign must be conceived as relation between two or more dimensions that are not equally accessible to the senses. Such relation can be thought of abstractedly, but as soon as it is described, for instance by the meta-language of semiotics, inevitably takes on a spatial appearance. That is evident above all in meta-semiotic diagrams. Saussure and his interpreters insist that the sign must be conceived as the unity of signifier and signified, which would be like the two faces of a sheet. However, the meta-semiotic diagram that visualizes this relation transcribes it topologically. Moreover, this topology is immediately hierarchical: the signifier is above, the signified below. Hjelmslev's schematization of the sign is not different from this point of view. The "E" of expression and the "C" of content might be placed on the same line, but always according to the hierarchical, horizontal topology of western reading: from left to right, expression comes first, followed by content, through the slash of function. The hierarchical topology between the various dimensions of the sign is even more conspicuous in Peirce's semiotics, where it is visually rendered by a triangular structure: from the representamen the mind must climb up the steeped line to the interpretant, which mediates access to the object. However, the mind never descend from the interpretant toward the object, but keeps climbing from interpretant to interpretant, as Peirce makes it clear through the concept of unlimited semiosis.

These topological, hierarchical characterizations all ultimately stem from the predominant ontological ideology of semiotics. Semiotics does not deal with ontologies, but is nevertheless shaped by a certain way of imagining the being, what is. From the pre-Socratic philosophy of the sign until contemporary semiotics, the ontological ideology of the discipline has revolved around the same axiom: what appears is not what is. There is something beyond what appears, and this something is posited as the goal of a narrative quest in which what appears plays an ambiguous role. It is a hindrance, because it somehow veils what is, but it is a helper too, since what is can be accessed only through the veil of appearance. As it will be pointed out later, though, according to semiotics, what appears is not automatically a helper, but it can turn into such if approached through suitable methodology.

In any case, those who partake in the semiotic endeavor must implicitly or explicitly subscribe to this ontological ideology; otherwise they would not be semioticians. Other ontological ideologies are, indeed, possible, but all nullify the semiotic perspective. In some alternative ontological ideologies, for instance, what appears is the being and the being is what appears. There is no way, and no necessity, to go beyond appearance, because the signifier is the signified, the expression is the content, and reality manifests itself through itself, as a language made by referents. Such ontological ideology is unconceivable from the point of view of semiotics, yet is embraced by some trends of the current scientific discourse. For instance, when radical neuroscientists claim that 'love' has been located in a certain area of the brain, they somehow endorse an ontological ideology according to which there is no hierarchical distinction between the physiological activity of neurons, the visualization of this activity on the screen of a CAT-scan, and the psychological feature linked with this activity: those neurons are love, and love is those neurons. Such logic is unacceptable for semioticians exactly for it manifests an ontological ideology that is strikingly at odds with that of semiotics, to the point of denying the rationale of the discipline. Indeed, if what appears is what is, and what is what appears, why should the very idea of the sign be entertained?

Another alternative ontological ideology that currently threatens the very foundations of semiotics is apparently more trivial, but perhaps more pernicious than the one that underpins neurosciences. It is the ontological ideology that often manifests itself in the attitude of the mass toward semiotics, and increasingly thus also in the candid reactions of undergraduate students towards the discipline: why should a novel *mean* something? Why should a movie tell more than its visual brilliancy? Is there really something beyond advertisement's prompts to buy? In other words: why should one bother with semiotics? Partisans of this ontological ideology are like the protagonists of *Flatland*, the 1884 dystopian novella by the English schoolmaster Edwin Abbott Abbott, in which people who live in a two-dimensional world encounter people who live in a three-dimensional world. The novella was meant as critique of Victorian positivism, but is still valid: the skepticism of the general audience and many students toward current semiotics is similar to that which the character of the sphere provokes upon its arrival in Abbott Abbot's *Flatland*.

Ontological ideologies that compete with the one that underlies semiotics can be arranged in a taxonomy inspired by the squared of veridiction. On the one hand, certain ontological ideologies predicate the perfect coincidence of what is and what appears. It is the typical attitude of scientific reductionism and of all the anti-hermeneutic stands that proliferate in contemporary mass culture: there is no way to distinguish any longer between what is deep and what is superficial, because there is no depth underneath superficiality; what one sees, hears, smells, tastes, touches is what ultimately matters. Those who search for meaning beyond the surface of reality are actually delusional and boring.

On the other hand, other ontological ideologies also conflate the dimension of appearance and that of being but, instead of proclaiming the unity of both into a common dimension, like in positivism, they tend to abrogate them into a sort of mystical vacuum, like in nihilism. It is the ontological ideology of new age spirituality, for instance, but it can be ascribed also to deconstructionist hermeneutics: how could meaning be accessed through the signifier, if both meaning and signifiers are nothing but illusion, constantly recreated by the chaotic riddles of history and discourse?

Two further alternative ontological ideologies distinguish, on the contrary, between being and appearance, between a dimension of reality that is readily accessible and one that is hidden beneath. The first embraces an ontological vision in which what is is more than what appears. In the squared of veridiction, that is the position of secret, which is also fundamentally the position of semiotics. Semiotics, as it was successfully thematized by Umberto Eco both in scholarly works and novels, is the realm of abduction, of adventurous and conjectural investigation. Sherlock Holmes is its hero. Semiotics believes that meaning is not at the surface of reality, but hidden in its depths. However, semiotics also contends that there is a method, a rational way to proceed from surface to depth. In other words, for semiotics the appearance of reality is not all, but can be trusted.

Also according to the fourth and last ontological ideology in the taxonomy, the appearance of things hides a more truthful layer of reality; yet, in this fourth ideology, appearance cannot be trusted. What appears is not what is. In the semiotic square of veridiction, such is the position of lie. It is also the ontological ideology of the so-called conspiracy theories. Supporters of these theories claim, as semioticians do, that meaning is to be found beyond the surface of appearance. Yet, they also claim, differently from semioticians, that appearance is not a reliable channel to meaning. On the opposite, for conspiracy theories there is no rational method to abduce what is hidden from what hides it, since what hides it is conceived not as a helper but as an opponent in the quest for meaning and truth. The disquieting consequence of this ontological ideology is that conspiracy theories are usually unfalsifiable, meaning that they are not conjectural theories

as Popper defines them. Semiotic theories *are* falsifiable because they trust the appearance of the signifier and work with it through a rational methodology. Other semiotic theories can operate differently, and falsify the first ones, exactly insofar as they both trust and work with the same signifying materials. That is the core of inter-subjectivity in semiotics. Yet, that is not the case with conspiracy theories. The surface of things is just discarded, and a hidden meaning fabricated with no relation with appearance.

The following diagram summarizes the four ontological ideologies described thus far:

	Being and appearance do not coincide	Being and appearance coincide
Appearance is reliable	SECRET / Semiotics	TRUTH / Positivism
Appearance is unreliable	LIE / Conspiracy Theories	FALSITY / Nihilism

A Taxonomy of Ontological Ideologies.

This taxonomy is not meant as a point of arrival but as one of departure. Several questions can be asked about it. Some of them concern the structure of the taxonomy, for instance, the way in which different types of hermeneutic discourse can be placed in the frame. Indeed, whereas the taxonomy associates semiotics with the ontological ideology and the epistemology of SECRET, it must not be read as a rigid grid, but as a dynamic scheme, where each quarter is separated from the others by thresholds more than by neat frontiers. Thus, as semiotics relinquishes its scientific attachment to the inter-subjective observation of the signifier and delves into speculations about the hidden layers of texts and culture, it resembles more and more a conspiracy theory. Such is the case of certain analyses offered, especially in the 1970s, by militant semiotics, or by semiotic guerrilla, where passionately denouncing an enemy ideology was even more important than coldly dissecting its language.


The same goes for semiotic theories that exceedingly emphasize the role of abduction in the passage from surface to depth, from appearance to meaning. Such is the case of Peircean semiotics, mainly in the interpretative version of it proposed by Eco, when focuses on romantic intuition more than on analytical method. William of Baskerville in *The Name of the Rose* still is a semiotician, although heavily resorting to abduction; yet, Robert Langdon in *The Da Vinci Code* is not a semiotician any more but a conspiracy theorist. The fact that nowadays the latter is more read and appreciated than the former is telling of the place of semiotics in the popular *imaginaire*.

In the same way, as semiotics, in its structural version, abandons the principle of immanence and endorses deterministic heuristics, be they neurophysiological or economic, it dangerously moves toward the area of reductionism. A symmetrical drift carries semiotics to forget the signifier and to turn into a sort of “semantic reductionism”. That has been the fault of certain trends of generative semiotics, when they adhered to the principle of immanence so strictly that they became oblivious of the surface, and of the indispensable feedback that it provides for the falsification of interpretative hypotheses.

Third, and last dynamic: when semiotics revalues the surface of signification to the point of detaching its analysis from that of the semantic level, thus turning the signifier into an object of playful speculation, then semiotics risks to step across the threshold that separates it from the

nihilism of deconstructionism.

The following diagram offers a visual summary of the tensions that agitate the taxonomy of ontological ideologies:



Dynamic tensions among ontological ideologies affecting the semiotic epistemology.

The publication, in 1966, of Algirdas J. Greimas's *Sémantique structurale* marked a breakthrough in the history of semiotics as the most ambitious attempt at capturing the laws that organize meaning in view of its expression. In the first diagram sketched above, the ontological ideology underneath Greimas's epistemology and methodological proposal situates itself at the core of the semiotic quarter of SECRET: the immanence of meaning and its manifestation are held as two separate dimensions, but a rational, systematic way to connect the former with the latter is viable. In a nutshell, indeed, Greimas's structural semantics is nothing but an extraordinary effort to introduce inter-subjective control in the human study of signification. In Greimas, signification is not reduced to its materiality, like in positivism; it does not disintegrate because of the slipperiness of both signifier and signified, like in deconstructionism; and it does not feature a mysterious, impenetrable relation between appearance and being, like in conspiracy theories. In Greimas's structural semantics, on the contrary, meaning is like an intricate jungle that, nevertheless, thanks to the analyst's titanic patience, progressively reveals its order, its patterned nature, and the laws that turn an array of invariants and variations into the fabric of signification, into the ordinate path between the manifestation of meaning and its immanence.

The question whether Greimas's confidence into the orderliness of signification was solidly grounded has engaged some among the best minds of the last quarter of 20th century, including Derrida and Eco. With hindsight, though, what mostly matters after almost fifty years since the first publication of *Sémantique structurale* is not to reappraise its intrinsic value, but to reevaluate it in the frame of a meta-semiotic effort, meant to articulate together ontological ideologies, epistemological proposals, and persistence of ideas through history.

There is little doubt that in 1966, when *Sémantique structurale: recherche et méthode* was first published in Paris by the prestigious publisher Larousse, an audience for this proposal already

subsisted, and was conquered by it forcefully, despite the undeniable difficulty of the meta-language. Thanks to Paolo Fabbri and Pino Paioni, the core of Greimas's proposal was made available to the Italian audience already in 1967, through the booklet *Modelli semiologici* [semiological models], published by Argalia, in Urbino, in 1967. Then, the first full translation of *Sémantique structurale* was also Italian: *Semantica strutturale: ricerca di metodo*, by Italo Sordi, published by Rizzoli, in Milan, in 1969. In order to retrace the seismography of ideas, details in the history of their publishing are extremely telling; Rizzoli was, and still is, one of the most prestigious Italian publishers. It being the publisher of the first Italian translation of *Sémantique structurale* indicates the central place that the Italian intellectual arena immediately offered to this methodological proposal. However, it is equally telling of the persistence of semiotic ideas that they currently find space mostly by small publishers around Europe.

In the 1970s, on the contrary, Greimas's work found editorial space by several European prime publishers. In 1971, Gredos, one of the most credited Spanish publishers, published Alfredo de la Fuente's translation of Greimas's *Sémantique structurale: Semántica estructural: Investigación metodológica*. The same year, in 1971, Jens Ihwe published a German translation: *Strukturale Semantik: Methodologische Untersuchungen*. The translation appeared by Vieweg Verlag in Braunschweig, an old and prestigious publisher specialized in the publication of the writings of great scientists like Albert Einstein and Max Planck. That reminds one of how Greimas's proposal presented itself and was welcome in Europe: as a scientific method for the analysis of meaning. The fact that nowadays no semiotician could advance the same pretense without being received with skepticism, irony, or even irritation reveals another feature of the semiotic trajectory in the history of ideas.

In 1973, Haquira Osakabe and Izidoro Blikstein published a Portuguese translation, *Semântica estrutural*, in São Paulo, by Cultrix and Edusp. As it is evident, the history and geography of these publications reconstitutes a map of how the School of Paris was about to spread in the following years, with strong concentrations in Italy, Brazil, Spain, but also Denmark and Finland. Gudrun Hartvigson translated *Sémantique structurale* in Danish in 1974. It was published by Borgen, in Copenhagen, under the title *Strukturel Semantik*. In 1979, Eero Tarasti published a Finnish translation, *Strukturaalista semantiikkaa*, by a publisher called "Gadeamus".

Adopting Lotman's model of cultural semiotics, one could say that, between the second half of the 1960s and the late 1970s, the semiosphere of continental Europe, and especially that of Latin and Scandinavian countries, was dominated by structuralism, and that Greimas's methodological proposal succeeded to gain its core.

Scrolling this list of translations, though, one is prompted to ask: what about English? What about the language that, already in the mid-1960s, was becoming the vehicular language of the world, first in mass culture, then also in the scientific discourse?

The first English translation of *Sémantique structurale* was published in 1983, by the time Greimas's *Du Sens* (1970), *Maupassant* (1975), *Sémiotique et sciences sociales* (1976) the *Dictionnaire* (1979), and *Du Sens II* (1983) had already been published in France and translated into several languages – mostly Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese – redefining at each new publication the perspective of Greimas's theory. The English translation appeared in Lincoln by University of Nebraska Press, a fine publisher that nevertheless does not compete with the giants of US academic publishing. The main translator, and author of the introduction, Ronald Schleifer, was, and still is, Professor of English at the University of Oklahoma. How to explain such delay and somewhat peripheral publication?

Greimas's meta-language was hard but not impossible to translate, as it is demonstrated by the rapidness and quality of translations in other languages. Moreover, the book mainly bears on a corpus of French examples, Bernanos's novels, but that was not a problem in English either.

Le journal d'un curé de campagne [The Diary of a Country Priest], published in French in 1936, had been translated into English immediately, in 1937.

In order to find an answer, it is interesting to analyze how translations rendered the title of *Sémantique structurale*. Indeed, this first title is followed by a secondary title, that in French reads: “*recherche et méthode*” [“research and method”]. The Italian translation of it had already downplayed its assertiveness: “research and method” became “*ricerca di metodo*” [“research of a method”]. However, the ambition of Greimas’s title was toned down especially in the English translation: “An Attempt at a Method”.

In December 1984, the journal *Modern Languages Notes* published a lucid review of this English translation. Robert Con Davis, also Professor of English at the University of Oklahoma, convincingly explained why *Sémantique structurale* was translated so late into English, so peripherally, and so timidly. Already in 1975, Jonathan D. Culler had published *Structuralist Poetics*, appeared by one of the most central US academic publishers, Cornell University Press. In 1976, one year later, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak had translated, also for a major US academic publisher – Johns Hopkins University Press – Derrida’s *De la grammatologie*, which was originally published, nevertheless, in 1967, one year after *Sémantique structurale*. The geography of the US translation of French scholarship therefore distorted its chronology: whereas Derrida’s deconstructionism was a reaction to structuralism, in the US, Greimas, who was the founder of structural semantics, was presented to the English readership as a somewhat vintage post-structuralist reaction to deconstructionism. Paradoxically, the US audience became familiar with deconstructionism before knowing structuralism, and knew structuralism only as a post-deconstructionist, post-structuralist wave.

History and geography of publishing are symptoms of intellectual evolutions, but do not fully explain it. The question remains of understanding why Greimas so forcefully struck a chord in the cultural semiosphere of 1960s and 1970s continental Europe, why it didn’t in the UK and in the US, and why, also in continental Europe, it lost momentum from the 1980s on. However, the most important question is the one that revolves about the legacy, and the prospects, of Greimas’s ambitions.

There is no clear-cut answer to these questions. In relation to the taxonomy of ontological ideologies proposed above, every switch or slide of paradigm fulfills different historical and anthropological needs. The sum of these changes brings about an alternation of ideologies where each reacts and succeeds to the previous one and simultaneously prepares and is cast aside by the next one without any clear indication of either agency or teleology.

What can be argued is that 1960s and 1970s readers and followers of Greimas enthusiastically adhered to an ontological ideology according to which communities can rationally debate about the perception of what appears in relation to the meaning of what does not. Later on, this trust in rationality, inter-subjective transparency, and universalism inexorably dwindled. On the one hand, Greimas’s popularity was undermined by the reaction of deconstructionism, amplified by the enormous popularity it gained in the US, mainly through providing theoretical support to various ideological claims (colonial studies, gender studies, post-Marxism, etc.). On the other hand, Greimas’s proposal was either stiffened into a “semantic positivism” or attached to reductionist theories.

Whereas deconstructionism denounced the hubris of Greimas’s universalism, reductionism anchored it exclusively to the study of nature. Greimas’s dream – which was also the dream of Saussure and Hjelmslev – to elaborate a rational but nevertheless social and cultural study of meaning, seemed lost.

However, a partisan of Greimas’s theoretical efforts could claim that intellectual history is currently turning page again, and that soon societies might rediscover Greimas, and Greimas’s

school, as a way out from the hermeneutic standstills of deconstructionism, reductionism, and conspiracy theories. In Europe as well as in the US, deconstructionism served a purpose in denouncing the encroachment of power in the sphere of language, meaning, and culture, and in advocating an emancipatory hermeneutic stand. However, merciless critique of structuralist universalism on the one hand brought about the progressive colonization of social sciences and humanities by hardcore scientific reductionism; on the other hand, it opened the gate to all sort of conspiracy thought and shameless revisionism. A dim consequence of the marginalization of any rational ambition in the humanities is that neo-positivism is still unable to tackle, let alone answer, the social demand for knowledge about meaning; simultaneously, conspiracy theories continue to muddy the waters of public discourse, giving the impression that no rational way exists to choose among competing hermeneutics.

Rediscovering Greimas in the international discourse of present-day semiotics means affirming the need for a new inter-subjective pact, for a new rationality, and also for a new universalism. If the world seems to speak an increasingly chaotic language, international semiotics should not add chaos to chaos, but revive with new energies and increased self-awareness an era in which linguists and semioticians thought that the way to comprehension and agreement was indeed difficult, but nevertheless possible. That the world had depth, separating appearance from being, manifestation from immanence, expression from meaning, but that semiotics had sufficiently strong lungs to dive into this depth and come up to the surface with a rational answer.

**THE ROOTS OF SEMANALYSIS;
JULIA KRISTEVA'S MASTERS IN
SEMIOTICS**

JULIA KRISTEVA'S SEMANALYSIS AND THE LEGACY OF ÉMILE BENVENISTE

Marga van Mechelen
University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
m.k.vanmechelen@uva.nl

Abstract

This essay describes the legacy of Émile Benveniste in the semanalysis of Julia Kristeva and their *Wahlverwantschaft*, also on a more personal level. They shared her criticism on semiotics, she followed his footsteps in looking for support in psychoanalytic theory in order to understand the genealogy of the signifying process better, as well as the heterogeneity of “texts” and the nature of the speaking subject. His influence becomes abundantly clear in her “L'engendrement de la formule” of 1969 in which she introduces her concept of semanalysis. While making Benveniste's concept of *signifiante* central to her vocabulary, she, at the same time and more so in later years, re-worked this and other notions of Benveniste, such as *histoire* in relation to *discours*.

1. The roots of semanalysis

Two years ago, Seuil and Gallimard published Émile Benveniste's final lectures at the Collège de France, from the years 1968 and 1969 (Benveniste 2012). Thirty eight years after his death on October 3, 1976, and forty five years after his career was cut short by an irreversible cardiovascular accident in late 1969 (Sebeok 1981: v). The publishers asked Julia Kristeva to write the preface to this collection of his final lectures. In it, she is able to summarize Émile Benveniste's general significance and what became so crucial to her own thinking: the speaking subject.

It was not the first time she paid tribute to Benveniste. An earlier account was *Langue, Discours et Société* (Kristeva, Milner & Ruwet 1975), a collection of articles intended as an homage to Benveniste. But the significance of Benveniste's thoughts for the development of Kristeva's semanalysis began with her reading of Benveniste's best-known articles, published in the two volumes of *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (1966 and 1974), some of which date from the mid-fifties.

In her first publications on semiotics, Kristeva already finds support in Benveniste for her criticism on semiotics. Her criticism brings two points into sharp focus. Firstly, the static character of semiotics and secondly, its a-historical character (Mechelen 2005). The first is directly related to the notions central to semiotics, namely “sign” and “signification”. The second relates to two different practices: how semioticians deal with the history of their own field of study and secondly, how they basically conduct their research. Kristeva reproaches semiotics both for its lack of (historical) reflection and the a-historical manner in which the signifying practices undertaken by semioticians are researched. Her criticism acquires its first programmatic form in 1966 when she introduces the notion of the *paragram* (Kristeva 1966). It refers to De Saussure’s study of the “anagrams”, which he started in 1906, but left unfinished a few years later (Starobinski 1971).¹ While De Saussure was searching for codes to decipher the intentional hidden “text”, Kristeva was more interested in the symptoms of unconscious contents in the articulated text, be it literary texts or other forms of expression. Three years later, in 1969, Kristeva introduces the term for which she is better known, namely *la sémanalyse*. In “L’engendrement de la formule” (Kristeva 1969) she describes semanalysis as the signifying theory that investigates *from within* the origin and development of texts.² Within the sign system, semanalysis opens another, hidden “scene” that is the genesis of the system. Incidentally, “hidden” is used here in a completely different sense than De Saussure used it. “L’engendrement de la formule”, which might be considered key to her thinking, introduces not only the concept of semanalysis, but also the concepts of *phenotext* and *genotext*. The phenotext is an imprinted text, but an articulation that can only be read, heard or seen by going back, vertically she says, to its origin, therefore through its engenderment (Kristeva [1969] 1978: 218). This origin might be translated as the genotext.³ Clearly her understanding of a hidden text in this article is directly related to what she wrote previously about paragrams and through this she adopts a critical position regarding the history of modern semiotics. The phenotext is considered a formula, a reduction and a sacrifice compared to the genotext, which is described as a gift and a *jouissance*.⁴ It is no surprise that Kristeva, who values the hidden text in such a way, is critical not only of semiotics, but of linguistics in general, especially of established scholars such as Noam Chomsky. To establish her theory more profoundly, she decided to re-read not only Freud’s *Traumdeutung* but also Lacan, and how he re-reads Freud and De Saussure. This was not an obvious choice for someone who at that time just had left a communist country. The component of “analysis” in semanalysis is often understood as a reference to psychoanalysis, though she defines it herself in “L’engendrement” as the theory that investigates *from within* the genesis of texts; the word “text”, of course, used in a broader sense. She calls the process of this genesis or genealogy of the signifying system *le procès de la signifiance*, translated by me and others as signifying process. Every practice contains such a process, though the degree to which it is expressed differs. She makes a distinction between a stronger and a weaker expression. The first, more powerful category is also known by a concept that she again derives from the Russian formalists, namely *poetic language*. In this, the material aspect, both the phonetic and the graphic signifiers, are emphatically present. It is clear that in her criticism of semiotics, Kristeva found support in psychoanalytic theory. But in order

¹ According to Starobinski in his *Les mots sous les mots. Les anagrammes de Ferdinand de Saussure* the studies about the anagrams were written between 1906 and 1909.

² “L’engendrement de la formule” was published in *Semiotikè. Recherches pour une sémanalyse*, in 1969. She gave Benveniste this volume a couple of weeks before his stroke.

³ Before Kristeva, the Russian linguists S.K. Saumjan [Shaumyan] and P.A. Sobolevau used these concepts of genotext and phenotext. See Coquet 1972: 345 and Kristeva 1969: 223.

⁴ Mauss, Lévi-Strauss nor Bataille are mentioned in this text but without doubt this notion of *gift* should be read in an anthropological sense and context. *Jouissance* is not yet the central notion it will be in her writings a couple of years later. Interpreted as *j’ouïs sens* it fits well with her idea that within the visible text a non-intentional meaning resonates.

to make this move, she needed the support of someone who took this step before. Undoubtedly, that person was Émile Benveniste.

2. *Wahlverwant*: Julia Kristeva and Émile Benveniste

Julia Kristeva accompanied Benveniste to an international semiotic conference in Warsaw, in 1968, the third important international meeting of semioticians in Eastern Europe, which paved the way for the AIS/IASS. Benveniste was raised in Syria, Aleppo, while Kristeva was born in Bulgaria. Both came from a polyglot environment, though Benveniste much more so than Kristeva.⁵ When Kristeva met Benveniste for the first time, she was very young and shy, so she says in the preface of *Dernières leçons* (Benveniste 2012). She had just arrived in France to study there and was eager to nestle in the heart of the French intelligentsia, as Benveniste did before. And of course the rest is history: both became prestigious lecturers at the French colleges and international universities.

In her enumeration of the facts of his personal life in the preface of the collection of his lectures, we notice a few other things they had in common, such as their left-wing political orientation. In the case of Benveniste, his sympathies, at least, towards rebellious young communists in the interbellum and his devotion to art and artists, especially the surrealists, and half a century later, the *Tel Quel* group. Kristeva had close contact with this group that founded its magazine in 1960. During their first conversations, they appeared to share an interest in Michael Bakhtin and his notion of *dialogue* as well. But still, from the record of their growing friendship, I draw the conclusion that besides their mutual intellectual interests, the fact that they both were “strangers”, to quote Roland Barthes (Barthes 1970), was the deeper ground of their *Wahlverwantschaft*. When “Paragram’s” was published, Benveniste was cited only once in a footnote, but when the article “L’engendrement” appeared three years later, he already plays a larger role. Six years later, a year before his death, Kristeva writes her first article dedicated to Benveniste, called “La fonction predicative et le sujet parlant” (Kristeva 1975), reprinted in *Polylogue* (1977). She talks about the revolution that his work brought forward in linguistics, though (at that time) still not visible enough.⁶

3. Under the banner of Benveniste’s concepts

In both her 2012 tribute, and that of 1975, Kristeva likes to underscore what distinguishes Benveniste from other linguists, also within semiotics. Even when those linguists and semioticians tried to connect language or semiotic systems to social practices, this was not done in a way that satisfied Benveniste, as she states in one of her better-known earlier articles, “The System and the Speaking Subject”, published in *Times Literary Supplement* (Kristeva [1973] 1975). In this article, she argues that the analysis of artistic practices ought to be the measure and criterion for semiotics and linguistics. And though she probably didn’t take this from Benveniste, she did recognize this mutual idea in his work. He at least gave her a better understanding of the heterogeneity of language itself. It is clear that she criticizes semiotics when it follows the linguistic model, placing it blindly at the service of the demand for social communication. Though signifying practices are supportive to social communication, the specific meaning of artistic practices is that they reject a utilitarian interpretation of social communication. In Kristeva’s

⁵ Benveniste’s mother taught Russian, Hebrew and French in Samokov, Bulgaria. Kristeva was unaware of this in the first years after she met him.

⁶ Around 1975, I was studying philosophy of language (besides my major in Art History). My professor was an adept of the Anglo-Saxon generative semantics and not very predisposed to French linguistics, with the exception of Benveniste, who I was allowed to choose for my reading list and who I indeed selected. At that time I already noticed that Benveniste was a generally respected linguist.

opinion, artistic practices are basically practices of transgression and, again, *jouissance*. She is informed in this conviction by her own experience with these practices, literature and poetry, as well as the visual arts.⁷

It is surprising that the influence of Benveniste on Kristeva's intellectual history has hardly been researched.⁸ Nonetheless it is important to consider this relation and the legacy of Benveniste in Kristeva's work for more than one reason. First, to follow the path from Benveniste's position to her own semanalysis. Second, to get a clue, in a more traditional sense, of what his influence entailed. We will continue with this point. Third, to gain a better understanding of how Kristeva interpreted Benveniste. And lastly, to gain deeper insight into the difference between semiotics and semanalysis. Let us first concentrate on a few concepts.

3.1. Signifiante

It is clear that Benveniste supported Kristeva in a certain direction through his writings and their conversations in the late eighties. Not forgetting their affinity on a deeper level, as mentioned already. But there are a few concrete facts that concerns concepts, which should not be omitted, because they reveal more clearly Kristeva's indebtedness to Benveniste. In an interview that Jean Claude Coquet (Coquet 1972) had with her in 1972, she explained that the concept of *signifiante* that she already used at that time, had its origins in the writings of Benveniste. We know how central it would become to her own writings in general. He introduces this concept of *signifiante* in one of his better known articles: "Sémiologie de la langue" (Benveniste [1969] 1974). Here he compares the semiology of De Saussure with the semiotics of Peirce, who according to Benveniste was not interested in how the "langue" operates.⁹ Though the status of the "langue" was the most important status to De Saussure, indeed when compared to other sign systems, Benveniste argues that it was never clearly defined by De Saussure. Benveniste emphasizes that this is necessary, but instead of giving his argument, he starts discussing concrete practices, like music and the visual arts. His main question is: "what is the value of the sign in-between those practices?" The reason why he is not able to give a satisfactory answer, so he says, is that the notions of the sign and langue appear to be an obstacle. His conclusion is that it is better to start from the individuality and particularity of these practices than from a general theory, and subsequently to investigate their relations and correspondences. It is not within the scope of this article to explain his argument in more detail, but his conclusion is interesting, mainly because it is interpreted in different ways. It seems contrary to what he said earlier when he returns halfway to the langue as the only possible system that in its structure and its functioning is truly semiotic. And therefore is needed as an interpreting system. Some semioticians stopped here and saw this as a confirmation of former positions. However, these were not his last words and it is Kristeva who listens especially to what he says next. When he distinguishes a semiotic and a semantic *signifiante*, she sees this as a way to delete the concept of sign altogether, because it blocked the access to all that exceeds the "langue". In Coquet's interview she makes an important remark when she states that her concept of semanalysis is identical to and encompassing what Benveniste calls "une sémantique ét une translinguistique" (Coquet 1972: 345).

⁷ Kristeva wrote two articles in the early seventies that were published in the visual art journal *Peinture, cahiers théoriques*, edited by four painters. The first one was about Giotto, called "L'espace de Giotto", later reprinted under a different title, "La joie de Giotto" (*Polylogue* 1977) and the second was about Giovanni Bellini ("Maternité selon Giovanni Bellini"), also reprinted in *Polylogue*.

⁸ In my book *Vorm en Betekening* (1993), a title that could be translated as *Form and Signifying process*, the relation between Benveniste and Kristeva plays a crucial role, though this relation was rarely discussed in secondary sources, neither at the time of publication, nor later on; at least that is the outcome of my recent research.

⁹ His criticism of De Saussure and Peirce is one of the most remarkable things in his final lectures, but of course we can also find it in his earlier writings.

3.2. Discours, énonciation and énoncé

In the first volume of the *Problèmes de linguistique générale* we find a reprint of a controversial article by Benveniste, published in 1956 in *La Psychanalyse* under the unpretentious title “Remarques sur la fonction du langage dans la découverte freudienne” (Benveniste 1966). This article, however, did not remain unmarked. More than the elaboration of his thoughts, it concerns, as the title says, only remarks. But his engagement to the Freudian discovery becomes clearly apparent. Kristeva discusses, in relation to this text of the mid-fifties, two concepts for which Benveniste is probably best known, namely *discours* and *énonciation*. Not all interpreters of Benveniste follow her in this direction, though they will agree that with his concept of *énonciation* he draws the attention to the speaking subject. The subject that speaks and makes of the langue his own langue while giving indices of his specific position. The act is called *énonciation* and expresses the relation to the articulated text (the *énoncé*). Obviously Benveniste wants to create bridges, between the langue, the *énonciation* and the *énoncé*, but also between, on the one hand, a social conception of the langue and on the other, the individual character of the parole or what he calls the *discours*. So Benveniste tries to reveal the dialogue between the two and consequently their continuous exchange. These dynamics are not possible without an *énonciateur*, i.e. an intermediary instance that, in the case of Benveniste, is maybe still understood in a more traditional semiotic manner, more so than with Kristeva. She brings his theory back into its Freudian context and more strongly confirms Benveniste’s idea of the continuous intervention of psychoanalytical processes in trans-linguistic messages. It is the acceptance of Freud’s theory of the unconscious and the splitting of the subject that should definitely lead to another approach to conscious communication.

3.3. Pronouns and the deictic pronomina

Two years after “Remarques sur la fonction du langage dans la découverte freudienne” (Benveniste 1966 [1956]), Benveniste published another article in a psychology magazine, *Journal de Psychologie*, in which he takes a next step by talking about the subjectivity of language in relation to personal pronouns. The title of the article is “De la subjectivité dans le langage” (Benveniste 1966 [1958]). Here he deals with the pronouns “I” and “you” which are signifiers that only make sense in concrete discursive situations. He continues by arguing that the same can be said about the deictic pronomina, such as “here” and “there”: “Ils ont en commun ce trait de se définir seulement par rapport à l’instance de discours où ils sont produits, c’est-à-dire sous la dépendance du je qui s’y énonce” (Benveniste 1966 : 262). There are a few other interesting examples, like how in utterances, in particular, the meaning of the verb changes considerably when only the personal pronoun has been altered. Let’s compare: “I assume that he left” and “you assume that he left”. The second sentence implies and confirms the utterance of an imagined former speaker; the first sentence does not. Another example is the difference between “je jure” and “il jure”. With Austen we could say that the first utterance is a performative one that has consequences for a real situation, socially and juridical. To use Benveniste’s word, it is an *engagement*, while “il jure” is nothing but a description. Kristeva sees these pronouns with an indexical status as *traces* in the Freudian sense. One could call them *indices* as well, referring to real persons and live communication. So the subject of enunciation leaves traces of the linguistic deed in the articulated text (the *énoncé*), a text that also has a history and that is part of a heterogeneous, semi-unconscious process.

4. Going her own way

After we have looked at the path that leads from Benveniste to Kristeva and the influence he had on her semanalysis, it’s time to raise the question where she went her own way. I think

it is quite clear that she already concentrated in her earlier texts on the “hidden scenes” and on the heterogeneity of signifying processes, much more than Benveniste ever did. On the other hand, she was convinced that with her concept of semanalysis she was taking Benveniste’s aim to bridge the distance between semantics and the trans-linguistique a step further. For that reason she proposed just one single concept, semanalysis, for the two, in order to show that it concerns only one process. “Nous appelons sémanalyse ce qu’il [Benveniste MvM] désigne comme une sémantique et une translinguistique” (Coquet 1972 : 345). She comes with yet another proposal to solve the confusion about what Benveniste understands by *signifiance*. Benveniste uses it both as what we might consider to be an umbrella notion, and as connected to a certain system. Therefore, a better and more unambiguous definition is needed, according to Kristeva, and hence she defines *signifiance* as the total of phenotext and genotext.

4.1. A psycho-semiotic approach of *histoire*

There are two other concepts of Benveniste to be mentioned, both are central to his enunciation theory, namely *discours* and *histoire*. The first is already mentioned. The second concept, *histoire*, describes a story that tells itself without a narrator. Both have been quite important, not only to Kristeva but to Greimasian semiotics as well. If we compare her interpretation to those of Greimasian semioticians, we see hardly any difference in the way they designate the central notions of this theory.¹⁰ However, the way they look at the function of these concepts in relation to the history and development of semiotics is quite the opposite. While in Greimasian semiotics they are instrumental for bridging the gap between De Saussure’s concepts of *parole* and *langue*, in order to create an escape from the chaotic and individual idea of the *parole*, Kristeva, following Benveniste, rather accepts these characteristics of any given language. She is confirming this more and more so in her writings after 1975. We recognize these differences in the use of the notion of *trace*. With Kristeva it brings us to the domain of the unconscious, to slips of the tongue, ambiguities and metaphors. They tell us something about the speaker, the speaking subject, and their impact on the effects of the utterance. In Kristeva’s view, based on Freud’s theory of dream interpretation, it makes no sense to distinguish between *discourse* and *histoire*. When someone tells about his dream, it does not matter *how* it is told. From a psycho-semiotic perspective, more important is how the supposed dream thoughts can be brought in connection with the manifest dream content. It is interesting to see that though she is focused on operations that exceed the normal formation of sentences, Kristeva is eager to show how heterogeneity functions on a micro level as well. Here again we see Benveniste’s influence. As, for example, on the level of the predicative function. While the subject of a sentence has an individual character, the predicate is more general and not so much connected to the immediate perception. The subject represents a state of being and the finite; the predicate, on the other hand, changes endlessly. So when first we speak about a “predication altérante”, in the end we must speak about a “predication infinitisante”, so she concludes (Kristeva 1975: 56).

5. Conclusion: semanalysis as the road “that never says, nor hides, but signifies”

Though other theorists, like Melanie Klein, became more important to Kristeva after 1975, her indebtedness to Benveniste remains to this day; this becomes abundantly clear in the preface to the collection of Benveniste’s lectures. Her semanalysis is a “science critique” and a “critique de la science”, but, following Benveniste, also an expression of the ideal to reform, to renew and

¹⁰ I have the interpretations of Emil Poppe and Eric de Kuyper in mind. See my *Vorm en Betekening. Kunstgeschiedenis, semiotiek, semanalse* (1993: 192-194), in which Felix Thürlemann is discussed more extensively as well (Mechelen 1993:142-185).

transform. Therefore, in her preface she emphasises and praises his ability to encompass the long tradition of linguistics, philology and semiotics, not only of the nineteenth and twentieth century, but also of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in particular Lancelot and Arnauld's *Grammaire générale et raisonnée*, dated 1660, which, as she mentions, brought the notion of the sign to the fore for the very first time. A sign, as it were, of the inclusion of the Cartesian subject into the syntax of the "langue". All later rifts – she mentions quite a few, are less important than the value of the legacies themselves. This attitude against histories is what they apparently have in common.

There was still another personal trait she shared with him that qualifies both their positions in linguistics and semiotics. Kristeva calls it Benveniste's style of thought, which is explained as an attempt to re-join morpho-syntactic details with the overarching linguistic and philosophical categories. He was able to signify, to "tell", to investigate in detail, hiding nothing behind aesthetic screens, while at the same time ensuring that messages never became closed messages or messages that obey just one system of thought or a single current in linguistics or semiotics. They both accept the inherent chaos of the twentieth-century developments in thinking, which left its marks on language itself. The experience of the living language, of speech, is what should ultimately determine the scientific approach. It's what makes us human beings, one could say. An act that never has a fixed meaning, but is always in a definitely unfinished state of becoming.

Speaking about Benveniste's approach, 43 years later, Kristeva feels the need to clarify why this approach was so extraordinary at that time. Contrary to linguists such as Bloomfield and Harris, for Benveniste linguistics meant to be engaged not only with the non-subjective formal elements of language, but also with the power of language that far surpasses the ability "to name". As Kristeva says: they were the days when semiology became synonymous with freedom of expression and thought. Hence it was understood internationally, not only in the West, but also in the East. Semiology was the alliance between both worlds; a prefiguration of the situation after 1989. Benveniste referred to the capacity of language to generate other systems of signs too, yet still as the only system capable of interpretation. And here I think Roland Barthes speaks to us again.

Anno 2014, Kristeva has left semiotics far behind, so she said when she was invited to attend the IASS congress in Sofia, and yes, her current topics are of a different nature, though I think she still examines them with the intention and eye of a semiotician. Despite the fact that she was – thanks to Benveniste I would say – devoted to the AIS organization for many years, as a member of the board, the editorial committee of Mouton, we should also consider and accept her as a critic of semiotics.

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SEMANALYSIS AND LINGUISTICS IN JULIA KRISTEVA. LITERARY WRITING, DIALOGUE, STRANGENES

Susan Petrilli
University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
susan.petrilli@gmail.com

Augusto Ponzio
University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
augustoponzio@libero.it

Abstract

As early as 1969 in *Semeiotiké* Julia Kristeva had already attempted a sort of short-circuit by connecting the linguistic and semiotic approaches to the psychoanalytical with her proposal of “semanalysis”. She compares the Cartesian ego, the transcendental ego theorized by Husserlian phenomenology and the self of enunciation linguistics with the doubling of the subject thematized by Freud and his theory of the unconscious. To focus on the unconscious means to modify the object of linguistics given that it implies describing signification as a heterogeneous process. Beginning from such topics addressed in this framework, Kristeva reflects on poetic language considering its implications for the question of the speaking subject. Moreover, she focuses on the I-other relationship, therefore on dialogue and inevitably on the Bakhtinian conception which on the basis of thematization of dialogue itself achieves a sort of Copernican revolution *à propos* the I-other relationship. Beyond poetic language and literary writing, beyond the theme of dialogue and of the *polylogue* and in relation to the question of the other, another central theme in Kristeva’s work is the foreigner, the stranger.

1. Language theory, literary writing and ethics

In an essay of 1974, “L’éthique de la linguistique”, republished in *Polylogue*, 1977, and subsequently in English as “The Ethics of Linguistics,” in *Desire in Language*, 1980, Julia Kristeva observes that the language sciences including linguistics should not ignore the question of ethics. Nor will it suffice, she continues, to simply add a few supplementary notions on the role

of ideology in language. The question of ethics concerns the speaking subject, that concrete speaking subject that each one of us is; and not, we might add, the “ideal speaker” *à la* Chomsky which Kristeva too readily critiques when addressing the question of transformational generative grammar.

No doubt the concept of speaking subject needs to be questioned in light of the Cartesian subject as thematized by authors like Marx, Nietzsche and Freud (cf. Kristeva 1980b: 22). The problem of the truth of discourse in linguistics requires that we verify whether there exists a correspondence between such discourse and effective speaking, that is, speaking not of the abstract speaker, but of the concrete, individual, singular speaker. Neither the Cartesian ego nor the Husserlian transcendental ego account for the speaking subject; neither account sufficiently for the speaking subject's loss (*perte*), for its outlay (*dépense*) (*Ibid.*: 24; and 1977: 358).

Kristeva makes the following observation:

...formulating the problem of linguistic ethics means, above all, compelling linguistics to change its object of study. The speech practice that should be its object is one in which signified structure (sign, syntax, signification) is defined within boundaries that can be shifted by the advent of a semiotic rhythm that no system of linguistic communication has yet been able to assimilate (1980b: 24).

To keep account of semiotic rhythm means to pass from the sentence, the unit privileged by language, understood as *langue*, to the utterance, a concrete unit of discourse endowed not only with meaning, but also with sense (meaning + direction). The field of language where rhythm emerges best is the poetic. The task is not to study poetic language separately from ordinary language (*langage courant*), but rather to reach a better understanding of how ordinary language functions. To obtain this requires that we explore the boundaries of language, its margins, those areas where language is exposed to upheaval, dissolution, and transformation: “Situating our discourse near such boundaries might enable us to endow it with a current ethical impact. In short, the ethics of a linguistic discourse may be gauged in proportion to the poetry that it presupposes” (*Ibid.*: 25).

For an approach to linguistics that keeps account of rhythm, accentuation of the utterance, therefore of poetic language, Freud's psychoanalysis is important. According to Kristeva, Freud's discovery of the unconscious provided the necessary conditions for reading poetic language in association with a linguistics of the utterance produced by the concrete speaking subject.

An important contribution to poetic language comes from twentieth century avant-garde movements. In “The Ethics of Linguistics”, for France Kristeva points to Mallarmé and Artaud, though she avoids naming the linguist she alludes to: “a most eminent modern linguist believed that ‘in the last hundred years’ there have been only two significant linguists in France: Mallarmé and Artaud” (*Ibid.*: 25). For the Russian avant-garde Kristeva names Mayokovsky and Khlebnov.

According to Kristeva we need to listen in the laboratory of the avant-garde, to understand its experience in terms of a relationship that could be qualified only as a “love relationship”. She perceives such an orientation in the path taken by Roman Jakobson: “It should not be surprising, then, that it is his discourse and his conception of linguistics, and those of no other linguist that could contribute to the theory of the unconscious – allowing us to see it being made and unmade (*poiein*) – like the language of any subject” (*Ibid.*: 26). Kristeva underlines the importance of Jakobson's contribution to establishing phonology and structural linguistics in general, to the study of Slavic languages and to problems of linguistic learning. But all this is based *first and*

foremost on his listening to poetic language. This is a leitmotif which pervades all of Jakobson's research and orients his approach to language, and which provides it with no less than an ethical dimension. Kristeva concludes that Jakobson's linguistics "appears to bracket the technical nature of some contemporary tendencies such as generative grammar" (*Ibid.*: 26).

Ultimately Jakobson's linguistics "has something to say about the speaking subject". He reaches phonology through his studies on poetic language, rhythm, the poetic verse with a special interest for the writings of Mayakovsky and Khlebnikov. His early studies are dedicated to both these poets. In the words of Kristeva:

It is quite an experience to listen to Harvard University's recording of Roman Jakobson's 1967 lecture, "Russian Poetry of my Generation" – he gave a reading of Mayakovsky and Khlebnikov, imitating their voices, with the lively, rhythmic accents, thrust out throat and fully militant tone of the first; and the softly whispered words, sustained swishing and whistling sounds, vocalizations of the disintegrating voyage toward the mother constituted by the "trans-mental" ("zaum") language of the second. To understand the real conditions needed for producing scientific models, one should listen to the story of their youth, of the aesthetic and always political battles of Russian society on the eve of the revolution and during the first years of victory, of the friendships and sensitivities that coalesced into lives and life projects. From all this, one may perceive what initiates a science, what it stops, what deceptively ciphers its models. No longer will it be possible to read any treatise on phonology without deciphering within every phoneme the statement, "Here lies a poet". (*Ibid.*: 27)

Reading Mayakovsky when in "How are Verses Made" he says "you have to bring the poem to the highest pitch of expressiveness," Kristeva observes that at that point the code opens to the rhythmic body and forms another sense "à venir" in contrast to present sense, a future, impossible sense. The significant component of this "future anterior" is "the word perceived as word," which opens to the struggle between rhythm and sign system. But Mayakovsky's suicide, Khlebnikov's disintegration (see Jakobson 1931), and Artaud's internship prove that this struggle can be impeded. Nonetheless, Kristeva claims that

Linguistic ethics, as it can be understood through Jakobson's practice, consists in following the resurgence of an "I" coming back to rebuild an ephemeral structure in which the constituting struggle of language and society would be spelled out (*Ibid.*: 34).

Kristeva concludes her essay with the observation that though the currently dominant orientation in linguistics, generative grammar, may keep account of Jakobson's position in studies on the system of language, especially phonology, nonetheless it neglects all that part of his work as we are now describing it. Generative semantics, for example, tends to neglect such phenomena as elision, metaphor, metonym, parallelism (which Jakobson experimented in his studies on biblical and Chinese verse). In Kristeva's view:

the dramatic notion of language as a risky practice, allowing the speaking animal to sense the rhythm of the body as well as the upheavals of history, seems tied to a notion of signifying processes that contemporary theories do not confront (*Ibid.*: 34).

In an essay of 1977 entitled “Polylogue”, published in a volume by the same title and translated into English as “The Novel as Polylogue”, now in *Desire in Language* (1980), Kristeva most importantly evidences once again how the real object of linguistic studies is the utterance. In the part entitled “Beyond the Sentence: The Transfinite in Language”, she insists that to recover the utterance as the fundamental unit of language in linguistic analysis is to thematize what is fundamental in concrete speech: intonation and rhythm. She also mentions music as the material of intonation, that body in which intonation consists and takes shape.

Instead of serving as the upper limits of enunciation, the *sentence-meaning-significance* here acts as its lower limits. Through and in conjunction with these limits, but not below, there occurs a breakthrough of what may be called “primary” processes, those dominated by intonation and rhythm. (Kristeva 1980b: 167)

It is necessary to go beyond the sentence: more-than-a-sentence, more-than-meaning, more-than-significance. Always more: more-than-syntactic. What always operates in the enunciation/utterance is a *dépense*, expenditure. The live word is never less, but always more. Kristeva points out that to rediscover the relationship with rhythm and sound means to rediscover the relationship that each speaker had with its mother, as a child and before that as an infant. We might add that this approach helps recover mother sense as described by Victoria Welby (see her papers on the topic collected in Petrilli 2009: Ch. 6) in the relation with the word.

The point is to rediscover the intonation, scansion and rhythms preceding the signifier's position as the position of language (*langue*), to rediscover the vital relation with the mother before that relationship with the *undifferentiated (abstract) mother* from which there derives an entity that is just as undifferentiated (abstract): maternal language (*langue maternelle*). What is involved, as Kristeva says, is the possibility of the experience of early childhood; of recovering language in relation to the “body proper” (*corps propre, Leib*) within the symbolic logical system. On this account, Kristeva speaks of a “second birth”, the Dionysiac birth. We already find here delineated the difference that constitutes a central topic in Kristeva's conception, as expressed from her very first book, *Semiotiké*: that is, the difference between the semiotic, to simplify, the maternal, on one hand, and the symbolic, the paternal, the order of the father, on the other.

In an essay she originally published in 1975 and again in *Polylogue* (1977), entitled “D'une identité à l'autre” (pp. 124-147), in English (“From One Identity to an Other”), in *Desire in Language* (1980), Kristeva says that: 1) it is not possible to address poetic language without considering “the presymbolic and trans-symbolic relationship to the mother” (Kristeva 1980b: 137) as aimless wondering within the identity of the speaker and the economy of its very discourse; 2) Moreover, this relationship of the speaker to the mother “is probably one of the most important factors producing interplay within the structure of meaning as well as a questioning approach of subject and history” (*Ibid.*).

In fact, in this same essay Kristeva critiques the dominant conception of the subject, of the self as it has been described through three central authors in Western philosophical reflection

on the problem: Descartes, Kant and Husserl. Reference is to a tradition that proceeds from “I think” to the “transcendental ego”.

According to Kristeva the problem of the subject, in particular the speaking subject, is outlined more adequately in the linguistic theory of Émile Benveniste. This above all because the speaking subject is considered by Benveniste as the subject of the utterance and includes in the operating consciousness of this subject “not only logical modalities but also interlocutory relationships” (*Ibid.*: 131).

In this essay as well, “D’une identité à l’autre”, Kristeva evidences yet again the importance of poetic language for the language sciences as much as for the human sciences in general. As we know, to poetic language she dedicated a large volume of 1974 entitled, *La Révolution du langage poétique*. An understanding of language is not possible without considering “heterogeneousness”, the heterogeneous component in language (“*l’hétérogène*”), with respect to sense and signification: this is the same heterogeneousness “detected genetically in the first echolalias of infants as rhythms and intonations anterior to the first phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, and sentences” (Kristeva 1980b: 133). Once again this is a matter of the heterogeneousness that is traced in rhythms and intonations and in the glossalalias in psychotic discourse. And it is also the heterogeneous which in poetic language produces so-called musical effects, “but also nonsense effects that destroy not only accepted beliefs and significations, but, in radical experiments, syntax itself, that guarantee of thetic conscious (of the signified object and ego)” (*Ibid.*). And the examples that Kristeva gives on this account are particularly significant: carnivalesque discourse, Artaud, Mallarmé and certain Dadaist and Surrealist experiments (cfr. *Ibid.*).

To return to the question of the speaking subject, Kristeva thus points out that to correspond to this heterogeneity of language the notion of speaking subject as theorized by the sciences of language must concern the subject-in-process (*Ibid.*: 135; see also Petrilli 2013: 150–151). And she goes on to explain again the reason for her need to have semiotics encounter Freud’s psychoanalysis, an encounter she had already denominated “semanalysis” in the subtitle of her early book of 1969, *Sémiotiké*. “Recherche pour un sémanalyse”:

It is of course Freud’s theory of the unconscious that allows the apprehension of such a subject [subject-in-process]; for through the surgery it practiced in the operating consciousness of the transcendental ego, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalyses did allow, not for (as certain simplifications would have it) a few typologies or structures that might accommodate the same phenomenological reason, but rather for heterogeneity, which, known as the unconscious, shapes the signifying function. (Kristeva 1980b: 135).

2. The speaking subject, dialogue, otherness, strangeness to self

The French translation of Mikhail Bakhtin’s monograph on Dostoevsky (1963), *La poétique de Dostoïevski*, appeared in 1970 with a presentation by Julia Kristeva entitled “Une poétique ruinée”. Kristeva had already turned her attention to Bakhtin earlier. In fact, the year before, she had already published the monograph mentioned above, *Sémiotiké. Recherches pour une sémanalyse*, 1969. An essay from this book, “Le mot, le dialogue et le roman” is dedicated to Bakhtin (the Eng. trans., “Word, Dialogue and Novel”, is included in *Desire and language*, pp. 64-91). This essay is also available in Italian translation in a volume entitled *Michail Bachtin. Semiotica, teoria della traduzione and Marxism*, edited by Augusto Ponzio (1977; see also Bachtin e il suo Circolo 2014). In her essay, Kristeva observes that Bakhtin evidences the dynamic character of the literary text, in which literary writing is elaborated, is in becoming in relation to another structure.

Bakhtin renders structure and structuralism dynamic because he considers the “literary word” as the intersection of textual surfaces and not as a fixed result, a fixed point. The literary word emerges from dialogue among different writings, that of the writer, the receiver, the hero (or character), current or antecedent cultural context, etc. (cf. *Ibid.*: 106).

Through Bakhtin Kristeva (see *Polylogue*, 1977) shows how dialogue and polyphony function in the literary text. Dialogism characterizes writing though it is manifested to different degrees in different literary genres. For example, by comparison to Dostoevsky, Tolstoj would seem to be a monological author.

In 1969 the book *Le langage, cet inconnu* appeared with the publishers SGPP, signed by Julia Joyaux, a pseudonym. The book was republished by Seuil in 1981 signed Julia Kristeva. The Italian translation by A. Ponzio appeared in 1992 and included an interview with Kristeva. Ponzio met Kristeva in December 1973, at a conference in Milan on *Follia e società segregativa*, promoted by Armando Verdiglione and organized by the collective *Semiotica e psicanalisi*. Other speakers present at what turned out to be an extraordinary event included Félix Guattari, Serge Leclaire, Jean-Joseph Gloux, Daneil Levy, Octave Mannoni, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Philippe Sollers. The proceedings were published by Feltrinelli (1974) and included an important text by Verdiglione himself, “La materia non semiotizzabile” (cf. Verdiglione, ed., 1974).

At this conference in Milan, Kristeva delivered a lecture entitled “Soggetto del linguaggio e pratica politica” (The subject of language and political practice). In it she speaks of “regression” with reference to the political and social situation of the time, a description that is still relevant today. By “regression” Kristeva understood submission to the law and identity. Dominant identity is national identity that cuts across and surpasses social contradictions in the name of a superior concern: nationalism. She maintained that from Plato’s time politics prescribes a *common measure* and in this way gives rise to a *community*. The common measure is language. Linguistics, including generative transformational linguistics contributes to this project by considering language as an object that can be measured, by evidencing its logical order, its character as a system, its manageability, its controllability, and all this in spite of Freud and of literary writing. “The discovery of the unconscious is preceded by and accompanies one of the most spectacular explosions of the ‘avant-garde’: Mallarmé, Lautréamont, Joyce, Kafka, Artaud. Their writings subvert the ideological code (family, religious, state mythemes), as much as the code of language (last guarantee of the unity of the subject)” (in Verdiglione, ed., 1974: 61).

The regression Kristeva registered at the time and which today is worsening is the constitution of systems that dominate practice: the allusion is to national identities. “National identity is precisely the common measure in language and in national identities”. The paranoia inflation of national identities is pushed to closure, to monologism. “What is excluded is the stranger – the other national identity, or (and above all) the one who, in the same country, does not speak the same language, the writer. Xenophobia reaches its peak”.

But Kristeva did not limit her discourse to national identity. She directed her critique at other forms of closure in identities such as belonging and difference, or better, difference that is exclusive and excluding. She even critiqued recent and what appeared to be radical movements like the feminist movements of the time when they committed to searching for their identity, “how to be nothing but a woman,” possibly with the Pope’s benediction. Kristeva criticized the tendency to search for one’s identity in some form of system, a closed unit, organization (*Ibid.*: 63-64).

A strong connection emerges in Kristeva’s work between her theoretical interests and social and political commitment. A. Ponzio underlined this aspect of her work at a presentation in the series “Giovedì letterari” (Teatro Piccini, Bari), when he had the pleasure of presenting her personally to an enthusiastic public. In her own words: “To address theory of languages and signs

in general today is not at all an innocent gesture.” Through this connection she questions mental habits, common places, behaviour considered obvious and natural, through which the subjects that adopt them contribute, mostly without realizing, to reproducing the dominant social system with its contradictions and inequalities.

With “semanalysis” Kristeva proposes a science of “signifying practices” connected with linguistic and sign work which each one of us performs within given social relations of production; therefore, it is the study of social ideologies, of the formation of the conscious (also viewed in its coercive function toward otherness relegated to the unconscious), of texts reflecting official communication, dominant logic and the common places of discourse.

Linguistics during the 1960s became a guide science. This was a consequence of its functionality to the social order. To understand this we need to look at the connection between linguistics and a tradition that developed in terms of generative grammar, defined with Chomsky as Cartesian grammar.

In her book of 1969, *Le langage, cet inconnu*, Kristeva outlines the field of linguistics, indicating limits, its incapacity to include and consider certain aspects of language. These limits are due to the history itself of linguistics and of its relations to European culture, with phonocentrism, with the priority or exclusivity attributed to alphabetical writing, etc. Instead, Kristeva reserves an important place for non alphabetical writing systems in this book.

Subsequently, in the years that followed, linguistics enriched its analyses with reference to reflection on language in the fields of philosophy of language and semiotics. There is an epistemological orientation in linguistics today that to an extent can be reconducted to Kristeva among others. This epistemological orientation has developed at the same pace as the linguistics of the utterance.

Linguistics of the utterance emerges alongside linguistics of language (*langue*) and keeps account of discourse as an act, and therefore of the speaker, the receiver, their explicit and implicit intentions, of the implied, the unsaid.

However, in an interview with Kristeva by Ponzio, included as an introduction to the Italian edition of *Le langage, cet inconnu* (1992), as in other places of her writings, she observes that though there have been developments, we have not gone far on an epistemological level from a philosophical tradition that witnessed the rise of linguistics. Though the linguistics of the utterance implies the notion of the subject, it does not question it nearly thoroughly enough.

As from 1969 with her book *Semeiotikè* Kristeva attempts a short-circuit by connecting linguistics and semiotics to psychoanalysis and proposes what she calls “semanalysis”. In this perspective she compares the Cartesian ego, the transcendental ego theorized by Husserlian phenomenology and the self of utterance linguistics with the doubling of the subject (identity/alterity) theorized by Freud and his theory of the unconscious. To focus on the unconscious means to modify the object of linguistics given that this implies to describe signification as a heterogeneous process.

Consideration of the unconscious fundamentally modifies the object of linguistics leading to a description of signifying processes in terms of heterogeneity. But Saussure had already claimed as much in his own terms, and in spite of his interpreters who searched for the system in his writings: in language (*langue*) there are only differences, and the speaker is not at all master of the word given that “his” language (*langue*) is “arbitrary”.

In the second edition of *Le langage, cet inconnu* (1981: 23), Kristeva adds a note in which she refers to Jacques Derrida and his concept of *écriture* and to the question of the predominance of the *trace* over the *phoné*. Kristeva observes that the concept of writing allows us to think of language, including its manifestation in terms of *phoné*, as *différance* (a neologism he introduces for the process of deferral/differentiation). Language (*langue*) is presented as writing on the basis

of “gramma-différance”. Writing is inherent to language (*langage*), and the phonetic word can be considered as writing.

Consequently subjectivity and objectivity can both be considered as the effect of difference; the subject depends on the complex of differences, on the system of *différance*, its very constitution consists in its capacity to divide itself and differentiate itself.

In an interview with Jacques Derrida, “Sémiologie et grammatologie” (1971), Kristeva asks Derrida (p. 19) “Qu’est-ce que la *gramme* comme ‘nouvelle structure de la non-présence’? Qu’est-ce que l’écriture comme ‘différence’?”. Derrida responds as follows:

Le gramme comme différence, c’est alors une structure et un mouvement qui ne se laissent plus penser à partir de l’opposition présence/absence. La différence, c’est le jeu systématique des différences, des traces des différences, de l’*espacement* par lequel les éléments se rapportent les uns aux autres. [...] C’est aussi le devenir-espace de la chaîne parlée – qu’on a dit temporelle et linéaire ; devenir-espace qui seul rend possible l’écriture et toute correspondance entre la parole et l’écriture, tout passage de l’une à l’autre.

But Kristeva’s main interest is writing in the stylistic sense of the term, literary writing, writing as “verbal art” (Bakhtin): Mallarmé, Céline, Proust, Nerval... In literary writing aspects of the word emerge that are not evident in the ordinary use of language. What in terms of Freudian theory may be identified as drives unfolding on the margins between the biological and the symbolic. “Poetic” style as understood by the Russian formalists, that is, with reference to literary language, can be considered as a modification of the discourse of daily genres under the effect of drives or “primary processes.” Signification as a heterogeneous process is manifest in literary writing where heterogeneity of the speaker himself finds full expression.

The text, through its rhythm even, vehicles messages that are heterogeneous with respect to what it expresses explicitly. Kristeva’s interest in this kind of message, that is, for what she calls “the semiotic” dimension distinguished from “the symbolic,” involves a shift of attention to rhythm, but also to the subdivision, the *découpage*, of fixed lexemes in the linguistic sign. This induced her in *La révolution du langage poétique. L’avant-garde à la fin du XIX^e siècle* (1974) to address the literary text, with special reference to Mallarmé. This approach explains Kristeva’s dual interest for writing and psychoanalysis where the latter is developed at both a theoretical-methodological and a therapeutic level. Writing and analysis both address the limit-states of language.

In *La Révolution du langage poétique*, Kristeva introduces the distinction between *symbolique* and *sémiotique*. The *symbolic* designates language as it is described by linguistics and the tradition it belongs to, that is, what in language is the “common basic measure of the community”, what in language belongs to the order of the sign, to the time of nomination, syntax, signification and denotation. The *semiotic* defers to primary processes and drives that enter into contradiction with the symbolic. *Literary writing* is produced on the margin between *symbolique* and *sémiotique*, or simply *writing* (understood as the practice of the writer, distinct from transcription and the mnemotecnic-communicative function).

Writing thus described is associated with the semiotic in search of its verbal translation into the symbolic. Writing is a completion of the semiotic; it invests the semiotic with the word. Its value consists in enhancing the experience of significance, of the heterogeneous in the process of signification. The literary text, in its very own rhythm, vehicles heterogeneous messages with respect to what it expresses explicitly. From this point of view, literary writing extends the horizon

of questions about language. And these questions engage the dynamics of the speaking subject.

Kristeva develops the distinction between semiotic and symbolic on the level of psychoanalysis. In analytical encounter we face the difficulties of the word or sense which testify to the difficulty of living. From this point of view, understanding the semiotic in a situation where it is suffocated or neutralized by the symbolic, is a way for the analyst to listen to the word of the other. Kristeva analyses these different situations that evidence the heterogeneity of signification, which analytical practice experiences directly in such books as *Folle vérité* (a collaborative volume of 1979), *Pouvoirs de l'horreur. Essais sur l'abjection* (1980), *Histoires d'amour* (1983) et *Soleil noir, dépression et mélancolie* (1987).

Literary writing aside, when a question of analytical listening, intonation and listening are as important as they are in writing. *Soleil noir* offers examples of attention, of listening toward the mad word, at a suprasegmental level of language – as the linguists would say – this is not the level of the signs of the symbolic but of the pre or trans-verbal which for Kristeva constitutes the semiotic. This repropose an issue that is central in *La révolution du langage poétique*, that is, the question of retrieving the semiotic through a focus on rhythm and attention as much as on the *découpage* of lexemes.

Writing and Freudian analysis share the propensity for listening to the word of the other: the other's word in its *uniqueness, singularity*. Thanks to such practices, we escape the perspective of a civilization that no doubt has produced the rights of individual, the Human rights. But this civilization is not capable of overcoming these abstractions. Prior to recognizing human rights is recognition of the rights of *singularity*. Singularity manifests itself to differing degrees in two types of encounter among words, in two types of listening: 1) encounter among words in writing and listening by the writer, 2) encounter among words and listening in analysis.

With Kristeva we can ask how to elaborate a theory that is sufficiently refined to account for singularity, for singular difference, for “singular inflections of the word”: this is theory of language as *mathesis singularis*. We are dealing with a word that calls for listening whether a question of writing and reading a literary text or of analytical practice. According to Kristeva this is a question of the relation of hospitality and welcome. And this relation presents what we can call an “ethical” dimension, as understood by Lévinas, which studies on language cannot ignore.

The title of Kristeva's 1969 book, *Le langage, cet inconnu*, proposes a motif in her subsequent research with the adjective “inconnu” centred on the concept of “étrangeté”; this motif recurs in the linguistic conscious and concerns relations between the speaker and the language that speaker speaks, between one language and another language, one culture and other cultures.

When in *Le Vieil Homme et les loups* (1991) she writes that our times recall the end of the Roman empire, Kristeva (as she says in her interview with A. Ponzio) is not thinking only about the moral crisis, but also the loss of values in linguistics and cultural tradition characteristic of western culture. She believes that the task of intellectuals, humanists and above all of linguists and semioticians is to recover the past in order to rianimate and renew it, and certainly not to transform and deposit it in some museum for the sake of identity sclerotized. Tradition offers a source of wealth to the subject through which to express one's singularity, difference, quality, cipher. The more the code through which the individual expresses itself is restricted, the more the possibility for creativity is reduced. Enhancement of tradition goes together with “hybridisation”. Grafts on tradition concerning experience, behaviours, values, feelings represent the effective possibility of growth and enrichment.

As Kristeva writes in *Étrangers à nous-mêmes* (1988: 9):

Étranger: rage étranglée au fond de ma gorge, ange noir troublant la transparence, trace opaque, insondable. Figure de la haine et de l'autre, l'étranger n'est ni la victime romantique de notre paresse familiale, ni l'intrus responsable de tous les maux de la cité. Ni la révélation en marche, ni l'adversaire immédiat à éliminer pour pacifier le groupe. Étrangement, l'étranger nous habite: il est la face cachée de notre identité, l'espace qui ruine notre demeure, le temps où s'abîment l'entente et la sympathie. De le reconnaître en nous, nous nous épargnons de le détester en lui-même. Symptôme qui rend précisément le 'nous' problématique, peut-être impossible, l'étranger commence lorsque surgit la conscience de ma différence et s'achève lorsque nous nous reconnaissons tous étrangers, rebelles aux liens et aux communautés.

Extraneity of one's language is extraneity of one's own conscious, extraneity of the unconscious. "Tell me the language you speak and I will tell you what your unconscious is": the Freudian postulate recalls that the conscious and the unconscious speak the same language that the subject speaks. Vološinov develops this position in *Freudianism*, 1927 (see Chapter IX on language, unconscious and ideology).

But the situation in which signification manifests itself glaringly as a heterogeneous process, as nomadism and extraneity, is that of the subject that does not speak its own language, but another language, or better, that speaks a language which, though one's own, resounds all the same as foreign, while the language of origin lives in the nocturnal memory of the body, as a language of other times which, even if it withdraws from possession by the subject, never abandons that subject. Kristeva analyzes this situation in a section of *Étrangers à nous-mêmes* entitled, "Le silence du polyglotte".

The subject that speaks a new language can perfect itself as to how to manage a new instrument, but his or her word remains the word of others. In this situation as a speaking subject placed between two languages, in "cette anesthésie de la personne happée par une langue étrangère", in this "mutisme polyforme" of the polyglot, heterogeneity of the process of significance itself evidences the doubling of the "unitary" subject, hidden in the normal use of language.

In literary writing the "silence of the polyglot" is transformed into "silence" of the writer, as a listening position, a position that characterizes the writer, that becomes the possibility of distancing, typical of the writer: as Bakhtin says in his 1970-71 notes (in Bakhtin 1986), the writer dresses in silence and uses a language while standing outside it. The writer gives up mastery over the word which is delusory, goes into the listening mode and resorts, through writing, to the "different forms of silence": irony, allegory, parody, metaphor, parable... Between two languages, as Kristeva observes, the foreigner knows what the loquacious and arrogant native speaker does not know, that it, that nobody is master of one's "own" language (nor is it possible to statalize, to nationalize language, in spite of the "reality" of national languages, on the basis of which identities are established, exclusions are justified and conflicts triggered).

The foreigner knows that with respect to the language he speaks, the language that speaks him, that silence is not only imposed upon him, but is part of him, in him. Here then comes the refusal to say, nothing to say, no reply, no answer to interrogation, to wanting to hear. Not to say anything, there's nothing to say, nothing can be said, the unspeakable (cf. Kristeva 1988: 28-29). With respect to this situation, the way out is writing.

With Kristeva we can address the problem of the relation between the national and the foreigner, which today assumes violent forms, with the following formulation: how to conciliate the intermingling of nations in states, on one hand, and maintaining national differences, on

the other. The assertion of linguistic and cultural difference can translate into the arrogance of identity (Giambattista Vico's "Boria delle nazioni").

A typical example of such arrogance is offered by Kristeva when she states with reference to her experience as a novel writer that the French can eventually accept discourse that presents a mirror of society like that in *Samourais* (a novel she published in 1979). However, they perceive the novel which reveals a condition of suffering, of pain, a sort of hell, as an attack on good taste.

Étrangers à nous-mêmes analyses the presence and destiny of the foreigner in European civilization, underlining the hybrid of his past and of his cosmopolitan future. Kristeva traces the role of "inquiétante étrangeté" in various authors (Rabelais, Montaigne, Érasme, Montesquieu, Diderot, Kant, Herder, fino a Camus e Nabokov) and in various moments in history: the Greeks with their "meteci" and their "Barbarians"; the Hebrews including Ruth the Moabite at the basis of the David's lineage; St. Paul who chose to predicate to immigrants to transform them into the first Christians, etc.

The question of "étrangeté" (straneità – "stranierità") is also present in one of Kristeva's more recent works, *Le temps sensible. Proust et l'expérience littéraire* (1994). Kristeva does not fail to evidence the role carried out by foreign-ness (racial: jewishness: sexuality: homosexuality) in the *Recherche* whenever the occasion presents itself. Extraneity, psychoanalysis, writing:

La psychanalyse m'a conduite à penser que c'est l'exil qui me constituait, et non pas une appartenance. Que la vérité [...] n'est pas dans notre appartenance à une origine – bien qu'elle existe et qu'il faille la reconnaître – mais dans notre capacité de nous exiler, c'est-à-dire de prendre une distance par rapport à l'origine. L'origine est une mère, une langue et une biologie, mais tout en les reconnaissant, nous devenons nous-même lorsque nous nous en libérons (Kristeva 2001: 24).

Writing, that is, literary writing can enhance the understanding of extraneity, with its tie to the heterogeneity of signifying and with alterity. Writings allows us to perceive alterity in the use of language and as such can contribute to welcoming extraneity. The more we recognize extraneity-foreignness to ourselves, the more we can capture the extraneity of others:

La rencontre équilibre l'errance. Croisement de deux altérités, elle accueille l'étranger sans le fixer, ouvrant l'hôte à son visiteur sans l'engager. Reconnaissance réciproque, la rencontre doit son bonheur au provisoire, et les conflits la déchireraient si elle devait se prolonger. L'étranger croyant est un incorrigible curieux, avide de rencontres : il s'en nourrit et les traverse, éternel insatisfait, éternel noceur aussi. Toujours vers d'autres, toujours plus loin (Kristeva 1988: 22).

To the book *Étrangers à nous-mêmes*, originally published in 1988, Kristeva adds a new introduction as results from the new Italian edition of 2014, published with Donzelli in Rome. Returning to the problem of living together with the foreigner, of extraneity and difference, Kristeva here makes considerations that are of great topicality today. Fundamentally she refers to European humanism where at its foundations she finds figures like Erasmus, Diderot and Freud. But it is up to us to continue constructing it – this unending construction. No doubt, this heavy responsibility involves politicians as well, but it mainly falls upon intellectuals, artists and writers.

In the concluding page to this introduction, Kristeva writes the following:

Heir to Christianity (catholic, protestant and orthodox) and to its source which is Judaism, compatible with the massive transplant of Islam, humanistic Europe is called today to engineer bridges *among three monotheisms*, and with the other religions. To achieve this tolerance and fraternity are necessary, but not sufficient. Humanism is not the “Spanish quarters” where to haphazardly stack all credos. In light of philosophy and the human sciences which have originated with secularization, republican laicity invites believers and non believers to consider that, if “nobody is the repository of truth”, it is the duty of each one of us to reconsider our ideas and go beyond fratricide dogma (p. xii).

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SEBEOK AS A SEMIOTICIAN.

THOMAS A. SEBEOK

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THE CONCEPT OF MODEL IN THOMAS A. SEBEOK'S SEMIOTICS

Marcel Danesi
University of Toronto, Canada
marcel.danesi@utoronto.ca

Abstract

Especially in his later writings, Thomas Sebeok was striving to interconnect semiosis in species in emulation of his great intellectual predecessor, Jakob von Uexküll. In order to liberate semiotics as a discipline from the cultural-ideological orientation it had taken in the decades of the 1960s through to the late 1980s, the era that foregrounded post-structuralism in semiotic analysis, Sebeok brought back the concept of model as conceived by Uexküll and developed by the Tartu School. In my view, his goal was to eliminate jargon and abstruse solipsistic notions from poststructuralist semiotics by expanding the paradigm to focus on the nature of semiosis as a model-based and model-generating faculty of the brain and, as consequence, to differentiate anthroposemiosis from zoosemiosis and phytosemiosis. This paper looks at modeling systems theory in the light of new technologies and the evolution of semiosis in the global village.

1. Introduction

The goal of semiotic theory is, essentially, been to figure out how human semiosis unfolds. The theoretical approaches of Ferdinand de Saussure (1916) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1938-1958) stand, to this day, as the main ones for carrying out any type of research on, or debate about, human semiosis. This state of affairs has really never been challenged, nor has the study of semiosis gone significantly beyond the human sphere until the late Thomas A. Sebeok started to formulate a new paradigm for semiotic theory, known as biosemiotics – a movement that continues to reshape the semiotic research agenda. Taking his inspiration from the great biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1909) – whose discovery by mainstream semioticians is due in large part to his efforts – Sebeok forged a point of contact between the scientific study of organisms – biology – and semiotics proper. Von Uexküll argued essentially that every species had different inward

and outward realities, called respectively the *Innenwelt* and the *Umwelt*, hence the differential semiotic systems that emerge across species. The key to understanding the difference is in the anatomical structure of each species. Animals with widely divergent anatomies do not have access to the same kinds of experiences and perceptions. They access them according to their own biologically-unique constitution. The key to understanding semiosis is to look more closely at how the translation of the *Umwelt* into the *Innenwelt* leads to the different forms of knowledge (instinctual or intentional) that each species develops.

Epistemologically, the goal of semiotics is to figure out how the relation of form (*X*) to content or meaning (*Y*) takes place. The result of linking the two – *X* stands for *Y* – produces, of course, *signs*. What constitutes a sign? And in what ways are the signs used by humans comparable to or different from the signs or signals used by animals? Is a text or a code a sign, only larger? Starting in the 1960s (Sebeok 1963, 1968) argued that such questions were intrinsically intertwined. To show this, he elaborated a specific version of *Modeling Systems Theory* (MST), initially associated with the Tartu School (Sebeok 2001; Sebeok and Danesi 2000). The concept of model is, thus, crucial to understanding how semiosis can be studied across species. Semiosis is a concomitant of biological life, and the modeling (sign-making) strategies that it permits vary according to species (Sebeok 1972, 1990, 1991, 1994).

The purpose of this essay is to revisit Sebeok's concept of model, since I believe that it can truly expand the scientific purview of semiotics. In a special 1999 issue of *Semiotica*, titled "Bio-semiotics," the biosemiotic movement took its initial cue (Nöth 2001). A basic distinction has since crystallized in the study of semiosis – instinctual versus intentional. Symptoms and many signals are instinctual responses to the world. Each species has its own set of such forms and many of these cut across species. On the other hand, intentionally-created sign forms, such as words, are not based on pure instinctual reactions. They involve a process of inventive creation that is grounded in small-scale reproductions of the world imprinted in sign forms. In effect, they are models of the world. While non-human species may have their own modeling systems, these do not parallel the modeling (reproductive) power of human semiosis.

2. Models and forms

As used commonly, the term *model* exemplifies, actually, many of the aspects of Sebeok's definition, given that it is used as a synonym for *theory* (Black 1962) or to indicate an analogy (a set of billiards balls in casual movement can be employed as a *model* for gas molecule movement). The term has also been used to define an exemplary paradigm to be followed (Da Vinci's "Vitruvian Man" constitutes a *model* of the perfect proportions of the human body), or one to be discarded (the marketplace *model* of production is harmful to the environment). In each case, however, the term implies some formal structure as a point-of-reference. The term was used by logician Alfred Tarski (1933) as referring to a representation of a mathematical or logical pattern. Even an equation such as the Pythagorean one, $c^2 = a^2 + b^2$, is a model of, initially, the relation of the sides of a right triangle. It also became a model for testing relations among numbers, known as Pythagorean triples.

Models possess what can be called a "4-E representational structure" – economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and ergonomics. A model, such as a blueprint for a building, is a small-scale version of the building to be constructed. In this sense, it is economical, compressing information into its specific form. The form is thus the specific way in which the architectural process is modeled. The principle of economy implies the related subprinciples of efficiency and effectiveness. A model allows us to "compact" information in a formal way and thus constitutes an efficient means of encoding that information in an effective fashion. As such, the more economical and compacted the model, the more effective it is in representing something. The fourth subprinci-

ple in the 4-E paradigm is that of ergonomics – a term coming out of psychology and sociology in relation to the design of workplaces so that they may provide optimum safety and comfort and thus enhance productivity rates. This notion has been extended to the study of biological systems and to the study of language. It was introduced in 1857 by Woiciech Jastrzębowski and then again in 1949 by British psychologist Hywel Murrell. The basic premise of ergonomics is that the design of things tends towards maximum efficiency. Models are ergonomic if they can be applied back on to the world to see what they yield in terms of maximally utilizing the relevant information. In the biological realm, the human body is designed to seek maximum efficiency in locomotion and rate of motion. It is an ergonomic structure. From our biological needs, we are seemingly impelled to design our own products and artifacts ergonomically – from door handles to the design of chairs for maximum comfort. In sum, a model is effective because it demonstrates these 4-E principles of human representation and communication. In other words, it is our cognitive strategy for recording information economically and then using it efficiently, effectively, and ergonomically.

2.1. Types of models and forms

Semiotics emerged as the study of physical *symptoms*, when Hippocrates identified the need to understand bodily “marks” (*semeion*) as a something (*X*) standing for something else (*Y*). The *semeion* is, thus, the body’s natural form indicating some physical aberration, and the objective of medicine is to model this aberration in order to create an efficient and effective diagnostic strategy of how to tackle it. Starting from this historical point, Sebeok then delineated his concept of model as a species-specific ability to produce forms (such as symptoms) to stand for referents (such as bodily processes) that have some relevance to species continuity. The goal of the semiotician is to understand how these *model* the relevant referents. The use of the term *form* rather than *sign* or *symptom* allows the semiotician to integrate various phenomena that would otherwise have to be assigned to separate categories, even though they may share certain signifying phenomena in common. Thus, a word is form modeling reality in a specific way, but so too is a text, which also models reality, but in a different way. In the human species, forms may be purely imaginary, in which case they are equivalent to *mental images*, or they may be externalized – that is, given material form – in which case they are *representations*. The work on sign theory can now be reformulated in terms of four main form types: (1) *signs* (words, gestures, and so on); (2) *texts* (stories, theories, and so on); (3) *codes* (language, music, and so on); and (4) *figural assemblages* (metaphors, metonyms, and so on). While there have been attempts to integrate these seemingly different signifying phenomena into one overall paradigm of semiosis, they have been, at best, scattered ones, before Sebeok. Given the notion of *model* and *form* in Sebeok, these can now be categorized as interrelated, since they are all designed to model something in terms of the *X stands for Y* relation. A *model* can now be defined as the overall relation *X stands for Y* itself and a *form* as the *X* component of that relation, since it is something that has been imagined or made externally (through some physical medium) to stand for *Y*.

Model-making typifies all aspects of human intellectual and social life. Miniature models, blueprints, maps, scientific diagrams, and the like are so common that one hardly ever takes notice of the fact that they are strategies of compressed information. The intriguing question that this reformulation of basic sign theory invariably raises is the following one: What is the function of modeling in life? This question begs, in turn, a whole series of related ones: How is human modeling similar to, or different from, modeling systems in other species? What is the relation between modeling and knowing?

To start answering such questions, Sebeok first provided a generic typology of forms that allow use to distinguish the anthroposemiotic from the zoosemiotic ones (Sebeok 1994):

- *Vocal/Nonvocal forms*: These are the signals and messages can be transmitted vocally or nonvocally. Bird communication, for instance, is vocal; bee-dancing is nonvocal.
- *Verbal/Nonverbal forms*: These are linguistic forms such as words, sentences, and so on that are unique to the human species. All other communication systems in Nature are nonverbal. Language is verbal, but not necessarily vocal (for example, it can be communicated also by means of alphabet characters, gestures, and so on).
- *Witting/Unwitting forms*: Unwitting or unconditioned forms (for example, the signals sent out by pupil responses) are essentially signals; words, many gestures are witting, showing purposeful and intentional behavior. But they can also be used as substitutes for signals.
- *Formation/Dissolution*: Modeling systems are *formed* in the organism by exposure to appropriate input in context and are subject to change or even *dissolution* over time. In all species, other than the human, forms are produced primarily through the biological channel; only human beings have the ability to create forms both through the biological channel and through the cultural one.

As Sebeok argued, it is above all else necessary to distinguish between forms as they occur in Nature or in culture. A symptom is an example of an *externalized natural form*, that is, a form produced by Nature. Words and symbols, on the other hand, are examples of *externalized artificial forms*, that is, forms made intentionally by human beings to represent something. Forms stand for something intentionally, and are thus produced by specific kinds of modeling processes. There four general types of forms (Sebeok and Danesi 2000): *singularized*, *composite*, *cohesive*, and *connective*. These serve many functions in human life. They allow people to model patterns in things; they act as predictive guides or plans for taking actions; they serve as exemplars of specific kinds of phenomena; and the list could go on and on. They will be discussed separately below.

The ability to produce and understand what models are is an innate semiotic faculty. When an infant comes into contact with a new object, his or her immediate reaction is to explore it with the senses, that is, to handle it, taste it, smell it, listen to any sounds it might make, and visually observe its features. This exploratory phase of human understanding constitutes a *sensory modeling* stage. The resulting internal model (mental image) allows the infant to recognize the same object subsequently without having, each time, to explore it over again with his or her sensory system (although the infant often will examine its physical qualities for various other reasons). Now, as the infant grows, he or she starts to engage more and more in modeling behavior that replaces this sensory phase. For instance, he or she starts pointing to the object and/or imitating the sounds it makes, rather than just handling it, tasting it, and so on. These are the child's first attempts at modeling the world in non instinctual-sensory terms (Morris 1938, 1946). Thereafter, the child's repertoire of modeling activities increases dramatically, as he or she learns more and more how to refer to the world through the modeling resources to which he or she is exposed in cultural context.

The types of forms discussed above are the end-results of three different, but interrelated, modeling systems, corresponding *grosso modo* to what Charles Peirce called *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness*. The child's earliest strategy for knowing an object with his or her senses is, in fact, a *firstness* strategy. The modeling system that translates firstness sensory forms into models is the *primary modeling system* (PMS). The PMS can be defined as the instinctive ability to model the sensory or perceptual properties of referents. Needless to say, Peirce referred to this process as iconicity. The child's subsequent attempts to refer to the object through vocal imitation and/or manual indication constitute a secondness knowing strategy. The modeling system that guides these attempts is the *secondary modeling system* (SMS). The SMS can be defined as

the capacity to refer to objects with extended primary forms and with indexical (indicational) forms. Finally, in learning to use a culture-specific name to refer to an object, the child is engaging in a thirdness form of knowing. His or her ability to do so is dependent upon the *tertiary modeling system* (TMS), which can be defined as the capacity to acquire and utilize the symbolic resources of culture-specific abstract systems of representation.

2.2. Structural features

The notions inherent in the foregoing discussion can be summarized in terms of six basic principles of semiosis:

1. Representation is the end-result of producing forms of various types to model referents (the *modeling principle*).
2. Knowledge is indistinguishable from the forms used to encode referents (the *representational principle*).
3. Modeling unfolds on three levels or dimensions, called primary, secondary, and tertiary (the *dimensionality principle*).
4. Complex (abstract) forms are derivatives of simpler (more concrete) ones (the *extensionality principle*).
5. Codels and their referential domains are interconnected to each other (the *interconnectedness principle*).
6. All models and their forms display the same pattern of structural properties (the *structuralist principle*).

The *representational principle* implies simply that in order for something to be known and remembered, it must be assigned some form. The *modeling principle* asserts that modeling is the activity that underlies representation. The *dimensionality principle* maintains that there are three dimensions or systems involved in modeling – primary, secondary, and tertiary. The *extensionality principle* posits that abstract forms are derivatives of more concrete, sense-based forms. The *interconnectedness principle* asserts that a specific form is interconnected to other forms (words to gestures, diagrams to metaphors, and so on). The *structuralist principle* claims that certain elemental structural properties characterize all forms. These are: *paradigmaticity*, *syntagmaticity*, *analogy*, *synchronicity*, *diachronicity*, and *signification*.

Paradigmaticity is a minimal differentiation property. To speakers of English, the two words *pin* and *bin* are recognized as different signs or forms by a perceptible auditory difference in their initial sounds. This differentiation feature is known in linguistics, of course, as *phonemic opposition*. Similarly, in classical Western music, a major chord is perceivable as distinct from a minor one in the same key by virtue of a half tone difference in the middle tone of the chord. As such examples show, paradigmaticity is definable as the property of forms whereby some minimal feature is sufficient to keep them differentiated from all other forms of the same kind. *Syntagmaticity* is a combinatory property of forms. Forms such as *tpin*, *tpill*, *tpit*, and *tpeak*, for instance, would not be legitimate words in English because the initial sequence [tp] + [vowel] is not characteristic of English word-formation, whereas words beginning with [sp] + [vowel] would: *spin*, *spill*, *spit*, *speak*. This combinatory feature of words is called, of course, syllable structure. Similarly, a major chord is recognizable as such only if the three tones are combined in a specific way: [tonic] + [median] + [dominant]. Syntagmaticity is definable as the property whereby the components of a form are combinable in some specifiable way.

Analogy is an equivalence property, by which one type of form can be replaced by another that is perceived as being comparable to it. The English word *cat* is analogous to the Spanish word *gato*; European playing cards can replace American cards if an analogy is made between

European and American suits; Roman numerals can replace Hindu-Arabic numerals through simple conversion; and so on. *Synchronicity* refers to the fact that forms are constructed at a given point in time for some particular purpose or function; and *diachronicity* to the fact that they undergo change over time. The change is not random, but rather, governed by both structural tendencies characterizing the code to which forms belong and external contextual (social, situational, and so on) influences. Finally, *signification* refers to the relation that is established between a form and its meaning. It is, more strictly, the relation that holds between the physical make-up of the form itself, the *signifier*, and the *referent* or *referential domain* to which it calls attention, namely the *signified*, to use Saussurean (1916) terminology.

Of course, these are all well-known notions within semiotics. But Sebeok's reworking of the notions in the context of his concept of modeling gives them a much more scientific rigor, showing how they underlie the structural formation of models. The key concept in semiotics has, in fact, always been that no single form can bear meaning unless it enters into systematic connections with other forms. The method of inquiry implicit in Sebeok's semiotics is thus different from the traditional linguistic-philosophical approach basically in seeing how sign forms and signifying processes constitute interrelated modeling phenomena.

3. Form types

As mentioned, Sebeok and Danesi (2001) identified four main types of forms resulting from specific types of modeling processes and needs. These are called *singularized*, *composite*, *cohesive*, and *connective*. In effect, these are inclusive of the many various and scattered signifying phenomena in the relevant literature, from individual words to metaphorical utterances, allowing for a classification and explication under the same phenomenological and epistemological rubric – modeling.

3.1. Singularized forms

In traditional semiotic theory *singularized forms* are called signs. In Sebeok's framework, a singularized form can be defined, more precisely, as a form that has been made specifically to represent a singular (unitary) referent or referential domain. Singularized forms can be verbal or nonverbal. The English word *cat*, or the equivalent Spanish word *gato*, for example, are verbal singularized forms standing for the referent (carnivorous mammal with a tail, whiskers, and retractile claws); a drawing of a house cat is its nonverbal (visual) equivalent.

Singularized forms include gestures, bodily postures, facial expressions, tones of voice, visual forms (such as drawn figures), words, intonation patterns, and graphic forms (alphabetic, ideographic, and so on). Singularized modeling is a general strategy for giving the perception of single objects, unitary events, individual feelings, and so on a specific form (Sebeok 1994). These are, in effect, "recognition-enhancing forms," which allow for the detection of relevant incoming sensory information in a structure-making fashion. Clearly, they economize on the referential domain by translating it into a discernible model of that domain. Throughout the history of semiotics, there have been several attempts to identify and classify these forms. Among these, Peirce's typology with sixty-six varieties is surely the most comprehensive, far-reaching, and sophisticated of all such attempts. In the verbal domain, one can also mention Roman Jakobson's (1970) classificatory system, which has shed considerable light on the minutiae of verbal modeling. Ignoring the minutiae for the sake of simplicity, six general categories of singularized forms can be extrapolated from the relevant literature. These are: the *symptom*, the *signal*, the *icon*, the *index*, the *symbol*, and the *name*.

A *symptom* is a natural singularized sign, recognizable by virtue of the fact that its form is related to its referent inside the body's morphology. It is a manifestation of some altered physical

(histological, cytological, and so on) process, ranging from a painful sensation (such as headache or backache), to a visible condition (such as a swelling or a rash), or change in body temperature. A group of symptoms that collectively characterize a disease or disorder is called a *syndrome*. A syndrome is, therefore, a composite form (see below). It is a peculiarity of symptoms that their meanings are generally different for the patient (subjective symptoms) than they are typically for the physician (objective symptoms).

The *signal* is a singularized form that naturally or conventionally (artificially) triggers some reaction on the part of a receiver. Carpenter (1969: 44), a prominent researcher of animal behavior, defined a signal as “a condensed stimulus event, a part of a longer whole, which may arouse extended actions.” All animals are endowed with the capacity to use and respond to species-specific signals for survival. Birds, for instance, are born with the instinctive capacity to produce a particular type of coo, and no amount of exposure to the songs of other species, or the absence of their own, has any effect on their cooing forms. A bird reared in isolation, in fact, will sing a very simple outline of the sort of coo that would develop naturally in that bird born in the wild. This does not mean, however, that animal signaling is not subject to environmental or adaptation factors. Many bird species have also developed regional cooing “dialects” by apparently imitating each other. A large portion of communication among humans also unfolds largely in the form of unwitting bodily signaling. Humans are capable as well of deploying witting signals for some psychosocial purpose – for example, nodding, winking, glancing, looking, nudging, kicking, head tilting. As the linguist Karl Bühler (1934: 28) aptly observed, such signals act like social regulators, eliciting or inhibiting some action or reaction. Artificial, mechanical, or electronic signaling systems have also been created for conventional social purposes. The list of such systems is extensive, and includes smoke signals, semaphores, telegraph signals, warning lights, flares, alarms, sirens, beepers, buzzers, knocking, bells, and so on.

An iconic singularized form results when the modeling process employed in its creation involves some form of simulation. It is a primary singularized form that displays a perceptible resemblance between the form and its referent. Roman numerals are iconic singularized forms because they imitate their referents in a visual way (one stroke = one unit, two strokes = two units, three strokes = three units); onomatopoeic words (*boom*, *zap*, *whack*, and so on) are also singularized iconic forms because they constitute attempts to portray their referents in an acoustic way; and the list could go on and on. There are manifestations of iconicity in zoosemiotic behavior as well, involving virtually all types of sensory channels – chemical, auditory, visual, and so on. An elegant (if sometimes disputed) example of a complex form of signaling behavior that evolved, as it were, to function as a visual iconic form is graphically described by Kloft (1959). Kloft suggested that the hind end of an aphid’s abdomen, and the kicking of its hind legs, constituted, for an ant worker, an iconic signifier, standing for the head of another ant together with its antennae movement. The ant can purportedly identify the likeness (the near end of the aphid) with its meaning (the front end of an ant), and act on this information, that is, treat the aphid in the manner of an *effigy*, which is a visual icon.

An *indexical* singularized form results when the focus of the modeling strategy is the location of a referent in space, time, or in relation to some other referent. In one of his most memorable illustrative examples, Peirce referred to the footprint that Robinson Crusoe – the character created by British novelist Daniel Defoe in his 1719 novel of the same name – found in the sand, which was interpreted by Crusoe as an index of some creature. A vast map of such indexical marks is imprinted onto substances by animals of all sorts (Ennion and Tinbergen 1967: 5). Singularized indexical forms do not resemble their referents, like icons do; rather, they indicate or show where they are in relational terms. The most typical manifestation of indexicality is the pointing index finger, which humans the world over use instinctively to point out and locate

things, people, and events in the world. Many words, are substitutes for such concrete indexicality: for example, *here*, *there*, *up*, *down*, and so on.

A singularized form is *symbolic* when the modeling process employed in its creation is constrained by cultural or historical factors. Any formal feature or element – an object, a sound, a figure, and so on – can be used symbolically. For example, a cross figure can stand for the concept “Christianity;” a V-sign made with the index and middle fingers can stand for the concept “peace;” the color *white* can stand for “cleanliness,” “purity,” “innocence,” and the list could go on and on. The ability to model the world symbolically is evidence that human consciousness is not only attentive to sensible properties (resulting in iconic modeling activities), and to spatiotemporal and relational patterns (resulting in indexical modeling activities), but also to all kinds of referents (actual and potential) in and of themselves.

Finally, a *name* is a singularized form that identifies a human being (*Alexander*, *Sarah*, *Charlotte*) or, by connotative extension, an animal, an object (such as a commercial product, a boat), an animal (such as a horse, a pet), or event (such as a hurricane). A name has both indexical and symbolic properties: it is partly an indexical form because it identifies a person and, usually, points to his or her ethnic origin; it is partly a symbolic form because, like any word, it is a product of conventionalized representational practices. It is thus an indexical model of ethnicity and origins, which is imprinted in the phonology and morphology of the form itself.

3.2. Composite forms

Now, a description of the *cat* referent above as *a popular household pet that is useful for killing mice and rats* constitutes, clearly, a different kind of form. This is known traditionally as a *text*. A text can be defined, more specifically, as a *composite form*; that is, as a form that has been made to represent various aspects of a referent or referential domain in a composite (combinatory) manner. A singularized form models something that can be identified as consisting of unitary structure; a composite form, on the other hand, has been made to model something by means of combinations of elements or forms to represent something that has compositional structure. Sentences, drawings, narratives, theories, conversations, and so on are all examples of composite forms. These are constructed in such a way (paradigmatically, syntagmatically, and so on) so that fit together structurally, but which are, as a whole, different from any of their constituent forms taken individually. A novel, for instance, is made up of words following one after the other. But conceptually it is not just the sum of the meanings of the words; rather, a novel constitutes a composite form that generates its own interpretation(s). Drawings, theories, and other composite forms are interpreted in this fashion. For instance, when asked what the theory of relativity is all about, people will typically couch their answer as follows: “It explains how time and space are interrelated.” One can, of course, relate the signifying parts to each other in an interpretive discussion of the text. This is, in fact, what people do when they discuss a novel’s meaning by referring to parts of the novel, to its plot, to its characters, and so on. But in all such discussions, the parts are related to the overall referent extracted from it, rather than seen as separate from it.

There are as many types of composite forms as there are singularized ones. For example, syndromes are, as mentioned, composite forms which collectively indicate or characterize a disease, a psychological disorder, or some other abnormal condition. An example of an iconic composite form is an imitative drawing of a scene or a portrait of someone. An indexical composite form, such as a topographical map, is one that is constructed to refer to spatial or temporal phenomena in an integrative relational way. A symbolic composite form, such as a mathematical formula, is a text that is made with the symbolic resources of mathematics. Finally, a composite name consists of several identifiers (for example, given name + surname) providing various kinds of culture-specific information – that is, where the person is from, what his or her parentage is, and

so on. Composite modeling is not a specific capacity of human semiosis. It is found in other species. One well-known example is the honeybee dance. Worker honeybees returning to the hive from foraging trips inform the other bees in the hive about the direction, distance, and quality of the food with amazing accuracy through movement sequences which biologists call a “dance,” in obvious analogy to human dancing. The remarkable thing about the dance is that it appears to share with human representation the feature of displacement, that is, of conveying information in the absence of the referential domain to which it calls attention.

3.3. Cohesive forms

Classifying a *cat* in the same category as a *tiger*, *lion*, *jaguar*, *leopard*, *cheetah*, and so on exemplifies a third type of modeling strategy – namely, the tendency to codify types of forms in some *cohesive* fashion. A code can be defined as a system that allows for the representation of referents perceived to share common traits. Codes consist of interrelated forms, making up a cohesive whole, which can be deployed to model types of phenomena in specific ways (for example, mammals of a certain type).

A cohesive modeling system provides particular types of forms (singularized and composite) that can be used in various ways and for diverse representational purposes. It can be compared to a computer program or to a common recipe. The former consists of a set of instructions that the computer can recognize and execute converting information from one form into another; the latter of a set of directions for preparing something to eat or drink by combining various ingredients. A language code, for instance, provides a set of phonetic, grammatical, and lexical “instructions” that the producers and interpreters of words and verbal texts can recognize and convert into messages. Generally speaking, for some particular representational need there is an optimum code or set of codes that can be deployed. For example, the composer of an operatic text will need to deploy at least three code-making sources in the construction of his or her text: the musical code, the verbal code, and the theater code (all in place at the time of the composition).

There are as many types of cohesive modeling systems as there are signs or texts. For example, the body’s immune system is a natural code consisting of interacting organs, tissues, cells, and cell products such as antibodies which not only neutralize potentially pathogenic organisms or substances, but also allow one to become aware of the difference between Self and “non-Self” (the external world). It is the code that undergirds the symptomatology of diseases. An example of a simple mechanical (artificial) signaling code is the common traffic light system: a red light, green light, or yellow light inform a driver or pedestrian to stop, move forward, or slow down respectively. The Roman numeral system is an example of an artificial code fashioned in part iconically. An example of an indexical code is the system of street signs used typically to regulate and guide traffic. These signs provide information, among other things, about the distance of certain places from specific locations, about the direction one is traveling in, and so on. An example of a simple symbolic code is the *Morse code*. This allowed people in the not-too-distant past to make verbal texts with dots and dashes (a dash is equal to three dots in duration) which were transmitted by a flash lamp, telegraph key, or other device. A letter or a number was represented (conventionally) by a combination of dashes and dots.

3.4 Connective forms

Finally, the use of the word *cat* in an expression like “Alexander is a cool *cat*” is the result of a modeling strategy known traditionally as *figurative* or *figural*. It constitutes a *connective form* resulting from the linkage of different types of referents (or referential domains) – a human referent with a feline referent. Much has been written recently on connective forms (Lakoff and

Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Gibbs 1994; Goatley 1997; Danesi 2001). Suffice it to say here that they exemplify what Peirce called an abductive force in the making of new information or in the repackaging of already-known information.

In essence, connective forms result when abstract concepts are represented in terms of concrete ones. The conceptual metaphor *thinking is seeing*, for example, is a connective form because it delivers the abstract concept of thinking in terms of forms associated with the concrete concept of *seeing*:

1. He does not *see* what possible use those *ideas* might have.
2. My brother can't quite *visualize* what that new *idea* is all about.
3. Just *look at* the professor's new *theory*; it is really something!
4. I *view* his *theory* differently from you.

These are *primary connective models*, that is, they connect an abstract concept such as *ideas* directly with a concrete referent (*seeing*). This can be called the primary "layer" of connectivity. Once it has been formed in a language's conceptual reservoir, then the primary layer becomes itself a new productive source domain for creating a higher (= more abstract) layer of concepts. This has been called the *layering principle* elsewhere (Danesi 2001). The models resulting from further abstract linkages are indexical, that is, they point to previous layers. Thus, for example, in utterances such as the following the abstract domain of *thinking* is rendered by domains that are themselves conceptual metaphors: namely, upward motion and scanning motion. These are examples of secondary connective models:

5. When did he *think up* that idea?
6. We *thought over* carefully your ideas.
7. She should *think over* the whole problem before attempting to solve it.

The third connective layer (more abstract) produces highly symbolic thinking. For example, a *rose* is used as a symbol for *love* in Western culture because its physical features – *rose* = sweet smell, red color, plant – also constitute metaphorical domains for love: namely, *love is a sweet smell*, *love is a red color*, and *love is a plant*. This is how the symbol rose can stand for love. It is an example, therefore, of a tertiary connective model. A connective form may also be the product of metonymic reasoning (among other figural assemblages). Metonymy entails the use of an entity to refer to another that is related to it. A metonymic connective form results when part of a domain starts being used to represent the whole domain (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 35-40):

10. She likes to read Dostoyevski (= the writings of Dostoyevski).
11. He's in dance (= the dancing profession).
12. My mom frowns on blue jeans (= the wearing of blue jeans).
13. Only new wheels will satisfy him (= car).

Each one of these constitutes an externalization of a metonymically-derived connective form – (10) is an instantiation of the *author is his or her work*, (11) of *an activity of a profession is the profession*, (12) of *a clothing item is a lifestyle*, and (13) of *a part of an object is the entire object*. Note that a connective form can also be realized as a material object (a rose), as a ritual (kissing), and so on. In other words it allows the semiotician to connect conceptual, symbolic, material, verbal, and nonverbal aspects of culture, communication, and representation.

4. Concluding remarks

Sebeok's notion of model is a truly insightful one, since it allows us to link all forms of meaning, from a word to a text and a classificatory code under the same semiotic rubric. A word is a model of something; a text also models something, but in a different way (through composition). Each form thus provides a clue as to the nature of the referent or referential domain that it encodes. This means that there is a distinction among semiosis, modeling, and representation: *semiosis* is the neurobiological capacity to produce forms (signs, texts, and so on), *modeling* is the channeling of the *semiotic* capacity towards a *representation* of some referent (the actual act of creating a form). And representation is the strategy of actually realized a form. Modeling reveals how the brain carries out its work of transforming sensory input into internal forms of thinking and external forms of representation: a specific external model is thus a "cognitive trace" to the form a concept assumes in the mind, and since concepts depend on how they are modeled it has been argued throughout this book that the form that knowledge takes depends on the type of modeling used.

Sebeok's system would thus take systematically the various facets of traditional semiotic analysis and connect them in an integrative fashion. Once the nature of the modeling process has been ascertained, then its forms and functions can be deduced or inferred from observation of the semiotic behavior involved. As Sebeok showed throughout his illustrious career, the relatively simple, nonverbal models that animals produce are natural forms that must fit "reality" sufficiently to secure the survival and sanity of the members of a species in their ecological niche. In human beings, the modeling instinct is so pervasive and powerful that it often becomes very sophisticated indeed in the adult life of some individuals, as borne out by Einstein's testimonial, or by what we know about Mozart's or Picasso's ability to model intricate auditory or visual referents in their heads in anticipation of transcribing them onto paper or canvas. Models make it possible for humans not only to represent immediate reality, but also to frame an indefinite number of possible worlds.

There are many questions that Sebeok's theory raises for semiotics. I would like to conclude by claiming that I believe that it is headed in the right direction and that the questions can be tackled along the way. The attractive aspect of the theory is that it allows us to use a standard terminology for studying semiosis across species, which in turn, allows us to establish a taxonomy of notions, principles, and procedures for understanding the uniqueness of human semiosis. The result will be, in my estimation, a rigorous program for studying human cognition as a capacity that transforms sensory-based and affectively-motivated responses into a world of mental models, and then to reconstruct that world through them whenever we want. As Kalevi Kull (2001: 94) has aptly put it, it is very likely that the Sebeokian notion of model will produce a "better understanding of life itself."

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SIGNS AND LIFE IN A LIFE FOR SIGNS. THOMAS A. SEBEOK'S GLOBAL SEMIOTICS

Susan Petrilli

University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
susan.petrilli@gmail.com

Augusto Ponzio

University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy
augustoponzio@libero.it

Abstract

Thomas A. Sebeok is no doubt a major representative of contemporary semiotics. With Sebeok the boundaries of this discipline have extended beyond historical-natural language, beyond culture. Such amplification is possible largely on the basis of an axiom that is pivotal to the global semiotic perspective: where there is life there are signs, that is, signs are present wherever there is life. Sebeok was the first to point out that semiotics is “global semiotics”, because all life-forms depend upon the action of signs (semiosis). Moreover, as a “semiotic animal” capable of “metasemiosis,” the human being has a capacity for responsibility and is responsible, first of all, for life and its health over the entire planet. From this perspective semiotics is also semioethics.

1. Going back to our 2002 monograph on Sebeok

As we claim in the opening pages of our Italian monograph on Thomas Sebeok, *I segni e la vita. La semiotica globale di Thomas A. Sebeok*, 2002, this particular master of the sign is no doubt a major figure in semiotics today.⁽¹⁾ With Sebeok the boundaries of this discipline have extended beyond historical-natural language, beyond culture. Such amplification is possible largely on the basis of an axiom that is pivotal to the global semiotic perspective: where there is life there are signs, in other words signs are present wherever there is life. Sebeok was the first to point out that semiotics is “global semiotics”, because all life-forms depend upon the action of signs (semiosis).

In this monograph, we present Sebeok's semiotics, his *global semiotics* or *semiotics of life*, and consider its influence on scientific research and the current historical-social situation. This is the main task of the first part which is entitled “Ricognizioni”. Taking off from this platform we then move on in the second part, entitled “Il punto,” to formulate a few conclusions, as pro-

visional as they may be, concerning central problems and concepts in semiotics.(2) Following Sebeok, *I segni e la vita* (Signs and Life) overall not only addresses semiotics as a discipline, but also semiotics understood as the capacity for reflection on signs, proper to human beings, semiotics understood as the capacity for conscious awareness and responsibility. Here reference is to responsibility of the semiotician, once we recognise with Sebeok that to deal with signs is to deal with life.

Today the relation between semiosis and life needs special attention given that it is vital for humans as much as for all other life-forms. But such a focus is not at all easy to reach in the contemporary world. In fact, human communication at a planetary level has developed to the point where it pervades the entire social reproduction process, that is, not only the level of circulation where commodities are exchanged, but also the processes of production and consumption. The consequence is that the signs of this order of communication tend to be the only ones we human beings take an interest in. This leads us to losing sight of the larger picture, the far vaster dimension of communication, that involving all of life over the planet. Human signs only constitute a minimal part of communication thus described and are totally dependent upon it.

Anthropocentrism has generally dominated over the study of signs, especially since the rise of semiology, following Ferdinand de Saussure, with its specific programs and fields of research. But today with current developments in global communication, anthropocentrism is not only a flaw in a discipline, but a danger to all of life over the planet.

Nowadays we witness the hypostatization of human communication as an effect of globalization. This process goes together with privileging the *communicative function* as the absolute function. This not only involves privileging human signs, but also reducing them to the status of a communication means, internal to the current world system.

On his part, instead, Sebeok has insisted on the function of signs, beyond the communicative function, on semiosis as modelling worldview, being a preliminary condition for communication (see also Danesi and Sebeok 2000). This is the case for all living beings. But for what concerns humans from the time of their appearance as hominids – and which enabled their evolution through to the current phase – their species-specific modelling device is such that it constructs not only one world, as in the case of other living species, but numerous worlds, an undetermined number of different worlds (the multiplicity of historical-natural languages is proof of this): this is what Charles S. Peirce tagged “the play of musement”. Sebeok took up this expression as his formula for human modelling and used it as the title of his 1981 book.

More than by the word, the human being is characterized by language, where by “language” is understood “modelling device” of the world, one capable of inventing an infinite number of possible worlds. In Sebeok’s work, the critique of semiotic anthropocentrism is accompanied by the critique of phonocentrism. Speech and the different historical-natural languages are a manifestation of language understood as a modelling device, a *mute* modelling device up to the transition, in human evolution, from *homo habilis* to *homo sapiens*. Nor are historical-natural languages simply a means of communication. They too become (with respect to language, secondary) modelling systems.

It follows from all this that the function of signs is not exhausted in communication. Moreover, human communication is not reduced to communication as it occurs in the current global communication system. On the contrary, rather than limit ourselves to carrying out the role of organic communicators, functional to today’s reproduction system, we are endowed with a capacity to plan economic-social and cultural worlds altogether different from the existing world. This is important to underline considering how manifestly destructive the global communication system is at different levels, not only in quantitative terms, but also qualitative.

On the question of modelling in language and knowledge, we believe it most important to

evidence the relation to “simulation,” that is, “imitation”. Misunderstandings relatively to the concept of “imitation” are largely due to the fact that the word “imitation” is often wrongly interpreted as passive repetition, rather than as innovation and as oriented in a creative sense to varying degrees. More than just evidence the creative valency of “imitation”, we need to explain the sense of “imitation”, with an interpretant that shifts its meaning so as to evidence the active, creative, inventive role of imitation. In the first place this interpretant must free the semantic field of “imitation” from the juxtaposition imitation/innovation or creativity, as well as from interpretation of imitation as being subject to a model, instead of as modelling activity. To this end the interpretant we propose for “imitation” is “simulation”. Imitation is simulation. And simulation is a modelling process.

The expression “signifying simulation” (Bettetini 1991) refers to the simulation processes inherent in verbal language and all other sign systems. Simulation is the specific object of knowledge theory and of studies on cognitive processes generally, or of epistemology when a question of studying scientific languages and therefore theory of scientific knowledge.

Signifying simulation lies outside the boundaries of semiotics and belongs to the bordering territory of theory of knowledge and epistemology. However, it is of interest to semiotics when, as metasemiotics or philosophy of language, it addresses the processes of their formation and conditions of possibility, thereby abandoning a purely descriptive approach to the study of signs. In this case, the theory of verbal language and of the sign generally is connected with theory of knowledge and of cognitive processes generally. On their part, theory of knowledge and epistemology which study signifying simulation and therefore languages and signs as well, frequently invade semiotics, even without knowing, and therefore must necessarily confront themselves with semiotics.

Primary signifying simulation in the human being is what we have identified as *language*. This statement is completely free from phonocentric implications. In fact, language is distinguished from speech whose specific function is communication. As anticipated above, language as we are describing it is a modelling device. According to Sebeok, its specific characteristic is what the linguists, logicians and semioticians call “syntax”. Thanks to syntax modelling uses construction pieces that can be assembled in an infinite number of difference ways and create an indeterminate number of models that can be deconstructed to reconstruct different models with the same pieces. This enables us not only to produce worlds like other animals, but also an infinite number of “possible worlds”.

All this allows for that complex “play of musement” traceable not only in the “good” simulation of fiction and the different forms of artistic creation, as in the imaginary of myths, relations, popular beliefs, social utopias, e in the “bad” simulation of lying, deception, ideology as bad conscience (cf. Bonfantini and Ponzio 1997, 2006), but also in all forms of investigation, from the most immediate and unconscious present in ordinary perception to investigation oriented scientifically.

As a modelling device language has an iconic relation with the universe it models. On this aspect may we recall studies by Peirce, Wittgenstein, Jakobson, Sebeok.

Human language (or simply “language”) includes both verbal and nonverbal language. Verbal language is both oral, or vocal language, that is, speech, and written language. Written language is usually considered as secondary with respect to oral language as a result of a “phonocentric” orientation (cf. Derrida’s critique). According to such a perspective written language is no more than an external cover, transcription. Instead, on the basis of considerations by Sebeok on the origin of language, oral language itself, speech is secondary: secondary with respect to language understood as primary modelling, specific to the human being, while on the level of phylogenesis speech comes later. Verbal language, whether oral or written, and therefore histor-

ical-natural languages, and their transcription systems, where they exist, presuppose language understood as modelling. Just as nonverbal languages presuppose language.

Speech, like language, made its appearance as an adaptation, but *for the sake of communication* and much later than language, exactly with *Homo sapiens*. Speech organizes and externalizes language. Consequently, language too ended up becoming a communication device, enhancing the nonverbal capacity already possessed by human beings; and speech developed from language as what some evolutionary biologists call a derivative *exaptation* (cf. Gould and Vrba 1982: 4–15).

Important to underline is that thanks to language not only do human animals produce worlds similarly to other species, but, as Leibniz stated, they can also produce an infinite number of possible worlds. This brings us back to the “play of musement,” a human capacity that Sebeok following Peirce (1931–1966) considers particularly important for scientific research and all forms of investigation, and not only for fiction and all forms of artistic creation.

2. Reasoning with Sebeok: on the relation between sign and interpretant

For Sebeok the “cardinal notion” of semiotics is the sign (see Sebeok 1994b: 1, trad. It. 51). We have made a few observations on this account, which we will now recall. Sebeok posits that all components in the definition of sign (i.e., in addition to Sign the Object and Interpretant) are *signs* in turn, “as its species”. This ends by leaving such notions unexplained.

According to Sebeok (1994b: 10–14), both the Object (O) and the Interpretant (I) are Signs. Consequently, we may rewrite O as SO_n and I as SI_n so that both the first distinction and the second are resolved in two sorts of signs (*Ibid.*: 12–13).

In our opinion and in accordance with Peirce who reformulated the classic notion of *substitution* in the medieval expression *aliquid stat pro aliquo* in terms of *interpretation*, *the sign is firstly an interpretant*. The Peircean terms of the sign include what we propose to call the *interpreted* sign on the side of the object, and the *interpretant* sign in a relationship where the interpretant makes the interpreted possible. The interpreted becomes a sign component because it receives an interpretation, but the interpretant in turn is also a sign component endowed with potential for engendering a new sign. Therefore, where there is a sign, there are immediately two, and given that the interpretant engenders a new sign, there are immediately three, and so *forth ad infinitum* as conceived by Peirce with his notion of *infinite semiosis* or chain of deferrals from one interpretant to another.

To analyze the sign beginning from the object of interpretation, that is, the interpreted, means to begin from a secondary level. In other words, to begin from the object-interpreted means to begin from a point in the chain of deferrals, or semiotic chain, which cannot be considered as the point of departure. Nor can the interpreted be privileged by way of abstraction at a theoretical level to explain the workings of sign processes. For example, a spot on the skin is a sign insofar as it may be interpreted as a symptom of sickness of the liver: this is already a secondary level in the interpretive process. At a primary level, retrospectively, the skin disorder is an interpretation enacted by the organism itself in relation to an anomaly which is disturbing it and to which it responds. The skin disorder is already in itself an interpretant response. To say that the sign is firstly an interpretant means to say that the sign is firstly a response (cf. Petrilli 1998: 1.1. and 2014: 1.1.). We could also say that the sign is a reaction: but only on the condition that by “reaction” we mean “interpretation” (similarly to Morris’s behaviourism, but differently from the mechanistic approach). The expression “solicitation-response” is preferable to “stimulus-reaction” in order to avoid superficial associations with the approaches they respectively recall. Even a “direct” response to a stimulus, or better solicitation, is never direct but “mediated” by an interpretation. Unless it is a “reflex action,” the formulation of a response means to identify the

solicitation, situate it in a context, and relate it to given behavioural parameters (whether a question of simple types of behaviour, e.g., the prey-predator model, or more complex behaviours connected with cultural values, as in the human world).

The sign is firstly an interpretant, a response through which something else is considered as a sign and becomes its interpreted, on the one hand, and which is potentially able to engender an infinite chain of signs, on the other. Consequently, the “ambiguity” of the concept of semiosis discussed in the entry “Semiosis” in *Encyclopedia of Semiotics*, edited by Paul Bouissac (1998), does not concern the term but the phenomenon itself of semiosis. In fact, semiosis is at once a process and relation, activity and passivity, action *of* sign or action *on* sign, including sign solicitations and responses, interpreteds and interpretants.

In Peirce’s view, semiosis is a triadic process and relation whose components include sign (or representamen), object, and interpretant. “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object” (CP 2.274). Therefore, the sign stands for something, its object, “not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea” (CP 2.228). However, a sign can only do this if it determines the interpretant which is “mediately determined by that object” (CP 8.343): as stated, semiosis is action of sign and action on sign, activity and passivity. “A sign mediates between the *interpretant* sign and its object” insofar as it refers to its object under a certain respect or idea, the ground, and determines the interpretant “in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” (CP 8.332).

3. Proceeding together with Sebeok

Global semiotics is an important instrument for the study of signs today, given that the world we inhabit is the world of global communication (Sebeok 1994a, 2001). Global semiotics identifies the study of signs with the study of all life forms over the planet and is the historical development of the human capacity for semiotics, that is, metasemiosis, therefore conscious awareness and critique. In addition to indicating the general science of signs, “semiotics” is the term used by Sebeok to indicate *the specificity of human semiosis*. This concept is proposed in a paper of 1989, “Semiosis and semiotics: what lies in their future?” (see Sebeok 1991: Ch. 9), and is vitally important for a *transcendental founding of semiotics* given that it explains how semiotics as a science and metascience is possible. Sebeok writes:

Semiotics is an exclusively human style of inquiry, consisting of the contemplation – whether informally or in formalized fashion – of semiosis. This search will, it is safe to predict, continue at least as long as our genus survives, much as it has existed, for about three million years, in the successive expressions of Homo, variously labeled – reflecting, among other attributes, a growth in brain capacity with concomitant cognitive abilities – *habilis*, *erectus*, *sapiens*, *neanderthalensis*, and now *s. sapiens*. Semiotics, in other words, simply points to the universal propensity of the human mind for reverie focused specularly inward upon its own long-term cognitive strategy and daily maneuverings. Locke designated this quest as a search for “humane understanding”; Peirce, as “the play of musement” (*Ibidem*: 97).

Sebeok has shown how in the whole semiobiosphere, the human being is the only animal capable of semiotics in the sense that it not only uses signs, but also reflects on signs. Therefore

the human being is a rational animal, that is, a “semiotic animal” (Deely, Petrilli, Ponzio 2005). To claim that the human animal is a “semiotic animal” means to claim that humans are endowed with a capacity for metasemiosis, for reflecting on signs and taking responsibility. By “responsibility” is understood responsibility for the whole of life, that is, for the whole of semiosis, for all living beings on Earth. It ensues that responsibility concerns semiotics as a general science of signs and the semiotician as a semiotician (cf. Deely 1998). Awareness of responsibility in such terms is particularly important today given that, as anticipated, semiosis on the planet, that is, life, is in serious danger in the face of the destructive character of the human world of global communication.

The first part of another book we have co-authored together, *Semiotics Unbounded* (2005), is entitled “Semiotics and Semioticians”. A good part is dedicated to Sebeok’s global semiotics.

As claimed by Lévi-Strauss:

A lire les ouvrages de Sebeok, on est confondu par sa familiarité avec les langues et les cultures du monde, par l’aisance avec laquelle il se meut à travers les travaux des psychologues, des spécialistes de neuro-physiologie cérébrale, de biologie cellulaire, ou ceux des éthologues portant sur des centaines d’espèces zoologiques allant des organismes unicellulaires aux mammifères supérieurs, en passant par les insectes, les poissons et les oiseaux. Ce savoir plus qu’encyclopédique se mesure aussi aux milliers de noms d’auteurs, de langues, de peuples et d’espèces composant les index des ouvrages écrits ou dirigés par lui, et à leurs énormes bibliographies. (Lévi-Strauss 1986: 3)

For Sebeok semiotics is more than just a science that studies signs in the sphere of socio-cultural life, “la science qui étudie la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale” (Saussure 1916: 26). Before contemplating the signs of unintentional communication (semiology of signification), semiotics was limited by an exclusive focus on the signs of intentional communication (semiology of communication). This was the main trend in semiology following Saussure. However, after Sebeok semiotics is not only *anthroposemiotics*, but also *zoosemiotics*, *phytosemiotics*, *mycosemiotics*, *microsemiotics*, *machine semiotics*, *environmental semiotics* and *endosemiotics* (the study of cybernetic systems inside the organic body, on the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels). All this is developed under the umbrella term *biosemiotics* or just plain *semiotics*. According to the global semiotic perspective, signs and life converge as do semiosis and behaviour among all living beings.

In Sebeok’s view, biological foundations, therefore biosemiotics, are at the epicenter of studies on communication and signification in the human animal. From this viewpoint, the research of the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, teacher of Konrad Lorenz and one of the cryptosemioticians most studied by Sebeok, belongs to the history of semiotics. Sebeok’s semiotics unites what other fields of knowledge and human praxis generally keep separate either for justified needs of a specialized order, or because of a useless, indeed harmful tendency toward short-sighted sectorialization. This attitude is not free of ideological implications, often poorly masked by motivations of a scientific order. Biology and the social sciences, ethology and linguistics, psychology and the health sciences, their internal specializations – from genetics to medical semiotics (symptomatology), psychoanalysis, gerontology and immunology – all find in semiotics, as conceived by Sebeok, the place of encounter and reciprocal exchange, as well as systematization and unification. However, systematization and unification are not understood here neopositivistically in the static terms of “encyclopedia”, that is, in terms of the juxtaposition of knowledge and linguistic practices or reduction of knowledge to a single scientific field and its relative language,

for example, neopositivistic physicalism.

Sebeok develops a view that is global thanks to his continuous and creative shifts in perspective, which favour new interdisciplinary interconnections and new interpretive practices. Sign relations are identified where for some there only seemed to exist mere “facts” and relations among things, independent from communication and interpretive processes. Moreover, this continuous shift in perspective favours the discovery of new cognitive fields and languages which interact dialogically (cf. Bakhtin 2008). They are the dialogic interpreted-interpretant signs of fields and languages that already exist (cf. Ponzio 1990, 1993, 2004a, b, c). In his explorations of the boundaries and margins of the various sciences, Sebeok dubs this open nature of semiotics “doctrine of signs”.

Developing and specifying Peirce’s idea that the entire universe is perfused by signs, Charles Morris recognized that semiotics could be extended to the organic in its wholeness: for there to be a sign there must be interpretive activity by the living organism (cf. Petrilli 1999). Following Morris (1971), Sebeok develops this thesis and claims that the entire life sphere is made of signs. This means that even a microorganism, for example a cell, flourishes insofar as it interprets signs. Sebeok extends the boundaries of semiotics to a maximum with his “semiotics of life” or “global semiotics”. Anthroposemiosis is only a small part of this. And within the sphere of anthroposemiosis an even smaller part is represented by verbal language. Even human beings, like all other members belonging to the sphere of zoosemiosis, communicate above all through non-verbal signs (see Sebeok 1998, 2001). Furthermore, the basis of all voluntary communication is formed of endosemiosis processes like those relative to the immunitary and neural systems.

Thanks to Sebeok the science that studies the *semiotic animal*, i.e. the human being – the only animal not only capable of using signs (i.e. of semiosis), but also of reflecting on signs through signs, anthroposemiotics, has today freed itself from *two traditional limitations: anthropocentrism and glottocentrism*.

With regard to the first, anthroposemiotics no longer coincides with general semiotics but rather is a part of it. Semiotics is far broader than a science that studies signs solely in the sphere of socio-cultural life. Semiotics also studies the signs of unintentional communication (semiology of signification); but before this it was limited by exclusive preference for the signs of intentional communication, Saussure’s *sémiologie* (semiology of communication). By contrast, semiotics following Sebeok and his “global semiotics” studies communication not only in culture, but also in the universe of life generally. With regard to the second aspect, getting free from glottocentrism, the critique of glottocentrism in anthroposemiotics must be extended to all those trends in semiotics which refer to linguistics for their sign model. Anthroposemiotics insists on the autonomy of non-verbal sign systems from the verbal and also studies human sign systems that depend on the verbal only in part, despite the prejudicial claim that verbal language predominates in the sphere of anthroposemiosis. To get free from the anthropocentric and glottocentric perspective as it has characterized semiotics generally implies to take other sign systems into account beyond those specific to mankind.

In his article “The evolution of semiosis” (in Posner, Robering, and Sebeok 1997-2004, vol. I), Sebeok explains the correspondences connecting the branches of semiotics with the different types of semiosis, from the world of micro-organisms to the superkingdoms and the human world. Specifically human semiosis, anthroposemiosis, is represented as semiotics thanks to a species-specific “modelling device” called “language”. This observation is based on the fact that it is virtually certain that *Homo habilis* was originally endowed with language, but not speech. Sebeok’s distinction between *language* and *speech* corresponds, even if roughly, to the distinction between *Kognition* and *Sprache* drawn by Müller in his 1987 book, *Evolution, Kognition und Sprache* (see Sebeok in Posner, Robering, and Sebeok 1997-2004, I: 443).

That the human being is a semiotic animal also means, as anticipated, that it is the only animal existing that is capable of awareness, of responsibility: the human being is responsible for semiosis over the entire planet, that is, for life, which unless proven otherwise only exists on the terrestrial globe. Again we have dealt with this issue in a series of earlier writings, in particular in another co-authored book of 2003 titled *Semioetica* (see also Ponzio and Petrilli 2014).

In *Semiotics Unbounded*, we refer to Mikhail M. Bakhtin, another important figure from the twentieth century, who is not generally taken into consideration in semiotic or philosophical circles, and unjustly relegated to the sphere of literary criticism. But in all his writings he repeats, "I'm a philosopher", that his reflections belong to the sphere of philosophy of language. He also qualifies his thoughts in terms of semiotics and metalinguistics. An important focus in his writings is his critique of the reduction of communicative processes to relations between the sender and receiver and between *langue* and *parole*, as improperly established by Saussure.

A particularly interesting aspect of Bakhtin's work is his insistence, from his early studies, on the problem of responsibility – he characterizes this interest as "moral philosophy". Bakhtin established a very close relation between sign and otherness: signs flourish in the relation with others, and require a responsible standpoint towards them, without alibis and without evasion. There is a close connection between Sebeok and Bakhtin. It is not incidental that Bakhtin too has always viewed the biological sciences with great interest (Bakhtin 1926). In his book on Rabelais he evidenced the inseparability and intercorporeal compromise of all living individuals, including human beings, in organic and nonorganic processes throughout the entire universe.

4. Confronting Sebeok with Ferruccio Rossi-Landi

Among the various authors we have studied in addition to Sebeok, in the field of semiotics, another author who has had an important influence on our works is the Italian philosopher of language and semiotician Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1921–1985). Between these two masters of the sign and guides in our research we have detected some fundamental points of convergence, in spite of the differences that no doubt are present.

As from the early 1960s Rossi-Landi proposed and developed his hypothesis of language as work from his early writings of the 1960s onwards. According to this approach the two definitions of man as *laborans* and as *loquens* coincide. Natural divisions that oblige one to assign verbal work and nonverbal work, the production of messages and the production of merchandise to separate regions do not in fact exist. In both cases we are dealing with semiosis, with the *linguistic work of modelling*. On the basis of such a claim it is possible to establish a connection between Rossi-Landi's concept of work, on the one hand, and the concepts of primary, secondary and tertiary modeling as elaborated by Sebeok, on the other.

Similarly to Sebeok, Rossi-Landi criticized those theories that reduce the problem of the origin of language to the problem of communication. As writes Rossi-Landi in *Metodica filosofica e scienza dei segni*: "We must evidence the nonreducibility of language to mere communication, otherwise it would not be possible to place the capacity of language in a coherent framework concerning the phylogenesis of nerve structures and relative psychic functions" (Rossi-Landi 1985: 234).

In Rossi-Landi's view, language understood as work is at the origin of the different historico-natural languages; these in fact are viewed as the product of language as work. Linguistic work reactivates languages and endows them with new value through the *parole*. The latter is individual only because each single elaboration is individual. However, the model of production is social (see Rossi-Landi 1968, 1973, 1975, 1992).

In our view, all this puts us into a position to relate Rossi-Landi's concept of "language as work" to Sebeok's concept of "language as primary modeling".

Commodified and alienated work is a characteristic of today's social system. Work in the expression "linguistic work" evokes something that is juxtaposed to play, and therefore may lead one to believe that linguistic work contrasts with the "play of musement", as described by Peirce. But let us remember that Sebeok too evoked the play of musement to the end of characterizing the human being as a semiotic animal, therefore to evidence specifically human primary modeling or what he calls "language".

The truth is that the concepts of "linguistic work" and "play of musement" (expression that corresponds to the title of a book by Sebeok) do not contradict each other. As Rossi-Landi explained, work and play are not juxtaposed, indeed play requires preliminary work as well as work for its performance, work no doubt that is particularly agreeable .

Another point where Rossi-Landi's position and Sebeok's come together concerns the critical stand taken by both against hypotheses that attempt to explain the origin of language on the basis of the need to communicate.

For both Rossi-Landi and Sebeok language is what makes the constitution, organization and articulation of properly human work possible. Speech and historico-natural languages presuppose language understood as the capacity for syntactic construction and deconstruction proper to human modeling which, as a result of syntax, is capable of producing an indefinite number of possible worlds.

From this point of view both Sebeok's work and Rossi-Landi's work may be associated to an approach in semiotics envisaged by myself with Susan Petrilli and which we have proposed to call "semioethics".

5. Going beyond in the sign of Sebeok: semioethics

Semiotics, understood not only as a science but as an orientation perspected by semioethics, arises and develops in the field of anthroposemiosis. Therefore, it is connected with the *Umwelt* and species-specific modelling device (or language) proper to human beings. And as we have just observed, this species-specific primary modelling device endows human beings (differently from other animals) with the special capacity to produce a great plurality of different worlds, whether real or imaginary. The implication is that human beings are not condemned to remain imprisoned in the world as it is, to forms of vulgar realism. Semiotics is a fact of the human species. But the possibility of its effective realization is a fact of the historical-social order. Our *Umwelt* is a historical-social product in addition to a biosemiosical endowment, so that any possibility of transformation or alternative hypotheses finds its effective grounding and starting point, its terms of confrontation, the materials necessary for critique and programming in historical-social reality as it gradually evolves and is distinguished from merely biological material.

A global and detotalizing approach to semiotics demands openness to the other, the extreme capacity for listening to the other (see Petrilli 2013; Ponzio 2009). Therefore, it presupposes the capacity for dialogic interconnection with the other. Accordingly, we propose an approach to semiotics that privileges the tendency towards detotalization rather than totalization. Otherness opens the totality to infinity or to "infinite semiosis," leading beyond the cognitive order or the symbolic order to enter the ethical order, which implies infinite involvement with the other, therefore responsibility towards the other.

Note 1. The Italian monograph on Sebeok, published in 2002 with Spirali in Milan, was followed by another monograph on Sebeok's global semiotics co-authored by ourselves with Marcel Danesi, *Semiotica globale. Il corpo nel segno*, 2004 (Graphis). In English, *Thomas Sebeok and the Signs of Life* by Petrilli and Ponzio was published in 2001 in the series Postmodern Encounters (Icon books), promoted by Paul Copley. In personal conversations in Bari with myself and

Augusto Ponzio in the early 1990s, Sebeok had happily foreseen that this “extraordinary young man” would contribute to semiotics and its dissemination internationally. In fact, Cobley is now the newly elected President (at the VII World Semiotic Conference, Sofia, 2014) of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, but before this most importantly director (with Kalevi Kull) of the flourishing book series “Semiotics, Communication and Cognition,” published with De Gruyter Mouton, in addition to acting as editor of numerous collective publications and promoting the work of others in semiotics. So on this account too, as a talent scout Sebeok saw well. And today in fact Cobley’s commitment to semiotics after Sebeok has now been officially recognized by the Semiotic Society of America with the nomination of 9th Sebeok fellow (2014).

Our monographs and numerous essays on Sebeok and his work on the sign is also the result of our own lifetime work dedicated to translating his books into Italian: In fact, *I segni e la vita* (2002), which appeared with Spirali, was preceded, in 1998, by publication in Italian translation by Susan Petrilli of Sebeok’s 1991 monograph, *A Sign is Just a Sign* with the same publishers. In 1984, Spirali had already published the Italian translation (by Massimo Pesaresi) of Sebeok’s book of 1981, *The Play of Musement*. Other books by Sebeok published in Italian translation by S. Petrilli, in consultation with A. Ponzio, include Sebeok’s 1979 monograph *The Sign & Its Masters*, in 1985 (Adriatica, Bari), his 1986 book, *I Think I am a Verb*, in 1990 (Sellerio, Palermo), and his 1991 book, *Semiotics in the United States*, in 1992 (Bompiani, Milano). In 1998 we also published an original collection of essays by Sebeok under the title *Come comunicano gli animali che non parlano* (Edizioni dal Sud, Modugno, Bari), which does not have a counterpart in English. By Sebeok and with Sebeok is another volume we co-authored with him, *Semiotica dell’io*, published in 2001, Italian translation by S. Petrilli (Meltemi).

Note 2. The fifteen chapters forming *I segni e la vita* are divided into two blocks: Part I, *Ricognizioni*, contains the following eight titles: 1. For a global approach to semiosis; 2. The interdisciplinary perspective of American semiotics; 3. Towards the signs of Gaia and beyond; 4. Signs on the masters of signs: a transition book; 5. Languages and non languages; 6. How other animals communicate; 7. Planetary semiotics and world communication; 8. Semiotics of learning and education; Part II, *Il Punto*, contains the following seven: 1. The sign; 2. Semiosis and semiotics; 3. Icon, index and symbol; 4. The origin of language and writing; 5. Linguistic creativity; 6. Bioethics, semiotics of life and global communication; 7. Semioethics and global semiotics.

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